“The right parts joined together make a unit.”
Alaska, our last territorial frontier, always romantic, distantly picturesque, grows each day into more important stature as a place for settlement and development, and as a key position in national defense. It will perhaps some day be a fulcrum for one of the mighty levers which are to be the mainstay of our national protection.
In a larger sense the key to our national strategy lies in the control of the West Indies and as far south as the mouth of the Amazon River, control of the Panama Canal and all its approaches, control of the Aleutians and all to the south and eastward of them If we are master of these three extended areas, we are master of all between them. Therein lies the safety of the United States and the American republics. Any pressure from Asia can be resisted. Any military incursion into South America from Europe can be offset. Any severance of our power is prevented by. the control of the middle tie—Panama. A strategic axis is formed. Three powerful levers are implanted on the surface of the earth for military control. The Alaskan angle does not detract from the importance of Honolulu. The control of Alaska in fact is only more fully insured by Honolulu. The control of the east coast of South America does not detract from the importance of Norfolk or Cuba but is an extension of the Norfolk-Cuba implication.
* This article was submitted in the Prize Essay Contest, 1939.
In former days and conditions Alaska did not amount to much. But today it lies on the rim of military possibilities. It is like the right guard of a boxer. A boxer does not lead with his right, but at the proper moment and place a powerful right may be decisive.
The continental United States was, during the period of our great western migration, so extensive a domain we found no need economically to develop Alaska. The latter place was a region for prospectors, adventure hunters, fish canneries, and a few missionaries. The oceans were wide and encroachments remote. Our title to the land was clear. We could hold it as a boy does a big apple. We did not need it for immediate use, but could keep it for the future. We were, in fact, a nation glutted with spare land. Vast territories elsewhere were ripe for settlement. Alaska could wait. It has waited. But now has come the time when we can no longer consider it a faraway frontier. The lifeblood of the community—people, commerce, national life—must be forced into the veins of this appendage of our commonwealth.
The quick passage of time, the shrinkage of distances because of fast ships and airplanes, has brought the region closer—closer to Asia and closer to us. If we have not expanded to the west, Asia has shown a tendency to expand to the east, in any direction, in fact, that it could. Alaska looms up like a buffer between East and West. Now we are forced to be interested in it; we are forced to develop it if we want to keep it; we are forced to recognize its importance in a strategic sense if we want even to preserve our present territorial status.
The history of the territory until recently has been wide, free, one might say loose—loose because there have not been enough people there to tighten it up; not enough settlement there to create attention on a wide and sufficient scale; except for a few adventurous exploits of fishermen, of seal hunters and gold miners, the land is largely undeveloped, unused, unguarded, unrecognized. In the main, the whole atmosphere of the place is open, expansive, generous, and carefree. The distances are far between. The government is by reason of these distances loose- jointed. But this cannot last. The strong fiber of the people, a close government, contact and communication—these things alone can make of it the properly ordained community that it should be.
A brief survey of Alaska’s habitation by white people may give a clearer picture of the situation. The plan for the first exploration of the region was the brain child of Peter the Great of Russia. On his deathbed he signed the order which sent an expedition east to Kamchatka and to the dreary sea wastes beyond in search of territory and riches for the Czars. The world was large in those times. Land was plentiful and free to the taker. The rank and file of people in Europe were content to abide by their hearths. To the bold fell the riches of distant empires, as always. By the highways of adventure lay the mountains of gold. That, figuratively, was the impulse for the roving argonauts of the day, among them those representing the Czar. The pressure of confined space had not borne down on the people of the steppes and the north woods, but a desire for salt water ports to the east and south had aroused their imaginations.
Bering, the leader picked out by the Czar, with his lieutenant Chirikoff penetrated as far as southeastern Alaska. Bering perished and found a grave on one of the lonely islands he had visited, and had the sea of the north named after him. Chirikoff became the name of another lonely island, off the southwest peninsula of the Alaskan mainland. Both islands were monuments to brave men who had found fame of a sort. But the influence of the Russians was on the march. Pribilof came in 1767 to the foggy seas and found the noted islands which bear his name. By his discovery of those islands where seals live and breed he opened the door for a school of adventurers, the pelagic sealers, who hounded the region for more than a century and well-nigh caused international strife before a just settlement could be made. In the wake of Bering and Pribilof came the explorers, the fur traders, the priests. At St. Michael stands an aged blockhouse to remind us of Russian influence there. On the greensward at Unalaska a number of tiny cannon tell of other contacts. At points all along the south shore one might find, if a search were made, remnants of decayed logs, once forts which were the strongholds of the czarist agents. Throughout all the land where natives now dwell one may find the little churches of the Greek Orthodox creed. Exploration, trade, government of a sort, religion—thus was the sequence of development begun.
Southward came the Russians as far as San Francisco Bay in search of fortune in sea otter skins then found by the thousands on the Farallons and near-by rocky shores. The Russians built a post near where the Russian River runs out of the California mountains into the Pacific Ocean. There was no power able at that time to hinder them, for the region was remote from the politics of the world. International conflicts in Europe and revolutions drew attention elsewhere. But northward from Mexico had come the Spanish padres, followed by the great landowners. The germ of conflicting interests was being laid; but it did not develop into open warfare because of changes then unforeseen. The Russians failed to maintain their stand here largely because they did not people the land. They exploited it.
While such events were in progress Captain Cook, the English explorer, swung through the South Seas and swept along the Alaskan shores to the Arctic Ocean on his memorable surveying expedition. Vancouver followed soon after, laying the foundation for British interests in the rich new area. At the same time the Canadian settlers extended westward, headed by the trappers, till the flag of the mother country had come down to the tide waters of the Pacific from across the plains of the continent, a flag to be seen from the Oregon territory northward to Dixon Entrance, on Vancouver Island, and a hundred lesser islands in between.
Meanwhile the new republic—the United States—had set out to expand. West came the whalemen, following the herds from Cape Horn to the Arctic through the Bering Sea. Their ships were sailing seas the Russians had explored; they were contacting the land where Bering had started his settlements; the Anglo-Saxon influence was beginning to saw an opening through the long territorial arm of the Russians, cutting the American continent away from Asia politically. Across the middle American desert had ridden the plainsmen to converge down the slopes of the Rocky Mountains on the shores of the Pacific. The Americans, though they may have little known it at the time, were elbowing the Spanish influence back to the southward and pushing the Russians back to the north, wedging wider the gap which thinly separated the grandees and the cossacks.
Four great powers had now met in an area whose ownership was still a question of controversy and treaty. Spain fell out by reason of causes which affected her whole American empire. Russia after the Napoleonic wars relapsed into a land largely taken up with other interests, her power in the great American territory dwindling. Through fear of Great Britain’s encroachment, as some say, and through the efforts of our own Secretary Seward, the Czar sold the American domain to the United States in 1867 for $7,200,000—a pittance for an empire; which, however, did not prevent certain critics from labeling the whole transaction “Seward’s Folly.” Again we note that if the Russians had populated Alaska there would have been a sufficient incentive to hold it and the power to do so. They neglected to people it and the region was lopped off.
“Seward’s Folly” was the result of progression, not something that one man alone plucked out of the heavens of chance. Without the roving whalemen, without the plainsmen, without the urge to movement westward felt by the American adventurers, the finding of gold in California, the reactions of the Civil War, the opportunity would never have been presented for this wonderful piece of bargaining. It was a Yankee bargain.
By this time another contender had come into the field. The visit of Commodore Perry to Yeddo Bay in 1852 seemed, as in the twinkling of an eye, to bring forth from medieval backwardness to modern ways the people of a clever race—the Japanese. They too began to expand along the most likely roads; and in time a part of this interest turned to the north and east. It carried them to Manchuria, Korea, among the northern islands to the Kuriles, and to the waters of Alaska for the seals. Those sleek seals, among other things, whose skins had lured many an adventurer, now lured the Japanese. And the people in the United States began to realize that Japanese seamen could sail away from their native shores and were a potential factor to be reckoned with.
The very essence of expansion is development. That which expands and does not develop is merely a dissipation. Exploitation is not development in its best sense. We have been exploiting Alaska more than we have been developing it. We do better than the Russians did in populating it, to be sure, but we could and should do even better than we do. The time for proper development is here and we cannot honestly continue abuses which are associated with exploitation.
In 1867 it was a long sight and a visionary one that could see from Washington and the continental United States to remote Alaska with so many thousands of miles of undeveloped terrain in between. It is no wonder, perhaps, that except for a few farseeing people the place was little more than a distant land of conjectural romance. But a few brave souls saw the possibilities and began the movement west and north. They came to Alaska by way of the sea. For Alaska is for practical purposes an insular domain. The first arrivals and settlers were largely seafaring men who gingerly crept into the inlets and bays and among the valleys of the high mountainous shores. They did not know what lay beyond. They did not look into the interior. They did not look much to the future. The present for them was enough. Their homes were far away. They would get their fortunes and go back. It took a long time to bring in the permanent settlers. Let us see what sort of land they were settling.
Alaska extends from latitude 51 to 72 degrees north, and from 130 degrees west to 173 degrees east longitude. It has an area of 590,000 square miles. In 1920 the census of the land was 55,036 people. For such a vast country that surely is a small population. A big percentage of them are Indians. The people now live mainly along the south shore and in the southeastern part.
The territory is for convenience divided into three distinctive regions: (1) the main territory; (2) southeastern Alaska or the panhandle; and (3) the Aleutian archipelago. The Seward Peninsula is a wide region of 20,000 square miles, fertile and easily habitable. The Yukon watershed covers an area of 200,000 square miles of habitable land. North of Bristol Bay begins the vast expanse known as the tundra country, which is mainly treeless. West of the Seward peninsula trees do not grow. The east and south region is one of mountains and glaciers, forests, islands, and fiords. There are over 400 glaciers of various size in all Alaska, 31 of these alive—surging toward the sea.
For 10 years after the American acquisition the Army was responsible for the development of the land. For 7 years succeeding the army control the Treasury Department directed its destiny. This was a slow means of progress. But on May 17, 1884, Alaska by act of Congress was made a territory and the laws of the Oregon territory became effective in it. A governor was authorized, courts were established, mining rights granted, schools instituted, and restrictions placed on the Indians. In 1899 a penal code was enacted; in 1900 a civil government was provided. But still this was inadequate. In 1903 homestead rights were established; and in 1906 the territory was granted representation in Congress. In 1912 a territorial legislature was begun. While the government was thus slowly being established, let us observe how the resources were exploited.
Gold, that magnetic, gleaming metal which fired the ancients, which in all ages has drawn men to the far regions of the world, brought men to Alaska. Mining for gold there began in 1880 and has been carried on since. But the greatest and most spectacular search began in the last decade of the nineteenth century, known as the Klondike gold rush. The beaches at Nome and environs yielded their share of the yellow metal, and the influx of fortune hunters, exploiters, promoters, gamblers, and sordid riffraff began. Men deserted their ships as they had done in the days of the forty-niners of California, to get to the diggings. Perhaps the greatest benefit to the territory from this stampede was the introduction of people, some of whom became permanent residents. For the people make the land. Lode and placer mining have prospered since. Dr. Alfred Brooks, U. S. Geological Survey, in 1922 said: “the Alaska mining industry is advancing, not retrograding,” and “is now on a more substantial basis than ever before.” That was 16 years ago and many changes have since taken place.
In 1920, $12,960,106 in copper was taken from Alaska. Largely from the copper came $804,745 in silver. There are also found tungsten, platinum, quicksilver, nickel, cobalt, and coal. But the most important industry in Alaska is the salmon fisheries. In 1922, $29,487,626 was the value of the take. It is not only the most valuable industry but it also affects the greatest number of people. Eighty per cent of the investment in the territory is in the salmon business, and 25,000 people find employment in it. There are 5 hatcheries, more than 100 canneries. Along the rugged shores one may see literally hundreds of fish traps in operation, thousands of fishing boats plying their trade during the season. The halibut banks in the Gulf of Alaska bring forth their myriad workers—bobbing fleets of small powered schooners whose masts fade away beyond the horizon. At Akutan a whaling station operates during the summer season, a businesslike summation of what was once such a wild and adventurous pursuit. The herring run along these shores, and the profits from thousands of barrels of salted herring is no small one.
In the early days of the salmon industry sailing vessels left each spring from San Francisco, Seattle, and Portland, anchored off the canneries during the summer, then sailed home in the fall of the year with the season’s catch on board. Those sail ships are gone now and in their place steamers go faster and more surely to and from the canneries In former times the ships were isolated from the States for 5 or 6 months, no word available about men or fish. In these later times radio stations at the canneries or on board the steamers attending them make daily reports to their home offices. But with all this great industry note that the millions of dollars are taken out by people who make their homes in the United States, not Alaska.
Alaska had to be explored, surveyed, visited. The Army surveyed the interior in a series of expeditions which reported extensive possibilities in the new land. Revenue cutters sailed the length of the coast line from Hyder to Unimak Pass and from Unimak Pass to the mouth of the McKenzie River. Civilization advanced into the hinterland to the natives who lived there often in primeval simplicity and backwardness. In the earlier years the whale ships had skirted the coast and sailed into the Arctic, got caught in the ice, stranded on the beaches, were marooned through the long winters at Point Barrow, at Herschel Island. For them the government sent out searchers of inquiry and relief. It was part of the process of settlement.
The whale ships sail no more. A few trading vessels go beyond the Bering Strait. But airplanes fly over the tundra. Mail, medicine, and doctors can now go in a few hours to outlying regions which in former days took weeks to reach.
Civilization is a slow process. It cannot be forced. Incentive from within is necessary. Men will freely go for profit. Few will venture for the sake of duty and ideals. That is the difficulty of the whole problem. We have not yet convinced enough people of the importance of Alaska. We have not yet conceived a means of making it profitable for men in large numbers to settle in this territory. We have not yet sufficiently developed the idea of a home life up there. To most people it still remains a frontier. That would not so greatly matter were it not for the implication that the absence of people indicates no interest, no knowledge; and no knowledge means no understanding of the relationship of the whole to the national unity, and for this reason to the naval problem.
In the summer of 1927 and again since then a small Japanese steamer appeared in the Bering Sea on the American side. It was said to be a fisheries tender, government operated, which had come to Alaskan waters to study that industry. It stopped at Akutan and observed in detail the operations of the whaling station there. It proceeded on into Bristol Bay, where in like manner it took notes of the salmon fisheries. It loitered in the region for a number of weeks. Are we able to read a hidden motive between the lines? It is understandable that such a vessel should make an inquiring visit; it was a friendly gesture that they should be interested in a product (whale meat) some of which was destined for use in Japan. The point is that their interest was directed toward the Alaskan scene; and it is only too obvious the Japanese are seeking a means of expansion, commercially, territorially. The sequel came a few years later when a Japanese fishing fleet appeared in Alaskan waters and began to fish for salmon, accompanied by mothering vessels to receive their catch for return to Japan.
Let us learn a lesson from that incident. It is true the American authority extends only to prescribed distances from the land. The Bering Sea is not a closed sea. In international law the open sea is just that for lawful pursuits of all nations. Fishing for salmon is lawful. But none the less a controversial question had arisen. At present it has gone no farther than that. What this country cannot afford to tolerate is the idea of foreign vessels promiscuously prowling around our shores in a manner which can give rise to such debatable situations as may bring friction. The salmon question if allowed to mature could be even more insidious than has been the question of seals.
Geographically Alaska is as far away as an oceanic island. There will come a day when roads will reach many parts of it, but today its only approach is by sea. To stabilize its resources calls for development of a permanent sort. With a larger population, with home industries, with shipping commensurate with the needs of the region, it may become a strong arm of our defense. Where there is shipping there is power. Where local interest lies there lies security and balance.
There are those who are born by the hearthsides of their grandfathers and great-grandfathers and who desire to live and die there. There are those who wander afield, whose feet fret on old ground, who want more than the old can give, who want to build on new soil and create hearthstones of their own choosing. There are those who are forced out by pressure from within. Those who go out to seek for themselves are the ones who make the pioneers. They are the ones who must settle Alaska.
So far are distances in Alaska, so sparse its population, that the question of courts, law enforcement, arrest and prosecution, presents an unusual problem to those charged with the duty. It has been answered partially by the traveling court. Where litigation cannot come to the court, the court goes to the litigation. Thieves and murderers, applicants for naturalization, all manner of cases are brought before this body which travels from port to port aboard ship. There are no roads and no railroads in the outlying regions, so the court travels to them by the sea. The Coast Guard has supplied cutters in the summer season to carry this legal body wherever there may be work for it, from Valdez to Kodiak, from Chignik Bay to Seldovia, to Unalaska and Bristol Bay. The court carries its entire make-up from records and stenographer to the United States attorney to prosecute and the attorney for the defense, the latter on the supposition that legal aid is due anyone on trial. The court may hold sessions between the bare walls of a cannery warehouse. It may convene in some crude dance hall, the judge sitting on the orchestra platform, the jury grouped around where dancing feet have given rhythm to the boards. Fishermen, squaws and squaw-men, and school teachers may be on the jury, they may be the witnesses, any one of them may be the person at bar. The whole is a sign of the backwardness of the land. Courts must abide in the land, available for all at reasonable times. No court can do justice which does not from day to day feel the pulse of its constituency. No land can be settled and play the role of a commonwealth whose only judicial appeasement comes once a year, across the sea—and stays only a day.
This brief picture is drawn of Alaska to indicate what we have there in the north country to fight for, what it may mean territorially and commercially to us. The picture of how it can be held to that end and the manner of doing so is one vastly more intricate.
Alaska is a point of strategy. If it has worth as such it should be consolidated in the prime scheme of things. If it may be a key to naval operations it must be intelligently developed. The security and control of certain parts of the Pacific by the United States calls for bases. Alaska may be a base for intensive operations. To what extent may it be utilized? That largely depends on the sphere of a possible war, the aim of the contending forces. But a region with 5,000 miles of coast line, islands, inlets, and waterways should be considered a most desirable spot for the rendezvous of ships under certain given conditions. There might be a base at Unalaska, at Chignik Bay, or somewhere in Prince William Sound. There should be at any one of these places, or some other chosen harbor, a key position established. Scapa Flow was the key to all naval operations in the Great War. Had that failed, and without a suitable substitute, German sea power would have borne a different relation to the war and its final outcome. The West Indies was a key not only in the Napoleonic wars, but in the American Revolution it bore such strategic importance it may be said to have controlled the final result. Alaska is most admirably located for secondary bases.
There is nothing secret about the physical possibility of Alaskan ports, the shelters, anchorages, approaches. Any person, from a student of navigation to the high command of any fleet, may buy a portfolio of charts which give in minute detail all this information. But a stranger attempting to use them to sail his ships would encounter many difficulties. He would lack local knowledge. He would feel the need of experience. That could come only by having been in the region. That is what should be aimed at for every naval officer who might be associated in a war emergency with these waters.
Ships in the past navigating the rocky shores and the broad shoal waters of Alaska have paid in unknown numbers for their lack of knowledge, the absence of good charts, carelessness, or the plain misfortunes of the sea. In 1918 the Alaska section of the Seattle Chamber of Commerce collected a list of marine disasters involving vessels of appreciable size. This list contained the names of hundreds of ships, hundreds of lives lost. It did not include minor incidents, but it was indicative. Vessels which have been condemned for ocean traffic have often finished their days in the inside waters of Alaska, a place of last demand. But it should not be a place of last demand. It has come to be a place of first demand.
It is desirable that Alaska be settled more fully. It is desirable that the industries be developed with permanent occupation in mind; that is to say, the fortune of the region should be fostered by permanent dwellers. For their fortune, good or bad, is in large measure the fortune of the entire country. The thousands of men venturing north each year and coming away with millions of dollars in profit deplete the land, giving nothing in return. The Spanish carrying gold from Peru and Mexico proved of no gain to Spain. The exploitation of America by the French and English was of no lasting gain till the colonization became permanent and stable. The regions of the world cannot be bled of their wealth without giving return, and in the case of Alaska the return means to people it and consolidate it. It must be a thoroughly stable part of our commonwealth or it will wither away into a useless extremity, become more of a hazard to the whole than if completely severed.
In a naval sense Alaska should be one of a series of focal points. These focal points should envisage a lively and aggressive preponderance of trade and interest in the Americas. These focal points should reach from the Arctic on the Pacific side to the tropic zone on the shores of Brazil. It is true the idea should not contemplate any encroachment on the South American republics. But what should be aimed at is a course to prevent any European or Asiatic power from freezing in on South American affairs to the point of dictation and to our detriment. The points should be grouped somewhat as follows:
- Alaska, comprising the area from Bering Sea to Puget Sound.
- Seattle, San Francisco, San Pedro, and San Diego area.
- Honolulu with various groups of islands to the west and south for ship bases and rendezvous for aircraft.
- Panama and its approaches east and west—most vital.
- In the West Indies a base as far east as geographically possible, to control the east coast of Brazil. Trinidad or Martinique would be most desirable, but San Juan or St. Thomas, the best we can figure on at this time, are little developed in this sense. From the European angle this West Indian control is most vital. For to the southeast of these lies the gateway to all east South America. It is scarce two thousand miles across the narrows from South America to West Africa. It would be well if we could control the entire area from Florida to Pernambuco. It dominates the approaches to the Panama Canal. Should any European power seek to control South America, we have then a lever by which we may pry loose any foothold threatening there.
- The last focal point—the northeast coast of the United States—takes care of itself. There will be no fatal encroachment from across the north Atlantic—only toward South America. First trade, then economic control, then political encroachment. It is a far look ahead. But supposing a European power did get a foothold in South America, the next step would be to squeeze in on Panama.
The Germans and the Japanese are the two powers which may be said to confront the United States. This may seem absurd. The judgment is reached after a process of elimination. Great Britain will not menace the United States for reasons of self-interest. It is but a truism, though well to note, that no nation will encroach on another save for reasons of self-interest nor will it stand aloof save for the same reason. In the case of Great Britain friction with the United States would only serve to weaken the British Empire in all its relations with Europe. Further, both nations are the so-called democratic kind and would travel parallel with each other rather than contrariwise as long as the present world setup prevails. The very foundation of the United States was laid by English-speaking people; the same language is spoken by them today. It would take a sweeping racial change to alter the basic attitudes of these two groups.
France, the second democracy, will not war with us as long as we see eye to eye with the British. The American continents are the supply backbone for France in any major war. She cannot turn elsewhere. In a war with the United States such supplies would be shut off from France to her undoing. Further than that there is no controversial question between the two countries. And a war to the westward for France leaves her German border open to invasion. France could not dream of such a war. Her major wars for a long time to come will all be European.
Russia will not at this reckoning war with the United States except by subversive political connivance, if at all. There is nothing we have that Russia would want except industrial organization. That could be got by her own internal development, not by war. She has the material and needs only the trained men and organization to reach prosperity.
There is left then in Europe only the German combination, and such alliances as that group may bring together or be a party to. It is there our greatest source of trouble may spring from. In Napoleon’s day France stood in the same role. Today it is reversed. It is not the mere German nation that is to be feared, but the combination of powers which that country may control. We have the proposition of her gaining the ascendancy in southeastern Europe. Germany gaining in power, if her government does not collapse, will in time grow beyond her present-day ideas. It is impossible to determine the details of how these ideas will grow, but we can assume with likelihood the trend will be toward economic and political control of any minor countries the Germans collaborate with.
There is the proposition of German colonies in Africa, especially West Africa, being returned to her by the mandated countries. It may not take place. Again it may. That brings the problem right up to our back door. The Monroe Doctrine may be challenged. If we mean to stand by that document, now is the time to head off encroachment. As far as Germany is concerned, that is the possibility we must envisage and guard against, that is the reason for military control of the West Indies region and to the east and south of it. The United States and Great Britain could well enough control such a situation. The United States might be called on to control it alone. Allies are desirable, but independence of them is a great virtue.
There need be no fear or great alarm because of any single European power. Our resources are so great, our production setup is so vast, if properly organized, that by the mere process of holding out the United States could in the end probably overcome the resistance of any one power, even if that were Great Britain.
If it is not the single power, what is it? It is the combinations which may arise that give cause for the war alarms—the fear of being drawn into a struggle by which we gain nothing, by which we are only frustrated and weakened. It is the power to head off such combinations, the power to crush any part of them before they materialize to a dangerous extent which should be the American aim when laying down plans for national defense. It is not waiting till the enemy appears at our shores. It is preventing an enemy’s unduly taking the key position before the fight begins.
We now come to the only other menace —that in the Pacific. Russia once shadowed that region. But save for her lonely Siberian shore she is gone, as far as America is concerned probably for good. Who else might be interested in Alaska and the United States? Only Japan. The Japanese are not a menace to our continent at this time. That country is not interested in Alaska in a territorial sense. Oriental invasion would not be tolerated on the American continent and there is ample power to prevent it now. Japan’s trend is today toward the south and west on the mainland of Asia. It will be a number of years before she has consolidated her inroads into China, if she succeeds, enough to permit her to cast an eye elsewhere. In the matter of her Chinese gains let us assume two possible results.
- Japan is either to be smothered by her incursions into the mainland and will fall back exhausted, or
- She will overwhelm the region, reorganize the government there, and create a powerful empire whose resources are at the disposal of the Japanese regime.
If the first happens there will be a slump in Japanese influence and power. If the latter results then there will elapse a period when Japan would welcome quiet from outside powers until she recuperates, after which she would emerge vastly more powerful, and if aggressive, much more to be watched and guarded against.
Let us not foreget historical comparisons when assuming that Japan will be too weak at the end of this struggle, provided she stays intact. Recall our own Civil War. The French encroachment in Mexico about that time was intended to set up an empire to the south of us. During the war we had no power for the moment to prevent it. But when the war ended, exhausted though the government was, the United States had a powerful military machine organized and equipped and capable of tearing to pieces any power that might have attempted to reorganize any part of the American continents.
So, too, may Japan emerge powerful—too powerful.
The United States could and would counter Japan under a number of conditions. Roughly they may be outlined as follows:
- If Japan attempted any sort of invasion of the United States. (An absurdity today.)
- If Japan attempted to seize the Philippines.
- If Japan attempted to gain control of the Hawaiian Islands.
- If Japan attempted to seize any portion of Alaska or the Aleutians.
- If Japan attempted to encroach on Mexico or Panama or any South American country.
It is not supposed, in fairness to the Japanese, that they want or ever will want to do any of the things enumerated above. But times and events change governments and people and their desires and tendencies.
All of the foregoing considerations seem today highly unlikely. How long will they be so? If any one of the suppositions could become a possibility, then all of them might. The first would undoubtedly be the Philippines. If the natives of that group of islands persisted in wanting to be subjects of the Japanese, in the end the United States could hardly prevent it without maintaining a military establishment there beyond all reason. If the natives do not want to be Japanese then under no conditions should the United States allow it to be brought about. It then becomes a naval problem. It involves the re-enforcement of the islands, the harassment of Japanese trade routes and communications. It would be a big task, but it could be done. We must make up our minds.
Japan at this time could not possibly attempt encroachment on the Western Hemisphere; she might after becoming overwhelmingly powerful. There is no immediate prospect of that. But it must always be borne in mind that such a possibility exists.
Only by subterfuge could Japan attempt to seize Hawaii, by using the heterogeneous population of the islands in a coup. There is no reason for this to happen if sane and constant attention is paid to the problem.
Japan would not attempt to seize any part of Alaska now, except in times of emergency as a wedge, a part of operations of a wider scope—as long as the present state of affairs exists. But the state of affairs can always change. Let us suppose the Russian Soviet regime collapsed. That suggestion is not beyond consideration. The mighty Russian empire collapsed; its massive and none-too-elastic successor also could collapse. Eastern Siberian shores could be left wide open to invasion. Suppose Japan by this time had consolidated her Chinese conquest, or had withdrawn from there and sought expansion to the northward. Such a strip of shore line to the north and east would be inviting. Suppose all eastern Asia from East Cape to the China Sea became Japanese. We find ourselves not 5,000 miles away from Japan but less than a hundred. What would be the possibility then? None knows. Do we dare to imagine? Let us remember that the imagination leads to far fields, but where the mind can go there also can man’s activity go. We cannot let our thinking stop at mere likelihood. We must speculate to the far outer rim of possibilities, though none but our children see it, if even they do.
Suppose some future day the German government set out to encroach on South America from the east at the same time the Japanese brought pressure to bear from the west. It can be seen how vital would be our complete strategic control of the West Indies sector on the one side and the Alaskan area on the Pacific. If we had complete control with all it implies we could block such machinations. A well-placed submarine menace to Japan emanating from Alaska, an air force assembled in time of emergency in the same place, each capable of a sortie on Japan, would be a powerful weapon to counter any Japanese activities toward us of the Western continents.
There should be docking facilities for minor craft within the Gulf of Alaska. There is none today. Think of the proposition of going 2,000 miles to survey the hull of a ship in time of emergency! The days of beaching and heaving down are here no longer.
Every ship that trades to Alaska is an asset for defense. Every piling driven for a dock to moor and recondition those ships becomes an asset. Every man who is put to work to facilitate the operations of this shipping adds up on the black side of the ledger. They are commercial advancements. They are strategic requirements. Ships and men and supplies. Every oil tank where fuel can be stored advances toward the margin of safety. Every channel that is buoyed, every anchorage that is plotted is a step toward security.
But more than this—an established rendezvous from which submarines, light craft, airplanes and their carriers could assemble must some day be established on the southwest coast of Alaska. To deny that is to deny the need of naval power. To crystallize the thought and develop the plans is but to recognize the inevitable. It is but to see the weakness of our problem from one angle, and to apply the remedy. Today, tomorrow, or tomorrow’s tomorrow, it will come. The distant end of a necessary axis of operation becomes a lever of control. None can deny the right of self-defense. The development of the Alaskan end of it is a vital premise to the proposition.