Lighter-than-Air Craft and Line Squalls
(See page 369 this issue.)
Lieutenant Commander E.H. Kincaid, U.S. Navy—Although the author evidently intended his article to be helpful to aviation, and particularly lighter-than-air aviation, the conclusion that lighter-than-air craft should be limited to the geographic limits between 30° N. and 30° S. latitude, if correct, will so limit their activities as to make them useless for universal operation as scouts. I do not believe the methods by which he arrives at this conclusion to be borne out by such evidence as is available. The premises upon which he bases his conclusions are (1) than aircraft, particularly lighter-than-air craft, are unable to fly through line squalls associated with polar fronts, (2) that polar fronts do not progress below 30° latitude, and (3) that weather was the principal cause of all recent airship disasters.
In Rosendahl's Up Ship are cited several incidents where line squalls were successfully encountered. The experience of the air mail pilots and aviators on duty here at the Academy give evidence that mine squalls may be successfully encountered. While they are bumpy, uncomfortable, and possibly dangerous, they do not as a type of weather form universal impassable barriers. Dr. Eckner in his flight round the world used the favorable winds behind a typhoon to his advantage.
As regards the second premise, the author states that polar fronts do not progress below 30° latitude. See back of Pilot Chart of the North Atlantic for March, 1933, for an example of a violent polar front that extended as low as 18° latitude. At the present moment Rosby and Willets are searching, with more or less success, for polar fronts in the doldrum’s hurricanes, in the equatorial belt.
As to the third premise, that the weather was the principal cause of all recent airship disasters. In this he disregards not only opinions of the Court of Inquiry into the Akron disaster but implications as to possible human error, either in construction, or operation in other airship mishaps. The history of 143 airships in Germany, during the exigencies of war, shows only 10 per cent wrecked through storm, forced landings, etc., and in these there may also have been a human element. Few people will deny that the British R-101 and possibly the Akron were flown too low, and in the latter case at the moment of maximum external strain, the airship was being flown partly as an airplane, supporting disposable heavy weight (she was about 5,000 pounds heavy and had about 20,000 pounds disposable ballast) by her horizontal elevators and engines, and imposing strain on the ship in addition to that imposed by external elements. What would have happened had she gone up to two-thirds between the sea and “pressure height” aerostatically and slowed down the engines?
In evaluating the worth of a type of craft conceded to have overwhelming advantages as a scout, one is justified somewhat in hunting for human error either in construction or handling as a cause for failure, in order that their scientific values may not erroneously be discarded. Such human error certainly existed in the early days of the Shenandoah. When torn loose from the mast at Lakehurst had we known what we now know the story might have been different, for, had we carried the rudder in the opposite direction to that used and had the engines been turning over, removing strain from the nose, at the mast the ship would most probably have ridden out the storm. Or had we cast loose earlier we could have ridden it out in the air with a whole ship. After we were in the air with rudder broken and two cells missing, she was flown dangerously low with engines wide open and this at one time caused grave concern. I was criticized at the time for taking her up to 5,000 feet and the criticism was accepted at the time as justifiable. While we learn from these experiences if the lessons are passed on to those who follow in our footsteps, it will take many years of operation of airships to acquire as many practicable formulas in airmanship as Knight's Seamanship furnishes the surface mariner.
Finally the author ignored the fact that line squalls are more frequent and more severe over land than over the ocean where the atmosphere is more homogeneously distributed. This latter fact calls attention to the semi-permanent high pressure areas over the Atlantic and Pacific, the horse latitudes, that make ideal meteorological hangars for our airship scouting operations. These highs make the Hawaiian Islands in the Pacific and Bermuda and the Azores in the Atlantic the most perfect airship bases. Where else should we use them? Here the airship may, on the grand average, scout at will in the only type of weather guaranteed against the dangerous line squalls—the center of the highs.
Edward Preble
(See page 1683, December, 1933, PROCEEDINGS)
Commander A. Bainbridge Hoff, U. S. Navy (Retired).—Mr. Pratt has given us a very interesting idea, and has developed this idea in an original and attractive manner. Unfortunately his supporting statements are in many cases open to historical question. In some cases they are incorrect. In commenting upon them I am obliged to quote largely from memory, as my reference books are inadequate at the moment.
Page 1683: He refers to Hull as a "lieutenant." During the Tripolitan War Hull was, I think, a master-commandant.
Page 1683: The author's contention that historians have treated Preble as merely one of several commanders of the American Forces in the Barbary Wars, is, I think, scarcely justified. On the contrary the average person interested in this period of our naval history, remembers, as the "commodore" off Tripoli, no one but Preble. He is the outstanding figure of the tune, sharing this distinction only with Decatur. It is with difficulty that one recalls the other commodores, unless one is, of course, a special student of the epoch.
Page 1683: Mr. Pratt indicates that his officers, before Preble took hold of them, were mere inexperienced fledglings. This is most certainly interesting, and would be more interesting still if the names of those officers the author had in mind were given. It is true Preble did not pick his officers, but they were the "cream of the Navy" nevertheless, even before he arrived on the scene. They had already evolved a new code of naval ethics, based on mutual good-will and the enthusiasm of youth. Preble had been brought up in the old English school where the "subordinate is never right, and must always be censured." Nelson changed this in the British Navy, and the new young Navy of the United States brought about the same change in Preble. Thus was produced one of the finest combinations of leadership and support that our Navy has ever known.
Preble became our earliest great commander, adored by his officers and men, and friendly with all of them.
The writer of these comments was bred from childhood in the tradition of admiration for Preble, and yields to no one in maintaining it, but the facts are as just given and not as Mr. Pratt has them.
It is conceded without question, however, that their service under Preble increased and crystallized the skill and esprit de corps of our naval commanders in the War of 1812. We may, therefore, face all these facts without diminishing one jot of our regard or enthusiasm for Preble’s skill and leadership.
Page 1684: The author gives the previous naval and sea service of some of Preble’s officers. In general he seems to have the impression that Preble’s naval experience was superior to any of theirs. Here he is wrong and has made several specific errors. He has omitted from service in the French War the name of Hull. Hull saw distinguished service in that campaign in the Constitution. There may be others also that he has omitted, but I cannot recall them on the instant. Preble, Bainbridge, Porter, and Decatur, all came from the merchant service, the only training school that existed before 1798.
Porter, Decatur, and Perry had naval captains for fathers, but were trained by these fathers aboard merchant ships. Porter and Decatur, I feel sure, saw active service before entering the Navy. Whether Perry did, I am not certain. All merchant ships went armed. Bainbridge had a dashing record in the “armed merchant service” before entering the Navy.
When Preble took command in 1803 practically all his commanders had already had several years of active naval service, as had also quite a few of his young lieutenants and midshipmen. I feel that Mr. Pratt is way off his course in this whole paragraph. Hull and Bainbridge had already made naval records for themselves and were a pattern for the younger officers.
Anyone interested in this matter might do well to refer to G. W. Allen’s two books, Our Naval War with France and Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs.
Page 1686: “Nearly all the officers were southerners.”
This is an egregious error, as well as the deductions made from it. Almost all the successful naval commanders and first lieutenants in the War of 1812 were, on the contrary, northerners.
Hull, Chauncey, Perry, Allen, Morris, Wadsworth were all from New England. Jacob Jones, Decatur, Bainbridge, Lawrence, Porter, Stewart, Burrows, Read, Crane, Biddle, Macdonough were from the middle states. They were from Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York. Decatur was born in the eastern part of Maryland, but was entirely identified with Philadelphia. His father, Captain Decatur, came from Rhode Island.
The southerners were Warrington and Blakeley, minor figures though of the same fine clay as the others.
It is well known that when Preble first arrived in the Mediterranean there were misgivings as to what he would do. This had nothing whatever to do with his coming from Maine, but was because he was hardly known in the service. After serving in several sea fights with distinction during the Revolution, at the Peace in 1783 he went into the merchant service. When the new Navy was formed in 1798 he was made the fifth lieutenant in seniority, not the fifth captain, as the author has it.
He was promoted to captain in 1799, and his long trip to the East and subsequent illness made him practically unknown in the service.
In 1803, on taking command in the Mediterranean, he was forty-two years old. His senior captains were around thirty.
Page 1687: Mr. Pratt says: “He planned the cutting out of [the] captured Philadelphia."
The scheme and manner of burning the Philadelphia, so brilliantly carried out by Decatur, came from Bainbridge, who communicated it to Preble in writing. This is an accepted historical fact. Also I have always understood the Deme expedition, led by Eaton, was Hull's idea.
Of course Preble's was the controlling mind in all these activities under his command, but he was not always, naturally, either the originator nor active agent.
To wind up these few remarks, it may be noted that throughout his essay we are confronted by Mr. Pratt's omission of the article "the" before the name of vessels. This is not the custom of American seafaring men, either naval or mercantile. It is in fact "yachtmen's journalese." I venture to say that the majority of seamen have a distaste for this usage.
Should Poison Gas Be Legalized?
(See pp. 1013, July, 1932, and 111, January, 1933, PROCEEDINGS)
Lieutenant Commander H. A. Gosnell, U. S. Naval Reserve.—I suppose I should consider myself annihilated by the discussion of my article, by Captain G. J. B. Fisher, U. S. Army. Indeed I would feel so if my article had contained some of the particular statements implied or attributed to it. Necessarily, many of the discussions in the PROCEEDINGS must appear long after the article discussed. Accordingly, in some respects, no reader can be blamed for accepting at its face value whatever a critic may say. For instance, I cannot expect a reader to go back and look over my article again after reading a discussion of it. Therefore, for my own protection, I must make reply to this contribution from Captain Fisher and point out the manner in which it resembles the old game of setting up a straw man and knocking it down. In order that I may not myself be guilty of the same fault I shall simply quote a number of the "statements" in the discussion and follow each with a "reply." First of all, however, I must express my profound grief and chagrin over finding that something I wrote inspired Captain Fisher (or anyone else) to add even a bit to the frightful pother about prohibition! Having made this apology I am now ready to proceed.
Statement.—The prohibition of war gases has also been tried. It ran from 1899 until the first real test came, during the World War.
Reply.—Even a casual reader of international law will learn that the prohibition existed long before 1899. This I pointed out in my article.
Statement.—Admiral Mahan has never, it seems to me, been accorded full credit for his sane approach to the proposition of illegalizing chemicals as it was initially presented at the First Hague Conference.
Reply.—There was no proposition to illegalize chemicals, at least none ever reached the status of a convention. (To be exact, the agreement was to bar "projectiles, the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases.") This confusing of all chemicals with what is commonly known as poison gas is one of the most frequently used devices of gas warfare advocates. This failure to make distinction, and the constancy with which it appears, leads one to the conclusion that it is done with the deliberate intent to cloud the issue in the minds of the uninitiated public.
Statement.—(Quotation from Mahan) "It is illogical, and not demonstrably more humane to be tender about asphyxiating men with gas, when all are prepared to admit that it is allowable to blow the bottom out of an ironclad at midnight, throwing four or five hundred men into the sea, to be choked by water." This inescapable argument, presented by a mild-mannered, religiously inclined authority on naval history, kept the United States from lending its sanction to an agreement the violation of which was inevitable.
Reply.—As to the quotation from Mahan: It may have been correct then; but now it already has been proved both logical and desirable to try to eliminate the horrors of, say, mustard gas and still not be concerned about men being thrown into the water as a result of an important naval achievement. It was not the above quoted “inescapable argument” of Mahan, or anything similar, that caused the United States delegates to refrain from signing. The main basis of Mahan’s famous plea as a whole and the principal reason for our not signing was that the weapon was new and untried. The future development even of shells, let alone gas, was quite uncertain. No one knew whether gas shells would be too inhumane or not. Lastly, to say that, in 1899, the violation of the poison gas shell agreement “was inevitable,” is merely a “second guess.”
Statement.—It may be worth while to correct what appears to be a misapprehension on the part of Commander Gosnell as to art. 23 of Hague Convention IV as written at the Second Hague Conference, and to which the United States subscribed. This prohibits the employment of “poison or poisoned weapons.”
This convention required each subscribing government to issue to its armed forces, instructions in conformity therewith. In the United States this was done by the publication of Rules of Land Warfare, War Department Document No. 467. Paragraph 177 of this manual furnishes a clear exposition of art. 23 in these words: “This prohibition extends to the means calculated to spread contagious diseases, and includes the deliberate contamination of sources of water by throwing into same dead animals and all poisonous substances of any kind, but does not prohibit measures taken to dry up springs or to divert rivers and aqueducts from their courses.” The United States, in other words, accepted art. 23 in the sense of what we now call bacteriological warfare.
Reply.—Now really this is too much. In other words: Hague Convention IV bars “poison or poisoned weapons,” and our Rules of Land Warfare, 117, deems this prohibition to extend to bacteriological warfare and contamination of water; therefore the United States in signing the convention didn’t really bind itself to bar “poison or poisoned weapons!” I trust that no reader of the U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings swallowed a non sequitur of this caliber.
In the first place the instructions ordering our Army to conform with Convention IV are contained in the War Department’s Bulletin No. 6, of February 19, 1913. The Rules of Land Warfare are just what their name implies. They cover the entire field of land warfare and they govern our armed land forces in the waging of war. They are based only in part on the Hague Conventions and go further in many places—as may be seen in the very point at issue here. I shall quote exactly: “176. The use of poison.—H. R. XXIII, par. (a). In addition to the prohibitions provided by special conventions, it is especially forbidden to employ poison or poisoned weapons.1
“177. Application of rule.—This prohibition extends to the use of means calculated to spread contagious diseases,” etc.—the remainder being as quoted by Captain Fisher. The words “extends to” mean only one thing and that is, that XXIII is considered to include also bacteriological warfare and contamination of water—not that it comprises only those two things. This is made even more clear by the footnote to paragraph 177 which reads: “The original or base of this prohibition is found in G.O. 100, of 1863, art. 70, as follows: ‘The use of poison in any manner, be it to poison wells, or food, or arms, is wholly excluded from modern warfare. He that uses it puts himself out of the pale of the laws and usages of war.’”
Statement.—Regarding the Washington conference, Commander Gosnell fails to give the treaty there written its full name. It is, A Treaty in Relation to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare. Were it in effect, we should not have a single submarine in our Navy today! If, as Commander Gosnell claims, such agreements have weight in international law, then we ought to gather up all our submarines and tow them to a watery grave well out beyond Catalina Island.
Reply.—The main point in this statement is wholly false. The part of the treaty concerning submarines does not seek to eliminate them at all. It simply restricts their employment to military objectives. Their employment, in legitimate manner, in commerce warfare is of small importance anyway compared with their value in military operations. The U. S. Senate ratified the whole treaty by a vote of 72:0—submarines and gas. Great Britain, Italy, and Japan also have ratified it. Ratification by France is all that is now required to put it into effect. In regard to the waters beyond Catalina Island as a burial ground for submarines, I presume that this area was selected for the benefit of voyagers in the glass-bottomed boats.
Statement.—But among the nineteen nations that failed to ratify this convention, (Geneva Protocol of 1925) Commander Gosnell neglects to mention specifically the United States.
Reply.—Correct; I did not. I said: "It was signed by forty-one states and, at this writing, has been ratified by twenty-six. These twenty-six include such powers as France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy." If anyone finds this not "specific" enough as to the United States, I am sorry about my "neglect." And, as to the "nineteen nations" that "failed to ratify": There were only seventeen signers that had not ratified by the time I sent in the final corrections to my article (March, 1932). There were, at that time, only fifteen fewer ratifiers than signers—or only twelve fewer if the parts of the British Empire are considered separately. These figures are doubtless still smaller by now.
Statement.—If Commander Gosnell will examine what was behind the refusal of the British cabinet to support Admiral Dundonald's proposed use of noxious gases at Sevastopol, something more than their "outrageous barbarity" will become apparent as the real motive.
Reply.—Not being in a position to examine what took place behind the scenes at this cabinet meeting, I am forced to guess at the "real motive" so cryptically suggested.
Statement.—Nor should we overlook the fact that these same plans were resurrected by General Dundonald and laid before Winston Churchill the early days of the World War. They were in part rejected by Churchill, not on the grounds of barbarity, but from fear of reprisals—that the British would start something they could not finish.
Reply.—My reply this time is in the nature of approval. Here is an excellent exposition of one of the chief reasons why we have obedience to the laws of war—and that is fear of reprisal. Those who consider all laws of war to be "just so much boloney," and who are unwilling to read military history and international law, will do well to consider this point. Apart from the imponderable factor that most motions and individuals are not inherently "dirty fighters," we have always present the fact that each side is deterred from infractions by fears of reprisal in some form. This reprisal may and does range all the way from immediate and specific retaliation up to much more important and general acts such as the declaration of war by a strong neutral or the lasting loss of good name in the eyes of the world.
Statement.—The canny First Lord of the Admiralty, however, was impressed from these plans of Admiral Dundonald with the possibilities of obscuring smokes, and the experiments he then initiated mark the advent of the modern naval smoke screen.
Reply.—A perfect example of the difference in legality between different forms of "chemical warfare"—in this case, poison gas and smoke screens.
Statement.—It is not difficult to imagine the furor that would be raised if some self-styled humanitarian attempted to deny local police authorities the use of chemicals for handling civil disturbances. A similar storm would arise at any serious effort to deny our armed forces the modicum of training they now receive in chemical warfare.
Reply.—Again the old confusion of harmless gases with those causing great suffering. There would be a tremendous howl if the police took up the use of, say, phosgene in operations even against hardened criminals. (I do not mean to imply that I would join in the howl.) Further, there seems to me to be a rather inexact parallel between the use by the police of tear gas, etc., and the training of our armed forces in chemical warfare. (Nor do I mean to imply that I am opposed to many phases of this training.)
Conclusion.—Quite evidently my critic is himself one of the chemical warfare service lecturers criticized in parts of my article. If the readers of the Proceedings could have read his discussion immediately after reading my original article I could have asked for nothing better; so many of my points were exemplified so perfectly by his statements. With so many months intervening, however, I feel that the above paragraphs are necessary in order to keep the record straight. Most of Captain Fisher’s discussion consists of arguments in favor of the legalization of all poison gas along with other forms of chemical warfare. I shall not undertake to discourse again on this matter, as I have done the best I can in my original article and believe that my main arguments are still good now if they were good then. I shall comment on one point only, and say that the oft-advocated scheme of keeping people from breaking laws by wiping out the laws has always seemed to me to be a rather queer method of achieving perfection.
Quarterly Marks and Promotion of Enlisted Personnel
(Seepage 1715, December, 1933, Proceedings)
Lieutenant H. G. Rickover, U. S. Navy.—This article is another of a series dealing with the promotion of enlisted men which have been appearing at frequent intervals in the Naval Institute.
Only during the past three or four years have the imperfections of the present system made themselves strongly felt. In previous years, when promotions were relatively fast, the workings of the system were not of great concern; men deserving of advancement could be promoted. The fact that occasionally a poor man was promoted over a good one was not of great moment; it was still possible to find a place for the deserving individual.
With the limited number of advancements in rating now possible, the operation of our present system has become of greater importance. This is evidenced by the number of articles dealing with the subject which have recently been published in these pages. In general, criticism has been along the following lines:
- Variations in types of examinations given by different boards.
- Variations in scale of marking by different boards.
- Tendency of examining boards to raise marks in order to assure candidates having a fair chance.
- Tendency of division officers to assign high quarterly marks in order to insure individual of an equal chance with men of other divisions or of other ships.
- Continual taking of examinations for the same rate.
- Rapid advancement on some ships as compared with others.
- Unfairness to individual recently transferred.
The above defects have been discussed at length in the various papers dealing with the subject and they are self-evident. To revise the system of assigning quarterly marks by requiring a minimum of 2.5 instead of 3.5, as suggested by Lieutenant Raftery, will not bring about a state of affairs where outstanding men alone will get high marks. The division officer, being human as you and I, possessing loyalty for his men, and being familiar with the inequalities and injustices of the system will continue to assign high marks.
Although no system can be devised which will operate fairly for the advantage of the Navy and for the benefit of the individual, nevertheless it is considered that the present system is not the best one obtainable. As a member of examining boards for many years the writer has often been impressed with its weaknesses and its injustices.
As has been aptly remarked by one critic, if the chances of officers for promotion depended on a method having deficiencies as above outlined, the intolerable condition would' soon be remedied. If the welfare and morale of our enlisted personnel are of equal importance, they should be given similar consideration.
In "Promotion for Enlisted Men" in the January, 1932, PROCEEDINGS, Lieutenant James Kirkpatrick, Jr., U. S. Navy, after discussing the deficiencies of the existing system, proposed the following:
Non-rated men should be advanced to the lowest petty officer grade to fill the vacancies as at present. Petty officers, when eligible for advancement and on passing the required examination, would be reported by their commanding officers to the, Bureau of Navigation where their names would go on the waiting lists and the date reported as qualified. When the man "made his number" for advancement, the bureau would inform his commanding officer, who could then advance him or report him back to the bureau as undesirable for advancement, should he so feel at the time, thus striking his name from the list. Similarly, at any time while the man's name is on the waiting list for advancement, his commanding officer would be authorized to recommend its removal, which would be the equivalent of failing to recommend him for advancement. Men disrated would be, of course, removed from the waiting list.
Lieutenant Kirkpatrick's method appears to be a workable one, and one which will afford a greater measure of justice and equality of opportunity than our present system. The writer sees no reason, however, for excepting non-rated men from the plan. As a matter of fact, it is applicable to non-rated men in a greater measure than to petty officers, inasmuch as their youth, limited service, and lack of relevant information in service records renders suitable selection difficult. Nonrated men on their first enlistment must certainly obtain an unfavorable impression of the Navy promotion system with its lack of uniformity, inequality of opportunity, and multiplicity of examinations. If we expect them to be "sold" to the Navy, we should make it clear that, providing they perform their duties satisfactorily, they will be advanced in a fair, methodical manner.
Critique of American Collision Law
(See page 1249, September, 1933, PROCEEDINGS)
Lieutenant Commander Edward T. U.S. Naval Reserve.—I am respectfully calling your attention to a few questions and answers in this article.
On page 1253, question 4 reads as follows: "A steamer is at sea in a fog and her engines break down. What fog signal must she use?" The answer on page 1254 reads as follows: "One long and two short blasts of the whistle at intervals not exceeding two minutes." The answer given covers the signal to be blown by a tow, but a steamer should use two long blasts. (Refer art. 15 (B), international rules.)
Question 7 reads as follows: "A steamer is being towed from one dock to another in inland waters at night. What lights must she show?" The answer to question 7 reads: "All running lights including side lights." This should be only side lights and not range lights. (Refer art. 5, inland rules.)
Question 10 reads as follows: "A steamer passing through an inland channel at night followed by another steamer goes aground. What lights should she show and what sound signal should she use?" The answer to question 10 reads: "The regular lights for a vessel at anchor; the danger signal (four or more short blasts)." The answer to this question should be two red lights indicating that vessel is out of control and the sound signal should be the danger signal followed by a blast to indicate which side vessel should pass on. (Refer art. 16, rule VIII, pilot rules.)
I am merely calling this matter to your attention as I have handled many accident cases as counsel before the U. S. Local Inspectors, and find these answers very confusing to our members as many of our members receive this magazine.
Reply by Lieutenant Raymond F. Farwell, U. S. Naval Reserve, to discussion of “Critique of American Collision Law.”
Question 4.—The answer is based on the supposition that the steamer is under way at the time of breakdown and applies to the interval immediately -following. At the moment of breakdown her signal must be changed from the one prolonged blast provided by art. 15 (a) international rules to the long and two short blasts provided by art. 15(e). This signal must be given at intervals not exceeding two minutes as long as the vessel has any headway, which may be as little as five minutes or as long as fifteen, depending upon whether the vessel is large or small and whether she is making moderate or unlawful speed at the time. Article 15(b), providing two long blasts, does not govern unless and until all headway is lost.
Question 7.—This answer, although correct at the time the article was written, has been invalidated by the amendment to art. 5, inland rules, passed as Public Bill 400 March 1, 1933, but published only within the last month. The answer was based on the old wording of art. 5, which applied only to sailing vessels, the courts holding that steamers must consequently show all running lights under the conditions named. [The Scandinavia, 11 F(2d) 542.] The amended reading of art. 5, inland rules, changing the words “a sailing vessel under way or being towed” to “a sailing vessel under way and any vessel being towed” now requires a steamer being towed in inland waters at night to show side lights only.
Question 10.—Under the circumstances given, the need of a danger signal is obvious and is not questioned. The two points in dispute are (1) that the stranded steamer should follow the danger signal with one or two blasts to indicate on which side the approaching vessel should pass, and (2) that she should display two red lights instead of the usual anchor lights to indicate that she is out of control.
Unless my edition of the pilot rules, dated July 5, 1933, is already obsolete, or there are recent local rules specially applicable to New York Harbor, Mr. Pinchin’s contention as to the additional whistle signal is not sustained by the law. The provision cited in pilot rule 8 of one or two blasts is for a dredge with pipe line or other outlying equipment, and is in reply to an approaching vessel that has signaled for permission to pass; and by the reply, the dredge is presumably indicating that it is safe to pass. But a stranded vessel is not a dredge, and having demonstrated her own ignorance of the channel by running aground, is hardly in a position to indicate on which side another vessel may take a safe passage.
As to the required lights, neither the inland rules nor the pilot rules provide specific lights for a vessel not under command. Article 4, international rules, prescribes a signal of two red lights in a vertical line for such a vessel, and the enacting clause of the international rules provides that those rules shall apply to all public and private vessels of the United States on the high seas and in all waters connected therewith, navigable by seagoing vessels. Article 30 authorizes special rules duly made by local authority relative to the navigation of any harbor, river, or inland waters. From these provisions it may be inferred that in the absence of a special rule in inland waters, the international rule applies, and this doctrine has some court approval. But when we attempt to justify the two red light signal here on such grounds we run into the same difficulty that was brought out in the recent case of the Socony No. 115 (CCA 1933) 63 F(2d) 226 affirming 58 F(2d) 392. This was a collision in 1927 in New York Harbor between a barge in tow alongside the motor vessel Hartford Socony and a carfloat in tow alongside the tug Syossett. The Syossett had been disabled for about 40 minutes prior to the collision by fouling her propeller with the chain attached to an unlighted buoy near the entrance to Greenville Channel, and had warned other vessels throughout the period by danger signals repeated at intervals of about one minute. She displayed the regular running lights for herself and tow and was libelled for failure to show the two red light signal to indicate that she was not under command. Both the district court and the Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the libel on the grounds that as there are already four distinct signals of two red lights in a vertical line provided in different parts of the pilot rules, each applying to a specific case not fitting the description of the Syossett, the Syossett could not display such a signal without violating art. 1, inland rules.
Art. 1.—The rule concerning lights shall be complied with in all weathers from sunset to sunrise, and during such time no other lights which may be mistaken for the prescribed lights shall be exhibited.
So in our case, since the present pilot rules already specify several meanings for the two red light signal, none of which is to indicate an ordinary vessel aground, some other signal must be used, and singularly enough it was a decision in another New York Harbor collision case which established the doctrine that a vessel aground in inland waters is, for the purpose of proper lights, a vessel at anchor. In a collision between the Ant and the C. J. Saxe in 1881, the Saxe, which was struck by the other vessel while pulling on a tow that had grounded, was held at fault for displaying towing lights instead of an anchor light, which at that time was a globular white light. Referring to the rules then in effect the court said,
in navigation, a vessel aground is in circumstances quite similar to a vessel at anchor; and the spirit, if not the letter, of the two rules is best ascertained by holding that a steamer with a tow, whether aground or at anchor, should exhibit the single light required by the tenth rule.
The Ant (DC N.J. 1882) 10 F 294.
Working Division
(See page 21, January, 1934, PROCEEDINGS)
Lieutenant Arnold Kline (S.C.), U. S. Navy.—This article can well be appreciated by today's division officer who is faced with the problem of fulfilling ship's work and carrying out the scheduled gunnery drills. He is handicapped by lack of personnel and in some cases, such as modernized ships, he has had additional spaces allotted to his care. This is a condition which exists throughout the Navy. Ensign Perkins rebels at the working parties and the inroads that they make on his care and upkeep problems. He has suggested the establishment of a "working division," in which are to be included the "ship's louses, A.O.L.'s., non-regs, skylarkers, etc," An admirable system to relieve the division officer of his primary and basic function—the handling of men!
I do not feel that this is a step in the right direction, for to me it reeks of the same psychology that developed the debtor's prison and the alimony jail. Undeveloped men can hardly improve when herded together in one division which carries the stigma of disgrace. Men profit by example, and a poor man when placed among better men is affected by the influence of the latter. Should a man be of the incorrigible type then by all means select him out as soon as possible, but under no circumstances place him in a position where he may render more harm to a ship’s company. I have never seen a “ship’s louse,” a man who is absolutely worthless in all positions. Especially aboard a capital ship the co-operation of the division officers and heads of departments should be solicited in an effort to find a suitable position for such a man. I am reminded of a man in my division in a light cruiser who had been tried in every department and who proved a complete failure. Finally, almost in desperation, the gunnery officer suggested that he be made the executive’s orderly. In a short time much to our surprise he proved to be the best orderly in the ship.
The working division system as it functions in many ships today is a carry-over from the days when the division complements were 20 per cent larger than they are now. Under those conditions a working party of fifteen hands did not seriously handicap a division. However, when a 3-gun turret operates with approximately sixty-five men, a new system of allocation of working parties must be devised, and the only reasonable and fair method is to prorate a working party from all deck divisions. I am fully in sympathy with the deck division officers’ problems but I cannot endorse a suggested system which I believe detrimental to good morale.
1 In the actual Convention, instead of the three asterisks there is a “...” and a new paragraph commencing “(a).”