About the time that Mr. Fletcher Pratt’s highly interesting article, “A Naval War Game and a Formula,” appeared in the Proceedings for December, 1932, describing how a group of east coast American naval enthusiasts had devised their own naval Kriegsspiel, a similar game, which by that time had reached the stage of a continuous campaign in miniature, was in full swing in an American west coast city. The group of civilians who had in this case come together and organized an informal naval war game club were students of a western university and members of the Naval R.O.T.C. unit of their institution. With a background of interest in maritime affairs carried over from high-school days, and stimulated by the naval science course and by the naval literature available in three well-stocked libraries close at hand, the game itself was the result of a chance suggestion made two years ago. The beginnings were primitive enough, being paper and pencil contests with simple rules; but as this did not satisfy the originators when they moved on to more complex questions, further development was not long in coming. As more students became interested, and more reading on the subject of Kriegsspiel was done, the evolution of the game set in at an increasing pace, so that it was not more than six months before the group attempted a general campaign in miniature. This latter feature contributed to the general interest, especially as it permitted the students to make use of their studies in history, political science, geography, and economics, besides those in naval science. The “campaign” was, of course, taken “from life,” being an imaginary war between two leading world sea powers. And if time was thus diverted from the prescribed college studies, yet no permanent harm was done in the opinion of the participants. The experience gained, especially in geography, was ample compensation for the “liberal education” lost.
While the method of conducting the “campaign” is still very much as it was in the beginning, the set of tactical rules of the game (ship vs. ship, ship vs. air and shore forces) is the latest and most complicated of a series of such sets. There is nothing rigid or eternal about any feature of the game, strategic or tactical, as the guiding principle is to adhere to reality as much as an amateur’s knowledge and existing facilities permit.
The latest and most elaborate campaign was rather unceremoniously launched at a general business meeting of the group- Here the members agreed between whom the “next war” was to be fought, and selected the umpire and the personnel of the competing sea powers. After a brief survey of the political, geographic, and economic conditions pertaining to the chosen theater of operations, the initial situation and other sundry details were settled by mutual consent. With the closing of this meeting the “war was on”; thereafter “once friends were now foes” and only the umpire was left in a position to overlook the whole field of operations. Actual “warfare” began in earnest after each side had studied its naval, geographic, and economic strengths and weaknesses, had reviewed and weighed the facts thus derived, had drawn up its plans of campaign and battle, and had submitted the results of these deliberations—its dispositions for “zero hour” and proposed moves for a designated period in advance—to the umpire. The next move then lay with this “obnoxious” but highly respected and all-powerful third party, who, after reading and comparing the reports, would either inform the rival "powers" to proceed as planned to a certain date and then submit movement reports for another designated period thereafter, or, if his strategic plotting sheet told him of possible contacts, to cease operations at a certain date and await further events at the next meeting. It was at the meetings, of course, that "fighting" was done. Sometimes the umpire would demand more information which he always got. Each side had the right to submit requests for intelligence reports on the enemy; each detail had to be accompanied with a statement of how that intelligence was being derived (scouts, agents, etc.). It lay in the discretion of the umpire to answer these requests as he saw fit. Sometimes, though in rare instances, the replies contained more than one had asked for. Scouting contact reports from one's own aircraft, submarines, and the like, came in from the umpire at intervals determined by the communications schedule previously submitted. The contents of this correspondence covered a wide range of subjects, from fleet and ship movements through to commercial and military orders placed in neutral countries. At times the requests for information by the umpire were rather mystifying, but since it was the umpire's duty not to give away what would be unknown in reality, experience showed that it was safer to rely on intelligence reports from him than to draw conclusions from what was being asked by him. It lay within his rights to ask for irrelevant details if he thought that any particular side was attempting to "interpret" his inquiries. This system of dealing with intelligence and information, always a rather intangible quantity under the conditions of a war game, worked out to the complete satisfaction of the group. After the "archives" had been opened at the conclusion of "hostilities," each one could see for himself how realistically this subject had been handled and how well it stood comparison with what has been published regarding naval intelligence during and after the World War. It was only then that the contestants realized how well they had been able to judge their “enemy” and to what extent they had remained in the dark concerning his movements and intentions. Thus the strategic end of the game was taken care of between regular meetings of the group. Each meeting usually produced a new situation, after which the same procedure would be followed until sufficient contacts had been made to enable the umpire to call for a new meeting.
The strategic references were voluminous enough, including as they did literature on naval history, strategy and tactics, geography (including a mass of Hydrographic Office material), current political and naval political periodicals and data on the economics of the “war area,” but they do not compare to the array of “weapons” necessary to decide the issue on and off the game board.
The most picturesque item of the game- board equipment is undoubtedly the collection of ship models, gradually built up at home ever since these miniature wars began. At present this collection includes minute replicas of every major and most of the minor warships of two of the world’s leading sea powers along with liners and typical cargo and oil carriers of the respective merchant navies. They are fashioned out of pine wood. Glue, pins, and varnish are the other building materials. A penknife, small drills, razor blades, and various grades of sandpaper constitute the “navy yard.” Because of the limitations of space and the method of game- board work, the rather small scale of 1:3600 was selected; this resulted in making average destroyer models around an inch and an 880-foot aircraft carrier a little less than three inches in length. Plans were drawn from good broadside and aerial photographs appearing in the Proceedings, the press, and in such naval annuals as Jane's Fighting Ships and Weyer’s Taschenbuch der Kriegsflotten. All essential external features, save the turret guns, were provided for, so that the models give fairly good recognition silhouettes from all angles and from the “air.” The importance of this feature will become apparent later on. Since the games were conducted indoors and often at night with ordinary artificial illumination, it was found that the most accurate “visibility” effect with the spacing used was obtained with the models finished in varnish instead of in paint. By choosing arbitrary distance scales, one can use these compact little models to lay out complex formations within a surprisingly small space.
Though not much time has been left for extra features, a beginning has been made in providing scenery for certain phases of naval and amphibian warfare with the introduction of models portraying sinking vessels and navy-yard structures and buildings. The representation of atolls and mountainous islands is under consideration.
Along with these model navies is a collection of ships’ data, compiled from three naval annuals and other sources and supplemented by armor and gun distribution plans for the various categories. Allowances are made for variations from the specifications of the original designs due to age and alterations. Data, as far as it could be determined, on the characteristics and performance of weapons not represented in miniature, such as ordnance, aircraft, torpedoes, mines, shore forces and fortifications, etc., were also made available and kept up to date for the two contesting sides. Next comes another compilation entitled Gunnery and Damage Tables. This traditional designation, once quite accurate, does not do justice to the present mass of material in the pamphlet. While its full description would take pages, an idea of it may be gained from some of the contents: a collection of “hit diagrams” for typical ships of the various warship types with tables on probability and positions of hits to match these; a series of tables giving percentage of gunnery hits against the arguments of gun caliber, range, angle of fall of shell, and size of target (also with straight danger space readings); other tables giving times of flight and rate of fire for various calibers with different mounts and ranges, supplemented by penetration-range curves. Most of the data, which were taken as a standard and to which known or assumed variations were applied in setting up the ordnance tables of the equipment of the nations each side represented, were obtained from published information of British armament firms. A formula and table for torpedo fire, the same for the effect of anti-aircraft guns and aircraft of all known types, time-spaced-distance tables and curves for ships and planes, a “visibility curve” (the distance of the theoretical horizon for different altitudes), and a series of smaller tables for quickly determining the issue in minor combats are some other much used features of this pamphlet. The list of equipment is closed with the following game-board materials for the present set of rules:
- A game board, 20 by 25 feet, ruled in 8-inch squares, with convenient co-ordinates marked. Scale taken as 8 inches equal to 2,000 yards.
- A number of scales, of various convenient lengths, calibrated to the above scale in yards and nautical miles.
- Two “spotting glasses,” really field glasses of similar power used in reverse.
- Two stop watches and an ordinary watch or clock.
- Tufts of cotton glued to J-inch cardboard squares, the tufts being of various proportional heights to denote “splashes” of different calibers (white in color to denote “no hit,” brown for “hit,” and red to show gun flashes from shore works).
- Cotton pasted to frames of different dimensions to simulate smoke screens, loose cotton for smoke and gas clouds, colored as required.
- A road-measuring instrument (used in military map work) to determine the distance traveled by ships on curved courses.
- Protractors (some with strings to lay off or Pleasure bearings), slide rules, position plotting sheets, draughting boards and sets, scales (to 1/100 inch), gunnery lists, order and message slips, and other writing materials.
The procedure of game-board work is initiated by the umpire’s decision that the movements of the rival forces, as per current routine reports from both sides, are leading to contact. The meetings of the group as a whole were reserved for the tactical or "battle" end of the game, While the strategic work, referred to above, was usually done outside and between such meetings, though the members of each Side held conferences of their own. If the Impending contacts were between forces of sufficient importance, the umpire would call for board work, otherwise either arbitrary settlement or tabular methods were resorted to.
Assuming for the sake of illustration, that a situation has arisen which promises .action between important forces engaged m the "war." The rival sides arrive at the Meeting place and set up their "headquarters" in separate rooms, while the umpire and any assistants he may have direct the necessary preparations. The rival sides have made their estimates of the situation from the course of the campaign, their strategic and tactical plans, their dispositions and whatever their intelligence and scouting arrangements entitle them to know up to the "date" and tune" at which the meeting is to open. As a rule, each naval force is laid out with the models on tables in whatever formation the real forces would be assuming for any particular time. These table formations were usually in "headquarters" room and were invaluable to contestants and umpire in supplementing the chart and plotting-sheet record of ship and force movements. Weather and visibility conditions were determined by the umpire, subject to the meteorological data available concerning the prevailing weather conditions for the locality and season of the scene of conflict.
If the first contacts were by scouts, the umpire called for the “scout” (one of the participants) to come to his desk. If the “scout” was supposed to be in a plane, he would be led to the enemy “headquarters” room and there be given a chance to look through reversed field glasses at the visible portion of the opposing formation from a position calculated to give the same view which would be had from the cockpit. If in a submarine, or surface scouting vessel, the position would be varied to obtain corresponding “heights of eye.” The visibility factor was regulated by blanking off by means of screens those vessels not in view, and by varying the intensity of illumination. The umpire determined by table or otherwise how long the observer could look, and whether the scouting craft got away or not. Radio traffic with its conflicting features of flashing vital news to the flag and giving away positions to direction finders, along with the chance factors of jamming and receiving messages, received attention.
Preliminary brushes by minor forces were seldom worked out in detail. These included contacts between various types of scouts and the like. Here the umpire would receive “attack slips” (white for surface ships, yellow for aircraft, and green for submarines) from the attacking side giving all pertinent data, such as time, target, attacking forces, brief of plan of attack, etc. He would then inform the enemy and after learning of the countermeasures, decide the outcome.
Actual game-board “warfare” commenced when major vessels drew within sight of one another. Because of limitations, all model ships of the forces engaged were seldom transferred from the tables to the game board, unless the opposing squadrons were numerically small. In fleet engagements and the like, ships not actually engaged in the particular phase under consideration would be left in their relative positions on the tables, and only the units “in action” or closely connected with the phase of battle would be transferred to the game board.
Prior to opening fire, the “commander” (“OTC” and “gunnery officer” combined) of each fleet takes a position slightly ahead of and on the engaged side of his own column. His assistant takes a position abeam of and on the unengaged side of the column. The “commander” is equipped with field glasses, a stop watch (used as a “time-of-flight clock”), gunnery lists, order and communication pad and pencil, while his assistant uses a protractor, small square, and distance scales. The road-measuring instrument may be used by him as required. The assistant umpires have drafting boards and instruments, and large scale cross-section paper; also ledgers in which to record original range and deflection estimates, changes in deflection and range, and times of opening fire, of salvos and of “cease firing.” One of these assistant umpires is assigned to each side. The umpire has the above mentioned Gunnery and Damage Tables, a slide rule, and writing materials for rapid computation of the results of fire, torpedo, and air attack.
The gunnery procedure for one side only will be described in detail. The force “commander” selects a convenient coordinate (which he keeps until the fleet movements force him to change) near the leading ship of the column and calls out the figures to the assistant umpire. This is then marked on the cross-section sheet. After deciding on the selection of targets and distribution of fire (which may be by individual ship or by divisions, depending on the lengths of the opposing columns), he makes his estimate of the course and speed of his targets, puts down the initial entries (range and azimuth bearings) in his gunnery lists and on a slip of paper, and hands the latter to the assistant umpire. He sings out “mark” the instant the salvo is supposed to go off and sets his stop watch going. The assistant umpire plots the estimate, picks off the co-ordinates of the splash or splashes, and calls them out to the enemy assistant who plots them on the floor, marking the positions on the floor with a cross and the number of the salvo. Each “splash” represents the mean center of impact of a salvo pattern, whose dimensions have been determined by the gunnery data. The enemy assistant now moves his ships along the course previously ordered by his chief to the position they will occupy when the salvo lands. All this is done from the time that the assistant umpire receives the salvo data to the instant the “commander” sings out “splash.” The enemy assistant then sets up the tufts of cotton over each marked “center of impact,” allowing them to remain visible for from two to seven seconds, depending on the caliber of the shells “fired.”
Through reversed field glasses the “commander” (who otherwise has little time to observe the enemy because of his gunnery list work and the direction of the movements of his own force) observes the relative positions of splashes and targets, estimates corrections for the next salvo and repeats the procedure for the next salvo. The corrections are in terms of “yards” up or down for range and in “yards” right or left for deflection.
When a salvo lands close enough to a target to be considered a “straddle,” the enemy assistant calls out “straddle.” The umpire halts the game for a period, rechecks the position of the straddling salvo (marked with a brown tuft of cotton), and with the data of range, type of ship, shell caliber, etc., enters the tables and determines the number and positions of hits. He then assigns the damage done, making the details known only to the enemy. The "force commander" can only Judge the damage inflicted from "appearances" (smoke, loss of speed, erratic maneuvering or actual sinking). The umpire keeps a record of the damage sustained by all vessels engaged. Time is also taken out for air and torpedo attacks, the throwing up of smoke screens and the like. Sometimes protracted gunnery duels are divided into phases of say five salvos each, between which rest periods are taken for discussion or reorganization. Salvo and move intervals are prescribed by the umpire; he may also stop the game and order one or both of the contestants out of the game-board room for short periods.
The procedure outlined above is flexible to the extent that arbitrary or tabular methods of deciding the issue were always at hand if things dragged too much, so that the most interesting phases could receive all the necessary attention. In these latter cases it sometimes took a whole evening to work out a quarter of an hour of battle, but this arrangement was well worth it when dealing with the “high spots.” This form of “fighting” provides all the desired detail of a real action, while its records provide ample material for “eye-witness experiences” and “histories.”
This type of miniature sea warfare was gradually evolved during the past twenty- four months. While many of its aspects had to be conducted in an amateur fashion, it has provided many hours of enjoyment and not a few thrilling situations for the participants. The effort devoted to its development may be ascribed to its popularity. It taught the members geography and left them with a fair knowledge of the external appearances and main characteristics of the units of the “engaged” navies. Although “peace” has returned for the moment to the scene of so many “actions” because of the separation of the group, the model fleets remain and they await the call to future campaigns and battles.
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OF ALL THE factors influencing the evolution of naval material, the experiences and records of actual warfare are naturally considered to carry the greatest weight in council: they are, indeed, the only data whose acceptance is indisputable. The claims and achievements put forward in time of peace, however their excellence may have been attested by the most realistic experiments, are all referred to actual war for trial, and are accepted only in so far as they fit in with war experience.—ROBERTSON, The Evolution of Naval Armament.