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To January 16, 1946United States.......................................................................................... 304
Post-war Fleet Organization—Joint Chiefs Recommend Naval Rases—Special Ships Explode Pressure Mines-—Coast Guard Reverts to Treasury-—-High Frequency Direction Finders—Atomic Bomb Tests—Sidelights on Second Battle of Philippines
Target Practices on German U-Boats—1The Foxer and Sono-Buoy— Merchant Aircraft Carriers—British Radar Countermeasures—End of the Exeter—Naval Prize Money—Various Notes
France..................................................................................................... 319
French Defense Service—French Fleet Now 300,000 Tons
Nuremberg Testimony—Guided Missiles
Japanese Admit 1942 Decisive Year—Sinking of the Taisho
Group Attacks by Torpedo Planes
Other Countries...................................................................................... 330
Argentina—China-—Netherlands—Poland—Venezuela
New Jet Plane for Carriers—The F8F Bearcat—Fast New Patrol Plane—Jet Engines
Emergency Shipbuilding Program Ended—Building Program for 1946—Private Operation Planned Soon—274 Merchant Ships Now in Reserve—Plimsoll Marks Return—Pay of Seamen
Miscellaneous......................................................................................... 338
Who’s Who in the Atomic Race
UNITED STATES Post-war Fleet Organization
Washington Post, January 14.—The Navy revealed yesterday that it will operate seven active post-war fleets. At the same time it put on a full-dress review of the organization of the top-level command which will direct the Navy’s post-war policies. The 1079 combatant ships—319 in active service, 73 in ready reserve, and 687 in laid-up status will be divided among three fleets in the Atlantic, three in the Pacific, and one in Mediterranean and European waters.
Main headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, will be maintained at Pearl Harbor. The post is now held by Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, who will soon be succeeded by Admiral John H. Towers. The Seventh Fleet, under command of Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., will operate in the Western Pacific. The Fifth Fleet, under Vice Admiral Frederick C. Sherman, will base on home ports and operate in the Central and Eastern Pacific. Both these fleets will include heavy ships, and specifically, aircraft carriers. The Third Fleet will be the Pacific Reserve, charged with Reserve training on the Pacific Coast. ,
The Atlantic Fleet, with Admiral Jonas H. Ingram as Commander in Chief, will include the Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth Fleets. The Eighth, under Admiral Marc A. Mitscher, will comprise a strong force of aircraft carriers and supporting ships based on home ports, and will normally operate in the North Atlantic and Caribbean. The Tenth, under Vice Admiral Bernhard H. Bieri, consisting of cruisers and destroyers and such other ships as may be assigned, will operate in the Caribbean and South Atlantic. The Fourth Fleet, whose commanding officer has not yet been named, will conduct reserve training in the Atlantic. The Twelfth Fleet under Admiral Henry K. Hewitt will operate in European and Mediterranean waters.
“It is planned,” the Navy said, “to rotate ships between the fleets within eacli ocean. In the interests of training of personnel, visits will be made to foreign ports consistent with other requirements and the desires of the countries concerned.” Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Chief of Naval Operations, outlined the service’s administrative policies under the recent departmental reorganization at a news conference which brought together for the first time the nine top ranting officers chosen by Nimitz to assist him m his assignment.
The group included the Vice Chief of Nava Operations, Vice Admiral D. C. Ramsey; the six deputy chiefs, Vice Admiral Louis E- Denfeld, personnel; Vice Admiral R. E- Conolly administration; Vice Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, operations; Vice Admiral W. S. Farber, logistics; Vice Admiral A. W- Radford, air, and Vice Admiral W. H. P- Blandy, special weapons; the inspector general, Admiral C. P. Snyder and Rear Admiral E. W. Burrough, heading the general planning group operating directly under the vice CNO. “The Navy’s post-war policy,” a Navy statement said, “is reflected in the selection of the deputies to the Chiej of Naval Operations. All types of naval weapons are represented with particular emphasis on aviation, submarines, amphibious operations, and research.
“The Navy intends to take full advantage of the experience gained in the combatant operations of World War II and to project that experience into planning, experimentation and peacetime training operations.”
Joint Chiefs Recommend Naval Bases
New York Herald Tribune, January 6, by James E. Warner.—Congressional and diplomatic action on retention of an American post-war chain of strategic naval and air bases girdling half the globe may follow the report of a House Naval Affairs subcommittee which left today for a three-week air tour of all naval establishments in the Pacific. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have presented to the State, War, and Navy Departments recommendations for such a chain of bases, but the State Department has refused comment on the status of negotiations to retain them under American control. Recommendations of the Joint Chiefs were made after they considered all foreseeable threats to the security of the United States and the peace of the world in years to come, including the possibility of new atomic weapons which may he developed by other nations.
It is known that the Joint Chiefs, in frain- ing their recommendations, were strongly in favor of permanent American retention of the “steppingstone” bases to the Philippines and the Asiatic mainland which United States forces wrested from the Japanese at a cost of many lives. Details of the plan were not revealed today, but it is believed they follow the broad outlines of the post-war naval- base plan approved by the House Naval Affairs Committee in October, plus some sort of American post-war emergency control over certain of the world-wide chain of bases which the Army Air Forces and the Air Transport Command built before and during the war. Unlike the Navy, the Army has not presented any formal post-war overseas base plan to Congress or otherwise put such a plan in the public record.
Representative L. Mendell Rivers, Democrat, of Soutli Carolina, is chairman of the subcommittee, which includes Representative John E. Fogarty, Democrat, of Rhode Island, and Representative George J. Bates, Republican, of Massachusetts. The chairman said the group not only will survey the progress of demobilization and the handling of ' surplus property in Pacific areas, but will reclieck the findings another subcommittee made last fall in the matter of necessary post-war bases. Negotiations would be required with Britain, Portugal, France, and various other countries, including Latin- American nations, either unilaterally or through the United Nations Organization. Various nations claim sovereignty to bases used by American naval and air forces during the war and to those which presumably are included in the post-war set-up.
In preparing their recommendations the Joint Chiefs—who are the chief of staff of the Army, the commanding general of the Army Air Forces, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the President’s personal chief of staff—are known to have taken into consideration the world naval situation in which, for the first time in history, the United States has the most powerful ileet in the world and expects to retain it. In addition, there is now only one other “fleet in being” capable of challenging even a segment of the American Navy. The British Royal Navy for many years has never been regarded as a threat to American security,
and another nation would need years to build a fleet which could pose any such threat.
But the destruction of the German, Japanese, and Italian Navies, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs, was counterbalanced by the new threat—that some nation in years to come might not only develop an atomic bomb, but possibly devise other, new atomic weapons. The post-war naval and air base recommendations of the Joint Chiefs were framed to counter any such atomic-weapon threat to American security and world peace —so far as is militarily predictable at this time.
Through the famous “destroyer deal,” in which the late President Roosevelt traded fifty over-age destroyers to Britain for ninety- nine-year leases on various base sites in British islands, the United States is already well supplied with various fleet and air bases through the Atlantic area, in addition to its own bases along the eastern coast, in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and in the Panama Canal Zone. James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, inspected some of these, including those on British territory, during the last two weeks and announced that the United States will continue to make all necessary use of the bases during peace time.
In the Pacific, where pre-war ownership of islands was vested sometimes under World War I mandates, in various countries, the situation is not so clear. But Admiral F. J. Horne, vice-chief of Naval Operations, testifying before the House Naval Affairs Committee September 19, minced no words about them. .
“We have directions, orders, not to abandon any of these bases,” said Admiral Horne, “not to give them up, to keep them in caretaker status until their ultimate disposition has been decided.”
Mr. Forrestal and Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, in their testimony, said they proposed the United States retain all necessary operating rights in the Pacific island bases, although they would not object to such rights being called a “trusteeship.” “Obviously,” said Admiral King, “sovereignty is to be preferred; but as far as the Navy is concerned, whatever diplomatic arrangements will promote co-operation among the nations of the
world and will insure our having control of the essential bases in the name of the United States, so that we will have exclusive control, will suffice for us. T hey can call it a trusteeship or anything they like.”
The Navy’s plan for post-war bases, as listed in House Report No. 1107, issued October 9, calls for regular operation of twelve fleet bases, including aviation facilities, in the Pacific area, at Kodiak, Adak, Hawaii, Balboa, the Guam-Saipan area, in the Bonins-Volcano group of islands, the Ryukyus, Manus, Tutu-Tawitawi, Subic, in the Leyte-Samar area, and at Palawan. In reduced operation would be ten more bases— in the Galapagos Islands, Attu, Johnston Island, Midway, Wake, Samoa, Eniwetok, Kwaialein, Truk, and Palau. Retained in caretaker-emergency status would be Dutch
Harbor, Canton Island, Palmyra, Majuro, and Ulithi.
Fleet bases to be maintained in regular operation in the Atlantic under the Navy plan would be Argentia, Coco Solo, Guantanamo, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Trinidad. In a maintenance status would be the Bermuda fleet base, which would also be an airfield under reduced operations, and in caretaker status would be fleet bases at St. Thomas, Antigua, Georgetown, Great Exuma, Jamaica, and Santa Lucia.
Maintained in full operation on the Atlantic side under the Navy plan would be air bases at Puerto Rico and Coco Solo. In reduced operation would be those at Argentia, Bermuda, San Juan, Guantanamo, Trinidad, the Azores, and Port Lyautey. In maintenance status would be bases in Iceland and
Greenland. In emergency caretaker status would be those at St. Thomas, Antigua, Jamaica, Great Exuma, Georgetown, St. Julian Lafe, and St. Lucia.
Special Ships Explode Pressure Mines
New York Herald Tribune, December 31. “—Especially equipped naval vessels, manned by volunteers, are cruising Japanese bays and channels deliberately seeking any “live” pressure mines hidden beneath the water, the Navy said tonight. The ships have been fitted with remote controls so that engines and boilers can be operated from the main deck and flying bridge. Thus no crew members need remain below in compartments which would become steam-filled death traps in the event of a mine explosion.
To cushion the shock of possible explosions crew members stand on mattresses or raised wooden gratings and wear tank helmets for head protection. Overheads also are padded with mattresses.
During the war Japanese inland waters were sown with new type pressure mines which played havoc with Japanese shipping because of the difficulty of sweeping them. The mine is detonated by a change in pressure of the water surrounding it, which ordinarily is caused only by passage of a large ship over the mine.
Anticipating the invasion of Japan, the mines were set to neutralize themselves after a specific time interval, but the only way to make certain that none remain dangerous is to run large ships over them. The “guinea pig” squadron, as the outfit is called, is doing that job, using battered ships unfit for any other service. So far no mines have exploded under them. The ships make their runs with skeleton crews of about twenty-two men each. They are the Marathon, a former troop transport; the Pratt Victory, and the Joseph Holt, freighters taken over from the War Shipping Administration.
Coast Guard Reverts to Treasury
New York Herald Tribune, December 30. —President Truman by executive order today returned the Coast Guard to the Treasury Department effective next Tuesday and ordered the Navy to cease protecting vessels, harbors, ports, and waterfront facilities, all normal peacetime functions of the Coast Guard.
Mr. Truman noted that the wartime need for the Coast Guard to function as part of the Navy “no longer exists.” The Navy took over the Coast Guard on November 1, 1941.
The Navy will not completely divorce itself from the Coast Guard immediately, however. The executive order stated that
in the interest of expeditious demobilization and other exigencies of the naval service . . . the Coast Guard shall continue for such period as may be mutually agreeable to the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of the Navy air-sea rescue functions and the maintenance and operation of mid-ocean weather stations and air-sea navigational aids under the directional control of the Navy.
Also some Coast Guard vessels, facilities, and personnel will continue for an indefinite period to operate as a part of the Navy, subject to mutual agreement by the Navy and the Treasury Departments. The Coast Guard will resume its peacetime functions equipped with most of the radio and radar devices used in detecting enemy ships during the war. These devices will now be turned on smugglers and other maritime lawbreakers, and they also will be used in effecting rescues and as navigational aids.
Admiral Joseph E. Farley has been named by President Truman as Commandant of the Coast Guard succeeding Admiral R. R. Waesche, who is ill. The swearing in ceremony probably will take place on Tuesday.
High Frequency Direction Finders
Washington Post, January 14.—The Navy disclosed today the wartime secret of “Pluff Duff,” an electronic long distance detection device which played a major part in winning the battle of the Atlantic. Technically called high frequency direction finder (the initials HF-DF rapidly became “Huff-Duff” in service slang) the electrical “finger” can spot a ship or plane half-way around the world. It was used as a teammate of radar and sound devices which spot objectives at a much shorter distance only. The Navy told how the device on board ships, planes, and in a network of shore stations succeeded in
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Atomic Bomb Tests
breaking up U-boat wolf packs before they could assemble and how at least one of the submarines which landed saboteurs on the Long Island and Florida coasts in 1942 was located and sunk before it could escape.
What the device does is pick up any voice or code radio signal transmitted on the international shortwave communications channels, and within a split second visually show the direction of the signal’s source. When two or more “huff duff” units ashore or afloat get such bearings, it is a simple mathematical exercise for a control center to determine where the lines of direction meet on the earth’s surface. This fix is accurate within a few miles when attained at long distance and can be refined by getting more or closer bearings. Radio direction finders were in use before the war, but they were slow and subject to a multitude of errors.
“Huff Duff” overcame all the problems of correction and provided a device which automatically scans the entire circle 20 times a second. This speed completely crossed up the strategy of the German high command which believed the Allies only had old-fashioned types of manually turned detectors.
Nazi submarines felt they were safe in using “squirt” radio transmissions, in which lengthy reports could be compressed into a signal of not more than 15 seconds. One example of what happened, however, was the sinking of the U-66 near the Cape Verde Islands in May, 1944. Her captain sent a report to Berlin which was on the air less than 15 seconds, but 26 Allied DF stations in the Atlantic network obtained bearings on the boat.
The Navy’s DF network extended from Jan Mayan, a small island between Iceland and Spitzbergen, to Bahia, Brazil.
Although most of the wartime use of the direction finder was against submarines, it was equally effective in locating at long range airplanes in flight and surface ships. “Huff Duff” became a vital part of the Coast Guard air rescue system which during the war dispatched airplane-rescue boat teams to any scene of trouble at sea after receiving even a brief distress signal.
Postwar use of DF is expected to play a big role in increased safety of aviation.
Washington Post, January 14.—Joint Army-Navy plans to test the effect of atomic bombs on a huge naval task force have been completed and turned over to the joint chiefs of staff, who soon will announce the site, date, and other details, Vice Admiral V. H. P. Blandy, deputy chief of Naval Operations for special weapons, disclosed last night. The long-awaited tests, which may revolutionize modern naval warfare by rendering surface-going ships obsolescent, will not be held before spring—March 21 •—Blandy said.
But the task force, made up of every type of naval vessel, is being assembled. Its composition is a secret but it is expected to include captured German and Japanese units as well as old American vessels.
Blandy outlined progress of the test planning at a press conference Friday at which Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal announced 1946 fleet dispositions. Also present was Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Chief of Naval Operations, who revealed that, in addition to the atomic bomb experiment, any new weapons developed by either the Army or Navy will be tested.
Matters discussed at the press conference were held up by the Navy for release last night.
Well-informed quarters predicted that Blandy would be named top test commander by the joint chiefs of staff. Blandy himself said the tests “will involve quite a large force composed of naval, Army Air, Army Ground, and civilian scientific personnel” and that “there are many angles to the tests, national and international, as well as naval, military, and technical.”
This was the first official indication that observers of other Allied nations may be permitted to witness the tests.
Sidelights on Second Battle of Philippines
Chicago Daily Tribune, December 17, by Quentin Pope.—An incorrect assumption by Vice Admiral Kinkaid, as well as errors of judgment by the Japanese, played an important part in America’s decisive defeat of the
Official U. S. navy Photograph
WAR IN THE MACHINE AGE
One of the powerful U. S. Navy dredges that helped rebuild Guam Harbor.
ehemy’s sea forces in the second battle of Oie Philippines area, October 22-27, 1944, Recording to information received in Wellington, N. Z. In bulletins issued soon after Oie battle, the Navy announced that the 3(1 fleet of Admiral Halsey and Admiral K'nkaid’s 7th had sunk or damaged 48 Nipponese warships at a cost of only six Amcri- can vessels “and a few lesser craft.” The oattle foiled a desperate enemy attempt to sOdl General MacArthur’s invasion of the Philippines at Leyte.
Naval officers gave this'unofficial version °f fhe battle:
Hit by enemy planes from north of the Philippines, Admiral Halsey radioed Ad- nnral Kinkaid lie was pulling out to the north to deal with that prong of the Japanese force. Kinkaid’s critical error was made after he intercepted a radio message sent by Halsey to his battleships ordering them to form a separate task force. Kinkaid decided this message meant Halsey was leaving his battleships behind to protect the central Philippines. But Halsey did not order his battleships detached and when the 3d Fleet moved north to hit Jap carriers, its battleships went along.
In the meantime, naval officers said, Kinkaid—in the belief Halsey’s big ships were still in the area and available for covering Rear Admiral Thomas L. Sprague’s escort carriers—held his own battleship forces in the south. Then one of the Japanese forces emerged from San Bernardino Strait, between Luzon and Samar Islands north of Leyte, and began battering American escort carriers off the southern tip of Samar. Two of
them, the St. Lo and Gambier, were sunk, as well as two destroyers and a destroyer escort. Ready for the kill, the Japanese—to the surprise of the Americans—broke off the fighting with Sprague’s force and headed back toward San Bernardino Strait. This riddle is now laid by American officers to the fact that this central Japanese fleet never was intended to be more than a diversionary force. In typical Nipponese fashion, the officers said, the Japanese commander adhered to his orders even when he might have succeeded in carrying out the primary aim of the Japanese, the cutting off and smashing of General MacArthur’s beachhead on near-by Leyte.
The final error, however, was made by Nipponese intelligence concerning our dispositions, the officers said. The Japanese miscalculated our strength in the area and also our naval forces in the south. Kinkaid, by withdrawing to the south, even though by so doing he left Sprague’s escort carriers at the mercy of the overwhelming central Japanese force, was in a position with his battleships to score the great victory of the Surigao Strait. Describing that battle, the Navy report said, “The Japanese columns slowed indecisively to 12 knots, and then, as shell after shell from the American vessels found their marks, the enemy tried to reverse course and escape [back through the strait].
“Of the two battleships, two heavy cruisers and two light, and 10 destroyers, all were sunk except one battleship, one or two cruisers and perhaps half the destroyers. 1 he next day our aviators discovered the battleship and a fugitive cruiser, badly crippled, and finished them off.”
GREAT BRITAIN
Tartlet Practices on German U-Boats
London Times, December 12.—The Battle of the Atlantic broke out again today between the R.A.F. Coastal Command and the German U-boats. But whereas the result of the struggle which lasted throughout the European war remained in doubt almost until V-E Day, there was only one possible outcome of the resumed battle. Stationary and without crews, the U-boats were “sitting” targets for a hail of rockets, bombs, depth-charges, and cannon shells.
There are 110 captured German submarines to be disposed of, and 36 of them have been allocated as practice targets for air attack—18 each for the R.A.F. and the Fleet Air Arm. Today R.A.F. Coastal Command opened a week’s program during which they will sink three U-boats a day, using a variety of weapons, some of which are new.
Sunderland flying-boats with depth- charges, Liberators and Warwicks with special bombs, and Mosquitoes armed with rockets and cannon took off from their bases in northern Ireland and Scotland to attack submarines towed by the Royal Navy to a point 120 miles N.N.W. from the Irish coast. An aircraft carrier, II.M.S. Nairana, acted as control ship for the attacking aircraft, and a destroyer, H.M.S. Blencathra, stood by f°r air-sea rescue purposes. Fortunately the destroyer’s services were not required. '1 he operation was carried through without a hitch and all aircraft returned safely to base-
One of the main objects of the exercise was to test new methods of attack and improved weapons. Of special interest are the Mosquitoes’ new armor-piercing rockets. 1 hey are so fused that they do not explode until they have penetrated some distance under water, when they can hit the most vulnerable part of the U-boat’s hull. The rockets did not take long to prove their effectiveness. 1 he first U-boat sank in four and a half minutes and the second in five minutes. The third, which was bombed, took longer.
Soon after taking off No. 248 Mosquito Squadron, which is based at Ballykelly, on the shores of Lough Foyle, formed into four “V” formations of three aircraft, and flew in this order until the U-boats were sighted. They were visible miles away. F rom a distance they seemed like brown and green cigars lying on the surface of the blue, sunlit Atlantic. In the last moments of their brief careers they looked what they were deserted and doomed objects whose power for evil had gone.
After receiving permission to attack, the Mosquitoes formed up in line astern an< dived on their target, one after the other, at intervals of 500 ft. As they dived steeply the sea and the U-boats seemed to come up to meet us. The first rockets narrowly missed; the second battery scored direct hits; and
from then on every volley seemed to register a hit. The rockets shot downwards like orange meteors, leaving a trail of smoke. As they struck the hull, above or below the 'vater-line, there was a series of short, vivid explosions, and in a few moments a cloud of smoke hovered over the U-boat.
by the time the first attack was over the submarine began to roll and lift, and soon the hows were awash. Only a few aircraft had tune to come round for a second attack be- f°r their victim started to sink by the bows, slowly at first and then more steeply. Quickly the stern came up, until the U-boat appeared to be standing on its nose. Then it slid out of Vlew, leaving only smoke and an angry boil pu the surface to show where it had met its ^nominious end.
The Foxer and Sono-Buoy
London Times, December 1.—Allied naval experts foresaw Germany’s most secret Weapons for use in the U-boat war and had blue-printed effective countermeasures long before the weapons could be used. Some of the secrets that helped to beat the U-boat were a device that enabled a man in an aircraft to listen to submarines moving under Water, a multiple mortar that fired a pattern °f lethal depth-charges ahead of our escort ships, and a device that upset the “brain” °f the Germans’ acoustic homing torpedo.
It was in 1943 that the enemy suddenly unleashed the weapon expected to change the whole course of the Battle of the Atlantic—a torpedo which could “home” on the noise of a ship’s propeller and chase its victim before striking. British scientists and members of the naval staff, although in the dark as to the exact nature of this secret weapon, had forecast its probabilities so accurately that countermeasures could be put into force at once.
One of these was a gadget called Foxer, a uoise-maker which was towed astern of a pbip. Not a single ship was sunk while using d- Hitting back at the enemy, Britain was already using a secret weapon that was to Prove one of the most effective innovations of fhe war against the U-boat. This was the Hedgehog, a huge mortar which could throw 24 projectiles 200yards ahead of the attacking sbip. The use of Torpex, a new underwater explosive produced at Woolwich Arsenal, gave the projectiles their lethal power.
American scientists produced the device that enabled airmen to hear submerged U- boats, the Sono-Buoy, a buoy with a hydrophone and a radio set installed in it. Searching aircraft dropped them in the sea and then listened-in to U-boats under the water, so that they could locate and attack them unseen.
Scientists also provided special gear for the Anti-Submarine Fixed Defense branch of the Royal Navy which protected major ports from Scotland to Australia with its detection loops. Delicate instruments on the sea-bed gave protection against midget U-boats and enemy “frogmen.”
Merchant Aircraft Carriers
Engineering, December 7.—For some time before the United States came into the war, the operations of U-boats in the Atlantic had been causing increasing anxiety and although, after the attack on Pearl Harbor in December, 1941, American aid was at once intensified, there remained for a period a wide danger zone, outside the range of shore- based aircraft or of small anti-submarine vessels, where aircraft carriers offered the only hope of security for convoys. Naval carriers, however, were not available in sufficient numbers for such duties, nor were seagoing escort ships, and to meet this need, which had been foreseen earlier in the war, the Merchant Shipbuilding Branch of the Admiralty, in conjunction with the Burntisland Shipbuilding Company, Limited, prepared a design for a dual-purpose ship to combine the functions of a cargo vessel and an aircraft carrier. The principal cargo that could be carried was grain, as the requirement of a clear flight deck prevented the fitting of cargo-handling appliances; but as grain carriers the vessels proved to be quite successful, and a number were built eventually in other shipyards also, to the drawings prepared by the Burntisland Company. From the description, “merchant aircraft carrier” were derived the initials “M.A.C.,” which caused the vessels to be generally known as “Mac-ships”; a designation which was fixed the more securely by the choice of
Scottish names for them—Empire Macal- pine, Empire Mackendrick, etc.
The keel of the first ship, the Empire Macalpinc, was laid at Burntisland on August 11, 1942, and she was delivered to the Admiralty on April 14, 1943. Her principal dimensions are: length over-all, 448 ft.; beam, 57 ft.; depth molded, to shelter deck, 37 ft. 9 in. and to the second deck, 28 ft. 9 in.; and load draft about 24 ft. 6 in. The tonnage is 7,950 tons gross and 5,250 tons net, and the deadweight capacity, about 7,930 tons. The flight deck, 422 ft. long and 62 ft. broad, extends practically over the full length and is 53 ft. above the keel. It has no sheer, and drops slightly—2 ft. 6 in.—at bow and stern, giving a minimum free board of 28 ft. 6 in. at the forward end when the ship is in service trim. The deck has a completely flush surface, although the openings in it, in addition to the 42 ft. by 20 ft. hangar hoist, include eight trunks communicating with the cargo holds. The hoist is electrically operated and can be raised or lowered at a speed of 30 ft. a minute with a working load of 10,000 lb. Arrestor wires are fitted on the flight deck, and there is the usual steam jet in the bows as a wind-direction indicator. The deck covering is a nonskid paint. Along the sides and at the after end of the flight deck, continuous safety nets are fitted, interrupted only by the sponsons for the four Oerlikon antiaircraft guns. Two Bofors guns are also carried, and a 12-pounder is mounted on a platform projecting from the stern, below the level of the flight deck. The fire-fighting equipment to deal with crashed aircraft consists of a number of Bhomcne generators. The wheelhouse is in the customary position on the starboard side, though somewhat farther forward than is usual in fleet carriers, and is constructed of non-magnetic steel. It is cased with plastic armor.
The aircraft hangar is at the after end of the ship and extends upward from the second deck to the flight deck. The machines carried have been usually Fairey Swordfish, though this type is now no longer in production. The hangar space is sufficient to accommodate a stock of the larger spare components, such as wings, tail planes, etc. Forward of the hangar, most of the space between the second deck and the upper deck is devoted to stores and miscellaneous equipment; in addition to the ship’s stores and the refrigerated chambers, aircraft spares and electrical spares, ammunition, aviation petrol, and lubricating oil are stowed here, and the accommodation for the crew is also in these ’tween decks, together with a gyrocompass room and an emergency wireless office. The total complement is 107, comprising 52 Merchant Service personnel, 16 D.E.M.S. men, and 39 officers and men of the Fleet Air Arm. The navigating, etc., equipment includes two chart rooms, one for the ship’s officers and the other for the air personnel, and a radar installation. The deck machinery consists of hydraulic steering gear, a steam windlass, and three steam winches for handling the lifeboats and the four 3-ton derricks provided to deal with the ship’s stores. One of the winches, fitted aft, can be used for warping- The lifeboats are of steel, and there is also a full equipment of rafts and other buoyant apparatus. The wireless aerials extend from the mast on the wheelhouse to booms rigged out from the ship’s side between the upper deck and the flight deck. Paravane gear is fitted forward. Water ballast, fresh water, and oil fuel are carried in the cellular double bottom, and water ballast also in the forward and after peak tanks and in deep tanks aft. Fresh water is carried also in tanks at the forward end of No. 3 hold and at the sides of the shaft tunnel, and there is a feed tank in the engine-room double bottom- Nos. 2, 5, and 6 holds can be used as deep tanks if necessary. The eight cargo holds are situated entirely below the second deck, the grain being loaded into them through chutes and discharged by means of shore suction plant.
The propelling machinery consists of a Doxford four-cylinder opposed-piston oil engine of 3,400 brake hp. at 114 r.p.m., the cylinders being 600-mm. bore and 2,320mm. combined stroke. In service trim, the speed is about 13 knots; steam is used for all auxiliaries and is supplied by two boilers, one being fired by the exhaust gases from the main engine. This boiler, of the horizontal marine type, generates sufficient steam to operate the principal deck and engine-room auxiliaries when at sea. Both boilers arc arranged in the ’tween deck space, and the waste gases, like those of the main engine, are discharged through the ship’s side. Electricity for lighting, heating, ventilation, etc., is supplied by three 65-KW generators in the main engine-room. Mechanically controlled heating and ventilating equipment is provided throughout, each hold having two ventilators, one of which is fitted with a motor-driven supply fan. Air-heating units are provided to dry out holds which can be used as deep tanks. The vessels are classed 100A1 by Lloyd's Register of Shipping and were built to the requirements of the Home Office and the Ministry of War Transport; and under Admiralty inspection with regard to the carriage and fitting of the aircraft, armament, wireless equipment, the stowage of depth charges and fittings for their release, and all arrangements in connection with magazines and the carriage of aviation petrol.
British Radar Countermeasures
The Aeroplane, December 7.-—Much hitherto secret information was released last week concerning the radio countermeasures employed by the Royal Air Force during the war to confuse the Luftwaffe’s radio communications and to render ineffective the enemy’s radar system.
The necessity for “bending” or distorting the radio beam by which German bombers were directed to their targets in this country during the winter of 1940-41 gave our development of radio countermeasures its initial impetus. From then until the end of the war this extremely complicated and abstruse subject became the whole-time study of a small number of specialists who alone understood all its ramifications. From a defensive role our radio countermeasures were soon turned to the offensive in assisting our bomber forces in their attacks on Germany, and between our experts and the enemy there developed a battle of wits in which the Luftwaffe struggled violently to avoid the effects of our ether offensive. No sooner did the Germans think of some means of countering our devices than we would invent others, and there came a time before the war ended when we were and remained complete masters of the situation.
In the summer of 1941 it was established that the enemy were using radar to plot our bombers for fighter interception. Calculations gave us the station’s approximate position, and in December, 1941, aerial photographs were obtained which led to our raid on Bruneval on February 27, 1942. It was the knowledge gained from the capture of German apparatus there that made possible the successful development of our countermeasures.
The first of these was developed at the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnbor- ough and was introduced in December, 1942. Known as “Tinsel,” it made use of a radiotelephone transmitter with the microphone placed near the engine or in the airplane’s fuselage. Each operator was given a specified frequency band to watch with instructions to jam any German radio telephone he heard. The noise the German pilot heard from our aircraft may be imagined.
Every wireless operator in each bomber took part. They were trained with the help of gramophone recordings of actual night- fighter radio traffic. Valuable kelp came from the German-speaking operators distributed throughout the bomber force and many of the remarks which came from the hopelessly confused German pilots are unprintable. Completely failing to shout down the interference, they resorted to abusing each other and the jamming operators indiscriminately.
So successful was this system that the Germans were forced to use Morse telegraphy in an attempt to break through. They tried speeding up their radio telephone messages, switching on their transmitters for only a few seconds at a time, but without success. Yet another subterfuge was to transmit a continuous musical program, breaking off suddenly to snap out an order.
One of our most spectacular countermeasures was introduced over Hamburg on the night of July 24-25, 1943, when a vast number of aluminum foil strips lluttered slowly down from our bombers, to settle on the ruins of the already badly damaged city. This was Operation “Window,” and its purpose was to defeat the enemy’s radar, which would react to the metal strips as though each were an individual airplane.
Each of the 791 bombers employed on the Hamburg raid dropped, in addition to its bombs, one bundle of 2,000 of these foil strips every minute. The total amounted to 2| million strips weighing 20 tons. Assuming that each bundle showed an echo or “blip” for 15 minutes, the total number of “blips” on the enemy’s radar screens during the raid was equivalent to 12,000 aircraft. The effect on the enemy was devastating, and our losses on this raid were reduced to 1.5 per cent compared with the previous average of 5.4 per cent. By similar methods the Germans could be led to think that several great forces of bombers were on their way to attack them, only one of which was genuine. They had to make up their minds which was the right one to intercept, and more often than not they guessed wrong.
Side by side with our enemy radar offensive went a determined effort to upset the Luftwaffe’s radio communications. This chiefly took the form of jamming or obliterating an enemy signal with a more powerful one of our own on the same frequency. A particularly successful method of confusing, distracting and annoying the enemy, even to the extent of giving German fighter pilots instructions contrary to those transmitted by their own ground controllers was the “Corona” system, in which the B.B.C., the General Post Office, and Cable and Wireless all collaborated with the R.A.F. Instead of transmitting noise, as was the case with ordinary jamming tactics, “Corona” used a “ghost voice”—a fluent German speaker. This was heard by the enemy for the first time on the night of October 22-23, 1943, and immediately drew blood.
The target on this occasion was Kassel, and before the end of the raid the enemy night defense organization was in a state of complete chaos. A furious German controller was warning his aircraft to “beware of another voice” and “not to be led astray by the enemy.” The “voice” not only spoke idiomatic German, but could also mimic perfectly the voices of his opposite numbers. After one particularly violent outburst by the German controller the “voice” said: “The Englishman is now swearing.” The German’s reply was: “It is not the Englishman who is swearing but me.” On another night the enemy attempted to beat the “ghost” by putting a woman on the microphone but this had been anticipated and a German-speaking W. A.A.F. “ghost voice” was immediately put on the microphone.
Other ruses included picking up actual enemy signals and retransmitting them to sound like their own signals, so confusing the enemy pilot that he did not know whether he was listening to his own or ours. And when he tried to get a bearing we gave him one. German airplanes were heard being told that they were over Peterborough when they were actually over the center of London; such was the state of confusion we created. An early attempt to deal with enemy radar by the use of a warning receiver was conceived about October, 1942, and christened “Boozer.” In its original form it was simply a receiver which lit a warning lamp when the aircraft became “illuminated” by an enemy radar transmitter. The pilot would then change his course until the lamp went out.
Operation “Drumstick” jammed enemy high-frequency telegraph controls in the 3.06.0 megacycle band; “Fidget” jammed enemy telegraph commentaries and instructions to night fighters during the progress of a Bomber Command attack on the medium wave band. Enemy ground radar stations using the 300-600 megacycle band were jammed by operation “Carpet,” and “Jostle” was a high-power high-altitude jammer of enemy radio-telephone communications on short and ultra-short wave bands. It was, in fact, a flying broadcasting station, 40 times more powerful than the transmitters usually used in aircraft.
Some of the most vital and well-guarded secrets of German radar night-fighter defenses fell into our hands through an error of navigation. A young Luftwaffe pilot handed them to our scientists undamaged when he landed on a R.A.F. emergency landing field at Woodbridge in Suffolk, under the impression that it was Venlo in Holland. His airplane, a Ju 88, held the key to some particularly troublesome and baffling German radar equipment, as well as the Germans’ latest form of homing apparatus. Within 10 days, effective countermeasures had been evolved by us and were in operation.
The greatest single triumph of our Radio Counter Measures organization was achieved in connection with the Normandy landing, when it perpetrated what has been described as the greatest hoax in military history. It took place on the night before D-Day and was carried out with the aid of 105 airplanes of the R.A.F. and 34 small ships of the Royal Navy. Its purpose was to lead the enemy to believe that the landing would be made not on the Normandy beaches but farther north in the Pas de Calais between Cap d’Antifer and Boulogne. The man responsible for this plan was Air Commodore L. Dalton Morris,
C. B.E., Bomber Command’s Chief Signals Officer, working with a small panel of service and civilian experts. On the night of June 5-6 the five parts of the plan went simultaneously into operation.
Eighteen small ships steamed towards Cap d’Antifer to create the impression of a landing on that part of the French coast. As enemy radar could quickly sum up the size of this force and dismiss it as not being a serious threat, No. 617 Squadron, led by Group Captain G. L. Cheshire, V.C.,
D. S.O., D.F.C., flew in support. Every minute of the 3£ hours of the operation, these aircraft dropped 12 bundles of metal- ized “Window” strips which produced false echoes on the enemy radar screens. Flying in box formation over an area 12 miles wide and 8 miles deep, the aircraft had to fly in a continuous orbit, gradually nearing the French coast, to give the impression of a large convoy moving slowly across the Channel. The effect was heightened by the naval ships towing balloons which would reproduce a “big-ship” type of echo on the enemy radar screens.
At the same time a similar deception was being practised in a direction heading for Boulogne. In this case 16 ships were covered and greatly “magnified” by No. 218 Squadron, led by Wing Commander R. M. Fen- wick-Wilson, A.F.C.
In two areas in the Channel 20 aircraft of No. 199 Squadron maintained a permanent jamming barrage which covered the enemy’s coastal radar frequencies, reduced his warning system, and screened our own aircraft. Flying at 18,000 ft. at a constant distance of 50 miles from the enemy coast and with positional error of never more than 5 miles from 10 fixed points in the channel, these aircraft jammed the Hun radar for hours on end. In this task they were joined by four Fortresses of No. 803 Squadron of the U. S. Army Air Corps.
Between the two formations of small ships 29 Lancasters patrolled for 4£ hours to lure the enemy night fighters away from the actual landing areas. They, too, added to the confusion on the German radar by providing between them 82 jamming transmitters. A secondary reason for this patrol was the hope (speedily fulfilled) that the Germans would mistake this patrolling as top cover for one of the decoy invasions.
While all this deception was going on, dummy airborne invasions were carried out at two points—one slightly east of Fecamp, the other halfway down the Cherbourg Peninsula. Dummy paratroops were dropped at both points, together with enough strips of “Window” to give the harassed enemy radar operators the impression that this airborne invasion was 20 times larger than it actually was.
The deception was a success. The enemy opened up on the 16 ships heading towards Boulogne with all available searchlights and guns and, even more important, sent the bulk of his night-fighter strength to engage the aircraft on patrol, under the impression that they were protecting the invasion “armada.” E-boats were also sent out to engage the diversionary threat.
The mock airborne drops also brought about speedy reaction and delayed the enemy’s ground reaction to the real airborne drops east and west of the Normandy beaches. And while the German radar system, already badly disorganized by Bomber Command attacks, was thus hopelessly confused, the real invasion forces sailed on their appointed course without any interference by air or sea.
Among those responsible for the brilliant record of our Radio Counter Measures organization there were, in addition to Air Commodore Dalton Morris, now Director of Telecommunications at the Air Ministry, Air Vice-Marshal E. B. Addison, an earlier holder of the post, Dr. R. Cockburn, of the M.A.P.’s technical research department on telecommunications, and Wing Commander A. Forsyth of II.Q., Bomber Command. W.A.A.F. officers who played a prominent part in the work especially in its early days of development, included Flight Officers Barbara Pemberton, Elizabeth Strang, and Ursula Smith.
End of the “Exeter”
London Times, December 3.—The full story of II.M.S. Exeter's gallant end fighting against impossible odds oil the coast of Java has now reached the Admiralty. It was brought back from a prisoner of war camp by her commanding officer, Captain O. L. Gordon, R.N., who made complete records while he was a prisoner and kept them from the Japanese by hiding them in a tube of shaving cream. The cruiser, famous for her part in the battle against the Admiral Graf Spec off the River Plate, was sunk on March
I, 1942.
After the series of actions on February 27, in which the Exeter was damaged, the cruiser returned to Surabaya. There was no time for proper repairs and on February 28 she sailed at dark with six of her eight boilers out of action. She was accompanied by
II. M.S. Encounter and U.S.S. Pope.
At first the Exeter could only make 15 knots, but superb work by the engineering staff got two more boilers going and speed was increased at midnight to 23 knots. Early in the morning two enemy cruisers began to bear down on the already crippled cruiser and her two destroyers. A little later a large enemy destroyer appeared ahead and almost immediately afterwards two other cruisers and more destroyers came into view.
The engineering staff at the last minute managed to repair one more boiler and at 26 knots the Exeter, with the two destroyers in station either side of her, steamed into action. She had only 20 per cent of her main armament ammunition remaining after the previous battle.
The destroyers tried to ward the enemy off by firing torpedoes and to screen the Exeter by making smoke. One enemy cruiser was hit by torpedoes from the Pope, several other ships were hit by gunfire from all three allied vessels, and one destroyer dropped out of line.
But the end was not far off. The Exeter received a vital hit in “A” boiler-room; the main engines stopped and all power in the ship failed. As she was being straddled and hit by the enemy cruisers, orders were given to sink her and abandon ship. She sank about 11.50 A.M.
Shortly afterwards the Encounter was also sunk. The Pope remained at hand to the end and managed to escape in a rain squall, only to be sunk an hour later after an attack by Japanese bombers.
Naval Prize Money
London Times, December 20.—It was announced yesterday by the First Lord of the Admiralty that, in conformity with long tradition, prize money will once more be paid to the Royal Navy in respect of enemy ships and cargoes captured during the war. It has been decided, however, that this is the last occasion on which prize money will be paid. There is a widespread feeling that it would suit modern conditions of service better for this historical relic to be assimilated into the normal grant of gratuities on future occasions.
The amount of the prize fund to be distributed is still matter for conjecture. The Prize Court is still sitting, and ships are still being condemned in prize. Unofficial estimates put the eventual total at about £20,000,000, though this can be no more than pure guesswork. In the last war the fund reached about £14,000,000 and was shared according to rank by all members of the Navy who served at sea. The distribution on this occasion will be widened to include the Royal Air Force. No sailor would grudge them such a share in view of the long and arduous work undertaken by Coastal Command, without whose efforts in search and in shadowing the prize fund would undoubtedly not be so large.
There arc two kinds of prize—that taken at sea by naval ships or sent in under a prize crew and that which surrenders voluntarily or through stress of weather in a British port. The former is good naval prize, known as “droits of the Crown,” and, if condemned in the Prize Court, forms the prize fund, which is available for distribution. The latter is called “droits of Admiralty” and, under an Order-in-Council made by Charles
II, belongs technically to the Lord High Admiral. In modern days, however, the office of Lord High Admiral is carried out by Commissioners who are paid a salary, and the droits of Admiralty are paid into the Consolidated Funds as an offset against the salaries of the Commissioners.
For centuries the hope of prize was largely responsible for keeping the Navy adequately manned. The reward of a successful engagement was the distribution among the crew of fhe value of the capture. The earliest known regulation for the distribution of prize is to be found in the Black Book of the Admiralty. “The King shall have and take the ffourth part of alle manner of the said goods, and the owners of the said shippes another ffourth part, and the other half of the said goods shall belong to those who took them.”
A new regulation in Henry VIII’s reign laid down that in all cases of prize the King’s share would be one-half of the money, all the ships over 200 tons, all the guns and “apparel.” This regulation was still in force during the first years of Queen Elizabeth’s reign, though later she made many a private bargain with her adventurous seamen. The Elizabethan era was the first of the golden periods for prize. With the Spanish treasure ships making their uncertain way across as yet uncharted oceans, many opportunities °f making fabulous captures existed.
Drake's voyage of circumnavigation, in which he plundered the Spanish possessions m the Pacific, is an epic in the story of prize money. His experience at Tarapaca, for instance, must be almost the easiest of all acquisitions of prize. This is the description °f it, from the narrative of Francis Pretty, who accompanied Drake on the voyage.
‘ . From hence we went to a certain port
called Tarapaca, where, being landed, we found by the seaside, a Spaniard lying asleep who had lying by him thirteen bars of silver, which weighed 4000 ducats Spanish. We took the silver and left the man.” When Drake’s ship, the Pelican, eventually returned safely f° Plymouth, she carried in her hold more fhan 2,000,000 ducats’ wortli of gold, jewels, and silver.
In Drake’s footsteps fallowed Thomas Cavendish (more often called Candish), who was the second Englishman to sail round the world. He also found and captured a Spanish treasure ship, the Santa Anna, which was found to contain 122,000 oz. of pure gold, apart from jewels, silks, silver, and other valuables.
Raleigh and Sir John Hawkins, Sir John Champernownc, and Sir Thomas Seymour all helped themselves from this seemingly inexhaustible stream of gold. Right up to the end of Elizabeth’s reign the taking of prize was little short of pure piracy. Almost anyone, under license from the Crown, could fit out a ship and prey upon mercantile trade at sea, especially if it were French or Spanish. Only gradually was the taking of prize woven into the rules of war at sea.
In 1649, under the Commonwealth, an Act was passed giving one-half of all prize to the captors and the other half to the Treasurer of the Admiralty, with which to raise a fund for charitable purposes, rewards, etc. An act of Charles IT, passed in 1661, for the better regulation and discipline of the Navy laid down that a strict account was to be furnished before anything was removed out of a prize of war, except for pillage. Pillage had for long been a recognized perquisite of the sailor. Everything found above the gundeck, except “arms, tackle, furniture, and stores,” belonged by traditional right to the individual captors. Pillage was finally abolished by an Act of William and Mary under which everything in a ship had to be condemned as prize and then distributed as to one-third among the captors, one-third to the Treasurer of the Navy, and one-third to the use of their Majesties.
The next and perhaps the most important step was taken during the reign of Queen Anne, when the famous Cruizers Act was passed. Under this Act the whole of the prize fund was vested in the Crown, which then transferred its share by Royal Warrant to the captors. The Act laid down the exact ratio of shares, from the Admiral of the squadron down to the “swabber, ordinary trumpeters, barger, seamen, volunteers by letter and marine soldiers.”
During the reigns of the Georges there came the second golden period of prize money. In the French and Spanish wars, and especially the Seven Years War, the prize fund again reached fantastic heights. Admiral Lord Anson, for instance, amassed an immense fortune out of prize. In his great voyage of circumnavigation, in the midst of almost unbelievable hardships, prize to the value of over £1,000,000 was taken. Anson’s share would be about £125,000. Later, after the battle of Cape Finisterre, the resultant rounding up of a French convoy brought him a further £69,991. Another who received large sums was Admiral Sir Charles Saunders. His greatest single haul of prize came when he was Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean. When the Active (frigate) and Favorite (sloop) captured the Spanish treasure- ship Hermione on May 21, 1762, just as she was about to enter Barcelona, the value of the prize amounted to £519,705 10s., and as Commander in Chief Admiral Saunders’ share of that exploit was £64,963. All the lieutenants on board at the time of the capture got £13,000 each, while the share of every seaman and marine was £485.
Any member of a prize crew who helped himself before distribution was brought to court-martial and savagely punished. A typical case is the court-martial of John Hervey, a midshipman, in 1761. lie was in charge of the prize crew of the Diligence and made away with “two trunk cases of iron ware, a case of pictures, a cask of Delph ware, and a cask of wine.” He was sentenced to be disrated from the rank of midshipman, to receive 72 lashes round the fleet with the cat-o’-nine-tails with a halter round his neck, and to wash down the latrines of the ship for three months after his punishment.
The prize fund is still vested entirely in the Crown and can only be granted to the Navy under Royal Warrant. Acts passed by William IV and Victoria both restated this principle, and the Prize Act of 1864, which is still in force, expressly lays down that officers and crews of II.M. ships may only take such prize as is granted them by the Crown.
At the beginning of the last war it was recognized that modern conditions of naval service made it unfair to adhere to the old rule of distributing prize only to the actual captors*of a ship. Any such method automatically excluded all those whose service in
the Fleet precluded them from being present at the actual capture of a prize. In consequence it was decided that all serving actively in the Navy should be included in the final distribution. When the final balance of the fund was struck it was distributed throughout the Navy. Admirals received about £3,000, captains about £800, while able seamen got £25, and boys £15. On this occasion, Mr. Alexander announced, “the variation in payments between ranks” will be very much narrower; the First Lord would not, however, commit himself to payment “on a Hat rate basis.”
Various Notes
Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser has informed Mr. Chifley, the Prime Minister, that arrangements have been completed for the removal of the base and supply organization of the Pacific Fleet to Singapore and Hongkong by stages extending to June, 1946. Refitting facilities will probably he required from Australia for some time. Admiral Fraser has written to Mr. Beasley, Minister of Defense, expressing keenest regret at the Fleet s departure and his thanks for the help given by Australia. Mr. Chifley said that the United Kingdom Government had sent the Fleet to the Pacific as soon as practicable in keeping with the pledge to throw its full weight against Japan, and he recorded Australia’s deep appreciation of this cooperation in the joint British Commonwealth effort in this part of the world. He had already thanked Admiral Fraser and the ships’ companies for their invaluable assistance in repatriating Australian prisoners-of-war, and he offered Australia’s best wishes to all officers and .men of the Fleet as they moved from Australia’s shores. —London Times, November 20.
H.M.S. Rodney, flagship of Admiral Sir Henry Moore, Commander in Chief, Home Fleet, has arrived at Portsmouth for the purpose of transferring the flag to H.M.S. Nelson, which is to succeed her as flagship of the Home Fleet. Sir Henry Moore hauls down his flag in the Rodney on Saturday, and on the same day Vice Admiral Sir Neville Syfret will hoist his flag in the Nelson as Commander in Chief, Home Fleet.
Units of (he Home Fleet began arriving at Portland yesterday. H.M.S. Dido (flagship) and H.M.S. Diadem, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, were first to reach harbor. On November 28 the battleships Nelson, Queen Elizabeth, and Valinid arc expected, with two more cruisers and ships of the 17th Destroyer Flotilla.—London Times, November 21.
Major General F. W. Festing, G.-O.-C. Hongkong ground forces, said today that Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, Commander in Chief of the British Pacific Fleet, would transfer his headquarters to Hongkong “quite soon,” but this did not necessarily mean that Hongkong would take on the functions of Singapore as the major naval base in the Pacific. General Festing said that the British are building a large airfield on the mainland near Castle Peak, about 15 miles from Kowloon. The equipment intended for an assault on the Japanese mainland had been diverted to this airfield, which would take all sizes of bombers and transports, and would be completed in four to eight months. The projected airfield was an indication of the return of commercial air traffic. It would occupy an area of 600 acres.—Reuter, Loudon Times, November 25.
The British Admiralty has offered naval establishments here and at Bay Bulls, 16 miles away, to the Newfoundland Government, on condition that the local Government maintains the buildings in repair in case of emergency, when the buildings would revert to the Admiralty. The establishments include two fine hospitals and many administrative buildings, machine shops, piers, and other docking facilities. Bay Bulls has a complete marine slip for repairing ships up to the size of a large corvette.—Reuter, London Times, December 15.
Influence of the atomic discoveries on naval design was mentioned at the luncheon which followed the launching of H.M.S. Blake, a Tiger class cruiser, from Fairfield's Yard, Govan, yesterday. The new cruiser, of 8,885 tons displacement, has nine 6-inch guns in three triple mountings, ten 4-inch guns in five twin mountings, and considerable secondary armament. Proposing the toast of the Fairfields Company, Rear Admiral C. S. Daniel, Controller of the Navy, said that the atomic era must have far-reaching effects on naval construction. “I believe we shall one day find we are in a position to start on a radically new naval construction program. And the change from the present to the new will be as great as that from sail to steam, if not greater.”
“A Navy remains an absolute necessity. A certain degree of new construction must continue to keep the Navy at the approved size; nothing is more expensive than an obsolete Navy.” Naval construction, he added, must of necessity be on a small scale for the next two or three years, during which there must be research and development in an endeavor to determine the nature of the future Navy.—Manchester Guardian, December 21.
FRANCE French Defense Service
London Times, December 7.—Plans for the reorganization of the defense service of the Fourth Republic are now almost ready. They represent, at least in their present paper form, a considerable advance towards General de Gaulle’s conception of unified direction and command. The essential first step was to define the limits of responsibility of the two new Defense Ministries and to integrate these with the National Defense Council. It is expected that a decree to that effect will go before the Cabinet next Tuesday.
M. Tillon, the Communist whom General de Gaulle accepted as Minister of Armaments, will supervise all branches of war production. M. Michelet, of the M.R.P., is to be responsible for the administration of the three fighting services, the functions of the Ministers of War, the Navy, and Air being abolished. Under him he has an inspector-general for each branch, General de Lattre de Tassigny for the Army, General Bouscat for Air, and Admiral Misoffe and Admiral Sable for the Navy. Each of these has in turn a general staff, respectively, under General de Lattre de Tassigny (whose double appointment is made workable by the addition of General Touzet du Vigier as Chief of the Army Staff), General Valin, and Admiral Lemonnier.
So much for the administrative side of the defense team over which General de Gaulle in his double character of Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense will preside. As generalissimo he will be advised on military affairs by the General Staff department under General Juin, who, it is understood, is to be reinforced soon by General Billotte. This department is therefore responsible for feeding General de Gaulle with plans and information upon which he can base decisions and for seeing that these decisions arc carried out. The co-ordination of the fighting services is to be assured by their representation on a joint Council for National Defense, over which the Prime Minister will preside. This council will settle production priorities and approve the general lines of strategy.
French Fleet Now 300,000 Tons
Chicago Daily Tribune, January 2.—• France’s Navy, augmented by destroyers, escorts, corvettes, and other craft received from the United States and Britain, has reached approximately 330,000 tons, or slightly more than half its pre-war strength, Vice Admiral Philippe Auboyneau said today. Auboyneau, Commander in Chief of the French Navy during the war, is skipper of the cruiser Emilie Berlin, the first French ship to dock in a Chinese port since the war. The Berlin will leave Thursday for Saigon with 300 civilian and military passengers, including part of the French army garrison being withdrawn from China.
The British Navy’s withdrawal from administrative and operative control of IndoChina waters was mainly effected today with the departure of the bulk of headquarters personnel for Singapore. The French gradually will take over control from the British Navy key personnel, left here principally to handle the transfer elsewhere of two British brigades remaining in southern Indo-China.
GERMANY
Nuremberg Testimony
Manchester Guardian, December 10, Nuremberg, December 10.—The whole black record of the Nazi wars of aggression has now been unfolded before the international military tribunal with the completion of the prosecution’s case under Count Two of the Nuremberg Indictment which today was concerned with the 1941 attack upon Soviet Russia and the “unholy alliance” that led to Japan’s crowning act of treachery at Pearl Harbor and so brought the full power of the United States into the conflict.
After the luncheon recess today one of the missing defendants, Ernst Kaltcnbrunner, who has recovered from the head hemorrhage that occurred on the eve of the trial, was brought into the dock and, received with marked coldness by the other accused, took his place in the front row between Keitel and Alfred Rosenberg. Called upon by Lord Justice Lawrence to plead, he declared that he “believed” he was not guilty. As chief of the security police of the S.S., Kalten- brunner, an Austrian, was Himmler’s right- hand man. He looks it.
Perhaps the greatest mystery of the war, the reason that impelled Hitler to invade Soviet territory at a time when strategic calculations pointed to the launching of his “Sealion” operation against Britain, is largely elucidated, if not explained, by the secret papers of the “Barbarossa Plan” submitted by Mr. S. J. Alderman, of the United States prosecution, by arrangement with the British team, who under Count Two have been mainly concerned with this phase of aggression. We now see that it was less a desire for Russia’s economic resources than a growing suspicion of Soviet expansion in the Baltic and the Balkans that caused Hitler to launch his attack against the advice of some of his commanders.
The invasion, planned with meticulous thoroughness, was to be the “greatest deception in the history of warfare,” for which the necessary troop concentrations, coinciding with renewed activity on the Channel coast, were made out to be a feint for operations against Britain. Something of what was going on in Moscow in the meantime may be gathered from entries in the German naval attache’s war diary, whose authenticity is vouched for by the defendant Raeder and in some respects becomes one of the outstanding documents in the case if only for the fact that it was ever produced.
Counsel, it is true, confined himself to essential extracts, but the entire document is before the Court and many people may well be surprised at the lengths of co-operation to which Russia went, including the provision of naval bases in the early days of the Soviet- German pact. According to the German archivists, Raeder, supreme naval commander in September, 1939, first discussed with Hitler the question of Russia’s ceding submarines to Germany and providing facilities for the fitting out of auxiliary cruisers at Murmansk. There was no doubt about the honest attitude of the Soviet. The German naval attach^ in Moscow reported that the Kremlin was convinced of the necessity for co-operation with Germany. In October Russia had offered a well-situated base near Murmansk, and Raeder was pointing out to the Fiihrer the value of winning Norwegian bases with the aid of Soviet pressure. Whether or not the Kremlin
was playing a double game, Berlin seemed eminently satisfied. Mr. Molotov in a speech on foreign policy talked of the permanent friendship with Germany and sharply attacked the British blockade for violating international law. Gradually the Soviet armament demands were raised. They asked for the hulls of Seydlilz and Lutzow, the plans of the Bismarck and Tirpilz and of the gun turrets of even bigger battleships in the yards.
Then came the opening of the Russo- Finnish war and—perhaps this was the fundamental mistake—erroneous conclusions about the weakness of Russian fighting power. By January, at all events, Hitler desired the delivery of the Lutzow and of the construction plans of the Bismarck to be delayed as long as possible, as with a favorable turn of war they “might get out of it altogether.” By May Russia had declared herself uninterested in the Norwegian campaign and the German Ambassador in Moscow could find no sign of uneasiness over the German victory.
But there was a first sign of uneasiness in Berlin over the Russian entry into Bessarabia and in June the Chief of the Naval Staff saw that although Russia keenly appreciated the German military successes she feared that a German victory would be followed by a German attack on herself. Not that the Soviet desired an Allied victory. Stalin was determined not to sacrifice himself for the Allies.
Soviet moves in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia coincided with reports of the naval attache in Moscow of a noticeable cooling off on the part of the Russians, who had become apprehensive lest in British eyes they should be seen as leaning too strongly towards Germany. There were more straws in the wind in the summer of 1940—the Stalin- Cripps conversations and failure of the British attempt to split the Soviet from Germany, new demands by Russia on Finland, and the rising hope in Helsinki that one day, after all, the Reich might bring help to the Finns. In August the Germans began the transfer of ten infantry and two armored divisions to Poland in case rapid action should become necessary to safeguard the Rumanian oilfields—a move that had its influence on the “Sealion” preparations against Britain.
On April 24 the British Ambassador in Moscow is recorded in these notes as predicting that war would break out on June 22, as indeed it did, though it is apparent from the documents that the “Barbarossa” operation would have been launched in May had it not been for the rising in Yugoslavia. Most of the other documents submitted concern military details of the Barbarossa Plan, but there is no lack of evidence of elaborate preparations made for exploitation of Soviet territory by economic units under the defendant Rosenberg, nor of sinister overriding powers given to Himmler’s S.S. There is even a suggestion that after the defeat of Britain the Baltic States might be colonized by Englishmen.
Mr. Alderman then went on to survey the various attempts made by Germany to persuade Japan to enter the war—attempts which culminated at Pearl Harbor, though even after that an effort was made to get Japan to intervene in the war against Russia by means of a stab in the back in Siberia. The first attempt to get Japan to drop her neutrality and turn the Anti-Comintern and Three-Power Pact of September, 1940, into a military alliance appears, as far as can be gleaned, to have ben made in March, 1941, when Matsuoka, then Foreign Minister, came to Berlin.
Prior to his being received by Ribbentrop, Keitel issued on March 5 “Basic Order No. 24,” regarding collaboration with Japan, which states: “It must be the aim of collaboration based on the Three-Power Pact to induce Japan as soon as possible to take active measures in the Far East, and the center of gravity of the interests of the United States of America will be diverted to the Pacific; the common aim of the conduct of the war is to be stressed as forcing England to the ground quickly, thus keeping the United States of America out of the war.” The order ends by stating that the Japanese should not be given any intimation of Barbarossa operations. A fortnight later, on March 18, Keitel, Raeder, and Jodi together saw Hitler, and Raeder urged that the Japanese should take steps to seize Singapore.
Japan, Raeder commented, wanted if possible to avoid war against the United States. She could do so if she carried out a successful attack on Singapore. Raeder disagreed with Keitel over the need to keep the news of the Barbarossa plan from the Japanese and urged they be told. All this led to Ribbentrop’s seeing Matsuoka on March 29 and April 5. Ribbentrop promised to attack Russia should the latter intervene after Japan had gone to war with Britain over Singapore and said that the British were so occupied in home and Mediterranean waters that Raeder had given it as his opinion that the British would not be able to send a single ship to the Far East. Anyhow, according to Matsuoka, this did not matter, as “the Japanese Navy has a very low estimate of the threat from the British Navy. It also held the view that in the case of a clash with the American Navy it would be able to smash the latter without trouble.”
However, he was afraid that the Americans would not take up battle with their fleet. Thus the conflict with the United States might perhaps be dragged out to five years, a possibility which caused considerable worry to Japan. Matsuoka later in the talk asked for German assistance to attack Singapore. Ribbentrop said: “The Ftihrer has developed new methods for the German attack on strongly fortified positions which he could make available to the Japanese.” Matsuoka said the young Japanese naval officers were of the opinion that Singapore could be taken in three months (actually it fell just over two months after the outbreak of hostilities).
In January, 1939, Himmler and General
Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, had talked over the problems of a joint German-Japanese attack on Russia which developed in general terms at least into a project for linking up the German and Japanese armies in Central Asia with the ability to menace India through Turkistan and Afghanistan. On the occasion of this meeting Oshima told Himmler that the Japanese had sent ten Russians with bombs across the Caucasian frontier with the “mission to kill Stalin.” A number of additional Russians whom he had also sent across had been shot at the frontier. In addition he had organized the dissemination of leaflets in Russia by means of small balloons from Poland and was also going to attempt to smuggle them into the Crimea by motor boat from Rumania.
On July 10, 1941, the German Foreign Office cabled the German Ambassador in Tokyo, General Ott, urging the Japanese entry into the war on Russia. The Japanese plotted war against the United States, of the likelihood of which Berlin was warned in a cable from General Ott reaching them on December 2. Pearl Harbor and other attacks followed. Hitler on December 14 thus appraised the Japanese stroke: “You gave the right declaration of war; your method was the only proper one.” He would continue this way in the future.
Where the future might have led him was made clear by documents produced by Mr. Alderman dating from Pearl Harbor and discussing projects for the capture of Atlantic islands for use against America as well as a remark made by Goring at a conference of aircraft designers at Karinhall in 1938, when the Rcichsmarshal said: “I am still entirely without a plane which flies with five tons of explosives as far as New York and back. I should be extremely happy to have such a bomber so that I would at last be able to stop somewhat the mouths of the arrogant people over there.”
Throughout the reading by counsel of Ribbentrop’s series of inaccurate appreciations and forecasts of military, naval, and air situations, Goring laughed half ruefully, half angrily, every now and then turning back to Donitz, who sits behind him, as if seeking confirmation of his scathing judgment of the former Foreign Minister’s opinions in these matters.
Guided Missiles
The Aeroplane, November 30.—Of all the facets of the interesting aeronautical exhibition held recently, at Farnborough, perhaps that which caused most comment was the section devoted to guided missiles produced in the last stages of the war by the late enemy. The general appearance of these air weapons was certainly frightening, and as this section was situated at the entrance to the main static indoor display nothing more dramatic could have been shown. In this last review of Farnborough’s effort we can do no more but congratulate the promoters on staging such an informative and graphical illustration of the latest progress in aeronautics, which is not now confined to the airplane, as we know it, but to many projectiles of Wellsian fantasy. In the section devoted to guided missiles three bays had been set aside in the main hangar. One was devoted to the FZG 76 flying bomb, a second to the A4 long-range rocket, and the third to guided missiles, most of which had not been seen before and about which little has been published.
A complete standard FZG 76 was exhibited, mounted in position on the lowest of the eight sections forming the standard- type launching ramp. A second FZG 76 fitted with long-range fuel tanks and a smaller warhead was shown on a handling trolley. Both of these flying bombs had wooden- covered wings with metal tips, whereas it will be remembered that most of those found here during the “doodle bug blitz” had metal-covered wings.
An A4 (V2) rocket was exhibited, with its power unit uncovered for inspection and much of the remaining outer covering removed for the same purpose. A large section of the outer skin was shown with its quota of glass wool insulation, and in spite of the profuse “Don’t Touch” warnings many visitors on the public days acquired painful hands.
As the VI and V2 are only too well known, the third bay with its novelties proved to be of the greatest interest, and the exhibits are described here in detail. German failure to bring development and production into line is well appreciated, for after an examination of these weapons we realize possibly that they were open for further development, and could have had an unpleasant effect on the Allies’ air strategy, in spite of antidotes, had the war continued.
Little has been published about British guided-missile development, but a few details have been released about the United States Glomb, Gargoyle, and Gorgon, the last being a cleanly designed rocket-propelled radio-guided bomb.
Designed by Rheinmetall Borsig, the Rheintochter R1 was developed as a ground to air weapon for operation with the Rheinland system of aircraft interception, in which two radar plots, one on the hostile airplane and the other on the projectile, were correlated by a ground controller.
The Rheintochter R1 consisted of a rocket- propelled missile with six wings, aft of which was a booster rocket with four fins. The booster rocket was used for launching, and after expending its energy it dropped off. The distance from the launching base at which the booster rocket left the main missile was about two kilometers. The main rocket had a fuselage measuring 11 ft. 10J in. in length and 20 in. in diameter. Just aft of the pointed nose were four wooden control fins connected to operate in pairs, the top and bottom fins controlling the direction of flight and the lateral fins acting as elevators. The rocket motor was located just forward of the wings, and the exhaust gases were released through six venturis spaced round the fuselage between the wing roots. These venturis were outward inclined to ensure that the gases cleared the booster rocket unit.
Of mixed wood and metal construction, the aerofoils had a very thin section. Leading edges were of wood, while the sections aft of the thickest part were made up of a solid wooden core covered with thick sheet metal. These wings had a root chord of 28 in., a tip chord of 10 in., and the sweep-back on the leading edge amounted to 40 in. The total span was 8 ft. 8 in. The “warhead” was situated in the extreme tail aft of the wings.
The booster unit consisted of a cylindrical fuselage 58| in. long and 22 in. in diameter. It contained a rocket motor and mounted four all-wood fins. These fins had a root chord of 32§ in., a tip chord of 12 in., and a total span of 7 ft. 3 in. The exhaust gases were ejected through five outlet tubes in the extreme rear. These tubes had a maximum diameter of 7 in. and a length of 7-J- in. Two additional lubes, upper port and lower starboard, were sealed off, but the reason for this is not apparent.
Rheintochter R1 was launched from an inclined ramp. Small holes in some of the main wing tips suggest that some form of launching runner had been fitted. A flare in the tail of the main rocket was used as a visual aid for steering in good conditions. Development of this weapon had ceased prior to May, 1945, but an improved version known as the R3 had appeared. The total length of the R1 was 18 ft. 10§ in., the maximum speed 1,500/1,600 ft. per second, and the maximum ceiling 20,000 ft.
An interesting point about the German development of air-to-air and ground-to- air weapons was the way in which “pukka” aircraft designers were brought in to design missiles. Henschel was given a range of types to design, including 11s 293 and I Is 298, Mes- serschmitt designed the Eizian (Gentian), a four-rocket missile similar in outline to their Me 163, while Junkers produced the Schmet- tcrling. Schmellcrling was designed by Professor Wagner, of Junkers Flugzeug und Motoren Werke, and this weapon bore the distinctive title of V3.
Schmellcrling was a radio-guided, rocket- propelled anti-aircraft missile. In layout it comprised a long cylindrical metal fuselage with a short span mid-wing placed far back, with a cruciform tail unit. The fuselage was built in sections housing the components, and was covered with a metal skin. The nose was asymmetrical, the port side carrying the long fuse and warhead and the starboard side having a 6^-in. four-blade airscrew driving the electrical services.
The wing was an extremely interesting structure, being cast in one piece, including the main spar, trailing edge, and six main ribs. Attachment was by means of a tubular spar passing through the fuselage and inside rib to a point at the junction of the nose of the third rib and front spar. The whole structure was covered with a light-alloy skin and lateral control was achieved by spoilers on the trailing edge. The cantilever tail unit was also cast and covered with light alloy. Spoilers were fitted to the trailing edge of the tailplane, but no true directional control was provided.
Ground launched, Schmetterling was propelled by two rocket motors, one attached to the top of the fuselage and the other beneath the fuselage. These units gave tremendous thrust for a short period and when expanded were automatically jettisoned. Schmetterling was to have homed by radio on bombers by acoustic and sighting devices. Professor Wagner believed this missile to be so accurate that he predicted that one bomber would be destroyed for every missile fired. This weapon was ready for quantity production.
Data: Span of wing, 6ft. 2 in.; chord of wing at root, 26 in.; chord of wing at tips, 13 in.; sweep back at leading edge, 25 in.; total length, 13 ft. \\ in.; diameter of fuselage, 13-J in.; span of tailplane, 39 in.; all- up weight, 350 lb.; maximum speed, 620 m.p.h.; ceiling, 50,000 ft.; range, 20 miles.
Wasserfall was a ground-to-air rocket missile generally similar to conception to the larger long-range A4 rocket. The exhibit at Farnborough was actually a small model of this weapon. It was painted leaf green and still had traces of earth clinging to it, which was explained by the fact that this particular specimen had been obtained as a result of dragging a pond near Nordhausen. The figures quoted for the full-scale Wasserfall are: length, 24 ft.; diameter, 3 ft.; and all-up weight 3jj tons. The model was stated to be one-quarter of the full-size weapon, in which case the measurements for the large production type would be slightly inaccurate, as the model measured 6 ft. 3j- in. in length and 8§ in. in diameter. The wing span of the model was 1 ft. 7 in. and the span of the tailplane and elevators measured 2 ft. 1 in. About 45 of these missiles were launched experimentally, but only 12 were successful. Presumably, they were launched vertically from platforms similar to those used in launching A4s.
Externally, the Wasserfall is almost identical to the A4, but has four short-span wide- chord wings, and it appears to be related to another weapon found in the American Zone of occupation in Germany just after the German collapse. This other type had only two wings of a higher aspect ratio and a modified tail unit.
Wasserfall was propelled by visol and nitric acid and was originally designed to be detonated by a radio fuse. Later models would probably have been detonated by a proximity fuse in conjunction with a homing device. The early models of Wasserfall are known to have been fitted with a Siemens K12 automatic pilot servo unit, used to actuate the control surfaces.
One of a series of air-to-air, ground-to-air and air-to-ship weapons produced by Hen- schel was the Hs 298 shown at Farnborough. The IIs 298 was described as a radio-controlled glider bomb, but as in the case of the Hs 293, which also carried this description, the Hs 298 had rocket propulsion.
A small and ugly missile, the Hs 298 was designed for use against bomber formations. It was released from a parent airplane flying a little above or below the target at a range of £ to 1§ miles. The stipulation that the Hs 298 was to be launched from above or below the target was probably to help in aiming the missile as it would be more easily guided from these positions.
Experimental work was begun early in 1944 and it was not completed by the time of the German collapse. Control was achieved by spoilers on the tailplane and wing t ips. The missile was exploded by a proximity fuse.
Data: Span of wing, 4 ft. 2f in.; chord of wing at root, 19J in.; chord of wing at tips, 9 in.; sweep back on leading edge, 18J in.; length, 6 ft. 7 in.; width of fuselage, in.; maximum depth of fuselage, 16 in.; span of tailplane, 211 in.; all-up weight 210 lb.
Much attention had been given by the Germans to the air-to-air weapon for use against bomber formations. In addition to the somewhat clumsy Iienschcl Hs 298, the Germans had developed and used experimentally a rocket-propelled guided weapon known as X4. This missile consisted of a well-streamlined torpedo-like metal fuselage with four swept-back wooden wings and a cruciform metal tail unit. The nose section of the fuselage contained the 110-lb. warhead, detonated by a fuse housed in an 11-in. projection forming the nose. The center section housed the liquid propellant fuel, while the rear section contained the gyroscope, battery, and electrical services, with the propellant outlet in the extreme tail.
X4 was carried by Focke-Wulf Fw 190 fighters, being suspended from a modified 70-kg. bomb rack. On approaching a bomber formation X4 was released and flew ahead of the parent airplane, using its own rocket fuel and being controlled from the Fw 190 by means of electrical signals sent along the two 0.22-mm. insulated wires connecting the missile to the fighter. Six kms. of this wire were carried in each of the two metal bobbins fixed to the X4. These bobbins, 24 in. long, were mounted at the tip of the lower port and upper starboard wings. Flight control, as distinct from remote control, was achieved by comb-like spoilers on the tail fins—these spoilers had a maximum movement of 1/10 inch. The other wing tips carried an aiming flare. Having a top speed of about 620 m.p.h., X4 was already in quantity production. Data: Total length, 6 ft. 8 in.; span from wing tip to wing tip, excluding diameter of bobbins and flares, 1 ft. 7 in.; maximum fuselage diameter, 8$ in.; span of tailplane, 10$ in.
Bv 246 was a glider bomb used for attacks on Allied shipping. In layout the Bv 246 was a shoulder-wing cantilever monoplane with twin fins. The fuselage, 11 ft. in length, was of metal construction built in four sections, the front and rear sections being joined aft of the trailing edge, while both front and rear sections were each built in two pieces, the top and bottom halves being welded together.
The wing was the most interesting feature as it was made of concrete with a metal mesh core, being built in two sections attached to the side of the fuselage and faired at the roots. This wing had a span of 21 ft. 1 in., an area of 14.4 sq. ft. and the unique aspect ratio of 34. There were no ailerons.
Although there were two fins attached at the ends of the cantilever tailplane, only the port fin incorporated a rudder. Small elevators were fitted. Wooden pegs protruded from the top and bottom of both fins in the Bv 246 shown at Farnborough; there was no apparent reason for these fittings, but a photograph published in 2’he Aeroplane on August 17, 1945, showed guide flares fitted above each fin.
Three of these glider bombs were carried beneath the Heinkel He 177 and two under the Junkers Ju 88, Ju 188, Ju 388 and Dormer Do 217. Some form of radio control was fitted although no aerials were visible on the specimen examined. The total weight of the missile was 1,600 lb., of which about 1,000 lb. was taken up by the warhead.
A light-blue-painted example of this antishipping weapon, Hcnschel Hs 293, was included in the Farnborough exhibition. It is already well known. Data: Span, 9 ft. 6 in.; length, 11 ft. 8 in.
In addition to the actual weapons under development, Germany had produced a number of purely experimental missiles, and the example in this category shown at Farnborough was the Feurlilie 25. This was developed for ballistic and aerodynamic research at the Hermann Goring Research Institute at Volkenrodc, near Brunswick. The Feuerlilic 25, which was of all-metal construction, had a total weight of 264 lb.
The missile had a long, cylindrical fuselage with a maximum diameter of 9 in., and a long, pointed nose. The mid-cantilever wing was placed far back, the whole wing being swept back and also sharply tapered in chord. With a total span of 3 ft. 8$ in., the root chord was 25$ in., while the tip chord was only 7$ in.
Propulsion was by rocket powder burning for six seconds, the exhaust gases passing out through the rear of the fuselage. Symmetrical fins were mounted above and below the rear of the fuselage, each fin carrying a cantilever tailplane, the upper tail- plane having an elevator. Lateral control was achieved by small ailerons at the tips of the main wings. These ailerons were actuated by means of electro magnets mounted in the wing-tip fins, these in turn being controlled by a gyroscope housed in the fuselage.
Feuerlilie 25 was launched from an inclined ramp at an angle of 60 to 80 degrees and aiming was assisted by guide flares attached to the tips of the vertical fins. The total length of Feuerlilie 25 was 6 ft. 6 in., the span of the tailplane was 13J in.
In addition to the weapons dealt with in detail here, this particular section of the Farnborough Exhibition included a variety of German mines and bombs, among them the fat SA 4,000-kg. bomb and the FX 1400 radio controlled armor-piercing bomb.
The FX 1400 was used for anti-shipping operations, including an attack against ships at Plymouth in April, 1944. This bomb was dropped from 20,000 ft. aimed by a normal bomb sight. After its release the parent airplane slows down and climbs to bring itself into line with the bomb and the ship. The bomb aimer then sends radio-control signals to the bomb to keep the three in line until the bomb hits.
Also of interest was what is probably best described as a “sabotage set.” It consists of a large wooden bomb-like container housing three men, who are dropped in this structure by parachute. On landing they break out and get “cracking.” Two of these units could be carried by a Junkers Ju 88.
This exhibition of guided missiles showed remarkable lines of development of which we are yet only on the fringe. Great steps forward should be possible in the future, and we may hope for at least some rocket transport within the lifetime of many readers of The A eroplane.
As an indication of future trends it is timely to recall Mr. W. G. A. Perring’s recent lecture delivered before the Royal Aeronautical Society. In his lecture Mr. Perring mentioned the German A9 and A10 long-range rocket projects. The A9 was an A4 fitted with wings enabling it to glide, thereby increasing its range. The addition of wings to the A4 brings it even closer to the Wasserfall design already described. A10, in the project stage only, was a two- stage rocket consisting of an A9 attached to the A10 unit which acted as a giant booster rocket to be jettisoned after carrying the A9 into the stratosphere. In this project the system adopted in the Rlicin- tochter again appears. Hitler’s drive for new techniques in air warfare had certainly borne fruit.
No description of German anti-aircraft
weapons would be complete without some details of the Bachem BP 20 Natter (Viper), illustrated in The Aeroplane of October 5, 1945, but which was not shown at the R.A.E. Exhibition. Natter was in an early stage of development, but at least one experimental launching had taken place. This advanced project fitted into a category between the interceplor/fighter and the guided rocket projectile evolved for the defense of specific targets.
Launched from a ramp at an angle of 75 degrees, the Natter had assisted take-off provided by two solid fuel rockets which were jettisoned about 5,000 ft. At this height the Walter HWK 109-509 bi-fuel rocket motor provided the thrust. The climb was ground controlled but the pilot located in the nose took over for the actual interception. After attacking the hostile bomber formation with rocket projectiles the pilot and rocket motor returned to earth by parachutes.
JAPAN
Japanese Admit 1942 Decisive Year
New York Ilcrald Tribune, January 13, by Leo Cullinane.—The Navy Department revealed for the first time this week that the highest Japanese naval authorities now have fully confirmed American assertions that the most decisive battles of the Pacific war occurred in May and June, 1942. These were the historic battles of the Coral Sea and Midway. The former probably saved Australia from direct attack by Japan. The latter saved Hawaii from further attack, and may have warded off an assault on the west coast. Both these crucial engagements lasted four days and both were unique in that opposing sides never exchanged a single shot from surface vessels. The action was entirely by aircraft, nearly all from opposing carriers. The Coral Sea Battle began May 4, and at Midway the action began June 3. These air-sea encounters occurred during the first six months of the war when the United States had not fully recovered from the sneak attack at Pearl Harbor.
Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, former Chief of Naval Operations, in his first report covering combat operations up to March 1, 1944, devoted only eleven paragraphs to the Midway and three to the Coral Sea Battle and confined his final official report, made public only a few weeks ago, to other subjects.
Both the engagements were primarily air battles. The Army participated in the Midway engagement, using heavy and medium bombing planes, which probably sank one Japanese carrier, although most of the damage inflicted on the Japanese was credited to carrier-based naval planes.
Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, now Chief of Naval Operations, was Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet and exercising tactical command at the time. In discussing engagements, he said: “The Battle of the Coral Sea showed us what we could do; the Battle of Midway was definitely the turning point.” After these engagements, Admiral Nimitz said the Navy could go wherever it wanted in the Pacific since the Japanese had lost the initiative.
This statement was more than borne out by the Navy’s disclosure to the New York Herald Tribune this week of information contained in interrogations of high Japanese naval officers after their surrender. Chief among them was Fleet Admiral S. Nagano, Chief of Naval Operations, who said: “The Japanese Navy suffered its first serious losses at the Battle of Midway. Again late in 1944 in the Battles of the Philippine Sea we took extremely heavy losses, particularly in our carrier strength.”
Interrogation in Tokyo on October 6 of Captain Y. Watanabe, gunnery officer on the battleship Yatnalo, flagship of Admiral Yamamoto, commander of the Midway invasion force, revealed the occupation of Midway was planned after the first air raid on Tokyo by the Doolittle flyers. The Japanese mistakenly thought the planes came from Midway, so it was decided to capture the island and use it as a base to attack Hawaii. He said Admiral Yamamoto bitterly blamed the failure of the Japanese invasion force on the “lack of precaution on the part of our air force.”
Admiral Nimitz also revealed this week that Admiral Yamamoto never bragged that he would dictate peace in the While House, as so many stories related. Even the Japanese people were fooled on that one, Admiral
Nimitz said. What Admiral Yamamoto really said, sometime before Pearl Harbor, was the following:
Should hostilities break out between Japan and the United States, it will not be enough that we take the Philippines or Guam, nor even Hawaii and San Francisco. To make victory certain, we will have to march into Washington and dictate the terms of peace in the White House. And I wonder if our politicians, among whom armchair arguments about the war are being glibly bandied about in the name of state politics, have confidence in the final outcome and arc prepared to make the necessary sacrifice.
Yamamoto was shot down in an airplane in the Solomons because the Navy had cracked the Japanese code and knew from intercepted messages just where the Japanese naval leader would be.
Captain Susumu Kawaguchi, executive officer of the big carrier Iliryn, lost in the Battle of Midway after its planes had heavily damaged the United States carrier Yorktown, said the lliryu was sunk solely by United States Navy aircraft. He said that several times the ship was attacked by Army heavy bombers (B-17 Flying Fortresses), but, despite their low altitude when the bombs were dropped, no hits were scored on the lliryu. The lliryu was one of the carriers that hit Pearl Harbor.
Captain Aoki Taijiro, commanding officer of the carrier Akagi, declared that the huge Midway fleet was sent in because the Japanese believed it could escape largely unscathed like the force which attacked Pearl Harbor. But he ruefully acknowledged that the Midway force did not get off so easily.
The Battle of the Coral Sea, just as Cor- regidor was falling and American and British forces were being driven out of Burma, was a tremendous morale factor. Up to that time, the power and efficiency of the Japanese Fleet was largely an unknown factor.
The Coral Sea engagement showed that all that was necessary to defeat the Japanese Fleet was to meet it in battle. This was what Admiral Nimitz and other naval leaders wanted to know. After that battle, United States naval forces steam-rollered their way into every objective. The Japanese, however, needed the second lesson, that of Midway, to have the fact driven home. In fact, that is where the Japanese grand fleet was driven after Midway—home. It did not emerge again in any kind of force until the last desperate and suicidal appearance of the war, the battles of the Philippine Sea more than two years later.
Sinking of the “Taisho”
Chicago Daily Tribune, December 11.— Japan’s largest and newest aircraft carrier was torpedoed and sunk by a United States submarine in its first engagement in the Philippine sea in 1944. The 40,000-ton Taisho, launched as Japan’s answer to ever increasing American air supremacy, exploded and sank six hours after it was punctured by a single torpedo on June 18, its senior staff officer disclosed today. Another carrier, the 30,000-ton Chokaku, also was sunk by an American submarine on the first day of that engagement.
Captain Toshikazu Ohmac, the staff officer aboard the Taisho, told the story of its end in describing the first battle of the Philippine sea—which Japanese officers consider one of the most decisive engagements in Pacific naval warfare. The Taisho was the flagship of the attacking force under Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa. The group was attempting to save Japanese surface ships after their air power was smashed off Saipan. After it was hit, one of the carrier’s compartments burst into flame but the fire was extinguished. The ship steamed northward beyond the range of American planes. Suddenly the Taisho exploded violently and disintegrated into flaming wreckage. It sank in a matter of seconds and only a few of the crew survived. Ohmae said gasoline fumes loosed by the torpedo explosion had ignited.
The staff officer said that both he and Ozawa had been aboard, but transferred to another vessel 15 minutes before the explosion. Ozawa later appeared as commander of the task force which engaged Admiral Halsey’s 3rd fleet at the northern end of the triangular second battle of the Philippine sea. In that battle the Japanese Navy was erased as an effective combat force. Ohmae said, however, that the first battle of the Philippine sea was the most decisive naval battle of the war.
“Japan lost its sea power in the Pacific after that and was unable to protect the homeland,” he said.
U.S.S.R.
Group Attacks by Torpedo Planes
Krasny Flat, September 25, by Captain V. Getmanov.—In the first period of the war, circumstances in the Baltic did not permit the unfolding of group torpedo plane operations against enemy shipping. And, one must add, cruising operations were necessarily rather hurried.
With the advance of the Leningrad and Baltic front troops in 1944, circumstances in this theater suffered a radical change. German naval communications livened up, and transport between the troops surrounded by the enemy and the homeland was intensified. From isolated cruising raids, the Baltic torpedo-carrying aviation went over to group action. Our aviation operating from advanced airdromes in the Baltic was able to operate more effectively on enemy communications. The first such attacks were carried out by small groups, and at first gave dependable results. However, after the enemy took a number of measures to strengthen convoy and transport protection, the situation changed. Fire power from powerful A.A. defense on both convoying ships and transports rose to such a state that it became impossible for our torpedo planes to attain the desired results.
New tactical uses for torpedo planes became necessary, and such forms were soon discovered. We came to the conclusion that groups of torpedo planes could break through a strong enemy defense and strike home if part of the planes armed with torpedoes were supported by another part armed with bombs and acting as Slormoviks. The bombladen plane would rake the targets with machine-gun fire prior to the attack. For this maneuver it was necessary to employ skillful teamwork by torpedo planes leading the group.
If we examine the elements of attack, we notice that the bombing planes sometimes attack at the same altitude as the torpedo planes. The great tactical difference between the two is that bombers travel full speed at the moment of attack, whereas torpedo planes slow down, hanging over the target, so to speak, in order to get off the torpedo. The position of the torpedo plane before its target is exceedingly dangerous. At that moment he needs fire support and another plane to attract the enemy’s attention. Because of their characteristics, our bombers were quite suitable for covering the torpedo planes’ attack and could at the same time deal a blow on their own.
A group of planes would fly in close formation. On approaching the target, after the command “Attack” the planes would divide according to calculations, a pair to each ship (torpedo plane and bomber), and open a concentrated machine-gun fire on the convoying ships and transports. On the target the bomber, which had already been recognized, would go out first. He would give it the gas, and head for the target at full speed and with maneuvers against the A.A. fire. From this moment he became the lead plane, and the torpedo plane gradually slowed down to let go a torpedo. Practise shows that frequently the effective fire of the bomber would force the surface craft to curtail its fire before the torpedo plane came in to attack. Picking up confidence for the success of attack, the torpedo plane would set its course for the target, coming in zigzag with machine guns firing. Then, at a given distance and height, and with the proper speed, it would launch the torpedo and turn away giving full gas.
The number of enemy vessels sunk since this method of attack was applied clearly shows how effective it was. The group torpedo plane attack as a tactical form has completely justified itself.
The experience of this war shows further, that the most effective means of destroying convoys which are powerfully protected by A.A. fire is a devastating attack of combined forces of aviation. In such attacks large groups of torpedo planes, bombers, dive bombers, and Stormoviks take part.
OTHER COUNTRIES Argentina
The Argentine State merchant fleet has ordered five ships totalling 46,100 gross tons and costing £1,362,000 to be built in Great Britain, and one ship of 9,100 tons from Sweden. Three vessels have been ordered from Short Bros., Sunderland, and one each from the Burntisland Shipbuilding Company, Limited, and from Bar- tran and Sons, Sunderland.—London Times, December 7.
China
James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, last week asked Congress to enact legislation which would authorize President Truman to transfer surplus naval ships to the Chinese government for maintenance of peace in the Pacific. The legislation also would permit the President to provide China with technical advisers and to detail naval officers and enlisted men “to assist the republic of China in naval and maritime matters.” Mr. Forrestal said in a letter to Speaker Sam Rayburn that the vessels could be transferred to China “by sale, exchange, lease, gift, or transfer for cash, credit, or other property.” “It appears that the national interest,” he said, “as well as considerations of good conscience, require that the United States give aid to the republic of China by assisting that nation in maintaining a navy at a strength which will make possible a substantial contribution toward the maintenance of peace in the Pacific.”—Maritime Activity Reports, December 27.
Under the watchful eyes of Vice Admiral Daniel E. Barbcy, commander of (he 7th Fleet, members of the first class of Chinese being trained here by the American Navy to operate amphibious craft went through their paces today. It was at Barbey’s suggestion that the Navy authorized establishment of a training base here and assigned three LST’s for the use of the first class. Commodore P. L. Carroll is in charge of the school, where American officers and enlisted personnel of the ships act as the instructors. The 36 officers and 260 men in the first class are being taught everything about the operation of Diesel type craft, except the use of United States communications and radar. Barbey said radar still is too secret and intricate to attempt instruction in the brief training period.
Two Chinese crews are placed aboard each ship, where each member of the American crew teaches them his particular job. The first class will be ready to take over the ships by April 1. Meanwhile additional classes will have begun training in other types of amphibious craft. In recommending establishment of the training school, Barbey said it would enable China to form the nucleus of a new navy with which she could transport her own troops. It also will speed the return home of the American sailors.
The first demonstration the Admiral had of results of the training came when he stepped aboard a moored ship and asked Seaman 1st Class Waller Fisher of Huntsville, Alabama, what he was teaching his two students. Fisher said he was showing them how to heave a line and said they were doing pretty well, The Admiral asked for a demonstration and a young Chinese let loose with a wild heave that sent the heavy ball and line skimming over Barbey’s head and made most of the American and Chinese officers duck.
Captain S. K. Lin of the Chinese Navy said 300 to 400 men and 40 Chinese officers are being trained in England for the Chinese Navy and that about 1,000 Chinese have been receiving naval training in the last eight months at Miami, Florida.—Chicago Daily Tribune, January 7, by Joseph Hearst.
Netherlands
Two thousand Dutch marines, trained and equipped in the United States, arrived off Batavia today and the British said they probably would disembark within a few days. The Cabinet of the unrecognized Indonesian Republic met immediately, prcsumbly to discuss the prospective landing.
The Indonesians had protested against movement of additional Dutch forces into the Netherlands Indies, but in this particular case had agreed some time ago to allow the marines to be brought in to replace Amboinese natives serving in the Dutch Army, Premier Sutan Sjahrir said. Sjahrir was prevented by illness from attending today’s Cabinet meeting.
In announcing the marines’ arrival, Allied headquarters said they would replace Dutch native troops “who are going outside Batavia.” The British said that Indonesian leaders had been informed that the Dutch marines would help enforce order, thus making possible a disarming of Dutch civilians.
[Netherlands Premier Willem Schermerhorn indicated in a special broadcast to the Dutch people that a complete public statement of his government’s policy and intentions toward (he Netherlands Indies will be made soon, Aneta, the Dutch news agency, reported yesterday, according to the United Press.]
Trained at Quantico, Virginia, Camp Eugene, North Carolina, and Camp Pendleton, Oregon, and fully supplied with American equipment, the marines arc considered among the finest troop in the Netherlands armed forces. Most of them were recruited in southern Holland. The Dutch are known to have 6,000 more marines, mostly Holland-trained, awaiting shipment to the Indies. —New York Herald Tribune, December 31.
Poland
Roman Kutylowski, president of the Gdynia- Amcrica Line, Inc., the Polish national merchant shipping company, has left the United States to confer in Poland on re-establishing the country’s merchant fleet, units of which are expected to be returned from the Allied shipping pool in the spring. At Mr. Kutylowski’s office in New York it was said he went first to London to attend a conference with Polish representatives, and that he would go from there to Gdynia and Danzig. While in Poland he will see members of his family for the first time since 1938. The Polish Press Agency, at SO Rockefeller Plaza, New York City, announced that Poland’s merchant fleet of 31 ships, totaling 140,000 tons, would be repaired and overhauled after it is returned in the spring and would be ready for service from Polish ports by next July. The ships include the Batory Sobicski, Kosciuszko, and Pulaski all passenger ships. Freighters include the Narwik, Tobruk, Bialystok, Ballyk, Boryslaw, Morska, Wola, and Stalowa Wola. Two other ships, the Ragna, under charter from Swedish owners, and the Katowice, arc now operating between |London and Hull, and the two Baltic ports of Gdynia and Danzig.— Maritime Activity Reports, January 3.
Venezuela
Venezuela is interested in acquiring coastwise ships in this country, it was disclosed last week by Otto Scott Estrella, member of the Venezuelan naval mission which recently arranged for the purchase by his Government of a group of Canadian corvettes. Mr. Estrella stated at a meeting of the international trade section of the New York Board of Trade that the reason the small naval vessels were purchased in Canada rather than in the United States was because of difficulties which his mission experienced in trying to buy surplus property in this country. Mr. Estrella said that his mission is interested in many types of surplus material in addition to naval craft. This includes railroad, roadbuilding and agricultural machinery. At the present time, the mission is only looking into the possibility of buying merchant craft, he said, but he indicated that they were definitely interested in acquiring small coastwise steamers for the Venezuela domestic trades. “We’re truly in a hurry about it,” he declared in commenting on his country’s need for materials to expand and diversify its economy. The Venezuelan said that the present Government in Caracas is making plans for a substantial drop in the country’s oil exports, realizing that the present output of 1,0(10,000 barrels a day probably cannot be continued.—Maritime Activity Reports, December 27.
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A NAVY JET-FIGHTER COMES HOME TO ROOST
A. jet-pushed, propeller-pulled Fireball fighter about to laud on the deck o{ the \J. S. aircraft carrier Ranger.
AVIATION
New Jet Plane for Carriers
Washington Post, January 10.'—The Navy last night announced development of its first exclusively jet-powered fighter plane for carrier operation. Its top speed exceeds 500 miles an hour. Designated the FD-1 “Phantom,” the plane was designed and built by the McDonnell Aircraft Corp., St. Louis, Missouri. Despite its high speed, the Phantom has a landing gait comparable to conventional carrier-based fighters, making “wave-oils” feasible. The plane, already extensively flight-tested, has a service ceiling of “well over 7 miles,” the Navy said.
Primarily designed as an interceptor, it has an extremely high rate of climb and a range of approximately 1,000 miles. “This plane,” the Navy announcement said, “constitutes a significant milestone in the history of naval aviation as it opens the field of carrier operation to the all-jet interceptor.”
Power is furnished by twin axial-flow Wcstinghouse turbo-jet engines built into the wing roots. The engines, which are of exclusive American design, contain no long scoops or ducts. For conditions where takeoff assistance is needed, cither standard carrier catapults or jato (jet-assisted takeoff) units may be used.
The “Phantom” is built of light aluminum alloy polished to a finish which presents little air resistance. A plexiglass cockpit canopy, set ahead of the engines, resembles an “elongated bubble.” All rivet heads are set flush, and the tricycle landing gear is completely inclosed when retracted. Total weight of the plane with full combat load is less than 10,000 pounds.
The single-seat low wing monoplane has a wing span of approximately 40 feet. The wings fold electrically, and when rigged for stowage the plane is only 16 feet wide. Rocket devices and auxiliary belly fuel tanks may be dropped in flight. Armament consists of standard fighter armament mounted in the nose.
The F8F Bearcat
Aero Digest, December 1.—Designed to be more than a match for the best aircraft which the Japs could produce, the F8F Bearcat is the newest of the planes built by Grumman for the Navy. A fast, highly maneuverable craft, the Bearcat is a low mid-wing monoplane powered with a singlestage Pratt & Whitney 2800C double Wasp engine, turning a four-bladed Aeroprop. Its speed is reported to be “in excess of 400 m.p.h.,” at sea level, and its rate of climb is 5,000 fpm. with the aid of water injection.
In designing the plane, Grumman drew on their experience with their earlier outstanding aircraft, the Wildcat and Hellcat, and the best qualities of these, together with some features of the more outstanding Japanese planes, have been built into the Bearcat. The result is a relatively lightweight airplane with a high rate of climb and excellent maneuverability, which is at the same time possessed of all the stamina and “toughness” required of Navy fighters.
The Bearcat is a smaller airplane than its predecessor, the Hellcat. Compact and rugged, its gross weight is approximately 3,000 lb. less than that of the F6F, and its wing span and over-all length more nearly approximately those of the Wildcat. Wingtips of the Bearcat are squared, and slight dihedral at the wing roots is typical of Grumman designs.
The combination of small size and a powerful engine makes for reduced drag and a low power loading factor. These contribute to the speed and performance of the plane, and when the pilot is equipped with an antiblackout suit, extremely tight turns and other maneuvers at high speed are practicable.
Observers who have watched training squadrons in action have reported that the Bearcat will climb faster than, and turn inside of, any plane that has taken the air against it—except perhaps those powered with jet propulsion units.
A bubble canopy over the pilot’s cockpit provides 360° visibility; and the short, blunt nose permits good forward vision when making landings. This is especially important during carrier operations, when it is advantageous for the pilot to keep the edge of the deck in view after he has reached the “cut” position.
The Bearcat is armed with four .50-cal.
machine guns in the wings, and is equipped to carry both bombs and rockets. Although put into production too late to see combat, several squadrons of F8F’s had been assigned to combat evaluation duty, and were engaged in carrier landing operations at the time of V-J Day.
Fast New Patrol Plane
Washington Post, December 20.—The Navy revealed yesterday that it has developed and already tested the fastest, most far-ranging and heavily armed search plane ever devised—the Neptune patrol bomber P2V. Others will be delivered soon by the Lockheed Aircraft Co., of Burbank, Calif.
Powered by two 3,350-hp. Wright radial engines, the craft has a top speed in excess of 300 miles an hour, a normal range of 3,500 miles, and a maximum range of 5,000 with extra fuel tanks.
Its nose is studded with six 20-mm. cannon, and it carries two torpedoes. Beneath each wing are eight 5-inch high velocity rockets—twice as many as any other patrol bomber carries. It also can carry twelve 325-pound depth charges for submarine attack, four 2,000-pound bombs, or a greater number of lighter weight bombs. In its top and power air turrets it carries twin-mount .50-caliber machine guns. Its gross weight of 58,000 pounds includes 1 ton of the latest radar-radio equipment.
With full load, its normal cruising speed is 170 to 200 miles an hour and its service ceiling is 23,200 feet. The Neptune can fly on one engine in an emergency, has a 100- foot wing spread, and a 75-foot fuselage.
As an example of its range, from Guam it could fly over Wake Island, Tokyo, Manila, or New Britain. Based on Manila, it could patrol Singapore, Shanghai, or Indo-China. It carries a crew of seven, with sleeping accommodations and an all-electric galley. One feature is its “varicam tail,” a mechanical device for varying the curve of the horizontal tail surface. This allows the pilot to balance a heavy load in one part of the plane and keep it in level flight.
Jet Engines
Mechanical Engineering, January.—At a recent press conference George II. Woodward, manager, and R. P. Kroon, manager of engineering, Aviation Gas Turbine Division, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, South Philadelphia, described the jet engines developed by the corporation and displacing the 19B and the 9.5A types. The new plant in which the engines are built represents an investment of $10,000,000 and includes a $3,000,000 engineering laboratory devoted exclusively to the development of the gas turbine. Mr. Woodward said that on February 1, 1945, when the Aviation Gas Turbine Division was established, it had 204 employees directly on its pay roll. At present, he added, the Division numbered 1,100 employees and work was still being done outside the Division’s own plant. In about one year he expected to have between 1,500 and 2,000 employees. The plant was designed for an annual capacity at maximum of $10,000,000 to $15,000,000 worth of aircraft engines. In addition to the jet engines, a sketch was shown of a propeller-drive gas turbine.
The jet engine will be used exclusively when speed is important above all other considerations,” Mr. Woodward said, “although jet-propelled planes are not yet very efficient from the standpoint of fuel consumption. This means that the jet engine will find its immediate application in highspeed interceptor planes which are not required to travel long distances from their own airports or aircraft carriers. The jet engine may also find application in extremely high-speed transport ships designed for relatively short-distance commutation. The rate of combustion is so intensive that in a given space 1,000 times as much heat is released as in a conventional power-plant boiler. Brought up to a temperature of 1,500 F., the combustion products then enter the turbine where they give off a good deal of their energy to drive the compressor. The tips of the turbine blades move at 800 mph. They arc revolving so fast that the centrifugal pull on each turbine blade is 50,000 times its own weight.
As the air enters the engine, it first cools the lubricating oil. The aluminum oil cooler is located where it is subjected to cooling air independent of whether the airplane is flying or on the ground.
After having gone through the turbine, the gases then enter the exhaust nozzle. From here the jet exhausts as a 1,200-m.p.h. gale. This exhaust nozzle is one in which the area and thereby the velocity of the jet can be varied by a movable tailpiece. The accessory drive comprises those accessories which serve the engine proper and they consist of:
(1) An electric starter to bring the engine up to the speed at which it can maintain itself.
(2) Fuel pump to deliver fuel to the combustion chamber.
(3) Oil pump to circulate the oil to the bearings and to the coil cooler, which is mounted in front of the engine where air cooling is available at all times.
(4) An overspeed control to prevent the engine from “running away.”
(5) An electric tachometer to give a visual indication of r.p.m. to the pilot.
The accessories which serve the airplane are:
(1) A generator to provide electric current,
(2) A hydraulic pump to furnish high-pressure oil to serve wing flaps, landing gear, etc., or,
(3) A vacuum pump to operate the aircraft instruments.
The 9.5A engine has many of the same features. Its top speed is 34,000 r.p.m., 567 revolutions per second. It was originally designed to power an American buzzless bomb, but appears promising in general to drive small planes and, in later modified form, as a small mechanical-drive turbine to drive helicopters, cabin superchargers, and electric generators.
The engines we have built so far are all pure jet engines. We believe, however, that the jet engine is essentially a power plant suited for high-speed aircraft. We have felt that such aircraft should be of a very clean and streamlined design and that it was extremely important to build the engine so that it would have a small frontal area which would make it possible to design such a streamlined plane for very high speeds; that is why we have gone out of our way to design for such a small diameter.
Our analysis of gas-turbine propeller drives has proved that we can build a gas turbine of only one half the diameter of the reciprocating engine of the same power. We are confident that we can build a gas turbine with an installed weight between one half and three quarters of the installed weight of the piston engine. Our studies show that on a large plane the gas turbine would give performance which would be superior to the piston engine in every respect, namely, in range of the aircraft, maximum speed, rate of climb, pay load, and take-off distance. In addition, the inherent simplicity of the gas turbine, the fact that practically no cooling is needed, and that vibration problems and noise are much reduced as compared with the piston engine, will make the gas- turbine propeller drive extremely attractive for future aviation.
Already today there is a demand for engines of 6,000 and 10,000 hp. The Germans built an 8,000-hp. jet engine. A piston engine for such powers would be a difficult piece of machinery to build, and it is doubtful if its size and complexity would not be prohibitive. But we see no reason at all why jet engines or gas turbines of 6,000 or 10,000 hp. cannot be built almost immediately.
MERCHANT MARINE
Emergency Shipbuilding Program Ended
Marine Progress Weekly News Reports, December 12.—With the delivery of the Victory ship Brainerd Victory from the yard of the Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation and that of the T-2 tanker J. II. McCarcgill by Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Company, two emergency ship construction programs were brought to an end. The cargo ship program which included Victory and Liberty ships as well as concrete cargo vessels and barges has been one of the greatest shipbuilding feats ever attempted by any nation.
The tanker construction job, proportionately as great as the dry cargo project was, if possible, even more important than that of building Liberties and Victories. The need for gasoline on the world battle fronts was stupendous with whole tanker loads being used in very short periods of time. In addition there was the great need for bunker oil for the warships of the allied navies and for the merchant ships in convoy for the factories turning out munitions and all the varied uses to which petroleum products have been put.
The Liberty ship program was completed in October with the SS. Albert M. Boc taking the end of the long line of Liberties opposite the SS. Patrick Henry, the first ship of this type to be completed. From Liberty ship No. 1 to the last there were 2,710 built, the majority of them straight cargo ships but diverting into specialized types at various stages of the war. When the submarine campaign took an extra heavy toll of tankers, Liberty ship hulls were converted to tankers and later on Liberty ships were specially built for the carriage of tanks and aircraft in boxes, and toward the end of the war and designed for post-war operation as well as war duties there were Liberty ships built as colliers. Without any considerable change in the ship’s structure, Liberty ships were made into troop ships and have been instrumental in returning thousands of soldiers home from overseas posts.
The Victory ship program, entered into when materials were available and the pressure was lightened a little, has resulted in the construction of 531 vessels. The early ones were built as combat loaded transports and cargo ships for the Navy and their entrance into the cargo carrying business was at first slow. These ships have, however, been taking an increasingly important place in present-day ship operations.
The first Victory ship, like the last, was built at the Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation. It was called the United Victory with other ships immediately following being named for the various United Nations. 1 hus we have the Belgium Victory, the USSR Victory, etc. Later the ships were named for American colleges.
Building Program for 1946
Maritime Activity Reports, January 3. The coming year secs ahead for the shipbuilding industry in this country a construction program calling for the delivery of approximately 140 merchant ships, to be built by 14 yards. This estimate does not take into account the 11 new passenger ships which have been authorized by the Maritime Commission, but for which contracts have not yet been executed. The ships to be constructed during the year include about 100 for the Maritime Commission and the rest for private accounts.
The Albina Engine & Machine Works, Inc., in Portland, Oregon, is scheduled to deliver in 1946, 17 coastal cargo ships for account of the Netherlands Government and three Cl-MT-BUl’s for the U. S. Maritime Commission.
Of the 24 ships to be built by the Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp., Pascagoula, Mississippi, 14 are special type vessels for Lloyd Bra- sileiro. The others are seven C3-S-A5’s and three C3-Sl-BRl’s for the Maritime Commission. The Ingalls building program will continue until February 1947.
The Bethlehem-Sparrows Point yard, Sparrows Point, Maryland, is under contract to deliver 17 ships in 1946, including 3 C3-S-A3’s, 3 C5-S AXI’s, 2 T3-S2-Al’s, and 9 Rl-S-DHl’s.
The Sun Shipbuilding Co., Chester, Pennsylvania, is building 10 large cargo ships for the Netherlands Government and 2 private tankers. The yard is also under contract to build 5 T3-S2-A3’s for the Maritime Commission.
The Gulf Shipbuilding Corp., Mobile, Alabama, is building 3 C2-S-El’s and 2 R2-ST-AUl’s.
Three refrigerator ships for the United Fruit Company are being built by the Newport News (Virginia) Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., to be delivered next year.
Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., Kearny, N. J., has contracts to build 3 C2-Sl-DG2’s and 6 C3-S-BHl’s.
The Kaiser Company, Inc., shipyard at Vancouver, Washington, is building 8 C4-S-A4’s. while Kaiser’s Richmond No. 3 yard will complete 2 of this type ship this month.
Two P2-SE2-R3’s are scheduled for delivery next year by the Bethlehem Alameda (California) yard.
Consolidated Steel Corp., Long Beach, California, has contracted to deliver 9 C2-S-Bl’s in 1946.
Western Pipe & Steel Co., San Francisco, California, is building 3 C3-S-A4’s.
The North Carolina Shipbuilding Corp., Wilmington, N. C., will build 6 C2-Sl-AJ4’s and 4 C2-S-AJ5’s next year.
I’usey & Jones Shipbuilding Co., Wilmington, Delaware, has under construction 2 S3-S2-BPl’s.
Private Operation Planned Soon
New York Herald Tribune, January 14.— The United States Maritime Commission announced today that the nation’s merchant fleet—with the exception of troop transports —will be returned to private ownership and operation “at the earliest practicable moment” and outlined policy that should be followed after the shift. After the changeover, it said, private operators will assume full responsibility for the operational procedure of vessels, owned or chartered by them, in accordance with the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 and other statutory law. The responsibility for obtaining officers and crews and for transporting this personnel from port to port will revert to the operators and unions without war time aids furnished by the War Shipping Administration. However, the training of seamen will be continued by the Federal government on a scale commensurate with peace time needs of the merchant marine. Responsibility for the efficiency and health of crews will be assumed by the operators with the government participating as accorded by law, the commission said. Troop transports will be excepted until large-scale troop movements cease.
274 Merchant Ships Now in Reserve
Maritime Activity Reports, December 13. —Two hundred and seventy-four merchant ships of various types have been placed in the inactive Reserve Fleet during the past few months, the United States Maritime Commission and War Shipping Administration announced this week. These include Liberty ships, tankers, cargo vessels, tugs, and concrete vessels. No troopships are being placed in the inactive fleet.
Temporary Reserve Fleet locations now being utilized are the James River, Virginia (headquarters in Norfolk); Suisan Bay, California (headquarters in San Francisco); and the Mobile River, Alabama (headquarters in New Orleans). Permanent sites chosen to date are Wilmington, North Carolina; Houston and Beaumont, Texas.
Vessels are placed in the Reserve Fleet when the WSA does not need them to meet current cargo demands. Many arc so damaged from war service that immediate repairs are uneconomical, many are older vessels without the speed or accommodations necessary for the modern Merchant Marine. A few are new vessel hulls launched after V-J Day but not outfitted or completed for service.
When vessels go out-of-service certain stores, equipment, and fuel are removed to other active WSA vessels. Equipment such as linen, tableware, and rope are placed in WSA warehouses for reissue. Other equipment is left aboard until the future status of the vessel is determined. When a ship is taken out-of-service, preservatives are immediately applied to machinery to forestall deterioration. Lifeboats, rafts, and cargo handling gear are stored in the vessel’s holds.
T2 tankers are given special attention to prevent deterioration of the turbo electric drives. Machinery spaces are sealed up and dehumidification units are installed. This temporary lay-up of T2 tankers will be done by shipyards in the vicinity of Beaumont, Texas, and in San Francisco Bay.
Vessels arc anchored in units of 10 to 35. They arc tied up with fenders and spring lines for protection against the tides. A staff in each area cares for preparation of the vessel and maintenance durings its stay in reserve.
Experiments in dehumidification in machinery and boiler-rooms and living and cargo spaces to prevent deterioration are being conducted by the Todd Shipyards Corji., Hoboken, New Jersey on the Liberty ship SS. John Stevenson. Results of these studies together with those made by the U. S. Navy will be applied in ships in the permanent reserve.
Plimsoll Marks Return
Maritime Activity Reports, January 3.— The International Convention fixing the load lines of vessels in American waters, suspended during the war, was put back into effect last week. President Truman in a proclamation revoking the August 9, 1941, suspension, said continued suspension is no longer necessary or desirable. Also known as Plimsoll marks, load lines are conspicuously painted on the sides of merchant vessels to indicate the limit of submergence allowed by law. In wartime, load lines could provide information to enemy submarines in setting their torpedoes for a deep or shallow run.
Pay of Seamen
Maritime Activity Reports, January 3.— American merchant seamen are the highest- paid seafarers in the world, according to a survey by a committee of general agents of the War Shipping Administration on the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts. The survey was made as part of negotiations between the agents and the National Maritime Union for a new contract. Able seamen on American ships receive a base wage of $145 a month, while the average income of the same rating on ships of fifteen other leading maritime nations of the world is $58.25 a month. American seamen also get overtime and penalty pay, sometimes amounting to 25 per cent of base pay. Canadian seamen, paid $81 a month, are second in the basic wage classification. Chilean seamen, who receive $17 a month, are lowest paid. Chinese and Indian Lascar seamen, whose wages are said to be still lower, were not included in the survey. Base pay of able seamen by nations follows: Argentina, $36; Australia, $57; Belgium, $49; Brazil $25; Canada, $81; Chile, $17; France, $54; Great Britain, $56; Greece, $44; the Netherlands, $63; New Zealand, $68; Norway, $58; Poland, $56; Sweden, $53, and the United States, $145. American seamen are seeking a 30 per cent increase, which would bring their monthly pay to $185.50 a month. The basic wage of seamen does not include the value of board and lodging furnished on voyages, estimated by shipping men at $175 a month.
MISCELLANEOUS Who’s Who in the Atomic Race?
Marine Corps Gazette, January, by Stefan T. Possony.—The invention of the atomic bomb has modified the economic geography of military power. No country can hope to maintain itself in a conflict fought with atomic weapons unless it possesses the elements necessary to manufacture these new implements of war in sufficient quantity and superior quality. Three major elements are required for the production of atomic arms: radioactive raw materials, a large output of electric power, and a big, efficient, and technologically progressive industry.
Atomic bombs are produced today from uranium and thorium. Although uranium is present in most granitic rocks and appears in more than 120 minerals, it can be mined only at very few places. Thorium is three times more plentiful, but it is mined at even fewer points than uranium. Important deposits of both elements may still be discovered. Yet during the search for radium, most large uranium deposits seem to have been located—at least outside Asia. Both elements are extremely rare. (They are, in fact, so rare that they can hardly ever become a major source of industrial power.)
The energy available in one pound of uranium is equivalent to that gained by the combustion of 1,000 tons of coal. Yet roughly 750,000 tons of uranium would have to be mined every year if coal were to be replaced as the prime source of power in the world. The total amount of recoverable uranium is probably far less than 750,000 tons. To be sure, there is enough uranium available to destroy the world’s large cities. Yet if uranium and thorium are extensively used for civilian and defensive purposes, the use of uranium bombs on a mass scale might be precluded by the exhaustion of the raw material.
Before 1922, the carnotite mines in Colorado and Utah were the main producers of uranium (and radium). In that year rich deposits of uranium were discovered in the Belgian Congo near Elisabethville, department of Katanga. In 1930, the world’s largest layers of uranium were located near the Great Bear Lake, Canada. A fourth major deposit is on the French island of Madagascar.
Canada has secondary deposits of uranium near the lakes Athabasca and Common and near Port Hope, Ontario. In the United States, uranium is found in smaller quantities in California, Wyoming, Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and North Carolina. In the African region, uranium is also available in the Transvaal and in the Uru- guru Mountains. Although it is at present not possible to calculate exactly the magnitude of these various deposits, it is probable that between two-thirds and three- fourths of the globe’s uranium are concentrated in North America and Africa.
Within the British Empire, uranium is also found in Cornwall as well as in southern and western Australia. The largest European deposit is at Joachimsthal or Jachimov, on the Czech-German border. Norway, Bulgaria, Sweden (Karelia), Finland, Germany (Saxony), and Italy (Piedmont) have small amounts of the valuable element, which is also found at three points in Japan and in the state of Minas Geraes, Brazil.
The uranium resources of the Soviet Union are uncertain. It is assumed that there are no important deposits in European Russia. Some uranium has been discovered in the Urals. Mendelyeevite, an uranium-bearing mineral, is found near Lake Baikal, Siberia. The richest known Soviet deposit is in Turkestan, in the Tyuya Muyun Mountains near Ferghana. None of the Russian deposits seem to be really rich, yet since large parts of the granitic formations in Russsia are as yet poorly explored, Russia may actually possess greater reserves of uranium than would appear today. Some European deposits are situated close to the Russian frontier.
Thorium is extracted from monazite sands. The state of Travancore on the Malabar coast in British India, together with Ceylon, supplies almost 80 per cent of the world’s needs. The rest comes from Bahia, Brazil, and from the Dutch East Indies. Monazite sands are in Florida and in both Carolinas. Additional British Empire resources are at Villeneuve, Quebec, in New South Wales and in England proper. Thorium is also produced in small quantities in Colombia, Southern Norway, and Finland. Russia has by no means inconsiderable resources of monazite, particularly in the gold-bearing regions in the Urals and in the Ilmen range; monazite has also been reported from Siberia.
Extensive use of atomic weapons is impossible without the large-scale production of plutonium. It has not been revealed how much plutonium is used per bomb, although it is known that the amount is by no means small. The production of this element requires a great amount of electrical energy. In the first experiment in atomic fission in 1939, IS times more electric energy was required than was released. Power is still needed in extremely great quantities. According to the report by Dr. H. D. Smyth of Princeton University the production of one kilogram of plutonium a day would require a plant capable of delivering between 500,000 and 1,500,000 kilowatts. In fact, plutonium output was already in 1945 “very large,” according to the Smyth report.
Besides plutonium, atomic bombs can be made of U-235 which must be separated from the more common U-238. This separation requires large amounts of electric power by whatever method is chosen. Although a large part of the separation work went on at a site where power produced by TVA could be used, one “of the largest . . . steam power plants . . . ever built” was there constructed.
It may be then assumed that, to make an appreciable number of atomic bombs, one million kilowatts of installed power plant producing 8,000 million kilowatt hours of energy per year must be set aside. As a comparison, the total installed power plant of the entire world in 1924 was estimated at 53 million kw. At present, only three countries—the United States, Germany, and Russia—produce more than 30,000 million kwh per year, an output which would seem to be the minimum requirement for a substantial fabrication of atomic bombs. Since Russian power stations utilize more than 60 per cent of their capacity, while Britain exploits only 22 per cent, England should be included in the group of the chief producers of electricity.
While Germany can no longer be counted as a unit, France, Belgium, and Holland, including the parts of Germany occupied by France, could together attain a production of 30,000 million kwh per year. Yet only the United States turns out enough power—almost 200,000 million kwh in 1944 —to embark upon a true mass production of atomic weapons.
A nation’s total power output indicates its capacity to manufacture atomic bombs. Yet without very large individual power stations production would become even more complicated than it actually is and power requirements would increase on account of losses by long-range transmission. The startling fact is that in the whole world there are not more than 29 power stations with a capacity of more than 500,000 kw. Of these, 25 are in the United States and Canada; two are in Germany and two in Russia. There are only 8 power plants with a capacity larger than one million kw; all of them are in the United States and Canada.
Potential Water Power in IIP Africa—274,000,000
Belgian Congo & Ruanda-Urundi—130,-
000,000
French Equatorial Africa—50,000,000 Asia (without Russia)—84,000,000 India—39,000,000
China including Manchuria—23,000,000 Soviet Union—78,000,000 Siberia—64,000,000 European Russia—14,000,0000 North America—77,000,000 U. S. A.—33,500,000 Canada—25,500,000 South America—74,000,000 Brazil—36,000,000
Europe (without Russia)—60,000,000 N orway—16,000,000 France—6,000,000 Spain—-5,700,000 Italy—5,400,000 Sweden—4,000,000
Russia’s third Five-Year Plan envisaged the construction of a dozen power stations on the rivers Volga, Kama, and Oka. One of these—to be situated on the big bend of the Volga near Kuibyshev—shall become the largest in the world and develop 3.4 million kw. Another large station is planned in the neighborhood of Kaluga. An ultimate output of 75,000 million kwh is envisaged by Russia.
To what degree can the power plant of the various countries be enlarged? For the production of 8,000 million kwh of energy, about ten million tons of coal per year must be consumed. This seems litttle in terms of American output. England, too, could set aside such a quantity. Also Germany could mine more coal than she did before her collapse. Coal production in Russia is comparatively small and continuously lags behind plans. The Soviet Union has very large deposits of excellent coal. Although most of it is located in out-of-the-way Siberia, difficulties will be overcome as soon as the transport system has been substantially improved. At present, Russia moreover has access to the coal in Silesia. France is so deficient in coal that even if she retains the Saar region and federates herself economically with Belgium, she would be unable to base the production of atomic weapons on coal. Large-scale increases in the world’s electric plant will probably be based on water power. Although the initial cost of hydro-electric plants are higher than those of steam plants, they offer considerable advantages from the military point of view: once in operation they reejuire neither man power, nor raw materials or transportation. What are the hydro-electric reserves of the various countries?
“Just as the automobile replaced the horse and made work for millions of Americans, the atomic explosive will require the services of millions of men if we are compelled to employ them in fighting our battles” (General Marshall).
The manufacture of atomic bombs requires huge and numerous industrial installations. Moreover, these weapons can be used with impunity only by the side which has secured command in the air, is able to fill the skies with numerous heavy bombers, fighters, long-range rockets, and rocket interceptors, and which also protects its own industry and population against atomic reprisal. It seems, therefore, obvious that only the countries with the biggest industrial output will be able to make and employ atomic weapons. Since the industrially strongest nation can produce more atomic bombs and more means of protection than any other country, it should henceforth enjoy a premium of strength greater than that enjoyed by it in previous industrial wars.
Efficiency and productivity cannot be expressed in quantitative terms. Many people think that, once the secret of the atomic bomb has been pierced, other nations will be able to produce that weapon. The loss of the American scientific monopoly of the atomic bomb is ultimately unavoidable, yet not every country will be able to manufacture atomic bombs.
Efficiency and productivity of industry become fairly obvious if a nation’s production record is examined. An industry which never pioneered, made few contributions to technological progress, boasts of no or very few major inventions and which does not enjoy the services of first-class scientific and creative personnel is very unlikely to pioneer on an important scale within the foreseeable future, or even to imitate the fabrication of complicated products.
There are no secrets in automobiles, but the overwhelming majority of cars are built in North America. Mass production plants in England, Germany, France, and Italy are partly American-owned and equipped with American machinery. While England and Germany specialized in high-quality automobiles, the United States made trucks for almost the entire world.
Russian cars were built with American patents and with American tools. Russia contributed no important improvement to automobile engineering, and had to import great numbers of cars, trucks, and even tractors, the very basis of her mechanized agriculture. (For that matter, Dnieprestroi was built by an American firm and much of the machinery was imported from the United States.) Russia’s industry as a whole still depends upon the importation of machinery and tools from leading industrial countries.
The industrial preponderance of Western Europe and Nortli America is gradually broken with respect to commodities of more or less easy and standardized manufacture. Yet it is more pronounced than ever with respect to products of complicated design requiring precision work on a large scale.
Only the United States and Great Britain were able to turn out satisfactory heavy bombers. They had an unchallenged monopoly in bombsight and radar equipment. No other country was ever able to build efficient aircraft carriers and to equip them with aircraft as effective as land-based planes. High octane gasoline, though invented by a Russian, was produced largely in the United States, Great Britain, and Germany and had to be imported during the war into Russia. Other examples could be quoted ad limilum. Germany alone was able throughout history to compete technologically and industrially with England and America.
Even if technological secrets are revealed, the know-how of production will not be transferred to other countries. Numerous Anglo-Saxon “secret weapons” were known to all belligerents, but few were successfully imitated. The production of atomic bombs is unquestionably the most difficult industrial task ever performed. For example, uranium must be purified to a degree far exceeding the purity of materials needed in laboratories. An impurity in granite of one part in 50,000 is considered undesirable. The cooling system requires a sheath “that would protect uranium from water corrosion, would keep fission products out of the water, would transmit heat from the uranium to the water, and would not absorb too many neutrons.”
Can similar—almost superhuman—problems be solved by industries which heretofore only occasionally manufactured complicated and revolutionary equipment and which receive the bulk of their precision tools from abroad? The history of industrial production indicates that such an achievement is most unlikely.
Yet suppose that rapid industrial progress will enable other countries to catch up with the production of the atomic bomb. Will the United States and Great Britain be able to retain their lead in the development of atomic weapons and to produce them in a superior quality? The future is, of course, unknown. One genius, an Edison or Marconi of the Atomic Age, might upset the balance. Nobody can predict what his nationality will be. The United States might fall back in the race for atomic weapons if its research is incompetently organized or insufficiently endowed. Yet if no grave mistake will be made, the United States and Britain should continue to remain the leaders in atomic research and production. For their combined leadership in research and inventiveness is challenged by no one.
What, for example, is the geographic location of basic research? An analysis of the nationalities of Nobel prize winners provides an answer to that question. Of 89 winners in the fields of physics and chemistry, 29 were Germans, 10 British, 11 Americans, and 11 French. (Since 1930, incidentally, the United States and Germany received the same number of prizes.) In the fields of medicine and physiology, there were 11 British, 8 Germans, 4 Americans, 4 French, and 4 Austrian winners. There are also two Russians, Pavlov and Mctchnikoff, who won the prize prior to the first World War.
Altogether, 15 countries won prizes; four of them won two-thirds of all prizes. More than half of the winners—67—came from
Nobel Prize Winners
Germany..................................... 37
Britain......................................... 27
United States................................ IS
France......................................... 15
Holland......................................... 7
Austria.......................................... 7
Sweden......................................... 6
Switzerland................................... 5
Denmark....................................... 4
Italy.............................................. 3
Belgium........................................ 2
Russia........................................... 2
Hungary........................................ 2
Spain............................................ 1
India............................................. 1
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the three great democracies and from Holland, Belgium, and India. The former Axis countries provided 49 winners (of whom, however, a certain number emigrated to Britain and America.) Three small European democracies contributed 15 winners. No less than 96 per cent of all prizes fell to the United States and European countries west of the line Stockholm-Vicnna. Eight winners participated indirectly and ten others directly in the development of the atomic bomb.
Where is basic research most successfully applied? The hundred most important nonAmerican inventions listed by the World Almanac have been made in the following areas:
Important Inventions
Britain......................................... 37
Germany..................................... 27
France......................................... 20
Small European countries. ... 11
Italy.............................................. 4
Russia........................................... 1
In addition, there are at least 70 major American inventions on record, some of them made by foreign-born Americans (Erricsson, Tesla). Thus, while Germany may be leading in basic research, the Anglo- Saxon countries are relatively stronger in practical application.
The continuous efficiency of industry depends upon a steady flow of minor inventions—upon the number of patents granted every year. In this field again, the United States, Britain, and Germany have the un-
disputed lead. The number of patents granted in the United States oscillates between 31,000 and 41,000, in Britain between 17,000 and 19,000, and in Germany between 15,000 and 16,000. Switzerland is relatively, i.e., in number of inventions per capita of population, the most inventive country, while among the Great Powers, Britain is at present leading in comparative inventiveness.
Information about Russian patents is very scanty. According to a table of comparative inventiveness published by Ellsworth Huntington, Russia was twentieth among the nations in 1925. In absolute numbers, as many patents were then granted in Russia as in Switzerland. During the last years, Russia has failed to publish statistics on patents. While Russia habitually buys great numbers of American patents, she was granted only one American patent in 1938 and eight in 1940. “Even Japan, with 57 U. S. patents in 1939 and 44 in 1940, topped the Soviet Union.” (Robert Strausz-Hup6. The Balance of Tomorrow, New York 1945.)
The second World War hardly demonstrated that the international distribution of inventiveness has undergone significant changes. No country outside North America and Western and Central Europe has as yet attained technological maturity.
How, then, are the three main elements of atomic power distributed over the globe? Insofar as raw materials are concerned, the United States and the British Empire, together with Belgium and France, control the largest portion of known deposits. Russia’s resources of uranium and thorium are uncertain. If electric requirements are considered, the United States is the only country which can at present organize mass production of atomic weapons. Russia might possibly acquire a large electric power plant within the next decade.
Will the Great Powers embark upon competition for the control of Africa’s uranium deposits and hydro-electric potential? Will they compete for the uranium deposits and the power plant of Central Europe and Scandinavia? These arc the major problems of tomorrow’s international politics.
In terms of industrial efficiency, only the United States and Great Britain can be con-
sidered as capable of making atomic weapons within the near future, even if the secret cannot be maintained. The industries situated between the Ruhr and the Loire are efficient enough to take up atomic production, although they would have to import their raw materials from overseas. Yet in the absence of economic and political federation, atomic production in Western Europe may be ruled out as unlikely. On the basis of the historical record, it would be very surprising if Russian industry could successfully engage in atomic competition.
The only region which possesses all the elements needed for atomic production is the United States and Canada. The continent of
North America is thus the geographic center of atomic power. Little is in view to indicate that within the next decades that center will be removed to other areas. The invention of the atomic bomb has, so it seems, enhanced the strength of the already potentially and actually strongest military power—the United States. If moreover the United States and Great Britain pool their intellectual resources, as they did so successfully during the war, an almost permanent and crushing superiority in atomic production will be assured for democracy. This is, perhaps, the most solid reason for the hope that, this time, peace may be of a more durable quality.