The value of motor torpedo boats in modern naval warfare is now generally recognized. Only a few weeks ago General MacArthur, who had ample opportunity to observe their performance at close hand, asserted that the presence of 200 such boats in the Far Eastern theater of war might have turned the scales in our favor. Although originally conceived of as defensive weapons, they have already fully proved their ability to carry out offensive operations. In European waters, North Sea as well as Mediterranean, they are being used by both sides on a large scale to attack enemy ships even far out at sea. The exploits of our own PT’s in the Philippines are still in everyone’s memory. If motor torpedo boats have been unable thus far to score a major success against warships it seems due more to the lack of proper targets than to any inherent incapacity for offensive action. In case the still existing major handicaps of motor torpedo boats, limited seaworthiness and short radius of action, can be overcome, there is no doubt that they can even be a valuable adjunct of the battle fleet itself. If during a fleet engagement they descended on the enemy’s formation in an attack synchronized with that of the air forces—to divide and weaken his defenses —they could throw him into confusion and doubtless even cause him considerable material damage. To such offensive use of motor torpedo boats the objection is sometimes raised that even modern boats of our PT type are not reliable enough, since they cannot operate in bad weather. This objection loses weight when we recall that few naval battles have ever been fought under very poor weather conditions, and that even in modern times heavy seas will greatly reduce the effectiveness of all fighting ships, especially destroyers and cruisers. Besides, most present-day motor torpedo boats should be able to cope with any weather which will allow airplanes to take off from or land on the deck of airplane carriers. In other words, in any weather in which carrier-borne aircraft can take an active part in fleet operations, motor torpedo boats will be able to co-operate—if they are available. They must, however, be ready to accompany the fleet and to cover great distances, which they cannot do under their own power.
But if, as some feel, fleet action in the traditional sense is not to be expected in this war, there is still need for some means to transport motor torpedo boats quickly and far over sea. For modern boats of that type can also be used advantageously in attacking the enemy on his own ground. Sudden raids by motor torpedo boats on his lines of supply or on ships in and near his seaports can do him great damage. The chances of success of such attacks can be greatly increased by providing some of the boats with equipment to overcome obstacles blocking the entrance to those ports, perhaps in the manner of the Italian Grillo of the last war,1 although the daring deeds of Lieutenant Cushing during the Civil War furnish us with an encouraging tradition of our own. But unless the objects of the attack were within easy striking distance from one of our bases, the boats would have to be carried close to the scene of action, to be picked up again after the completion of their mission. The obvious solution of both these problems is a torpedo-boat carrier, a ship specially designed and equipped for that purpose. Battleships or cruisers, although they have occasionally been used to carry torpedo boats, should not be considered for that task, as it would only hinder them in the performance of their proper duties, while they could not be really efficient bases from which to launch the boats. Nor could converted merchant vessels fully serve the purpose as they are too slow for maneuvering with the fleet. Improvisations may have to be resorted to in many cases, but they cannot achieve the maximum results, and we are concerned here with the best solution of the problem.
The recent exploits of our PT’s have aroused the public imagination and proposals for torpedo-boat carriers have become almost a popular pastime. Magazine articles and even movie films present them as a sort of war-time entertainment. But most of these proposals are more glamorous than practical. The designs of the mother-ships are usually characterized by enormous size, extremely streamlined hulls, and special chutes to launch the boats. As a rule the plan provides for a large number of planes to be carried in addition to the boats. The main idea of the popular designs seems to be, then, to combine airplane and torpedo-boat carrier, to unite two great favorites of the present day in one ship.
The idea of combining the task of carrying torpedo boats with some other useful function is, of course, quite sound. The boats are comparatively light and as long as their value in long-distance operations is not definitely established, no navy might wish to devote a major fleet unit to the task of carrying a few torpedo boats exclusively. But the question is, what functions can be combined in our vessel so as not to interfere with each other? It is evident that motorboats as well as planes use deck space and thus might be in each other’s way if loaded into the same ship. Moreover, the two functions for which the ship is to be used might not always be mutually compatible from a tactical point of view, since the best position from which to launch the planes might not be the most favorable starting place for the boats. Although after a careful investigation a combined airplane-motorboat carrier might be found feasible, a better solution of the problem seems to be the combination of fleet mine layer and torpedo-boat carrier. Since the boats take up deck space but not much weight, they would not interfere with the carrying of mines, which are heavy but are stored within the ship and need only a small deck space. There might be, of course, other advantageous combinations which would not violate the principle of compatibility of functions. In any case, however, the ideal carrier would have to be a ship of cruiser size and speed; it should be armed with a strong battery of anti-aircraft guns for its own defense and as a welcome addition to the fleet’s air defense. Such a ship, carrying, for instance, several hundred mines and from six to eight motor torpedo boats, would certainly be a valuable asset to the fleet. But it could also be sent out on special missions, either all by itself or in combination with other fleet units, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, etc., as it would easily fit into any formation of existing warships. Our new San Diego class of cruisers might well serve as a model for the ideal torpedo-boat carrier mine layer, though in order to gain the needed displacement for mines and boats, savings would have to be made in armament, armor, and machinery. For instance, eight 5-inch double purpose guns would have to suffice, and 35 knots should be adequate speed for the new type. The technical problems involved in the design and construction of such a vessel do not seem impossible of solution.
Indeed, the idea of a torpedo-boat carrier is not a new one and has been tried out before. The very first torpedo boats, built during the seventies of the last century, being small and of very limited radius of action, suggested the idea of a carrier. During the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, the Grand Duke Constantine, an armed merchant steamer of about 1,500 tons, was equipped to carry six small torpedo boats on her davits. The ship was commanded by Lieutenant Makaroff, later admiral and the tragic hero of Port Arthur, while one of the boats was in charge of Rojdestvensky, the defeated commander of the Battle of Tsushima. This early torpedo-boat carrier was used in several attacks on the Turkish fleet at Batum and Sulima. Thus, for instance, on June 12, 1878, Makaroff arrived off Sulima in the Grand Duke Constantine, with a sister-ship, the Vladimir, as consort. Having located the enemy, he dropped his boats, ordered them to attack in two divisions and rejoin the mother-ship at a rendezvous off the coast. Despite the tireless efforts of Makaroff and the bravery of his crews this attack as well as all others proved a complete failure. The reason for this negative result lay, however, not so much in the inefficiency of the carrier or of the Russian attackers, as in the low state of perfection of the torpedoes used. During the earlier attacks the boats were still equipped with spar and towing torpedoes which proved very ineffective. Only later the automobile or Whitehead torpedo was substituted in some of the boats, but the Russians were inexperienced in its use and had to invent the very tactics of torpedo attack. Nevertheless, the superiority of the new torpedo over all other types was clearly demonstrated in that war.2
The Constantine was the forerunner of more elaborate torpedo-boat carriers in the British and French navies. The British Vulcan, launched in 1889, and officially designated a steel twin-screw torpedo depot ship, was a vessel of 6,620 tons displacement, 350 ft. length, 58 ft. beam, and 23 ft. draft; with 12,000 hp. it attained a speed of 20 knots. Its armament consisted of eight 4.7-inch guns and twelve 3-pounders, its protection of a steel deck of from 2£ to 5 inches in thickness. It carried on deck six second-class torpedo boats of 60 ft. length, two countermining launches, and four other steamboats. The Vulcan had been built expressly for the object of carrying these torpedo boats, and was thus no last minute improvisation. She was used, however, also as a mining and electric cable depot ship, a floating workshop, forge, and foundry. The six small torpedo boats which she carried on her deck could be hoisted in and out by means of specially fitted hydraulic cranes.3 Considering all these qualities, it can readily be seen that in her time the Vulcan fulfilled all requirements which we expect of our modern torpedo-boat carrier; in addition to her main function, she also served as mine layer and depot ship, and was an efficient, fast, though lightly armed cruiser.
The French counterpart of the Vulcan was the Foudre, launched in 1895, of 6,000 tons, 19 knots, eight 3.5-inch, four 2.5- inch, and five 1.5-inch guns; she was capable of carrying eight torpedo boats. The vessel was later transformed into a submarine mother-ship and seaplane tender, and as such it was still in use during the World War.
The reason why these original torpedo- boat carriers found no successors in their own navies and no followers in others was not their inefficiency for the task for which they were built, but the development of the torpedo boat itself. The advent of quick-firing guns necessitated increasing speed in the torpedo boat and at the technological stage reached at that time that could be achieved only by heavier machinery and larger boats. Soon the torpedo boats reached sizes which made it impractical to carry them on the deck of a mother- ship. At the same time the evolution of the torpedo-boat destroyer set in, causing a gradual decline in the popularity of the former small torpedo boat. Moreover, the ascendancy of the battleship and the general peacefulness of that period did not encourage further experimentation with torpedo-boat carriers. No new ones were built and the existing carriers were used for other purposes. The Vulcan ended its existence as a submarine depot ship.
Today, however, after the development of the lightweight explosion motor and the application of the hydroplane principle to improve hull forms, we again have very small boats capable of high speeds, though unable to cover long distances on their own power. Thus conditions are again very favorable for the development of torpedo- boat carriers, and quite especially is this true in our own case. Great Britain and Germany may get along without such a ship because distances in their part of the world are short enough to allow motor torpedo boats to operate independently. Such conditions do not prevail on our side of the Atlantic, nor in the Pacific. Here, then, the potential value of a torpedo-boat carrier is greatest; indeed, it seems an urgent need of the moment.
The equipment of suitable merchant vessels or other auxiliary craft to serve as temporary carriers might be resorted to as a temporary measure, but at best it will be a makeshift arrangement which cannot satisfy the need for a real torpedo-boat carrier. Such improvisations may well serve the purpose of transporting torpedo boats from one base to another and may even have a certain limited offensive value, but as mentioned before they cannot accompany the fleet into battle, nor can they be employed independently on special offensive missions involving speed. On the other hand, it might be worth while to consider the equipment of coastal gun boats with one or two motor torpedo boats, so as to increase their striking speed and power far beyond their own capacity. Such equipment might be more valuable to them than aircraft, as coastal patrol vessels are rarely out of reach of shore-based aircraft. On the other hand, the quick availability of high speed motorboats would greatly increase their effectiveness in fighting submarines.
The boats to be carried by the torpedo- boat carrier, large or small, may have to be of a special design, probably smaller than the regular PT’s, perhaps limited to 60 feet in length. Their displacement must be kept down in order to facilitate their quick dispatch, their length must be limited to allow a larger number to be accommodated on deck. To save weight, the armament and fuel supply of the carrier-borne boats could be held to a minimum, while their speed should be as high as possible. If chutes should prove impractical, a little experimentation will probably lead to some other satisfactory launching arrangement.
Although nothing is known about any modern torpedo-boat carriers—which would be of less usefulness to any other country than to America—all of the belligerent navies, except the Japanese, possess and use motor torpedo boats. The rather strange reluctance of the Japanese to employ a weapon which has proved its value conclusively, especially in coastal warfare, may be due to their inability to produce a proper lightweight motor for that purpose. After all, even Great Britain only a few years ago purchased many of the motors for its motor torpedo boats from Italy. The apparent absence of hostile motorboats in the Pacific4 greatly simplifies for us the problem of defense against such boats. Nevertheless it deserves very careful attention. There is today no doubt that their sting can be just as deadly as that of torpedo planes, and it is very probable that at night they are more effective than the winged variety. If a fleet or a single ship is unprepared to deal with these mosquito craft, serious losses might result. The British seem to have developed a special motorboat destroyer, a picture of which appeared in the June issue of the Naval Institute Proceedings. But for the Pacific that type of vessel might not be adequate as a solution of the problem. Perhaps its solution lies in additional quick- firing guns on all ships and destroyers; but in order to cover the attacking boats even at close range the angle of depression might have to be increased over that of ordinary anti-aircraft guns. Again, the torpedo-boat carrier would be the logical testing ground for all such questions. In addition to carrying the boats it would have the task of developing the best offensive tactics for motor torpedo boats, methods for the coordination of attacks by boats, planes, and submarines, special techniques for forcing the harbors of the enemy, and the best defensive measures against the attack of hostile mosquito craft. If, in addition to all that, it were able to lay mines along the enemy’s coast while waiting for the return of its charges, such a vessel certainly would justify the expenditure involved in building it. Naturally, a number of torpedo- boat carriers could operate together like a division of cruisers or aircraft carriers.
Modern warfare with its rapidly changing conditions creates a demand for new weapons and new tactics which have to be met quickly if they are to prove effective. The one who foresees the need and is prepared to satisfy it will have a great advantage over his slower opponent. Resourcefulness and initiative in making ready new means of warfare may contribute greatly to ultimate success. Airplanes and motor torpedo boats, two peaks in the technological development of the last decades, express the genius of the American people better than almost any other modern weapon. They suit the talent for things mechanical as well as the spirit of dare-devil offensive characteristic of our people. Everything that promises to offer an outlet to those qualities and to make full use of them should and must be promoted in the interest of our country’s defense. The torpedo-boat carrier is eminently fitted to do just that, and it is therefore a desirable and needed part of our Navy.
1. Cf. my article on “Italian Attempts at Harbor Forcing during the Last War,” Naval Institute Proceedings, January, 1942.
2. Fred T. Jane, The Imperial Russian Navy, London, 1899, p. 185 ff.
3. Wm. Laird Clowes, The Royal Navy, Vol. VII, Boston and London, 1903, p. 41 f.
4. It is, however, quite probable that the Japanese have taken over several motor torpedo boats from the Siamese Navy and perhaps even a few from the conquered Dutch East Indies. The presence of hostile motor torpedo boats in the Pacific must therefore not be wholly discounted.