Our fathers came to this country in order to get away from things which they left behind in Europe, and which they were no longer willing to tolerate. They came here to be free to live under conditions of their own making. The things they left behind continued to exist in Europe, and periodically they threaten to overflow into this country. We are now engaged in a bitter war to keep them from so doing.
Twice in our time Germany has initiated aggressive war. In both of these wars the United States has become involved. In the first we had available manned beachheads on the continent of Europe. The Navy’s part was to keep the sea lanes open and safeguard the transportation of an expeditionary force to those beachheads. In the current war no such beachheads were available, but a large, garrisoned, industrialized island base was available in the British Isles in which to assemble the expeditionary force with which to seize the continental beachheads. The Navy in this war had, therefore, to fight a major amphibious war before the decisive land war could begin. Our battlefields are getting nearer home from war to war, and the character of our wars is becoming more menacing.
In this war air power has found its place as a proved and powerful component. Another war will be even more triphibious. Its onset will be still harder to meet. By no wider margin than German failure to invade England in her weakest hour was the war kept beyond the Atlantic. We have demonstrated how to invade across the Channel. The German military caste is apt at learning from its enemies how to conduct successful war. The margin by which disaster was avoided this time was narrow. Men now living have not had to face a foreign foe on this continent. By what process may we be assured that our children shall be spared this crowning catastrophe?
If we are to fight again, it will be very advantageous to do the fighting on the enemy’s soil, not our own. But our greatest assurance of safety, while so conducting our affairs that any subsequent war may be so fought, is to be sought in preventing known aggressors from again initiating major war. It is pertinent, therefore, to inquire what feasible measures would contribute toward preventing Germany from again initiating aggressive war. At least twice before efforts have been made to devise and apply such measures. These efforts have not been successful. Among the causes of their nonsuccess, two have been conspicuous. A basic prerequisite for the waging of major war is large-scale production of munitions. The implements necessary to such production are, in general, the same which are needed for legitimate production for civilian use, namely, tools, skilled labor, and materials. It does not appear feasible to deny Germany tools and skilled labor. It would appear feasible, however, to ration the importation of strategic materials.
To effect such rationing it would first be necessary to determine what quantities of such materials need to be imported in order to permit legitimate German industry to function in an orderly manner. This determination would of necessity need to be revised from time to time to take care of changes in industrial production, but it should never permit of excess stock-piling. The procedure, in other words, consists of inventory control exercised at ports of entry.
Germany has heretofore disregarded such restrictions; and the countries at interest, engrossed in peaceful objectives, have failed to keep themselves informed of such disregard, or to check it at the source when forced upon their attention. There will inevitably be a strong tendency to repeat this failure when war has receded into the background. The League of Nations, being a creation of the nations (or part of them) which permitted these things to happen, likewise failed; any such organization which lacks independent authority and responsibility together with means of enforcement will fail again. The recognition of this fact has led to proposals for various forms of superstate which could call into action the agencies of the interested parties when acute situations arise. Great resistance to these proposals has appeared and will appear based upon reluctance of great nations to place themselves at the beck and call of such an organization; and the experiences of the League of Nations which, reflecting the desires of its more powerful members, declined to take effective action to meet threats, while they were small, is quite likely to be repeated.
There is, however, precedent for an inter- jurisdictional organization at the operating level, exercising authority at the point of contact by the powers at interest. Such a one in the municipal sphere is the Port of New York authority. This authority has corporate powers to deal with situations relating to the development and operation of the port, for which purpose the two states and various municipalities concerned waived such portion of their jurisdiction as was necessary to enable the authority to function. The Tennessee Valley Authority is another familiar example.
A more directly pertinent example, however, is the commission established in 1856 by interested European Maritime Powers to service commercial traffic in the Danube River. This natural highway was of little use because the country through whose territory flowed its lower reaches failed to police the river, to keep it dredged, to provide aids to navigation, and otherwise to make it easily and safely navigable. The Commission had all the authority necessary to accomplish the tasks with which it was charged, to collect dues necessary to pay its own way, to provide the things needful to enable it to function; but no others. It did successfully fulfill the need of providing at the point of contact an international agency, not a superstate, capable of functioning satisfactorily without affecting adversely the international relations of the powers concerned.
Whether or not, therefore, an international organization comparable to the League may be brought into being, it is believed that one comparable to the Danube Commission, but charged with preventing the accumulation by Germany of the means of war production, would go far toward denying her the means for again initiating aggression.
There is, however, another major factor which has contributed directly toward the initiation by Germany of major war. The group of Prussian landed aristocrats known as the Junkers have a highly privileged position in Germany. They have in common an interest in maintaining a highly protected economy which gives them a living without the necessity for exerting their talents too greatly other than to safeguard their uneconomic privileges. Professionals in arms and government, they are a very capable and resourceful race, who accept war as an instrument for safeguarding these privileges. They have provided both the statesmanship which started war and the generalship which conducted it, unsuccessfully these times, it is true, so far as Germany is concerned, but by a narrower margin this time than last. The wars have been more successful, however, in sustaining the feudal privileges of the Junkers than they have been in serving the best interests of the German people. The Junkers already talk of the next one.
The mass of German people seem amenable to such leadership as the Junkers supply, even when it leads them away from their own best interests. There is nothing in their history (nor in that of the Junkers) to suggest that they will not again be led into war. More than once terms have been imposed designed to make the Junkers incapable of again leading Germany into war, but these have failed. The establishment of an international authority to control German inventories may hamper their efforts, but the Junkers are resourceful, and the measures heretofore applied they have found means to turn to their benefit.
It may be assumed that they likewise will try to find a way to turn this means to their benefit. So long as it is to the interest of the Junkers to initiate war, they may be relied upon to find a way to prepare to conduct it effectively. If we are to reduce the likelihood of such an unhappy event, we should seek to reduce the interest of the Junkers in producing it. Among the things which sustain their interest are three: their established uneconomic status, supported by entailment, protective tariffs, and other similar devices; their acute consciousness, as a group, of race and class; and the fact that they are, in general, dependent upon the same set of interests for their living. The second item depends upon the other two, and would ultimately disappear once they have been eliminated. Similarly, the third arises from the same circumstances as the first, and would disappear with it unless another common interest should be achieved. The problem, then of making ineffective the interest of the Junkers in initiating war, may be solved primarily by disestablishing them as a privileged feudal group of landed proprietors, and facing them with the necessity of seeking a living in divergent pursuits. The effective removal of the special protective laws which enable them to maintain themselves as landed gentry would in itself tend to force the Junkers into various activities where their constructive talents could find legitimate play. This process would tend to send them on their several ways, so that they would finally find themselves in competition with each other instead of tied together by their present feudal ties; and the legitimate industrial occupations in which many of them would find themselves would be better served by peace than by war. This development would be slow, and is no panacea; but the sons of this generation would grow up under conditions different from those of their fathers, and more favorable for inculcating in them a desire for peace.
The Junkers cannot be expected to take such a fate lying down; and for a substantial period their resistance would cause trouble. But without this step they may confidently be relied upon to seek war again in another quarter century.
If, therefore, we intend to reduce the likelihood of German aggression in the next generation, we need to include in our measures designed to accomplish that end these two: Ration German stocks of strategic materials, for the accomplishment of which set up an international rationing authority with suitable powers analogous to the Danube Commission; disestablish the Junkers.
And keep our powder dry.
Note.—This article was written before the subject matter had been fully developed in the public press.