The operations of the Japanese naval landing force at Shanghai during the period January-March, 1932, form interesting and important chapter in e history of the Japanese Navy. This first major land operation of the modern Japanese Navy not only aroused intense interest among the commissioned and enlisted personnel of the entire naval forces at that time, but is still studied and discussed in naval magazines and in wardrooms of the Fleet. It is difficult to overemphasize the influence that these operations have had on Japanese naval lading force training and tactics, and in spite of the fact that there were many aspects of the fighting in the streets of Chapei and Hongkew which were quite different from landing force operations as they are usually considered, it cannot be doubted that the lessons learned have had a considerable effect on later similar operations. Japanese officers admit that they earned many valuable lessons and state that the Japanese Navy has no intention repeating the mistakes which were made at that time, and it is evident that these lessons have been well learned in view of the fact that in 1937 a comparatively small naval landing force was able to defend itself for more than ten days against three of the best-trained divisions of the Chinese Army.
The Japanese naval landing party at Shanghai dates from the spring of 1927, as do the British and American units of the defense force of the International Settlement. Thus in 1932 the landing party of approximately 1,700 officers and men, commanded by a captain, had been stationed in the area for almost five years. Since there is no marine corps in the Japanese Navy, the force was made up of naval officers and bluejackets who had received special instruction and training in land operations prior to their assignment to duty in Shanghai. This preparatory training consisted of approximately six months’ instruction in close and extended order drill, cross-country marches, field work, instruction and range firing of machine guns, rifles, and pistols, and intensive bayonet and sword drill. The organization of the landing force was similar to that of units of the Japanese Army, and the equipment except for uniforms was also patterned after army equipment.
The general duties of this force were the same as those of the other international forces stationed in Shanghai, and were set forth in the joint international defense plan of the International Settlement. This plan was drawn up on the assumption that it might be necessary for the international forces to act in concert to defend the Settlement from a hostile Chinese army. Under the plan the Japanese were assigned the Hongkew and Yangtzepoo sections, which is the area where most of the Japanese nationals live, and it cannot be doubted that the force was capable and ready for their assigned duties, since they had with characteristic thoroughness conducted frequent exercises in the area and were entirely familiar with the problems involved in defending their sector. However, as the following brief discussion will show, the situation which developed was quite different from any which had been contemplated under the joint defense plan or by the Japanese command.
The general political situation which existed in 1931-32 in the Far East is well known. The Japanese Army had in September, 1931, launched a campaign in Manchuria which, in the comparatively short space of six months, ended in Japan’s gaining complete control of China’s three northeastern provinces. This aggressive action on Japan’s part aroused strong anti-Japanese feeling throughout China, especially in the metropolitan areas of Shanghai and Canton. Patriotic Chinese organized societies for the purpose of boycotting the Japanese and compelling Chinese merchants to refrain from using or dealing in Japanese goods, under threat of seizure and imprisonment. From the Japanese viewpoint this was bad enough, but when the movement took the form of violent outbreaks against Japanese residents and attacks on Japanese citizens, they began to consider the situation as critical.
Early in January, 1932, a Chinese newspaper in Shanghai made derogatory references to the Japanese Emperor, a few days later five Japanese priests were attacked on the streets, and shortly after that a street fight took place between Japanese civilians and Chinese police in which there were several wounded on both sides. These clashes so alarmed the Japanese residents and authorities that demands were made on the Mayor of Greater Shanghai that all anti-Japanese activities cease and that the Chinese garrison of Chapei which adjoins Hongkew be withdrawn. In this tense atmosphere the Japanese residents association met on January 25 and demanded that the Japanese naval force in Shanghai do something to protect them, adding that if the commander did nothing they would act themselves and if this failed they would request the home government to send army units to Shanghai. The chairman of the association pointed out that the Army was having no difficulty in protecting Japanese rights and interests in Manchuria and implied that the Japanese citizens in Shanghai questioned the ability and the intentions of the Navy to afford them the same protection.
As a result of this pressure the Japanese Consul General after consulting with the naval commander delivered an ultimatum to the Chinese Mayor on January 27, and in spite of the fact that all of the demands were accepted the commander of the naval force decided to act and issued orders for his men to take their defense stations at midnight. At the same time he issued a proclamation saying that he was very apprehensive in regard to the situation in Chapei where there were many Japanese nationals, that he had decided to send his forces into the area to enforce law an order, that he hoped that the Chinese troops would withdraw to the west of the Shanghai-Woosung railway and that a Chinese defenses in the area should be removed. However, this proclamation did not reach the Chinese until a few minutes before the troops began to move. Later an attempt was made to excuse this action by explaining that the Japanese force had taken stations as a result of the declaration of an “emergency” by the Shanghai Municipal Council, and that the other defense forces were already on station, but there can be no doubt that the Japanese naval commander’s intentions were as stated in his proclamation, and had no connection with the action taken by the other defense forces. It is also true that the hand of the naval commander had been forced by the local civilian populace.
In spite of this hostile declaration, the Japanese appear to have had no definite plan except to attempt with 2,500 men to occupy an area in the Chinese city where there were stationed approximately 10,000 Chinese troops of the 19th Route Army’ which could be easily and quickly supported by as many more.
The area held by the Chinese troops was a thickly-populated metropolitan district completely built up, and by its nature very easily defended. On the other hand any attacking force would be compelled to move through streets or buildings, a difficult undertaking for a force without heavy artillery. And finally, the area to be attacked was adjacent to a great international city occupied by thousands of foreign residents whose safety must be considered. The need to avoid damaging the settlement south of the narrow Soochow Creek, and the necessity to avoid becoming involved with these other defense forces had to be considered constantly. Also the Japanese command appears to have had no definite information as to the moral strength and location of the Chinese units. The truth is that the Japanese commander, the officers and men of the landing party, as well as the Japanese residents believed that the Chinese would immediately withdraw from the designated areas without offering any resistance whatever. Thus, shortly before midnight on January 28, the landing force was mustered at the Japanese naval headquarters and, in the presence of almost the entire Japanese civilian populace who had gathered to witness the occupation of Chapei, began to advance along North Szechuan road which runs almost parallel to the Shanghai-Woosung railway.
At each street and alleyway entrance leading west from North Szechuan Road small parties of bluejackets and civilians detached themselves from the main body and waited for a prearranged signal on which all parties were to move in the direction of the railway. Many of these parties were accompanied by photographers and cheering civilians. The signal was given and the advance started but after the leading units had moved westward only a few blocks and were approaching the boundary lines between the settlement and Chinese territory they were met by heavy machine-gun fire from Chinese sentinels who had been stationed along the boundary. In this way the “Shanghai Incident of 1932,” which was to cost the Japanese government 50,000,000 yen and several thousand lives, and the Japanese, Chinese, and foreign residents of Shanghai many times that amount in loss of property and trade, was started.
The resistance of the Chinese found the Japanese almost totally unprepared and all along the line and in every street and alley in the thickly settled area there was the utmost confusion. In some cases the officers in command of the parties who were leading their detachments were killed or disabled by the first volleys. In other detachments where the men were at once instructed to take cover all coordination and unity was lost in the darkness. The unit commanders did not know where their supporting and adjacent units were, and were not entirely sure of where the Chinese were. Since there was no concrete plan of attack, each detachment on finding itself unable to advance further was forced to stop, seek cover, and wait. In this general fashion a line was established in the maze of streets, and this line which was fixed two hours after the initial shots were fired remained in general unchanged throughout the fighting, which lasted more than a month.
Although taken by surprise the Japanese recovered quickly and by morning they had succeeded in filling gaps in their lines, landing additional men from the ships in the harbor, covering important points with armored cars, and later “digging in” with sandbags and barbed wire. The ground forces were aided and their somewhat damaged morale raised by the appearance of several seaplanes from an aircraft tender which had arrived a few days before the outbreak of hostilities. These planes began to bomb the city of Chapei and what they thought were the Chinese lines, hoping that they could “blast” the Chinese forces out of the city. There can be no doubt that the bombing attacks did have some effect on the morale of the Chinese and that Chinese losses as a result were considerable, but in no sense did it produce the desired result, although the Chinese had no antiaircraft guns and not much knowledge of protection against aircraft.
As soon as the line was established in Chapei and the Japanese landing party had settled down to a period of trench warfare against a foe which did not take the offensive, a new and unexpected menace appeared in the form of plain clothes snipers and gunmen behind their lines. Since the population of the Hongkew and Yangtzepoo areas is largely Chinese and since the lines did not extend to the northern and eastern districts of the settlement, Chinese snipers appeared in all sections of the area and began to hamper Japanese operations in innumerable ways.
Chinese plain clothes soldiers have been a part of their armies for many years. They were effective in 1926-27 during the march of the Nationalist armies from Canton to North China, and have been used in the same way by Chinese Communist armies since then. While the most useful work of these plain clothes soldiers is as intelligence agents and spies they are also used as propagandists and as guerrillas. As such they can and do increase the problems of the enemy forces by cutting communication lines, attacking isolated posts, and making guard and sentinel duty infinitely harder. This was the case at Shanghai in 1932 where three types of these plain clothes soldiers appeared to hinder the Japanese.
The first type were regular soldiers who volunteered for this hazardous duty behind the Japanese lines. If they were sent on intelligence duty they were unarmed and usually acted alone, but if their mission was to attack specific Japanese posts they operated in groups of from five to ten men, approached the rear of the Japanese lines as closely as possible, an hiding in buildings, fired on every Japanese who exposed himself. These men were, according to Japanese reports’ brave to the point of being reckless an foolhardy and were undoubtedly the most troublesome of all of the plain clothes men. The second class were students or laborers who as patriotic Chinese acted largely on their own initiative and tried to injure the Japanese in any way possible. In general these were young men or women (some 20 young Chinese women were captured by the Japanese during the course of the action) of fair education, and although untrained were daring and resourceful in working behind the lines. The third class of plain clothes men were professional gunmen or mercenaries who for $3.00 a night would take part in any enterprise which appeared to show prospects of profit. Groups of these men acted under the orders of the 19th Route Army commanders, some were hired by Chinese patriotic societies, and others were desperate characters who took advantage of the disturbed conditions to shoot, kill, and rob Japanese bluejackets or civilians.
The numbers of these plain clothes soldiers varied from time to time, but there were probably as many as 400 regular soldiers and 200 volunteers operating in the Hongkew and Yangtzepod areas during most of the fighting. Some of the groups were organized under regular leaders and conducted well-planned attacks on outposts, headquarters, mills, storehouses, and even hospitals. Their activities were such a menace to the Japanese that during the first two weeks almost one fourth of the Japanese force was engaged in patrolling the rear of the lines both day and night, and clearing houses and buildings of snipers.
However, even though the Japanese
divided their forces, and took every possible precaution, many casualties and much damage resulted from these operations, and the morale of front-line Japanese units suffered heavily, particularly at first. It is not too much to say that the most important offensive actions taken by Chinese forces during the whole “Shanghai incident” were taken by these irregulars, and that if their attacks, which were the only attacks worthy of the name, had been co-ordinated and timed with offensives by the Chinese troops in Chapei, the Japanese positions and lines could have been very seriously threatened. The Japanese tried to offset these activities as much as possible by arming their own civilians in Hongkew, with the result that the whole area was filled with the unofficial and ununiformed “soldiers” of both sides. Under these circumstances it is only natural that grave excesses were committed by both undisciplined groups.
After the Chapei front had been established and strengthened, and the rear areas cleared of the first groups of plain clothes soldiers and snipers, a general plan of operations was formulated for the first time. It was considered that any offensive motion by the Chinese troops was most unlikely, but on the other hand their defensive positions were being strengthened rapidly, so if a general attack were to succeed it must be made as quickly as possible. Preparations were completed on February 3, and the whole landing party, now re-enforced to almost 6,000 men by the landing forces from ships that had been rushed to Shanghai, attempted an advance. As is usual in Japanese operations the attack was to be a night surprise attack, beginning shortly after midnight, and had as its objective the Shanghai- Woosung railway line. This attack was, however, beaten back with considerable loss, the only gains made being of a minor nature in places where there had been salients in the Chinese lines.
The failure discouraged the Japanese naval commander and he was probably even further discouraged by instructions that his force was to remain on the defensive in the future. This decision had been reached in Tokyo after a survey of the situation had been made by several officers of the Army General Staff who had been sent to Shanghai to make an estimate of the situation. They saw that the naval landing party had got themselves into a difficult position, and that the strong and stubborn Chinese force in Chapei could not be driven out of the city by a frontal attack without considerable loss to the attackers. Therefore it was recommended that at least one army division be sent to complete the work of driving the Chinese away, and that until they arrived the naval landing party must be content to hold the Chapei line. Actually this did not prove to be a difficult task since the Chinese were without artillery, tanks, or other modern equipment, and were content to remain entirely on the defensive except in very limited areas and for brief periods. Later minor attacks were launched by the naval landing party in conjunction with the 9th Army Division on February 29, and these were continued until the Chinese withdrew from Chapei on March 23, and the landing party occupied the area. The withdrawal of the Chinese was, however, not caused by attacks from the Hongkew sector but by the threat to their flank and rear which resulted from additional landings which the Japanese Army made at Liuho on the south bank of the Yangtze River.
This in brief outline was the action of the Japanese naval landing party at Shanghai in 1932. Although the accomplishments were small and the results almost entirely negative since the army “won the war,” the five weeks fighting against an enemy which employed only defensive tactics gave both officers and men experience in actual combat which was very valuable. Opportunity was afforded to display the “spirit of the offensive” to the fullest extent, to develop various methods of making and co-ordinating attacks, and to test material and personnel in the field.
- As a result of this “incident” the landing force in Shanghai was completely reorganized so that it could be greatly expanded without any change in fundamental organization. During the five weeks of fighting it had been necessary to send re-enforcements several times, and about ten days after the affair started a rear admiral had been placed in command of the whole force. It was found that this shift in command in the midst of the operation was attended with considerable disorder due to the unfamiliarity of the new commander and his staff with the situation. It was decided that this need to double or triple the forces could have been foreseen, and that in the future an experienced officer of high enough rank to retain command would be selected for the duty in time of peace, so that in the event of hostilities it would not be necessary to change the commander and his staff. In the same way it was learned that it is well to have the skeleton organization of several additional battalions or companies which could be brought up to war strength quickly, and which could thus function under capable officers who were on the spot. While this plan necessitates an organization which may be overstaffed for normal peace-time needs, the results are worth it.
- Both officers and men selected for duty ashore must be carefully chosen, and well trained. Officers selected must be of such character as to inspire complete confidence in their men since “the success of any shore operation depends as much on the character of the leaders as on the orders he issues and the plans he makes.” Normal naval training does not fit an officer or man for landing force duty, so this must be supplemented by special training, particularly to develop initiative- Officers and men must be taught to make decisions quickly and on their own responsibility and must not wait for detailed orders. Drills and exercises must be made as realistic as possible and both officers and men must use their ingenuity to make training simulate actual war conditions- Several platoons of men were lost because they forgot that although three or four small rocks may represent a stone wall in a drill, they do not offer much protection against actual machine-gun fire.
During these drills it is necessary to acquire entire familiarity with all arms and weapons, since their use must be automatic in the heat of action. This also means that men must not be supplied with new weapons until they have had proper drill and instruction in their use. At Shanghai in 1932 there were numerous casualties among the Japanese forces when new types of hand grenades and trench mortars were supplied to units which had not had sufficient drill to understand how to use them. Basic training must be given on broad lines so as to include all probable situations which may develop. For example, the Japanese believed that their duties in Shanghai would be to protect their sector against unorganized mobs, but in this action they found themselves called upon to attack well-trained and organized Chinese troops. For this, their own training was insufficient.
At night complete systems of challenges; recognition signals, and even distinctive uniform markings are desirable, especially for patrols working in or around streets and buildings. Patrol areas must be clearly defined, specified, and understood to avoid taking hostile action against units of friendly forces.
- Japanese officers and men are willing to give everything for the sake of their Emperor and country, but at the same time all men must be reminded that they must never do anything that will bring disgrace on the uniform.
No classes of Japanese officers and men have a monopoly on bravery, and while there are exceptions to all general rules, it was found that the bravest and most daring were unmarried men between the ages of 20 and 25; that men between the ages of 30 and 35 with wives and families, especially if they were solely responsible for the support of these families, were generally the least ready to accept great risks. Men over 40 were willing enough, but their physical strength and stamina were usually not equal to their spirit. Contrary to common belief it was learned that men who were noted for their bravado, men with bad conduct records, or men who were heavy drinkers did not measure up to their more quiet conscientious comrades.
- While complete co-ordination of units is essential, and it is a well-known principle that only the force which has complete mutual understanding will win in battle, this must be achieved by indoctrination before going into action rather than by “conference” or other method, once the action has started. The practice of holding conferences of unit commanders before each attack was finally discarded because it was found to be a waste of time.
- All hands must remember that the victorious force is the force which refuses be defeated, and that there is usually a very narrow margin between victory and defeat. Morale is all-important, so it must be kept high under all conditions, and mistakes which affect it must be cleared as soon as possible. For example, several times during the fighting the Japanese troops thought that they were being fired on by their own artillery, and even though it was shown that they were not, the morale of units involved suffered very badly.
- It is imperative to keep all officers and men as calm and as quiet as possible except just prior to an attack. Even though this is well understood, and every possible effort is made, there will be considerable excitement and confusion and in the confusion, orders will be misunderstood and false or erroneous reports will be made or received. On the other hand the officers and men must be aroused to a fighting pitch just before starting an attack. Means and methods of doing this must be decided by the commanders of the units, and of course the same method cannot be used effectively every time an attack is made.
- Greater care must be used in the Japanese service to allow men to get proper rest. Many commanders kept their men on the alert day and night until they dropped from exhaustion. Under certain conditions this may be necessary, but proper dispositions against surprise attacks can and should be made and commanders must not expect superhuman efforts from their men. Officers must learn to depend on their intelligence services rather than on their own intuition to tell them when to keep all of their men on guard for long periods.
- It is not a good plan to utilize armed civilians. Civilians can be of great service and if available should be used as guides, interpreters, and messengers, but they should be unarmed. During the fighting many civilians committed outrages through fear or excitement and some of them even used the unsettled conditions as an excuse to do away with business rivals. Armed civilians are a menace to even friendly forces.
Finally, the problem of supplying forces in the field and of standardization of equipment is one which must be worked out in great detail. Several times during the operation there was a temporary shortage of such important materials as gasoline, ordnance spare parts, and even ammunition although Sasebo and Kure are only one or two days’ steaming from Shanghai. When making out equipment tables a margin of 50 per cent in excess of prospective needs is not unreasonable. The necessity for standard equipment was brought out when the Army had to borrow several hundred thousand rounds of rifle and machine-gun ammunition before the operation was completed.
However, the most important lesson learned at Shanghai was that information in regard to the spirit and morale of the probable enemy forces is as essential as information in regard to their equipment, and that it is imperative to have an accurate estimate of probable enemy actions before beginning a campaign. The initial failure of the landing party commander to carry out his plan was due to his failure to obtain accurate information of the Chinese positions as well as his failure to estimate correctly the Chinese determination and ability to resist the advance of his forces. Both before and during the greater part of the action the Japanese could not bring themselves to realize that they were being opposed by troops who were, in spite of their previous reputation, brave and resourceful opponents. The Japanese believed that, because Chinese soldiers had not been able to stand against them in the past, they would never be able to do so, and the result was that they attempted an action with 2,500 men which finally required twenty times that many. The cost was heavy, not only in men and money, but in prestige, for at Shanghai in 1932 the Japanese armed forces lost their reputation of being invincible.
★
The side which takes the initiative has usually the better chance of securing advantage by dexterity or stealth, and there lies one of the advantages of offence. But it is not always so. If either by land or sea we can take a defensive position so good that it cannot be turned and must be broken down before our enemy can reach his objective, then the advantage of dexterity and stealth passes to us. We choose our own ground for the trial of strength. We are hidden on familiar grown®’ he is exposed on ground that is less familiar. We can lay traps and prepare surprises by counter attack, when he is most dangerously exposed. Hence the paradoxical doctrine that where defence is sound and well designed the advantage of surprise is against the attack.
It will be seen therefore that whatever advantages lie in defence they depend on the preservation of the offensive spirit. Its essence is the counter-attack—waiting deliberately for a chance to strike—not cowering in inactivity. Defence is a condition of restrained activity—not a mere condition of rest. Its real weakness is that if unduly prolonged it tends to deaden the spirit of offence. This is a truth so vital that some authorities in their eagerness to enforce it have travestied it into the misleading maxim “That attack is the best defence.”—Corbett, Maritime Strategy4