On July 1,1933, a squadron of 25 large Italian military seaplanes of the Royal Italian Air Force under the command of General Italo Balbo, Air Minister,1 took off from their base at Orbetello, Italy, on a transatlantic flight which was to take them to Chicago and back to Rome.
The seaplanes were Savoia-Marchetti S 55 X flying boats, each powered with two Isotta-Fraschini 880 hp. water-cooled motors, and two three-blade propellers. The planes were capable of a maximum speed of 150 knots with a cruising speed of 124 knots. Their cruising range was about 40 per cent above that required by the longest distance to be flown between any two consecutive bases. The flying weight of each plane fully loaded was about 11.5 tons. Each plane was manned by a commander pilot, a second pilot, a radio operator, and a mechanician. Some planes had on board an extra man for special duties. All personnel were officers and non-commissioned officers of the R.I.A.F.
The entire flight had been divided into 13 legs, thus affording 14 landing bases where the squadron would be able to find shelter, fuel, communication facilities, and general assistance. The 14 bases and the distances separating them were:
Orbetello—Amsterdam.... about 870 miles
Amsterdam—Londonderry....... 630 miles
Londonderry—Reykjavik........ 930 miles
Reykjavik—Cartwright............. 1500 miles
Cartwright—Shediac.... ........... 800 miles
Shediac—Montreal.................... 500 miles
Montreal—Chicago.......... 870 miles
Chicago—New York............... 950 miles
New York—Shediac............... 725 miles
Shediac—Shoal Harbor.......... 650 miles
Shoal Harbor—Azores……1525 miles
Azores—Lisbon.... 908 miles
Lisbon—Rome..... 1351 miles
In addition to the above, an emergency base located at Julianehaab, Greenland, was to be used only if necessity compelled. This base would have afforded to the squadron the same facilities as other bases, but its main purpose was that of providing the flight with a miniature weather bureau well equipped and well manned, situated far enough north, where weather conditions are generally bad and very unstable, to permit the preparation of weather forecasts for the most hazardous of the 13 legs —the “hop” from Reykjavik to Cartwright.
Each base was under the command of a specially detailed Italian air officer and was manned by men of the Royal Italian Air Force.
The International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation became interested in this historic flight late in 1932, when one of the system representatives in Europe was called to Rome to discuss with General Balbo tentative arrangements for the communications organization to serve the needs of the flight. General Aldo Pellegrini, director of the Royal Air Force Training School in Orbetello, and Colonel Mario Infante, director of Communication Services of the Air Ministry, were detailed to come to New York to select sites for the North American bases and to confer with the communication officials of the I.T.T. for the purpose of organizing the most ambitious chain of radio, cable, and wire communications ever attempted for an aerial venture, in fact, for any world event.
The writer was detailed by the late Mr. Hernand Behn, then President of the I.T.T., to organize the radio, cable, and telegraph set-up of the International System in the execution of the role entrusted to us by the Italian government.
Plans were evolved for the intricate problem of providing and assuring:
- Continuous, fast, and reliable 2-way radiotelegraphic communications between the flying squadron, the landing bases, and the Italian Air Ministry in Rome throughout the entire duration of the flight.
- Speedy and accurate weather reports and weather forecasts to the squadron; such reports to be collected from vessels at sea in areas extending as far north as Labrador, Greenland, and Iceland, and as far south as was needed to cover the return route via Shoal Harbor, Azores, and Lisbon. Hourly weather reports from land points and coastal stations along the proposed course of the seaplanes over the American Continent.
- The conveyance of these reports to the U. S. Weather Bureau in New York, where they would be translated into accurate forecasts by Doctor James Kimball, a meteorologist who has figured prominently in supplying weather data for virtually all transatlantic flights.
- The transmission of periodic weather forecasts to the commander of the squadron at predetermined hours, and the preparation and transmission of special weather bulletins at such other times as the commander of the Crociera might request.
On the rapidity, co-ordination and reliability of all these services depended the safety of the fliers and the success of the flight.
Communication facilities.—Regular commercial communications were at best only seasonal and sporadic at certain places along the route of the flight, while at others there existed no communication facilities of any kind. Complete wire, cable, and radio facilities were available at only a few of the base sites. Studies were made of the location and characteristics of all available communication facilities along the proposed flight course and steps were taken to fill in the gaps, through the provision of additional facilities, so as to form an uninterrupted chain of communications.
The I.T.T. had at its disposal the extensive network which, through its subsidiaries, it possesses in the Western Hemisphere; a network comprising high-power Atlantic coastal and transoceanic radio stations, high speed under-sea cables between North America and Europe, and land lines with connections to the telegraph system of the Canadian Pacific Railways in Canada.
The Italian Air Ministry had at its disposal two of the R.A.F. land radio stations in Italy, the radio sets in each plane of the squadron, and also some portable field radio sets. In addition, the ministry enlisted the assistance of the Italcable Company of Italy, which has submarine cables connecting Italy, Spain, and the Azores with the cables of the Commercial Cable Company. Also, the ministry secured the loan of two submarines of the Royal Italian Navy, the Millelire and the Balilla, and chartered a number of vessels including the yacht Alice and several trawlers. All these ships were equipped with intermediate and short-wave radio apparatus suitable to the discharge of the particular duties assigned to each vessel.
To supplement other facilities and to provide the flying squadron with signals for radio-compass bearings, the relaying of dispatches, and emergency assistance, 3 trawlers were stationed at regular intervals on the course between Londonderry and Reykjavik and 4 trawlers and 2 submarines on the course between Reykjavik and Cartwright.
The seaplanes themselves were equipped with highly efficient and compact radio telegraph sets. Each consisted of a 400-watt transmitter and receiver capable of operation on both low and high frequencies (500 to 2,500 meters and 22 to 99 meters). Each plane also carried a special receiver for radio-compass use.
The efficiency of this military equipment can be gauged by the fact that during pre-flight tests 2 of the planes were able to hold 2-way communication with our radio station WSL. Worthy of note in this instance is the fact that the planes were lying on the waters of Orbetello Bay, 4,000 miles away and shielded from WSL by the rising hills of Orbetello.
In conformity with the Italian military procedure, and in order to assure uninterrupted communication at all times, all assisting vessels and bases were instructed to keep constant watch during actual flight hours and to relay, on request, those messages which through any cause could not be sent to or received directly from the seaplanes or any base. The same watches were maintained at the New York control center in the I.T.T. building.
Wave lengths assigned.—In order to avoid interference from commercial coastal radio stations and from ships at sea, various wave lengths were assigned to the different Crociera services as follows:
To communications from assisting vessels and land bases to and from the flying seaplanes, 840 meters.
To communications exclusively between the seaplanes themselves, 900 meters.
To radio-compass signals from assisting vessels and Royal Air Force field stations, 900 meters.
To radio-compass signals from the yacht Alice, 1,050 meters.
The yacht Alice, which was to act as base ship at Cartwright during the westward flight and as base ship at Shoal Harbor during the eastward flight, arrived at New York toward the end of April. As had been prearranged, conferences were held with the Italian officers detailed to the operation of the ship’s radio station and arrangements made whereby from the start of the ship’s voyage to the north daily schedules would be worked out between the ship and our stations WSL and WAG. This procedure was necessary to determine the optimum frequencies for the various distances and hourly schedules involved.
These and other tests proved to be particularly difficult due to magnetic and electrical storms to the northward, similar storms near New York, heavy static, and interference. As a result of this work, the following conclusions were reached:
WAG could best communicate with the yacht Alice on 718 meters and 2,420 meters.
WSL found that from 1800 GMT to 2200 GMT it could use with advantage 23.84 meters for transmission to the Alice and 29 meters for reception. From 2200 GMT to 1800 GMT 35.76 meters proved better for transmission while a wave length of 39 meters was better for reception.
AVN and AVM could contact WAG easily enough on 840 meters, while AVS could not be relied upon to contact directly either WAG or WSL on long wave, magnetic disturbances, fading, and low power being the adverse factors. Twenty-nine meters, however, proved satisfactory.
AVR and AVL could not rely on continuous contact with WSL but could receive WSL on 17.87 and 23.84 meters during the day and on 35.76 and 54.04 meters during the night.
All the base radio stations and the trawlers could, however, communicate promptly by relay with WSL. (Distances between the vessels averaged 250 miles.)
ABO and IKM in Italy, being permanent land stations, could communicate easily with WSL on the following wave lengths.
WSL would transmit on 17 and 24 meters during the day and receive on 18 and 29 meters; during the night it would transmit on 36 and 54 meters. There would be a period between darkness and daylight when 29 and 36 meters gave best results. The optimum wave lengths for use between the seaplanes and WSL during the flight over the North American Continent between Cartwright, Shediac, Montreal, Chicago, New York, and Shoal Harbor were determined by a very practical experiment.
Colonel Infante and R.A.F. Radio Operators Ponticelli and Mercalli, equipped with short wave receivers similar to those of the planes, undertook an automobile trip from New York to Chicago, Montreal, Shediac, Cartwright, and return. At predetermined intervals, they stopped en route and noted reception from WSL on various frequencies for the various legs of the North American course. The results of these tests determined the assignment of the following wave lengths for communications between the seaplanes and WSL from Cartwright to Chicago and from Chicago to Shoal Harbor:
26 meters from Cartwright to Shediac
36 meters from Shediac to Chicago, Chicago to New York, and New York to Shoal Harbor
29 meters for greater distances.
WSL had no difficulty in contacting the squadron at any time along the entire course of the flight. The reasons for this were: (1) the high power of the transmitting station; (2) the fact that when necessary WSL was able to transmit on four transmitters simultaneously, each on a different frequency, thus enabling the receiving operators at any point to select the optimum frequency for his location out of the four frequencies used, namely: 16780 kc. (17.87 m.), 12585 kc. (23.84 m.), 8390 kc. (35.76 m.) and 5555 kc. (54.04 m.).
The carrying out of these tests and contact work lasted from the first week in May to the end of June, 1933. WAG and WSL were practically on the air at all hours on this work and their staffs had to be increased considerably, in order not to delay the normal commercial work of these stations.
In addition to the facilities under the direct control of the I.T.T. and the Royal Italian Air Force, we found it necessary and extremely helpful to obtain the assistance and co-operation of the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs of Newfoundland and the Canadian Pacific Railway Company of Canada. Mr. W. D. Neil, General Manager of Communications of the C.P.R., not only responded very willingly to our invitation but also obtained the aid of the Canadian National Railway for the prompt transmission of messages to and from the base of the Crociera at Shediac over the C.N.R. land lines to Moncton.
Through the co-operation of Commander C. P. Edwards, Director of Radio Service of the Canadian Government Department of Marine, the facilities of the coastal stations of the Canadian government and the Canadian Marconi Company were placed at our disposal.
For that portion of the flight west of the 35th meridian, the New York control center had been entrusted with the meteorological services. The collection of weather reports from all points adjacent to the course of the flight presented a problem demanding considerable preparation. These reports were required from ships at sea, from C.P.R. stations, from all bases in Labrador, from our radio and cable stations, and from many of our tele- | graph stations located near the Canadian border between Chicago and New York- Arrangements had to be made with the Canadian Weather Bureau concerning collection and transmission of weather reports by the Canadian and Newfoundland government weather stations, with the Department of Marine of the Canadian government, in charge of the operation of the government coastal radio stations in Canada, for the transmission of reports directly to our coastal radio stations or by relay between designated government stations. Copies of all weather messages received from ships at sea for the Weather Bureau at Washington were required in New York by Dr. Kimball of the local Weather Bureau and Prof. Montanari, meteorologist of the Royal Air Force.
Emergencies.—Another phase covered by the communication system was that of preparing for emergency messages. In order to provide immediate assistance to any unit of the seaplane squadron while over North American waters, it was arranged that the director of Naval Intelligence, the director of Naval Communications, and the chief signal officer of the Army in Washington would be made joint addressees for all bulletins released by us relating to the flight movements. This would have permitted prompt action by the U. S. Army and Navy in case of distress.
The commander of the Eastern Area of the U. S. Coast Guard was also kept informed of the progress of the flight in the event that the services of the Coast Guard should be required to render assistance to a disabled seaplane. The Coast Guard radio stations NMP in Chicago and NMD in Cleveland kept constant watch during the actual flying time from Montreal to Chicago and New York.
The director of Naval Communications ordered the Atlantic coast naval radio stations north of New York to keep constant watch during the "hops" from Cartwright to Shediac and from New York to Shoal Harbor as auxiliaries to Mackay Radio.
The squadron, however, was never out of communication with the I.T.T. control center and, happily, no disaster occurred requiring the assistance of the military services.
Communication log of the flight.—There is listed here briefly the high spots of continuous contact with the squadron during the 43-day period from the start to the finish of the Crociera. Of these 43 days only 103 hours were actually spent in flying the 12,000-mile stretch covering land and sea.
The time given is E.S.T., 75th meridian.
July 1
9:10 A.M. Everything being ready and the weather favorable, the 25 seaplanes took off from Orbetello for Amsterdam.
2:00 A.M. Italian squadron reported over Basle, Switzerland.
3:00 A.M. Squadron sighted over Strassburg.
3:30 A.M. Balbo has radioed that weather conditions over Lake Zurich were not clear. Later over Basle, he closed up his formation. Static conditions make communication with the planes difficult during the early morning hours.
3:45 A.M. Balbo's plane radioed that the squadron had passed Karlsruhe.
5:00 a.m. Squadron crossed Dutch-German frontier.
6:40 a.m. Leading planes landed in Amsterdam.
8:00 a.m. One plane capsized in landing.
8:10 a.m. Advised from Amsterdam capsized Plane wrecked, one of the crew missing, pilot and commander saved by two Dutch marine cadets.
8:25 a.m. Sergeant Quintavilli of the wrecked plane is dead; Captain Baldini, Lieutenants Novelli and Demetrio injured and fifth man slightly hurt.
July 2
2:30 a.m. Balbo took off from Amsterdam for Londonderry. The 23 other planes of the squadron followed immediately.
8:55 a.m. Squadron landed at Londonderry. Completed 1,500 miles.
July 3
4:15 a.m. Take-off from Londonderry postponed because of unfavorable weather.
July 5
7:40 a.m. Squadron took off from Londonderry for Reykjavik.
11:40 a.m. Balbo’s flagship advises that flight proceeds satisfactorily. More than half the distance from Londonderry to Reykjavik has been covered.
1:20 p.m. Flight proceeding normally; visibility much clearer; sea perfect; passed trawler.
2:15 p.m. Report from Balbo states Italian squadron landed at Reykjavik. Squadron faces a stop of a few days here on account of adverse weather conditions over Atlantic.
The control center, which up to this time had been concerned mostly with dispatching the great volume of messages to and from the Italian Ministry in Rome and the bases in Amsterdam and Londonderry and to the squadron, now became directly responsible for the collection of weather reports and the transmission of forecasts preparatory to the long and hazardous transatlantic flight from Reykjavik to Cartwright.
Bulletins were required twice a day while the seaplanes were resting at the bases, every two hours while the planes were preparing to start, and every hour (or oftener if requested) while the planes were actually flying.
The U. S. Weather Bureau in New York had been connected with the control center by special wires, and the hourly weather reports from the designated observation points soon began to pour in. Forecasts were then transmitted in Italian to the commander of the squadron regularly and accurately. On July 8, WSL received from Reykjavik a message addressed to the writer in which General Balbo expressed his satisfaction and his thanks for the “speed and accuracy” of the communication services.
July 12
2:15 a.m. Squadron took off from Reykjavik for Cartwright.
8:15 a.m. Squadron passed over Italian submarine Millelire at lat. 57.2 N., long. 46.5 W., approximately 950 miles from Reykjavik.
11:20 a.m. Italian squadron now 200 miles from Cartwright. All is well.
1:50 p.m. Balbo landed safely at Cartwright. 4:20 p.m. The eighth and final squadron of 3 planes has now landed at Cartwright. This completes the landing of the 24 seaplanes under the command of Balbo and concludes what is regarded as the outstanding achievement in aviation history. The number of planes safely brought across the Atlantic is more than twice that of any previous flight ever undertaken.
July 13
8:30 a.m. Balbo’s leading squadron took off from Cartwright for Shediac.
8:55 a.m. The last squadron is now in the air for Shediac.
9:15 a.m. Planes passed Venison Island (Labrador).
10:00 a.m. Planes entering Belle Isle Straits. 12:05 p.m. Squadron abeam of Cape St. George.
1:00 p.m. Squadron bucking strong wind and is shaping its course to Magdalen Island in the Gulf of St. Lawrence.
1:10 p.m. Planes over Magdalen Island.
2:25 p.m. Planes sighted off Shediac.
2:37 p.m. Balbo landed at Shediac. Sea calm, weather good.
3:00 p.m. All of the seaplanes have landed safely. Squadron has completed about 4,500 miles of its 7,000-mile flight to Chicago.
July 14
8:51 a.m. Balbo’s planes took off from Shediac for Montreal.
9:11 a.m. First planes passed over Moncton. 9:38 a.m. Last squadron took off from Shediac. 9:49 a.m. First planes passed over Sheffield, N.B.
10:16 a.m. Planes over Otis, N. B.
10:21 a.m. Over Canterbury, N. B. close to U. S. territory.
10:57 a.m. Over Sherman, Maine.
11:00 a.m. Balbo has radioed that he is abeam of Lake Millicent, Maine, and at this point they were having a beautiful view of an immense forest. Mackay Radio has just delivered to the general a congratulatory message from Premier Mussolini.
What is believed to be a record was achieved today by Mackay Radio in the handling of the message from Premier Mussolini in Rome to General Balbo in flight over Maine. The entire transmission took exactly 3 minutes, and the reply from the General to Premier Mussolini (a few minutes later) was handled with the same speed-
11:08 a.m. Six planes passed Grant’s Farm, Maine. Others following.
11:29 a.m. Italian planes passing over Jackman, Maine, almost entirely across the state and heading back toward Canada. ,
11:42 a.m. Over Megantic, Quebec. Balbo is ordering his squadron up to 9,000 feet. Air at this level much more quiet.
12:05 p.m. Planes passed over Scottstown, Quebec.
12:50 p.m. Planes sighted at Montreal.
1:10 p.m. Planes landing at Montreal.
July 15
10:14 a.m. Balbo took off from Montreal for Chicago.
10:49 a.m. The sixth squadron has just takes off. We have just delivered to General Balbo’s flagship a radiogram recommending a change in the course 60 miles to the northward to avoid thunderstorm on the course Toledo, Cleveland, Erie. General Balbo will radio his exact course later to enable the U. S. Army escort of 40 pursuit planes to meet him at the point where he will enter U. S. territory.
11:09 a.m. The last squadron took off from Montreal.
11:33 a.m. Over Prescott.
12:03 p.m. Over Kingston.
12:05 p.m. Over Belleville, Ontario.
1:22 p.m. Over Bowmanville, Ontario.
1:25 p.m. Balbo radioed that he was over Lake I Simcoe at 1:05 p.m. pointing for Nottawasaga Bay and thence to Southampton on the east shore of Lake Huron. He advised that he would fly south along east shore of Lake Huron and would enter the U. S. at Port Huron.
1:45 p.m. Over Hillsdale, Ontario, about 60 miles north of Toronto.
2:45 p.m. Balbo reports that he passed over Port Huron.
3:15 p.m. Squadron over Detroit.
3:40 p.m. Over Toledo.
3:45 p.m. Balbo has just sent a message to the Italian government stating that he passed over Toledo escorted by a squadron of American Army combat planes flying in splendid and close formation.
4:29 P.M. Planes over Fort Wayne Junction.
5:00 P.M. Over South Bend, Indiana.
5:30 P.M. Circling over Chicago, then landing.
July 19
7:42 A.m. Balbo took off from Chicago for New York.
8:13 A.M. Eighteen planes have taken off. Squadron is flying about 120 m.p.h. and closing into formation.
8:33 a.m. The last Balbo plane took off from Chicago. Balbo flew from Chicago to Michigan City, about 40 miles from Chicago, and circled that city waiting for his entire squadron to form. Accompanying him were 36 U.S. Army planes.
8:35 A.M. Balbo heading east. Flying at 4,500 feet.
9:46 A.M. Planes over Toledo.
10:30 A.M. Over Lorain, Ohio. Flying at 1,000-foot altitude. Propeller speed 1,500 r.p.m.
10:40 A.M. Over Cleveland, Ohio.
10:56 A.M. Over Ashtabula, Ohio.
11:10 A.m. Passed over Erie, Pa.
11:53 A.M. Balbo passed over the American Side of Niagara Falls.
12:35 P.m. Abeam of Charlotte, N. Y., 4 miles out from the south shore of Lake Ontario.
12:50 P.M. Passed over Oswego, N. Y.
1:20 P.M. A message from Major General Haskell, commanding the New York National Guard, was transmitted to General Balbo's plane requesting the Italian Commander to fly his squadron over the National Guard encampment at Peekskill, N. Y. General Haskell stated the Guard would fire a salute as the Italian squadron passed over. General Balbo, however, was not able to change his course so as to accept this invitation.
1:35 p.m. Planes passed over Waterville, N. Y.
2:05 p.m. Over Newburg, N. Y.
2:35 p.m. Circling over New York City.
2:55 p.m. Balbo landing at Floyd Bennett field.
July 25
9:01 A.M. Balbo's squadron takes off from New York for Shediac.
11:22 A.M. Over Scituate, Mass.
11:35 A.M. Over Boston Harbor.
12:50 P.M. Balbo transmitted several messages of thanks addressed: one to the President of the United States; one to the Mayor of New York; one to the Mayor of Chicago; one to the Secretary of War; and one to the Secretary of the Navy.
1:15 P.M. The plane I-GALL has been forced to land off the coast at Rockland, Me., on account of an oil leak. The plane is in radio communication with our radio station at that point and will again take off as soon as it can obtain additional oil.
1:40 p.m. Planes over Lubec, Me.
2:00 p.m. Leading planes passing over St John, N. B.
2:10 p.m. Balbo sent a message advising that plane I-ARAM was landing at St. John to take on more gasoline.
2:37 p.m. Balbo’s squadron landing at Shediac. 3:15 p.m. The plane 1-GALL took off from Rockland, Me., for Shediac.
4:30 p.m. All planes are now safely landed at Shediac.
July 26
8:31 a.m. The squadron took off from Shediac for Shoal Harbor, Newfoundland.
9:15 a.m. Balbo radios that he is over Cape North and flying at an altitude of 1,000 feet.
9:20 a.m. The Plane I-ROVI was forced to land at Cape Traverse due to minor trouble to the water pump.
9:50 a.m. Squadron now over Port aux Baxques.
10:50 a.m. Balbo radios that he is over Fortune Bay, visibility good although sky completely cloudy. Flying at about 2,600 feet, propellers at 1,600 r.p.m.
11:25 a.m. Over Comeby Chance, about 30 miles from Shoal Harbor.
11:40 a.m. Squadron landed at Shoal Harbor.
July 27
7:13 a.m. Plane I-ROVI took off from Cape Traverse for Shoal Harbor. The pump trouble has been repaired.
8:15 a.m. Plane over Channel Head, N. F.
9:30 a.m. Over Fortune Bay. Flying very high and very fast.
10:10 a.m. I-ROVI landed at Shoal Harbor.
August 8
2:45 a.m. Balbo’s squadron took off from Shoal Harbor for the Azores.
6:05 a.m. Balbo radioed that squadron was 450 miles out of Shoal Harbor. He had ordered 9 planes to land at Horta and the remaining 15 at Ponta Delgada in the Azores.
11:15 a.m. Italian Armada is 300 miles from Horta.
12:05 p.m. Balbo’s flagship passed Cape Flores.
12:50 p.m. Flagship passed Horta.
1:25 p.m. Pellegrini with 9 planes is now landing at Horta.
2:00 p.m. Balbo and his 15 planes are now landing at Ponta Delgada.
August 9
2:20 a.m. Pellegrini’s squadron took off from Horta.
3:30 a.m. Balbo’s squadron took off from Ponta Delgada.
4:30 a.m. I-BALB (Balbo flagship) calls IKM but is unable to contact. WSL contacts I-BALB immediately and General Balbo radios that the plane I-RANI capsized in taking off from Ponta Delgada and that Capt. Ranieri, Sergeant Major Cremaschi, and Sergeant Boveri only bruised. Second pilot Lieut. Squaglia suffering from concussion of the brain. The other planes, still on the water, would take off immediately and join the squadron. Thus 23 planes would fly to Lisbon. This dispatch forwarded immediately by cable to the Air Ministry. .
4:40 a.m. It was announced that Lieut. Squaglia had died. .
10:30 a.m. Squadron lands safely at Lisbon.
August 12
1:40 a.m. Squadron took off from Lisbon on its way to Rome.
4:40 a.m. Balbo’s flagship reported by radio to WSL that he was abeam of Gibraltar and that previously in the vicinity of Cape San Vincente the clouds were very low over the sea.
7:50 a.m. Squadron over Formentera, Balearic Islands.
8:40 a.m. Over Majorca Island.
10:30 a.m. Passed over Gulf Asinara and Port Torres in Sardinia.
12:15 p.m. Flying over Ostia, Italy, and a few minutes later heading for Rome.
12:25 p.m. Circling over Rome.
12:45 p.m. Balbo’s squadron has landed at Ostia amid thunderous applause from hundreds of thousands of spectators. General Balbo and his brave men have covered in mass formation over 12,000 miles thus ending the most remarkable feat in the history of aviation.
The I.T.T. is indebted to the radio station d the Vatican City for the step by step instantaneous description of the events as they took place when the planes were arriving at Ostia, circling Rome, and landing at Fiumicino (Ostia).
It is of interest to note that a commercial organization was able to provide perfect communications in the execution of & military aviation problem. Although a peace-time and commercial mobilization, this communication problem necessarily was handled and directed by the writer , and his staff—most of whom are Naval Reservists or have had other military service—as a military problem. That such a mobilization could be effected in peace time by a commercial organization without in any way affecting the efficient handling , of its normal traffic, however, should be a significant demonstration of the great potentialities of this all-American communication organization to our Army and Navy in time of war; not only from the standpoint of available personnel but material as well.