There is no other approach of vessels at sea or in inland waters so trying to the souls of seamen as that of two vessels on a near-collision course in the crossing situation. What navigator of a privileged vessel, about to cross another, has not experienced certain tense moments when it appeared doubtful if the burdened vessel was going to do her duty and give way? Moments when the impulse to reverse or sheer out and yield the right of way was barely balanced by a realization of the risk, legal and physical, of changing course or speed? Or what navigator of a burdened vessel in the same situation has not at some time convinced himself by a pair of bearings that he had plenty of time to cross ahead, and then experienced a harrowing interval wondering whether he Was going to make it, conscious that if the race ended in a tie he was hanged higher than Gilderoy's kite? According to the case books, about 40 per cent of faulty collisions are crossing cases. When we consider the nervous psychology nearly always present on one or both vessels in these cases, the wonder is that the collisions rate is not higher. One is almost inclined to the belief that the crossing situation should have a law against it.
It is unfortunate that under American law an approach which is naturally fraught with a certain degree of mental hazard should have been made legally so complex that some of its intricacies are puzzling even to admiralty lawyers and are completely baffling to the average mariner, whose duty is not to argue fine distinctions of law but to avoid collision. The writer has attempted to point out in these pages the danger of having differences in the signal requirements of the crossing situation under international rules and under inland and pilot rules.1 Briefly summarized, assuming vessel A to be the privileged and vessel B the burdened vessel in a crossing situation involving risk of collision, the different requirements are as follows:
- Under international rules, effective in waters outside the prescribed inland waters of the United States and dependencies,2 including not only the high seas but the inland waters of countries having no special inland rules, as for example, Canadian waters3 other than the Great Lakes:
- A must hold course and speed across B’s bow, unless and until B’s wrongful action forces her into the jaws of a collision.4
- A cannot announce her intention to do this by whistle signal, as every whistle signal contained in the international rules, except fog signals, indicates a change in course or speed.5 She may give notice by a flare-up light or a detonating signal, but this is only a permissive, not a required, signal.6
- B is required to keep out of the way,7 to avoid crossing A’s bow,8 and if necessary to slacken her speed or stop or reverse.9
- If B keeps out of the way by sheering to the right she must sound one blast; if by sheering to the left, two blasts; if by reversing, three blasts. A, holding on, cannot reply.10
- If B does not give way as required, it is A’s duty to maintain course and speed as long as possible, i.e., until in such proximity that it is no longer possible for B to avert collision unaided. A must then take such steps as in her judgment will best assist in preventing collision,11 indicating any change in course or reversal of engines by appropriate signal of one, two, or three blasts.12
- Under inland and pilot rules, effective in prescribed inland waters of the United States and dependencies:
- A must hold course and speed across B’s bow, unless and until B’s wrongful action forces her into the jaws of a collision.13
- A should announce her intention of holding course and speed by sounding one short blast in a timely manner.14
- B is required to answer with one blast, at least if approach will be within one-half mile.
- B is required to keep out of the way,16 to avoid crossing ahead,17 to cross the stern of the other,18 or if necessary, to slacken her speed or stop or reverse.19
- If B fails to answer A’s signal properly, either ignoring it or answering it with two blasts, or if she apparently fails to give way as required, then the lawful procedure for A is to (1) sound the danger signal,20 (2) repeat the one-blast signal,21 (3) hold course and speed as long as there is still room for B to obey the law, 22 and then (4) take such steps as in her judgment will best assist in preventing collision,23 sounding three short blasts if she reverses her engines.24
Article 12, inland rules, is identical with art. 12, international rules,25 and A may, therefore, make use of a flare-up light or a detonating signal, if desired. However, such a signal is not required, no vessel has ever been held at fault for failure to use it, and its efficiency in arousing B to her duty when A's crossing and danger signals are not effective is very questionable. The footnote of art. 21, international rules,26 is missing in the inland rules, and authority for A to change Course when in the jaws of collision comes from art. 27, inland rules, and pilot rule XI.27
It will be observed that while both at sea and in inland waters of the United States, A is expected to cross B's bow and B is forbidden to cross A's bow, whenever there is risk of collision, yet the proper action of the vessels under international rules and under inland and pilot rules appears to differ in the following definite respects:
International Rules
- A maintains whistle silence.
- B sounds one short blast if turning to star board, two short blasts if turning to port, and maintains whistle silence unless changing course or reversing engines.
- In case of misunderstanding, A can only rely on a flare-up light or a detonating signal attract B's attention, an optional signal.
- B may clear A in any way except to cross her bow, i.e., by sheering right or left, slowing down, stopping, or reversing.
Inland and Pilot Rules
- A sounds one short blast.
- B answers one blast of A with one blast. Or she may initiate the one-blast signal.
- In case of misunderstanding, either vessel must sound the danger signal. This is not optional but required, and failure to use it is legal fault.
- B must clear A by altering course to starboard to go under A's stern, or by slowing down, stopping, or reversing.
An examination of the cases discloses two common misconceptions of the law in regard to the crossing situation among navigators. The first of these is that the application of the crossing rule is modified by art. 27, the special circumstance rule, to such an extent that whenever the privileged vessel recognizes any risk of collision whatever, she immediately has complete discretion as to whether or not she will attempt to cross ahead. The second common error is the assumption that, by using a two-blast signal first, the burdened vessel obtains an enforceable right to cross ahead.
In regard to the first point, there are many navigators who openly express the belief that, even when they have the right of way, in a close situation the safest plan is to yield it at once upon the slightest evidence of dispute. The trouble with this in practice is that oftentimes it may lead us into the very collision we are seeking to avoid, with the stigma of legal liability added to physical injury. The road hog is a notorious bluffer, and there is always the danger that his intention to usurp the right of way may weaken, and he may sheer suddenly to starboard in conformity with the requirement just at the time the privileged vessel slows down or sheers to port to avoid him, with incriminating consequences to the latter if collision ensues. The moral culpability of the privileged vessel in such a case may be slight, but legally she will be held as guilty as the other, and may even be found solely at fault.
With the law on this point as specific as it is—and art. 19 is identical under international and inland rules—the courts could hardly decide otherwise. The crossing rule represents the second of two distinct methods of procedure prescribed in the rules when two vessels approach each other so as to involve risk of collision. The first requires each vessel to take some positive action which has the effect of changing her status quo. It is illustrated by the rules that govern when vessels meet head and head. Both must alter course to starboard, both are equally bound to signal, neither can claim, under inland rules, that the other should have whistled first. The second method is based on the assumption that one vessel shall maintain her status quo, and that any positive action to avoid collision shall be taken by the other. It is illustrated by the rules when one vessel overtakes another, or a steamer meets a sailing vessel, or a sailing vessel running free meets another close-hauled, or two steamers meet on crossing courses. The whole theory of such rules is that collision is less likely to occur if one vessel is directed to avoid the other and the other is then required to continue exactly what she is doing. The theory breaks down the moment the burdened vessel cannot rely with certainty on the faithful adherence to course and speed by the privileged vessel. It is for this reason, of course, that we have art. 21,28 and that is why the courts invariably excuse an otherwise blameless burdened vessel which can prove it was handicapped in its efforts to avoid the other by a change of course or speed on the part of that vessel.29
An examination of the decisions on this point should convince the most skeptical as to the validity of the doctrine in the eyes of the courts. As early as 1873, under the old rules, the Federal Court declared,
Mere apprehension of danger of collision will not justify change of course in a vessel whose duty under the rules is to keep her course. A change should only be made where there is actual danger.30
Again, in the case of the Norfolk, where a privileged vessel slowed down because of a third vessel with tow 1,200 feet beyond the intersection point, it was said,
The duty of the privileged vessel to keep its course and speed is as definite and precise as the duty of the burdened vessel to keep out of the way.31
The United States Supreme Court would seem to have decided this question with finality when it held that,
When two steam vessels are crossing so as to involve risk of collision, it is not only the right, but the duty of the privileged vessel under pant rules, art. 19, to hold her course and speed until a departure from the rule is necessary to avoid immediate danger, and the fact that subsequent events show that stopping and backing on the part of the privileged vessel would have avoided collision does not prove negligence.32
Two very recently decided cases, one in the Circuit Court of Appeals, have reaffirmed this principle. In the Boston Socony, the Circuit Court said,
The privileged vessel is always in a difficult situation. The rule is that she must keep her course and speed until it becomes apparent that the burdened vessel cannot alone avoid the collision,33
and in the Frederick H, the district court of New York, held that,
A privileged schooner on a crossing course with a tug and on the tug's starboard bow was bound to keep her course and speed until it was apparent that the burdened tug could not avoid the collision.34
The belief that an initial two-blast signal by the burdened vessel confers upon her the right of way is a misconception of the rules which seems to be common in inland waters, particularly in busy harbors where there is a great deal of cross traffic. Thus, in San Francisco Bay and in New York Harbor this signal is frequently used. Whatever may be a local custom, it is never safe to assume that it can displace a positive statutory provision. As held in a very old case,
If there is a custom which permits Sound steamers to claim exemption from the operation of this article and art. 16 of the international regulations when approaching the ferries in the East River on the ebb tide, such custom is opposed to law, and cannot prevail.35
However, notwithstanding local custom, the practice is at least questionable, and every navigator who makes use of it should fully understand its legal and judicial significance.
In the first place, there is nothing either expressed or implied in the inland or pilot flues to justify a two-blast signal by either vessel in the crossing situation. On the contrary, the privileged vessel is directed to hold her course and speed; the pilot rules specifically authorize the one-blast signal as a means of notifying the other vessel that such is her intention; and the additional provision in the pilot rules that signals shall be given and answered seems to require a like response of one blast from the burdened vessel. It is true that there was at one time a pilot rule which permitted vessel having the other on her starboard hand to proceed if it could be done with risk of collision, and provided a two-blast signal therefor; but even this was regarded as contrary to the spirit of the crossing rule, and was repealed after being invalidated by the Federal Court in the following language:
Rule 9 of the Board of Inspectors, approved by the Secretary of Commerce and Labor Feb. 25, 1907, which permits the vessel having the other on her starboard hand to cross the bows of the other if it can be done without risk of collision, is invalid, as repugnant to the starboard hand rule.36
In the second place, if the burdened vessel, assuming that she has ample time to cross ahead, initiates the two-blast signal which in the absence of any statutory provision can have no sanction but that of local custom, she thereby expresses an admission that risk of collision exists, and lays herself open to the charge of proposing a violation of the law. Recognizing this, the courts have repeatedly ruled that such action is at best no more than a proposal which the other vessel is under no obligation to accept; that unless and until the proposal is agreed to by the other, as indicated by a reply of two blasts, the privileged vessel must hold on; and that even after such agreement the burdened vessel assumes any risk of carrying out the maneuver.
The following decisions, some of them antedating the present rules for inland waters, are ample evidence of the attitude of the courts on this question:
If a burdened steamer, by her signals, invites a departure from the ordinary rules of navigation she takes the risk both of her own whistles being heard, and, in turn, of hearing the response, if a response is made, and of the success of the maneuver.37
Two whistles given in reply to a signal of two whistles from a steamer bound to keep out of the way mean only assent to the latter’s course at her own risk, and an agreement to do nothing to thwart her. It does not relieve the latter of her statutory duty to keep out of the way; but when collision becomes imminent, both are bound to do all they can to avoid it whether the previous signals were of two whistles or one. If imminent risk of collision is involved in the maneuver assented to, and the maneuver was unnecessary, both are responsible for agreeing on a hazardous attempt.38
When the boat having the right of way fails to respond to the signal of the boat whose duty it is to keep out of the way, the latter has no right to assume, because of such silence, that the former abandons her right of way.39
The failure of the privileged vessel to assent to a signal contrary to the rule is equivalent to a dissent which holds the burdened vessel bound to observe the starboard rule.40
The privileged vessel is not required either by inspectors’ rules or by inland rules to answer the burdened vessel’s signals if she does not assent thereto.41
The privileged vessel is entitled to assume that, although the burdened vessel may at first propose to exchange rights of way, it will, if such a proposal be rejected, conform to the rules of navigation.42
In the light of these decisions the risk in the use of an initial two-blast signal by the burdened vessel is apparent, and should always be avoided. Certainly it can never be legally justified when the vessels are approaching each other so as to involve risk of collision; and when it is possible for the vessel having the other to starboard to pass so far ahead of the other that risk of collision may be deemed not to exist, whistle signals are not only unnecessary but are better omitted.
If, as sometimes happens, the privileged vessel offers to yield the right of way by blowing two blasts first, the situation with regard to the burdened vessel is somewhat different. Once the burdened vessel assents to the arrangement by answering with two whistles and the desired agreement is thus established by the interchange of signals, she becomes, in a sense, the privileged vessel, though not under the same legal obligation as a privileged vessel to hold her course and speed. In a crossing collision between a tug and a ferryboat in New York Harbor in 1903, where the privileged tug gave two blasts and then failed to go astern of the ferry, the courses being almost at right angles, the Circuit Court of Appeals held that,
An agreement by signal, initiated by the privileged vessel, by which she was to pass under the other’s stem, justified the latter in keeping her course and speed.43
However, in another crossing collision in the North River, decided fourteen years later, in which the vessels were crossing at a fine angle, the Circuit Court of Appeals held both vessels at fault, involving the burdened vessel for not co-operating with the privileged vessel to avoid collision by also altering course. The court found that,
When a privileged vessel proposes that the burdened vessel cross her bows and gets an as sent to such proposal, she assumes the risk of the proposal . . . the case is one of special circumstances, and the burdened vessel is not rigidly bound to keep her course and speed.44
An interesting side light on the legal complexities which are introduced when the privileged vessel initiates the two-blast signal, the signal is accepted, and a collision follows, is revealed in the deliberations of the Circuit judges in the case just cited:
It is good law that when the burdened vessel decides to keep out of the way by crossing the bows of the privileged vessel, though she gets an assent to such a proposal, she assumes the risks, involved in choosing that method. The duty of the privileged vessel in such cases is to co-operate and she need not keep her course. The situation, at least in this circuit, after the agreement, is one of special circumstances. But such an agreement initiated by the privileged and assented to by the burdened vessel, might be regarded as creating other duties. It could be considered as a proposal, that the duties of the vessels should be reversed, and that the burdened (now the privileged) vessel hold her course and speed, so that the privileged (now the burdened) vessel might be able to forecast her positions at future moments precisely as the rule requires when no agreement has been made.
We have been unable to find much in the books that touches on this precise point. In the Susquehanna, 35 F 320, the burdened vessel was exonerated because she did not "thwart" the Proposal, having apparently kept her course. On the other hand, in the Columbia, 29 F 716, Judge Brown thought it a matter of indifference which vessel proposed the change; the burden always remaining upon the vessel originally burdened. In Stetson v. the Gladiator, 41 F 927, Judge Nelson said that the exchange justified the burdened vessel in keeping her course.
In none of these cases was the originally burdened vessel held to any duty to keep her course. On the whole we are disposed to think that any agreement to change the usual rules should be treated as creating thereafter a position of special circumstances. If so, we think that, although the proposal emanates from the privileged vessel, and should be taken as meaning that she will undertake actively to keep out of the way, it need not absolve the burdened vessel from her similar and original duty also to keep out of the way, nor will it impose on her a rigid duty to hold her course and speed. It is true that that duty is imposed by the rule generally as a correlative to the duty to keep out of the way, but only in cases where no agreement has been reached. Some convention is essential when neither knows the other's purposes, but where both have agreed upon a maneuver by an exchange of signals their accord should be left for execution by movements adapted to the circumstances. For example, if the angle of crossing is wide, it will usually be best for the originally burdened vessel to hold her course and speed; but if it be narrow, it is safest for both to starboard and pass at a greater distance. No doubt the proposal involves the proposer in a duty to give a wide enough margin for safety, even though the assenting vessel does not starboard.
The foregoing discussion shows that even the seasoned admiralty judges of the Circuit Court are sometimes compelled to struggle with the intricacies of the law of crossing. If a single useful fact emerges from the involved discussion in this decision it is that changing the lawful signal by both vessels has the important effect of destroying the right of way of one of them, and making her share with the vessel contemplated by the rules the burden of avoiding collision. This in itself is an excellent argument, in the crossing situation, for sticking to the procedure in practice provided by law.
From the viewpoint of the privileged vessel, for her to initiate the two-blast signal must appear as a very foolish act. For she is either suggesting that in her opinion the vessel to port already has ample clearance, in which case the signal is superfluous, or else she is giving notice to the burdened vessel that she (the privileged vessel) proposes to waive her privilege and act contrary to the law, in which case, if the other assents by answering with two blasts, she is bound to do her part in carrying out the maneuver. Moreover, she is taking the chance that the burdened vessel may not assent, and until an assent is received she must continue to hold course and speed. As was said in a New York case decided just recently,
In order to change a situation of this kind from the situation of a privileged and a burdened vessel to a situation of special circumstance, it is necessary that the burdened vessel should reply with an identical signal and accept the privileged vessel’s waiver of the privilege; otherwise the privileged vessel would never know how she should navigate.45
In the writer’s opinion, not only should the privileged vessel scrupulously avoid proposing a two-blast crossing signal but she should be very chary about assenting when it is proposed by the burdened vessel. It would be unwise to lay down an arbitrary rule here, and the individual case must be decided on its merits, remembering that avoidance of collision is always the prime desideratum. The navigator must determine, in the particular instance, which of three actions involves the least risk; (1) agreeing to the proposal with two answering blasts; (2) ignoring the proposal by whistle silence; (3) insisting, by one blast, on obedience to the rules; in which case, although the pilot rule against answering two blasts with one or one blast with two has been declared invalid in cases where the original signal is improper,46 the single blast should, nevertheless, be preceded by the danger signal. However, when adopting the first action it should be borne in mind that while a privileged vessel is not in fault, according to the Circuit Court of Appeals, for holding her course even though she fails to receive a response to her first signal of one whistle,47 if she assents to the crossing of her bows by the other vessel she waives her privilege absolutely.48 When she assents to this by repeating the two whistles, it is her duty at once to assist the maneuver, a point which the United States Supreme Court, on appeal, declined to review.49 Finally, a vessel which assents by signal that another shall cross her bows cannot urge the attempted maneuver as a fault, though it results in a collision.50 These decisions make it evident that even an undisputed acceptance of an irregular proposal carries with it certain risks.
The navigator is sometimes puzzled to know just how close a vessel approaching from starboard must be to make the law of crossing apply. It will be noted that art. 1951 is applicable in both inland and outside waters when vessels are crossing so as to involve risk of collision. In another part of the rules we are told that risk of collision can, when circumstances permit, be ascertained by carefully watching the compass bearing of an approaching vessel, and that if the bearing does not appreciably change such risk should be deemed to exist. This should not be taken to imply that obtaining a series of bearings of an approaching vessel is an absolute test of risk of collision. It is undoubtedly a valid test to the extent that if the bearings observed are constant, collision will occur if neither vessel changes course or speed, and consequently, vessels have been held at fault for failure to take such bearings as a precautionary measure.52 But it does not follow that in all cases where the bearing is changing, no risk of collision is involved. As said by the Circuit Court of Appeals,
This section is not a rule of navigation, but merely a suggestion of one circumstance which denotes that there is danger of collision; and a steamer is not justified in assuming that there is no risk because there is an appreciable change in the compass bearing of the lights of a sailing vessel seen at night, which would manifestly be an unwarranted assumption under some circumstances.53
Thus, in the crossing situation, the bearings of a vessel on the starboard bow may be constant, indicating that the two vessels will reach the point of intersection at the same time; they may be drawing ahead, indicating the privileged vessel will reach the point of intersection first; or they may be drawing aft, indicating the burdened vessel will reach that point first. The rapidity of change in bearing depends on the distance apart and the relative speeds of the two vessels. It would be a mistake to assume that only in the first case is there risk of collision. It is title that if the bearings of the privileged vessel draw ahead with a certain degree of rapidity, there is a presumption that she will have clearance across the bow of the burdened vessel; but this does not relieve the latter of her obligation to watch the privileged vessel closely, and to slow down or stop or reverse, if necessary, before coming into dangerous proximity. Conversely, if the bearings of the privileged vessel draw aft with sufficient rapidity, there is a presumption that the burdened vessel might cross with safety; but wide indeed must be the margin in that case before she is legally justified in making the attempt. As a matter of law, it must be wide enough so that no risk of collision is involved; as a matter of practice and of common prudence, it should be wide enough so that no collision can occur no matter what the other vessel does.
This is a sweeping statement, but its validity is established by court decisions in both the United States and in England. As early as 1869 the Supreme Court held that,
Rules of navigation such as have been mentioned (as to the duties of two vessels approaching each other) are obligatory upon such vessels when approaching each other from the time the necessity for precaution begins; and they continue to be applicable as the vessels advance so long as the means and opportunity to avoid the danger remain. They do not apply to a vessel required to keep her course after the approach is so near that collision is inevitable, and are equally inapplicable to vessels of every description while they are yet so distant from each other that measures of precaution have not become necessary to avoid collision.54
This decision was referred to by the district court of Michigan in a Great Lakes case a short time later, and amplified in the following unmistakable language:
Risk of collision begins the very moment when the two vessels have approached so near each other and upon such courses that by departure from the rules of navigation, whether from want of good seamanship, accident, mistake, misapprehension of signals, or otherwise, a collision might be brought about. It is true that prima facie each man has a right to assume that the other will obey the law. But this does not justify either in shutting his eyes to what the other may actually do, or in omitting to do what he can to avoid an accident made imminent by the acts of the other. I say the right above spoken of is prima facie merely, because it is well known that departure from the law not only may, but does, take place, and often. Risk of collision may be said to begin the moment the two vessels have approached each other so near that a collision might be brought about by any such departure and continues up to the moment when they have so far progressed that no such result can ensue. But independently of this, the idea that there was no risk of collision is fully exploded by the fact that there was a collision.55
Similarly, in the case of the Philadelphia, the district court said,
The term “risk of collision” has a different meaning from the phrase “immediate danger” and means “chance,” “peril,” “hazard,” or “danger of collision”; and there is risk of collision whenever it is not clearly safe to go on.56
Two statements from decisions of Dr. Lushington, famous admiralty jurist of the mid-nineteenth century, will suffice to show the English parallel of this doctrine. In a case in 1851 he said,
This chance of collision is not to be scanned by a point or two. We have held over and over again that if there be a reasonable chance of collision it is quite sufficient,
and in another case,
The whole evidence shows that it was the duty of the Colonia, with the wind free, to have made certain of avoiding the Susan. She did not do so, but kept her course till she was at so short a distance of a cable and a half’s length (900 feet) in the hope the vessels might pass each other. Now it can never be allowed to a vessel to enter into nice calculations of this kind, which must be attended with some risk, whilst it has the power to adopt, long before the collision, measures which would render it impossible.57
It was such an interpretation of the term risk of collision which caused the Circuit Court of Appeals to reverse the lower court in a New York Harbor collision between the tug Ashley and the tug Volunteer. The district court absolved the Volunteer on the theory that the starboard hand rule did not apply to her because it appeared that there was time for her to get across before the courses would intersect; but the Circuit Court of Appeals, in reversing the decision, said,
The starboard hand rule is intended to avoid just such speculations. When the courses as being steered are crossing courses they involve risk of collision and the burdened vessel is required to keep out of the way and the privileged vessel to hold her course and speed. The account given by the master of the Volunteer brings the situation precisely within this article. Arts. 19 and 21.58
Perhaps in the very nature of the case common sense would permit no other interpretation. For in the final analysis, it is as logical to place an absolute obligation upon one vessel not to cross ahead as upon the other vessel to maintain course and speed. And when a collision occurs because a burdened vessel that thought she had time to get across is hit by a privileged vessel that sheered to the right in an ill-timed attempt to clear her, the courts cannot consistently find that one was under compulsion to hold course and speed if they do not find that the other was equally under compulsion to avoid crossing her bow. In accordance with a very old doctrine when two vessels are at fault, the decision can only be an equal division of damages.
If we exclude all those cases which frequently arise in crowded harbors where the presence of a third, or even other additional vessels, creates special circumstances modifying the rules, then we may draw a very practical lesson from the foregoing decisions, namely, the manifest danger of crossing a vessel to starboard unless she is so far away that it would be impossible for her to bring about a collision. If she is that far away, the navigator need not worry about proper signals: no crossing signal is either authorized or permitted, for there is no risk of collision.
1 “Critique of American Collision Law,” Sept., 1933, Proceedings; “Conflicting Signals—A Critical Analysis,” Mar., 1934, Proceedings.
2 For a vessel held at fault for failure to observe the inland rules in the waters of Southeastern Alaska see the Admiral Watson, 266 F 122.
3 The international rules are expressly made to govern in the inland waters of Canada, the Great Lakes excepted, by parliamentary act, Feb. 9, 1897.
4 Article 21, international rules: Where, by any of these rules, one of two vessels is to keep out of the way the other shall keep her course and speed. Note—When in consequence of thick weather or other causes, such vessel finds herself so close that collision cannot be avoided by the action of the giving-way vessel alone, she also shall take such action as will best aid to avert collision. [See arts. 27 and 29.]
5 Article 28, international rules: The words “short blast” used in this article shall mean a blast of about one second’s duration.
When vessels are in sight of one another, a steam vessel under way, in taking any course authorized or required by these rules, shall indicate that course by the following signals on her whistle or siren, namely:
One short blast to mean, “I am directing my course to starboard.”
Two short blasts to mean, “I am directing my course to port.”
Three short blasts to mean, “My engines are going at full speed astern.”
6 Article 12, international rules: Every vessel may, if necessary in order to attract attention, in addition to the lights which she is by these rules required to carry, show a flare-up light or use any detonating signal that cannot be mistaken for a distress signal.
7 Article 19, international rules: When two steam vessels are crossing so as to involve risk of collision, the vessel which has the other on her own starboard side shall keep out of the way of the other.
8 Article 22, international rules: Every vessel which is directed by these rules to keep out of the way of another vessel shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, avoid crossing ahead of the other.
9 Article 23, international rules: Every steam vessel which is directed by these rules to keep out of the way of another vessel shall, on approaching her, if necessary, slacken her speed or stop or reverse.
10 Article 28, international rules. See footnote 5.
11 Article 21, international rules, Note. See footnote 4.
12 Article 28, international rules. See footnote 5.
13 Article 21, inland rules: Where, by any of these rules, one of the two vessels is to keep out of the way, the other shall keep her course and speed.
Pilot rule VII: When two steam vessels are approaching each other at right angles or obliquely so as to involve risk of collision, other than when one steam vessel is overtaking another, the steam vessel which has the other on her own port side shall hold her course and speed; and the steam vessel which has the other on her own starboard side shall keep out of the way of the other by directing her course to starboard so as to cross the stern of the other steam vessel, or, if necessary to do so, slacken her speed or stop or reverse.
14 The signal section, pilot rules, provides as follows: One short blast of the whistle signifies intention to direct course to own starboard, except when two steam vessels are approaching each other at right angles or obliquely, when it signifies intention of steam vessel which is to starboard of the other to hold course and speed. See also the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals in the West Hartland, 295 F 547, in which the signal is held mandatory; and the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals in the Boston Socony (NY 1933) 63 F (21) 246, in which the signal is held permissive but not mandatory. Until the Circuit Courts of Appeal agree on this point, or the Supreme Court decides it, the navigator in inland waters should act on the theory that he cannot go wrong in using the signal, and may be held at fault if he does not use it.
15 The signals for passing, by the blowing of the whistle shall be given and answered by pilots, in compliance with these rules, not only when meeting "head and head," or nearly so, but at all times, when the steam vessels are in sight of each other, when passing or meeting at a distance within half a mile of each other, and whether passing to the starboard or port.—Pilot rule III.
16 Article 19, inland rules: When two steam vessels are crossing so as to involve risk of collision, the vessel which has the other on her own starboard side shall keep out of the way of the other. Cf. pilot rule VII (see footnote 13).
17 Article 22, inland rules: Every vessel which is directed by these rules to keep out of the way of another vessel shall, if the circumstances admit, avoid crossing ahead of the other. Same as pilot rule IX, except the latter specifies every steam vessel.
18 Pilot rule VII. See second paragraph, footnote 13.
19 Article 23, inland rules: Every steam vessel which is directed by these rules to keep out of the way of another vessel shall, on approaching her, if necessary, slacken her speed or stop or reverse.
20 Article 18, rule III: If, when steam vessels are approaching each other, either vessel fails to understand the course or intention of the other, from any cause, the vessel so in doubt shall immediately signify the same by giving several short and rapid blasts, not less than four, of the steam whistle. Same as pilot rule I, except the latter adds the danger signal.
21 Boyers Sons Co. v. U.S. (NY 1912) 115 CCA 400; The Elizabeth (NY 1902) 116 F 225; The Felix Taussig (Ore. 1925) 5 F (2d) 612; The Nereus, 23 F 448.
22 The Norfolk (Aid 1924) 297 F 251; The General U.S. Grant (NY 1873) Fed Cas No. 5,320; The Boston (1922) 258 US 622, 66 L. Ed. 796.
23 The George S. Schultz, 84 F 508.
24 Article 28, inland rules: When vessels are in sight of one another a steam vessels under way whose engines are going at full speed astern shall indicate that fact by three short blasts on the whistle. (This rule is repeated in the pilot rules, signal section, last paragraph.)
25 See footnote 6.
26 See footnote 4.
27 Article 27, inland rules (identical with pilot rule XI) provides: In obeying and construing these rules due regard shall be had to all dangers of navigation and collision, and to any special circumstances which may render a departure from the above rules necessary in order to avoid immediate danger.
28 See footnotes 4 and 13.
29 The Morristown (NY 1922) 278 F 714; The Elizabeth, 197 F 160; The Northfield 154 US 629.
30 The General U. S. Grant (NY 1873) Fed Cas No. 5,320.
31 The Norfolk (Md 1924) 297 F 251.
32 The Boston (NY 1921) 258 US 622, 66 L. Ed. 796.
33 The Boston Socony (NY 1933) 63 F (2d) 246.
34 The Frederick II (1934) 4 F Supp 593. 35 The Pequot (1887) 30 F 839; The Mohegan (1899) 105 F 1003.
36 The Pawnee (NY 1909) 168 F 371.
37 Hamilton v. The John King, (1891) 49 F 469; The Admiral, 39 F 574.
38 The Nereus (NY 1885) 23 F 448.
39 The Pavonia (NY 1885) 26 F 106.
40 The Eldorado (NY 1896) 32 CCA 464.
41 The Montauk (NY 1910) 180 F 697.
42 L. Boyers Sons Co. v. United States (NY 1912) 195 F 490.
43 The Edwin I. Bertoind (NY 1906) 144 F 6454.
44 The Newburgh (NY 1921) 273 F 436.
45 The Penn. Ry. Co. No. 541 (1934) 7 F Supp 208; also the Elizabeth, 197 F 160.
46 The Transfer No. 15, 145 F 503; Yamashita Risen Kabushiki Kaisha, (CCA 1927) 20 F (2d) 25; The Norfolk, 297 F 251.
47 The E. H. Coffin, Fed Cas No. 4, 310.
48 The Sammie (NY 1889) 37 F 907; The Albatross, (1910) 184 F 363.
49 The Boston (NY 1921) 258 US 622, 66 L. Ed. 796.
50 The Arthur M. Palmer (NY 1902) 115 F 417.
51 See footnotes 7 and 16.
52 The President Lincoln (1911) 12 Asp MC 41.
53 Wilders SS. Co. v. Low (Hawaii 1911) 112 F 161.
54 The Wenona, 19 Wall. 41.
55 The Milwaukee (1871) Fed Cas No. 9,626.
56 The Philadelphia (1912) 199 F 299.
57 Marsden’s Collisions, 8th ed., p. 302.
58 The Ashley (NY 1915) 221 F 423.