In the present period of record- breaking construction for rearmament fostered by the crisis in Europe, it would seem that a natural tendency in ship construction should be toward new types of ships; ships in particular that might serve to enhance the effectiveness of aircraft and that would increase the versatility of their use. Such ships would further the desired end of nullifying or containing the enemy air force, which, as the present crisis has already demonstrated, is a prime requisite for victory.
The problem of insuring adequate aerial offensive or defensive power resolves itself into a means of having available, indefinitely, sufficient numbers of aircraft to prevent the enemy aircraft from obtaining and maintaining their vantage points, and eventually the power to destroy them. Fleets never have, and never will come within range of effective enemy shore batteries, and likewise, today, they will not deliberately come within range of shore-based aircraft, unless their own air force is strong enough to contain the enemy air force. It follows that an essential part of our preparedness should be to obtain the maximum number of aircraft able to go to sea and operate with the fleet.
The difference between the problem of air superiority at sea and on land lies largely in the time and replacement elements. Aircraft are not manufactured at sea, their bases (ships) are numbered, and these bases, during war, may be expected to decrease regularly, with the attendant great loss of aircraft. Normally in a fleet action, the loss of 100 planes will be a far greater blow than the same loss in land warfare. Any means of increasing the number of aircraft available for action at sea, and at the same time decreasing the chances of aircraft losses, should be a valuable addition to the strength of our fleet, particularly in overseas operations.
The desired qualities outlined above could be approached by the construction of flying-deck cruisers, vessels of about 10,000 tons displacement, carrying 24 to 36 airplanes, nine 6-inch guns, an effective anti-aircraft battery, and a number of machine guns. These vessels should be well able to perform all the duties of a normal 6-inch cruiser, exceed the latter’s efficiency in many phases, and at the same time constitute a more serious threat to the enemy from greater distances. These vessels, in numbers, would constitute a large number of landing decks widely dispersed over the sea, the advantages of which are self-apparent.
The writer does not claim originality of thought in the vessel here described. The idea was first advanced at the London Conference by the U. S. Navy and was fostered by our then existing shortage of allowed and available carrier tonnage. A provision was introduced into the Conference by U. S. Navy representatives, and accepted, which allowed 25 per cent of our 6-inch cruiser category to be equipped with landing decks. At that time, 25 per cent tonnage totaled 80,000 tons. More than 73,000 tons of 6-inch cruisers were then unbuilt, and this tonnage was at the disposal of the United States for the construction of flying-deck cruisers. Speculation as to their construction caused at that time considerably controversy. On more than one occasion since that time, the desirability of this type has again been propounded by eminent naval officers. Perhaps the present war will supply impetus that has heretofore been lacking. The recent large increase in proposed carrier construction would tend to substantiate the foregoing.
It is not deemed necessary to outline the many purposes for which a flying-deck cruiser could be utilized, above and beyond a normal 6-inch cruiser’s capabilities. This vessel would be experimental only in a remote sense, and that mainly in its employment.
Air power is bound to necessitate changes in instruments of warfare. There can be no doubt that our fleet will need enormous aircraft support in any major war. There can be no doubt that means for increasing such support will be developed. Would not a flying-deck cruiser be a step forward?
It is clear that an insular state, if attentive to the conditions that should dictate its policy, is inevitably led to possess a superiority in that particular kind of force, the mobility of which enables it to most readily project its power to the more distant quarters of the earth, and also to change its point of application at will with unequalled rapidity. —Mahan, Reprospect and Prospect; Studies in International Relations Naval and International. 1903.