Inner causes.—The threatening development of events in the Far East and the wish of Japan to end the naval treaty of Washington, which since 1922 has done so much to stabilize conditions in the Pacific, have made a deep impression on public opinion.
The peaceful policy of Japan from 1922 to 1931 convinced many people that there was no real danger of war in the Pacific, that this was a mere story invented to justify the existence of great navies. Several authors have proclaimed that a war in the Pacific would be madness, seen from the economic point of view. A few naval experts have decided in the same direction on account of the great technical difficulties and enormous risks of a naval war in the Pacific. So in their opinion a war in this region was very improbable.
How can we reconcile these optimistic views of yesterday with the sad conditions of today? Have these authors of perfect sincerity erred? One could answer yes and no. They have not erred in the facts pointed out, but they have erred in the conclusions at which they arrived. They have seen only one side of the question and concluded from that for the whole. They have had too narrow a view and have not studied deeply enough the great problem of peace and war. A war in the Pacific region would be economic madness and bring disaster to all participants. True —but so it was in many wars and nevertheless they were fought.
The technical difficulties and risks would be enormous. So it was in many wars, as in the war of the American Revolution, the expedition of Napoleon to Egypt, his wars against Spain and Russia, the war of Japan against Russia in 1904-5. And yet those wars were fought.
The economic and military-technical questions are only two of the many factors which influence the problem of peace and war. We must seek more deeply and try to find the core of the problem.
Wars are fought between men. It is the qualities of men that bring about wars. There is no question on earth that could not be solved peacefully, if men were only good. But men are not. It is the Old Testament tale of the curse of Paradise; the verdict that men are too bad for Paradise is the real key to the problem of peace and war.
When we try to express this in the terminology of modern science we should say: the problem of peace and war is a psychological-biological question. These two sides, the psychological and the biological, are closely connected and practically never to be separated completely. There have been wars that were chiefly based on psychological causes, as religious wars; in other conflicts the biological factor has played the greater part. States are conglomerations of men, and as men have their days of youth, of maturity, and of old age, so have states. Some states are in the prime of life, while others are just rising and other states again are decaying. The life of states, like the life of men, is dynamical. Whereas ten years ago the political positions of the majority of states may be nicely balanced and just, they may not be as just today and in ten years they may be unjust and unbalanced. There comes tension between the static position of the political borders, based on the conditions as existing at a given moment and the dynamical process of growth, maturity, and decay of nations. When this tension becomes too great, then a readjustment of the political positions is necessary and in our imperfect world many times a war is the only means to get this readjustment. That is more or less the biological side of the problem. But it must be noted that the psychological factor has also a powerful influence here. When a nation grows and its power becomes greater, it is inclined to overrate its own power and to underestimate the power of other nations and therefore it tries sometimes to enforce a readjustment of the political positions at a time that is not yet ripe for such a readjustment. This never ending question of the decay of some nations and the rise of others is serious enough among small powers. But then it is relatively innoxious unless greater powers become mixed up in it. Besides, the expansive impulse of small powers is usually kept in check by the great powers. Much more serious is the problem of readjustment among the great powers, and in certain cases this will lead to wars that bring misery to whole continents. This specific case arises in particular, when among the great states a young giant arises, who is fully aware of his power, who sees the weak spots and deficiencies of the older first-class powers, and who, stimulated by his rapid growth, overrates his own possibilities and grasps for the domination of a continent or the whole world.
The famous French writer on naval affairs, Admiral Castex, has denied in one of his works, “Synthèse de la Querre Sous Marine,”2 the assertion that the World War was the first very great war. He proves that more than once there have been wars or coherent groups of wars that were, taking into account the possibilities of those times, of similar dimensions to the war of 1914. He confines himself to the history of Europe and says:
In truth, you could not deny that in the course of every century in modern history, with a remarkable and very obvious periodicity, peace in Europe has been disturbed by a political group aspiring after hegemony. In the sixteenth century it was the Empire of Charles V, first one realm, afterwards split up into two parts. It was the power of Louis XIV in the seventeenth century; France in the time of Bonaparte in the j nineteenth century; the German Empire in the twentieth century. About every hundred years there has been a disturber of peace. Always it is a nation in full bloom, overflowing with vitality, full of ambition that will predominate everything. This disturber of peace, mighty through politics and through arms, gives clearly proof of the intention to usurp his neighbors and to destroy them. It is impossible to live in peace any longer. Willingly or unwillingly man has to change the , pen for the rifle, the plow for the gun, and try to I destroy the mad beast that disturbs the general state of peace. This is accomplished only after exhausting efforts, extending over a prolonged ) period. (Italian wars, wars of Louis XIV, Napoleonic wars, war of 1914). Coalition of the threatened interest is necessary.
Castex then gives a striking picture of the remarkable constant features that appeared in each of these attempts for hegemony, giving some further qualities of the aggressive nation.
The disturber of peace is suffocated with power. He breaks his bonds, he bursts the chains that try to constrain him. When such a stream of vitality manifests itself, there is a revival in every domain, military, scientific, political, commercial, industrial, maritime, colonial, demographic. The increase of vitality is not limited to one single domain.
The vision of the great French naval philosopher is completely in accord with the symptoms we are seeing now in the Pacific.3 The disturber is the young Japanese giant, who demonstrates an enormous growth in many ways. There is the rapid growth of the population, the conquest of a series of territories culminating in the recent capture of Manchuria. There are also the psychological symptoms: the belief in the great vocation of one’s own nation, the underestimation of the strength of the other great powers, the will to take on the task of these “old and senile” nations, the will to absorb the neighboring countries, the overrating of one’s own strength, in short the will to power and the grasp for hegemony. There is, indeed, a striking resemblance between Japan of today and Germany before the war. There are differences, but these are by no means reassuring. The outstanding difference is that the need of expansion was not so urgent for Germany as it is now for Japan. There was for the German people enough room to live in within the borders of Germany, whereas there is not place enough in Japan proper for the rapidly increasing population. So the cry for expansion in Japan has really an economic basis. This explains too the greater vehemence of Japan. It must be noted here that this situation in Japan has been willfully created. Before the opening of Japan there were strong laws to enforce birth control, but with the entry of Japan into modern politics these laws were altered and birth control vigorously repressed, for a large population was necessary to succeed in international politics. So this economic question is in its deepest foundation not an economic one, but a psychological one.
In the light of the above, it is evident that we must not regard an aggressive power as a wicked people, a defensive power as one of a higher character. The Japanese are a people with splendid qualities, as are the Germans. Generally speaking, there are no nations that have a more bellicose nature than others. The aggressive period is a phase in the development of almost every people. There have always been powers that are more or less aggressive, and powers that are more or less on the defensive, but the dividing line is today not the same as yesterday, nor as tomorrow. War must be seen as a great tragedy of humanity, as a wrong resulting from the defects of human nature, and not as a mischief forced by some devilish state on innocent nations. It is these defects of human nature that make war in the Pacific so probable. Theoretically there are many possibilities to prevent war. The Japanese might resort to birth control, which all Western powers have done, and confine themselves to the great empire they have conquered on the continent of Asia. Manchuria may be too cold to be a great direct outlet for the Japanese population, but the possession of Manchuria will give work and food to several more millions of men in Japan proper. If it were only an economic question, it might be solved. But it is a psychological one as well. The Japanese will not resort to birth control and they will not confine themselves to their present borders. They desire the hegemony over Asia and Australia and in all probability they will not stop before they have reached that or are defeated. For they are moved by the blind spirit of power.
The deepest causes for war in the Pacific are the psychological and biological factors; it is the will to power of the youthful, rapidly growing Japanese giant.
Realizing this tragic truth, there is little room for optimistic views. There are some influences that might lead to peace. The Japanese, after the exertions of the last few years, might reach in a relatively short time the acme of their vitality, followed by a decline. But as yet there are no signs of that. It might be that the great Anglo-Saxon naval powers should show on the one hand some understanding for the difficulties of Japan—they are already trying to do so—and on the other hand should assume a firm attitude, strengthening their naval position in the Pacific on such a scale that the risks of war would be too great even in the eyes of the most chauvinistic Japanese. It is doubtful if this is really possible. The British Empire and the United States are at the moment defensive powers and it is in the nature of things that their naval efforts are relatively inferior to that of the aggressive power. In both states are strong pacifistic influences. At the moment England and America have not accumulated in the Pacific forces of a strength to intimidate the Japanese militarists, and each separated cannot enlarge its forces to that standard at a short notice. Nevertheless, this policy of being strong and showing at the same time some understanding for the Japanese difficulties is the only way that would have some chance to preserve peace. Good will toward Japan must not, however, lead to a diminution of military strength' To concede naval parity would go much too far and would cost bitterly in the future. The chance of preserving peace that follows from this policy would become greater if the British Empire and the United States co-operated. As Castex says: “The coalition of the threatened interests is necessary.” A British-American entente would be a great thing for the cause of peace. Then the great Anglo-Saxon powers would have done all they could to save mankind the calamity of a new war. But it is at best doubtful if an entente will arise. Russia should follow an analogous policy. But Russia is weak and a real entente with the British Empire or the United States is not likely. It may be that Russia can only buy peace by liquidation of her possessions in the Far East. Will she take that course? Economically the loss of the Vladivostok districts would not be unacceptable, but then there is the psychological feature. It would be a serious loss of prestige.
So on the whole the inner causes that are tending to war in the Pacific region seem to be stronger now than the forces that favor peace.
External causes.—Now that we have reached this pessimistic conclusion we may try to give a short survey of some factors that may influence the outbreak of war. Apart from the question of coalition between the British Empire and the United States there are three very important factors:
(1) The ratio of relative naval strength that is shifting to the disadvantage of Japan. This factor is for Japan an argument to make war in 1935 or 1936.
(2) The fact that Manchuria is not giving yet its full military-economical output. This circumstance will induce Japan to wait.
(3) The possibility of a-great war in Europe, in which England and Russia might participate. This will be for Japan also a reason to wait.
The relative decline of Japanese naval power in the near future may be clearly foreseen. Japan has about 700,000 tons of modern ships now,4 the United States 800,000 tons, and the British Empire 940,000 tons. But when the vessels that are now being built are ready, which will be the case in 1937, Japan will have about 720,000 tons, America 1,000,000 tons, and the British Empire 1,000,000 tons. Japan can build supplementary vessels, but this will not improve her relative position, for the naval treaties limit the building in the years 1935 and 1936. Japan can put on the stocks in these years only about 62,000 tons against America’s 140,000 tons and the British Empire’s 190,000 tons.5 So the building in the coming years will further lower Japan’s naval position, and the Japanese chance of victory in a naval war in the Pacific will become smaller than it is now. A building race after 1936 will not alter this. In the attitude of Japan at the recent London naval discussions, you can discern the intention to reconcile this factor which would be a reason for forcing war now, with the others reasons that favor delay. The Japanese policy in London was to avoid the relative weakening of the Japanese naval power—except for a short period of transition—and thus keep the splendid naval position it has now, firmly bound in a new naval treaty. In other words, Japan would rather not make war in the coming two years. If that were not the case, it would not have done its utmost to get a new and more favorable treaty than the Washington-London regulations. A new treaty would have had no influence in the years 1935-36. If Japan wanted war tomorrow, it would have been the right policy to show in London a peaceful face and to try to temper the suspicions of England and the United States, and thus check their preparations for war. But as it was Japan tried to get a new treaty with a much higher ratio for Japan. If this attempt had succeeded, there would be no reason to make war now. But it failed and rightly so. Hence it is possible that Japan will not wait for the completion of the many men-of-war that England is building and the veritable armada that America has on the stocks, with the completion of the naval base at Singapore and the further fortification of Pearl Harbor, but will use the splendid naval position she has now and make war at once. There is a historic parallel. In the beginning of this century there was a naval race between Japan and Russia. Russia was the more opulent power and was near to winning this competition. The Russian Pacific fleet became gradually stronger. In the first months of 1904, Japan had 6 battleships and 6 armored cruisers ready for service. Russia had in Port Arthur and Vladivostok 7 battleships and 4 armored cruisers. An eighth battleship was on its way out with some smaller vessels, and 4 more nearing completion in Baltic ports. If Japan had waited a year the Russians would have had a superior force in the Far East and the risks of war would probably have been too great. But Japan did not wait. So it is possible that Japan will make war now. It is also possible that she will accept the weakening of her naval position for a score of years, and will wait for development of the economic strength of Manchuria and possibly for a new war in Europe. So generally speaking the danger of war will be very great in the coming two years, for the majority of the vessels building in America and England will not be completed before the beginning of 1937, so that during the years 1935 and 1936 the naval position of Japan will remain favorable. If there is no war in these two years to come, the danger of war will be diminished for a number of years; but then it will gradually rise again. This is only a very general outline and there are many circumstances which can influence it otherwise. The serious danger of incidents that will bring about war will remain. We have only to think of what happened in 1914 at Sarajevo. There is also the fact that in Japan as in every other country there are many political tendencies and countertendencies which may interrupt the trend of Japanese policy.
Preparations for War
When in 1904 on the eve of war with Japan the Russian Captain Vladimir Semenoff was to leave for the Far East, he took leave from his superiors at Kronstadt6 and also visited Admiral Rojestvensky. Semenoff asked him if he thought that war was imminent. And the Admiral sadly gave the answer: “Not always does war begin with the firing of the first shot. In my opinion there has been war for some time. It is only the blind who don’t see that.”
In this sense there has been war for some time in the Pacific. The first preparations for this war were made long ago, but when we take only the period after the World War, there is as regards Japan the improvement of her strategical position by the retention of the mandated islands, the fortification of Formosa, the Pescadores, and the Bonin Islands, the regular building-up of the Navy after the Washington conference (from 1922 to 1933 Japan has built more tonnage than America and almost as much as England, a proportion of which no one would have dreamed of before the war), the enlargement of the military-economic basis by the perfection of industry and the conquest of Manchuria. As regards Great Britain we had the voyage of Lord Jellicoe in 1919 and his report, that for the greater part was never executed, further the building of the great Far Eastern naval base of Singapore and the re-enforcement and modernization of the squadrons in Pacific waters. America removed in 1919 the strongest squadrons to the Pacific, and developed the naval bases on the west coast and in Hawaii. In the last few years these preparations have been much intensified, which is an unmistakable sign that a crisis is to be feared.
The preparedness for war has been much improved in Japan; there are naval maneuvers on a scale hitherto unknown, the credits for Army and Navy are raised to 45 per cent of the total budget, a chauvinistic wave has gone through the whole nation. In the case of England, the work at Singapore has been accelerated, the Far Eastern and Australian squadrons are re-enforced, the coast defense in Australia and New Zealand have been taken in hand. The admirals’ conference of Singapore took place in January, 1934; discussions were held in November between Sir Maurice Hankey with the Australian Minister of Defense and the government of New Zealand, followed by the great maneuvers at Singapore in December last. The American fleet has been concentrated in the Pacific since 1932, the bases on the west coast and Hawaii are being further improved, the possibility of naval and air bases on the Aleutian Islands has been examined, great maneuvers will take place in the Northern Pacific, the great Roosevelt building program and the Vinson Bill have brought an armada of warships on the stocks. Russia has re-enforced her army and air force in the Far East; a conference of high officers of the Far Eastern forces took place in December at Moscow. England and Russia both have been active in the politics of the European continent to consolidate peace there and to have their hands free for dealing with the Pacific- Japan arrests spies in Japan, England catches spies at Singapore, America at San Diego. So the preparations for war in the Pacific have taken their course, in spite of many vacillations, as demonstrated for example by the building of the naval base at Singapore, and by the American and British naval policy. When we now consider the result of these preparations, we immediately see the fact that the expanding power, Japan, has reached a higher degree of preparedness for war than the three defensive powers, Russia, the British Empire, and the United States.
Japan.—The whole Japanese people are animated by a high spirit of patriotism and are ready to make any sacrifices for the great destinies of the empire. It is this mentality that makes Japan such a great power. The Japanese Army is a splendid force and vastly superior to anything that could be brought against it on the continent of Asia. The air forces are not so strong but re-enforcement is being undertaken. In all probability the air power of Japan is sufficient to protect the Japanese islands against Russian air raids and to take the offensive on the continent. The naval position of Japan is very favorable. Japan has many well-situated naval bases. The only weak spot is the interdiction of fortifications in the mandated islands, but it is possible to improvise there in war time bases for light craft and seaplanes. Some measures have already been taken to improve the harbor facilities on a few islands. The status quo that according to the Washington treaty limits fortification of the Pescadores, Formosa, and the Bonin Islands is no great drawback for Japan, for these islands were already strongly fortified before the treaty came into force. The Japanese fleet has an almost perfect freedom of action in the Western Pacific. The Japanese Navy has great qualities; it is a well-balanced and splendidly trained force. The newer ships have higher fighting qualities than British and American ships at the cost of habitability and perhaps seaworthiness. Japan has about as much personnel as England and the United States and great reserves besides, so that, as compared with England and America, a manning problem does not exist. Japan is inferior to England in battleships, battle cruisers and first-class cruisers, about equal in aircraft carriers and second-class cruisers, and strongly superior in destroyers and submarines. Compared to America, Japan has fewer battleships, has about parity in aircraft carriers and first-class cruisers, and is vastly superior in all other craft. Particularly strong is the Japanese submarine flotilla. Of the 65 submarines about 30 can operate independently over the enormous distances of the Pacific; the other submarines are good medium-sized boats. This splendid flotilla is a formidable weapon, fit par excellence to operate offensively and by surprise.
The only weak spot in the naval armament of Japan is the small and slow fleet of oil tankers. This would be a handicap for offensive operations. Some new ships are under construction. Since at Washington the Anglo-Japanese alliance came to an end, Japan has been isolated. There are many signs that Japanese diplomacy is endeavoring to break that isolation. Rumors of an alliance offered to France have been denied. Now there are vague rumors about a contract with Germany, Poland, and Turkey, and unquestionably Japan has some influence in Abyssinia. The position of Japan would indeed be much strengthened if she had an ally in Europe that could retain there British and/or Russian forces. Abyssinia might eventually with the help of Japan hamper the British communications with the Far East. The relations of Japan with Siam are said to be very friendly. Siam has strategic interest in connection with Singapore. The efforts of Japan to find some allies are of great importance and deserve to be followed carefully. China will be probably more useful than detrimental to Japan in case of a war in the Pacific.
The weakest spot in the position of Japan remains the economic basis. This is improved by the conquest of Manchuria and will further improve as the development of that region proceeds. The oil position remains difficult, but there are large stocks and Japan is not easy to blockade. The economic position by no means prohibits war, as some people seem to think. For the present, however, the economic structure of Japan is weaker than that of other great powers and Japan cannot stand the strain of a great war for an unlimited time. Not yet! This may influence not only the moment when war may break out, but also the strategy. The hypothesis that Japan will operate along the lines of a defensive strategy is on this ground untenable. Why should Japan repeat the faults of the German naval strategy? Japan must operate offensively if she is not to lose the war from sheer exhaustion.
Russia.—The real military strength of Russia is difficult to estimate. The Navy is extremely weak, the air fleet appears to be strong, the Army large and fairly well equipped. The rumors about the great strength of the Russian armed forces may be truer than some people think, but this does not alter the general features of a war in Eastern Siberia. What has always been the weak spot of Russia, even today, is poor transportation; Russia can concentrate in the Far East only a fraction of her military power. Japan can bring to bear there the total of her forces. Air power has not altered this. The Russians are trying to improve their communications, they are creating a complete war industry in Siberia, but as yet there is no reason to believe they have solved the problem. The inner strength of the Soviet regime is not great, in all probability it is weaker than under the czars. Will it withstand the strains of a great war? We doubt it. So we may safely conclude that a Russo-Japanese war would take rapidly the same course as the war of 1904-5. The Russians may have some initial successes with air raids on Japan, but then Vladivostok and the Maritime Province would be occupied by Japan, and the Russians would be driven back to Lake Baikal. Such a war may not be easy for Japan, but she will win. So Russia may be a useful ally to one of the great sea powers in case of a war with Japan, but she is not in a position to fight Japan single-handed with any chance of success.
British Empire.—The British Empire has declined in vitality since the World War. England suffers under the consequences of that war. The Navy is very weak for the great interests it has to protect. There are strong pacifistic tendencies. Nevertheless, the British Empire remains a great power and probably these signs of lassitude will after some time disappear. The British Navy is on the whole slightly superior to the Japanese Navy. England has a chain of naval ( bases from the mother-country to the Far East via the Mediterranean, and the route around the Cape has also been prepared. In this relatively safe way to the Far East, England has some advantage as compared to America. In Singapore, England has a great base from which to launch her forces into the Pacific waters, with Hongkong as an advanced post. The base at Singapore, however, is not yet completed and not fully equipped; the garrison has not its full strength and the local air force is weak. Therefore this famous base is not yet absolutely impregnable, and depends after all on the strength of the fleet. Over Hongkong is the status quo of Washington; it seems to be fairly well fortified and will not fall without serious resistance. A barrage of light naval forces is present in Far Eastern and Australian waters. In case of war with Japan they will have the task of hampering the initial operations of the Japanese fleet and defending Singapore and Hongkong till the British battle fleet has arrived. For this important function the British light forces in those waters are not too strong. In war time they will co-operate as a “Far Eastern Fleet,” but it may be doubted if this co-operation will be really effective. Public opinion in Australia, which in war time is likely to cry for the retention of the Australian Navy in home waters, is a weak spot. The operations of the Far Eastern Fleet in the World War met with no great success. Its lack of offensive activities resulted in the defeat at Coronel. The actual composition of this formation is open to criticism. It consists of modem 10,000-ton cruisers, rapid destroyers, and submarines, together with some old and slow cruisers and a 25-knot aircraft carrier. These slower vessels are dangerously placed and will be a hindrance to the mobility of the fleet. They had better be withdrawn to the Mediterranean to operate with the slower battle fleet. The number of British submarines in the Far East is small— there are only 12 boats. The submarine is the weapon par excellence to disturb the operations of a superior surface fleet and to obstruct attacks on naval bases. Remember the Dardanelles!
The British position in the Pacific would be much stronger if the Admiralty doubled the number of submarines east of Suez, instead of retaining these weapons in home waters, where they will find little to do.7 The great and dangerous defect of the world-wide British strategical system is the weakness of the mobile forces, of the fleet itself. The British Navy has only a small superiority over the Japanese Navy. While Japan has concentrated her forces in the Pacific, England has not and cannot. The maritime communications are the arteries of the British Empire, they must be kept open at all costs. The Admiralty cannot withdraw the light covering forces of the seaways in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean if there is a war in the Pacific. It must take into account the possibility that Japan will send out many auxiliary cruisers and maybe a few real cruisers to attack these communications. Besides, the political conditions in Europe are not likely to permit the sending away of every British man-of-war to the Pacific. The British Empire cannot afford to concentrate the whole of its naval forces in the Far East. This diminishes the margin of superiority that is already small. The British naval position against Japan is much weaker than it was in 1914 against Germany. If Japan finds no allies, England may win in the long run by her greater economic resources. Much will depend on naval leadership.
United States.—The United States have in some ways a stronger position than the British Empire. The vital parts of the British Empire lie scattered over the seas and they are only kept together by the power of the British Navy. When that Navy is destroyed the Empire must die. If the United States on the contrary lost her Navy and her colonial possessions, she would be seriously crippled, but she would not die. In this she has a stronger natural position than the British Empire. Nevertheless, if the United States naval power were destroyed, the United States would no longer be a real first-class power, she would lose her influence on the world’s progress and her power to maintain the Monroe Doctrine. A lost Pacific war thus would be for America too a great calamity. The United States is economically much stronger than Japan and could stand theoretically the strain of a great war much longer. It has a greater potentiel de guerre. The knowledge of this great natural strength, however, has led to the neglect of the standing forces of her Army and Navy. Therein lies a danger.
The American strength is not as overwhelming as many people think.
If America in 1914 had had to fight Germany alone, would it have won the war? It is very doubtful. So this neglect of the standing forces in peace with the intention of improvising everything in war time is dangerous. There are also internal weak points in America. The American nation is not a homogeneous one. There are large unassimilated groups. Pacifistic tendencies are strong. The U. S. Navy, as it is now, is strong but has serious defects. It is not a well-balanced force. It has in no category a really all-round superiority over the Japanese Navy. America has a great numerical superiority in battleships, but these vessels are too slow to bring the Japanese battleships to action. Japan has battle cruisers, America has none. This gives Japan a great freedom of action. Japan can form flying squadrons with one or more battle cruisers as a nucleus and America cannot bring against those squadrons anything that is at the same time rapid and strong enough to fight them. America has 15 first-class cruisers and Japan has 12, but the Japanese vessels are better protected. In second-class cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, Japan has a great superiority. The American numerical superiority in destroyers and submarines does not make up for the inferior qualities of the individual ships. America has only 9 submarines fit to operate independently over the great distances of the Pacific. The American naval air force is very strong, but there are too few aircraft carriers to bring home this superiority. The American ships are undermanned. America has no great naval bases in the Western Pacific; for offensive operations in force it must have a great and rapid fleet of oil tankers. But the existing oil fleet is small and consists mostly of very slow vessels. It is not clear why this serious defect is not corrected by lengthening the existing ships and placing new and stronger motors in them, a simple measure that has been effected by numerous merchant ships. The difficulties that these slow auxiliary vessels will give in war time have been exhibited in many maneuvers, but as yet this defect has not been removed. Apart from the bases on the west coast, America has only one great naval base in the Pacific, Pearl Harbor. This base is strongly fortified and well equipped, and further improvement is in progress. But it is isolated and depends finally upon the fleet. On the small naval base Manila (Cavite) rests the status quo of the Washington treaty. It is not tenable in case of war with Japan. The Americans seem not to have used even the freedom of action that the status quo permits, such as the replacement of old guns by new ones, etc. Only few troops are in the Philippines. The Asiatic Fleet has been reduced in the last few years. It may be politically expedient to evacuate the Philippines—strategically it weakens the American position. The right naval strategy is to let the Japanese pay a price as high as possible for the occupation of the Philippines. The Asiatic Fleet must be composed of a few rapid cruisers and destroyers and numerous submarines. It must have its real base in Pearl Harbor and must only be detached to the Philippines. It must be a flying squadron of extreme mobility. When war breaks out the cruisers are rightly placed to take up at once la guerre de course against the Japanese communications with the Indian Ocean and Australia. And the submarines would give a much higher military output if they were present at the beginning of the war in Far Eastern waters, than if they were placed at Pearl Harbor or home bases. The existing weakness of the Asiatic Fleet thus is open to criticism. Otherwise the concentration of the Battle Force and the Scouting Force in the Pacific is a very sound measure. The Panama Canal remains a vulnerable point and dividing the fleet would therefore be a mistake. To sum up, America is, through the composition of her fleet, the defects of her material, the undermanning of her ships, the lack of naval bases in the Western Pacific, not well prepared to fight Japan. The American position in the Pacific is at the foment weaker than the British position. The right naval strategy for America in case of a war with Japan would be to keep on the defensive, to play for time, and to Wait till her fleet is sufficiently re-enforced to begin offensive operations in force. But here again public opinion is a dangerous thing. It interfered in the naval strategy when America fought her war with Spain. Public opinion may also interfere in the Pacific strategy and force an ill-timed offensive on the Navy.
Conclusion
We have tried to give a short survey of the causes that are driving toward a war in the Pacific and of the strategic positions that the great Pacific powers hold after years of preparation for war. It is impossible to conclude optimistically. A great chance for war exists. The strength of the expansive power is great and its morale high. The best policy that the great Anglo-Saxon naval powers can assume is to take an attitude as friendly as possible toward Japan, to consolidate their positions in the Pacific, to build up gradually to the 5:5:3 ratio of the naval treaties, and to cooperate.
This is the best policy, too, for the sake of humanity.
To be prepared for war is therefore the best guarantee of peace. With weak powers, with armies on call, the goal cannot be attained; the fate of every nation lies in its own strength. An alliance is of course very valuable, but in the long run it is not wise to become dependent on foreign help. Our best assurance lies, therefore, in the superiority of our army.—Von Moltke.
1. This article was submitted in the Prize Essay Contest, 1935.
2. Published in 1920. Castex then had the rank of capitaine de frègate.
3. Since this article was written, Admiral Castex has published the fifth volume of his great work, Théories Stratégiques, entitled “La Mer Contrela Terre." In this volume he has elaborated his theorie de perturbation and on page 724 he denies that Japan is a disturber, admitting, however, that the attitude of some Japanese elements has contributed to make this impression. He sees in Japan the sea power that holds in check the real disturber of the coming years, I’homme de terre Russia. In his opinion, Japan is the natural ally for the Anglo-Saxon powers against the common Russian danger that will become very great in an indefinable number of years.
4. Age of battleships reckoned as 26 years.
5. Assuming that in aircraft carriers only the Argus will be replaced.
6. See Rasplata.
7. Since the number of British submarines in Far Eastern waters has been augmented to 15.