The Romans . . . found it requisite to keep their fleets always in readiness, not to be taken unprepared on sudden emergencies; for none will attack or insult a power known to be always ready, and prepared to avenge any affront. . . .”—Vegetius, Military Instructions, Book V, Section 1 (translation 1767).
I
The year 1939 marked the end of an era and ushered in for the United States a crucial period that will mark for generations her general course and determine to a large extent her destiny. Events have pushed great responsibility on the United States. Because of conditions that were in the main beyond the control of this country, there have arisen the most perplexing and pressing problems of national defense that have ever confronted the nation, and because the first line of defense protects the country far from its shores, particular attention is now focused on the Navy, its strength and its readiness to meet numerous potential situations.
American foreign policy, American foreign trade, and American prosperity are indissolubly associated with American national defense. The outcome of the present world war will be a major determinant of the trend of our sea power and the direction of our national policy. In a world where countries cling to fairly definite and clear-cut ideologies and goals, there are uneasy sensations in the hearts of many neutrals as to the possibilities of states losing their way of life and their mode of government.
We may have a series of wars—no man knows. Great social and financial problems will meet the world in the chaos that may well prevail after World War No. 2 has run its course and finished its major slaughter. It is because of this ominous probability that America must be strong—and that means first and foremost on the sea. Sea power cannot be improvised or a start made when a great emergency draws nigh.
It follows as the night the day that after the present European struggle a bankrupt Europe will exist, and it is logically argued that this country will have much to do in the rehabilitation of a war-sick, mutilated, and bankrupt world. It is hoped that we will assume the role of the honest banker, rendering good service to both creditors and debtors, for thereby rests the hope of starting once again a flow of trade and the development of commerce that is the lifeblood of nations. Just as all rich banks are well guarded by burglar alarms, so will the United States need a strong defense to protect her from the jealous, the covetous, and who can say, the thief. Here again sea power will be a potent factor.
A great share of the political anarchy that exists in the world was deliberately created by men. Whether it be for the domination of men and states (which means lust for prestige, power, and profits), or whether it be a crusade for ideological causes that runs directly counter to democracy, liberal thought, and even Christianity, intelligent Americans ponder over one pressing question: how can we stay out of this existing maelstrom of world conflict with its tragic loss of life and property, its incalculable handicap to generations yet unborn? In short, how may we best protect what is ours? Surely not at this stage by treaties, pacts, and promises. Certainly not by wishful thinking, with only the hope that it will not happen here. There is only one answer at this time with a world on fire, one language that is understood— America will be heard and respected by (1) an adequate sea force with proper bases; (2) a compact, fast hitting, highly efficient army that may be further augmented while the first line of defense takes the initial impact; and (3) by an air force so superior both on land and sea that it can stop the aerial force of probable enemies that may attack or attempt to gain a foothold on this hemisphere.
The question is ever asked—What is adequate? And in that connection, it is only human nature and a natural reaction that motivate the military-naval man never to underestimate the power of possible enemies. Many who will not have to do the fighting have a tendency to overestimate the strength of our own arms because of some remarkable military-naval exploits of the past as well as the fortuitous circumstances that have aided us in some of our wars. This question of adequacy is most difficult of a precise definition. James Madison, writing in The Federalist, put it well when he said: “The chief measure of adequacy lies in the correct estimate of the strength of the armed forces of other nations.” It means a continual study by experts, which is not the simple matter it was in Madison’s day. It has become an estimate of many arms, such as battleships, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and an evaluation of the merchant marines. Air forces are particularly difficult to evaluate. And behind all estimates stands the major factor: the potentiality and productivity of the industrial and economic fronts. Last, but by no means least, there exists the will, the courage, the belief in cause of the armed forces and their populations. For the people are after all the first line of any defense.
It is next asked, A Navy adequate for what? That may only be answered by studying the national policies that are of vital concern to the United States—her people, and her government. For example, the Monroe Doctrine, which has been considerably implemented by the Lima Pact and high authoritative declaration. At the opening of the Lima Conference, Mr. Hull put it succinctly when he said,
Each and all of us desire passionately to live at peace with every nation in the world, but there must not be a shadow of a doubt anywhere as to the determination of the American nations not to permit the invasion of this hemisphere by the armed forces of any power or any possible combination of powers.
This means that, in the event of any aggression by a major power, the United States, by virtue of her preponderant position in this hemisphere and her critical interests, will have to meet the threat. The answer is sea power, a powerful fleet in being, on the oceans that surround the two continents.
No one can predict the exact outcome of the present war. No one knows how certain countries will be aligned at the finish. If the war is not a stalemate—or a victory that comes after a long, bitter, and costly struggle—there is the great possibility of a continuance of power politics in some quarters. We can be sure of nothing. For that reason this country is determined by the strength of her sea power to be able to break any blockade of its ports, destroy any outward interference with the sea trade that it is now trying to develop and further in new geographical areas, a commerce upon which this country depends for the “velvet” of its prosperity. What is more, our sea power may determine, after a peace or an armed truce by the belligerents, whether or not a power or powers with alien ideologies, and aggressive international political tactics, will be permitted to infect or contaminate the body politic of the United States with subversive activities because of occupation of proximate territory. In any defense against aggression, or in any declaration of policy to forestall without hostilities a contemplated aggression, the factor that will speak for this country in stronger terms than all protestations, resolutions, notes, and fiery journalism will be sea power— strong, efficient, and ready.
The great power that the United States holds will determine to a great extent her destiny for many years that lie ahead. Probably at no other time in our history does the situation demand cooler brains, more cautious planning, and a determined resolve to do what is best for the country. Our position as a world state for generations may rest on our decisions and upon taking the long view. For this reason, in a welter of propaganda, we must strive to rationalize our position, think first of the country and her future: our sympathies and our emotions must be controlled.
Many military-naval writers in foreign lands are writing and thinking about the position into which the United States has been thrust by inexorable events. In an article published September 26, 1939, in the Messagero, G. G. Napolitano wrote: “Many people here think that the disappearance of the British Fleet police service on the seas may gravely compromise the future and existence of the United States.” The writer added that Lord Lothian, before leaving for his new post in Washington as the British Ambassador, gave an interview, from which he quoted: “What would become of the United States if the British Empire disappeared or if the English fleet should cease to function as in the past? If the British Fleet ceased to patrol the seas, what would take its place?” and the Ambassador-Elect added, “One cannot conceive of a vacuum in the ocean.” The Italian continued, “The funny thing is that there is some truth in the opinion that the new Ambassador lends to the Americans. How many Americans are there who think that the United States Fleet would take the place of the British?” and he added, “The United States now has a fleet which, though large, is still increasing, is nevertheless insufficient to safeguard American interests simultaneously in the Pacific and the Atlantic.” Although we look to our future on the sea, how far will we go to give positive protection to our commitments?
II
It is a day for realistic appraisal. Every conceivable angle of a country’s war potential must be inspected. Totalitarian warfare means total militarization. It is difficult to define totalitarian warfare or write in brief compass the military ideologies of the totalitarian states, but Ludendorff gave the quintessence of the belief when he said, “War is the highest expression of national life, therefore politics must be subordinated to the prosecution of war.” The well-known paper, the Deutsche Volkskraft, printed a state expression on June 13, 1935, that said:
War has become a form of national existence, with the same rights as peace. No human or social activity has any right to exist unless it serves the preparation for war. The new individual is completely filled with the idea of war; he may not, he cannot think of anything else at all.
This same publication, in a more complete definition of the peace that would come after a conflict in which totalitarians were victors, said,
The war of the future will be totalitarian, not only in the mobilization of forces for its prosecution, but also in the extent of its results. In other words, totalitarian war will end in totalitarian victory—the utter destruction of the vanquished nation and its complete and final disappearance from the historical arena. The victor will not negotiate with the vanquished concerning the conditions for peace, because there will be no party capable of negotiations. He will impose whatever conditions he thinks fit. In reality, totalitarian warfare is nothing but a gigantic struggle of elimination, whose upshot will be terrible and irrevocable in its finality.
Such peace plans cause men to stop and ponder. It is quite natural that a lone, great democracy that is not engaged in war should give some consideration to the expositions of a system alien to ours; in short, how peace will be negotiated in the event that totalitarianism should win or force a negotiated peace. It is the possibility that may exist, it is the dreadful uncertainty of the precise outcome of this great conflict that causes the United States to look to her moats, and to insure that the guard that stands on the ramparts is strong and able to cope with any probable combination that may want to filch from this country all that which is held most dear.
A possible reorientation of sea power in the Atlantic has projected and hurried the consideration of the so-called “Two Ocean” navy. That is somewhat of an oversimplification. Attention to United States sea power in the Atlantic was accelerated by the Pact of Munich. It would take a great many years to build a navy equal to our present Pacific Fleet, and it would also take many years to build the necessary bases on each coast for the upkeep of two major fleets. Yet it is of great strategic and political importance to the country that the main fleet be properly disposed in peace times, in order to concentrate quickly in war. That disposition will change with the world situation. Our sea frontiers must be guarded in each ocean, and this means dry docks, navy yards, as well as bases, with filling and service stations for planes and submarines. At the present time the Fleet must be in readiness to move on a few hours’ notice from one ocean to the other.
Congress, with a realization of the importance of flexibility for the Fleet, and its important “service stations,” ordered that the Navy report as to the bases needed for the protection of our shores and the Panama Canal. This was the beginning of the much publicized Sub-Committee Board report submitted to Congress on December 27, 1938. This board, after painstaking study, recommended either establishment or the expansion of 41 naval stations or bases of which 25 were needed for airplanes, that important arm of the modern fleet. Congress authorized 8 air bases in the mid-Pacific, Alaska, and Puerto Rico area.
The Hepburn Board took the long view in its important studies and well-reasoned conclusions. In fact, all that the board recommended as necessary at the earliest practical date were authorized, with the exception of Guam. The board pointed out that with adequate air and submarine protection in Guam this country would be secure against all attacks, short of a major effort on the part of any probable Pacific enemy. But it added that if a “strong advance fleet base” were developed in Guam there would be “practical immunity of the Philippines against hostile attack in force,” and that “such defense would reduce to its simplest possible terms the defense of Hawaii and the Continental coast of the United States.”
This recommendation propounds an important question that now confronts the country as a matter of national policy, and that is how much force shall we keep in the Orient? What will be our general policy toward trade and commerce with China and Japan? And what will be the ultimate status of the Philippines after 1946? The Navy has a vital concern in all discussions made and conclusions reached in the premises. It is not too much to say that as long as a small fleet or force is expected to remain in the Orient to protect American nationals and property, then that force must have a base. The ultimate status of the Philippines is not known at this time by any man. But we do know that Guam is owned and governed by the United States, and we know that Guam can be defended. But whether we defend it or not, we know that the harbor at Guam is full of coral heads and is a menace even now to the Pan-American planes that depend on that tiny spot for their most important and necessary link in transpacific travel. The Hepburn Board recommended that Guam at least be utilized as a filling station, with a harbor made clear and suitable for seaplane anchorages. As the United States looks to her future on the sea, it is interesting to note that the military-naval experts of all nations emphasize the strategic importance of this well-located island.
Hector Bywater, the well-known British naval expert, wrote,
To say that Guam bears to the Philippines the same relation that Heligoland bore to the German fleet or that Malta bore to the defense of the British interests in the Mediterranean would be to understate rather than exaggerate the facts of the case.
Bywater also added in the same book, published in 1934, that:
Strategically, our position [the British] has deteriorated to an alarming extent, unpalatable though it may be, the truth is that we are not at the present time in a position to defend our widespread and priceless interests in the Pacific. During the past thirteen years our naval strength in that ocean has shrunk almost to insignificance and there is no immediate prospect of restoring it.
Lieutenant General Kiokatsu Sato, who retired from the Imperial Japanese Army (Department of Political Strategy), published in December, 1939, another book, Japanese-United States War Imminent. A misleading title, but it does express the views of a writer of some of the best sellers in Japan. In these days of international tension, it is well to quote without comment the distinguished and scholarly General:
If the United States of America carries out her traditional China policy to a full extent, then she is bound to clash with Japan sooner or later on the China question which is vital to the existence of this country. We shall have to settle the question by force of arms, if diplomatic negotiations fail.
This brings us to a consideration of a possible war with America. No matter from what motive hostilities may come to be opened, or whether we assume the offensive or the defensive, there can be no doubt that Hawaii will be the most important strategic point in a war between America and Japan. Success or failure in the struggle for this strategic point will prove a decisive factor in the war.
With the Hawaiian Islands as her base of operations America could bomb Tokyo or Osaka without much difficulty, provided she used airplanes and airships of superior quality. While Hawaii is an American possession Japan would have to remain on the defensive.
The struggle for Hawaii thus constitutes the first stage of a Japanese-American war. On the assumption that Hawaii was captured by our navy, the Japanese forces would undertake, as the next step, the task of destroying the Panama Canal and the main squadron of America. If the Japanese Navy succeeded in crushing the American fleet in the Pacific, landing on the Pacific coast of America would become easy. . . .
Rear Admiral Gumpei Sekine (Retired), of Japan, in an article in the October, 1939, number of the Bungei Shungu wrote:
But the citizens of the United States must keep the fact in mind that there is a limit to the patience of the Japanese. It will not be too much to say that the history of Japan in the comity of nations since the Russo-Japanese War has been marked throughout by cheating at the hands of Britain and oppression at the hands of America. This fact is beginning to dawn on the minds of the Japanese. They seem to be awakening to the true character of America.
To state it frankly, the Japanese have thought too highly of America. It is a fact that most Japanese have accepted the belief that America is a country wedded strictly to the principles of justice and humanity. I do not go so far as to say that America has flouted these sacred principles. The point is that there is nothing to distinguish the United States from other countries. Put another way, America, like other countries, has paid lip service to justice and humanity, while pursuing its dominating policy of self-interest.
As the United States looks to her future on the sea it is well to study and analyze the public expressions and writings of high ranking military-naval experts of great powers. With the propaganda angle always in mind, students of Far Eastern affairs must recall when evaluating statements such as the above: the Nine Power Treaty that Japan and the United States promised to respect, the conquest of Manchuria and North China, the bombing of civilians and foreign property, the “southern expansion policy,” and the ultimate status of American property rights and American nationals as the “New Order” moves along as a result of the “China incident.”
III
A strong Navy for the United States is justified by the “hemispheric” policy of self-defense. The stakes are too great to leave to luck or to chance the protection that may be required—the force to meet all situations. For purposes of study, three future considerations are presented. The accomplishment of any one will affect the future of the American Navy:
- A victory by Britain that is decisive and complete.
- A victory by Germany and Italy that would involve the destruction of the British Fleet with claim on possessions or bases in the Western Hemisphere.
- A stalemate, leading to a diplomatic patchwork of a negotiated peace treaty that may attempt to cede territory to Germany and Italy on the West coast of Africa or in the Western Hemisphere.
In the event of a decisive final victory by Britain, it may be assumed that the United States will for some time be left as the sole protector of the Monroe Doctrine, and all “hemispheric” commitments. When the debris has cleared away in Europe, it is quite probable that the British Grand Fleet will base on Singapore. Britain has much to do in the Far East. Her base is ready, but there are no ships. The Hongkong-Singapore line is now cut by the Japanese occupation of Hainan, on which island air bases are now established. Spratley Island, 250 miles from the Southern Philippines, has been claimed by Japan. The economic penetration of Siam by Japan has been vigorously pushed. The Tientsin “incident” is a matter of British record well documented with proof. In the event of a British victory in Europe, it is only logical to assume that Britain will do some investigating of the “new order” in China, if a satisfactory solution is not reached in the near future. America is much interested in the investigation, but British primary and paramount interest in her own Far Eastern territory and her huge investments there will occupy the attention of Britain. This will leave the United States as the major naval power in the Atlantic and the Eastern Pacific.
With the rapid scientific development of the airplane, thereby shortening ocean spaces, the United States will look more to her Fleet, carriers, and patrol planes to protect the United States, Canada, and Latin America. The increase planned in the Fleet with the additional units proposed for the Atlantic Ocean are well justified in the light of the defense problem that will confront this country in the event of an Allied victory.
In the event that Germany should be victorious and the British Fleet is destroyed or captured, then the United States will confront in the Atlantic the anti-democratic Axis Powers. This means the achievement of the German dream of superior sea power that has been part and parcel of German policy since before von Dietrichs and his German division attempted to interfere with Admiral Dewey’s victory after the Battle of Manila Bay.
We may expect a revival on a grand scale of the German Merchant Fleet, and no more efficient or well-run merchant ships ever sailed. This will mean the necessity for trade and markets. The expansionist policy of the totalitarian states must find new outlets for industry and the possession of raw materials. This will lead to an exploitation and economic penetration of Latin America if it can be achieved. American sea power will be our only guarantee that the protection of our vital national policies shall prevail in the Western Hemisphere as long as the world is ruled by force and “have nots” commence to be “haves.”
In the event of a German victory, this country will undoubtedly firmly resist the transfer of any territory such as Greenland, Newfoundland, the Bermudas, and the Bahamas to unfriendly powers. The strength of the resistance, if it is made, will be proportional to the strength of our Navy. The control of these islands would lay the industrial areas of the United States at the mercy of a hostile air force. These important contingencies must be examined as the United States looks to her future on the seas, for a strange anomaly exists in that this country is committed to give protection to territory that is now belligerent.
The basis for resistance to transfer rests on the Monroe Doctrine. In 1830, Secretary of State Van Buren gave official notification to the Spanish Government that this country would not permit the transfer of Cuba to any European Power. Mr. Roosevelt reasserted this interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine on August 18, 1939, at Kingston, Canada, when he said that the United States would not “stand idly by” if our northern neighbor, Canada, were molested by an aggressor. The realist never forgets the commitments of the country, all inspired by the duty of our statesmen to declare when required, and without equivocation, the principles upon which American security rests. But behind these statements, in a world of broken treaties, stands an ever vigilant fleet looking both to the East and to the West. Such national policies are only as strong as the power that supports them.
In the event of a stalemate, or the establishment of a European balance of power by a negotiated peace, the United States will be left in a rather secure position in the Atlantic Ocean. This country will, of course, adhere to her basic policy if the transfer of any territory in this hemisphere is involved, but we shall also have profound concern in the event that any West African possessions or islands such as the Azores are acquired by the totalitarian powers. At the present writing it is reported that Italy has effected plans for an air route to Brazil that will possibly touch at Lisbon and the Cape Verde islands, thereby avoiding use of the French and British flying fields at Bathurst and Dakar. The west coast of Africa is nearer than the United States to Brazil. It is 4,800 nautical miles from New York to Rio; and 3,350 miles by plane from Bathurst, West Africa, to Rio. A stalemate may bring a colonial-possession shake-up that would be of vital concern to hemispheric solidarity.
There is no reason to believe that never again will this country have an occasion to invoke the Monroe Doctrine in the Pacific. It may happen in many conceivable situations. The classical example is the Magdalena Bay incident when, in 1912, Japanese fishermen had found business so profitable in Mexico that an attempt was made to secure a concession with headquarters at Magdalena Bay, the best strategic location at the time on the west coast of Mexico. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge berated Japanese designs in Mexico, and invoked the Monroe Doctrine. The concession was never secured. Another incident occurred when the world’s richest and greatest salmon preserve was threatened by Japanese fishermen in 1936-37. Japanese floating canneries were established off Bristol Bay, Alaska. This move jeopardized the work of about 30,000 American fishermen. Though these canneries were outside the 3-mile limit, Japan moved out on protest of the Department of State. Have we any assurance that some similar action will not arise in the future?
The most elaborate and costly projects in our naval history are now under way for the sole purpose of protecting the interests of “hemispherical solidarity.” These are additional locks at Panama, additional protection of the Canal Zone, the air bases at Jacksonville, Florida, and San Juan, Puerto Rico, the augmentation of the Atlantic Squadron, with corresponding Army air force protection. This is in pursuance of a policy that the Navy must hold indisputable command over sea approaches to North America and northern South America.
IV
The year 1940 marks the authorization of naval ships and the shaping of naval policy that will determine the size of ships and the trend of our shipbuilding for many years to come, the lifetime of most of our senior officers. It is a crucial year. Nevertheless destiny, history, and the present world situation answer some questions that have been vigorously discussed in the past.
Thomas Clark, Esq., in his preface to the first competent naval history of the United States, wrote on May 6, 1813: “Is an efficient naval establishment necessary for the United States? Does it possess the means of forming and supporting one? What naval system would answer best for the United States?”
The majority of Americans will agree that the first two questions have been answered in the affirmative. But as the Congress of 1940 considers sea power and defense in the light of ominous world conditions, it is again confronted with Clark’s basic consideration: “It will first be necessary to fix a determinate idea to the words [adequate] efficient naval force.”
There will be much discussion of types of weapons, size of battleships, and their vulnerability to the bomb and torpedo, but in principle the great majority of Americans are agreed that the United States must be invulnerable on the sea and the quicker that relative position is reached and maintained the better. It is realized as never before that the size of our country, its long coast lines, its wealth, and its way of life and of government require a navy second to none, and larger than most, for a positive protection and perpetuation of our possessions and ideals. The stake is now so great and the insurance premium is now so high that in many respects the United States is slowly but surely taking the accolade of sea power. That means an unquestioned superiority in the Pacific and a strong, powerful defense force for fast striking in the Atlantic. Why? Because the safety of the United States lies with the outer ramparts of sea defense, including air power.
The United States is at this time building about 572,000 tons in the combatant categories. About 53,950 tons will be completed in 1940, but in this year 54,000 tons of ships now underage will become overage. In 1941, one ship of 2,710 tons will become overage, and there should be completed about 70,000 tons of new ships. In 1942, 123,700 tons of combatant tonnage reaches the overage limit. The rate of obsolescence drops off to 66,660 in 1943, 54,550 in 1944, and thereafter to an average of about 40,000 tons per year until 1950. In short, only small net gains are being made each year by replacement tonnage because of our long building holiday.
It will be in 1944 that the United States may be assured of reaching the authorized strength of its Navy. The Fleet will then consist, in each category, of approximately the following underage ships:
17 Battleships 49 Cruisers
11 Aircraft carriers 135 Destroyers
71 Submarines
[In September, 1940, Congress authorized and appropriated funds for combatant ships as follows: 7 battleships, 8 aircraft carriers, 27 cruisers, 115 destroyers, and 43 submarines.]
The aircraft program is progressing most satisfactorily with a view of keeping abreast of all base and ship expansion. It is emphasized that in placing “Wings over the Navy” the Bureau of Aeronautics is stressing quality of planes and personnel.
The present authorized plane strength of the Navy is 10,000, but Admiral Towers has recently testified before the Congress that we will need 15,000 for the proposed enlarged Navy.
A few individuals and groups will try to deny this naval defense to the country. Aside from the foreign propaganda against the program that will be most subtly and well directed, often by our own nationals, there will be the usual opposition that ranges from the starry-eyed professional objectors, to the real pacifist who refuses to fight for anything, on down the line to those who are uniformed or misinformed as to the great issues at stake. Pacifist groups exist but in rapidly diminishing numbers. Their ammunition has been spent; their prophesies have come to naught. They have found that wishful thinking in a cold, warring world is the frail stuff of dreams.
There will be oversimplifications as to our defense program as well as the opposition outburst of the old half truth that “Force settles nothing.” Ask Ethiopia, China, Albania, Austria, Czechoslavakia, France, Poland, and the Low Countries if force settled anything. Some men in good faith will say that “Neither side wins a war and preparation will get us in one.” This reasoning is fallacious. One side always wins, no matter how costly the victory. Americans who fought in the World War are eternally grateful that the Allies won. From the American point of view, who can question that the winning of the Revolution, the War of 1812, the Civil War, and the Spanish War contributed to the independence, the strength, and the size of this country? Whenever Americans are beguiled into making the illogical inference that because war is terrible, brutal, cruel, and costly, the game is not worth the candle for good causes—when that point is reached by the majority of any state, it may be said to mark the decadence and the decline of the country as a world power. All the great world states of history faded and failed because of this attitude combined with a failure to maintain an adequate defense.
War must never be glorified as an end in itself. It must not be accepted, as defined in some ideologies, as the natural state of man and the State. But just as long as nations despise, repudiate, and scorn what other nations consider their way of life and their form of government; just as long as militaristic states endeavor by working within and without to take such peaceful powers in camp, there will be resistance by individuals and states. The means of resistance to predatory nations rests with defense and defense alone. The last two decades of diplomacy should teach us this, as we look out on a world with millions of armed men facing each other in the Orient and the Occident. No great power has ever maintained itself for long without military force; the disaster that marked the end of every world power was a military defeat. With countries fighting at this moment for their very existence, we have no assurance that the pattern of the past will in any way be changed. We have not one iota of proof that wars and more wars will not be the lot of humanity for generations. Every movement directed toward permanent peace must be encouraged, but until infamous and highhanded wars of conquest are banished from the earth, armies and navies must be and will be maintained.
The United States is making every effort to stay out of World War II, but it cannot be denied that the outcome of this great conflict is of importance to every American. The position of British sea power and the international balance of power at the end of the war are of vital interest to this country. It was the rivalries of European powers for a long period in the infancy of our Republic that kept us relatively free from European aggression. The Monroe Doctrine rested for generations on British sea power. It is believed that no more will this be true. Britain has an Oriental situation to look into when the present war is over, if she emerges with the naval-military strength to cope adequately with the situation. The price of empire is great; Britain will not relinquish lightly the possessions of the Far East into which so much blood and treasure have been poured. Some experts think that an attempt to break up the British Empire is a basic issue of the conflict of today. The majority of Americans also believe that it is to the interest of the American people that the British Empire hold together. This country wants with all its heart to keep out of war. That, of course, means standing on our own feet without allies, or hope of allies in all dangers that may confront the country and the hemisphere. That means that we shall probably have little to say about the peace, because we shed no blood and gave no treasure to effect that peace. But in the last analysis it means that to exist as a great nation, to command respect both in the marts of trade and the high councils of the earth, we must have a strong, efficient, and well- commanded defense. The more isolation— the more defense.
We are fortunate in our geographical situation. The huge “island” of the United States is situated such that sea power comprises its first line of defense in the event of any attack; sea power with its right arm, air power, constitutes the main defense of the Panama Canal, and sea power is the only really effective means of breaking up any attack on our distant possessions. The importance of sea power to our security has, aside from the Navy, long been ably argued by many civilian experts, but the pressure of current events plus the problems just coming over the horizon of the future brings us to the inescapable conclusion that America’s destiny lies on the seas. Geography and world events have made it so. All naval policy is based upon what Mahan termed “command of the sea.” To gain that command requires a superior combatant and merchant navy.
One of the striking but little explored phases of American history is the rise of the United States Navy to that of a sea power of major strength, a force that has been an important factor in every war in which the country has been involved. To those with a deep feeling for history, it should be of profound interest to keep in mind that it was our own Admiral Mahan who, by gathering related phenomena, first set forth in clear exposition that fact that sea power has exerted a determining influence on history. In a logical and well-documented presentation, he showed how, although many wars ended by the victory of some army, it was in reality the victory of some navy that was a primary requisite to the ultimate victory of the nation in arms. It is submitted that the army by a final victory effected the “checkmate”; the navy, nevertheless, brought the situation up to the “mate in four moves.” By a cursory inspection of the military-naval history of Greece, Carthage, Rome, Spain, Holland, France, and Britain, it may be noted that the victorious navy always exerted a determining influence on the rise and the maintenance of the powerful State. In short, naval power was the prime determinant whether propulsion was by oars, sail, or steam. Adequate air power is a fundamental requirement of naval power in modern warfare.
We have no valid proof to refute these striking examples of history. As in the days of Imperial Rome, so today, a navy that provides adequate defense must be sufficiently strong to defeat an enemy fleet whenever and wherever it can be brought to action. The United States is now one of the world’s greatest powers, if not the greatest. No man or group can predict with exactitude the murky future of international events. It is probably too early to know the “line up” that will meet at “the kill.” International tension exists in a degree unequalled in modern history. There is a fear psychosis that in varying degrees affects all neutrals. This country has far- reaching commitments that in the last analysis can only be protected by a “fleet in being.” Aside from the Far Eastern problem, it is generally agreed that the protection of the Western Hemisphere comes first on any agenda of priority missions of the Navy. Twenty-one American republics will have to depend mainly on the United States Fleet. That protection is vital; without it, history may repeat, thereby causing the death of a freedom greater than any in existence—the loss of that which Abraham Lincoln called “the last great hope on earth.”