The Battle of Helles and Lemnos

It should be noted that the Turkish light cruisers Medjidieh and Hamidieh took no part in the main action. Both ves­sels, however, presumably were available for combat and the Greek Commander in Chief could have spared nothing larger than destroyers to oppose them. The fail­ure of the Turks to utilize these two com­paratively fast and powerful ships never has been satisfactorily explained. No de­stroyers or other small craft on either side actually took part in the action, which therefore resolved itself into a contest between the four Turkish armored ships and an equal number of Greek units.

The Battle of Helles.—Shortly after sighting the main body of the Turkish Fleet, Kountouriotis observed the enemy turn to starboard in succession and head approximately west by north past Cape Helles (see track chart). The Greek Com­mander in Chief then chose a course N 30 E converging on the Turkish column. At 9:22 a.m. the two flagships were only 12,000 meters apart; the Turks opened fire which was returned immediately, within a few minutes the old Turkish battleship Messoudieh appeared to be in difficulties and dropped out of line.

To take full advantage of the Averoff's superior speed and fire power, provision had been made for the flagship to act in­dependently of the three older vessels. At 9:35 Kountouriotis hoisted a signal in this sense, increased the Averoff’s speed to 18 knots, and at 9:55 turned to starboard, heading directly for the Turkish Fleet. His three other ships turned to port in succes­sion at 9:50 and followed a southerly course parallel to that along which the Turkish ships appeared about to retreat. In fact the latter turned 16 points to star­board almost at this moment, and headed back for the straits. By 10:50 the Averoff had closed the range to less than 3,000 meters and scored 7 hits on the Barbarossa.

The Turkish ships were now retreating in bad order toward the straits, pursued by the Averoff, which soon came within range of the Turkish shore batteries. Kountouriotis held on to a southerly course, passing Cape Helles at a distance of just over 5,000 meters and continued to fire on the Turkish vessels until about 10:20, when the latter reached the en­trance to the Dardanelles. The three smaller Greek ships had followed a nearly parallel course some 5,000 meters to the west. They were now joined by the Aver­off. The Greek Fleet continued to watch the entrance to the straits until 2:50, and then returned to Mudros Bay, leaving a destroyer patrol.

The official Greek report of casualties during the action at Cape Helles listed 1 officer and 1 petty officer killed, and 9 men wounded. All of these were on the Averoff except for one man wounded on the Spetsai. The Greek flagship received only su­perficial injury, which did not impair its fighting power, while the other Greek ships were undamaged. No official reports of Turkish losses appear to have been made public, but unofficially the totals were placed at 14 killed and 57 wounded. The Messoudieh appears to have received 3 hits and the Barbarossa 7, as already stated. One of these pierced the armored deck of the Turkish flagship and caused damage which apparently required some weeks to repair. The Turkish Commander in Chief was replaced by Captain Tahir, and was later court-martialed and retired.

Between the battles.—On December 22 the two Turkish light cruisers came out of the straits accompanied by a torpedo boat and four destroyers. They fired upon the Greek patrol vessels, which withdrew to­ward the west until the Averoff appeared. The Turkish ships then retreated to the straits. On this occasion, the Greek sub­marine Dolphin discharged a torpedo at the Medjidieh, but without result. Never­theless, the Dolphin h.ad proved its worth on patrol duty despite the absence of radio equipment. About the same time a Greek seaplane carried out a reconnaissance flight over the Turkish base and dropped several small bombs, by hand, on the Bar­barossa.

Three more sorties were made by the Turkish cruisers, and on January 11 they were followed out of the straits by three battleships. The Greek Fleet left Mudros Bay and advanced to meet them, where­upon the Turks retreated without fighting. It may be surmised that the new Turkish Commander in Chief simply was testing out the Greek Fleet’s readiness to fight and ascertaining whether the Averoff was still at Mudros.

About this time the Turkish command determined to make more serious use of light cruisers. The Hamidieh succeeded in evading the Greek patrol and proceeded to the important harbor of Syra, where a large armed merchant vessel, the Macedonia, was sunk by gunfire on January 15. The populace was terror stricken, and the effect on the government in Athens is demonstrated by orders sent to Kountouriotis the same day. He was instructed to repair to Syra with the Averoff and de­stroy the Hamidieh. The Greek Admiral protested vigorously, pointing out that his task was to keep the main Turkish forces immobilized, and that the Aver off must not be separated from his three older vessels. Kountouriotis won his point, although Athens rejected his proposal to lay a mine field outside the straits to aid his patrolling destroyers.

The Hamidieh continued to cruise about the Mediterranean for three months, attacking merchant shipping and trans­ports, in addition to bombarding Serbian forces at Durazzo. The moral effect was considerable. Several Turkish units as­signed to similar duties might have ex­erted an important influence on the outcome of the war. But Kountouriotis was fully aware that a single cruiser could not play a decisive role, and refused to be diverted from his main purpose. However, he did detach one of his smaller armored ships on two occasions to assist destroyers in searching for the Turkish raider. The latter had no difficulty in avoiding pur­suit, but finally chose to enter the Suez Canal for a second time late in March. Three Greek ships then proceeded to a point near Port Said and kept the Hami­dieh bottled up until the end of the hostilities.

The Greek Commander in Chief rightly interpreted the action of the Hamidieh as an attempted diversion, and ordered his entire fleet out of Mudros Bay for patrol duty in case the Turkish cruiser tried to re-enter the straits or proceed to Smyrna; also to be prepared for a new sortie by the Turkish battleships. Scarcely had he re­turned to Mudros when at 8:30 a.m. on January 18 the destroyer Leon, on patrol, radioed that three battleships, one cruiser, and several destroyers were issuing from the straits. Thirty-five minutes later the Greek Fleet had steam up and was coming out of the bay. The Averoff met the pa­trolling destroyers in retreat before the Turkish cruiser Medjidieh followed by three battleships, all heading directly for Mudros.

Battle of Lemnos.—Upon sighting the Averoff, the Turkish Commander in Chief turned his ships to port in succession, while the cruiser Medjidieh dropped be­hind the three battleships. At 10:50 the two fleets were on converging southerly courses (see track chart), and at 11:35 all of the Turkish ships opened a concentrated fire on the Averoff. The range was only 8,500 meters, but the Turkish gunnery appears to have been defective. One minute later the Averoff and her three older com­panions began a rapid and accurate fire against their opponents.

The cruiser Medjidieh withdrew from the Turkish line in deference to her lack of Protection, but the heavy units of both fleets held to their converging courses until 11:55. The range had been reduced to 6,000 meters and the Turkish ships were suffering severely. The Hydra and the Psara, bringing up the Greek rear, con­centrated their attention on the weakest of the enemy battleships, the Messoudieh, while the Averoff, aided by the Spetsai, en­gaged the flagship Barbarossa and her sister-ship, the Tour gout Reis. By 11:55 the Messoudieh was covered by a pall of smoke and had fallen out of line. Thereupon all three Turkish ships turned again to port and retreated toward the straits at full speed. They had an advantage of at least one knot over the older Greek vessels and soon drew away, hotly pursued by the Averoff.

The Greek flagship followed the retreating enemy for 2½ hours, keeping his rear under fire, and abandoned the chase only when the Turkish ships were approaching the protection of their shore batteries. During this final phase of the action it was noted that the Turkish fire was very ragged and that little attempt was made to keep in formation. At 3:00 p.m. the Averoff was joined by her three companions and remained on patrol until 7:10 p.m. when all of the enemy ships had disappeared into the straits.

The Greek Commander in Chief report­ed one man wounded during the Battle of Lemnos, only minor damage to the Averoff, and none whatever to his other vessels. Authoritative data on Turkish casualties are lacking, but unofficial reports are to the effect that the Barbarossa lost 75 killed and 130 wounded, while the Tourgout Reis had 47 casualties and the Messoudieh 68. The Turkish flagship is stated to have re­ceived 30 hits and her sister-ship 17, while the Messoudieh also is known to have suffered severely.

Greek supremacy established.—After the action at Lemnos on January 18, no further attempt was made by Turkey to contest the Greek Fleet’s control of the Aegean. The armistice of May 31, 1913, put an end to hostilities for the time being and subse­quent naval operations involving Britain, France, and Germany have no place in this narrative. The events described, however, serve to illustrate several fundamentals of naval strategy.

Rear Admiral Kountouriotis first sought security by occupying all of the Turkish islands which lay in his path up to the Dardanelles. He kept his forces concen­trated in the face of the enemy and re­fused to be diverted from his main pur­pose by public demands for protection against a raiding cruiser. Finally, he showed himself ready and eager to take the offensive at every opportunity, and to pursue the retreating enemy to the very entrance of the fortified straits. His per­sonal courage was evidenced by the fact that the greatest risks always were taken by the ship flying his flag.

Turkish strategy is less clear, and indi­cations are that divided counsels were at least as great a handicap as deficient gun­nery. The comparative success of the Eamidieh as a raider brings up the question as to why Turkey’s other light cruiser, the Medjidieh, was not similarly em­ployed. In addition, the Turkish Fleet pos­sessed several older vessels which could have served as commerce destroyers and which Greece had no adequate means to oppose without unduly weakening the con­centration at Mudros Bay. Perhaps most serious of all, no attempt was made to hinder the movement by sea of Bulgarian troops from Salonika to Dedeagatch dur­ing November, 1912. Encumbered by 27 helpless transports, the Greek Fleet would have been at a serious disadvantage in the face of a resolute Turkish attack.

The two naval engagements of Helles and Lemnos were less decisive than might have been expected, but for rather obvious reasons. The hottest phase of each battle lasted only a few minutes before the Turk­ish ships began to retreat. Moreover, the three principal Turkish units were well protected against the enemy. The 15-inch belts of their two largest battleships were formidable obstacles for the 9.2-inch and 7.5-inch guns of the Averoff, while the 10.6- inch armament of the older Greek ships was of rather antiquated design, limited range, and not even provided with tele­scope sights. Greece’s four largest destroy­ers did excellent service on patrol through­out a difficult winter and captured several enemy merchantmen. However, these new ships had been delivered without torpe­does and none of the required size could be obtained until after the two battles had been fought. This precluded their use for attack against the enemy’s armored ships.

In a very real sense, however, the Greek Fleet was decisively victorious. Its mis­sion was accomplished and popular appre­ciation of the Commander in Chief reached its full expression more than a decade later when Paul Kountouriotis was chosen President of Greece. Thus he was given an opportunity to contribute in large measure to cementing the friendship of his country with its ancient enemy, Turkey. Before Kountouriotis’ death a few years ago, in­timate and cordial relations between Greece and Turkey had become a major factor for peace and stability in the Bal­kans.

Note.—This brief account of naval operations during the First Balkan War is based largely upon memoranda prepared for the present writer by Captain Alfred Leontopoulos of the Royal Hellenic Navy. Captain Leontopoulos, then a midshipman, served on the Averoff during the period covered. He also very kindly supplied the track charts, and all but one of the photo­graphs. Other sources consulted were Cassavetti, Hellas and the Balkan Wars; Lt. Col. Sir Reginald Rankin, Bt., The Inner History of the Balkan War; W. H. C. Price, The Balkan Cockpit; the Statesman’s Yearbook, 1913. (See pp. 750-61 for photographs.)