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THE MERCHANT MARINE AND WORLD FRONTIERS. By Robert Earle Anderson, Director of Finance, U. S. Marine Commission. New York: Cornell Maritime Press. 1945. 205 pages. $3.00.
Reviewed by Senior Professor Allan Westcott, U. S. Naval Academy
The main factors in our Merchant Marine problem are set forth in this authoritative treatise, which deals with our immense wartime construction achievement, the future of sea and air transport, post-war relations with foreign merchant fleets, and the size and prospects of the post-war American Merchant Marine. It appears that we shall have in round numbers from 50 to 60 million tons of merchant shipping after the war. After scrapping, selling abroad, or stowing away some of the older ships and 27 million tons of slow-going Liberties, we shall still have perhaps 20 million tons of fast Victory ships, tankers, and other craft well suited for ocean trade.
How shall these ships be employed, bearing in mind that a strong merchant fleet under our flag is a highly important element in military security? The author of the present volume is all for putting them under private ownership, at prices corresponding roughly to their pre-war cost abroad, and using them to maintain our essential trade routes, to build up our foreign commerce, and, without “hogging,” to secure a fair share of the ocean carrying trade.
Here, of course, the fact enters in that ships can be built and operated more cheaply abroad. Our big Merchant Marine will have to be “free enterprise with public assistance,” if it is to survive. And ship subsidies, differentials, or whatever they may be called, are essentially a protective tariff enabling the industry to carry on. Furthermore our foreign trade problem seems to be not so much one of finding markets for our goods as of enabling foreigners to pay for what they want to buy. This means increasing our imports, and this is why some of our “longhaired economists,” as Mr. Anderson calls them, would go so far as to advocate abandoning the shipping business to our foreign competitors who can handle it more cheaply, since by so doing we would increase their purchasing power.
Truly our Merchant Marine problem has its difficult angles, as seen by our experience after World War I. But it appears likely that we shall stick to the policy enunciated in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, which called for a fleet
(a) sufficient to carry its domestic water-borne commerce and a substantial portion of the waterborne export and import foreign commerce of the United States and to provide shipping service on all routes essential for maintaining the flow of such domestic and foreign water-borne commerce at all times,
(b) capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency,
(c) owned and operated under the United States flag by citizens of the United States insofar as may be practicable, and
(d) composed of the best-equipped, safest, and most suitable types of vessels, constructed in the United States and manned with a trained and efficient citizen personnel.
CARRIER WAR. By Lieutenant Oliver Jensen, U.S.N.R. New York: Simon and Schuster. 1945. 173 pages, illustrated. $2.50.
Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander Frederic M. Gardiner, U. S.
Naval Reserve (Retired)
To write history that sparkles and at the same time retains its value as a record for posterity is a literary achievement! This is what Lieutenant Oliver Jensen, U. S. Naval Reserve, has accomplished in his book Carrier War, which is described on its jacket as: “The first-hand story of Task Force 58 and a year of naval war in the Pacific through the battles of the Philippine Sea. Containing 200 pictures and maps.”
The book is reminiscent in some respects of that fast-moving and now famous screen (technicolor) presentation “Fighting Lady.” The author of Carrier War paints on a canvas of some millions of square miles of island- strewn ocean, using wide and vigorous brush strokes for his background, but painting in a large number of intimate details—biographical, humorous, tragic, or technical as the occasion demands—which give life and cohesion to the finished picture.
Carrier War describes a year’s activity of that powerful armada of the United States Navy, which has been given the designation “Task Force 58.” The story picks up the narrative of our naval conflict in the Pacific in the dark days at the commencement of our actual offensive, when our carrier force had been whittled down to one available unit, the Enterprise—the “Lucky E.” The history carries us through all the actions which involved the employment of carriers in force—Marcus Island, Wake, Rabaul; the landings of Tarawa and Kwajalein; the raids on Truk, Saipan, and Palau; down through the two battles of the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf which clinched our supremacy on the sea and in the air.
The text of Carrier War is gripping and authentic in itself, and the photographic illustrations are excellent and profuse. It is an outstanding book for readers who want to know the historical background, the details of life aboard ship and of combat afloat and in the air, and the human as well as the military side of some of the outstanding personalities of our naval war in the Pacific during what may prove to have been its most critical phases.
HELLDIVER SQUADRON, THE STORY OF CARRIER BOMBING SQUADRON 17 WITH TASK FORCE 58. By Robert Olds. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company. 1945. 225 pages. $3.00.
Reviewed by Richard S. West, Jr.,
U. S. Naval Academy
Helldiver Squadron by Robert Olds is the story of the U.S.S. Bunker Hill’s Bombing Squadron 17, from the beginning of 1943 until the spring of 1944.
The Bunker Hill, a 27,000-ton giant of the Essex class, was at Norfolk on New Year’s Day, 1943, when her air squadrons were organized. Among her airmen were veterans from the Hornet, the Enterprise, the Wasp, and the Saratoga. To Captain John J. Ballen- tine, her first skipper, Commander M. P. Bagdanovich who commanded the air group, and Lieutenant Commander J. E. Vose, Jr., commander of Bombing 17, fell the special problem of breaking in the new Helldiver plane, the SB2C design, for use on board a carrier. “The Beast,” as the airmen called their new Helldiver, had to be tamed, the entire air group practiced as a unit, and the ship had to be shaken down. This process required more than six months. It was November before the Blinker Hill reached the fighting front in the southwest Pacific.
The Bunker Hill made her first bid for fame on November 11, 1943, in a raid on Rabaul. A single earlier raid had been made on Rabaul, on November 5. After the Bunker
Hill’s Armistice Day raid the days of the “Guadalcanal Express” were numbered, as this great base where the express had been “made up” was shortly reduced to impotence.
The Bunker Hill’s next strike came at Tarawa Atoll. Helldivers in this action concentrating upon the airstrip and defenses turned Betio Island into “a badly moth- eaten facsimile of a tropical paradise.” Following this action Rear Admiral Frederick C. Sherman, skipper of the old Lexington, came abroad and the Bunker Hill became the flagship of a new task group.
Henceforth the Bunker Hill’s rest periods in Espiritu Santo were few and far between and her punishing raids on enemy outposts were frequent. Nauru Island was so punctured that it “looked like Swiss cheese.” Kavieng, New Ireland, was attacked on Christmas Day with bombs on which the jocular tars had chalked the admonition “Don’t open until Christmas.” As a nickname “Holiday Inn” began to seem appropriate in view of the Bunker Hill’s affinity for stirring up trouble on holidays. As if to celebrate her first anniversary the Bunker Hill launched another surprise raid on Kavieng on New Year’s Day, 1944.
Shifts in command now brought Captain Thomas P. Jeter to replace Captain Ballen- tine (promoted to Rear Admiral), and Lieutenant Commander G. P. Norman as the new commander of Bombing 17. The Bunker Hill now became a part of Admiral Mitscher’s Task Force 58. In the invasion of the Marshalls, the Bunker Hill’s targets were Kwaja- lein and Engebi Islands. Under her new officers the ship continued to maintain a high level of efficiency in combat. In a day and a half of concentrated action at Truk she sank or damaged 176,000 tons of Japanese shipping. While Saipan was being invaded, the Bunker Hill was neutralizing airstrips on near-by Tinian.
Mr. Olds’ chief material, it would seem, has been battle reports, not the formal and formidable documents labeled “official” but the word of mouth records of men just in from action. The book conveys a good idea of what carrier warfare in the Pacific is like and is well worth reading.
AMERICA’S FAR EASTERN POLICY. By T. A. Bisson, Research Associate, Institute of Pacific Relations. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1945. 235 pages. $3.00.
Reviewed by Lieutenant William L.
Sachse, U. S. Naval Reserve
The Institute of Pacific Relations is “an unofficial and non-political body, founded in 1925 to facilitate the scientific study of the peoples of the Pacific Area.” It has sponsored this book in order that its members may have an “impartial and constructive analysis” of the Far Eastern situation, with special reference to the future adjustment of international relations in that region.
To do this Mr. Bisson has provided a lucid and judicious survey of our Far Eastern policy since 1895, highlighting particularly the crucial 1931-41 decade. He underscores our determination to participate in the future economic development of eastern Asia as the mainspring of our policy. The remainder of the book is devoted to a “tentative discussion” of some fundamental Far Eastern problems which will face the United States when the war ends. Chief among these are: the treatment of a conquered Japan, the reconstruction of China, and a program for the countries of colonial Asia. In Japan, disarmament, in the field and in the factory, will be necessary for the peace of the world—• but will not be enough. The real determinant is “the extent to which Japan’s political and economic system is reoriented toward peace.” The implications of such a program are broad. It involves more than the support of a new administration of civilian moderates under a “chastened” Emperor. It demands the removal of the conditions upon which the power of the Japanese military caste has rested: the monopoly of economic power, depressing living standards, restricting the home market, and stimulating aggressive trade expansion; and the God-Emperor institution, requiring that “the Emperor’s divine sway be extended over the world by a Japanese ‘master race’.” Whether the will, not to mention the power, necessary to effect such a revolution will exist in a prostrate Japan remains to be seen; Mr. Bisson be-
lieves that they will “certainly emerge,” though “their exact degree of strength cannot now be estimated.” In any case, such a revolution must be the product of native liberals: “no AMG can impose a cut-and- dried blueprint of reform on Japan.”
In reconstructing China the author warns against high-pressured industrialization without regard for changes which must be effected in the country’s rural economy. Three quarters of the population still depend upon the soil for a livelihood. Positive steps must be taken to eliminate rural anachronisms and abuses; industrialization of itself will not be enough. Only by providing a heightened living standard for the farmer can the nation as a whole-—and the world— benefit from the new industries.
China’s emergence as the leading sovereign power of the Orient cannot but influence southeastern Asia, stronghold of the old Far Eastern colonial order. Here the four interested powers—Britain, the United States, the Netherlands, and France—should evolve a common policy, directed toward the eventual freedom and self-government of the component territories. Mr. Bisson believes that joint action in this respect would go far to counteract Japanese Pan-Asiatic propaganda. This is but one of our concernments with the post-war Far East in which he deprecates unilateral action and stresses the need for the utmost co-operation with other nations.
THE PEOPLES OF MALAYSIA. By Fay- Cooper Cole. New York: D. Van Nostrand Company. 1945. 354 pages. $4.00.
Reviewed by Lieutenant Charles T.
Houpt, U. S. Naval Reserve
Primarily a scientific study of the racial similarities between the inhabitants of the Malay Peninsula and the great and small islands which stretch away to the south and east, this book will appeal particularly to anthropologists and ethnologists, and, in a lesser degree perhaps, to military and naval men whose duties bring them into contact with the natives of this part of the world. Had this volume appeared before the retaking of the Philippines, Chapter VII, which deals with the peoples of those islands, would have been indispensable background information for those who needed to become familiar with the ways of the groups whose support they were soliciting. Such knowledge is necessary, for the natives are quick to take offense at ignorance of, or lack of respect for, their customs.
The author, Dr. Cole, is well-known in geographical circles as Chairman of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Chicago. A specialist in Malayan research, he spent five and a half years gathering material among the peoples whose traits and activities he here describes. For purposes of comparison, or for clearing up controversial points, he refers frequently to other authoritative sources, and the result is a carefully documented treatise, with valuable appendices, bibliography, and index.
Beginning with prehistory, the author traces the migrations of the Malaysians. He reviews historical facts, especially those relating to the impact of Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, British, and American cultures upon the ways of these Far Eastern peoples. Such influences, Dr. Cole asserts, have been merely superficial. Beneath the veneer lie fundamental, tell-tale similarities in physical traits and customs which go far toward proving that the Malaysians sprang from a common source and locality. Particularly interesting exceptions are the Negroid Pygmies who are scattered over the Andaman Islands, the Philippines, and the Peninsula itself. In successive chapters the author discusses the Mongoloid Malayans of such little-known places as Palawan and Nias, as well as of the larger islands of Borneo, Java, and Sumatra. High points of interest in each chapter are the descriptions of the social customs and taboos, especially those relating to birth, marriage, death, the planting and harvesting of rice, the appeasing of spirits to alleviate sickness, and the use of blowguns and musical instruments.
Although the book lacks the graphic detail which one expects to find in an account based upon personal experience, the objectivity and simplicity with which the author treats his subject are commendable in a scientific report. Dr. Cole has ably accomplished his purpose of drawing together and analyzing all the significant available data concerning the peoples of Malaysia.
Thumbnail Reviews
Betio Beachhead: U. S. Marines’ True Story of the Battle for Tarawa. By Captain Earl J. Wilson and three Marine Combat Correspondents (M.T. Sergeants Jim J. Lucas' and Samuel Shaffer and S. Sergeant C. Pete Zurlinden). New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons. 1945. 158 pages. $2.50.
The 75 or more striking full-page photographs in Betio Beachhead give in themselves a vivid idea of the fighting in this “first seaborne assault on a defended atoll.” The text has much the same purpose—to convey the character and color of the fighting from records made on the spot, without much attempt at critical analysis or a clear over-all picture.
Island 49. By Merle Miller. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 1945. 186 pages. $2.00.
It might seem that this soldier-correspondent and editor of Yank has entered into a tough competition, writing a fictional story of a Pacific island invasion, when the bookshops are full of similar narratives based on fact. But his experiment is interesting, and offers much greater freedom for psychological study of officers and men in action. In fact he gives us a kind of up- to-date Red Badge of Courage, very competently done.
Ship Handling in Narrow Channels. By Lieutenant Commander Carlyle J. Plummer, U. S. Coast Guard Reserve. New York: Cornell Maritime Press. 1945. 107 pages. $2.00.
This is a concise, practical book based on long experience in handling large vessels in confined waters; and especially useful for wartime navigation of unbeaconed or enemy areas. It covers effects of suction, tides, and currents, making sharp turns, passing moored or moving vessels, use of tugs, mooring, and use of anchors to maneuver. The chapter on the last named subject first appeared in the Naval Institute Proceedings for March, 1942.
Important Professional Books
Mygott, Gerald, and Chaplain Henry Darlington, Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Prayer Book. New York: Knopf. 1944. $1.00.
National Education Association. Education in the Armed Services. Washington, D. C.: National Education Association. 1944. 50 £.
Neuschutz, Louise. Jobs for the Physically Handicapped. New York: Bernard Ackermann. 1944. $3.00.
This book aims to present opportunities available to civilians with a physical handicap, and to offer to wounded veterans of the war the hope and means of rehabilitation for a useful life. Papashvily, George and Helen. Anything Can Happen. New York: Harper. 1945. $2.00.
The author thought of America as a place where anything can happen and he has not changed his mind for twenty years.
Perry, George Sessions, and Isabel Leighton. Where Away; a Modern Odyssey. New York: McGraw-Hill. 1944. $2.75.
The stirring adventures of the cruiser Marblehead.
Pratt, George K., M.D. Soldier to Civilian. New York: McGraw-Hill. 1944. $2.50.
Problems of readjustment.
Redfield, Holland L. Instrument Flying and Radio Navigation. New York: Ronald Press. 1944. $3.00.
Stern, Jacques. The French Colonies. New York: Didier Publishing Co. 1944. $3.00.
Their past and future, with emphasis on the vital importance of the colonies to the Allied cause.
Werth, Alexander. Leningrad. New York: Knopf. 1944. $2.50.
A portrait of the city and its inhabitants who held off the Germans for two years and then beat them back.
Avison, George. Uncle Sam’s Marines; How They Fight. New York: Macmillan. 1944. $1.00. Berge, Wendell. Cartels: Challenge to a Free World. New York: American Council on Public Affairs. 1944. $3.25.
Braham, Harry L. Permanent Peace for Europe.
Boston: Christopher. 1944. $2.25.
Brogan, D. W. American Character. New York: Knopf. 1944. $2.50.
An interpretation by a brilliant English scholar. De Jong, L. and Stoppelman, J. W. F. Lion Rampant. New York: Querido. 1944. $3.00.
The story of Holland’s resistance to the Nazis. Fedorov, Colonel. The Red Army. New York: Transatlantic Arts. 1944. $1.50.
Account of the magnificent Russian fighting force, including the 25-year history of the Soviet Army and the story of its present triumph over the Nazis.
Fleisher, Wilfrid. What to do with Japan. New York: Doubleday, Doran. 1945. $2.00.
How to convert a fantastically militaristic people into a peace-loving nation.
Fleming, Sir John Ambrose. Physics for Engineers. New York: Chemical Pub. Co. 1942. $3.00.
A survey of present-day knowledge in the realm of physics.