When the writer was examined for promotion to the grade of lieutenant, he was asked to discuss the occupation of cities. A number of years later, on his examination for the grade of commander, he was asked to describe the organization of a landing force of the strength of one regiment, and to tell how it should be landed, including the measures to be taken for its defense. Although these two questions scarcely scratch the surface of the subject of joint military-naval operations, they serve to indicate that the Navy Department expects naval officers to have some knowledge of the subject.
It is obvious to one who has made a study of naval history that knowledge of the subject of joint military-naval operations is something more than mere general equipment of the naval officer—it is, rather, the foundation and cornerstone of his technical education. Fleets fight battles, and gain victories, but for what purpose? To clear the seas for the movement of troops and trade, to support the Army in its operations at home or abroad.
In the average naval officer's career, the detailed study of joint operations has received scant attention. But recently the Bureau of Navigation ordered eight officers of the line of the Navy to the Marine Corps schools at the Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia. Of the eight officers, one is a lieutenant commander, graduate of the Naval War College, junior course, and of the second-year course of the Marine Corps schools; this officer is now ordered to the staff of the latter school. Three officers are recent graduates of the Naval War College, junior course, and now go to the Marine Corps schools, second-year course, as student officers. The other four officers are graduates of the line postgraduate school at Annapolis, Md., and are now entering the first year of the Marine Corps schools. These orders constitute a new development in a plan that has been evolving slowly over a period of nearly ten years.
All naval officers probably know that the Marine Barracks, Quantico, is the east coast base of the Fleet Marine Force. Quantico lies on the west bank of the Potomac River, about thirty miles below Washington. A fine, large concrete dock with ample depth of water affords a ready means of embarking an expeditionary force promptly and directly on board the transport that would carry the force to its destination. The tracks of the Fredericksburg, Richmond, and Potomac Railroad pass through the reservation, making available equally efficient rail transportation facilities. The broad waters of the Potomac, the varied near-by terrain, and all the usual facilities of the Marine Corps Base provide ample opportunity for the training of officers and men in the operations peculiar to the Marine Corps.
The school system of the Marine Corps has its headquarters at Quantico. The schools are under the command of a brigadier general, the present commandant being Brigadier General Breckinridge. The system consists of four schools or courses as follows:
- The basic school at Philadelphia.
- The first-year course, Marine Corps schools at Quantico.
- The second-year course, Marine Corps schools at Quantico.
- The correspondence school at Quantico.
The basic school is used for the initial training and indoctrination of newly commissioned second lieutenants. The correspondence school conducts courses by mail in a great variety of professional and academic subjects. The first-year course, Marine Corps schools, provides tactical instruction for lieutenants and captains. The second-year course provides advanced instruction in tactics, minor strategy and logistics, and command-staff functions for senior captains, majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels. Throughout the first- and second-year courses the primary war mission of the Marine Corps is the guiding principle. Simple as this statement seems, it is nevertheless the crowning achievement of years of effort, and is worthy of explanation.
For many years, the two senior units of the Marine Corps schools based their instruction upon the systems in use at Army schools, such as the Infantry School at Fort Benning, and the Command and General Staff School at Leavenworth. Many of the marine officers who served as instructors at Quantico were graduates of these and other Army schools. The World-War experiences of the marines seemed to point to the necessity of training officers to command a brigade or a division in extensive land operations. In addition there had to be courses covering the general subject of small wars, in which the highest degree of proficiency is demanded of our marines. To these two broad subjects were added many minor courses of detailed professional nature, such as equitation, topography, and the like. Into the midst of this busy schedule was introduced a new course in joint military-naval operations. The graduate of the school was part marine and part Army.
As the necessity for reorganizing the curriculum of the schools was realized, a careful study was made, and out of it grew a new school, a truly Marine Corps school, with a curriculum based essentially upon the primary mission of the Marine Corps. This mission was stated by the late Major General Eli K. Cole, U. S. Marine Corps, (U. S. Naval Institute PROCEEDINGS, November, 1929) as follows:
The major war mission of the Marine Corps is to support the fleet by supplying it with a highly trained, fully equipped expeditionary force for the minor shore operations which are necessary for the effective prosecution by the fleet of its major mission, which is to gain control of the sea and thereby open the sea lanes for the Army overseas.
This statement may be reworded briefly as follows: The primary mission of the Marine Corps is to conduct minor land operations overseas in support of the fleet.
The essential features of this mission are:
- The operations of the Marine Corps in war are dictated primarily by the needs of the fleet, that is, the seizure and defense of bases for our own fleet, or denial of such bases to the enemy. Naval officers are as intimately concerned in such operations as are the marines.
- The land operations of the marines will be of a limited nature, that is, limited as to extent, kind, and forces employed.
- In these over-seas operations, the Marine Corps must have the support of the fleet.
A critical study of the essential features of the primary mission of the Corps pointed the way for the reorganization of the curriculum of the schools; it was to be based and developed upon the requirements of expeditionary forces seeking to seize and defend bases. To this general subject were to be added consideration of small wars, and other studies made necessary by the normal peace-time functions of the marines.
Inasmuch as the fleet is the principal factor in the overseas base-seizure or landing operations, the necessity for close liaison between the fleet officers and marine officers can be readily seen. Co-operation and mutual understanding are essential in the planning of joint operations as well as in their execution. At the present time, Marine Corps officers are assigned to duty at the Naval War College, where they may learn something of the Navy's methods of conducting war. That course, however, includes very little of use to a marine in his study of the tactics of landing operations and over-seas movements of an expeditionary force. As for the naval officer, there has been no systematic course of training in the naval features of landing operations and base defense. The Marine Corps schools now provide a means for the systematic study of this subject, largely, of course, from the standpoint of the Marine Exeditionary Force.
The Navy has encouraged specialization for years in a great variety of subjects. It is proposed herein that a new specialty be recognized, that of joint military-naval operations, covering the entire field from the conduct of a group of troop-laden boats from ship to shore to the support by the fleet of the movement overseas of an army. To realize the vast importance of a correct concept of this subject we have only to look back upon the history of past wars, reaching back into the days of Greece, Rome, and Carthage and extending through the World War. Indeed, this subject brought to its logical conclusion includes the very essence of the art of naval warfare. In his study of naval strategy, Mahan erects his entire structure upon a foundation of naval bases, their influence, establishment, and use in offense and defense. Captain Knox, in a recently published article emphasizing the importance to a navy of bases, stated, "Bases make ships."
To a Navy so completely lacking in over-seas bases as is our own, no subject could be more engrossing, more needful of understanding, more deserving of study than the seizure and defense of bases. Such knowledge cannot be obtained overnight. Proficiency in such operations cannot be gained merely by ordering them. The material required can be provided only as the result of lengthy experiment, research, and trial, followed by a carefully drawn plan of procurement.
The emphasis in war history falls constantly upon need for co-operation and mutual understanding between sea and land forces. Such an understanding might have prevented the loss of Hannibal's army; it might have enabled Napoleon to invade England; it might have saved Port Arthur for Russia, and with it, her interests in the great territory of Manchuria; it might have brought about an early and successful termination of the Dardanelles campaign with unlimited possibilities. The striking cases in history of the epochal effects of successful joint operations are too numerous to cite, but they all point to the same conclusion, that no naval officer can afford to be without a definite understanding of the elements of tactics and strategy involved in joint operations.
A way is now opening by which a naval officer may select military-naval operations as his specialty and follow a systematic course of study from his earliest days. It is realized that the plan outlined herein may be difficult to adopt in many cases, yet it is offered as a suggestion.
Generally, an officer may expect to be ordered to his first shore duty after about seven years of commissioned service. These two years of shore duty afford an opportunity to attend the line postgraduate school for one year, to be followed by the first-year course at the Marine Corps schools, thus launching the officer upon his study of military-naval operations. When the officer has attained the rank of lieutenant commander, and is due for shore duty again, he may spend a year at the Naval War College, junior course, to be followed immediately by the second-year course at the Marine Corps schools. Upon attaining the rank of commander, the officer may attend the senior course at the Naval War College, to be followed by a year at the Army War College.
Inasmuch as the normal span of an officer's career from ensign through captain will include probably six tours of shore duty, and only three have been used in the above plan, ample opportunity is afforded for other types of duty if desired. Although the nature of the advanced course at the Naval War College has not been announced there will undoubtedly be room here for further study of military-naval operations in their broader features.
It is realized that an officer's career can rarely be set forth with the definiteness of a railroad time-table; yet without a plan of some sort, systematic progress is not probable. Certainly the line officers of the Navy should keep pace with their brother-officers of the Marine Corps. They should prepare themselves by study and specialization where appropriate, in order that there may be officers who are sufficiently versed in both the Marine Corps and fleet aspects of joint operations to assure bringing to the subject sympathetic and understanding co-operation. Ultimately, this knowledge finds its highest degree of usefulness in its application to the joint problems of the Army and Navy. It seems almost trite to call attention to the amazing indifference of the German General Staff to the need for and value of naval co-operation in its plans for the opening operations of the World War. Such indifference could not have existed in the minds of officers trained in the school of joint operations. Yet this same indifference was one of the contributing factors toward the failure of Germany's initial thrust. A similar lack of understanding on the part of the British led to the costly and futile prosecution of the Gallipoli campaign. By way of contrast is the success of the Japanese against the Russians in the first phase of the Russo-Japanese War, a perfect illustration of the value of a thorough knowledge of the tactics and strategy of joint over-seas operations.
The marines have embarked upon a serious venture. They are determined to fit themselves as best they can, by study and training, to support the fleet. The Navy's duty demands that, in its turn; it make every effort to merit the support of the Marine Corps, and be prepared, by study and training, to support the Marine Corps in the execution of the task assigned to it by the Navy. This the Navy can help to do by training a group of naval line officers who, possessing an intimate knowledge of both Marine Corps and fleet problems, may contribute toward successful cooperation of the two forces in joint operations.