The Aircraft Bomb and the Naval Gun
(See page 1289, September, 1933, Proceedings)
Lieutenant Cornelius A. Wood, U. S. Naval Reserve.—So far as this article goes it is unanswerable. It is a constructive bit of argument clarifying the relativity of big-gun fire versus aircraft bombing as known at present.
It is advisable, however, lest readers rest content in a false sense of security, to point out that Lieutenant Commander Ramsey does not make any pretense of comparing the hitting effectiveness of the 1-ton and the 0.5-ton bomb (its shell weighing as much as the 1-ton bomb). One is led further to the conclusion that for penetrative power and range the big gun has the ascendancy over the 1-ton aerial bomb but that for the disruptive force of the high explosive 16-in, shell versus the disruptive force of the 1-ton bomb, the advantage usually lies with the bomb.
Striking a compromise of the above and other factors, the general conclusion somewhat favors the big gun in the majority of circumstances and under the more usual conditions, although both bomb and big gun have a decided place and function in a well rounded out Navy, the type of Navy we require.
Although the article leaves one with a feeling that all is well with emphasis on gun versus bomb as the backbone of this theoretically well rounded Navy, there remains a lurking danger to the naval reader in taking such a position. He should not forget that the comparison is with 16-in. guns, not with anything smaller, and that were the comparison made with lesser caliber guns the conclusions reached in many instances by Lieutenant Commander Ramsey might well have to be changed so that the shift of preponderance would frequently be from such gun in favor of the 0.5 ton or the 1-ton bomb.
It is practical and wise, whether or not logical, that the comparison between these sizes of bombs be made with the lesser caliber rifles, for ships equipped only with these lesser guns must equally consider contact with such aerial bombs. Lieutenant Commander Ramsey has only scratched the surface in settling the argument for the 16-in, naval rifle. Few of our ships, few of any nation's ships, carry such rifles. The bulk of fighting ships carry only lesser guns. The question is of paramount importance, therefore, in balancing our Navy to consider the relative effectiveness of aerial bomb versus other than 16-in, caliber rifles as well. For example, how about the relative effectiveness of the 8-in, gun with which our new 10,000-ton cruisers are equipped?
Nor should it be lightly dismissed that the heaviest bomb that it is today practical for an airplane to discharge pointblank at the end of a dive is a 0.5-ton bomb; nor that the effective radius of a bombing plane from its base today is approximately 500 miles. Both the size of such bomb and the radius of bombing operations from the base can conceivably be somewhat enlarged by the further perfection of airplane design.
Lieutenant Commander Ramsey has done a great job in pointing the way to many of us as to how the comparison between gunfire and bombing should be made. In doing this, it seems to me he has answered it effectively as between the largest bombs and the 16-in. guns. It is up to the planning board now to carry on the comparison right down the line of armaments and to provide the answer in each case so that it may take such material form as will meet the requirements of a well rounded Navy.
Calling Your Shots of Sun and Stars
(See page 1463, October, 1933, Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander M. C. Kent, U. S. Navy.—This article has much of merit and will prove of interest to younger officers as they undertake the work of navigator.
The author’s statement that “the simple use of The Rude Star Finder and Identifier . . . offers him a good picture of what stars and planets are to be visible and their locations in the heavens” is open to question. A more “simple” and certainly a clearer “picture” may be had by spotting each, of the larger magnitude stars and the planets found to be visible on a miniature mooring board diagram (H. O. #2665c) using the circles to measure altitude and the radial lines to measure azimuth. This furnishes a perfect picture and enables the navigator to determine in advance what stars are best situated in relation to the ship’s course, in relation to each other, and in relation to refraction producing conditions, to give best results. Stars at high altitudes are undesirable as considerable error in obtaining perpendicularity in the observation is likely. Observations of stars at low altitudes are subject to large errors due to refraction. Stars at altitudes from 100 to 500 are desirable and at from 20° to 40° will usually give best results.
Lieutenant Davis makes a poor case in his exposition of the value of sights of bodies "whose azimuths most closely agree with his course line or differ from it by 90°" as a means of determining speed, set, and latitude and longitude. He infers that such a cut affords an accurate determination of latitude and longitude. If this is so, then any cut of two bodies whose azimuths differ by 90° (or nearly so) will give the same information regardless of how the azimuths agree with or differ from the course, and it is indisputable that any accurate fix gives all the information available relating to position, speed, set, etc.
Rather than endeavoring to get "speed shots" or "set shots" a navigator should (to quote from Bowditch) "put forth every effort to obtain the most probable position of the ship."
The assumption that a 90°-cut of two lines of position resulting from such astronomical observations as are possible at sea gives the "most probable position" of the ship is erroneous, in spite of the statements in Dutton and other textbooks that such a cut constitutes a "fix" and the definition of a fix as "an accurate determination of latitude and longitude."
In modern navigation errors in time have been practically eliminated by radio time ticks obtainable almost continuous throughout the day. Sextants have been so improved as to reduce that part of the personal error incident to the manipulation of the sextant, but the personal error still remains and combined with other minor errors (some of which cancel each other), and the often undeterminable effect of unusual refraction, results in no line of position derived from observations at sea being accurate. This being so, three or more lines are desirable in a determination of the most probable position, and even these must be properly interpreted.
When three or more lines of position are plotted and "run up" for any change in position incident to the time interval between sights, there will usually be a triangle or other figure of error rather than an intersection of all lines at one point. Asymmetrical rather than a small figure of error is desirable. In determining the most probable position of the ship it is always necessary to consider the directions the bodies observed. The mean position should be taken, in most cases, to be equidistant from the lines of position and should lie either toward or away from all the stars observed and not away from some and toward others.
The accompanying figures illustrate the method. The arrows point from the position lines toward the observed bodies, and the small circles show the most probable position of the ship.
Cases A, B, and C, are obvious. Case D is one in which good judgment must be used. If lines a and b are considered of equal value, a mean line c should be drawn and adjustment made as in case C. Case D also illustrates the decided desirability of selecting stars so situated as to produce a triangle when circumstances permit. It should be noted that in case E the position is outside the triangle of error.
Lieutenant Davis and all officers whom his article interests will find much of interest and value in an article entitled "The Sumner Bisectrix" by Lieutenant Commander L. V. Kielhorn, U. S. Coast Guard, in the September, 1928, issue of the Proceedings and will read with interest and profit the matter relating to refraction as affecting star sights contained in Blackburn's Excelsior Ex-Meridian Tables.
No part of this discussion is intended to detract from what Lieutenant Davis has written but rather to accent the point he has made of always choosing the best sights available and getting the best position possible. The navigator who does this will never be in doubt of the relative value of different position lines in special cases. He will also learn to distrust single sights and to appreciate that the best possible determination of "the most probable position" tells him all he can possible know regarding speed, set, proximity to dangers, etc.
Incidentally Lieutenant Davis should use more care in his thought and use of the term "set." He overlooks the fact that set may be present and still only disclose itself as a factor of speed made good.
Procurement Planning for War
(See page 1601, November, 1933, Proceedings)
Captain H. L. Pence, U. S. Navy.— This article is an excellent contribution to the subject, especially in its description of what has been done by the War Department to prepare for adequate and timely supply of personnel and material for the next major emergency. War has developed in modern times from an effort by paid soldiers to do a nation’s will, to a point where today an entire nation must wage war if it is to be successful. No individual in a future conflict can escape his personal responsibility to contribute in some way to its successful conclusion. An entire nation used for such a purpose must, if it is to be effective in a role in which it is so unusually ignorant, be told how it can serve the country. This information must be furnished by the Army and Navy from prearranged plans. In the United States no other governmental agencies desire or would dare plan for war in a detailed way. It is considered, therefore, that the War and Navy Departments have a peculiar responsibility in this respect.
The former in the early years following the World War realized this obligation, particularly as it concerned the planning for supply of Army personnel and material. Backed by the National Defense Act of 1920, the War Department has proceeded to develop efficient agencies to cope with this problem. Until recently the War Department has been spending over $300,000 annually to develop this important work, a work which goes hand in hand with its operational studies and plans and which fully supports them.
Our responsibility in the Navy certainly cannot be less than that of the Army, for we are the first line of defense. The fleet in being when war breaks must be augmented in ships, personnel, and material to an enormous extent how enormous it is difficult for many persons to appreciate. Development of procurement plans to meet such augmentation is something that cannot be done on the spur of the moment. No nation has ever possessed such plans in any major war in history. Possessing them, a nation through their operation would undoubtedly be saved months of needless sacrifice in life and treasure. They would contribute in a major and decisive way to the successful, prompt, and effective culmination of the conflict.
One hears successful naval officers of the World War say, “Well, we ordered material in the last war and got it because we knew what we wanted and let our contracts early j we will do the same in the next war.” I wonder if it will be as simple as that? Many things have happened since 1917-18 which might affect that viewpoint.
We have now a peace-time control of industry strikingly similar to that imposed during the last war. Will its future development assure or retard our procurement program? Is it worth our while to know and intimately study this development now in order that the full force of industry be assured and placed at our disposal when needed? I wonder if in the next war we will have half of the world holding off the enemy for over a year until we are prepared. I wonder if we in the Army and Navy are going to bid against each other in the next emergency—until the cost of war again goes to 50 millions of dollars a day with the country plunged into another orgy of spending which, if it is to be like the last one, will require at least several generations to liquidate and balance, to say nothing of the resultant upset in economic conditions. I wonder what the result will be at the start of such a conflict if the Army lets all of its contracts according to a prearranged schedule—and the Navy suddenly finds few concerns left from which to order. Will the resultant compromise, assuming it is entirely satisfactory, contribute to a prompt ending of the war? Of course it will not and if there is doubt in the satisfactory answering of any of these questions, then there is undoubtedly in finitely more to this procurement planning business than can even be hinted at in a limited article such as that by Captain Williams, excellent as it is.
Captain Williams had experience in the last war with war-time procurement and remembers many of its almost overwhelming difficulties. He appreciates that the solving of some of these difficulties now is better than waiting until war is upon us. He has recently graduated from the Army Industrial College, that excellent school for the study of economic planning which so few naval officers know and appreciate. No officer, therefore, in either service can speak with more authority or background on the necessity for procurement planning than Captain Williams. If his article will serve, as I believe it will, to generate a spark of interest in the naval service for an activity long overdue for intensive attention it will not have been written in vain.
Of course it is vital to steam, shoot, maneuver, and communicate, but each of these important activities will, it is believed, have its progress seriously retarded by the end of the first six months of war if supplies and personnel are not flowing in quantity and quality to the desired places at the desired times. And in this connection it must be appreciated that certain supplies cannot be forthcoming until certain strategic materials used in their manufacture are available—a potentially vital problem in itself. With no reserve of strategic materials in being and with possible supplies of such materials restricted in time of war due to closed sea lanes or other causes, the problem of procurement planning may be expected to reach major proportions. If it is agreed that war may come, it would seem that procurement planning must be seriously considered. That much seems apparent. It is only a question whether we want to do it ahead of time or take a year or more for the effort after the emergency is upon us. Good business methods should supply the answer. This excellent article by Captain Williams shows the way.
The Navy's Future Fuel Problem
(See page 1400, October, 1933, Proceedings)
Lieutenant Carl J. Lamb, U.S. Naval Reserve.—Lieutenant Hamilton's article is timely and should give rise to further discussion and thought, not so much about the facts presented as to the solution of the future problem. To a layman it would seem evident that the first course recommended should be carried out at once, and serious consideration given to the second one.
Due to the nature of my business and to the consequent opportunity which has been afforded me to observe certain general trends, I venture to call attention to the following facts:
- Diesel ships, especially tankers, are getting away from the use of refined Diesel fuel oils and are going in increasing numbers to bunker C centrifuged.
- A large number of gas plants no longer use the refined gas oils, but have successfully substituted bunker C or residuum oils.
- Many gas plants burn water or coal gas tars successfully, in place of fuel oil or coal, to generate steam.
- The British Navy is experimenting with a liquid fuel consisting of pulverized coal suspended in mineral oil.
- Liquid boiler fuel produced from coal by processing is being experimented with abroad.
- The British Air Force has contracted for large quantities of synthetic motor fuel, produced from coal by hydrogenation.
- An American corporation is producing a group of twenty valuable solvents and chemicals from the pentanes, by chlorination.
- Another company is producing a group of synthetic non-inflammable lubricants and insulating oils by changing benzol to di-phenol, and then chlorinating.
- As the market price of liquid boiler fuel goes up, many central stations and industrial plants will shift back to coal.
- Aside from work done in England and Germany, where there are no natural petroleum supplies available but there is coal in abundance, no serious efforts have been made to produce an inexpensive liquid fuel from coal, or toward blending water or coal gas tars with mineral oils.
In view of the Navy’s fuel problem of the future, as presented by Lieutenant Hamilton, and in the light of the above facts, it is suggested that it might be worth while to consider a research program for developing either synthetic fuels from coal, peat, or wood, or a blend of synthetic and mineral fuels.