As has been so often said, taught, and written, the only reason for a warship is to provide a gun platform. But of what use is a gun platform if the men on that platform are not well trained; if the guns are not modern and efficient; if the Power driving the platform is not efficient; and finally, if the platform itself does not properly float when needed? Assuming the men well trained and the armament efficient, then the platform or ship will be still fightable if it can be kept afloat in such a position that the guns can be served. If, however, the ship by reason of poor protective design or deterioration cannot be made to float properly even when damaged, then all the best guns and men on board will be of no avail. It becomes apparent, therefore, that the necessity for designing and maintaining our hulls in the best material condition becomes one of the major peace-time functions of naval personnel. Training in gunnery, maneuvers, torpedo firing, and economy and efficiency in engineering performance are all necessary, but equally so is the upkeep of the hulls of our vessels. Since the original design of our older ships, the requirements of additional underwater protection, additional deck protection against aircraft bombs, and protection of personnel against the effects of toxic gases have all become necessary. The success of the Germans with their stability and floatability control has made evident to us that such control is and must be considered a prime function of a ship’s company. But of what use is an elaborate system of protection against the more offensive weapons and a complicated method of damage control unless our officers and men understand the necessity for maintaining the hulls, protective deuces, and control features in the best of condition? Accepting the above necessity, then there can be only one conclusion which can be drawn if our ships are not in excellent condition—naval officers are not on the job. It is all well to say requests were submitted to yards and tenders, but necessary work was not done. This condition has existed and undoubtedly will continue to exist. In spite of the feeling among a great number of us that the Navy is above money grubbing and politics, the fact remains that our service is on a dollar basis and when this condition exists, politics must enter. It is my firm belief, however, that much of the dollar control and industrial political control might be obviated if all officers, regardless of rank or corps, would work in harmony to the end that the maximum results be obtained for each dollar spent. To the end that such co-operation and control may be obtained, it seems to me that two conditions must be met: (1) a training of all officers in the necessity and procedure for upkeep work performed by ships’ companies, tenders, and by navy yards; (2) the proper organization of ships’ companies so that the best upkeep work may be had without an undue sacrifice of gun drills, maneuvers, and engineering training. Both of the above conditions become more imperative each year as our ships become older, with little hope for replacements, and with the added necessity for stringent economy due to decreased appropriations.
With the exception of the possible addition of several not strictly naval subjects and the extension of other subjects to include new developments in the naval school’s curriculum, the basic system of training officers has not changed in many years. If, as has been assumed in an earlier paragraph of this paper, the proper upkeep of our ships is a paramount function of the naval officer and man, then why do we not cause each officer to be fully instructed and trained both in the necessity for and in the proper methods to be employed in attaining good upkeep? The cost of the hull of a war vessel is approximately one-half the total cost of the ship and the yearly cost of hull upkeep is enormous. These expenditures certainly in themselves justify trained personnel for upkeep. Midshipmen are taught seamanship, gunnery, navigation, and elementary electricity and engineering. In the engineering course is included a hurried and elementary course in the principles of naval architecture. Little, if any, of this latter-mentioned part of this subject is retained by the average officer. I fail to see the necessity for its retention by the general run of line officers. The principles and conceptions of the “ship” should be taught but there should be included, at least for all second- and first-class men, a complete course of instruction in material upkeep with the reasons for it and the best methods to be employed. This proposed subject probably appears small in scope and as if it might be quickly covered. If the necessity for the proper upkeep of our ships is to be stressed, the subject cannot be made too comprehensive. Upon graduation each young officer should be given further instruction and practice in the upkeep of his ship, including general prevention of deterioration and the methods and steps to be taken in placing a ship in the best protective condition for battle. Our postgraduate instruction for line officers, essentially our line officers’ course, should further amplify the instruction in upkeep, preservation, damage control, and the general duties of material officers on board ship. If such training were in practice, I believe all officers would be in a better position to exercise the duties now assigned them in connection with making the ships more efficient weapons of war.
Several articles have been written lately on the organization of the ship—one by Commander Tisdale, dealing more particularly with the duties of the first lieutenant, and another by Lieutenant Commander Strong, on “Technique of Organization.” As has probably already been seen, my proposals deal specifically with material upkeep and include much from the article by Commander Tisdale and some from discussion of it by Captain King.
Material upkeep of ships, merchant or war, falls naturally into two divisions the upkeep of engines and of hulls. Under our present system, the engineer officer and usually his principal assistants are postgraduate-school trained. The maximum part of their duties has been concerned with engineering problems. The men under him are “engineers” and as such have only duties incident to the operation and maintenance of power plants. Their battle stations concern usually the same parts of the ships which their daily peace-time work includes. It is my opinion that the general excellence of performance and dependability shown by the power plants of our ships is the result of the well-trained officers and men who operate and repair them. The other division of ship maintenance, that pertaining to the hull, is supervised usually by a somewhat junior officer. This officer’s duties, on major ships and cruisers, also include battalion commander, damage control officer, gas defense officer, and sometimes other duties such as athletic officer and ship’s service officer. In battle on major ships he is in the central station and, when the conning tower is out of commission and also the secondary control disabled, he must take control. The training of this officer has not been along the lines necessary for the work he must do. He has under him only a few artificer ratings and usually only the boatswain and carpenter for technical assistants. The necessity for more officer assistance has been adequately covered by Commander Tisdale. Except for the few artificers in the first lieutenant’s “gang,” the men for his material upkeep must Necessarily come from gun divisions. Since the upkeep of the parts of our major ships is also a function of the divisions having those parts of the ship and those same division men have battle stations and drill stations not in line with material upkeep, it follows that upkeep and preservation are dependent on gun drills, rifle ranges, athletic parties, special working parties, etc. In other words, the first lieutenant does not have control of the men necessary to do his work. This is wrong. It is my belief that on major ships forty men other than artificers and on smaller ships a fewer number, working steadily in preservation upkeep of the hull of a ship, could keep that ship in excellent condition, provided that were their sole duty. They should be trained in their job and with proper encouragement should take pride in their work. With supervision by trained officers and petty officers and with the artificers for the special work, their task should not be difficult.
The foregoing ideas concerning organization are offered as one solution, in addition to a sufficient number of trained officer assistants, if the present scheme of departmental heads on ships is retained. Certainly, on small ships with few officers where the duties of the first lieutenant have not been increased in scope, the present scheme of departmental organization should be retained. On major ships, however, too much has been placed on one officer by the addition of such duty as damage control, with the necessity for working its organization into or with existing repair and fire parties; and by the practice of the first lieutenant serving as battalion commander of the landing party and having several non-military duties. If we add to the aforementioned expansion of duties, the provision that the first lieutenant takes control after the executive officer, we should see the necessity not only for an officer of relatively high rank with good training and capabilities, but also for some change in organization.
The upkeep and operation of power plants has as much, sometimes more, to do with the preservation of hull, certainly of the ship, as has the upkeep of what is strictly hull structure. Artificers of similar ratings are needed in both the hull and engineer departments. The boundaries of the machinery spaces are as much hull as the boundaries of any other spaces. Still the engineer officer has control of his spaces and the first lieutenant has general supervision of all other parts of the ship for upkeep purposes. This division of ship upkeep is a product of that bugbear cognizance. Bureau cognizance of the building of the ship and provision of money for its upkeep is provided by law and is the result of the statutory organization of the Navy Department. A discussion of its desirability as pertains to Navy Department organization is beyond the scope of this paper the purpose of which is to discuss ships. A ship is a unit and all effort should be expended by its personnel for the ship and not for certain divisions or parts of the ship.
Since the upkeep of hull and engines is closely allied as to material and could be as to personnel; since battle organization for damage control necessarily must, when fully developed, closely unite the two departments having to do with hulls and engines; and since, if my conception of cognizance is accepted for the ship, the departments should be closely allied at all times, I can see no valid reason why the two departments should not be placed under one co-ordinating head called a material or maintenance officer. This officer should be next in rank to the executive officer and succeed him in line of command; he should be an officer trained in ship and engine upkeep and capable of administering the general details of coordinating the two departments. During battle he should be in the central station, in communication with all parts of the ship. The strictly engineering duties in his department should be administered, as they are now, by the engineer officer and the proper assistants. He should have two principal assistants for the hull portion of the ship, one a lieutenant commander as first lieutenant who, with his permanent upkeep gang, should be responsible for the material upkeep of all hull structure (routine cleaning should be done as now by divisions) and who should have the necessary junior assistants for supervising the maintenance work and for training and administrative details; the other a lieutenant or lieutenant commander to serve as damage control officer and administrative assistant, who under the direct supervision of the material officer should direct damage control parties. The organization of artisans and shops under this assistant’s direction and under the direct control of the carpenter, boatswain, and a machinist should be such that artificers are well trained both in peace-time and war-time work and to the end that the best results may be obtained for the ship. This proposed organization is diagrammatically outlined in the following chart:
In summary it is proposed:
(1) Elimination of much technical naval architecture instruction at the Naval Academy and a substitution of instruction in ship upkeep methods, including damage control;
(2) Additional instruction of young officers along above lines;
(3) Postgraduate instruction of officers in advanced principles in order to provide well-rounded ships’ maintenance officers;
(4) Reorganization of major ships’ companies to include a material or maintenance officer coordinating the engines and hulls, permanent upkeep gangs of trained men under each division, and one officer for damage control.