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Admiral Sir John Fisher:
A Reappraisal
(See p. 317, March, 1942, Proceedings) Lieutenant Franklin G. Percival, U. S. Navy (Retired).—Although most of the points in Mr. Marden’s highly interesting paper are well taken, a few of them seem open to question.
For example, one can imagine the snort of indignation from the great admiral if he could have read Mr. Marden’s reference to him as “A democrat and perhaps even a socialist at heart.” Lord Fisher clearly showed that he was a humanitarian, but there is no evidence that he believed all men entitled to equal rewards; on the contrary, no man was ever more ready to reward true merit, or to punish incompetence and dilatoriness. Not to “everyone according to his needs,” but to everyone according to his works, was his way of dealing with subordinates. He did not believe that “all men are created equal” any more than the “duchesses” did; he simply believed in an aristocracy of usefulness, whereas they believed in an aristocracy of birth. When he was the very personification of individualism, how could anyone ever regard him as inclined to socialism?
The foregoing, however, is a minor point; the more important error which Mr. Mar- den makes is in regard to the British battle cruisers which fought at Jutland. Since none of these ships are now in existence, they can be discussed objectively without injuring the interests of our friends. The assertion that these vessels “came out of
Jutland at least as well as the badly- mauled German battle cruisers,” simply does not square with the well-known results of that battle. None of us care to glorify Germany these days, but any historical paper is a waste of time unless it hews to the line and lets the praise or blame fall where it may. Only by exercising rigid impartiality can we profit by the experience of others.
Mr. Marden also misses the point that there were fundamental errors in the designs of both classes of British battle cruisers. The design of the Invincibles was based on their fighting armored cruisers; it ignored the inevitability of their having to fight German vessels of their own type. When the Germans did reply with 11-inch- gunned battle cruisers which were clearly too much for the 6-inch armor belts of the Invincibles, Fisher designed the Lions. In them he thickened the armor belt to 9 inches, but he should have made it 12 inches to enable them to be used with the desired freedom. Hindsight shows that this lack of armor doomed both classes in any real fight with stoutly protected German battle cruisers.
Mr. Marden seems inclined to excuse inadequate armor on the grounds that scouting was a function entirely divorced from fighting. At any rate, he blames Beatty for using his battle cruisers in “a long-range action with the German battle cruisers, something for which they had never been intended.” How could Beatty have driven in Hipper’s forces and located the High
Seas Fleet without fighting? Admiral Fisher would probably have snorted again at the idea that his ships were “never intended” for fighting. His later slogan, “Armor is vision,” sounded as if he intended his battle cruisers to be able to fight for needed information. The trouble was that his disregard for fact-finding resulted in a fatal gap between his conceptions and the actual potentialities of his ships.
Although defective magazine arrangements may have contributed to the loss of British battle cruisers at Jutland, the plain fact is that no magazine arrangements could have saved such scantily protected ships. The Hood, for example, presumably had the improved magazine arrangements decided upon after Jutland; but she succumbed just as quickly to the heavily armored Bismarck as her thinly clad predecessors had to Hipper’s stoutly protected units.
The real lesson of Jutland was this: The usefulness of any type of warship depends upon its ability to continue to function in the face of enemy attacks. Fisher continually underestimated the effectiveness of his enemy’s weapons. He thereby demonstrated that expert estimates are a very poor substitute for proved facts. There is abundant evidence that this lesson has been taken to heart by Fisher’s successors.
The Naval History of Turkey
(See pages 209, February, 1942, and 341,
March, 1942, Proceedings)
Lieut. Comdr. Charles Moran, U. S.
Naval Reserve.—I was much interested by the article “The Naval History of Turkey,” the second and last installment of which appears in the Proceedings for March. It is a scholarly and timely work for which I desire to express my admiration. I cannot help wondering, however, whether the author is familiar with the Russian sources dealing with the Battle of Chesme. They give a decidedly different account of that engagement from those appearing in the English language.
According to the Russian historians the fire ships that played so prominent a part in that battle were four in number. Two were commanded by Britishers, two by Russians. Lieutenant Dugdale’s craft was sunk by Turkish fire before reaching its objective. Lieutenant Mackenzie fared no better; he ran his craft aground. Lieutenant Ilyin managed to run his craft alongside a Turkish 84, grappled, and soon had the Turk ablaze. Lieutenant Gagarine set fire to his craft and allowed the wind to carry it against a Turkish vessel. It would seem, therefore, if my information is correct, that it was the Russian, not the British, officers who started the fires that wrecked the Turkish fleet.
In Chapter XXI of my recent book, The Sea of Memories, you will find more details concerning the campaign in question. In view of the fact that we are at present engaged in a common cause with the Russian people, it seems to me that we should give their Navy credit wherever it is due.