“I have cull’d a garland of flowers,
Mine only is the string that binds them.”
The inquiring beginner in the study of strategy and tactics must struggle through long and tedious volumes until the whole subject seems, as a British soldier once said of the British Navy, “a huge mystery surrounded by sea sickness.”[2]
Nowhere does he find a simple, logical, and understandable outline of the basic principles, with their more important applications, nor even agreement among writers as to what are the fundamental principles. This intrinsically most fascinating and exciting subject becomes an involved and confusing welter of conflicting arguments and catch phrases.
Experts, of course, do not require such a simple outline or similar elementary aids to understanding. They will point out, with perfect correctness, that any brief outline of such a comprehensive subject involves a dangerous degree of oversimplification. These masters of the subject, however, are not required or expected to read this article. But inasmuch as they have so far failed to supply the starting student with a simple classification and framework for study, this beginner, with the valor of ignorance, will attempt to devise one.
The correct point of departure in the study of any subject is the original definition and delimitation of the subject itself. Here, at the very beginning, we run into our first difficulty, for we find almost as many definitions of strategy and tactics as there arc authors. Shunning the temptation to add one more definition to the existing surplus, we will start with certain basic principles of all human activity, and hope that from the discussion of the subject each reader may evolve a definition satisfactory to himself, or at least a workable understanding which may obviate the necessity for wordy definitions.
In the first place, we cannot consider naval strategy without considering national strategy. The Navy is merely an instrument of national policy, created by the will of the people in order to carry out the will of the people. If (he people have no will, if they refuse to give to the Navy the necessary means to carry out their will, or if they demand the impossible from the Navy, no amount of naval strategy or tac-
NATIONAL STRATEGY
OBJECTIVE
Ultimate Objective
National mission
Immediate Objective (in war)
Unlimited, or limited by objective
Offensive or defensive in purpose
UNITY OF PURPOSE
Correct Domestic Policies
Political (mutual co-operation vs. class warfare)
Economic (tolerable vs. intolerable scale of living
Psychologic (ethnologic, ideologic, religious)
Co-operation among National Agencies
OFFENSIVE
Implemented Policies
Domestic
Foreign
Resistance to conflicting policies of other nations
National Will to Fight
CONCENTRATION
Information (Political and economic research)
Forces Opposed
Our foreign policies (do they make us allies or enemies?)
Political (Democracy vs. Totalitarianism)
Economic (the “Haves” vs. the “Have Nots”)
Psychologic
Conflicting foreign policies of other nations
Composition of Own Forces
Economic preparedness
National economic and financial strength
Strategic materials
Mobilization of industries
Facilities
Materials
Trained Men
Merchant marine
Military preparedness
Bases and fortifications Organization of command
Sources of military supply Composition of forces
Information Organization of forces
Communications Mobilization of men
Training
SECURITY
Consequences as to Cost
tics can save them. There are, therefore, be economically, politically, or in actual three obvious mam divisions for our outline: (I) National Strategy, (II) Naval Strategy, and (III) Naval Tactics.
This beginner, after making and tearing up half a dozen outlines, comes to the conclusion that there are live basic principles. These basic principles apply equally to all three of the main heads immediately above; in fact, they are the same principles that govern any successful human accomplishment.
(1) We must know what we are trying to accomplish—not hazily or in vague generalities, but specifically in terms of the ultimate objective, the immediate effect required (the immediate objective), and the thing to be attacked in order to start the accomplishment (the physical objective). This is the principle of the Objective.
(2) In any group effort, all individual efforts must be directed toward the same end. Nothing can be accomplished by pulling and hauling in all different directions. There must be Unity of Purpose and of effort.
(3) The principle of the Offensive. Having decided upon the objective, and all being of one purpose, the next thing is to do something about it. Results come, not from wishful thinking, but from purposeful action.
(4) The most elemental and universal principle of all warfare, Concentration— concentration of force at the decisive point. Never mind the little issues and the little battles that go on in the outskirts and merely confuse the issue. Win at the decisive point, and the minor situations will take care of themselves or may be disposed of later.
(5) A principle which must be considered, but should not be too much emphasized until all the others have been fulfilled to the limit. That is the principle of Security, which includes the factor of consequences as to cost. We cannot afford to pay too dearly for our whistle, whether it be economically, politically, or in actual battle.
These five principles seem to fit the requirements for the principal subheads of our outline, and to stand the test of examination and re-examination. Within their framework, we will try to fit the various secondary principles and applications. The reader who is hardy enough to follow the searchings of this beginner to the end of this article may judge as to the success achieved.
I. National Strategy
The fact that national strategy is the fundamental upon which all military strategy must be based is so obvious as to scarcely need discussion. The military forces exist only to carry into effect the policies of the nation. The first of three “immutable strategic principles” cited by Captain Edward Altham, R.N., is:
“Naval efforts, like military operations, must always be subordinate to government policy . . . ”[3]
Objective
To jump immediately into the subject, therefore, without wearisome preliminaries, the first thing which must be decided is, “What are we all trying to do?” In other words, what is the national Objective? To define that, let us adopt for ourselves as a nation, a Mission, conventionally made up of a Task and a Purpose definitely oriented as to time and place. The following seems as good an expression of a national mission as this beginner is able to devise:
To obtain and insure freedom, security, and prosperity for our people, at home and abroad, in our time and our children’s time, by adopting and prosecuting correct national policies, by peaceful means if possible, by war if necessary.
This is our ultimate objective, one on which all citizens of whatever creed or political party should agree. So far as the prosecution of this Mission is concerned, whether we are at peace or in war is not of vital importance. In fact an important cause of confused thinking in the matter of national policies is the artificial line drawn between a nation “at peace” and “at war.” A nation is in constant conflict with other nations, economically and politically, and therefore diplomatically. When diplomatic methods fail in the furtherance of national policy, then it becomes necessary either to abandon those policies, or to resort to physical violence to enforce their acceptance by other nations. Thus Clausewitz’s much quoted definition: “War is the pursuance of national policy by other means.”
The actual declaration of war causes a severe upheaval in the personal affairs of most individuals. It is, therefore, natural that we should consider it as a similar complete break in national affairs and policies. This is not necessarily the case. The declaration or act of war, in modern practice at least, is more of a legalistic distinction. It is merely that point in the eternal conflict between nations where methods of open physical violence are admittedly resorted to in the furtherance of national policy. The work of the statesman and the diplomat continues, and becomes of even greater importance after the commencement of war.
The reason for the above discussion is that this writer at first attempted to divide his outline under the obvious headings “in peace” and “in war.” This developed many confusions and interferences which were eliminated with the acceptance of the old concept of Clausewitz. The concept of a continuing national strategy, passing without break from peaceful methods to means of violence, leads to a much more rational and logical understanding of national strategy.
The ultimate objective of the nation being decided, there may be a number of immediate objectives of the national strategy. In war this objective may be, and in these modern days usually is, to reduce the will to resist of an entire nation, not stopping until that goal is reached. In other words, a war of unlimited objective. On the other hand, the objective may be merely the acquisition of a certain territory, or the destruction of a certain threatening fleet, in which case it is a war limited by objective. Let us, at all costs, for reasons which will be discussed later, shun the deceiving and dangerous terms, “limited” or “unlimited” war.
In the old days of the small professional army and navy, the limited objective was quite common, and certain territories changed hands again and again with the general populaces of the combatant countries scarcely disturbed by the war waged at a distance from their homes. But modern transportation and communication, and the development of new and widely devastating weapons of war, such as the aerial bomber and the distant blockade, have changed all that. It is difficult to conceive of two modern nations at war, except that all the populaces are involved so that the war can be decided only when a majority of the people of one or the other loses its will to fight. Modern wars are wars of unlimited objective.
A final classification of the national objective is whether its purpose is offensive or defensive. Are we trying to take something from another nation, or arc we merely trying to defend something which we possess from an aggressor? No two combatant nations will probably ever agree on this point. Germany claims, for instance, that in attacking Poland she was merely defending herself against the economic and political aggression of Great Britain. In a few cases, such as Holland and Belgium, even the most clever sophist must admit a clear case of defensive war on their part.
Unity of Purpose
History, particularly modern history, is too full of examples for us to waste time demonstrating the necessity for a united people. No army or navy can save a nation which is divided within itself.
But a united people is not a God-given blessing to be looked upon complacently as some sort of a divine right. On the contrary, it is the direct result of correct and intelligent national policies. It is the constant duty of every citizen to see that policies are adopted which will result in unity of the people within the nation. And it is the duty of the chosen administrators of the government to so interpret those policies that there will be unity of effort in furthering them.
All this seems too trite and obvious to write, yet it happens in every great emergency that there is not complete unity of purpose in the people or in the government agencies. Consider the uncomfortable position of our own commander in Siberia in 1918-20. He writes:
I was in command of the United States troops sent to Siberia and, 1 must admit, I do not know what tile United States was trying to accomplish by military intervention,[4]
and again:
As a result the representatives of the War Department and the State Department were carrying out entirely different policies at the same time and in the same place. There can be no difference of opinion as to the accuracy of this statement, and the results were bitter criticism of all United States agents.[5]
Consider also the predicament of the French naval command in the Mediterranean in the summer of 1940. Should they fight, and if so, whom should they fight? Should they join the British, capitulate to them or fight them? Only a responsible government at home could tell them, and there was no responsible government at home.
But it is useless to quote further examples, for this is a condition beyond the control of the naval officer. He must take what orders he may get, interpret them and reconcile them in the light of what knowledge he may have, and then do the best that he can.
The military commander in the field is entitled to know what he is sent to accomplish, and he is entitled to the undivided support of all government agencies in fighting for that accomplishment. Without these, unity of purpose is impossible, and it is the function of national strategy to see that he has them.
Offensive
A good purpose or objective, and unity of purpose, must be implemented by action if there is to be any result. Mere static waiting accomplishes nothing.
In national strategy the extent to which the offensive will be followed depends to a large extent upon ethnographic and national characteristics of the people. Are they by inheritance and training a dynamic, a static, or a retrogressive people? We in the United States have always prided ourselves on being a dynamic people. Our great areas were colonized by our pioneers, using the aggressive, offensive principle. The pioneer blood still flows in the veins of most of our citizens, and in spite of political pressure for less work and more pay, bounties, pensions, and impossible securities, the pioneer spirit still believes that results come only from action.
We must, therefore, make our domestic and foreign policies alive and active. Dead and outgrown issues should be abandoned or modernized. Our foreign policies should be co-ordinated so far as possible with those of other nations to avoid conflict, but where conflict is inevitable we must be prepared to make active resistance to the conflicting policy.
Ultimately, there must be a national will to fight to preserve our policies. The rights
NAVAL STRATEGY
OBJECTIVE
Ultimate Objective
Naval Policy of the United States
Command of the sea (surface, subsurface, and air)
Immediate Objective (in war)
Unlimited, or limited by—objective, physical isolation
Offensive or defensive in purpose
Correct physical objective
UNITY OF PURPOSE
Unity of Command
Organization, Planning, Training
Common
Concept of War
OFFENSIVE
Suitable and Adequate Forces
Offensive or defensive Navy
Bases—Situation, Strength, Resources
Freedom of action (local or temporary command of the sea)
Initiative Movement
Energy Speed
Offensive Strategy
Attack Raids
Blockade—close, open Defensive-offensive
Economic—terminal area, focal area, pelagic
Defensive Strategy
Offensive-defensive
CONCENTRATION
Information
Correct Physical Objectives
Forces Opposed
Estimate of strength and weakness factors
Reduction of strength by—
Raids and attrition
Division or diversion by
Attack or threat of attack
Action by inferior force
Composition of Own Forces
Suitable and adequate task groups
Economy of force Tactical grouping
Flexibility of maneuver combinations
Favorable Relative Position
Disposition of task groups Character of the theater of operations
Co-operation between task groups Surprise
Co-operation all forces (military and civil)
SECURITY
Consequences as to Cost
Major forces in decisive areas
Minor forces in indecisive areas
of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness cannot be guaranteed by mere words, even though written on the most durable of parchment. In this fiercely competitive world, they can be guaranteed only by the national will to fight for them, and a military and naval strength which makes that will respected by the other nations of the world.
Concentration
It is a military axiom that no force can be strongest everywhere. The successful leader decides where the decisive point is to be, and he attempts to be strongest at that point. National strategy must do the same thing. It must first have adequate information upon which to base its decision. It must then consider the forces opposed, change such policies as cannot be supported, and build its own forces strong enough to support the vital policies retained. Many great books have been written on this subject, and this beginner will not attempt to more than suggest in his outline some of the more important subheads.
Security
It is particularly essential in national strategy that serious consideration be given to the consequences as to cost. Too often this factor is given little or no consideration in the halls of Congress. To help a few mining states of the union, a high price is set on silver, and repercussions undreamed of by the politicians threaten our trade relations with 400,000,000 Chinese. We bar Argentine beef, or put a duty on Cuban sugar, and then wonder why our new reciprocal Monroe Doctrine does not receive the enthusiastic reception we think it deserves. These are merely examples of the difficulties of co-ordinating our domestic and our foreign policies. Every political action, domestic or foreign, should be analyzed to determine its consequences as to cost in relation to our national defense, so
that we may measure its effect in making friends or enemies for us abroad. Risks must be taken, we cannot please everyone, but let these risks be taken with open eyes, knowing and evaluating the possible consequences.
II. Naval Strategy
Objective
It is a fundamental part of naval strategy to make long range estimates in peace times as to what enemies we may have to meet and when and where. Upon these estimates—and the amount of money appropriated by Congress—depends the design of ships and bases. As a guide and an objective, the following are the basic paragraphs of the United States Naval Policy of 1940:
Naval policy is the system of principles, and the general terms of their application, governing the development, organization, maintenance, training and employment of a Navy. It is based on and is designed to support national policies and interests. It comprehends questions of character, number, and distribution of naval forces and shore activities; of the number and qualifications of personnel; and of the character of peace and war strategy and operations.
Fundamental policy: To maintain the Navy in strength and readiness to uphold National policies and interests, and to guard the United States and its continental and overseas possessions.
There is also a converse to the principle that naval strategy must always be subsidiary to national strategy. We quoted only the first half of Captain Altham’s first immutable principle. The second half is:
.. . but although political aims may tend to influence war plans, they should never be allowed by ministers and their professional advisers to dictate a course of action which is at variance with sound strategy.[6]
Gallipoli in 1916, Siberia in 1918-20, and the frontal attack on Greece by Mussolini in 1940 point the moral. But here again, the naval officer is merely the servant of the government. It is his duty to advise and to protest if he thinks necessary, it is his privilege to growl, but where he is ordered he will go.
In war, the ultimate objective is to secure and maintain command of the sea. Captain Altham gives this as his second principle:
The primary mission of a navy in war is to deny the use of the sea to the enemy, while preserving it for friendly interest.[7]
Obviously, the best way to secure command of the sea is to destroy the enemy fleet and all his naval forces. We will discuss command of the sea in more detail later, but it is well to mention that, while the principle remains the same as it always has been, the submarine and the aircraft have made its application many times more difficult. Command of the sea now carries with it the necessity of commanding, not only the surface, but 50 fathoms of water below the surface and 30,000 feet of air above the surface.
We have already discussed the differentiation between a war of unlimited objective and one of limited objective such as our war with Spain or Japan’s with Russia. In strategy there is another classification. A war limited by physical isolation is one where the forces engaged are of necessity limited physically by the difficulties of transportation in the face of hostile fleets, raiders, or submarines.
We have mentioned previously the danger of confusing the terms “war with limited objective” and its loose but popular abbreviation, “limited war.” The seriousness of such looseness of terminology is best described by Major General Sir George Aston:
You will have shuddered ... at coming across the loose statement in English writings that Clausewitz used to refer to “limited wars.” There is something very fascinating in the expression “limited war,” it conveys the idea of a limited liability campaign upon which one may embark as lightheartedly as one may invest cash which one does not mind losing in a limited liability company.[8]
In the early months of every war, many people are fascinated by the idea of a “limited” or “easy” war, which can be won handily by a more or less static blockade, without great expenditures of men or money. The results speak for themselves. There is no such thing in these times as a limited war. It is all or nothing. No matter how our civilized sensibilities may shrink from it, the hard facts are as that tough old sea dog Admiral Lord Fisher preached over and over again:
War is the essence of violence.
Moderation in War is imbecility.
HIT FIRST. HIT HARD. KEEP ON HITTING.[9]
Again we may distinguish between offensive and defensive war, bearing in mind that this distinction has to do only with the purpose of the war, not with the method of its prosecution. The long range naval strategy will depend upon whether our national policy calls for attacking an enemy at his home ports, or merely defending our possessions from his attack, but the actual fighting of our individual ships will be the same in either case.
Strategically, we must also select a correct physical objective. In warfare it is not enough to have a good purpose. Warfare requires definite forceful action against some definite physical point or force if anything is to be accomplished.
Unity of Purpose
This principle becomes more vitally important the closer we come to actual contact with the enemy. In naval strategy it is obtained primarily by unity of command and by indoctrination. Indoctrination is that training which projects the thinking and the methods of the commander down through the command, so that his will and purpose are carried out, even though in body he may be half an ocean distant and completely out of communication with the particular operation. It assures the carrying out of his methods and tactics for destroying the enemy fleet, in the smoke and confusion of the hottest battle, even though not an order is sent out from the flagship.
The peace-time study of war, of campaigns, and strategy and tactics, develops a common concept of war, defined in Sound Military Decision as “a comprehensive view of the general scheme, its purpose, and its involvements.” Possession of a common concept of war tends automatically to produce indoctrination and co-ordination between forces.
Offensive
Volumes have been written as to the respective merits of the offensive and the defensive in warfare. Each has its elements of strength and of weakness. The navies of the United States and of the British Empire, however, have been brought up on the principle of the Offensive.
But no matter how much we develop the offensive spirit, spirit alone is not enough. Adequate and suitable ships must be available for either offense or defense, and these ships must have adequate and suitable bases for their support. An offensive attempt with a defensive navy is plain suicide.
Strategically, bases derive their value from three factors. They must be strategically located to support our forces, to protect our lines of communication or trade, or to threaten the forces or lines of our enemy. They must be strong enough to protect themselves. Bases exist to protect the fleet, not the fleet to protect the bases. A base which requires protection from the fleet reduces the fleet’s freedom of action where it should increase it; it is a liability instead of an asset. A base must have resources to supply itself and to supply and renew the fleet. It should be a source of strength to the fleet, not a drain upon it. These are factors which are often overlooked in the peace-time discussions as to location of naval bases. And of course it is entirely superfluous to add that naval strategy is more often hindered than helped by consideration of the political needs of a particular area in deciding upon where to spend government money in the development of a base.
Closely dependent upon bases comes the next principle, freedom of action, and the much discussed command of the sea. The British, for obvious reasons, place command of the sea as their primary principle. In the days of England’s naval glory this was a comparatively simple thing to attain. Once the enemy fleet was soundly defeated, or bottled up in port, the sea belonged to the stronger naval power. But today command of the sea, to be effective, requires command of the subsurface and of the air as well. Both in this war and in the last, we see England, possessing a considerable preponderance of naval power, energetically driving enemy craft from the sea, and yet pushed to the brink of defeat by submarine and air forces, with which her fleet is unable to cope. Nothing less than the capture or complete destruction of all enemy bases for aircraft and submarines will give England command of the sea. The Grand Fleet may sweep over an area of sea, and no enemy dares show a topmast over the horizon. But 30 minutes after the fleet passes a lone submarine may emerge, or a squadron of bombers appear, and these lone and comparatively insignificant forces have control of all that sea within the range of their lookouts, and continue to have that command until a more heavily armed force appears. The importance of surface command of the sea is certainly greatly reduced when a blockaded enemy can still shut off ocean-borne trade by the use of submarines and air bombers.
Complete command of the sea would, of course, win the war. But paradoxically, the only way to obtain complete command of the sea is to win the war and thus deprive the enemy of its submarine and air bases. We must either admit that surface command of the sea is not nearly as important as it used to be, or we must revise our definition, considering complete command of the sea as including command of the air and the subsurface. If we accept that definition then it becomes so difficult of attainment and so decisive if attained, that it properly belongs as an ultimate objective, where it will be found in this outline.
As a strategical concept, then, command of the sea becomes a relative and temporal condition, and as such takes second place to the principle of freedom of action.
Freedom of action can be attained only by action, by initiative, energy, and movement. The hardest thing is always to overcome the inertia, to get started. If at anchor, either physically or mentally, inertia works against you. In getting under way, you waste valuable time and energy which might better be used in overcoming the enemy. If under way, momentum works for you. The dynamic energy of motion will pull you over many a dead center. Mental processes work faster and easier for not having to overcome the lethargy of inaction. It is inaction which ruins the morale of the crews of blockaded ships. It was action, activity, and hard work that accounted for much of the good morale of Nelson’s men through their long and weary months at sea.
Although the tradition of the Navy is the tradition of the offensive, even a beginner in strategy would not advocate that the offensive be taken blindly under all circumstances. There are advantages to both offense and defense, and certain situations which clearly call for one or the other. In those conditions where the decision is not clear it is well to remember the old adage, “When in doubt, attack.” Our objective is always to destroy the enemy fleet.
There have been in the past quite a few advocates of the defensive position. The war of 1914-18, with its lines of trenches and fortifications and its endless naval maneuvering, convinced many that the defense had grown stronger than the offense. The Germans in 1940 proved the contrary. In the endless seesaw for supremacy between offensive and defensive weapons, the offensive is certainly on top at this time. Let us quote Major General David P. Bar- rows, U. S. Army (Ret.), in answer to the question as to how Germany had been able to achieve so astounding a triumph:
A second answer to this question lies in the concept of war adopted by Britain and France, based on the belief that wars can be won by defense rather than offense, with little shedding of blood and small sacrifice. This concept is fallacious in the light of military history. It permits the opponent to set the hour of battle, to choose the points to strike. It gives him the initiative.[10]
While a temporary defensive may be necessary to gain time, ultimate victory can result only from the offensive. But if the enemy fleet refuses action, then our strategy changes in particular while still remaining offensive in principle. We may use the blockade. The close blockade is designed to lock the enemy forces within the harbor and not permit them to leave. In these days of submarines, mines, and aircraft, it is extremely difficult to maintain a close blockade without large losses among the patrolling vessels. Furthermore, in the case of an offensive blockade, its purpose is not to keep the defensive fleet in, but rather to entice it out to action beyond the range of its supporting fortifications. Therefore, the modern blockade is an open or distant blockade.
Raids are perhaps more frequently used for moral than for direct military effect, for building up the morale of the raiders, for reducing the morale of the attacked. A few shells dropped in a coastal town, for instance, may cause a popular clamor for protection resulting in a fatal division of the major fleet forces. One of the principal errors in German psychology has always been the belief that they could break the British morale by raids and civilian punishment. They fail to recognize a fundamental characteristic of the English stock. While he may get scared, he also gets mad, and in the end his anger predominates and becomes his strongest support.
If the enemy fleet will not come out to fight of their own initiative, then measures may be taken to force them out—military action against their base, raids against other vulnerable areas, the defensive-offensive, or economic pressure.
The convoy system in 1917-18 is an excellent example of the defensive-offensive. The general offensive against the submarine had failed because it was impossible for surface vessels to find the submarine in order to bring it to action. But by grouping the merchant vessels into convoys, it was necessary for the submarine to come to the convoy, which meant to the waiting destroyers. By taking a defensive position, our forces required the enemy to come to them, so our forces might assume an effective offensive.
Command of the sea is secured by destroying the enemy forces, by containing or blockading them, or by diverting them to other areas. Command of the sea is exercised by destroying enemy trade and protecting one’s own. Its purpose is economic blockade, and it is exercised in three ways. Control of terminal areas prevents egress and ingress to ports where trade lines must land their cargoes. Control of focal areas catches enemy shipping when passing through natural gateways or points where lines of communication must concentrate, such as the Straits of Gibraltar, the great canals, or the southern capes. Pelagic control consists of a general combing of the seas, and as the sea is very large and an enemy ship comparatively very small, this is obviously the least effective.
The defensive position is not to be wholly condemned. It has certain advantages and many strategic uses. The one fundamental concept upon which all authorities agree is that the defensive must always be considered as a suspended offensive. It must be only a temporary measure, to gain time, to protect a convoy, to divert an enemy force, or to complete preparations for an offense. It must never be accepted as a permanent situation, for so to accept it is to accept ultimate defeat.
The defensive should always be an offensive-defensive. It is an old adage that the best defense is an active offense. An inferior force in these days can wage an offensive-defense by means of submarines, aircraft, and raiders, which is far different from the passive defensive which strategists decry.
There are certain strategic operations which must always be defensive, such as scouting, patrolling, screening, escorting, supporting, and covering. The mission in such cases is to defend something else, and while the best way to defend it may be to attack an enemy, the commander who rushes off to attack, forgetful of his mission, shows little understanding of fundamental principles. The one absolutely vital principle is the maintenance of the offensive spirit. Without that, morale deteriorates, the will to fight is lost, and quick defeat is a certainty.
Concentration
The fourth great principle of all strategy is one upon which all authorities agree. Captain Altham gives it as the last of his three immutable strategical principles.[11] Battles are won by concentrating a stronger force against a weaker at the decisive point. It is the relative strength at the decisive point that counts. The battleships or whatnot which fail to arrive at the proper place at the proper time might as well not exist so far as that particular engagement is concerned. It is a strategical problem to bring all forces into action simultaneously, so as to have the full strength of one’s own forces available.
To accomplish this, it is necessary that we have correct information, obtained by research, espionage, scouting, and communication. It is necessary that we have selected the correct physical objective, not wasting our force by attempting too much or at too many points. And inasmuch as it is relative strength with which we are primarily concerned, we should endeavor to weaken the enemy’s forces by every possible means—attrition, cutting off their supplies or their bases, and by diversion and division.
Conversely, of course, we must not divide our own forces, or allow them to be diverted. Even a beginner in strategy and tactics shudders at the statement of a prominent layman, speaking recently before a large and influential group, that we should send at least one-third of our fleet to the Far East, based on Manila, Sourabaya, and Singapore. What an invitation that would be for an inferior fleet to dispose of each one-ninth of our fleet in detail. The principle of concentration demands:
All or none, the battle fleet concentrated whether in the Pacific or the Atlantic.[12]
The “philologist blokes” can perhaps explain why the methods of producing division or diversion, also produce the following alliteration: deceive, delay, deter, detain, distract, displace, decoy. The results may be accomplished by raids or by threat of attack on inferior forces, lines of communication, or vulnerable bases. It may sometimes even involve attack by an inferior force, sacrificing itself for the sake of diverting or crippling a superior enemy force.
Next we consider the composition of our own forces. They must be divided into task groups, suitable for the objective which they are given, and adequate to accomplish their task. This involves economy of force, for we cannot be strong everywhere; we must decide upon the decisive points, and be sure we are strong enough there, and do the best that we can at the other points, modifying the objectives if necessary to match the forces available and opposed. Fortified harbors and bases make for economy of naval force. So also does the assumption of the defensive role.
Units should be grouped so far as possible according to tactical qualities. A 30- knot raiding force should not be hampered by a 20-knot auxiliary. Also groupings within a fleet should be such as to promote flexibility of maneuver. While deployments or maneuvers under gunfire are to be avoided where possible, it is essential that they can be made if necessary with a minimum of delay and confusion. The preparation of this flexibility is a task for strategy.
Next, we have the selection of a favorable relative position, involving the location of task groups, and co-operation between them. To assure favorable relative position a close study is required, not only of our own and opposing strength, but of the theater of operations and the probable movements of the enemy.
Finally, as a means of obtaining superiority of force at the decisive point and launching it from a favorable relative position, we have the oldest and most primitive principle of warfare. The earliest caveman struck out from hiding so he might concentrate his strength against his rival’s unreadiness. The old Chinese General, Sun Tzu, wrote 2,400 years ago:
Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend, march swiftly to places where you are not expected.[13]
Surprise is a means of obtaining instant superiority at the decisive point. Its preparation is a strategical problem, its application is tactical, under which head we will discuss it further.
We have only to read the press accounts of the present war to see that the very closest co-ordination between army, navy, air forces, and merchant marine is a vital essential today. It has been pointed out by strategists that the German General Staff in 1914-18 failed to recognize the tremendous importance to their naval operations of military occupation of the Channel ports. They have not overlooked it in 1940, and both Germans and British are making the most in their campaigns of the tremendously added force of a combined offensive by sea, land, and air forces, hitting at the same time, although not necessarily against the same physical objective.
In closing this vital principle of concentration, all authorities stress the danger of considering it as a mere physical massing of ships and guns. A mass of ships or of men at one point is difficult to supply, slow and clumsy to get into battle or to maneuver. The principle of concentration requires only that enough forces be concentrated for tactical employment at the decisive point at the decisive moment. It is a problem of timing rather than of location. The Napoleonic principle was, “disperse to subsist, concentrate to fight.”[14]
Security
Just as it is impossible to be superior everywhere, it is also impossible to be secure everywhere. Security of vital points often requires sacrifice of security at non- vital points. The consequences as to cost must be carefully weighed, the forces necessary to protect the vital spots provided, and we must do the best we can with what is left. If we cannot protect all ports, correct strategy demands that we concentrate protection on the more important ones. The military principle is to lose a small port, leave a small ship, but keep the main fighting units intact.
This is a principle which, in every war, brings the civilian and the military components into conflict. Each port, large or small, rightly feels that it is entitled to protection. But its citizens are wrong when they demand individual protection by naval forces within sight of their harbor. Their best protection lies in a strong fleet, concentrated to deliver a knock-out blow at the decisive point and win the war. What good will a squadron off their harbor do them, if in the meantime a weakened fleet is losing the war in some other theater?
This country, we believe, learned its lesson in this particular, during the Spanish-American War. The clamor for protection against the very remote possibility of a Spanish attack on the Atlantic coast ports kept Schley’s Flying Squadron away from the decisive point long enough to permit arrival of the Spanish Fleet in Cuba unhampered. Had it not been for the very fortunate fact that Spanish hysteria over the possibility of an American attack against their coast caused a division of the Spanish Fleet, our first engagement of the war might easily have been disastrous for our Fleet. The military man can only hope that the lesson will not be forgotten the first time that a raider threatens to drop a few shells, or a bomber a few bombs, in one of our seacoast cities
NAVAL TACTICS
OBJECTIVE
Ultimate Objective
Immediate Objective
Correct physical objective
UNITY OF EFFORT
Unity of Command
Leadership
Loyalty
Indoctrination
Co-operation
Simplicity of orders
OFFENSIVE
Freedom of Action
Initiative
Energy
Movement
Speed
Offensive Tactics
Defensive-offensive
Defensive Tactics
Offensive-defensive
CONCENTRATION
Information
Correct Physical Objective
Forces Opposed
Estimate of strength and weakness factors
Reduction of strength
Favorable Relative Position
Movement
Timing
Surprise
Simplicity of maneuver
Indoctrination
Co-ordination of all task groups and branches
SECURITY
Co-operation (mutual support in action)
Consequences as to cost
III. Naval Tactics
Objective
The tempo increases as we progress along this outline. National strategy covers a period of generations, naval policy of years, but tactics today is a matter of hours, or even minutes. From the moment of contact by aircraft scouts to the first salvo, a commander may have an hour or so to make his plans and dispositions, although it is more likely to be only a few minutes. The first salvo is all important, and may be decisive. After the first salvo, even seconds are precious, and the battle, and perhaps the war, may be decided in a few minutes.
Tactical training and planning, therefore, must be done in advance. There will be no time after contact to make up deficiencies in either, or to make detailed plans for maneuver or fire control. The picture that this beginner likes to carry in his mind is that of Admiral Horatio Nelson in battle quietly pacing his quarter-deck while the shots fly fast and furious, calm in the assurance that his plans have been well laid, and that each of his captains knows exactly what is expected of him.
In keeping with the tempo of tactics, our outline of naval tactics becomes skeletonized and streamlined. Most of its principles have been discussed under previous heads. There remains only their application under the stress and strain of fire when much must be instinctive and automatic.
The ultimate tactical objective has been given us by our strategic study. It may be the destruction of the enemy force, it may be tailing an enemy force for the sake of information, it may be to lead the enemy by retreating tactics to within reach of a stronger force where their destruction may be insured. More briefly, it may be attack, information, diversion, delay, or decoying. It is essential that the commander know exactly what his ultimate mission is, both as to task and purpose, in order that he may carry out his mission. Blindly to attack a superior force when your mission is one of information may be heroic, but it is neither intelligent, nor is it playing fair with the other players on your team.
The immediate objective and the correct physical objective must generally be selected by the commander on the spot. In this choice, he must rely upon his background of sound strategy and indoctrination and his understanding of his mission.
Unity
In tactics, this principle expands from unity of purpose to unity of effort. Here is the fruition of all our training and study. Unity of tactical effort is the logical result of good leadership, loyalty, indoctrination, and co-operation. It is materially aided by a principle not previously mentioned, simplicity. In the smoke and heat of battle complicated maneuvers, long code messages, and devious plans signaled from the flagship are dangerous. If they create confusion in the mind of any of the sub-commanders then the principle of unity of effort is lost. With the rapidity and complication of modern tactics, simplicity in a battle or operation plan is an essential.
Offensive
This principle is an easier one to observe under tactics than under strategy. It would be hard to find a commander whose first impulse on sight of an enemy is not to close and attack. We must keep this offensive spirit under all circumstances. But we must qualify it by consideration of the particular mission assigned, and by the consequences as to cost.
Freedom of action must be maintained for a true offensive. It permits the commander to take the initiative, to choose the place and time of closing. But freedom of action must be considered in its relative value. Nelson would never have attained the glorious victory of the Nile at so little cost, if he had heeded the advice that his freedom of action was too severely restricted by shoals and lack of charts. But he knew that the French Fleet was at anchor, and he correctly estimated that many men would be ashore, so that relatively his freedom of action was greater than theirs.
It is a favorite wardroom argument whether Vice Admiral von Spee, coming unexpectedly upon the British battle cruisers coaling at the Falkland Islands, might not have crippled them with his inferior force if he had taken immediate advantage of surprise and his relative freedom of action, instead of trying to run.
We have already emphasized the vital necessity of initiative, energy, and movement. They should be emphasized a hundredfold in the study of tactics. The common characteristic of all great military commanders has been their initiative, energy, and speed. In their own words, Alexander the Great conquered Greece by losing no lime, Napoleon’s “l’audace, l’audace, l’audace, toujours l’audace,” Nelson’s time is everything; five minutes makes the difference between victory and defeat; and many others emphasize the point. History is full of examples of opportunities lost and potential victory turned into defeat by losing time and giving the enemy time to prepare and improve his position.
Speed and simplicity go hand in hand. All of our old conventional methods must be scrutinized and overhauled in the light of the speed of modern warfare. Methods that have been conventional for decades are too slow for today’s tempo. Consider the Germans’ sending of orders to their air fighters over France in clear, “All bombers to Cambrai. All lighters to Arras.”[15] Why not? Under the particular circumstances it was the only common-sense thing to do. Before the nearest enemy planes could get to Arras or Cambrai the Germans were gone on another attack. Time spent in coding or decoding would have been time entirely wasted, and time is the one thing we must not waste in modern war.
There is probably nothing in any regulations which permits of any such common- sense shortcuts. The officer who sticks slavishly to the book may keep his name out of the court-martial orders, but he will never get his name on the honor roll of those who win battles, at the speed at which they are decided today.
The following comment is undoubtedly too comprehensive, but it should receive the respect due an observation made on the spot, in the midst of action:
The secret of successful warfare is very simple. It is based on rapidity of decision and the lightning execution of orders. The Germans teach that it is better to take wrong action than no action at all.[16]
Whether the action is to be defensive or offensive is generally determined by the mission. But the principle of the offensive spirit previously discussed must always prevail. The defensive must be a temporary role, assumed for the purpose of strengthening oneself, weakening the enemy, or obtaining better relative position, for the purpose of taking the offensive as soon as possible. A strategical defensive may be long continued and still result in success if it is followed by a final offensive. A tactical defensive cannot continue for long without becoming a defeat.
Concentration
Under Concentration we have many of the subheads which have already been discussed. Information becomes largely a problem of communication. If the British communications at Jutland had been better so that Jellicoe had correct and timely information, his ability to concentrate his striking power would have been greatly increased.
In selecting the correct physical objective—if the enemy and the Mission permit of any choice—the guiding principle is, of course, to concentrate a stronger fire against a weaker. Nelson concentrating on the head of the French line at the Nile and breaking through Villeneuve’s line at Trafalgar, Jellicoe practically capping the T of Sheer at Jutland, are classic examples. Laymen frequently ask why fighting fleets always square away on parallel lines, usually at great distances apart, instead of immediately coming to close grips. The best explanation to a layman is that a ship fights like a crab, its weapons point in one direction, but it moves in another. Or to change the analogy, if heavyweight boxers could move only sideways, they would of necessity come together on converging lines, neither daring to rush in uncovered and risk receiving a knockout blow.
Concerning the forces opposed, we estimate their strength and weakness factors, and use those factors to our advantage.
We endeavor to reduce opposing strength by division, diversion, and confusion.
The principle of favorable relative position becomes of the very greatest importance in tactics. Naval battles are so short that victory or defeat may be decided in the first salvos, so the attack must be launched from the most favorable relative position possible. There will be little time to maneuver to improve the position once the firing starts. The principle should be to get the maximum force possible in action simultaneously. Consider Nelson’s, “The Order of Sailing is to be the Order of Battle.” Obtaining a favorable relative position is largely a matter of movement and timing. A fleet at anchor is easy prey to a fleet under way. The fleet with the speed and maneuverability to seize the favorable relative position is thereby enabled to concentrate its fire without exposing itself to the enemy’s concentration.
Surprise is a most potent factor in securing concentration. Not only does it permit of gaining favorable relative position, but it contributes to relative concentration in that it often finds the enemy unprepared and therefore unable to bring his whole fire strength to bear. Furthermore, it produces a mental confusion in the one surprised, which leads to indecision and confusion in his forces. To quote Commander Daveluy of the French Navy:
The very fact of being forced into an unexpected situation puts him in a state of inferiority, and prevents him from recovery, while at the same time your own forces can be better utilized.[17]
Concentration obtained through surprise is not limited to a sudden coming upon an unprepared enemy. The “Q” ships of 1914-18 were an interesting application. The heroic action of the 6-inch cruisers against the Graf Spec off Montevideo in 1940 was another. Dashing out from behind their own smoke screens, they were able to concentrate all their fire on the enemy, and then dash back into the protection of the smoke before he could land his heavier projectiles. In this action are demonstrated the vital characteristics of initiative, energy, movement, speed, timing, and surprise. With the preponderance of all these principles on one side, the heavier gun power and armor on the other side could only go down to defeat.
Simplicity of maneuver and indoctrination are also essential. Time is vital, and there is no time for complicated maneuvers, or for the commander to issue orders from the flagship for all the forces. The group commanders must know what the commander wants done and how he has planned to do it. They must do their part, at the proper times, without waiting for orders.
Co-ordination has become more and more important with the development of greater complications in the make-up of fleets, and with aircraft. Simultaneous attacks by big gun ships, light forces, destroyers, submarines, and aircraft are entirely possible, with perhaps mine-laying submarines laying their eggs ahead of the battle line. Everything happens at once in modern warfare, and the closest and most instant co-operation between all branches must be demanded. The desperate lack of that co-ordination between British and French arms, ending in the debacle of Holland, Belgium, and France, has been very evident. The strength of proper coordination is being demonstrated in the British campaign to drive the Italians out of Africa.
Security
This principle is closely related to that of co-ordination. Mutual support in action results not only in concentration of force against the enemy, but also in the greatest security. A covering attack, delivered promptly and vigorously by the light forces, or by air, may readily turn the tide for the big ships. Good teamwork is the secret of both success and security.
In tactics as well as in strategy, the consequences as to cost require serious consideration. Even a great victory may at times be too costly. Consider Nelson’s “By the time the enemy has beat our fleet soundly, they will do us no harm this year.” Jellicoe decided not to risk his battleships to secure a possible smashing victory over the High Seas Fleet and since those battleships were the only things standing between England and starvation, who can question his decision?
Summation
There are many things that a beginner must leave out of his outline. We have neither the time nor the space to consider such things as amphibious wars, protecting or attacking overseas expeditions, disputing, obtaining and exercising control of the sea, and undoubtedly many others not even dreamed of by this beginner.
In summing up, however, one warning must always be given. In a formal study of strategy and tactics, the tendency is to put too much emphasis on numerical strength, weight of broadside, theoretically correct position, etc. The beginner may calculate with theoretical exactness which side should win the battle, but while he is doing it the battle is often won—by the wrong commander.
Most of the great victories in naval history have been won by a smaller fleet over a larger.[18]
The reason, of course, is that “men fight, not ships.” After all the tangible factors are evaluated and added up, the intangible factor of the “will to win” forces the decision. Consider John Paul Jones, on a hostile coast, hundreds of miles from a base of support. His battle against a superior ship rages until his ship is in flames and about to sink beneath him. His adversary, seeing his desperate condition, asks if he has struck. But defeat was never a possibility in the mind of Captain Jones. He “had just commenced to fight,” and Captain Pearson, recognizing the impossibility of downing that indomitable will, struck his own colors.
Press reports of recent times have told us of French villages held by a few German soldiers, while five times as many French soldiers threw away their arms and hid. They have told of one British tank commander near Sidi Barrani signaling urgently that he was in the middle of 500 Italians with hands in the air, and needed help to secure them.
Once the will to fight is gone, the battle or the war is lost beyond saving. Correct strategy and tactics may put you in position to win battles, but the spirit of the fighters will win them.
The same rule applies to nations and to national strategy. Adolf Hitler had a basically sound idea, although we cannot help thinking he took in a little too much territory, when he said in Berlin in December, 1940:
. . . we have the power of work, and German power of work is our gold and our capital, and with this gold I can beat any other power in the world. I build up my entire economy on the conception of work.[19]
National policies cannot be enforced nor wars won by money or arms alone. The lean, hard, disciplined nation which pulls in its belt and does without in order to fight for what it considers its heritage will in the end overcome any fat, soft, undisciplined nation which cries for collective security in order to enjoy pleasure and prosperity without work.
“Ancient effortless, ordered, cycle on cycle set,
Life so long untroubled, that ye who inherit forget
It was not made with the mountains, it is not one with the deep.
Men, not gods, devised it. Men, not gods, must keep.”[20]
Kipling’s imperialistic jingoism has been out of style in the circles of the intelligentsia for a long time. It is too bad that the little man cannot come back to see the new imperialism of Germany, Italy, and Japan. Human desires and ambitions change very slowly. And so long as the desire and ambition of one nation runs athwart that of another, the principles of strategy and tactics must be invoked to settle the conflict.
Even a beginner can see that there is only one road to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness today. It begins with correct national strategy backed by a united and militant people. It carries on through a correctly designed, well-equipped, and thoroughly trained Army and Navy. It will reach its destination only if the officers of those forces carry in their minds the essential principles and the spirit of correct strategy and tactics.
. . . . the word strategy henceforth will convey the idea of preparation for fighting, and the word tactics that of the execution of the fighting. —Darrieus, War on the Sea.
[1] This article was submitted in the Prize Essay Contest, 1941.
2 Admiral Lord Fisher, Memories, p. 117.
[3] “Naval Strategy and Tactics,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th Ed., Vol. 16, p. 168.
[4] Maj. Gen. Wm. S. Graves, U.S.A., America's Siberian Adventure, 1931, p. 354.
[5] Ibid., p. 192.
[6] “Naval Strategy and Tactics,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th Ed., Vol. 16, p. 168.
[7] “Naval Strategy and Tactics,” loc. sit.
[8] Maj. Gen. Sir George Aston, Letters on Amphibious Wars, p. 95.
[9] Adm. Lord Fisher, Memories, p. 132.
[10] Speech before the Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, June 14, 1940.
11“Naval Strategy and Tactics,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th Ed., Vol. 16, p. 168.
[12] Capt. A. T. Mahan, Naval Strategy, 1911, p 39.
[13] Lt. Com. H.H. Frost, U.S.N., We Build A Navy., p.7
[14] Capt. A. T. Malian, U.S.N., Naval Strategy, p. 212.
15 Maj. Philip Gribble, R.A.F., “Blitzkrieg.” Reprinted by special permission of the Saturday Evening Post, copyrighted 1940 by the Curtis Publishing Co.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Capt. A. T. Mahan, U.S.N., Naval Strategy, p. 296.
[18] Stevens and Westcott, A History of Sea Power, p. 444.
[19] Time, Dec. 23, 1940, p. 18.
[20] Rudyard Kipling, “The Islanders," 1902.