FROM NOVEMBER 3 TO DECEMBER 3
THE AFRICAN WAR
Sanctions and War Threats. —The “economic siege of Italy” went into full effect on November 18 with the application on that date of the four League sanctions, comprising a boycott of Italian exports, denial of credits, embargo on the sale to Italy of munitions and certain other key commodities, and mutual support in the execution of these measures. For the time being, Italy took no further steps in retaliation than to stage a national demonstration against the “tyranny of the sanctionist states,” and to put into effect such trade reprisals as lay within her power. Earlier in the month the Fascist government had sent notes to each of the sanctionist countries, holding them to individual responsibility for their decisions and threatening reprisals and withdrawal from the League. France opposed a concerted reply, but in separate responses England, France, and other nations insisted that Italy’s conduct was responsible for the League’s decision, and that this in turn made their own action obligatory under the Covenant.
It was generally agreed that the sanctions of November 18, while involving serious and possibly permanent injury to Italian trade, would not bring immediate results, but that further embargoes on coal, iron, steel, and especially oil would strike a vital blow at her conduct of mechanized warfare. This indeed was recognized in Premier Mussolini’s threat to France that a ban on oil supplies would constitute “a hostile act.” There was speculation as to whether or not Italy would resort to desperate measures, such as an air attack on the British fleet in the Mediterranean, if these final strictures were imposed. Against such a possibility, however, France and England presented a united front. The meeting of the sanctions committee was postponed from November 29 to December 12, but with every prospect that the fuel and oil ban might ultimately be adopted, unless Italy showed signs of coming to terms. Coercion of this nature, even if successful, would leave Italy with a rankling hatred against its chief authors. And if there is already a tightening of the Franco-British Entente, one may expect, perhaps, after the working out of the present conflict, a realignment of Italy with Germany and other states of Central Europe against the Western powers. The present makeshift regime in Austria would certainly offer no obstacle to such a scheme.
One immediate effect of the League’s postponement of its oil embargo was to give an awkward prominence to the previous action of American officials in opposing American oil shipments to Italy. Though in the past the United States has supplied less than 10 per cent of Italy’s oil imports, the Fascist government had looked to this country as a means of meeting its fuel problems. This gave point to the alleged remark of Italian officials that America was “out-sanctioning the League.”
American Neutrality Moves. —Although the United States administration has felt that it could go no farther in the way of positive trade prohibitions than those authorized by Congress in the Neutrality Act of last August, it has clearly indicated a policy not only of removing protection from all trade with belligerents, but also of limiting such trade to its prewar-time scope. Three official pronouncements in November emphasized this policy. On November 15, Secretary of State Hull declared that trade with belligerents in such articles as “oil, copper, trucks, tractors, and scrap iron” was directly contrary to the administration policy and to the spirit of the Neutrality Act, and that close watch was being kept on the export of such commodities as compared with that of previous years. Again on November 20 Secretary of the Interior Ickes in his capacity as Petroleum Administrator warned that domestic producers should “keep the spirit and letter” of the Neutrality Act by refusing to sell “oil and other war materials” to Italy. Finally the Shipping Bureau of the Department of Commerce intimated that the administration policy opposed all commerce with belligerents and that the government might prove a hard creditor to firms whose conduct ran counter to this policy. Thus the Bureau used the pressure made possible by its $97,000,000 loans to shipowners, and the millions more due on vessels bought from the government.
Even though the official policy lacked something in definiteness, it received a large measure of popular support, backed up as it was by the demonstrated fact that belligerents may prove bad debtors, and also by the impression generally prevalent that foreign trade, especially in war time, is a bad business, beneficial only to a few rich profiteers. The view might perhaps be different should war-time conditions open a large market for such goods as cotton, the sale of which could be seen to bring direct benefit to a great section of the country.
Keeping Out of War. —Interesting comment on the administration’s wartime policy was provided in an article in “Keeping America Out of War” by Dr. Charles E. Beard in the December Current History. According to Dr. Beard, not only was the administration disappointed at the limitations on its control of neutrality policy imposed by Congress, but the program that “President Roosevelt, urged by naval advisers, sought to protect against Congress last winter” was
. . . freedom of the seas, that is, the policy of keeping sea lanes open, beating down blockades and making extraordinary profits, through diplomatic and naval protection, out of favored belligerents and their neutral appendages.
In view of the policies now adopted by the administration, this certainly comes as strange news. However, as regards naval opinion, Dr. Beard admits that there is no indoctrinated unanimity. He continues:
Yet it is due to truth to say that there was a decided rift in orthodox navalism although little was said about it in the columns of the daily press. Perhaps this was the most significant feature of the whole controversy. Early last spring in a radio broadcast Admiral Sims had flatly declared: “Our trade as a neutral must be at the risk of the traders; our Army and Navy must not be used to protect this trade. It is a choice of profits or peace. Our country must remain at peace.”
A survey of opinion among naval officers, conducted by the World Peace Foundation and made public in the autumn, revealed that 56 senior officers were inclined to believe that the Sims plan of non-protection for war traders would be possible, as against 54 who were inclined to regard it as impossible. A second question was put: “If possible, is the Sims plan of non-protection desirable?” To this challenge 58 naval officers replied in the affirmative and 45 in the negative. Thus was demonstrated positively the actual dissolution of the orthodox navalism fostered by Alfred Thayer Mahan, Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Naval Intelligence.
What is meant by “orthodox navalism” is somewhat obscure, unless it is a reference to the theory that the Rooseveltian policy of national expansion backed by a strong Navy found support in the writing of Mahan. Certainly this “orthodox navalism” would also come as news to most naval officers.
Dr. Beard’s own opinion of the administration’s neutrality policy is not altogether clear. He apparently approves the restrictions on our war-time trade, but at the same time views with alarm the fact that they indicate some co-operation with, or at least play into the hands of the scheming sanctionist powers.
As regards keeping out of war in general, Dr. Beard is no doubt right in saying that “pious aspirations do not guarantee peace,” and that “the preservation of peace demands alteration of domestic ideals and practices.” However, history shows clearly enough that the peace-loving nations cannot purchase peace by systematic surrender of rights, or by assurances that they will in no circumstances defend their policies and interests. The success of Japan in Manchuria, and of Germany in rearmament, encouraged Italy in Africa. There has been a tremendous growth of peace sentiment in recent years, with peace pledges galore; and yet, in the words of President Roosevelt’s Armistice Day address:
Jealousies between nations continue, armaments increase, national ambitions that disturb the world’s peace are thrust forward. Most serious of all, international confidence in the sacredness of international contracts is on the wane.
EUROPEAN POLITICS
Conservatives Win British Elections. —The somewhat spiritless November parliamentary elections in England, in which the chief issues were the government’s policy of increased armaments and its handling of the African situation, resulted in a safe though reduced majority for the government parties. In the former parliament, Premier Baldwin’s Nationalist ministry had an unwieldy majority of 411, which is now reduced to about 240. Of the 422 government supporters, 381 are Conservatives, 31 are Simon Liberals, and 10 are ex-Laborites and independents. Though defeated in the elections, Ramsay MacDonald and his son Malcolm remained in the Cabinet. There was little doubt that the government would maintain its stiff opposition to Italy, and would insure the re-enforcement of its diplomacy by a stronger Navy.
New Greek Monarchy. —The final step in the reversion of Greece from republic to monarchy occurred on November 25 when King George II landed on Greek soil at the port of Athens. Two weeks earlier, on November 10, the Greek Army had taken an oath of loyalty to the King, Premier Kondylis declaring that the restoration of the monarchy meant an improvement of the fighting forces and a revival of the Greek military spirit. The 150 deputies of ex-Premier Tsaldaris’ following appeared at the ceremony in Athens, and their desire thus evidenced to co-operate with the new regime was reciprocated by the King’s subsequent decision to extend amnesty to rebels, organize a new non-partisan cabinet, and order free elections at an early date.
In view of King George’s friendship with British royalty and his known devotion to British institutions, his return was regarded as strengthening the ties between Greece and England and improving the latter’s position in the Mediterranean.
London Naval Conference. —Little in the way of positive results was expected from the naval conference called to meet in London on December 6, and indeed fears arose at the outset lest the assembling of large delegations and the assertion of opposing claims might serve to intensify rather than adjust naval rivalries. Italy, in view of the rapidly changing situation in the Mediterranean, could hardly seek less than complete release from all restrictions. England, while desirous of a final conference to keep the record straight, could accept no recession from her settled program of increased cruiser and battleship strength. In view of the slight basis for common agreement, British officials suggested that trouble might be avoided by holding no plenary sessions, and by limiting press communiques to a single authorized source.
On November 19, Ambassador-at-Large Norman H. Davis was named to head the American representatives, with Admiral William H. Standley and Under Secretary of State William Phillips as colleagues.
UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA
Trade Pact with Canada. —Although the new American policy of removing protection from war-time trade would seem to encourage the idea of a nation economically self-sufficient, the American State Department is at the same time energetically pursuing Secretary Hull’s favorite policy of developing foreign trade by reciprocal agreements with other powers. Outstanding among such agreements was the commercial treaty rapidly achieved in November conferences between the new Canadian Premier, Mackenzie King, and President Roosevelt. The pact was signed at Washington on November 15. By its terms Canada opens her markets to United States products by lower duties on 767 articles, including many lines of manufactured goods, out-of-season fruits, and other commodities, while the United States promises lower tariffs on 53 articles and maintenance of 22 others on the free list. In general, however, the United States sets limits on the quantity of Canadian lumber, foodstuffs, and other goods to be imported into this country. The bargain is expected to increase trade for both countries, the shrinkage of which is indicated by the fact that our exports to Canada in 1929 amounted in round numbers to $950,000,000 and our imports to $450,000,000, whereas in 1934 the corresponding figures were $300,000,000 and $230,000,000.
FAR EAST
Autonomy in North China. —Under the dextrous hands of Major General Doikara, head of the Japanese intelligence service in North China, the stage was apparently set in the third week of November for an “independence movement” which would establish the five great provinces of Northern China as an autonomous state, guided by Japan and only loosely connected with Nanking. Although what actually happened is not yet clear, there was some lack of co-ordination between the Japanese military leaders and their diplomats at Nanking; the civilian elements gained temporary ascendancy, and the movement of military forces was held up. No one doubted the ultimate separation of the northern provinces, and their organization as a second Manchuria, but the delay suggested that Japan sought to accomplish the change in some sort of collaboration with General Chiang Kaishek, or in such a way as to enable the Nanking government to save its face and not enter into open hostilities, with the attendant possibility of interference by the Western powers. Japan could afford to go more slowly.
Though the larger movement temporarily missed fire, a smaller state, including parts of Hopei province, was proclaimed on November 23 under Yin Jukeng, former pro-Japanese administrator of the demilitarized zone in North China. The new government was to take over all public utilities and administrative functions, and to turn over to Nanking only sufficient revenue to cover a share of the foreign debt service. It appeared likely that it would soon be enlarged to include all of Hopei and Chahar.
China off Silver. —Emphasized by Japan as a cause for the autonomy movement, though it had been advocated long before, was the action of Nanking on November 13 in going off the silver standard, calling for the surrender of all silver to the government, and resort to a managed paper currency. The change was made necessary by the United States silver purchase policy, which raised the value of silver, deflated prices in China, and caused a monetary crisis. Naturally neither the northern Chinese bankers nor their Japanese advisers favored surrender of silver to Nanking. Japanese spokesmen were inclined not only to emphasize the monetary change as a motive for autonomy, but also to blame Sir Frederick Leith Ross, the British fiscal expert recently in China, for his encouragement of the new money program and his proposal of a loan to aid in its execution.
Position of Western Powers. —While the British stake in North China is much greater than in Manchuria, it appears certain that neither the British nor the United States government now favors as strong moves as were attempted under the leadership of Secretary Stimson in 1932. Sir Donald Ramsay, British Ambassador at Washington, conferred on November 19 with Under Secretary of State William Phillips, and on November 28 the British representative at Tokyo made inquiries as to Japan’s purpose in North China. Indications were that Britain would hesitate at vigorous action so long as her immense interests in the Yangtze valley are not vitally affected. Though it has been said that the United States is more ready to adopt a positive policy in the Far East than is England, the latter’s commercial interest there is far greater than ours.
Japan and Mongolia. —Although colonial empire in these days is not regarded as a profitable adventure, it may be noted that Japan’s exports to Manchuria have risen from 42 per cent (of her total exports) in 1929 to 64.5 per cent in 1934. In the future it is expected that Manchuria will also play a much larger part in supplying Japan with necessary raw materials, such as lumber and wood pulp, wool, foodstuffs, iron, and oil.
Meantime Japan has consistently pushed beyond Manchukuo for control of Inner Manchuria and the adjacent Chinese province of Chahar. As a result of clashes on the Chahar-Jehol border in January, 1935, Japan took over some 700 square miles of Chahar territory north of the Great Wall, which has since been incorporated into Manchukuo. She also gained virtual control of Chahar administration by the appointment in July of civil and military advisers in the provincial capital at Kalgan. In Inner Mongolia, the Mongol Princes have utilized the Japanese danger to secure autonomy from China. No doubt they would prefer their present status to a union with Manchukuo, but, to quote a recent Foreign Policy Report (November 20, 1935), they would “probably elect submission to Japan rather than fight to the death for China.” Japan is also pressing for a foothold in Outer Manchuria, but, in the opinion of the Report already quoted, the inhabitants there would infinitely prefer the mild tutelage and virtual independence they have enjoyed under Russian guidance to the strict control to which the Mongol tribes have been subjected within the Manchukuo border. The challenge offered to Russia in this region lies in the more distant future, but may be hastened by Soviet difficulties in Europe.