“With new and untried methods of warfare new tactics must be devised to meet them.”—Jellicoe
* This article was submitted in the Prize Essay Contest, 1938.
When Jellicoe penned the lines which introduce this discussion he was referring, not to new problems, but to certain novel features of age-old issues. He had had to contend with enemy battleships, battle cruisers, light and armored cruisers, torpedo boats and their so-called destroyers, submarines, and mines. Were his problems so different from those of earlier commanders who faced the ship of the line, the frigate, the fire ship, and the numerous other forebears of the modern naval vessel? We venture the opinion they were not. How much of his nerve strain was the result of failure, in peace, to foresee the modern development of ancient methods? No completely successful revolutionary type of naval vessel has ever been developed. The monitor and the ram were displaced with facility. The submarine is but a mobile mine and not always as successful, for it has to resort to showing at least its periscope before being able to use its means of offense. The Vesuvius also was claimed to be a revolutionary type, but proved a complete failure.
What new weapon of naval warfare has appeared in the present century? The submarine has been developed from its embryonic form to a state in which it may take its place in the battle formation and be treated as is any other unit of the fleet. The depth charge has seen the light of day but this is merely a defensive weapon which has limited the power of the submarine. The destroyer has “grown up” from its position of being merely a defense against the smaller torpedo boat to a state embodying the characteristics of both types. New forms of weapons have appeared but they have been evolutions of older, tried weapons. The ram, the dynamite gun, the monitor, even the torpedo itself, have appeared and waned completely or are on that path. Aircraft might be excepted in this because they have called into being a new element in naval warfare, but the plane, in the final analysis, is merely a projectile of a new form. Whether that element and that form of projectile will subdue those with which we have had greater experience remains to be seen. Certainly no data gathered from the recent years of war experience point toward the complete success of this new factor in warfare.
The principles of strategy never change, we are told, and the principles of tactics likewise remain with few modifications. The advent of sail, and later of steam, altered the methods of the ancients but the primary purposes of naval warfare endure. Greater mobility does not alter principles. The mechanization of the army may make possible greater speed of movement, added protection to troops, and increased fire power, but the basic tactics will continue to be those which governed the cavalry, the infantry, and artillery of earlier days. The meaning of the terms offense and defense can never vary, nor can we foresee the development of any new weapon which cannot be met as we have met the torpedo, the ram, the submarine, and even the airplane. As Dr. Oscar Parkes wrote in the Scientific American for October, 1935:
Meanwhile, we can be entertained by the stories of the Japanese one-man submarine, and extraordinary ships which the British are supposed to be building, descriptions of which periodically crop up in the press but which have no foundation except in the minds of the “special correspondents” who thrive on them.
Naval architecture is an extraordinarily stable art. Perhaps if a nation’s marine designers could produce something fantastic and revolutionary which would be successful, that nation might with ease win control of the sea. Because, in the past, such designs as have been produced have died natural deaths of impracticability, it is wiser for a nation to concentrate its endeavors along conservative lines.
Writers on naval affairs, too numerous to mention individually, have contended that the Washington and London treaties for the limitation of naval armaments forced the United States to construct vessels which were not entirely suitable for our purposes. In certain types this may be true, but had not the spirit of trying to outdo our neighbors brought upon us a never-ending enlargement of vessels necessitating a never-ending expansion of yard facilities? At the beginning of the century the nations were content with battleships of around 10,000 tons. By the time the World War came along, the size had increased to between 20,000 and 30,000 tons. So-called “experience” during the war forced up the tonnage of this class to almost 50,000 tons. Cruisers and other secondary vessels increased proportionately. If the much talked of “superliner” has reached its limit, why is there not a similar natural confine within which naval vessels should be kept? Modern engineering ability knows no bounds, we must admit, but the foundation upon which we should build our policy is not the capabilities of our engineers but the dictates of our strategists. Our experience with the Lexington and Saratoga proves that ships can be too big. The Ranger of less than half the size performs practically the same functions as the larger vessels. It is not claimed that this would be equally true of a capital ship, but during the World War the Queen Mary of 26,350 tons sank even more rapidly than the older and slower Blücher of 15,550 tons. Size does not necessarily denote strength but may frequently prove more vulnerable.
The close of the last war found the British Navy in possession of the Hawkins class of cruiser of about 9,800 tons, armed with seven 7.5-inch guns and designed for a speed of 30 knots. Compare this class with the later Cornwall type of similar tonnage, slightly higher speed but with eight 8-inch guns. The latter have been dubbed “tin-clads” and similar uncomplimentary titles. In reality they do not differ particularly from the earlier vessels unless it is in the less naval appearance they present. However, the Hawkins is a decidedly popular type while the Cornwall is just a “necessary evil.” The Hawkins class may be taken as a forecast of postwar cruisers. When capital ships were designed with a 6-inch secondary battery, it was natural to expect later cruisers to be more heavily armed. For general fleet duties the 8-inch gun seems to be satisfactory and the armor of the Washington treaty cruiser is not as different from that of earlier cruisers as some critics would have us believe. Progress in the theory of protection may even have made the recent cruiser far less vulnerable than her predecessors.
When we look back upon the characteristics of vessels which were built in the earlier part of the present century we realize the ever increasing size which dictates the naval building of today while the actual fighting power of the later ships has not always increased commensurately. For instance, the old Detroit of 2,089 tons mounted ten 5-inch guns while the present ship of the same name carries a like number of 6-inch guns on 7,050 tons. Granting that speed has increased and that airplanes have been added to the equipment, have we achieved adequate return for the added cost? The old Petrel carried four 6-inch, two 3-pounders, one 1-pounder, two 37-millimeter, and two Gatlings on 892 tons. In the Erie class we have the same armament on 2,000 tons. The Concord of Spanish-American War days carried six 6-inch on 290 less tons and, compared with the Erie's 20 knots, had a rated speed of 16.7 knots. It is readily admitted that modern implements of naval warfare require greater tonnage than did the implements of 30 years ago but it is debatable whether the great increases which have occurred are entirely necessary or, indeed, entirely wise.
Increased size is compensated for, in part, by increased speed and heavier protection in some classes. In other directions, however, the greater the size, the larger the target and the more difficult it is to protect such a vast area against enemy fire. Going on board some of our latest ships one looks with amazement upon the maze of gadgets of all kinds which confronts him. Compare the bridge of a wartime destroyer with that of the Winslow. Have we really made progress in security against breakdown of communications or, indeed, of fighting power? It is questionable whether we have. Reliance on mechanical aids may well destroy the objective for which we strive. In the confusion of battle can we expect that all this maze of mechanical contrivances will hold up to the test? This is but one question which must be answered in laying our plans for the future development of our naval strength. Emphasis must always be upon strength and our plans laid with a view to continuing strength.
The layman is amazed at the increasing costs which are involved in the replacement of our naval vessels. Even those in closer touch receive shocks when bids are opened or appropriations asked for. We contract for the building of a 34,000-ton, 22-knot passenger ship for $15,750,000 and yet the lowest bids for construction of the hull and machinery for an 8,300-ton seaplane tender total $10,959,194. Compare the cost of a war-time destroyer of 1,200 tons with that of a modern ship only 300 tons larger. Are we obtaining sufficient return in fighting ability? On 1,200 tons we had a speed of 35 knots, a gun armament of four 4-inch, and one 3-inch, and 12 tubes. On 1,500 tons we have 2½ knots more speed, four or five 5-inch guns, and a varying number of tubes not exceeding that of the older ships. Building costs have risen, ton for ton, since the war but a greater portion of the increase is accounted for by more expensive and more complicated equipment. Have sea-keeping qualities been enhanced in proportion to increased size or increased cost? Have the assured fighting qualities kept pace with the advance in size and cost? There are few who can answer those questions offhand. There is sufficient doubt, however, to warrant the most intense study. If we have deemed it advisable to determine the upper limit of size within which passenger shipbuilding should be kept, there is an even more imperative need for a similar study of naval ship limitations.
As some slight contribution toward the study which should be made of future naval design, an attempt will be made in the subsequent sections of this essay to discuss types, both past, present, and suggested, in an effort to determine, in general terms, the characteristics of some of the classes it may be decided are necessary for the United States to develop.
Battleships and battle cruisers.—Present trends would indicate that these classes, once separated, have now been grouped into one classification which may be termed merely “capital ships.” If the ships which are building in the various countries are to have the speeds which are rumored, and still be classified as battleships, battle cruisers which would operate with them would be required to have such speeds as would be almost impossible to achieve and leave any tonnage for armament or even the barest armor. It may be that the aircraft carrier has superseded the battle cruiser but, irrespective of what has displaced it, its disappearance would seem to be an accomplished fact in future building programs. England, while still retaining the battle cruiser, nevertheless at one time designed and built a squadron of fast battleships which may be considered as a prophecy of the future capital ship force. The heavy cruiser has also destroyed much of the usefulness of the battle cruiser and the principle of concentration would appear to make it advisable to retain the capital ship as one class brought together in the battle line as a compact force.
If we are to grant that the battleship and the battle cruiser of the future will be combined as one type, what should the characteristics of such a ship include? The United States is restrained by the London treaty to capital ships of 35,000 tons, armed with 16-inch guns. This limitation should not prevent the building of adequately large, sufficiently well-armed, and strongly enough protected vessels for use in the battle line as the backbone of the fleet’s organization. That the battleship retains its position as the backbone of the fleet can no longer be disputed. The loss of the España, while first credited to an aerial bomb, has now been conclusively shown to have been the result of striking a mine. But even if she had been lost through aerial attack that would not necessarily spell the doom of the capital ship. As first reported, the vessel was sunk by dropping a bomb down the stack—certainly a stroke of luck no matter how expert the bomber might be. With equal luck we might possibly sink a battleship with a .22 rifle, but that would not prove the unfitness of such vessels to comprise the battle line. The unsinkable ship has never been and probably never will be built and the possibility that some capital ships may be lost through one cause or another need not discourage their future construction. As the German naval authorities concluded recently, the “battleship is still the nucleus of every fleet which is unwilling to stay glued to the coast but is willing to fight for supremacy.”1
1 New York Times, November 9, 1937, quoting from Naval Year Book
In the battleship of the future, staying power and offensive power should come before speed. The battleship has not the same need for speed as have the secondary vessels which must operate as auxiliaries. However, to come into contact with the enemy’s battle line it is necessary that our own similar line be sufficiently speedy to make and maintain contact. We must realize that, if we are the stronger naval power, our weaker adversaries may not fight unless we force them to do so. Speed sufficient to enable our ships to contact the enemy is, in consequence, imperative. The competitive spirit is strongest in this characteristic.
If we agree as to the general characteristics, let us proceed to a more detailed study of the capital ship of the future. Within the limitation of the 35,000 tons at our disposal we can probably mount nine 16-inch guns in triple turrets, provide a speed of not greater than 27 knots, and armor the vessel sufficiently well to permit it to take and retain its proper place in the battle line. The concentration of the main armament in three turrets saves approximately the weight of one entire turret in comparison with the Maryland class which, in addition to the greater tonnage, over 3,000 tons, can well be utilized in adding to the protective qualities embodied in the ship. With regard to secondly armament, it seems logical that this should be combined with the anti-aircraft weapons. Such a combination could be used against both surface and air attack, and as it is unlikely that there would often be simultaneous attacks from both directions, the entire battery could be used against either form of attack. In the event that simultaneous attacks should occur, certain turrets of the battery would be assigned to surface and certain to aerial defense. The total number of guns available should not be reduced but they should be dual purpose weapons. If feasible, they should be mounted in triple turrets or, if the working of the guns would thus be retarded, then in twin mountings protected by housings. It must be remembered that unless we give some adequate protection to the secondary armament, its defensive Properties can be wiped out by enemy fire and the vessel is then open to unopposed attack by the enemy types against which the armament is intended to defend. Depending on the type of mount, it should be possible to install from twenty to twenty-seven 5-inch dual purpose weapons on the vessel. There would, of course, be a. heavy supplementary armament of lighter multiple guns for use against aircraft. Torpedo tubes should have no place in the capital ship. The storage of aircraft below decks as in the Brooklyn class of cruisers should, if possible, be followed in our battleship designs.
The battleship design described is a far cry from the Indiana of the early years of this century with its displacement of 10,288 tons, a speed of 16 knots, and an armament of four 13-inch, eight 8-inch, and four 6-inch guns. It is the price of progress, no doubt, as well as the price of international competition in naval armaments. However, it is not as great an advance as we have seen in other types and, upon its completion, we should have a vessel capable of maintaining its place in the battle line and adequate to the task of forming the backbone of the entire fleet.
Aircraft carriers.—Limited as these vessels are to 23,000 tons, and to guns not larger than 6.1 inch and to not more than 10 above 5.25 inches, the characteristics are not as apt to vary as considerably as those of other types. Even limiting ourselves to the tonnage permitted us by the Washington treaty, we should be able to build 7 or 8 carriers entirely suitable to our needs and embodying the characteristics which experience has shown us are advisable; The armament should consist of dual purpose guns supplemented by a powerful battery of light multiple guns. The speed must be determined by the ability to regain position in the fleet formation after having left it for the purpose of getting its planes into the air. It is possible that several types of carriers may be built for varying purposes but it would be wiser to determine the closest approach to the ideal for all purposes and concentrate on that one type. Greater flexibility of use will result from this policy.
If the carrier is to remain a separate type its characteristics do not offer any serious problems. However, we should bear in mind the possibility of many of its functions being adapted to the regular combatant vessels of the fleet for, inasmuch as the airplane is merely a form of projectile, it is quite possible to adapt the older types of ships as its carriers. If the large patrol-plane types continue to increase in size, range, and power, they may well supplant the carrier-based planes as bombers and torpedo carriers, while the cruisers’ own scouting planes may make it unnecessary to depend on the carriers for transportation of this type. There are those who believe the fighting plane is disappearing as a separate class, so, considering the matter from all angles, it is quite within the realm of possibility that the carrier will within the not very distant future be found unnecessary for the fleet. But, so long as it remains as a fleet type, we must plan its design to fulfill the purposes for which it is intended while providing against the possibility of concentrating too much power in any individual ship. Due to the inherent vulnerability of the type, its disappearance from the fleet would be a relief. No means have yet been developed to protect the type against its own weaknesses. It is possible that the adoption of autogiros may make it feasible to construct carriers with protected flight decks but so long as planes limited to horizontal take-off and landing are in use, there appears to be no method which can be devised to protect the take-off and landing area.
Cruisers.—It does not appear necessary to treat heavy and light cruisers as separate types. The construction of 8-inch heavy cruisers is prohibited for the present and even 6-inch cruisers over 8,000 tons may not be laid down due to treaty restrictions. The limitation of cruisers to 8,000 tons is a wise step and especially so with respect to the 6-inch type. It is debatable whether 15 guns of this size on a 10,000-ton ship are of greater value than 12 on 8,000 tons. Given 40,000 tons of cruisers, the purposes of the type could certainly be carried out to better advantage with 5 ships than with 4 and the total gun power would be equal. It is perfectly possible to mount twelve 6-inch guns on 8,000 tons although the British Newcastle class with this armament is 1,000 tons heavier. Our Omaha class originally mounted twelve 6-inch guns and with the advance in naval design the same armament should easily be placed on a ship of almost 1,000 tons greater displacement, while at the same time arranging the guns in accordance with modern practice. Had we to do it over again, would not our nine new 10,000-ton light cruisers be replaced, with eleven 8,000-ton ships at the expense of only three 6-inch guns and a saving of 2,000 tons to be used toward another ship? The scouting and screening capabilities of the tonnage involved would be greatly enhanced as a result. The concentration of such immense fire power as 15 main battery guns in one ship is a questionable policy and one which should be avoided in future construction.
The purpose behind the design of any class of vessel should be the ability to comprise within the design the necessary seakeeping qualities, the heaviest practical armament, the highest speed required to fulfill the mission of the type, and such protection as may be possible. The order of importance of these several qualities varies with the type being designed. It is possible that certain of the cruiser functions, so far as the United States is concerned, might be fulfilled by a vessel smaller than 8,000 tons, but in order to provide for all-round use the ships we build should be capable of filling any place in the fleet formation which is ordinarily assigned to the type in question. Consequently, 8,000 tons should be the basic limit of displacement of our cruiser classes. Within that tonnage we should be able to mount twelve 6-inch guns as a main battery, from four to eight 5-inch dual purpose guns (if possible in housings on twin mounts), a relatively heavy battery of multiple anti-aircraft guns, no torpedo tubes because the ability to use torpedoes is so limited, and as large a number of planes as may be carried within the tonnage allotted. Speed should not be less than that of our existing cruisers and could, with advantage, be higher. Protection may well be sacrificed to speed as it is impossible to provide adequate protection with armor plating, and speed is in itself a protection which for this type would undoubtedly be of far more value in battle.
Reverting back to the possibility of aircraft carriers as a type disappearing from the fleet, it would seem that if 10,000 tons is to be considered as a size for cruisers, the increased tonnage might better be used for greater airplane stowage while retaining the armament suggested for the 8,000-ton design. It does not seem practicable to depend on the carriers for scouting, bombing, torpedo, and fighting planes when the functions of these are so widely separated. Consequently, the ability of the scouting line to put into the air the equivalent number of planes which might, otherwise, be available from the carriers would warrant increased size for the cruisers. The limitations of this type with regard to the return of the planes must, however, be borne in mind although it is not a problem which need be dismissed as incapable of solution.
When our existing heavy cruisers come to be replaced it will be necessary for us to weigh their right to a place in the fleet and as convoy guards as well as commerce raiders. As we said earlier in this discussion, the close of the last war brought forth the British Hawkins class armed with 7.5-inch guns and the 8-inch- gun cruiser appears to be a logical step along the path of progress. With heavier destroyer guns, it is to be expected that cruiser armaments will increase in power. It is believed that, especially since the disappearance of the battle cruiser, there is a definite place for the more heavily armed cruisers and, consequently, our future plans should give them consideration. Our New Orleans class is as powerful a type, comparatively, as the early battle cruisers. We do not expect them to stand up against battleships and their speed will permit them to refuse battle with stronger forces. Their speed will likewise permit them to close similar or weaker enemy cruisers. Definitely, there appears to be a place for this type as supports for our scouting and screening lines and on other tasks. So far as one can foresee, also, the type will not be displaced by so-called “pocket battle cruisers” such as were described in the August, 1935, Proceedings. That design provided for a 10,000-ton ship armed with six 8-inch, nine 4.7-inch, and an array of smaller anti-aircraft weapons. The speed was only 29 knots and while its designer stated “she would be a dreaded enemy of the present treaty cruisers and of all smaller light warships, as well as all merchant vessels,” her ability to contact many of those vessels is seriously doubted. A speed of only 29 knots—the greatest which could be obtained on a vessel protected as this one was intended to be—is insufficient for a cruiser so long as the speeds of other vessels in the fleet remain what they are. The armor protection given to such a ship could never counterbalance the protection lost through low speed. Such vessels are what we must guard against in our future plans. They are what Dr. Parkes classifies as “extraordinary ships” and such ships have no place in our fleet organization.
Destroyers.—When one comes to discuss the destroyer type there is probably more voluminous material to be considered than for any other class of combatant vessel. Foreign nations appear to have gone to two extremes in their building programs and neither of these extremes should be given much consideration by the United States. Our better course would seem to lie in between the extremes. Our fleet is a seagoing force and our tactics must be devised around battle on the high seas. Our ships must be built in keeping with those tactics. Accordingly, the very small destroyer has no place in our fleet and the demands for numbers of destroyers prevent our concentration on the large type. Additional disadvantages of both of these extreme types will be mentioned as we proceed.
The American war-built 1,200-ton destroyer was an excellent vessel. The fact that the Swedish Navy’s Stockholm class is almost identical in design although smaller in tonnage is, in the writer’s mind, a first-rate recommendation for our boats as Sweden has developed one of the best equipped of the smaller navies. Our 1,200-ton class ships proved, by the most exacting tests, that they were capable of fulfilling the functions of their type. But, when we came to replace them, we took advantage of the expansive provisions of the treaty supposedly limiting naval armaments, and designed our replacements for 1,500 tons. The destroyer leaders we had needed so badly for years were designed for 1,850 tons and, when they were completed, we decided to form them into divisions while, in the latest organization plan, we show the smaller class in the position of leader for one of our future squadrons. Grant that we have not got sufficient new destroyers to be led by the nine leaders we have already completed, that does not alter the fact that our organization policy seems to take into consideration the use of the leaders by divisions. The additional fact that we do not classify the 1,850-ton ships as leaders but as destroyers is further proof of our intention to use them for a purpose for which, so far as can be determined, they were not designed. Of course, it is realized that the construction of eight leaders at once was a necessary move as the funds were available then and might not have been later. However, that does not prevent a different policy in the future.
One would think, studying destroyer design in the United States and abroad, that designers were floundering around out of their depths. There appears to be little logic behind the designs which are being produced. It is reasonable that Poland and Yugoslavia might produce the Grom and Dubrovnik which, while officially classified as destroyers, are in fact, to those countries, the closest approach to light cruisers which their budgetary positions permit them. The French Mogador and Fantasque (an appropriate name, incidentally) may even be understood for these ships are closer approaches to light cruisers than they are to the destroyer type and they would have to be met by cruisers. The British “Tribal” class, however, and our own Porter class are more confounding. The destroyer type in the American and British navies should stick to its primary objective and not go delving into the realm of other types. The fact that we had the permissible tonnage does not warrant its development into a type which does not fit in completely with the fleet organization.
Let us agree that naval progress since the war necessitated a slightly larger destroyer than the 1,200-ton ships we constructed at that time. On them we mounted four 4-inch guns and on some even four 5-inch. The new destroyers of the Farragut class mounted five 5-inch but only eight tubes capable, however, of use on either broadside. The Mahan class continued the same number of guns and mounted a larger number of tubes some of which were limited to use on one side only. In the Gridley class we find the number of guns reduced to four and the tubes distributed in two different arrangements in the various ships which make up this general class. Press announcements indicate that destroyers under construction will be of from 1,600 to 1,700 tons and rumor has it they may mount as many as 16 tubes and, supposedly, with the increased displacement, revert to the 5 guns carried by the Farragut and Mahan classes. How the guns will be mounted has not been announced, so it cannot be foretold whether the same difficulties of servicing the No. 3 gun will be encountered as are experienced in all classes which have a gun placed amidships.
The Porter and Somers classes of 1,850 tons carry eight 5-inch guns and 8 or 12 tubes. The guns are paired and are concentrated at the extremities of the ships. The arrangement of the armament is satisfactory but the necessity for so strong a gun power is questionable. The British Tribal” class is stated to mount seven (some authorities state eight) 4.7-inch guns with a very weak torpedo armament. The point is, have we not lost sight of the primary purpose of the destroyer in the designs of these unauthentic types? By concentrating so much fire power in one ship (the 15-gun cruisers are another example of this fallacy) we are not necessarily increasing the strength of the ships and we are destroying the ability of the ships to take their rightful places in the battle line. The presence of these ships with the fleet does not give us a supporting line since their gun armament is of the same size as the lighter destroyers. In this feature, the French Mogador is a better considered type since it mounts 5.5-inch guns, heavier than those with which the lighter destroyers are armed and, consequently, useful as supports to the smaller types. But the presence of a new type (and so we must consider the heavy destroyer) complicates tactics and brings into being specialized types which are not advisable if, indeed, the need for such specialized functions as they would perform can be supported. The destroyer (or any type, in fact) should be capable of fulfilling any duty which might be assigned to the type and the design of certain ships within a type for certain duties should be avoided. We need types suitable for general use and it is feared we are getting away from that in our present design trends.
Some years ago when our need for destroyer leaders was so pressing, there were advocates of 6-inch guns for such vessels. Had we followed those suggestions we might have developed a type similar to the French Mogadors but still further from the legitimate destroyer type than are our Porters. The presence of a differently gunned class with our destroyer squadrons complicates the ammunition supply problem and the necessity for such heavily gunned leaders cannot be upheld. After all, the primary purpose of the leader is to lead, and the only requirement is adequate quarters for the squadron commander and his staff. Greater gun power is not required to fulfill the duties of the type. However, a torpedo armament equal to the regular destroyers should certainly be mounted on the leaders. It has been stated that if maximum results are to be obtained from the destroyers in the future, torpedoes must be used in much greater quantity than they were at Jutland. The torpedo is the main weapon of the destroyer and our designs should recognize this.
The current trend is toward greater displacement for all types. It has been termed “the law of ship expansion” but it is a dangerous law. Particularly is it a dangerous law where destroyers are concerned. Increased size makes the type more vulnerable to gunfire during the approach to the point where the torpedoes may be launched with the maximum assurance of being effective. We have removed the tubes from our cruisers and the reasons for doing so include the inability of modern cruisers to come within striking distance without drawing a withering enemy fire. If destroyer sizes are to continue to increase, they will be equally unable to carry out their task. There can be no justification for the further enlargement of the destroyer unless it be pride in possessing the largest and that is a false doctrine upon which to design our naval defense. The destroyer, of all types, must be limited in size if its duties are to be fulfilled. The modern large destroyer is no longer a torpedo boat, and in rendering the type capable of fulfilling many of the duties of the cruiser the true function of the type has been so lost to view that its ability to make an effective torpedo attack is questioned.
Speed in a destroyer must be based on certain fairly evident requirements. Among these is the ability to leave the battle line, deliver its attack, and return to its position in the battle line while the rest of the fleet is proceeding ahead. Considering the speeds which have been given to other types, the present designed speed of our destroyers does not seem excessive. It is true that speed in a warship is not an end in itself and that it is only valuable so far as it helps the ship better to perform its mission. Speed for destroyers has not always been as valuable as the ability to move stealthily and to avoid observation. The ability to deliver a surprise attack by virtue of high speed should not, however, be overlooked.
It would be possible to continue this discussion of destroyers for considerably greater length but this does not seem necessary. It is believed that sufficient has been written to permit summarizing and an attempt to determine the characteristics which should govern our future construction of this type.
The destroyer of the future should be limited in size to the minimum which can embody the essential characteristics. It should be capable of maintaining approximately its top speed in average sea conditions, and be designed to minimize observation from enemy vessels. The essential characteristics would appear to include a sufficient armament to meet similar enemy craft and 5-inch guns are therefore adequate. Inasmuch as 5 guns involve difficulties of ammunition supply, 4 guns per ship seem to be sufficient. In order to reduce bridge heights, the guns should be paired fore and aft and completely housed if such housing does not seriously reduce the rapidity of training and rate of fire. Such guns should, of course, be dual purpose weapons and supplemented by multiple guns for anti-aircraft use. The torpedo armament should be the heaviest which can be carried on the permissible tonnage but would probably consist of at least 16 tubes in quadruple mounts. In this connection, consideration might be given to the quintuple mount with banks of 3 and 2 tubes, respectively, which would reduce deck space consumed by the mounts. Inasmuch as reloading of tubes in battle would be practically an impossible feat, provision for reserve torpedoes appears unwarranted but the need for a large number of tubes is more forcibly impressed. The torpedo storage racks on the Porter class would seem to be a wasteful procedure and, since they are on deck, the torpedoes stored there might be badly damaged in a heavy sea. The tube crews should be protected from machine gun fire as well as possible within the limitations of the weights to be disposed of.
The leaders of the destroyers described should be merely sufficiently enlarged editions of the same general type to allow the inclusion of the necessary additional quarters and other facilities required by the squadron commander and his staff. While we are permitted to build such vessels up to 3,000 tons and to arm them with up to 6.1-inch guns, such ships are not required and do not properly fit into the destroyer organization.
It is believed that the vessels which have been outlined would be entirely capable of fulfilling the functions of the type, which must of necessity include: ability to attack with torpedoes, their primary weapon; screen the battle line against attack from enemy destroyers, submarines, and airplanes; and offer a certain amount of support to the scouting line while, within the limitations of the type, assisting in the procurement of information. It is further believed that limiting destroyers to a size not greater, and if possible smaller, than those which are projected for our own Navy, would restore the type to its proper sphere.
Submarines.—There is less need for discussion of this type than of almost any other in the navies of the world. The gigantic white elephants which were constructed a few years ago have given place to conservative types capable of better fulfilling the duties required of this class of naval vessel. Progress in design has made it possible to construct a much smaller vessel than was the vogue just after the last war and embody in it most of the legitimate characteristics of the large cruiser-submarines then built. Numbers are of greater importance than size in this type and a limit of 1,500 tons makes it economically possible to construct a greater number of vessels which can better fulfill the required functions. Certain of our submarines could be of even smaller size than that mentioned. Further consideration should, however, be given to the design of mine-laying submarines as the presence of only one such craft in our entire fleet is insufficient. At least some of the submarines attached to the Asiatic Fleet should be capable of operating as mine layers. This capability would enhance their chances of being of real value m case of war with a Far Eastern power. Acting independently after the outbreak of war they would be in a position to work great havoc.
The submarine of the future should be limited to a vessel of medium size, carrying at least 6 tubes (except when fitted as a mine layer), and a light gun for use against aircraft. Its speed should permit its operation with the fleet but need not be as high as the speeds which we attempted to attain in earlier submersibles. It is believed that our submarine policy at the present time offers less reason for criticism than that covering other combatant types.
Escort and patrol ships and mine layers.—These types may be dismissed with brief comment but since they are so closely related to the other more important types, they should receive attention in this study. In the past we have relied upon the destroyer for escort duty both with the fleet and for convoy work. If possible, we should continue this policy but it may be that it will be impracticable to furnish sufficient destroyers for both duties. It might, therefore, be advisable to develop a special vessel for convoy duty while still concentrating on the destroyer for fleet escort duties. The escort ships which are being developed abroad would not be capable of being incorporated into our fleet organization as substitute destroyers and should, consequently, be limited to merchant ship convoy duty. Inasmuch as such ships could fulfill no legitimate peacetime function, it is believed that the patrol ship or gunboat would be a more suitable escort vessel and, treaty restrictions notwithstanding, such vessels could be designed to fill the peace-time need for protective vessels of reasonably sound construction and the war-time function of convoy escort. Torpedo tubes on such vessels would be of such questionable value as not to warrant their provision. The ability to carry at least one plane each must be considered as a weighty argument in favor of the patrol ship over a specially-designed light escort ship.
The patrol ships of the future might well mount 5-inch dual purpose guns in place of the 6-inch single purpose guns mounted on the Erie class, for the heavier armament does not permit their engaging vessels larger than destroyers and the dual purpose weapon is of greater general usefulness. They should be capable of carrying depth charges in war time and their speed should equal or possibly exceed by a little that of the latest examples of the type. As numbers are more important than individual size, the tonnage should not exceed that of the Erie class. This type would seem to be a far more useful vessel for general duties than a specially-designed escort ship.
The need for modern light mine layers to replace our old converted destroyers is the only reason why this type receives consideration in this discussion. Specially- designed vessels could better fulfill the required functions of the type and if we find it necessary to provide replacements for our war-built destroyers, there is an equally good argument for replacing the ships of that vintage which are now our only representatives of the mine-layer class. Speed, light dual purpose armament, and ability to approach without being observed should be the principal characteristics of the type.
Trends abroad.—Periodically we are entertained, as Dr. Parkes writes, by the descriptions of extraordinary ships building for various navies. The British, so conservative as a rule, have evolved the anti-aircraft cruiser, besides which the new navy will include the superdestroyer, the fleet gunboat, and motor torpedo boats. These types appear to be vain efforts to reach the moon. Fearful of a repetition of the situation which forced Jellicoe to write concerning the “new and untried methods of warfare,” the British Navy is attempting to solve the problem with new types of ships. In reality, they are not new types but are modern (some not even altogether modern) conceptions of older, tried types. They can fulfill no new functions. The anti-aircraft cruiser is but a concentrated anti-aircraft battery with its control removed from the ships it is intended to protect. The superdestroyer is still a destroyer while the motor torpedo boat has but given greater mobility to the torpedo tubes carried on the earlier destroyers. No matter what types we may design we are still dependent upon the shell and the torpedo to win over our adversaries. The bomb is only a less able type of shell and cannot perform all the functions of the older, better tried projectile. Whether the shell is fired from guns or dropped from airplanes, our defense against it must be similar and whether the torpedo is carried and fired by the superdestroyer or motor torpedo boat, our objective must, on the one hand, be the carrying home of our own attack and, on the other, the prevention of attack by the enemy. It is entirely possible that the present conception of the torpedo carrier may give way to a return to the small, exceedingly fast boats which better embody the basic qualities of the type. The original torpedo boats were, at the time of their construction, ideal examples of the type desired. We have said that naval architecture is an extraordinarily stable art and we need no greater confirmation of this statement than the reversion to small torpedo boats when it is found to be impossible to achieve our purpose with the overgrown craft “the law of ship expansion” forced upon us. But the fact that the present development of the motor torpedo boat is capable of launching a successful torpedo and destroying the largest ship is not evidence that this type is suitable for our Navy.
The Germans once designed their ships without adequate quarters for the crews because they were not intended to remain away from their bases for prolonged periods. Our fleet is a high seas fleet and every ship which is contained in it must be capable of long range and operation in every kind of weather. Consequently, the ships which some navies may find suitable to carry out their tasks, in the peculiar conditions which confront them, are not necessarily the ships which we should build. Even if it were considered feasible to provide a fleet of small motor torpedo boats and the new form of carrier which would be required to transport them to the scene of battle, we could have no guarantee that operation would be possible after arrival upon that scene. Shortly after the war designs of carriers for motor torpedo boats were prepared but none has been built, for the shortcomings of the scheme were too apparent. All other revolutionary break-aways from conventional forms of naval power have, up to the present time, shown similar weaknesses. It behooves us, therefore, to concentrate our attention on better-tried forms of offense and defense and to leave the “extraordinary ships” to the imaginations of the special correspondents who thrive on them.
Conclusions.—This paper has been prepared in an effort to encourage calm consideration of our naval needs. Jellicoe, faced with his terrific responsibilities and with what he considered “new and untried methods of warfare” may have become apprehensive regarding his ability to cope with either. He did not recognize that those methods were nearly as old as the universe but possibly unforeseen by his school of thought. England has been faced with similar problems in recent years and, unprepared for them, has resorted to the dreams which their anti-aircraft cruisers and motor torpedo boats represent. It has been another case of the “jitters,” no doubt, but an easily explained case. As we ourselves were, they had been content to mark time while potential enemies were strengthening themselves. Then came the realization of weakness and a mad desire to remedy that weakness. The steps which have been taken may prove suitable for England; it is doubtful whether they would for us.
The continuing “law of ship expansion” must be discounted as a guarantee of defense. Size may not only not assure strength; it may, in fact, produce weakness. Constantly expanding desires for more and more modern contraptions may not produce the hoped for results. What is suitable to the game board and what may be used with success in the coolness of peace-time maneuvers may well be entirely unsuited to the heat of battle. Our plans for the future should be guided by conservatism and by calmness and if we are sure that individually our items of equipment and the members of our personnel can bear comparison with those of other nations, the outcome of the battles we may fight is fairly certain. Our responsibilities as a world power have brought upon us a heavy burden and we can take no chances concerning our ability to uphold those responsibilities. The “new and untried methods” of other nations should not be ours and we should profit by the lessons of history that attempted revolutionary methods of warfare are not always successful and may be so completely unsuccessful as to destroy the nation which indulges in them. A strong offense must always be the basis of our plans but the concentration of too much power in any individual unit of the fleet may, through the loss of any given unit, result in the destruction of a disproportionate part of our total strength.
The greatest speed, the heaviest armament, the largest ship, must be compensated for by weakness in some other quality. It is by arriving at the proper compromise between these various characteristics and by building accordingly that we shall secure the strongest fleet. Our every thought should be concentrated on the achievement of that objective.