One of the more remarkable aspects of World War II has been the rapidity with which Japan overran Malaya, the Philippines, and other important areas in the South Pacific. It is now realized that these overwhelming successes were made possible by the thorough fashion in which the Asiatic power prepared for its campaigns prior to December 7, 1941. In drawing up a tactical plan for the execution of their contemplated aggressions, the Japanese, among other things, carefully developed the southern island of Formosa into an advanced base from which concerted attacks were to be launched against the near-by colonial possessions of the United Nations.
To Western peoples, Formosa has always been more or less terra incognita. This insular territory was generally remembered for its natural beauty, a characteristic substantiated by the origin and meaning of its accepted name. Early in the sixteenth century the Portuguese, who had established a base of operations at Macao near Canton, sent out an expedition to search for land in the surrounding Chinese waters. When the European mariners encountered a large island whose dignity and charm impressed them, they cried “Ihla Formosa!” (Beautiful Isle!) This description was not unwarranted, since Formosa, with its tropical forests and majestic mountain ranges, is unquestionably one of the world’s most attractive islands.
Because of its strategic location, Formosa was also destined to play a significant role in the history of the Far East. Situated between the Southern and the Eastern China Seas, it is separated from Fukien province in China proper by the Strait of Formosa which varies from 90 to 220 miles in width. Shaped like an elongated oval with a N.NE.-S.SW. axis of approximately 225 miles, the island has a length of from 60 to 80 miles and a total area of some 13,500 square miles.
Intermittently throughout its history Formosa has been subjected to either partial or complete control by more powerful neighbors. Apparently known to the Chinese during the pre-Christian era, the island did not seriously attract their attention until the opening part of the seventeenth century. More than 700 years later, the Middle Kingdom established several colonies there which were subsequently withdrawn. Although the Portuguese and the Spaniards preceded other Westerners in exploring this region, the Dutch were the first Europeans to effect a permanent settlement on Formosan soil.
It was not long before Japan also displayed an interest in the southern island. Had it not been for their sudden adoption of isolation during the first half of the seventeenth century, the Japanese might possibly have acquired Formosa, and the Philippines as well, several hundred years ago. Conquest of both territories was contemplated but not undertaken by the great shogun Toyotomi Hideyoshi and other Japanese leaders. When Japan cast off the hermit’s cloak and resumed intercourse with the rest of the world during the middle of the nineteenth century, some Japanese advocated the establishment of a far-flung overseas empire. Six years after the restoration of the emperorship, a punitive expedition sent to Formosa, although withdrawn,1 represented a national interest in that island which led to its subsequent annexation by the Japanese.
1 Hosea B. Morse and Harley F. MacNair, Far Eastern International Relations, Boston and New York, 1931, pp. 332-34.
The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 initiated Japan’s rise to the position of a ranking sea power. The Spanish-American War of 1898 similarly demonstrated the naval strength of the United States, and Dewey’s smashing triumph at Manila represented the beginning of an era in which the American Navy was to enjoy increasing prestige in shaping the destinies of the Far East. These two nations, one an Asiatic people and the other a member of the Anglo-Saxon race, later were to be locked in a terrific struggle for the supremacy of the Pacific. In this connection, it is sometimes forgotten that the American acquisition of the Philippines may have checked what the Japanese regarded as the natural course of their southern expansion. Observers have occasionally expressed the opinion that the Japanese, exploiting the strategic value of Formosa, eventually would have fallen heir to the Philippines if the United States had not made its appearance there first. In the words of the late Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, “The Philippines were so obviously the next steppingstone after Formosa that we cannot even imagine the Japanese statesmen as relinquishing the hope of securing them.”2
When the United States made its debut as a colonial power in the Far East, much of the basic strategy in a future Japanese-American war was created. In such a conflict, the Philippines-Formosa area was to be of initial as well as far-reaching importance. To strike farther southward, the Japanese, using Formosa as a springboard, must overcome or neutralize American resistance in Luzon.
The strategic position of Formosa vis-à-vis the Philippines was clearly proved during the waning years of Spanish sovereignty in the Far Eastern territory. Japan’s growing strength was in direct contrast to the decadence of Spain’s rule in the Philippines, and the Spaniards began to grow apprehensive of their neighbor to the north. Rumors concerning the future objectives of Japanese expansion began to circulate, and as early as 1891 there was nervousness among Madrid political circles about Japan’s intentions toward the Philippines.3 This disquietude reached its peak when the Chinese Empire ceded Formosa and the Pescadores Islands to the victorious Japanese.
2 Bradley A. Fiske, “How We Shall Lose the Next War—and When,” World’s Work, Vol. LIII, April, 1927, p. 628.
3 James A. LeRoy, “Japan and the Philippine Islands,” Atlantic Monthly, Vol. XCIX, January, 1907,
With restless Japan now firmly entrenched in the adjacent island, the vulnerability of the Philippines to attack was readily perceived by the worried Spaniards. A war with Japan might not receive the wholehearted support of the Filipino people, who had grown dissatisfied with the maladministration of their foreign rulers. Hardly more than 1,500 European troops were stationed throughout the colony, and Spain’s Navy was no match for that of Japan. Spain’s strategic problem, to be inherited by the United States, was how to cope effectively with a strong sea power which had occupied a near-by territory. In the event of a Japanese-Spanish war, naval battles would have determined the fate of the Philippines.
Japan’s aptitude for mastering the fundamentals of naval warfare was indicated by the results of the conflict with China. On the other hand, Spain, once the mistress of the seas, defended its Far Eastern colonies with an inadequate naval force. Its warships were outmoded and ill- kept, and the naval station at Cavite had fallen into disrepair. Cavite originally was designated as the principal Spanish base during 1795 when the English seemed to be on the verge of attempting a reoccupation of the country. One hundred years later, with the prospect of an armed struggle with Japan, consideration was given to the long-standing problems of erecting a modern naval base in the Philippines and of providing shore fortifications to protect Manila and other key points.
Realizing the need for prompt action, Spanish naval engineers had proposed a plan where Olongapo, 50 miles north of Manila on Subic Bay, was to be the site of the main base, with Cavite relegated to a secondary position. Despite their constant agitation for a more vigorous policy, previously the proponents of this plan were given little encouragement by the apathetic government authorities.4 These naval engineers understood that Spain, as in the case of the United States which succeeded her, needed a major base before successful defensive and offensive operations could be carried out against an enemy in that area. The problem of repairing and servicing a fleet was especially acute, since the Philippines possessed no dock accommodating vessels of over 1,000 tons.
4 Robley D. Evans, An Admiral’s Log, New York and London, 1910, pp. 301-02.
The increasing fear of Japan and the strained relations with the United States caused the Spaniards to cast aside much of their former indifference, and preliminary work, including the construction of buildings at Olongapo, had been accomplished prior to the outbreak of the Spanish-American War. The triumphant Americans revived the Spanish project and likewise designated Subic Bay site as the most favorable location for the principal base of the United States Fleet in the Far East. Reverting to the precedent established by the Spaniards, the American Government followed a course of indecision, and grandiose plans for the development of Olongapo were subsequently abandoned. This failure to build a major base in the Philippines imposed a severe handicap upon the United States when Japan launched its treacherous attack in 1941. The Japanese, for their part, constructed great naval and military establishments in Formosa and the Pescadores which served them well in the conduct of their offensive operations.
The rather feeble and obviously belated efforts of the Spaniards to strengthen Philippine defenses were not the only effect of Japan’s acquisition of Formosa. Feeling uneasy about the Japanese advance southward, the Madrid Government decided to sound out Tokyo with respect to Japan’s official attitude toward Spain’s colonies in the Far East. Aside from the larger issues, there was the specific problem of determining the territorial limits of Formosa. Spain was particularly concerned about the status of the groups of small islands which lie between Formosa and Luzon. As late as 1941, the eminent naval historian, Captain William D. Puleston, wrote that this connecting chain of islets would be exceedingly useful to Japan in a campaign against the Philippines.5 Without a clear understanding regarding their ownership, it was conceivable that eventually an expanding Japan, in addition to occupying the several minute islands adjacent to Formosa, would also claim sovereignty over some of the insular groups which more properly belonged to the Philippine Archipelago. If Japan were able to force a weak Spain into recognizing the validity of such claims, the security of the Philippines would have been further weakened. Conversely, if Spain assumed a negative attitude toward Japan’s demands, it might well create a pretext for the Japanese to wage war against the European nation and thereby gain control of all the Philippines.
The resulting international agreement which Spain negotiated with Japan, and the diplomatic negotiations preceding it, comprise a chapter of some importance in the history of the Far East which has been completely overlooked by American students of foreign affairs. The entire incident is closely associated with the better-known intervention of France, Germany, and Russia in the peace settlement of the Sino- Japanese War. Besides receiving the southern islands, victorious Japan was awarded the Liaotung Peninsula in Manchuria. The three European powers, seeking to prevent the Japanese from obtaining a point d’appui on the Chinese mainland, urged the Tokyo Government to renounce possession of the peninsular territory. Since Japan was not strong enough to contest the combined wills of these powers, she acquiesced to their wishes and grudgingly returned the disputed land to China.
5 Captain William D. Puleston, U.S.N., The Armed Forces of the Pacific, New Haven, 1941, pp. 163-64.
Spain, though not participating in the joint representations made to Tokyo, took advantage of Japan’s dilemma and pressed its own demands regarding the clarification of their relations. The Western powers which instigated the Liaotung controversy took an interest in strategically-located Formosa as well. Although there is a dearth of information on this subject, they seem to have queried Tokyo about the new Japanese possessions in the south, and consequently the channel between Formosa and the Chinese coast (the Channel of Formosa) was declared internationalized and open to the commerce of all nations. Moreover, Japan allegedly promised that neither Formosa nor the Pescadores would be ceded to any other power.6
Before initiating negotiations, the Madrid Government first sought assistance from the more influential countries of Europe. Germany, perhaps remembering the dispute with Spain over the Caroline Islands in 1885-86, remained cool to the Spanish proposals, but Russia and especially France lent support to the plans of the Iberian kingdom. With this backing, Spain secured a favorable response from Japan, and on August 7, 1895, an agreement was signed at Tokyo by the accredited representatives of the two nations.
In the opening statement of the completed document, it was asserted that Japan and Spain, in the spirit of good relations existing between them, wished to determine their respective territorial rights in the western Pacific. It was agreed by the two contracting parties that the degree of latitude which passes through the middle of the Channel of Bashi represented the boundary line between Japanese and Spanish territory. The channel referred to lies between Formosa and the Batan Islands off the northern coast of Luzon. Japan also announced that she did not have any claims upon the islands to the south and southeast of this line. Spain made a similar assertion regarding the islands to the north and northeast.
6 Jerónimo Bécker, “Historia politica y diplomática desde la independencia de los Estados Unidos hasta nuestros dias," 1776-1895, Madrid, 1897, p. 630.
Rejoicing was widespread at Madrid, and it was believed that the Japanese threat from Formosa had been lessened. Commenting upon the treaty, one prominent Spanish official allegedly stated, “We have just saved the Philippines.” When the Spanish and American Peace Commissioners met at Paris in the fall of 1898, the previous accord between Spain and Japan was utilized in establishing the territorial limits of the Philippines with reference to their cession to the United States.7 The Bashi Channel line therefore separated the possessions of Japan and the United States in the South Pacific.
The strategic position of Formosa was temporarily obscured to Americans by the events surrounding the acquisition of the Philippines. In reality, however, Japan already planned to utilize Formosa, or Taiwan as it was now officially called, in extending her influence elsewhere. The tropical island was referred to by the Japanese as Tonan no sehi, which may be literally translated as “the stone aiming at the south.”8 Little noticed events indicated the future course of Japanese policy. In April, 1898, China assured Japan that no part of Fukien, whose coast line was dominated by near-by Formosa, would be alienated to any other power. An even more significant development occurred a short time later. Having acquired territory in the Far East, the United States redoubled its interest in that area, and the famous Open Door notes soon followed. The American Minister to China, E. H. Conger, felt that it might be desirable for the United States to secure a naval base on the Chinese coast. In 1902, an attempt by the American Navy to procure a coaling station at Samsah Inlet north of Fuchow in Fukien failed because the Japanese Government refused to share that sector with another nation, particularly one possessing a strong navy.
7 James K. Eyre, Jr., “The Forgotten Boundary,” Philippines, Vol. I, October, 1941, p. 14.
8 Andrew J. Grajdanzev, Formosa Today, New York, 1942, p. 183.
In August, 1902, it was reported that two forbidden military zones, similar to those in Japan proper, had been created at Baku in the Pescadores and Keelung in northern Formosa. Baku was additionally converted into an auxiliary naval station, later to become a base of major proportions. When the first serious crisis between Japan and the United States arose following the Russo-Japanese War, Formosa attracted the attention of American strategists. Extensive military activity was observed on the island, the obvious intent being to strengthen the southern bastion against attack and to prepare it as a springboard for a campaign against the Philippines. As time passed, and the Japanese-American rivalry became more intense, the position of Formosa assumed greater importance.
The great naval base which the United States had once intended to build in the Philippines would have served, in part, as a counterpoise to Formosa. After years of uncertainty, the Joint Army and Navy Board adopted a program in 1909 which assigned the Philippines a role of secondary importance in the grand strategy for the Pacific Ocean. The main naval base was placed at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, with small docking and repairing facilities to be maintained at Olongapo. Immediately following the end of World War I, there was a renewal of discussion about the construction of a first-class Philippine base. Steps were taken to increase the fortifications on Corregidor and other points guarding Manila.
The outbreak of the world conflict in 1914 gave Japan an opportunity to solidify its hold on the Formosa-Fukien area. The Tokyo Government presented to China what is known as the famous Twenty-One Demands, based upon a memorandum compiled by the Black Dragon Society. In an exchange of notes dealing specifically with Fukien, China was requested to state whether she had any intention “of permitting foreign nations to establish, on the coast of Fukien province, dockyards, coaling stations for military use, naval bases, or to set up other military establishments; and also of borrowing foreign capital for the purpose of setting up the above-mentioned establishments.” China replied that she had no such intentions.9
It is a matter of history that the question of fortified naval bases was one of the major topics debated at the Naval Conference which met at Washington in 1921—22. Article XIX of the Five-Power Naval Treaty, signed on February 6, 1922, read as follows: “The United States, the British Empire, and Japan agree that the status quo at the time of the signing of the present treaty, with regard to fortifications and naval bases, shall be maintained in their respective territories and possessions specified hereunder. . . .” For the purpose expressed, the status quo was considered to imply that no new fortifications or naval bases should be established in the territories and possessions specified; that no measures should be taken to increase the existing naval facilities for the repair and maintenance of naval forces, and that no increase should be made in the coast defenses of the territories and possessions specified. These restrictions, however, were not to preclude such repair and replacement of worn-out weapons and equipment as is customary in naval and military establishments during times of peace.
According to the provisions of the treaty, the Japanese were prohibited from erecting fortifications and bases in the Kurile Islands, the Bonin Islands, Amami-Os- hima, the Luchu Islands, Formosa, the Pescadores and “any insular territories or possessions in the Pacific Ocean which Japan may hereafter acquire.”10 The inclusion of Formosa and the other islands in the restricted areas caused a storm of protest among the Japanese. A heated controversy centered around the question of whether Japan or the United States had secured the greater advantage from the principle enunciated in Article XIX. The United States was left without a major naval base in the western Pacific. While Japan’s loss seemed equally great, previously the Asiatic power had made much progress in fortifying Formosa and building naval bases there.
9 Morse and MacNair, op. cit., p. 586.
10 Ibid., p. 693.
It was known in 1918 that Formosa was garrisoned with strong army units, including some sections of the air force. During the fall of 1920, the Japanese naval authorities, in co-operation with the General Staff, worked out an additional program for the purpose of fortifying the principal islands which guard the approaches to the coasts of Japan proper. A committee of experts, headed by Captain Mori of the Imperial Navy, visited all the islands in question and suggested points where strong fortifications and naval facilities were needed most urgently. This activity was intended to counteract the then impending development of Cavite and Guam as first-class bases for the Pacific Fleet of the United States. Upon hearing that the American Government wished to sponsor a naval limitations conference, the Japanese rushed to complete the program which had been outlined. By the time that the conference met, Japan, secretly engaged in fortifying her island bases for many months, had finished much of this work, whereas scarcely anything had been done with the American projects at Cavite and Guam, which were to be shelved permanently.11
While most of this undisclosed effort seems to have been directed toward the Bonins and Amami-Oshima, Formosa undoubtedly received its share of attention. At least, it was noted in 1922 that Japan possessed a “very strongly defended and strictly non-commercial naval base” in the Pescadores Islands.12 A second source spoke of the “excellently fitted and fortified destroyer and submarine base” at Baku. Keelung, a good port in northern Formosa, and originally announced as a military zone in 1902, was pointed to as another potential naval base. It was interpreted that the same docks and facilities which were at Keelung for repairing merchant ships could be used to accommodate warships of the lower tonnage classes.
11 Hector C. Bywater, “Japan: A Sequel to the Washington Conference,” Atlantic Monthly, Vol. CXXXI, February, 1923, pp. 244-45.
12 Captain Dudley W. Knox, U.S.N., Retired, The Eclipse of American Sea Power, New York, 1922, p. 51.
It was during this same period of speculation about the future of sea power in the Pacific that the late Hector C. Bywater, an able English journalist who specialized in naval affairs, examined the possible role of Formosa in the event of a war between Japan and the United States. Bywater felt that Japan’s southern bastion would present a difficult problem for an attacking American force:
The only portion of the Japanese Empire which from its geographical position is exposed to successful attack is the Island of Formosa, or Taiwan, which was ceded by China in 1895 .... Situated only 500 miles north of Manila, Formosa is nearer to the Philippines than to Japan, and might therefore be successfully attacked by a joint naval and military expedition, provided the American Fleet had command of the sea in that area. There are, however, few good harbours in Formosa, and all of these are fortified. The permanent Japanese garrison consists of several thousand troops. Formosa would undoubtedly be useful as a base for offensive operations against the Japanese Coast and sea-borne trade; but for the reasons stated its reduction by an American force would not be reckoned with among the probabilities of a conflict in the Pacific.13
13 Hector C. Bywater, Sea Power in the Pacific, Boston, 1921, p. 278.
By and large, however, little concrete information was known about the existing condition of naval bases and fortifications in Formosa. Two English writers asserted in 1928 that the tropical island had been highly developed by the Japanese Navy:
The vital facts concerning Japanese strength would be incomplete without a reference to Formosa, the island which passed to Japan after the war with China in 1894. It has since been so heavily fortified that it has become a second Heligoland, and a byword for impregnable strength in the Far East ....
Formosa, about which information is as meagre as was that of Heligoland in 1914, is a link in the chain maintaining Japanese prestige in the Far East. Further, it proves that, as military engineers and strategic experts, the Japanese have little to learn from older nations ....
Unless a powerful American fleet were within comparatively close range of the Philippines, the capture of the islands by the Japanese could not be prevented. The latter are only two hundred and eighty miles from Formosa, which, since the Japanese occupation after the close of the war with China in 1894, has been converted into a stronghold that is, both from a naval and air force standpoint, an Eastern Gibraltar.14
The comparative tranquillity which prevailed for a decade in the Pacific was rudely shattered by Japan’s Manchurian adventure in 1931. With Japan bent upon the conquest of a great empire, the Government at Tokyo adopted a different view toward the question of naval limitations. On December 31, 1936, the terms of the naval treaties of 1921-22 expired, and Japan announced that she would not support their renewal. In abandoning the principles of naval limitations which she had agreed to in common with the other major sea powers of the world, it was apparent that Japan, as one step in the extension of her aggressions, wished to feel free to militarize Formosa. The termination of the Washington treaties and the development of Formosa as a base were both vital interests of the Japanese Navy.
14 Lieutenant Colonel Percy T. Etherton and H. Hessell Tiltman, The Pacific: A Forecast, Boston, 1928, pp. 57, 202.
A speech by Admiral Sankichi Takahashi, then Commander of the Japanese Combined Fleet, to a gathering of Osaka industrialists in 1936 indicated the growing boldness of Japan’s naval officials. Takahashi stated:
Japan’s economic advance must be directed southward, with either Formosa or the South Sea Island Mandates as a foothold. In this case the cruising radius of the Japanese Navy must be expanded suddenly as far as New Guinea, Borneo, and Celebes.15
15 William Henry Chamberlain, Japan over Asia, Boston, 1937, p. 167.
In August of that year, it was announced that Admiral Seizo Kobayashi (Retired), of the Imperial Navy, was to be the next Governor-General of Formosa. This marked a radical departure in practice, since there had been nine civilian governors-general in succession, and no military or naval officer had occupied the post subsequent to 1919.
The implication of Kobayashi’s appointment was obvious. As viewed by a well-informed American newspaperman at Tokyo, it
is interpreted as a move in the “southward policy” the navy favors as a corollary to the army’s continental policy. The navy cherishes the ambition of protecting Japan’s advance in the South Seas as the army has led on the mainland. The southward advance is envisaged as entirely peaceful and commercial, arousing no rivalries to which the west can object. When the Japanese speak of the South Seas they mean that vast tropical region comprising Siam, the Philippines, Malaya, Netherlands India, New Guinea and the Solomon Islands.' This region is the world’s tropical treasure house. It produces 94 per cent of the world’s hemp and 85 per cent of the world’s rubber and possesses large oil and iron reserves as well as sugar, tea and tobacco. Combined with Manchukuo’s potential wheat, pulp, coal and wool, it furnishes virtually all that is needed for national self-sufficiency.16
16 Hugh Byas, writing in the New York Times, August 30, 1936.
Despite official assurances regarding Japan’s peaceful intentions, Kobayashi’s tenure of office in Formosa caused an unfavorable reaction throughout the Far East. Seeking to allay some of the disquietude caused by the appointment, it was announced at Tokyo during the summer of 1937 that Kobayashi intended to pay a friendly visit to the American, British, and Dutch dependencies in the South Seas.
The government has been induced to sanction this journey because the appointment of a naval officer as Governor-General of Formosa was misread abroad as having connection with the southward policy the navy is supposed to favor. It is believed Admiral Kobayashi’s explanations of Japan’s southward policy will have a reassuring effect. He will repeat that Japan simply desires to expand her commerce in the South Seas markets and is willing to assist in developing natural resources and thus raise the natives’ purchasing power.17
The concern abroad regarding Kobayashi’s appointment was not unwarranted, because Formosa was being prepared for its historic mission as a springboard to the south which was long anticipated by the more extremist Japanese naval officers. The outbreak of fighting with China in 1937 momentarily shifted attention to the mainland where land battles occupied the spotlight. It became apparent, however, that amphibious operations in the South Seas would be needed in order to complete the mastery of the stubborn Chinese nation. As Gradzanev has correctly put it,
Thus the experts in Great Britain and Australia who felt relieved in 1931 and 1937 when “the tiger sprang to the west” instead of to the south, were mistaken. The China incident was a prelude to the war in the Southwest Pacific. But as aggression in China was inevitably linked with aggression in the south, so it soon became clear to the Japanese leaders that the successful liquidation of the China incident was impossible without mastery of Southeast Asia.18
17 New York Times, April 5, 1937.
18 Gradzanev, op. cit., pp. 184-85.
There was tangible evidence of the real meaning of Japanese policy in Formosa as evidenced by Kobayashi’s appointment. Late in the fall of 1936 and the first part of 1937, a spy fever swept Formosa. Foreign vessels taking shelter from storms in forbidden areas of the island were penalized. Numerous cases arose where English sailors were arrested and mistreated by the local Japanese authorities. This was a complete reversal of a once prevailing attitude when the Japanese and English navies had been on the most cordial of terms. The London Government protested to Tokyo regarding the arrest of an English officer who was charged with having photographed Formosan military objectives. The arrogant methods employed by the Japanese created debate in Parliament and produced comment in the English press. Although various motives were attached to Japan’s attitude, it was concluded that the Asiatic power wished to eliminate foreign contacts with Formosa. The tropical island was to be surrounded with mystery while the Japanese labored to prepare it for the events which were to come.
Western observers learned that the ever expanding Japanese naval budgets were allotting large sums of money for the fortification of Formosa, which was being turned into a “gigantic base of operations.” In this work, considerable energy was directed toward the enlargement of the naval base at Baku. The first Europeans to reach this region found better harbors in the Pescadores than in Formosa proper, and Baku was retained by the Japanese as the chief military port of the entire area. Though small in size, the Pescadores are so distributed as to provide shelter for the entire Japanese fleet. Information concerning Japan’s activities there was not complete. In November, 1938, Nauticus, yearbook of the German naval command at Berlin, revealed that Baku was being expanded, which was considered significant, since the Pescadores base “is the point farthest advanced toward Hongkong.” As of today, the naval base at Baku, strongly guarded, probably has docks and other facilities for the handling of at least the heavy cruiser classes, and perhaps even battleships.
Great activity was noted on the island of Formosa itself. It was reported in 1936 that a system of modern roads was being constructed, together with the double-tracking of Formosan railways. Recognizing the value of air power in exploiting Formosa’s strategic location during war in the South Pacific, the Japanese constructed a cluster of airdromes equipped to accommodate hundreds of planes. An English expert who was permitted to visit the southern island was impressed with the thorough fashion in which the Japanese armed forces were maintained there. It was his impression that the Japanese soldiers were infinitely better housed in modern barracks than the English troops at Hongkong.
Formosa was being prepared for total war of an amphibious character, with the land, sea, and air forces of the island coordinated under the dominating influence of the Imperial Navy. Of special interest to the expansionist-minded naval officers was the intensified development of Formosan ports which could serve as bases and points of embarkation for offensive thrusts against near-by territories. Formosa is poor in natural harbors, but the Tokyo Government did not spare money or effort in the improvement of the better ones. The economic and military center of Formosa was shifted rapidly to the southern portion of the island, with the new key area including the port of Takao and a group of airdromes around its periphery.19
Takao was one of the more important colonial ports of the Japanese Empire, and together with Keelung at the other end of the island, it handled a large share of Formosa’s external trade. Now rapidly militarized, it became one of the chief fortified ports on the coast. Little was known about the exact nature of the changes wrought in southern Formosa. “The port of Takao, which is regarded as a future rival to Hongkong, is surrounded with mystery.” The English were especially impressed with the importance of the feverish activity on Japan’s southern bastion. They moved to strengthen the defenses of Hongkong, and the crown colony was found to be very vulnerable to air attack.
19 China Weekly Review, Vol. LXXX, April 10, 1937, p. 199.
As the war with China dragged on and relations with England and the United States grew steadily worse, the militarization of Formosa proceeded with an ever increasing tempo. On November 26, 1940, it was announced that Admiral Kuhoshi Hasegawa was to succeed Kobayashi as Governor-General. Retaining his status on the active list, Hasegawa was the first serving officer of the Imperial Navy to occupy this position in twenty-two years. Apparently it was originally intended to follow precedent and appoint the senior retired officer, but Prince Fumimaro Konoye, Premier, and Admiral Koshiro Oikawa, Navy Minister, agreed to confine their selection to the active list and their ruling excluded several eminent elderly candidates. Hasegawa’s appointment seemed to have aroused the public imagination in Japan, for the Domei news agency interpreted it as “indicating the importance of Formosa as a base for Japan’s southward advance in the present international situation.”20
The accelerated activity fostered first by Kobayashi, and then by Hasegawa, extended to all phases of Formosan society. From the outset of Japanese rule, the whole economic life of the tropical colony was geared to that of the mother country. The Japanese exploited the rich territory, realizing sizable profits from their investments. They proved very thorough and efficient in developing Formosa’s natural resources, but the advantages lay chiefly with the overseas rulers.21
20 New York Times, November 27, 1940.
21 Rupert Emerson, Lennox A. Mills, and Virginia Thompson, Government and Nationalism in Southeast Asia, New York, 1942, pp. 116-18.
Confronted with the possibility of an amphibious war in the South Pacific, the Japanese re-examined the economic resources of Formosa in the light of their potential military and naval needs. A self-sufficient island base should possess war industries of its own. Although Formosa is essentially an agricultural country and a producer of raw materials, some strategic products, such as oil, are to be found there in limited quantities. Undoubtedly the recent administrations of Formosa have made determined efforts to develop the internal economy of the island with the purpose of creating new war industries and expanding those already in existence. Moreover, it is not improbable that the Japanese Navy envisaged a plan whereby the natural resources of the countries which were to be conquered in the South Seas might be used, in part, to stimulate the growth of Formosan war economy.
Beginning with 1931, and especially after the outbreak of war with China in 1937, the Japanese administration of Formosa prepared for war in another direction, i.e., a general tightening of their grip on the Formosan people. The utility of any insular territory as a base for the conduct of war is largely dependent upon the loyalty and support given by the native populace to the foreign power entrenched there. Early difficulties in controlling the Formosans tended to discredit Japan as a colonizer. The Japanese themselves despaired of winning the confidence of their new subjects. Military campaigns were employed to crush widespread resistance in the tropical colony, and it was not until 1902 that the greater portion of the population had been pacified.
A lasting problem in this connection proved to be the handling of the aborigines, who numbered some 155,921 as late as 1938. Occupying more than one half of Formosa, these unconquered savages, who were never subdued by the Chinese, stubbornly resisted Japanese domination. Divided into tribes and of Malay origin, they resembled the Igorrotes in northern Luzon and the Muruts of North Borneo. American and English colonial officials were able to win the respect and co-operation of the primitive peoples mentioned.22
22 Ibid., p. 115.
The Japanese were not so successful as the westerners in this matter. Plagued with a continuation of unsettled conditions among the aborigines, Viscount Samata Sakuma, Governor General of Formosa, started a five-year plan in 1909 for their pacification. Arms were confiscated in a thorough fashion, and the program was considered completed in January, 1915. The trouble did not end here, however. Instead of acquiescing to Japanese rule, the savages withdrew into the mountainous country which was covered with dense forests and entangling thickets. In order to protect the inhabitants of the plains from raids by this warlike people, the Japanese colonial authorities established what was known as the guard line, a path cut along the crests of hills and mountains beyond which the heavy growth of the jungle was cleared for several hundred feet. A cordon of forts, joined together by electrified wire, made this guard line more effective.
One of the worst disturbances during the entire period of Japanese occupation took place in 1930, when a revolt broke out among the Musha savages, a branch of the Taiyal tribe, the fiercest and numerically the greatest of the eight aboriginal races still holding the mountain fastnesses of Formosa. This uprising, located in the northeastern section of the island, resulted in the massacre of many Japanese. Isolated killings were reported daily. The immediate cause of the unrest was believed to be the project of an electric power company which called for the construction of a dam in territory held by the aborigines. The Musha rebels, who practiced head-hunting, fought hard against the expedition sent against them. Since the rugged terrain made overland marches difficult, the Japanese used airplanes for bombing and scouting purposes, thus bringing the punitive measures to an early close.
Although the Taiyal tribesmen and the other aboriginal groups appear to have become relatively quiescent in recent years, the two naval officers acting successively as Governor General overlooked no opportunity to assure Japan’s complete domination of the Formosan people. The colonial administration of Formosa has always been noted for the concentration of political authority in the hands of the Japanese. Appointed by the Emperor, the Governor General is vested with wide powers, including that of recommending officials for promotion and dismissal. He possesses summary jurisdiction over his subjects which has no parallel in American, Dutch, and English colonies. It has been the definite policy of the Japanese to keep the Formosans in a subordinate status. The natives are given primary educations, but beyond that point opportunities are limited. Most of the important as well as many of the minor positions in the colonial government have been occupied by Japanese, thus causing some discontent among the more educated Formosans who feel frustrated and thwarted.
The Formosans have never possessed any representation in the Imperial Diet at Tokyo nor a local legislature in which they could effectively express their views. Much against the wishes of the military and naval authorities, slight concessions in the way of self-government were introduced in 1935. The war with China nullified any gains in this respect, however. Chinese and European nationals, who had been tolerated to some degree, were now removed from active participation in the affairs of the island. It was insisted that Formosan children be taught Japanese in the missionary schools, whereas until then the European teachers spoke only Chinese. The press was very strictly censored, and no Chinese newspaper has been allowed to be printed or circulated since 1937. Every attempt by the Formosans to express dissatisfaction through political societies has been severely suppressed.23
23 “ London Times, October 29, 1936.
While strengthening the military and naval resources of Formosa, the Japanese did not overlook other channels equally important in preparing for the subsequent extension of their empire. Long before the nation embarked upon its recent conquests, the strategic position of the tropical colony was employed in peaceful fashion to expand influence throughout surrounding territories. Non-spectacular penetration of this kind, an essential prerequisite to the more violent policy of war, was typified by Japan’s negotiations with China regarding Fukien. The assignment of such a role to Formosa even antedated the appearance of friction between Japan and the United States. Mr. Nishizawa, the President of the Southern Advance Society in Formosa, emphasized that, as early as 1897, one of the tasks of the newly-founded Bank of Taiwan was the penetration of Southern China and Nan-Yo (the South Seas). Roughly speaking, Nan-Yo embraced all of Southeast Asia and the islands between Formosa and Australia.24
Pursuing the course outlined for it, the Bank of Taiwan established branches in Southern China, Siam, Hongkong, and elsewhere. Beginning with 1908, the Formosan Government annually set aside large sums of money for the purpose of extending financial assistance to Japanese residing in the southern area of penetration. Special attention was given to photographers, fishermen, and other groups who were able to gain valuable information about the countries of their residence, namely, Southern China, Malaya, Netherlands Indies, Australia, the Philippines, French Indo-China, and Siam. Fraternal and similar organizations of Japanese nationals, subsidized with capital from Formosa, opened schools and hospitals in the Philippines and North Borneo.
24 Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 183.
This program did not escape the impact of Japan’s intensified preparations for war in the South Pacific subsequent to the Manchurian incident. Research institutes for tropical countries and colonization societies were organized in Formosa. In 1936 the Japanese Overseas Minister, Mr. Nagata, answering an interpellation in the special session of the Imperial Diet, declared that “the historical mission of Taiwan lies in the South, because of Taiwan’s geographic position.” According to an authoritative analysis by Grajdanzev, the Formosan Government increased appropriations for overseas penetration from ¥1,061,000 in 1937 to ¥8,002,000 in 1941. In a sense, this increase served as an index to Japan’s preparations for war in Southeast Asia.25
Much of this imperialistic activity was centered at Takao, the important port at the southern tip of Formosa. Standing athwart the sea lanes traversing the extended Chinese coast, Takao is 1,495 miles from Yokohama and 1,800 miles from Singapore.
Later, when Japan found herself locked in a mortal struggle with the Western powers, the chief foe was to be the United States. The Philippines were the only American possession in the Far East, and heavy blows were to be aimed at this rich territory. Formosa proved invaluable to Japan in procuring information for the campaign against the Philippines. The proximity of Formosan territory to portions of the Philippine Archipelago is probably not fully realized in the United States. On a clear day, Philippine territory can be seen from a small island included within the jurisdiction of Formosa. The northernmost piece of land in the Philippines, the small island of Y’Ami, is 88 miles southeast of Formosa and an estimated 23 miles south of the line separating American and Japanese territory in the Far East. Y’Ami is 43 miles north of Basco, the capital of the Batan Islands,26 one of the two principal insular groups between the Channel of Bashi and Luzon. Basco possesses a fairly good anchorage, and the United States Navy maintained a cruising station there for a number of years. Some 100 miles farther south lies the island of Camiguin in the Bubayan group, which is roughly 50 miles northeast of the port of Aparri, a point of landing for the Japanese during the initial stages of their attack against the Philippines.27
25 Ibid., pp. 186-88.
26 “Not to be confused with the more famous Bataan Peninsula near Manila.
27 The distances given here are straight-line measurements from The Map of the Philippine Islands, Bureau of Coast and Geodetic Survey, Manila, 1937.
Taking advantage of this factor of geographical propinquity, fishermen, poachers, and smugglers from Formosa operated at will among the many unprotected islands of the Philippine Archipelago, particularly in the northern sector previously mentioned. Since the Philippine Government lacked the proper facilities, such as coast guard cutters, to check these invaders, the latter carried on their activities unhampered. Making no effort to obtain permission from the local authorities to conduct their business there, many Formosan and Japanese ships illegally entered the territorial waters of the Philippines. In this fashion, sizable quantities of Japanese goods were smuggled into the country, thus depriving the Manila Government of thousands of pesos in customs duties.
A captain of the Philippine Coast Guard service compiled a report on the activities of Japanese fishermen in the Babuyan Islands. He stated that the Japanese frequently trespassed and gathered lumber, camagon or ebony, rattan, coconuts, orchids, fish, and shells. Many of the fishermen were given protection and shelter by the local inhabitants, some living for a time with the native women. In an effort to provide a partial remedy for this situation, the Philippine Coast Guard service extended its patrol to the northern part of the Archipelago.
The increasing boldness of the Japanese was suddenly brought home to the Filipino people by an incident which occurred in September, 1934. At that time, the crew of a Japanese power fishing boat about 50 feet in length allegedly stole coconuts from a private plantation near Balabac, Palawan. The detachment commander of the Philippine Constabulary at Balabac ordered a sergeant and several soldiers to investigate the case. Accompanied by a police officer and two Filipino employees of the plantation from which the coconuts were stolen, the constabularymen traveled by launch and discovered that the vessel in question, the Kaiun Maru No. 5, registered at Takao and having both Formosans and Japanese among its crew, had been fishing illegally in Philippine waters.28 After overtaking the boat, the sergeant instructed it to proceed to Balabac, but the offenders claimed that their engine was broken and needed repairing. When the Filipinos were off guard, they were attacked, beaten up, and thrown overboard, together with their guns and ammunition. One man was rendered unconscious, and all of them kept afloat only by clinging to a large log. They managed to reach Bugsuk Island, where they were received and given medical treatment by an American lumberman.
Three days elapsed before an account of the attack reached Brigadier General Basilio Valdes, Chief of the Philippine Constabulary. He conferred immediately with other high-ranking officials, including Governor-General Frank Murphy. Revenue cutters were dispatched to take the vessel into custody, but it reached Formosa where its captain and crew were placed under arrest. Murphy cabled the American consul in the Japanese colony and urged him to prevent their release so that extradition papers could be arranged. The Governor-General said that the Government was doing its “utmost in the attempt to bring the offenders to justice. We shall exhaust our resources to this end.”
28 For a running account of this story, consult the Manila Bulletin for September 15, 1934, and succeeding dates.
According to a press report, the Japanese Consul General, Atsushi Kimura, stated that the Kaiun Maru was undoubtedly a Chinese vessel. The Chinese community in the Philippines grew angry about this alleged statement and China’s consular representative at Manila made inquiries from Kimura concerning it. Kimura regretted the disturbance, but he did not completely retract or deny the statement attributed to him. Early in October, Murphy asked for the extradition of the fugitive fishermen. During the first investigation held by the Formosan Government, the crew of the Kaiun Maru insisted that the incident happened seven miles outside the territorial limits of the Philippines; that they did not attack the constabulary patrol, and that the Filipinos were injured through causes other than the purported assault. The rumored exoneration of the accused produced considerable excitement in the Philippines.
The Japanese Government finally refused to extradite the fishermen to the Philippines. Light sentences were given the officers by the Formosan court, but a short time thereafter, even these penalties were suspended.29 This action, which was considered quite unsatisfactory by the Manila and Washington Governments, caused a strong reaction in the Philippines. The case of the Kaiun Maru, though not of outstanding importance in itself, occurred during a period when the people looked at the rising ambitions of the Japanese Empire with marked uneasiness. To them, the attitude of Japan toward the punishment of the fishermen more than substantiated their previous fears. The comment of a leading newspaper at the Philippine Capital, which reflected popular sentiment on the subject, stated, “All these things are happening while the American flag is still here. Can it be imagined that they will stop when we are already independent?”
Moreover, the controversy involving the Japanese vessel pointed to the strategic position of Formosa vis-à-vis the Philippines. The infiltration of fishermen from the Japanese colony into the waters of the neighboring archipelago undoubtedly helped the Imperial Navy to assemble information of a basic nature about the problems involved in attacking the American possession.
29 Joseph R. Hayden, The Philippines, A Study in National Development, New York, 1942, p. 716.
For more than forty years Japan was not able to use Formosa as a springboard to acquire outright any of the surrounding countries which the Japanese naval extremists wished to include in their Pacific empire. An initial opportunity was presented during the second Sino-Japanese War, when the island of Hainan was occupied by Japan in February, 1939. Located on the sea route from Singapore to Hongkong, and lying across the Gulf of Tongking, Hainan was considered to be vitally important to the safety of IndoChina. In 1907 Japan and France concluded an agreement pledging mutual support in maintaining peace and security in the regions of China adjacent to their possessions. Hainan was such a sphere for France, as Fukien wras for Japan. The occupation of the large Chinese island was officially explained by Japan to be a military move in the war; the arms traffic to the coast could be checked and bases provided for additional operations against Southern China. In reality, the acquisition of the insular territory was intended to strengthen strategic position for the inevitable showdown with the Western powers.30
30 New York Times, February 10, 1939.
Japanese armed forces from Formosa also struggled to overcome resistance in the portions of China most readily attacked from the southern bastion, namely Fukien, Kwangtung, and Kwangsi provinces. In March, 1939, Japan announced that she had annexed the seven Spratly Islands, which are approximately 700 miles southwest of Manila, an equal distance south of Hainan, 300 miles from French Indo-China, and 350 miles northwest of Sarawak. The Spratlys, 247 acres of coral reef, were claimed by France in 1933, which was the first action of this kind taken since their discovery in 1867. Seeking to justify their right to possession, the Japanese referred to a priority in the economic development of the reefs. Aside from phosphate deposits, the small islets have no great commercial value, but they surround lagoons which could be used for seaplanes, submarines, and small naval craft. During times of war, they might prove of value as a post for the observation of shipping passing through the Strait of Malacca to the Far East. In the official statement of annexation, the Japanese Government placed the Spratlys under the jurisdiction of Admiral Kobayashi, the Governor-General of Formosa. As viewed by the French, the principal significance of the action was a symbolic extension of influence toward the Philippines.31
In the meantime, the Japanese Army gave special training to troops stationed in Formosa, familiarizing them with the jungle warfare which was to be pursued so successfully in Burma, Malaya, the Philippines, and the Netherlands Indies. When the Japanese attacked the Philippines, the operation was carefully planned and executed without warning. The Americans, lacking sufficient defense forces, were not able to cope with the overwhelming mass of men and equipment which was transported from Formosa to the Philippines. Placing into application the concept that the Japanese colony was “a stationary aircraft carrier,” the invaders flew planes from the island and made simultaneous air attacks on Manila, Clark Field, Nichols Field, Cavite, and other key points. Actually the United States had planned to bomb Formosan air fields, but the devastating attacks of the enemy made such counteraction impossible. The small Asiatic Fleet was brushed aside by the many naval vessels which swept southward from their Formosan bases.
31 New York Times, April 1, 1939.
Having destroyed American striking power in that sector, the Japanese continued their operations elsewhere in the South Pacific. In August, 1942, a Chinese spokesman said that some 50,000 Japanese troops from the Philippines were concentrated in Formosa. It was his impression that they were transferred there “for readjustment and training,” presumably after the hard campaigning and heavy losses in bringing about the reduction of Bataan and Corregidor. Another possibility involved the desire of Japan to strengthen the permanent garrison of the southern bastion against some future counteroffensive of the United Nations. In any event, the island was proved vulnerable to attack from the air, for during February, 1938, Chinese planes bombed Taihoku, causing damage and casualties. A similar raid by American flyers was reported four years later.32
Some observers believe that the armed forces of the United Nations in the Pacific may follow a broad strategic plan calling for the progressive seizure of one insular territory after another until they are in position to strike a mortal blow at the heart of the Japanese Empire. If a campaign of this kind is undertaken, the recapture of the Philippines would probably be succeeded by an attack upon Formosa. The storming of Japan’s southern bastion would undoubtedly present difficult problems to an invading force, especially since the colony’s system of communications would enable the defenders to dispatch troops to any threatened point. Roads have been constructed for the purpose of improving the insular defenses against an attack from the sea, and air bases are strategically located throughout the area.
In weighing the factors working for and against a future invasion of Formosa, it has also been suggested that the Formosan people, tiring of Japanese rule, might revolt and contribute to the success of the United Nations. The stern measures of the last two Governors-General are said to have alienated the people from their overseas masters. Various disturbances and acts of unrest have been reported. For example, in October, 1936, Tokyo asserted that the colonial police had exposed a “plot” by a member of the Kuomintang to stir up trouble in Formosa. Two years later, Chinese sources alleged that serious unrest existed in the Japanese colony, where fuel tanks were blown up. The Formosans apparently resented Japan’s recruiting practices and war regulations.
32 New York Times, February 23, 1938; August 13, 1942.
On January 1, 1942, it was reported that Japan, feeling the pinch of a man-power shortage, began drafting all Formosan men of 20 to 24 years for military labor service. This forced labor was to be used for the construction of roads, fortresses, and harbors. Several months afterward, the commander of the Formosan volunteers in China, Li Yu-Pang, stated that guerrillas were quite active against the Japanese in the former Chinese possession. Another source claimed that more than 1,000 police were needed to suppress riots near Keelung, in northern Formosa. The rebellious Formosans, protesting against the compulsory work on military projects, were said to have killed 40 Japanese during heavy street fighting, which lasted several hours. In June, 1942, the official Central News Agency at Chungking asserted that a group of Formosan patriots had thrown bombs into the Japanese naval headquarters at Amoy, killing many of the enemy and spreading consternation throughout the city. These revolutionists, taking advantage of the confusion, also circulated handbills condemning the Japanese and demanding the return of Formosa to China.33
33 Ibid., March 6, 1942; May 17, 1942; June 22,1942.
Looking at the picture realistically, it is probably correct to assume that the spontaneous desire of the Formosan people to revolt at the first opportunity which presents itself has been exaggerated. Despite the rigid and sometimes harsh character of Japan’s rule, the Formosans seem to have adopted much of the Japanese way of living. Referring to the success of the Japanese in absorbing the native inhabitants of the southern colony, a reliable observer stated in 1937:
The younger generations were enrolled in the Japanese schools and in due course became Japanese subjects, wearing Japanese clothes, reading Japanese newspapers and looking toward Tokyo for political and cultural inspiration. The Japanese apparently have demonstrated in Formosa, at least, that some Chinese can be amalgamated, for the Japanese military authorities actually have used a considerable number of Formosans (Formosan-Chinese) in their administration in the puppet state of Manchukuo.34
Nearly seven years before the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States, Edgar Snow, the well-known authority on the Far East, maintained that China’s ability always to absorb her invaders was challenged by the record of Japonization in Formosa:
There exists already, in the island civilization of Formosa (Taiwan), a partly germinated specimen of this process. It is worth studying. Many of the measures Japan is beginning to use in Manchuria and may later extend to North China were originally tried and tested there. Through their application by a few thousand Japanese in Formosa, the some four million Chinese-Formosans have almost metamorphosed, after forty years, into model subjects of Dai Nihon.
Evaluating the effect of Japanese rule upon the average Formosan, Snow said:
Japanese influence continues to shape him in adult and economic life. Heavy censorship of the press and publishing, stringent restrictions regarding speech and action, have done much to impregnate the country with Japanese ideology, and signs of it are everywhere apparent.
They are informed on happenings in Japan, and can tell you of the latest Cabinet change in Tokyo, but of politics in China they know comparatively little .... After forty years this isolation from China seems to have left many of the Formosan Chinese relatively indifferent to their fate.35
Whatever part Formosa plays in the unfolding drama of the current war, it is certain that the future of the strategic island will command attention in the post-war reconstruction of the Far East. Prominent officials of the Chungking Government have already insisted upon its return to China. The disposition of Japan’s southern naval bastion will also be of prime importance to the United States. A demilitarized Formosa in the hands of the Chinese Republic and the construction of a major naval base in the Philippines would go a long way toward bringing peace and security to the entire surrounding area.
34 China Weekly Review, Vol. LXXX, April 10, 1937, p. 199.
35 Edgar Snow, “Japan Imposes Her Culture,” Asia, Vol. XXXV, April, 1935, pp. 218-24.