This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
Me;
°res of Tripoli,” will be accepted with
%
^sure by the members of the Institute
are officers of the Marine Corps. It is
e'r hope that it may equally interest eir brother officers of the naval service.
ery recently, in the August number of
e Proceedings, from the pen of Lieu- "ant Felix Howland, U. S. Marine
■ arps, in Reserve, we had the story of the 'dative displayed by Mr. William Eaton, ^ consul at Tunis in 1801, a former acer of our Army, in connection with the lining of American hostilities with the '^rbary states. Lieutenant Eller’s article j^ds to these traditions of our early inNavy.
. Ilis chosen title is the last five of the erst eleven words that open the Marine 0rps battle hymn. In the preparatory .riod preceding our physical entrance *^o the World War we had a Mr. Gilbert ;'Ison, a Chicagoan, who served at Quan- lc° without rank or title, but as one posted of a knowledge of men. Every ma- |l"e in training passed before his eye. He as the master builder of our morale—the leader of Quantico. When asked, after "ese men had done so well in France, dat had made them such superb soldiers, ’'lbert Wilson answered, “The first eleven v°rds of that song, ‘From The Halls of
k
°ntezuma to the Shores of Tripoli.’
There lies the foundation of your esprit de corps. Your traditions are there instilled by song into the heart of every marine.” And we knew this was true for we had read of those thousands of wounded from Bel- leau Woods who were carried into the hospitals of Paris singing that hymn. While adding renown to their corps, they discharged our obligation to our brother officers of the Army from the days of Chapultepec. They had fought in Belleau Woods under the leadership of an officer of the Army, Major General James G. Harbord—in gaining their renown as marines, they had conferred distinction upon their leader from the Army. The first six words of the song recall to us the gallant end of Major Levi Twiggs of the Marine Corps. He was killed at Chapultepec at the head of his command. That was a storming party composed of selected troops from various units of the Army and of the Marine Corps. And the Marine Corps was there honored by their brothers of the Army—they had entrusted its leadership to one of ours, the lamented Twiggs. And the other five words that open our battle hymn, the words that caption the Eller article, remind us of the services of Lieutenant Presley Neville O’Bannon of the marines. He hoisted over the fortress of Derne in Tripoli the first American flag that ever flew over a fortress of the Old World. The exploits of Lieutenant O’Bannon are familiar to every properly indoctrinated marine. In 1918 the Navy Department directed that one of its destroyers be named in honor of O’Bannon. On June 14, 1920, in the State Cemetery
at Frankfort, Kentucky, a monument was unveiled to his memory. His remains had been brought there to be re-interred in the fall of 1919 by the Susannah Hart Shelby Chapter of the National Society, Daughters of the American Revolution, located in Henry County, Kentucky.
As we under Wilson had instilled esprit in song so does the memory of O’Bannon and his marines live today in the songs of the woman of Derne: “Din din Mohammed U Ryas Melekan mahandi” meaning, “Mohammed for religion and the Americans for stubbornness.”
More than two decades ago, in deference to the wishes of some of our officers of extensive field service, it was proposed that our sword be discarded. The arguments seemed sound. But someone present read from the regulations the description of that so-called obsolete weapon; a “grip of the Mameluke type”; also “a blade slightly curved”—the scimitar type; a “straight crossed guard finished at each end with an acorn design.” The abolitionists were then asked, “Don’t you think that sword had something to do with Presley Neville O’Bannon, he who with his marines trained those Arabian Mamelukes into soldiers, then marched across the desert and stormed the fortress of Derne hoisting for the first time the American Flag on a fortress of the Old World and so authorized these words of our song ‘To the Shores of Tripoli?’” None answered for none there then knew.
Major Edwin N. McClellan, U. S. Marine Corps, in researches instituted shortly after this incident mentions Hamet, a brother of theBashaof Tripoli, a friend of the Egyptian Mamelukes. Hamet rendered material assistance in connection with the organization of the forces from these Mameluke tribes, trained later by Lieutenant O’Bannon’s marines. Later, when O’Bannon parted with Hamet, the latter presented to him, styling O’Bannon my “brave American” friend, a jeweled sword with a Mameluke hilt. This swor , Hamet, some years previously, had ca_r ried while serving with the Mamelukes in Egypt. Upon O’Bannon’s return to t e United States the state of Virginia Pre sented to him a sword modeled after tha of Hamet. The marine’s sword of today1® therefore regarded in its Mameluke h* as a heritage through O’Bannon fr°nl Hamet and the Mamelukes of Egypt- .
Colonel Frank E. Evans, U. S. Mafln'j Corps, in an article entitled, “The Swor of the Corps,” printed in 1916, after re searches by Captain Norman H. Sha'v- U. S. Marine Corps, had the following t0 say on this subject:
In no respect, however, has the corps reslS,L change so imperturbably as in its sword. Too f the sword of the Marine Corps is so unlike^11 of any other American service, be it Army, NaV'’ Coast Guard, Organized Militia, or cadet cotP ’ that it may rightly be regarded as the most tinctive feature of our uniform or equipment, cause of this unbridgable difference, which 11 has failed to modify to any appreciable exte and by reason of the haze of tradition that is ^ separably associated with the Mameluke s"'0 of the corps, it is certain that the mere rumor t any change was even contemplated in its 10 . would meet with the unanimous
dis.apprS
The corps, in short, regards its sword with a 1°-‘ affection second only to that which a nation bo for its flag, or a regiment of the line for its re° mental colors.
Colonel Evans further refers to a work el1 titled Military Reminiscences of Latter L11 of the Eighteenth and Beginning of Nf,tC teenth Centuries, by General A. C. Mcrcer’ Royal Artillery, wherein General M&ce^ said that after the Egyptian expedition ® 1807, the Mameluke saber was quite 1 rage among the general and field officers o the British Army. Colonel Evans the11 adds:
The far-reaching influence that the EgyP1*^ expedition had upon the rather widespread use the Mameluke sword in Europe was unquest1® ably communicated to the Marine Corps of United States in those early days. Egypt 1S . e home of the Mameluke. In the wars against Barbary pirates American frigates were a fa®11
of
i '•niv/io. r uc v v oiu xtoon 10 u
tabic “mamluk,” which meant slave. A body- f^td of Turkish slaves was first formed in Egypt
ks-Salih, Sultan of Egypt and Syria, was the st ruler to take this step, in the seventh cen- ty. His men were known as the Bahree-Mem-
in the Mediterranean, and each frigate car- t|e(l its detachment of marines.
.The exploits of Lieutenant Presley Neville Sannon, the hero of the capture of Derne, in lfipoli, in 1805, after a march of 600 miles ■'rough the desert of Barca, are familiar to the jj®cers of the corps through Major Collum’s full ^scription of that expedition in his History of the • Marine Corps.
p
°hcerning the Mamelukes, Colonel Evans SaVs:
A sketch of the sword of the Marine Corps, in V of the important bearing that the ancient atftelukes have exerted on its history, would be ^complete without reference to that famous body Warriors. The word itself is a corruption of the ^ the successors of Saladin.
°°ks. While they were originally slaves, and redded as inferiors, they excelled as warriors and |. eatually usurped the supreme power and estab- shed a powerful line of Mameluke sultans. Their ,?% sword was made of bronze but in their hands I®® blades of Damascus became famous, the scimi- shape was adopted, and until recently the |. ade used by the Cossack Light Cavalry showed .file difference in its main details from that made atnous by the Egyptians.
The Mamelukes are inseparably associated l fib the military history of Egypt, the first county in which a regular military organization was fiablished, and a country in which the fighting ®rnent was the most honored and powerful of all
'Ws.
I bfapoleon, however, in 1798, met the Mame- .''kes twice in battle and whipped them in master'd fashion, inflicting heavy losses on them which ^'nted for the Mamelukes the beginning of their sPeedy disintegration and downfall. It was not fitil 1811, however, that Mehemet Ali admini- .fifed their coup de grace, securing his position 7 a massacre of the Mamelukes in the citadel, dd laying the basis of Egypt’s independence.
In 1926, this writer passed through the ^public of San Domingo on a journey the Virgin Islands to the Republic of fia-iti. He became at San Domingo City guest of the present President of that ^public, the then Colonel, later Brigadier General, Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, then
the Commandant of the little Dominican army created by the American marines during the occupation from 1916 to 1924. They appeared in uniforms like that of the marines; they carried on our daily military routine of guard mounts and parade; their bugle calls were those of the marines. Colonel Trujillo had remarked that his little army was not altogether popular in certain political quarters. He explained that this rested upon the fact that they were the visible reminder that once the marines had occupied the Republic, that they, his forces under the Dominican flag, were frequently referred to by hostile “politicos” as being an offspring of the United States Marine Corps. But Colonel Trujillo then added to this writer that he and his officers looked not upon this term as one of opprobrium, that they were very proud of their origin. They would never cease to be grateful, he said, for the circumstances of their birth, its memory was very dear to them. Then he added, “I have a sword for you; it is now being engraved. I hope it will be ready before you leave.” Unfortunately the promised gift could not be delivered there. It was brought some days later to Cap Haitien, where this writer then was, by a Lieutenant Padilla of the Dominican Army. Upon opening the package there appeared the sword of the marines, our sword. But Lieutenant Padilla hastily corrected this misunderstanding. Pulling it from its scabbard he showed the blade. There inscribed were the words Ejercito Dominicana in the space where our sword is inscribed “United States Marine.” Padilla then said, “ Colonel Trujillo wanted you to know, to perpetuate the circumstances of the birth of his Dominican Army, we have adopted the sword of the American marines as our own sword.” This writer then sent by Padilla this message to his Colonel, that on future occasions which called for him to wear side arms he would carry that subtle tribute of the Dominicans, not his own sword.
that
author may not be exact or correct;
O’Bannon, Eaton, and their associates were men of resource and initiative as Lieutenants Eller and Howland have pointed out. They troubled not the Navy Department with any story of their difficulties. These they surmounted; they forged from the resources available to them the tools they needed. How singular the coincidence of history! O’Bannon welded, with only the help of but a corporal’s guard, the instrument he needed to overcome a formidable opposition. He made of the Mamelukes, the hereditary enemy of the Algerians, Tripolitans, and other barbarians, a trained military force. In memory of that we have preserved his sword. And then 120 years later, more or less, the present-day marines created and developed under our methods of training a little army for the Dominicans. That force, however, was not to be used, as was O’Bannon’s, to fulfill any immediate purpose of the United States. It was intended for the preservation of law and order in the Republic of San Domingo—to enable the Dominicans to maintain for themselves stable government. How appropriate that the sword of Mamelukes and of O’Bannon should, as a tribute to the American marine of today, descend as a heritage to that army of the people of San Domingo, the child of the American marines. Thus have the affairs of that republic become qualified to be so worthily and efficiently presided over by my good friend, Don Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, their present executive.
Command, U. S. Navy
(See pages 805, June, and 1486, 1501, October, 1932, Proceedings)
Rear Admiral J. W. Greenslade, U. S. Navy.—This paper was an effort to develop the most important and vital subject which demands the attention of the naval service today and to interest naval officers in the study of a command system which may be a helpful automaton or an incubus according as it is used.
The author is not inclined to accept th® importations of using “weasel” words, ol confusion of thought, and of failure to use naval terms, which were made in the discussions that appeared in the Octob®r Proceedings, pages 1501-6. And, in vie"' of the vehemence of the comment, he questions the purpose of many paragraph5'
The essayist can only infer in much 0 the discussion a desire to completely ex°r' cise an assumed evil. He attributes to the commentator a high motive and senses him a zealous interest in the good of the service. And, incidentally, the essayist de* sires to record his deep affection and ad' miration for the commentator and to acknowledge, with appreciation, that h’s service career has been influenced and in' spired by the latter.
A real point at issue in this discussion is over the statement that “Authority may be delegated, responsibility may not- The commentator’s denial of the correct' ness of that statement as a principle 0 command is based upon statements in Ia'v and regulations as to the method of exercising command, presumably in accord ance with sound principles. But basic pr>n' ciples are immutable; laws and regula' tions, though they must be accepted an obeyed, are not; different nations may eS' tablish different laws and regulations, bn that fact does not change the basic princ1' pies. The statement of principles by th® is open to question, but reference to la'vS and regulations neither proves nor dis' proves their correctness. It surely is funda' mental that a lower echelon of comma11 receives authority from a higher one andlS responsible to the latter for accompli1' ment of a mandate. The lower echelon ma>' then assign tasks and delegate authority necessary for their accomplishment to stn lower echelons. These last echelons are r®' sponsible to the intermediate one which’ however, cannot divest itself of completc responsibility to the higher for the aC'
^ttiplishment of the original mandate. .“Us, authority may be delegated, responsibility may not. This is, of course, an ab- Sfact consideration, but one which must “e kept in mind by those who make and change laws and regulations.
Reverting to laws and regulations, the commentator quotes the regulations governing the functions of the chief of Naval operations who “shall, under the direction °l the Secretary of the Navy, be charged ''hth the operations of the fleet and with Ihe preparations and plans for its use in He then states, “He cannot ^legate these duties to the commander 111 chief, U. S. Fleet,” and later, “He cannot delegate his authority.” Surely a literal Acceptance of those statements would present the commander in chief from exercis- lng any of the functions of military command in peace or war. But it is manifest jhat he exercises command in such respect both by virtue of authority delegated to A'm by the chief of Naval Operations Adder the direction of the Secretary of the Ravy and by virtue of his commission as c°mmander in chief; nor can it be denied ^at the chief of Naval Operations by the Authority vested in him may delegate or pommit authority (not his entire author- *ty) to subordinates. To insist on a system cf command giving literal adherence to the ^Ws and regulations, yielding nothing to Custom, liberal interpretation and evolutionary development, would be detrimental to efficient, co-ordinated exercise of Command. Reference to Art. 641 (2), U. S. ^ravy Regulations, 1920, wherein is prescribed an organization long since abandoned, sufficiently illustrates this statement.
The commentator has contributed great- v toward developing clear thinking on this Subject as well as command methods Miich will be simple and clean cut. In the light of his personal and professional character and stature, his interest in this subject is an indication of its importance and
of the necessity for definite determination.
Other comment on “Command, U. S. Navy,” appears also in the October number (pp. 1486-92 and 1501).
The positions taken throughout this comment are affected by the clearly demonstrated fact that the writer holds a definitely limited conception of what the functions of the commander in chief are and should be. A careful scrutiny of the comment reveals the writer’s views of this function in the following two quotations only:—
It is submitted that basic principles require that the commander in chief be responsible, not only for administrative command and direction of fleet policy, but for supervision of the fleet’s training and for its actual tactical command in battle (p. 1489).
Perhaps the greatest duty he would have to perform would be to effect a proper concentration of the fleet in its battle area and conduct that approach which would give our fleet the best chances of victory under existing circumstances (p. 1501).
There is no idea here of the planning, conduct and direction of campaigns and operations, no vision of the important functions and activities which will fall on the shoulders of the commander in chief in a prolonged naval war wherein a fleet battle will occur only if the enemy is in superior strength, or is surprised or is forced by the pressure of operations to stake his fortune on a desperate chance. The commander in chief will plan and direct that the fleet and its task forces will fight on every possible occasion wherein advantage or superiority obtains; but if he dashes around attempting to attend all of these local affairs or holds his fleet concentrated awaiting the fleet action, someone else will be winning the war. Whose duty will it be to plan and direct the strategical and major tactical activities of the fleet, maintain and operate the fleet in the war zone, plan and co-ordinate all fleet activities, and those of other forces,—for example, expeditionary? These activities will not be further developed here as the attempt to outline them fully was made in the subject article. But it is clear that no logical study of this phase of the subject can be made unless the true functions and activities of the commander in chief are fully recognized and established. This is the key to the whole problem of fleet command.
Culture Versus Proficiency
(See page 1110, August, 1932, Proceedings)
Lieutenant Leonard B. Loeb, U. S. Naval Reserve.—In a recent issue of the Naval Institute Proceedings there appeared an excellent article from the pen of an academy graduate now on the staff of New York University, Dr. Henry Crew. In this article a point of view is advocated which is of great interest in the present consideration being given to educational theory. This point of view merits further discussion. The article in question emphasizes the great value of the cultural element in education as against the more specialized technical training which has in the past been the basis of the curriculum at the Naval Academy. This point of view is at present being vigorously advocated by certain groups in the educational field. Among these groups perhaps the four most prominent ones are:
(1) A considerable number of leaders in that vast army of professional “educators” which has arisen in the last twenty years.
(2) The majority of the classical and humanistic faculties of collegiate institutions in this country whose dominance in the educational scheme has been threatened in the enormous development of the natural sciences.
(3) Many presidents and executives of the small colleges whose function is essentially the cultural development of the students enrolled.
(4) A considerable number of leaders in the field of engineering education who are concerned at the narrow viewpoint, lack of cultural background, and sometimes the downright illiteracy of the average engineering student.
These groups are exerting an increasing pressure towards the modification of college curriculums and especially prof®s' sional curriculums into ever broader an3 necessarily more superficial “cultural programs. While there is perhaps merit in this movement, and while there is doubtless much to be desired in the cultural attainments of our present college graduates, especially those from engine^' ing colleges, and hence also from our o"'n Naval Academy, it will pay us to pause f°r an instant to consider this problem befofe launching headlong into radical alter3' tions in these curriculums.
As with all problems in this exceeding^ complex civilization, it is probable th3t the problem involved is not a simple oUe containing just one element to be j01' proved. It is more likely that there exists an exceedingly complex relationship be' tween many factors in which an alteration in the sense indicated may produce seriou5 disturbances which can extend so far as t0 vitiate the whole purpose of the educ3' tional program. It would thus seem to b<j indicated that before acting one shouj1 make an “estimate of the situation” 111 order that one may be led to a reasonable’ decision which can guide the future opera' tions.
In other words one cannot consider 3 curriculum for education unless one firS clearly defines the term education 331 analyzes its implications. That the key this particular problem must lie precise*) in the interpretation of this term can be seen by any one who cares to look up 11 ^ definition of the word in any standar dictionary. The definition carries so man) essentially different aspects and apphca tions of a general process that the term c^n appropriately be applied to an infinity of problems and processes, and each adv° cate of an educational plan has chose11'
for
citizenship”), or it may be very special-
ass naval officers to man the fleet. Hence
°lten without knowing it, the peculiar application which suits his needs. For the Purpose of this discussion one may de- 'Ue education as the process of preparing atl individual for the accomplishment of ^toe mission or task. This mission may general, such as the living of a full and ^ritually rich and useful life (“training
.ed, such as the safe and efficient opera- of a railroad locomotive. Thus the rim or purpose of education is to fit some ^dividual to accomplish some task in a desirable manner. The process of educa- ll°n is the process which is devised to accomplish this purpose. The curriculum °f un educational institution is the detailed °Peration order upon which the process of ^Ucation is carried out.
To the naval officer it is clear that no j'Peration order can be formulated until ue mission is clearly stated and a careful primate of the situation has been made.
, Ucn and only then can an operation plan e formulated and the operation order Pr°perly written. This is a fact that many educators” apparently forget in their *eal for educational methods.
^ The task assigned the Naval Academy f Congress is obviously to produce first-
mission of the Naval Academy is to fain young men for the purpose of mak- them efficient and capable naval offi- ^rs- A similar mission could, by the ap- 9topriate substitution of the word engi- jeer, be derived for any engineering coland it may be stated at this point . at whatever is said about the naval fining can be applied nearly as appro- riately to engineering training.
•^fter stating the mission in an “esti- ate of the situation” the next step is to ^Pmerate the “opposing forces.” In this ase it is clear that the “opposing forces” ^te natural or social forces and not of i, military kind. Under the caption of enemy forces” one may list those forces which render difficult the mission as formulated. These may be enumerated as follows:
(1)Great scope of information required of line officers qualified to take any duty assigned.
(2) The tremendous complexity of modern technical developments, all of which are rapidly adopted by the Navy.
(3) The limited time available in a four- year course of study.
(4)The limitations of the human mind and body.
(5)The limitations imposed by financial considerations.
Under “own forces” may be listed the assets favoring the accomplishment of the task. These are as follows:
(1) An unusually able and carefully picked group of young men as matiere premiere.
(2) A real zeal on the part of these young men to perfect themselves in their calling.
(3)An excellent esprit de corps and morale, due to tradition and leadership.
(4) An able corps of instructors.
(5) Excellent material facilities for instruction as compared with many other institutions in the country.
(6) Better surroundings and far less distraction than in most colleges, coupled with a routine which utilizes effectively all the spare time.
(7)Sufficient funds (no educational institution has ever enough) to operate with considerable efficiency.
__ Under the “enemy’s probable intentions” one must discuss the bearing of the handicaps opposed by nature to the achievement of the objective. The limitation is really determined through the policy of the American navy which requires its line officers to be prepared to step into any duty assigned ranging from that of a steam engineer to that of ordnance officer, navigator, or communication officer. It is not the purpose of this analysis to discuss a policy
d
eid
gestion in the Academy could be achieve1 were a fifth year added. As it is at pres*
the two courses differ essentially in ^, emphasis placed on the technical and cU tural subjects, the inclusion of more 0 the one excluding more of the other.
Underlying both courses there are certain number of basic subjects wm ^ are generally acknowledged as indispe®® ble. These are the subjects of mat11 matics, physics, and chemistry. With0 these, further study is impossible. * 0 __ these courses cannot be slighted. In matP
which appears excellent and has proven itself sound. It is only necessary to note that this is the policy, that it is not the policy in some other navies, and that as a policy it is of utmost importance for the subject under discussion. If one had only to train a deck officer, an engineer officer, or a communication officer as a single specialist, an ordinary college type of education would suffice and the problem involved would be no more serious than that concerned in the general engineering curriculum. As it is, a naval officer must have the basic training in order to be able to fulfill the functions of a steam engineer, an electrical engineer, a navigator, a seaman, a communication officer versed in signals and codes, an expert in ballistics and ordnance, a military leader, a lawyer, a practical psychologist, a strategist and tactician, and an accountant. This extensive program is made more difficult owing to the rapid advances and intricate mechanisms which are adapted to naval vessels as fast as they are developed, and long before they are in common commercial use. Such an instrument as the gyrocompass, essential both to navigation and to fire-control mechanisms, requires a special course of study of some two or three months before an officer is really competent to operate, regulate, and supervise the repair of this single item of equipment. Add to this such equipment as the more specialized portions of the engine- room plants, such as evaporators, electrical power plants, Diesel installations, all requiring very specialized training, even for officers well versed in the basic principles involved, and one gets an inkling of the complications involved due to item 2.
When the item of expense is considered, it appears that the cost of the four-year curriculum is already prohibitive. Whether the service could well afford a fifth year, a device now being adopted by some engineering schools, is questionable. Doubtless much alleviation of the curricular conit seems doubtful whether the finances aP the consideration of the time element lD . naval education will make it possible^ t® extend the length of the course. Fail1®0 such an extension of available time the four-year course sets a definite limit t® the time available, and thus owing to ta physical and mental limitations of humaD beings, to the amount of information lir* parted. It accordingly becomes clear tba the “enemy’s probable intentions” can b® tersely summed up in the statement tha all the forces co-operate to limit the scop® of the educational program to an exteI1 which nearly precludes even a complete basic curriculum.
This action of the opposing forces neces sarily limits the “courses open to us” t0 the following considerations. As the “A11 sion” of the Academy is to produce fits class naval officers while the “opp°sl11” forces” consist of two mutually incoP^ patible elements requiring on the one haP^ a wide and thorough basic training a® on the other hand very limited time 'Vi
• . J . . Up*
which to accomplish this, the choice v comes limited to two general courses. * the one an essentially basic but definite > technical and scientific set of subjects caJ1 be chosen, leaving out any cultural cl ments not fundamental to later work. \
UP
the other the subjects chosen can broader in scope, the more technical a® specialized courses being supplanted j more general and cultural subjects. He®
for
lat .
I Ler applications cannot be covered in
tSs than a two-year sequence of four
0llrses of three semester hours (total of
e^ve semester hours). This course deals
o% with the essential classical elements
j Mechanics, heat, electricity and light,
. aving no place for modern atomic phys-
those who will use the principles in
>cs
th,
and
a very little physical chemistry. With
th,
fiv.
e semester hours or approximately one
one-half years full study time is con-
^lics it is inconceivable that a naval j lcer can progress without a command spherical trigonometry, analytic gentry, differential and integral calculus, ^ an elementary course in differential Nations. In addition some college alI °ra, elementary statistics, and perhaps eQientary vector analysis, should be indued in a single added short course. Uch a mathematical education in the sual college curriculum consumes some > teen units, or semester hours of work, p has been found at the University of .'ahfornia that a basic course in physics
0r such subjects as photo-electricity, ermionics or radio, now so essential to . cunical men. A similar amount of time required for the basic chemical courses . a*ch must include general chemistry, a e(y short course in quantitative analysis, Sltffilar short course in organic chemistry, ese three basic subjects alone, forty-
and
^ed, of course spread over the four years. These courses, vital though they are, do °t equip a student to go aboard ship and oerstand, to say nothing of operating, ., y section of the ship. They merely lay e foundation. Between such courses and e actual operation come the courses ap- ',5QPriately termed engineering courses, ese cannot and should not be practical Urses in operation. Engineering schools o industries have long ago learned that grating courses are useless. By the time ^at a college laboratory has found funds ^ Purchase modern equipment for such c°urse and to develop curriculums, industry and practice have developed beyond the equipment and the education is wasted. There lies, however, between basic science and operation the application of the basic principles acquired in the science to the theory of the problems of operation. It is this material that properly constitutes the engineering curriculum and which must perforce furnish the content of the major portion of the academy training. An illustration of this lies in the fact that between a basic course in heat and a tour of duty with a steam installation afloat as an ensign, the naval officer must learn the theory of the application of heat and thermodynamics of steam to the two different types of turbines. Again between spherical trigonometry and practical navigation at sea the theory of navigation must be acquired. This reasoning applies equally to the fields of electrical and ordnance engineering and so on. By the time that the midshipman has acquired a sufficient training in mechanical drawing to enable him to sketch a plan for a minor repair job, has acquired a speaking knowledge of two foreign languages, (the average college student only acquires a reading knowledge),, has learned his naval history and international law and military tactics, it is clear that there is no time left for “cultural” studies. In fact, the subjects covered would properly fill two full collegiate engineering courses and half a course in astronomy and navigation.
In such a technical course it is clear that the old question of “the theoretical versus the practical” no longer plays a role. In a modern mechanized navy there can be no “theoretical versus the practical” for an officer and a leader unless he has acquired the basic theory of operation. The four-year curriculum precludes any operation except the very little experience gained in the midshipmen cruises. Practical experience is gained afloat in the first tours of duty, the four years at the academy laying the foundation for this.
the decision arrived at for the Academy to make it applicable to case of most professional courses. In ea'
the
cb
It is at this point that those espousing the cause of culture will object to the first plan and advocate the second. They will suggest that even with a limited curriculum one can dispense with, say radio engineering, mechanical drawing, some navigation, perhaps a bit of steam engineering, or what not. In their place they would substitute the excellent “ disciplines” of formal logic, philosophy, economics, history, the classics, rhetoric, and English. For it appears that to be satisfactory a naval officer must be cultured. He must be a good speaker, he must have an excellent literary style, he must be able to discuss economics and the classics, and discourse learnedly on philosophy. All these qualifications make him more socially eligible and above all, give him a richness of inner life without which no man can be happy. Unquestionably a happy, cultured, and socially eligible naval officer is a great asset to the navy.
The question remains, however, as to whether an officer who has gained these cultural advantages at the sacrifice of vital technical courses, will perform the duties of his calling better in time of stress because of the sacrifice. It is clear that if these aims must be attained at the expense of precious basic training, he will not. There is thus only one conclusion to be drawn concerning the choice of one of the possible courses open. Either a man is trained to be a naval officer with what culture is provided by his rather varied technical course, or he is not, in which case he may be a most cultured man, whatever that may mean. When it comes to the question of fulfilling his mission in time of emergency it is the technically proficient and efficient naval officer upon whom the nation depends. Thus the “decision” is necessarily simple and clearly indicated. It is to plan the curriculum of the Naval Academy so that its graduates will have received all the essential basic education to fit them for their various technical and
professional duties, for the purpose of ducing efficient and competent naval o cers. .
With this “decision” the developmej\ of an “operation plan” and the writing an “operation order” in the form of curriculum is a comparatively simple ma ter. The tasks or topics to be studied mu^ be judicially chosen and then assigned the appropriate “task groups” in such manner as to achieve the maximum e ciency. As it was the purpose of this art1 to discuss the problem and arrive at^ “decision” a more detailed discussion the “operation plan” or “order” would out of order. In this connection, howev^ it may be added that in general the ‘ ta groups” in the past curriculums have be excellently assigned and as a whole the r^ suits have been surprisingly successful- has always been a source of amazement ^ the writer in his eight years of more less intimate contact with the navy tn ^ the Academy can accomplish a trainings varied in scope as effectively as it apPea to do in four short years. _
Under the caption of “auxiliary d cisions” the following comments may " added. It is clear that one may general!
Nava* case, it is, however, first necessary to n® cide upon the objective of the education11 project after which the course to be Pur^ sued becomes self-evident, a fact ign°rC by those who are zealots for culture. _ ^ It is also a question in the writer’s m111^ whether college courses can ever bring rC‘ culture to any one. It is his belief tn that portion of culture which can ^ taught is largely taught in the home dun11*-’ childhood, by example, tradition, opp0!^ tunities, and surroundings. Culture largely a matter of individual taste an^ temperament. Some persons are born W those psychical elements and aesthe tastes that make for culture, others no
Such persons will acquire it willy-nilly. As 0r those not so endowed they will never benefit by all the training and exposure to culture in the world. Some of the fortunate few who have cultural tastes look ack to the cultural inspiration they delved from some one or two inspired teachers in their college days. They wish that others could have had the same experience as they, forgetting that some 70 Per cent of their classmates exposed to the ®aine course, were not influenced at all. t is accordingly the writer’s belief that '■hese same few persons irrespective of their college contacts, would always have °Und such cultural inspiration in the ^brfd about them, though perhaps in a Afferent set of arts. No cultural courses inured Admiral Mahan; his culture was indent. It is, in the writer’s opinion, very b°ubtful if any one ever learned to write r°m the one or two superficial English bourses given in college. Facility in writes is acquired through reading, reading, aud more reading, accompanied by constant practice in the art of writing. The Same may be said for all culture in respect to reading.
Anent the question of curriculums, howeVer, there is one suggestion that the ^riter wishes to make. With the growing body of knowledge essential to a pro- bssional education, and with the limitations imposed in time, there is only one s°lution which will prevent men from teaching old age before they are trained in ]ieir professions. That is to thrust back 'bto the secondary schools more of the Momentary subjects taught in college, in eSsence as it is done in Europe. Thus by eradicating much modern educational fal- ^rol and play from the high schools, one c°uld easily push trigonometry (plane and sPherical) and analytic geometry back to *uis period. Likewise basic history, if Properly taught, except for those who wish use it professionally, belongs for the ^ost part to the secondary schools. Particularly is this true of the languages. It is ridiculous that in this country valuable collegiate hours should be spent in acquiring a reading knowledge of the live languages, while in Europe children learn their languages in grammar school. It is an acknowledged fact that the earlier in childhood a language is taught, the more easily does the child acquire facility in it. This in itself indicates an obvious improvement of the efficiency of instruction which educators seem to have ignored. If such subjects could be taught where they properly belong, the pressure on the college curriculums would not be so great and perhaps the curriculums of the professional schools could be slightly broadened. Unless this is done, however, the decision arrived at above must obtain and the curriculums of our professional schools, and particularly the Naval Academy, will perforce remain restricted. Until then, either the navy goes over to specialized officers, extends the Academy curriculum to five years, or raises the mathematical, historical, English and language requirements for admission, its curriculum will have to remain as narrow (if it is that), as it is if proficient naval officers are desired.
Scapa Flow
(See page 1583, November, 1932, Proceedings)
Paul Schubert.—The scuttling of the German Internment Unit at Scapa Flow on June 21, 1919, was an event of such significance that it will assume greater and greater importance as time lends perspective to the World War. On that day the backbone of a great fleet was destroyed, and an extraordinary naval era brought to an end.
Of the many men who participated in this momentous episode, a number have left behind their impressions of the day and the events which led up to it. Certain of these sources apparently form the foundation for the descriptive article by
Major Beda von Berchem in the November Proceedings.
But the historian, in examining the source material on Scapa Flow, is confronted by curious phenomena. Of the men who knew what was going on inside the German ships, virtually all were restricted in their point of view, and could observe only what took place on board the ship to which they were attached. Their acquaintance with events inside other ships was purely hearsay.
Moreover most German sources assume knowledge of the political situation which had developed in Germany—a chain of events in which the navy had played an important role. Politics colors the German viewpoints, and German observers do not hesitate, in many instances, to distort facts for political propaganda.
British and American sources are numerous and accurate, but cover only the external details and appearance of the scuttling, and the preliminary events outside the German command.
Still the source material presents a very full picture, which can be further supplemented at this writing by personal interviews with many men still living who were at Scapa that day. The present writer, in preparing the book Death of a Fleet with Mr. Langhorne Gibson, had occasion to make a thorough search of the field in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States—the investigation included interviews with Admiral von Reuter and numerous other participating observers— and has been led to conclusions which modify the facts as presented by Major von Berchem in several particulars, specifically, in his treatment of the German personnel situation at Scapa, of the incidents which led to the actual scuttling, and his description of the sinkings.
Admiral von Reuter’s testimony, it should be remarked, has peculiar value, as he was not only the central figure of the episode, but had freedom of movement at
Scapa, where he was allowed to make routine inspections of all the German ship5 and had perhaps the only objective vie^ of the entire command. His narrative Is available in book form (Scapa Flow—DaS Grab der deutschen Flotte, Vice-Admim a.D. Ludwig von Reuter. K. F. Koehler in Leipzig, 1921) and appends supplemeR' tary accounts by Captain Cordes, ndm commanded the destroyers, and by one o the chaplains.
The order to prepare the German coi®' mand for scuttling, surmised by Maj°r von Berchem to be unpublished, appea(5 verbatim in Reuter’s book. It had pre^i' ously received wide publication in the British press in 1919, when it was released by the British Admiralty, who had secured a copy aboard the wreck of the Ernden at Scapa.
Von Berchem speaks of “radicals” nnd “loyalists” in the German ships, and of a mutiny during the second week of M^' These terms assume full significance only when supplemented by the information that there had been active civil war m Germany since the end of December, an° that mutiny had been a virtually constant state at Scapa during the winter and spring. There had been innumerable riot3 in the ships, and some fifteen to twenty violent outbreaks, in which commanding officers were in some instances temporarily “deposed” and replaced by elected enlisted men.
Von Reuter had something over 4,000 men in 74 ships at Scapa, scattered ovet the huge anchorage (not, as von Berchem indicates, in one long line, but in tW° separate groups, and in part out of sight of each other). Fifty destroyers were moored in pairs, by flotillas, in Gutter Sound; twenty-four heavy craft were in a crescent anchorage, roughly three lineS deep, around the north of Cava Island) lying for the most part between Cava and Mainland and Cava and Hoy.
About half the men were Communists*
the mutinous element of the former fkgh Sea Fleet. These men repudiated von Neuter’s authority, and that of all other °fficers. Their goal was world revolution, ^ Soviet Germany, and they opposed the Berlin republic. But by special permission °1 Admiral von Trotha at the Admiralty, their “Supreme Sailors’ Soviet of the Inurnment Unit” had been officially recog- ftized. They had superiority of numbers in affiaost all the larger ships, and individual Communists were scattered throughout the unit. Since the term “Communist” ha-d only recently been applied to their Political party, most of them called them- solves “Independent” Social-Democrats.
On the other hand there were some 1,200 loyalists, chiefly in the destroyers and in the Emden. Reuter found these men, though disciplined, equally suspicious of the Berlin government, willing to follow *hm as a former imperial officer, but in- chned to distrust him when he demanded observance of the republic’s dictates. This fffimp included the majority of the 200 officers, and rather more than half the Petty officers.
Scattered through the ships were a certain number of “Majority” Social-Demo- crats—followers of the Berlin republic, ^ary alike of Communists and of Royalist officers.
Reuter, in this situation, was almost helpless. Personally, he had swallowed his distaste at the change in Germany’s form °f government, and was co-operating with Berlin to save as much as possible out of the wreck of Germany, making the one teservation that Berlin must co-operate Mth him too. Specifically, he wanted to take this internment unit home across the hforth Sea, where it could redeem itself. Berlin had promised a determined attempt to recover the ships at the peace conference.
The one asset Reuter had, in maintain- ffig “command” at Scapa over his mixed and turbulent personnel, was the fact that the British, who recognized his authority, were willing to back him in his efforts to check the political rioting in the unit.
As depicted by Major von Berchem, the events which led to the actual sinking require some modification. They fall into two categories—the reduction of the crews, and the circumstances which led Reuter to the decision to scuttle.
Referring to the “mutiny in the second week of May,” von Berchem says:
. . . these events had stiffened von Reuter’s decision to send the biggest part of his crews back to Germany. He came to this conclusion as being the best available, although he knew that he could not count on replacements for the evacuated men.
Actually, the step was the first deliberate act toward the scuttling, and its purpose was to give von Reuter command in fact as well as in name. He did not wish replacements for the evacuated men, and in his radio dispatch to Germany renounced all claim to replacements. And the decision was taken not at the end, but in the middle of May, after the publication of the first draft of the Versailles Treaty, when it first appeared possible that war would be resumed.
Reuter was able to reduce his crews without arousing suspicion because earlier in the year the British had originated a proposal that he cut his personnel by one- half.
This British proposal had been actuated by the following motives: (1) A wish to make it impossible for the Germans to get under way and steam, and (2) a desire to terminate the political rioting in the unit. The German steaming mobility had been officially authorized so that the ships could relieve their anchors during the Scapa winter gales if necessary—this had determined the size of the German crews. But Reuter’s ability to get under way made it necessary for the British to keep a battleship squadron present at Scapa as a guard to prevent him from getting up
anchor and starting home. In this Britain acted as “custodian” for the Allies, in whose name she had interned the German ships until the peace conference decided what was to become of them—the ships were still German property.
The British guard squadron, forced to remain inside Scapa, was seriously restricted in its normal training routine. If Reuter could be induced to cut down his crews, it would recover considerable freedom of movement and might, for example, go to sea to fire target practice, might, indeed, even be replaced by a unit less ponderous and expensive.
As to Britain’s attitude toward the German rioting, Britain was afraid a situation might arise which demanded British intervention and occupation of the ships to prevent bloodshed. This Britain did not wish to do, owing to the sensitive interallied situation at Versailles, where the future of the ships had become a bone of contention, and her action might be construed as manifestation of prior claim. Hence, to kill two birds with one stone, the British proposed to Reuter that he cut his crews in half. It was made as soon as the gale season was over.
But Reuter preferred to retain steaming mobility at any cost as a proof of German sovereignty. However, in mid-May, faced with the possibility of war, he wished to establish authority over his command, and finally accepted the British proposal. At that time, with British approval, he requested the German Admiralty to send transports to Scapa. On June 17-19 the transports arrived and 2,200 men were disembarked from the unit; they sailed on June 19. This virtually eliminated the Communist element from the scene; it likewise made it impossible for the interned German ships to steam.
The preparation of the ships for scuttling was in accordance with an order of the former imperial navy requiring defenseless ships to be sunk rather than surrendered—it was a measure taken as a step of readiness for the possible resumpti°n of hostilities. Von Reuter specifically de' fined this position in the closing para' graphs of his order, and stated that, if d1' rected to do so by the Berlin government) he intended to surrender the ships “to the eternal disgrace of those who have placed us in this situation.”
The scuttling was first conceived as ad officers’ coup. Only most trusted enlisted men were to be admitted to the prepara' tions, which, for fear of betrayal, were t° be kept secret from all the rest. The order was issued in this form on June 17. ^ directed that water-tight integrity be destroyed as far as possible without arousing suspicion, and all possible means of flooding the ships be got ready for instant oped' ing. Boats were to be prepared for abandoning ship, and an officers’ watch set, to watch for the scuttling signal day an' night, and to observe British movement5 (Reuter feared a surprise attempt at capture, in which case commanding officer5 were to scuttle on their own initiative).
Von Berchem states that the signa “Paragraph 11, Acknowledge,” was a reference to the eleventh paragraph of tin5 order. Actually, the order itself established the signal as a code to be translate “Sink the vessel under your command l10 mediately. The signal “Paragraph— group), Acknowledge,” similarly mean “Sink the vessel under your command a the designated time.”
The preparations could not be kep secret from the crews, and on June * Reuter, to put an end to wild lower-dec rumors, redrafted and circulated the order in a form which permitted commanding officers to take the men into their conn dence. In the resultant notification of tbe entire personnel, the officers more or lesS naturally ascribed the preparations t0 such motives as would appeal to the group of men they were addressing, and whos® support they must have. Hence a grea diversity, in German accounts, of “reasons why the ships were scuttled.” As to Reuter’s intentions and motives, however, there is no confusion.
On Saturday morning, June 21, Reuter ^came convinced that the armistice was to expire and war to be resumed at noon that day. Proof appeared to be the otherwise inexplicable movement of the British Snard squadron, which had left its anchorage and gone to sea—an action which he ‘nterpreted as movement beyond range of v'sion to clear ship for action.
^on Berchem intimates that Reuter and al1 the other German officers present knew that the armistice would not expire on that day, Saturday, but had been exuded until Monday, the twenty-third— hat is, that they deliberately violated the atoiistice terms, to gratify their personal Wish to keep these ships from British hands, and equally willingly turned their hacks upon their own government’s policy.
There is good reason to believe that !J° one at Scapa, including Vice-Admiral hhemantle, senior British officer present, haew that the armistice had been extended antil Monday. Admiral Madden, the British Commander in Chief, has stated that hfi omitted to notify Admiral Fremantle
the extension. Fremantle may possibly haVe received the information through the ^finally intercepted radio traffic, but jW°st certainly the news had in no way eeo communicated officially to the Germans, who at this time were receiving no ?®cial information from the British. And **■ is almost equally certain that the Germans could have gotten it in no other Way.
For there has never been the slightest of proof that Reuter possessed radio apparatus at Scapa and received news J°m Germany or from the outside world. f;0 German has ever breathed the sugges- ,l°n, nor have traces of such apparatus found in the salvage work on the sFips. The British order to dismantle the sets had been scrupulously carried out, as had all the other terms of internment.
For current information and news the Germans were dependent upon London newspapers which they received, four days old, soon after the British. Their only other source was the little local information they could glean from the crews of British drifters, etc., with whom they maintained amicable relations, sometimes exchanging schnapps for bread, soap, etc.
Von Reuter’s decision to scuttle was based upon the news in the London morning newspapers dated June 17, which contained the Versailles news dated June 16, and which he received on Saturday morning, June 21. He learned from these newspapers that the Versailles Treaty had, on the sixteenth, been irrevocably presented to Germany for signature, with a five-day ultimatum.
He had no way of knowing that, later in the week, the ultimatum had been extended. He did not believe that Germany would sign the treaty. He had received no official notification of peace. This was Saturday morning, the fifth day of the ultimatum, and he put together what facts he had, including the British departure, and concluded that he was faced with immediate resumption of war. Hence he gave the signal for the scuttling, intending to have it under way when, as he expected, the British returned at noon to demand his surrender.
This is Reuter’s own version of the events wrhich led him to the decision, and stands up under the most rigid scrutiny. The other officers merely obeyed his order, without knowing what had caused it. In German nationalist circles this version is less popular than the claim freely advanced by many officers, that the officers’ corps at Scapa, knowing the ships were to be surrendered by the Republican government, sank them as a manifestation of corps honor. But they could not possibly have had such knowledge, as on Saturday,
June 21, no German in the world knew positively whether Berlin would sign or refuse the Versailles Treaty; the Berlin government was faced by a rampant war party, and did not know its own mind, whether it would survive, or what would happen on Monday. Berlin was chaos. To suggest that the officers at Scapa sank the ships two days before a threatened resumption of war, to avoid an action, would be equivalently erroneous. Of course, among the officers present at Scapa there were individuals who would cheerfully have fought the most hopeless war, or repudiated any “Berlin surrender” to scuttle the ships before the massed batteries of the world, for the honor of their corps. And since in any case they were now sure that the internment unit would never go home, they were glad that opportunity came—for whatever reason—to sink the ships rather than have them pass to allied hands.
At Scapa, the reason why Fremantle actually went to sea is one of the most interesting aspects of the episode. His departure has given rise to fantastic but ungrounded rumors, such as the suggestion, common in the Orkney Islands, that Britain collaborated in the sinking.
In reality, Fremantle’s departure was made possible, in his estimation, by the immobile status Reuter had assumed when the German crews were reduced earlier in the week. Fremantle had interpreted Reuter’s crew reductions as preparation for surrender. He had weighed the possibility that the Germans might scuttle—the idea had been openly discussed in the British press but had discounted it in view of the consistent faithfulness with which Reuter had lived up to his government’s commitments. Fremantle expected to assume custody of the German unit on Monday, the twenty-third, and had prepared (but not published) orders and details to that effect.
In the meantime, it was now impossible for Reuter to get under way, and Fremantle planned, from Tuesday on, to take his command of five dreadnoughts, with attached cruisers and destroyers, into tbe Pentland Firth for a torpedo exercise. Fre' mantle was a routinarian; he had chafe for months at being kept inside Scapa; hlS ships, let down from the tension of wah were growing lax.
He secured radio permission from tbe Commander in Chief, Admiral Madded to carry out the proposed exercise, with the qualification that it must be completed by Saturday, the twenty-first. On Wed' nesday, Thursday, and Friday, June 19, and 20, rough water in the Pentlan Firth kept the British in port. On Satur' day, a fine day, there were good conditions in the Firth, and Fremantle got up anchor and left the British portion of the anchor' age empty for the first time since the German ships had been at Scapa. At sea, he scattered his units to make torpedo approaches on each other; his flagship was two hours steaming distance away fropl Scapa when, at 12.30, he received news that the German ships were sinking.
Von Berchem’s description of the German signaling, the actual sinkings, etc., *5 at some variance with the nature of the anchorage and the ways of men-o’-war.
The signal was made, not as a pas5' down-the-line by hand flags, but as a general flag hoist. Reuter’s flagship, Emden, was in the center of the crescent of heavy ships and visible to all 0 them; they received and acknowledge the signal fairly rapidly. The Germans had been allowed to exchange routine signal5' and the British drifters on patrol simply paid no attention to the flags at the yard' arms. But the Germans had been manning signal bridges only at certain times of day> at the moment the scuttling signal was hoisted, there were lookouts on deck but the bridges were not manned; it took a few minutes to get signalmen up from below for the acknowledgment.
The destroyers, five miles away in Gut'
‘er Sound, did not receive the signal so Sickly; several minutes elapsed before ^ey noticed it at the yards in the distant ^pital ships. One flotilla was hidden from others by a point of land, and to these ‘he signal had to be relayed by prear- fa.nged means, but this was actually ac- c°mplished. This flotilla (the VI) received ‘he signal last, and as its moorings were barest to the British base at Lyness, had ‘he least success of all with the sinking.
The scuttling was eminently successful. 50 destroyers, 30 sank at their moor- 'hgs, 18 were beached in a sinking conation, and 2 were kept afloat, partly hooded. Of 24 heavy ships, 1 battleship 3 cruisers, all sinking, were run ground by the British; the 20 remaining Vessels went down.
The sinkings were slow, slower than the Armans had anticipated. Friedrich der “rosse took an hour and a half; the other arger units averaged 2.25 to 3.5 hours, a few, in which the British managed ‘° take preventive measures, needed longer ‘han that. The Hindenhurg had been southed to go down on an even keel, and took Slx hours. Most of the ships were given a ‘‘st, to dip portholes and gun ports under ^d hasten the sinking.
The German crews were kept out of s*ght below decks until sufficient water had Wn taken aboard to threaten the ships’ ^ability. They then abandoned ship in jfood order, taking their personal belong- “igs with them, and only upon the unusual sPectacle of Germans lowering boats, did ‘■he British take the alarm. It was then ahout 11:45—the Germans had gotten ‘‘early an hour’s start.
German accounts are inclined to show p°ntempt of the British delay in discover- ltlg the scuttling, and of British activities ‘hereafter, including the salvage work, ‘hey are naturally highly incensed at the footing, which killed seven of their men ahd wounded some twenty-four. As a mat- ‘er of fact, the crew of the Emden, from which the signal was made, was not told of the scuttling and her cocks not opened until later, for fear of alarming three British drifters alongside; this crew went to mess at 11:30 without being aware that the fleet was sinking. And the seven slow British drifters on watch, each with a handful of men commanded by a junior or warrant officer, unable to summon help, confronted by the spectacle of a scuttled fleet, and of 1,800 men taking to the water at widely separated points in many boats, took desperate but reasonably effective measures to keep the Germans in hand. In one instance they did exceed orders by opening fire at men on the deck of the Markgraf, killing the commanding officer. But in firing at the lifeboats, they were carrying out standing instructions, known to the Germans, and fire ceased when white flags, which all the boats carried, were displayed.
The salvage work was begun with great vigor and promptness by the two steaming destroyers and the few tugs and trawlers present at Lyness, which adopted direct if brutal tactics; to their efforts can be attributed the number of ships beached. Fremantle’s destroyers did not reach the anchorage to assist in this work until 1330. But it is a curious fact that the British did not call on the powerful U. S. Navy mine-sweeping tugs present under Rear Admiral Strauss, U. S. Navy, at Scapa Pier (his forces were sweeping up the North Sea Mine Barrage) and that when these tugs were later sent to the scene on Admiral Strauss’ initiative, their services were rejected.
The greatest obstacle encountered by the British in seeking to delay the sinking of ships, was not the fact that water was coming in, but that water-tight integrity had been destroyed. All doors and hatches were open, ladders had been removed to delay penetration of the interior, and at the doors, etc., gaskets and dogs had been damaged. Along the pipe lines the valves
d
and remote controls had been rendered inoperative. Moorings had been fouled and jammed, in some instances requiring a demolition charge to part the cables.
But the many great ships that went to the bottom that day, did so without benefit of the picturesque phrases which Major von Berchem uses. There were no inner concussions. The German ships had no fires lighted, and the sinkings were not marked by boiler explosions. The effect was not one of rapid, hectic events, but a vast panorama of slow cataclysm and ineffable tragedy. Turrets did not come adrift, nor cranes go by the board or rugged tripods or stick masts “break in two.” Only in the destroyers, moored as they were in pairs, ships sometimes heeled inboard and crashed over on each other, smashing masts, funnels, and upper works against their neighbors as they capsized.
Most of the ships reached the bottom keel up, and there, out of sight of man, crushed masts and smoke pipes to crumpled metal and lay on their turrets. Seyd- litz sank on her side, with her armor shelf visible at low water.
During the salvage work, years afterwards, by Messrs. Cox and Danks on these vessels, the present writer was able, on a visit to Scapa, to enter the submerged wreck of the Prinz Regent Luitpold as she lay capsized on the bottom.
The notable thing about Prinz Regent Luitpold was the relatively slight destruction wrought in the interior of a 25,00 ton dreadnought, by capsizing and twelve years underwater. The midship section) under air pressure, could be entere through an air lock. The bulkheads wete slimy and scaled, but there was plenty 0 good paint under the scale, and surprise resistance to corrosion. In the storerooms; the stores had dumped over on the shelveS’ but they were all there, jars of preserve5’ bins of ship’s gear, everything imaginably There was grease in the cups of the turre lower handling rooms, coal in the bunker3' the boiler doors showed the marks 0 long stoking, electric lamps were in piaC^ in the sockets—everything just as it ba been left, the million and one bits of gear of a great battleship, in her day a member of the fighting line at Jutland, and whose firerooms the first , German mu tinies, those of 1917, had had their birth-
Messrs. Cox and Danks discovered a central station in one of the ships, whose water-tight doors were closed, voice tubeS secure, etc. This room, after more than a decade, had remained dry, and the Per feet gyrocompass which stood ready i0 run in it, was presented to the Army aI1 Navy Club in London.
The sinkings at Scapa were the clima* of an extraordinary sequence of mariti111® affairs. Through mutiny, revolution, a*1 defeat, they marked the final downfall 0 the Imperial German Navy, and a turnip point in world history.
★