Confederate Commerce Destroyers the Sumter and the Florida
(See page 394, March, 1932, Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander F. E. Cross, U. S. Naval Reserve.—Mr. Carlos C. Hanks has brought to the attention of readers of the Proceedings some very interesting events in connection with United States naval history during the Civil War, of which too little is generally known. In giving a recital of historical events, however, one should endeavor, by every possible means, to stress accuracy throughout. While this the author has no doubt intended, it nevertheless is true that, compared with the official correspondence and other writings of the period relative to the subject, his article, especially the description of the Wachusett-Florida episode, contains a number of striking inaccuracies. These, it is assumed, are open to correction.
There is a school of opinion which contends that historical research is better left alone. In fact, most people are largely so guided, since things exhumed so often bring in their train much that is disagreeable. But it is not the writer’s purpose in this discussion to delve that deeply.
After Commander J. N. Maffitt, of the undermanned, fever-stricken, and ill-equipped Florida, had made his daring and brilliant dash past the three United States war vessels that were guarding the entrance to Mobile Harbor, nearly four months elapsed before repairs to the crippled craft were completed, and she was in all respects made ready for sea to prey on enemy commerce. Before again running the gauntlet of blockading ships, however, which meanwhile the Union Navy had increased to seven, Maffitt prudently awaited a distinctly opportune time. He did not put to sea on the first dark night, as is implied in Mr. Hanks’s brief mention of that remarkable and thrilling escape which, since his vessel received no injury, was even more successful than his audacious entry into the harbor. He waited at anchor about three weeks, constantly on the lookout for weather conditions favorable to his departure, his men meanwhile chafing visibly from the forced inaction and suspense.
Then, on January 15, 1863, unmistakable signs of a norther appeared.
At nightfall the gale began. There was no sheltering rain, but the wind was almost dead off shore, the dark blue surface of the gulf was lashed into foam, and the spume of the sea was flying halfmast high.1
1How the Confederate Cruisers Were Equipped. By James D. Bullock, p. 174.
Maffitt prepared to get under way. By midnight, when the gale was at its height, the Florida boldly crossed a shallow bar, and behind cover of the veiled blackness of the night, stood outward into the storm-ridden gulf.
No doubt the blockaders had been doing their utmost to hold on to the land, since they must have known that on such a night the Florida would attempt to escape. Although she was seen and chased for more than half a day towards the Cuban coast, having greater speed and keeping in the strong southeasterly current of the gulf, she outdistanced her embarrassed pursuers, and finally was lost to view as nightfall approached.
Thus began the Florida’s first raiding cruise, which took her into the South, as well as the North, Atlantic, and lasted until August 23, 1863, when she put in to Brest for supplies and to effect necessary repairs to engine and hull. In all, Maffitt succeeded in taking fifty-five prizes, including the captures made by Lieutenant C. W. Read, who distinguished himself as commander of the Florida’s tenders.
During the time of the Florida’s successful raids on American merchant shipping, the cruiser Alabama, Captain Raphael Semmes, previously in command of the Sumter, during her brief career, was also at work destroying enemy merchantmen on the Atlantic. The important captures made by Semmes, happening simultaneously with those of the Florida, and with the Shenandoah in her cruise around the world, particularly in the Pacific, induced a state of panic, or grave consternation, among the great shipping interests of the North.
Shortly after Maffitt arrived with the Florida at Brest, his health “completely gave way.” The attack of yellow fever he had suffered at Cardenas2 left him in a weakened condition, resulting in rheumatism of the heart. He was relieved by Commander J. N. Barney who, after some months at Brest in charge of the refitting of the ship, was compelled to retire on account of physical disability. His successor in command of the Florida was Lieutenant C. Manigault Morris.
Mr. Hanks has correctly stated that Morris cruised the Atlantic from February to October, 1864; but he omits to inform the reader whether or not he made any captures of enemy merchantmen.
2Ibid.
This was the Florida’s second, and last, cruise. Morris operated in the West Indies, and on and off the American coast. He succeeded in taking thirteen prizes, all of which he destroyed. Between times he coaled and supplied at Martinique, landed a sick officer at Bermuda, and visited Teneriffe. His most important, as well as most valuable, capture was a mail steamer.
On the 10th of July, thirty miles off the Delaware Capes, he captured the United States mail steamer Electric Spark, bound from New York to New Orleans, with the mails (cargo), and a number of passengers on board. Morris transferred the crew and passengers to a passing English schooner which he chartered for the purpose, and then cut the steamer’s pipes, opened her valves and ports, and thus permitted her to sink.3
Mr. Hanks’s description of what transpired after the Florida anchored at Bahia on the night of October 4, 1864 (she did not anchor during the daylight hours of October 5, as he has implied), the story of her seizure by the U. S. S. Wachusett, Commander N. Collins, more than two days afterwards, and the steps taken by the inefficient Brazilian naval division present, in protestation of the violation of their country’s neutrality rights, is quite at variance with the official reports and state correspondence published on the case. Consequently, the official statement of Commander Morris, which is corroborated by other official writings, is of particular interest. Being a lucid, firsthand account of his personal experience in connection with the Wachusett-Florida controversy, it is reproduced herewith:
Bahia, October 13th, 1864.
Sir:
It is with great pain that I have to report the seizure of the Confederate States steamer Florida, lately under my command.
I arrived at this port on the 4th inst., at 9 p.m., to procure coal and provisions, and also to get some slight repairs after a cruise of sixty-one days. Just after anchoring, a boat passing around us asked the name of our vessel, and, upon receiving our reply, stated that the boat was from her Britannic Majesty’s steamer Curlew. Next morning I found that the United States steamer Wachusett was at anchor near us, but no English steamer, so I at once concluded that the boat which had hailed us the evening before was from the Wachusett.
We were visited on the morning of the 5th by a Brazilian officer, to whom I stated my wants, and was informed by him that he would report the same to the President, and that until his answer was received we could hold no communication with the shore. At noon I received a communication—which was left on board the Florida—from the President, stating that he was ready to receive me. At our interview he informed me that forty-eight hours would be allowed me to fit and repair, but that, should his chief engineer, whom he would send on board to examine the machinery, deem the time too short, he would grant the necessary extension. He was most urgent in his request that I should strictly observe the laws of neutrality, at the same time stating to me that he had received the most solemn assurance from the United States consul that the United States steamer would do nothing in port contrary to the laws of nations and of Brazil; and that he desired the same from me, which I unhesitatingly gave.
The Brazilian admiral, who was present at the interview, suggested that I had better move my vessel in between his ship and the shore, as our proximity to the Wachusett might cause some difficulty. My assurance to the President seemed to set his mind at rest on the score of any collision between the two vessels, and upon leaving him I immediately repaired on board and moved the Florida close inshore to the position suggested by the Admiral. I found the Brazilian engineer on board and was informed by him that it would require four days to repair the pipe of the condenser. Feeling now no apprehension of any difficulty occurring while in port, and wishing to gratify the crew with a short liberty, not only on the score of good conduct, but also of health, I determined to permit one watch at a time to go ashore for twelve hours, and sent the port watch off that afternoon. About 7:30 p.m. a boat came alongside, stating that she was from the United States steamer Wachusett, with the United States consul, who had an official communication for the commander of the Florida. The letter, with the card of the consul, was handed to First Lieutenant Porter, who, after examining it, and finding it directed to Captain Morris, “sloop Florida,” returned it to the consul, stating that it was improperly addressed; that the vessel was the Confederate States steamer Florida, and that when the letter was so directed it would be received. The next day (6th) a Mr. de Vidiky came on board, having received a letter from the United States consul, enclosing one for me. He requested me, before receiving my letter, to permit him to read to me the one sent to him.
It was a request of Mr. de Vidiky to carry a challenge to the commander of the Florida, and in case of its acceptance, to offer his (the consul’s) influence in having the repairs of the Florida speedily finished. I informed Mr. de Vidiky that I had heard quite enough, and, finding the letter to me improperly addressed, declined receiving it; but at the same time said to him that I had come to Bahia for a special purpose, which being accomplished, I should leave; but I would neither seek nor avoid a contest with the Wachusett, but should I encounter her outside the Brazilian waters, would use my utmost endeavours to destroy her. That afternoon, the port watch having returned, I sent the starboard watch, the other half of the crew, ashore on liberty, going also myself, in company with several of the officers. From our nearness to the Wachusett, persons on board that vessel could well see these men leave the ship. At 3:30 a.m. I was awakened by the proprietor of the hotel at which I was staying, and told that there was some trouble on board the Florida, as he had heard firing and cheering in the direction of the vessel, but on account of the darkness was unable to discern anything. I immediately hastened to the landing, and was informed by a Brazilian officer that the United States steamer Wachusett had run into and seized the Florida, and was then towing her out of the harbor. I hurried off to the Admiral’s vessel, and was told by him that he was at once going in pursuit, which he did as soon as steam was raised on board a small steamer belonging to the fleet.
The Admiral’s ship, being a sailing sloop of war, was taken in tow by the steamer and went out of the harbour. He returned in the afternoon with all his vessels, having been unable to overtake the Wachusett. Upon mustering the officers and crew left on shore, I found there four officers, viz., Lieutenant Barron, Paymaster Taylor, Midshipman Duke, and Master’s-Mate King, and seventy-one men, of whom six escaped by swimming from the Florida after her seizure. Of the actual occurrences and loss of life on board the Florida, I have been able to find out very little. The substance of what I have gathered from the six men who escaped is as follows: That at 3:15 a.m. on October 7, Master T. T. Hunter, Jr., being in charge of the deck, the Wachusett left her anchorage, and taking advantage of the darkness, steamed for the Florida, from which she was not seen until close aboard, when she was hailed by Mr. Hunter, who, receiving no answer, called “all hands” to quarters. Before the officers and crew were all on deck the Wachusett struck the Florida on her starboard quarter, cutting her rail down to the deck and carrying away her mizzenmast, at the same time pouring a volley of musketry and a charge of canister from her forecastle pivot gun upon our decks. The Wachusett then backed off and demanded our surrender, to which demand Lieutenant Porter (declined to accede. The enemy then fired again and again into us, which was returned by the officers and crew of the Florida.
Another demand was then made for our surrender, and Lieutenant Porter answered, “I will surrender conditionally.” The enemy then stopped firing, and the commander called for Captain Morris to come on board. Lieutenant Porter answered that Captain Morris was on shore, and that he, as commanding officer, would come on board as soon as he could get a boat ready. The enemy then sent a number of armed boats to take possession of the Florida. As soon as Lieutenant Porter was heard to surrender, fifteen of our crew jumped overboard to escape capture, of whom only six succeeded, the remaining nine having been shot in the water by the men on the forecastle and in the boats of the Wachusett. Mr. Hunter was wounded and a number of men killed. The enemy made fast a hawser to the foremast of the Florida and after slipping her cable, towed her out to sea.
I called in person on the President as soon as possible, but could get no further information out of him. On the 8th I sent a protest to the President, of which I send you a copy, marked 2. On the 10 th our agent was informed by the interpreter that the President did not intend to answer my protest, as the Confederate government had not been recognised by Brazil, and that I could find all official correspondence in the newspapers.
I then wrote a letter marked 3, in which reference is made to a letter marked 4. Just before leaving Bahia, having received no answer, I sent our agent, Mr. James Dwyer, to the President. The result of his visit is contained in his letter, marked 5. The Bahia papers contain a number of reports as to the killed and wounded on board the Florida, all of which I have thoroughly sifted, and find no foundation for the same.
At the time of her seizure there was about twenty-five tons of coal on board, most of which was dust. The list of officers captured is contained in the report of Paymaster Taylor, marked 6....
I am, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
(Signed) C. Manigault Morris,
Lieutenant Commanding, Confederate States Navy.
During the Wachusett’s attack on the Florida, the Brazilian Admiral, as is seen in Morris’ report, made a spirited protest with the weak force under his command, which consisted of three vessels—a small steamer, a sailing corvette, and a sailing yacht. The admiral explains the action he took at the time in his report to the President of Bahia, quoted herewith.
To the President,
Steamer Paraense, Bahia,
October 7th, 1864.
Illus. & Ex. Senhor,—
It is my duty to state to your Excellency that today at daybreak the United States of America steamer Wachusett, without having previously given any symptom of moving, suddenly left the anchorage where she was, and approached the Confederate States steamer Florida. When she passed by the poop of the corvette D. Januaria, where I was, I intimated that she should anchor, and not doing so, sent an officer on board to give notice that all the ships of the division, as well as the forts, would fire, if she attacked the Florida. To this intimation the commander replied that he should comply, and do nothing further, and that he would return to his anchorage, as your Excellency will see by the paper annexed signed by the officer who gave this notice.
Notwithstanding, the corvette, to ratify the intimation, fired a gun loaded with ball. Following, notwithstanding, her way outside, as it appeared to me to return to her anchorage, I observed as she passed by the bow that she was tugging the Florida. Immediately the steamer fired in the direction of the steamer Wachusett cannon loaded with ball; but escaping this attack, sailing in the direction of the bow, thus rendering useless the fire from the corvette, and I therefore ordered to cease firing. Having previously ordered that the Paraense should be made ready to move, I immediately seeing that this was possible sailed, and went after her, seeing that the breeze was light, and made signal to the yacht Rio de Contes to follow us to the waters, which she did with all possible speed, sailing in our wake.
We chased the Wachusett outside the harbour as she tugged the Florida, both of which were little more than three miles off. I trust your Excellency will believe that when I left this port it was with the decided determination of sacrificing every consideration present and future to fight her, notwithstanding the small amount of force on which I could reckon, in order to vindicate the insult offered to the sovereignty of the country, thus taking by main force the steamer Florida; and this thought I expressed to the officers on leaving the harbour as they were united in the cabin, showing them the requirement in which we found ourselves to sacrifice every consideration, without a thought to consequences, seeing that the proceeding of the commander of the Wachusett was of a nature to arouse the indignation of every Brazilian. A general and enthusiastic manifestation of complete adhesion to my opinion was the reply given by all the officers; and I am convinced that the other ships that accompanied me felt the same noble sentiments.
At seven o’clock in the morning the Paraense, tugging the yacht, gained considerably on the two American steamers, and I began to nourish the hope that we should satisfy our desires, when the wind calming, which the Wachusett soon perceived, always tugging the Florida, began steaming, increasing gradually the distance between our ships and their steamers flying before our bow, and being of considerably superior swiftness. Nevertheless, we chased them until eleven o’clock and forty-five minutes, when disappearing, I leaving outside the corvette and the yacht, with orders also to return to this harbour, where I dropped anchor at a quarter past three.
Before finishing this communication, I ought to give notice that a few moments before leaving this harbour I received offers from the Inspector of the Arsenal and Captain of the Port of assistance, or anything in their power, which I accepted, begging them to send me as many armed sailors as possible. But it being necessary to use the greatest possible urgency in order to catch the flying steamers, I believed I ought not to wait, and immediately quitted without waiting for the offered help, also failing to wait on your Excellency for the same motive, according to the message I received.
God preserve your Excellency,
(Signed) Gervasio Macebo,
Commander of the Division.
An official protest by the United States consul at Bahia, Mr. Thomas F. Wilson, addressed to the President of Bahia, against the port granting the Florida neutrality privileges, was unavailing. Disappointed by the President’s refusal, Mr. Wilson is criticized by the charge d’affaires at Washington as having “preferred to abandon his post, withdrawing on board the Wachusett.” The official records of the case not only show that Mr. Wilson was on board the Wachusett when that vessel seized the Florida, but that he took an active part in the proceedings.
En route to Hampton Roads with the Florida in tow, the Wachusett put in at St. Bartholomew, West Indies, on October 29, and at St. Thomas on October 30, where she remained three days. While at the latter port Commander Collins forwarded his report on the seizure of the Florida to the Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles. About two weeks later, when he arrived at Hampton Roads, Collins wrote again to Secretary Welles—“a supplement to my report.” This, in general, referred to the loss of several items of the Wachusett’s equipment in the prosecution of her “capture of the rebel steamer Florida,” also the following reference:
Thomas F. Wilson, United States consul at Bahia, desired to remain on this ship during the nights of the 5th and 6th October last, in anticipation of a probable conflict at sea with the rebel steamer Florida, and was on board at the time of the capture of the latter vessel. As it was not convenient to land him I brought him to this place.
Contrary to Mr. Hanks’s opinion, that “the action of Collins met with approval and satisfaction throughout the North, in spite of official utterances,” is the following deduction of the Brazilian charge d’affaires at Washington in his letter to the United States Secretary of State, protesting the “unlawful” seizure of the Florida in Bahia Harbor:
So open was the violation, so manifest the offense, that the enlightened American press was almost unanimous in condemnation of the inexcusable proceeding of Commander Collins.
In conclusion it is of interest to note that the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, in a lengthy reply to the Brazilian charge d’affaires, disapproves of the attack of the Wachusett at Bahia in the following words:
You have, therefore, justly expected that the President would disavow and regret the proceedings at Bahia. He will suspend Captain Collins, and direct him to appear before a court-martial. The consul at Bahia admits he advised and incited the captain, and was active in the proceedings. He will therefore be dismissed. The flag of Brazil will receive from the United States Navy the honor customary in the intercourse of friendly maritime powers.
The Navy—A Leader in Education
(See page 555, April, 1932, Proceedings)
Lieutenant Frederick J. Nelson U. S. Navy.—Lieutenant Commander Thompson, U. S. Navy, seems to have confused, in his discussion, the formal courses of instruction given to midshipmen at the Naval Academy, with that of the broadening influences of extensive travel. There can be little question that the naval officer is exceptionally fortunate in possessing the latter privilege but how much more such experiences would mean to him, and how much more adequately could he represent his country, if his preparatory and formal education had given him somewhat of a cultural background, as well as an admirable technical one, with which to meet the future incalculable and surprising situations? The fact that the Navy possesses some really remarkable leaders and outstanding representatives is almost in spite of its system of formal instruction, and not, I believe, because of it.
The article under discussion also emphasizes especially the engineer officer in the service, whereas the problems of other line officers, varying even more widely than do his, will be benefited even more by more liberal undergraduate work. The present writer entirely disagrees with the implication that professional men as a whole have no greater appreciation of the liberal arts than engineers. Not only does my personal experience refute this notion, but a study of the requirements necessary to enter specialized professional schools or classes proves this idea to be erroneous. And the fact that these men have a broader cultural background than the average naval officer does not mean, except to the uninitiated, that they have “toyed with biological specimens or written odes to the nightingale!” It means that they have attained in some small degree exact knowledge and understanding of the past and its attainments in order to understand and to appreciate the present.
Being unaware that liberalization has been attempted upon aspiring civilian engineers, I cannot refute the satirical description of such undertaking, yet from the fact that engineering schools are requiring more of their students than the narrowest curriculum consonant with turning out a so-called technical expert, it may be seen that even the leaders in technical education see some good in “advanced liberalism.” And it is to these leaders and these schools that the Navy’s graduate students are sent. Incidentally, even if engineering students were country gentlemen with assured incomes it is questionable whether they would be able to matriculate at Oxford or the Sorbonne to “imbibe Old World culture.” It is an entirely erroneous idea apparently held by Lieutenant Commander Thompson that civilian graduate education is purely a matter of ability to pay for it, and that it is mainly indulged in by the young and completely inexperienced. Any inquiry into the standards and the personnel of a reputable graduate school will prove quite the contrary finding. It is true, however, that the younger graduate students find the academic work easier and less confusing, and that the older and more mature students have quite a bit of brushing up to do before they offer keen competition. Some of the leading educational institutions have been doing for years what Lieutenant Commander Thompson recommends in offering advanced graduate work in business fields to men of industrial background and experience, the Harvard School of Business Administration being notable in this respect.
No one expects a technical school to grind out “combination technical dabblers in the liberal arts (than whom no one could be worse) and potential captains of industry”—especially the Naval Academy. However, since graduates of this particular technical school are to attain positions of great responsibility, not only within the service but as official representatives of the United States in many places and circumstances, would it not be advantageous if these individuals possessed more educational background than the minimum essential to turn out a junior technician? It is not that the Naval Academy training is not good so far as it goes, it is rather that it does not go far enough to suit some of her more aspiring graduates. This fact is evidenced in the popularity of graduate work the Navy has been conducting for a number of years. Such practice by the Navy is in line with the best and oldest academic tradition throughout Europe and this country. And after having had the privilege of such work in the postgraduate school, in one of the largest universities, and in one of the leading technical schools of the country, I am convinced that simply high technique and technical skill in whatever line found, leaves much to be desired in a man who is often, by virtue of his purely scientific training, called educated.
Possibly it is futile to worry about a liberal education for those who are to be “practical officers,” and yet one cannot but wish that along with the technicians, the Navy might increase the number of theorists and doctrinaires such as Michelsen, Mahan, and other officers, who, in addition to their professional skill, are cultured gentlemen.