Known Sunk—German Submarine War Losses, 1914-1918

For the German submarines the war of 1914-18 began when on August 4, 1914, Great Britain declared war on Germany; and on August 6, ten of them, of primitive type, set out on a scouting cruise in the North Sea. During the afternoon of August 8 the British battleship Monarch, one of three off Fair Island, was unsuccessfully attacked by U-15 under Richard Pohle; and early the next morning in the fog the submarine was sighted on the surface, apparently with her unreliable heavy-oil engines out of commission, since hammering could be heard. In a position approximately 580-35'N. 01°-56'E. the light cruiser Birmingham fired several 6-inch shells without effect and then at full speed rammed the almost motionless submarine amidships. The two cylindrical halves of U-15 came up astern and floated momentarily, but there were no survivors.

The other submarines returned to their base at Helgoland with the exception of U-13, whose commander, A. von Schweinitz, should have brought her back to port on August 12. Nothing had been heard from her since the 6th; possibly she had some diving accident, or struck a newly laid British mine in the Bight.

Not until November was another submarine lost, although the destroyer Badger ran down U-19 on the night of October 24, forcing her to return home for repairs. On the night of November 22, U-16 and U-18 attempted to enter Scapa Flow, not being aware that the Grand Fleet was not there. Following a steamer to the Hoxa boom, Heinrich von Hennig in U-18 discovered that the warships were absent and turned back. His periscope, however, was sighted by the trawler Tokio; a general search was made by patrol craft, and at 12:20 a.m. on the 23d the trawler Dorothy Gray succeeded in ramming the submarine. Her periscope and hydroplanes were damaged, and she dived at a steep angle, hitting the bottom and then rising suddenly to the surface, where she was rammed again by the destroyer Garry. After another hour submerged, she came to the surface and the crew fired star signals. The Garry came alongside and rescued all of the crew but one, who had remained behind to scuttle the submarine, which sank in 58°-41/N. 02°-55,W. off Muckle Skerry.

On January 13, 1915, three submarines set out for the Thames estuary. One of these, U-31, commanded by Siegfried Wachendorff, disappeared off the East Coast, probably striking a mine. U-22 under Hoppe met a submarine off the Dutch coast on January 21, and fired two recognition signals, neither of which was answered. One torpedo was then fired at this apparently British boat, which disappeared at once. Upon investigating the wreckage, Hoppe picked up the single survivor of U-7, commanded by George Konig, his best friend.

Gradually the British anti-submarine force became more effective, however, and losses were not so much due to accidental causes. Stoch in U-8, starting out from Helgoland, arrived near the northeast Varne Buoy in the Straits of Dover on March 4. At 12:30 p.m. the drifter Rohm observed a line of pellets, marking her nets, proceeding against the tide at a speed of 4 knots. The destroyer watch was notified, and at one o’clock the submarine was sighted by Viking. The search went on, and at five o’clock, after sighting a periscope, the destroyer Gurkha fired her explosive sweep. The stern of U-8 appeared almost immediately, and then the deck of the submarine emerged, although she was in a sinking condition. Gurkha and Maori shelled the conning tower, and several Germans thereupon came out with their hands up. The entire complement was rescued in the 15 minutes before the submarine sank, in 16 fathoms, in 50°-56'N. 01°-15'E.

Two days later, at sunset, a submarine was sighted by an Aberdeen patrol trawler; and on the 8th and the 9th she was seen four times, but dived quickly to avoid her slow pursuers. Finally on the 10th off Fife Ness she was sighted by the destroyers Acheron, Ariel, and Attack, which ran up to her on converging courses. Mack opened fire as the submarine dived, but without success. Two minutes later Ariel observed a periscope 200 yards to starboard and rammed, just as the submarine was breaking surface. Fire was then opened, and the submarine’s deck gun was hit and knocked overboard. Three minutes later the U-12 surrendered, sinking at once. Two officers and eight men were rescued; the commander, Kratzsch, was not among them.

On March 18 came one of the greatest 0 the English victories over the German submarines. At 12:28 p.m. in the North Sea H.M.S. Dreadnought (17,900 tons) sighted a periscope about a mile off the port bow. She at once proceeded at full speed of 17.5 knots to ram the periscope, which seemed to be moving away. It was thought that the submarine was attempting to complete an attack on another line of ships and remained too long at periscope depth; it is also true that there was a certain slowness in diving, peculiar to boats of the U-28 to 30 class. At 12:35 dreadnought rammed the submarine amid- ships on the starboard quarter. Her bows came up at an angle of 60 degrees and then nothing could be seen but some wreckage and an oil patch. There were no survivors, but the number U-29 was observed painted large on the bows. Her commander was Otto von Weddigen, one of the most successful of the German captains, who had sunk four cruisers.

These early losses have been narrated with some detail because to some extent they are typical of the entire war; and they also represent the rather successful solution of an entirely new problem. While in the years just before the war it had been foreseen that Germany would make use of submarines, her amazing success with them could not possibly have been predicted.

In the latter part of 1915, and all through 1916, decoy ships were used, sometimes accompanied by submerged submarines; their victories have been recounted by Campbell and others, and need not be discussed here. It may be said, however, that had they not been introduced with so little confidence, and in such small numbers, they might have accomplished much more.

Careful observation of the submarines’ customary routes, and the placing of mines or submarine patrols across them, resulted in half a dozen sinkings in 1917; and that summer, seaplanes were able to sink another six.

It was not, however, until the United States entered the war that the tide was really turned. The primary cause of the submarines’ failure, the introduction of a general convoy system in May, 1917, was possible only when the resources of the United States Navy were joined with those of the Allies. From that time until the cessation of submarine warfare, 433 ships were lost in convoy as against 85,772 which arrived safely, while 11 submarines were sunk by the convoy escorts.

Next in importance came the improvement and increased production of depth charges. Two thousand a month were being used in late 1918, compared with about a quarter of that number the year before, and twice as many submarines were being sunk with them (cf. Doughty in U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March, 1935). The hydrophone force, organized in June, 1917, was also of great assistance; submarines could no longer escape merely by submerging. In the case of UC-49, the submarine was heard below a group of patrols, one of which went noisily away; the UC-49 waited 17 minutes more and then came up, only to find herself surrounded, and when she dived again she was depth charged out of existence.

Another effective agent was the 650- pound Mark H2 mine, available after August, 1917, which was extremely efficient, especially compared with the older type which customarily exploded one time in three. Approximately 12,000 of these mines were laid before the end of 1917, resulting at once in nine or ten losses.

And with these mines it was possible to block the Straits of Dover, an operation which the Admiralty had wished to undertake since 1914. The first section was laid on-November 21, 1917, and on December 19, about midnight, the UB-56 struck a mine and was sunk. From that time on, the barrage gradually increased in importance, until finally most of the smaller U-boats confined their activities to the North Sea. Seventeen submarines in all were blown up by these mines or depth charged by the tireless drifter patrol.

One of the most interesting of the sinkings in the Dover Barrage took place in April, 1918. The UB-55 left Zeebrugge on the evening of April 21, and in the darkness she was trying to pass through the Straits on the surface, near the Varne Shoal; but sighting a patrol ahead at 4:10 a.m. her commander, Ralph Wenninger, ordered a dive to 40 feet. Just as she steadied at this level, her stern struck a mine to starboard; a violent explosion occurred, the lights went out, and water poured into the torpedo compartment. The crew was ordered forward in an attempt to restore trim, but water rose in the motor compartment, and the leaking wreck dropped to the bottom in 80 feet. The lights came on again, but gradually the water rose inside to a depth of 3 feet, and several men, losing hope, drowned themselves. Others put pistols to their heads, only to find the powder too damp to fire. Finally, when the pressure within equalled that without, Wenninger and 21 others got out; 6 of them, including the commander, were picked up at dawn by the drifters Shipmates and Seaflower, which had been searching the area since the time of the explosion. Oil from the wreck, in 51°-01’N. 01°-20,E. came up until noon, while another explosion, with oil coming up, was observed about a mile to the southwest at 8:30 a.m.; depth charges which were dropped produced no effect.

The next day (23d) at 11:45 a.m. in St. George’s Channel, the American destroyer Cushing sighted an oil track from a submarine and proceeded to drop depth charges for half an hour, in 51°-29,N. 06°-23'W. The only result evident was the killing of thousands of fish. But at 1:45 a.m of April 25, the British sloop Jessamine came upon a submarine motionless on the surface in 51°-59/N. 06°-26,W. The submarine headed away and was able to get her periscope under just in time to avoid being rammed, reaching a depth of 98 feet before the first depth charge, set to 100 feet, exploded some distance away, causing no damage, but forcing the bow up. The submarine then went full speed astern in order to dive deeper, but the second charge, set to 150 feet, exploded quite close, forcing the stern down at a steeper angle; and water began to pour into the motor room. To observers on the Jessamine she seemed to rise up in the water and split open. When the third depth charge went off, an attempt was made to blow the tanks, but only the forward tanks could be emptied. The bow went up still higher, and the depth gauge forward registered 33 feet. At this point the men in the forward compartment opened the torpedo hatch and attempted to escape. The Jessamine observed a large disturbance in the water 200 yards away and fired a shot into it. Cries for help were then heard (apparently from several men) and the ship turned at high speed to rescue survivors, but only one could be found. Od was seen coming up, and two more depth charges were dropped, to 200 feet, the survivor reported that a depth charge attack by American destroyers had opened UP the seams of the submarine, the U-104 under Kurt Bernis, and that the crew had been trying to calk them when surprised by the sloop in the darkness. He said that be had been asleep in his bunk when he was shaken by an explosion; then the submarine seemed to stand on end, and the next moment he felt the pressure of water in his ears.

An interesting sequence, or rather group of sequences, of events took place in May. The outcome, it may be said, was in no small measure due to the superior caliber of the British Naval Intelligence. It will be remembered that during the latter part of the war it was customary for divers to famine the German submarines sunk off the British coast; documents of great interest and value were frequently found, deluding code books, charts, and arrangements for meetings.

Early in May papers were recovered which gave notice of such a meeting. On May 2 the UB-31 and the UC-78, trying to get through the Straits of Dover, were destroyed by mines and depth charges, fud from one of them was brought up the ^formation that on May 11 the submarines U-153 and U-154 were to meet off the Spanish coast in 36°-45'N. 12-00'W. At Gibraltar E-35 received her orders by wireless and was waiting submerged at the rendezvous before either of the Germans arrived. At four o’clock in the afternoon the U-154 under Hermann Gercke arrived and started her patrol while waiting for her companion. Her frequent change of course completely upset the calculations of E-35, and it was not until 6:18 that a torpedo was fired. Because of the heavy sea it passed under. At 6:25 two more torpedoes, aimed at bow and stern, were fired at 500 yards. Both hit; one caused a violent detonation which put out the lights in E-35; the other with little noise threw up a very high column of water. In the lake of oil three or four survivors were sighted clinging to some woodwork, and E-35 moved towards them to pick them up; but suddenly 2 miles away appeared U-153, firing a torpedo which missed. E-35 dived at once and left the scene. U-153, after wirelessing to U-62 (which had arranged the night before to join the submarine cruisers and receive their surplus oil and torpedoes) that enemy submarines were at the rendezvous, also dived and proceeded homeward. The three or four men had meanwhile been unable to keep above water.

The Germans, too, had been collecting information, especially about the workings of the convoy system; by May 10 eight submarines had arrived in the western part of the Channel; and about midnight on the 11th U-43, U-70, U-92, and U-103 were making for the entrance to the Channel. Claus Rucker in U-103 had been detailed to intercept the transport Olympic at her position at four o’clock on the morning of the 12th, and at about 3:30 he had arrived at an attacking position; but his incompetent crew, apparently intent only on their special pancake breakfast, had not prepared the torpedoes in the after tubes. Trying again, he proceeded at top speed just below the surface, but the U-103 was allowed to lose trim and come up at 3:53; and in 49°-16'N. 04°-51’W. She was sighted, half a mile away against the light in the east, by the Olympic, which, firing one round which went over, altered course to ram. The submarine tried to escape by turning at full speed inside the circle of the Olympic, but at 3:55 the transport swung into her and, passing over, ripped open her control-room with a propeller. Tanks were blown, and the U-103 was able to keep afloat temporarily by going slowly ahead while the interior rapidly filled with oil and water. White Very stars were shot up but not understood by the escorting American destroyer Davis, which had turned back, fearing a destroyer had been rammed. Finally at 4:12 distress rockets sprayed the black sky, and a blinker appeal for aid was caught by the Davis, which soon located the sinking submarine by searchlight. The crew jumped off the deck and swam to floats dropped by the destroyer, and 4 officers and 31 men were picked up. One officer and eight men drowned, while the submarine sank stern first at 4:28. The Davis started back to Queenstown, and at 7:00 a.m. depth charged an oil track, without much success. When the first charge went off, the U-103's officers, according to a junior officer, “all started, and every one looked up at the clock, then at each other.” Evidently this submarine operation had been planned very completely.

But plans do not always work out perfectly; the U-103 had failed in its duty, and success depended on the UB-72, waiting in the east where the Olympic was due at eight o’clock. She had been sighted, however, about midnight to the westward of this position, and the British D-4 had set out to find her. Proceeding to the eight o’clock position of 50°-08'N. 02°-41'W., she arrived submerged at 4:30 and sighted the German boat moving south on the surface at a very low rate of speed. Trager and his officers were standing on the conning tower, looking westward through binoculars. Five minutes later the UB-72 altered course towards D-4, which lowered her periscope and then lost sight of the enemy until 4:43. After getting into position, D-4 waited for the enemy to come across her bows; and at 4:50 fired two torpedoes at 600 yards range. These hit bow and stern, and when D-4 came to the surface nothing was left of the German but a pool of oil with 3 men swimming in it. After they were picked up, one who could speak English inquired why they had been rescued; all submarines, he said, had been warned that the British always hanged survivors as pirates.

The Northern Barrage Immediately after the United States entered the war, in April, 1917, plans were made for a barrage of mines to inclose the North Sea. The mines at the disposal of the British Admiralty, even the notably efficient Mark H2 type, were not adequate for such a great undertaking, chiefly because of their low rate of production. By July, 1917, however, a new American mine known as Mark VI was perfected and ready for manufacture in large quantities. It was exploded electrically by the presence of a steel body in the vicinity while others were all detonated by percussion; and with the quantity production methods in the United States it could be manufactured rapidly and in great numbers. Conferences with the British were held during the summer; and on August 23 the Admiralty approved the plan. It was too late in the year to lay mines in northern waters; so during the winter the mines were manufactured and shipped in the spring to the laying bases in the north of Scotland.

The Northern Barrage as finally constructed consisted of three areas:

Area B, from a point 10 miles east of the Orkneys to 00°-50' W. (mostly American mines)

Area A, from 00°-50'W. 134 miles ENE. to 03°-10'E. (all American mines)

Area C, from 03°-10'E. 60 miles ESE. to Norwegian waters (half British, half American mines).

The barrage was begun on June 8, 1918, when deep British mines in Area C and surface American mines in Area A were laid; and similar excursions were made about every two weeks from then on. On July 9 the U-86, bound home, was attempting to cross Area A on the surface and was badly damaged. Her wireless report to Helgoland was intercepted and British destroyers were sent to attack her; hut she was able to make enough speed to reach harbor safely. After this the submarines passed near the Orkneys or through Norwegian territorial waters. On August 10 the outward-bound U-113 was similarly damaged and forced to turn back.

For some time, because it was possible that the Grand Fleet might need to pass through Area B, no mining activities took place there; and the submarines passed through without danger during the summer. But in September it was decided that the much less critical situation made it possible to mine this area; and the first excursion was planned as a surprise, neutral nations not being officially notified, but shipping being secretly warned. Just before the mine laying began on September 7, a large convoy was sent across the area to deceive any observing submarines; then the work began. Both British and Americans laid mines, deep as well as surface, and the area was heavily patrolled in order to keep the submarines submerged.

Two days later the U-92, outward hound under G. Ehrlich, struck a mine in this area while traveling submerged. There were no survivors. Another submarine was badly damaged the same day and forced to return home.

On the 10th UB-83 under H. Buntebardt was on her way out to pass through Area B when, it is said, she heard mines exploding in the barrage and believed that she was being heavily depth charged. Whether or not this is true (13 per cent of the mines laid on September 7 exploded prematurely) her conning tower was sighted in a small oil patch at 6:20 a.m. by the kite balloon over the destroyer Ophelia, 4,000 yards away. The Ophelia at once headed for the submarine, which submerged, and dropped three depth charges set for 200 feet. Four minutes later a violent underwater explosion was reported by the balloon, and thick oil came to the surface. At 7:25 a fourth depth charge was dropped. The Peyton came up and watched the rising oil until twelve o’clock; nothing else was seen; the submarine was destroyed in 58°-28'N. 01°-50,W.

Sometime between the 9th and the 20th the UB-127 under W. Scheffler, which had set out in company with U-92 on the 4th, struck a mine at the western end of Area B. During the second mine-laying excursion in that area, on the 20th, two bodies which were observed floating in the water were identified as German seamen by the type of life belt they wore. During the sweeping of Group 9, Area B, in June, 1919, two sweepers’ wires fouled the sunken wreck and oil came to the surface.

T. Bieber brought the UB-104 safely through the barrage after leaving Zee- brugge on September 6; but homeward bound he seems to have tried to pass between Area A and Area B, with the result that running into the mine field on September 19 he perished with all his crew.

There is apparently some doubt as to the date on which U-156, on her way home from America, was destroyed. The American tradition that “about November 15, 1918, she struck a mine and sank in a short time,” 21 survivors being landed on the Norwegian coast, not only lacks evidence, but also is discredited by the fact that the U-156 set out on June 16; the longest cruise made by a submarine of her type lasted three months. This time limit also invalidates the report of a prisoner on the U-140, a Belgian named Bastin, who stated that the U-140 passed through the barrage on October 22 in company with U-117, U-100, U-102, and U-156, the last of which was destroyed—“blown 500 feet in the air.” The oil shortage of the U-117 and U-140 which he describes is, however, substantiated by German authorities; but the presence of U-102 also seems impossible, because she set out for her cruise on September 2, and for submarines of her type the customary cruise length was from three weeks to a month. The British records seem reliable which state that the U-156 was lost in the mines of Area A on September 25 and U-102 in the same area on September 28. It is believed that the wreck of U-102, commanded by Kurt Beitzen, who in U-75 had laid the mines which sank the Hampshire with Lord Kitchener, lies on the bottom of the North Sea in 59°-21'N. 00°-55'E. The commander of the U-156 was Richard Feldt.

After these losses the submarines for a short period went in and out through Norwegian territorial waters, one of them even firing on a Norwegian vessel; but on September 29 announcement was made that mines would be laid around Udsire Island, thus completing the barrage to the east. These mines were all laid by .October 7.

The last submarine to be lost in the barrage was the UB-123 under R. Kamm. She was homeward bound from a cruise which had begun on September 27, and was destroyed on October 19 in a new mine field which had been laid by the British on the surface off the Orkneys on October 11.

Until the Armistice the submarines used a passage which had been discovered in the eastern part of Area A, and the Allies had made plans for a last mining excursion to fill up the gaps; but the imminent cessation of hostilities made this unnecessary.

Tabular List of Sinkings