The problem of war for a navy has so far through the ages been solved by destruction of the material of enemy battle machines to such a degree that personnel operating them can no longer make them function. Examples of successful naval combat show that the proper armament to use, to obtain an enemy defeat, is a battery of guns that have such an enormous striking force that the best production in naval architecture can be easily smashed. With this as a criterion, polished plans are formulated, and meticulous preparations are made for the coming upheaval, from careful study and painstaking development of phases of previous engagements. However, every war is different from the one for which experts make plans. The thought process that works the operative mechanisms of the mailed fist, becomes so fogged with the demand for precedent, that it is unable to keep its practice entirely up with the march of events. This is not because the basic principles of tactics change, nor are new principles invented, but because of simple application of modern utilities to modify older methods. There is a very far-seeing English writer, Colonel J. F. C. Fuller, who has a reputation for being rather liberal in his views. He seized upon chemicals, aeroplanes, and tanks as the three outstanding developments of the World War. These factors in particular caused the World War to be characterized by a series of upset calculations.
A paragraph from a book by Colonel Fuller, The Reformation of War, is quoted as follows:
Those of us who believe in the inevitability of war are nevertheless apt to think, as great wars only occur at about fifty year intervals, that, whatever changes science may demand, we have ample time to rest before setting to work to discover what the next war will require. No assumption could be more falacious, for, before a new military idea is accepted, a whole school of obsolete ideas, religious in their intolerance, has to be converted to the new idea, and not until it is converted will efficient training take place, and training is an all-essential to victory. If the truth must be known, should the next great war explode in 1972, then, if we work hard, we may just be able to convert the traditional school in time and replace it by a school of military scientists. Not brawny halberdiers skilled at the game of push of pikes or push of bullets or push of shells which strike down fool and sage alike; but intelligent thinkers who will push their ideas to the detriment of the enemy’s beef, who will pit brain against muscle, and, if opposed by muscle alone, will win a war quite possibly in a night without a day.
Careful consideration of what the author of the preceding paragraph sets out makes us believe that research in the chemical industry may show a path to the direction in which science is forcing warfare. The use of chemical agents may be the next step in military evolution. It is perfectly possible that in a single test tube may be found the conquest of the world. What type of chemical this might be is not known, but it seems that some knowledge of the subject is desirable. Military men should overcome any distaste that they might have for the use of chemical agents in connection with their profession. If in future wars, we are to avoid gross mismanagement in the high places, and panic, plus stupidity in the rank and file, it is essential that every one should make some study of chemical science as applied to war.
Application of chemicals to the principles of war is defined as the manufacture and use of gas in offensive and defensive measures for the purpose of gaining the objective or in carrying out the mission. Previous to 1915 records show evidences of smoke and liquid fire as the only forms of chemistry given war-time demonstration. During the World War armies of both sides employed chemical agents with such accurate results that their use in any future struggle is an established certainty. Whether or not gas can be made to apply to the Navy is still a conjecture, but the menace it offers to the man behind the gun is an item for serious thought.
Chemical agents are classified as vesicants, lung irritants, lachrymators, or toxic smokes according to the effect they have on animals or beings. The application they have to naval problems can be summarized by the various possible ways of projection. Substantial methods of gas release are by bombs, torpedoes, cylinders fixed on decks of submarines, toxic smokes from stacks of fast vessels, and spray from tanks attached to racks on aircraft. Gas from submarines will be the lung irritant type released in a cloud from multiple groups of that class, which approach submerged or at night. Toxic smokes from fast moving vessels, such as destroyers and cruisers, will be loosed as a screen for the opposing ship to pass through. Gas from an aircraft will be of a vesicant type, sprayed from fast planes that approach under cover of clouds, or under cover of a screen made by other aircraft. Of these various methods, the two that show the easiest and most effective application are by submarine and by aeroplane.
Transitions in material and methods which follow mobilization are so rapid, as well as so radical, that if we expect to keep up with them, we must have our minds prepared in advance for deviation from the old standards. The ease with which chemicals lend themselves to fleet use, the added value of this form of weapon due to limitations placed on other types, and the short time required after the declaration of war for the procurement and preparation of all forms of gas projection, as compared to guns and ships, make these agents so important a point in the tactical offensive, that any advantage that might be gained by their use cannot be overlooked. It is difficult, in looking back, to understand the ignorance of professional soldiers along the lines of chemical warfare, but it is far more difficult to find excuse for such lack of knowledge now. It is true that no navy has definite record of being yet confronted with the problem of protection during an engagement against chemicals. It is worth-while to remember, nevertheless, that had the German Army commenced their attack with chlorpicrin, instead of with chlorine, it is quite probable that methods of defense could not have been perfected against it in time to have prevented defeat. Without over-stressing the embracing factors mentioned above, but still considering thoroughly the importance that chemical agents might have in fleet movements and coast landings, we must lay emphasis on the need for gas protection. We must foresee steps on the part of an opposing navy to bring chemical methods to bear effectively against us and be able to definitely meet them. We must announce a policy so that the training of our Navy in chemical warfare will be such as to oppose effectively any enemy employing the use of gas. This becomes a mission of major consideration.
A mission of this class should fundamentally include preparations both for offensive and defensive methods of attack with chemical agents. Ordinarily defense is overlapped by a strong offense. This mission can not be so outlined, because the U. S. Navy, with its complex systems governed by public opinion, Congress, and a spirit of agreement, has defined its objective in gas warfare as purely defensive. By this decision we are limited to consideration of only protective methods. Attempt will be made here to set out primary steps for the training of ships’ crews in an organization of cover.
Protection must be considered in two phases—individual, and collective. Under the first phase are grouped all methods of gas control that pertain strictly to the individual. This includes such items as the gas mask, canisters, impervious clothing treated to deny liquid gas entrance, impregnated clothing treated to neutralize the injurious effect of gas vapor, hygienic methods in an infected area, and first aid. In the second phase are grouped methods of control that pertain to an assembly. This includes such items as gas proof rest compartments, spaces where gas entrance is absolutely denied, areas where the air is filtered through canisters, and gas riddance on a large scale.
The greatest danger at the beginning of another war, wherein gas is used, will come from panic which may follow if information is not diligently spread, and preparations made for protection. Each person on the ship must be given comprehensive instruction in its details. Teachings so outlined should be simple in form, progressive, and inscribe learning by doing. Methods should be simple and brief, but effective. To bring the ship’s crew into manageable component groups, it is proposed to first establish a school for division officers, where they can be given a thorough understanding in the detailed parts of protection by mask, canister, clothing, gas-proof spaces, filtered ventilation, and contamination removal. When this understanding is complete, these officers are to be used as a nucleus instruction body for the organization.
Due to the number of men in the crew of a ship, the problem of schooling this organization seems to be best met by grouping it into divisions, with the division officer responsible for proper instruction. The curriculum of the school should contain details of the gas mask, its use, types of masks, mask limitations, storage, repair, types, and use of protective clothing, ways and means of gas protection, and gas removal. The aim of all this is familiarization with proper care, fitting, and use of protective methods. At the same time, this will result in giving the officers and men some experience in the effect on their work, comfort, and endurance while performing their duties masked, or while confined to spaces where ventilation is controlled.
We find much opposition to the setting aside of sufficient funds for the manufacture of training appliances. The policy for this opposition comes from a group in control whose hands are effectively tied by public opinion, and this in turn is founded on the extreme shortsightedness of the layman, who does not seem to realize that there is anything more important in this training than the ability to put on and take off a gas mask quickly. The result is an almost complete lack of knowledge of the gas mask which should be issued today to ships in case of an emergency, and of the effect of gas mechanisms on the tactical handling of these crews.
Confined, as the problem seems to be, between such limits as the number of gas masks available, amount of chemical material at hand, useful number of trained personnel, and large displacement of instruction volume, training cannot conveniently be carried out during a gunnery year. For this reason, it is desirable to devote at least an hour a day to this schedule during the period that the ship is undergoing overhaul at her home yard. On first glance, this appears almost impossible because of the amount of ship work to be done. However, considering gas importance, the absolute lack of training of any sort in this subject, the convenience of a gas chamber, the number of drill masks available, and the inability to drill the whole crew on any other occasion, the necessity would seem to justify the time expended.
When the school of the individual is once completed, those charged with the preparation of training directives, training principles, and training regulations of the ship must include chemical warfare in their scheme. The organization of the ship should be written to include phases of protection under all conditions. It would be ridiculous to assert that in the next war, ships will be attacked only during actual engagement. They must be trained for protection from chemicals at all times. The organization of the ship should divide the crew into gas groups for both cruising and battle. Provision should be made for lockers with availability such that the divisions could, with the least possible conflict, equip each man with a mask. The limit of time allowance for this activity in issuing mask's must be acknowledged when we weigh the possibilities that might result from a surprise attack and when we think of the demand for ready supply on call to general quarters.
To places where personnel function during an engagement, the ventilation system should furnish air filtered through canisters. Spaces where the wearing of gas masks would hinder the operations during battle should be gas tight, and a system of air purification built in. Sick bays, messing compartments, washrooms, and berthing areas should be made up gas proof to provide for continued ship operations during intervals that the existing gas condition proves menacing. Cruising routine must include sentries for warning, and a detail for closing such parts of the ship as it is intended to deny gas entrance. The organization should also provide for the preparation of these same spaces at the times when water-tight doors is sounded—this to prevent any unnecessary delay on surprise or night alarm.
General quarters routine should be slightly easier to make provision for than cruising routine. Assuming that the men are already equipped with a mask, and that compartments are already closed, the sentries needed for sounding the gas alarm could very well be the battle lookouts.
Experiments with chemicals show that areas that have been thoroughly contaminated remain in that condition for a considerable length of time or until they have been completely de-gassed. Gas riddance, depending on the type used and the concentration employed, is a tedious process. Methods for accomplishing this vary in degree of simplicity from a mere matter of airing out the space, to giving the entire surface several coats of a cleansing wash with neutralizing solutions. Men engaged in this work must be carefully protected by approved types of gas-proof clothing. It is safe to believe that a well directed attack with chemicals would result in uninhabitable quarters and contaminated topside surfaces for several hours. Preparedness for ridding the ship of the effect of such an attack would make it mandatory to detail clean-up squads for all periods. Assuming that, as in all other emergencies, general quarters is sounded, clean-up squads would take station. With gas appliances normally falling under the cognizance of the construction and repair department, it is but natural to detail the clean-up crew to the forward and after repair parties. These men could then function under the first lieutenant’s charge with no overlapping in responsibility. Definite measures for issue, care, and maintenance of equipage would be the result.
With the crew well schooled in individual protection, the clean-up squads could commence to operate toward collective protection. They could quite easily be schooled, and drilled in the work of protecting compartments and de-gassing spaces during the daily general quarters period. This interval is chosen as most appropriate, because at this time these men are released from ship’s work and are not used for gun replacements. By spending one hour each week of this time on processes, and another hour each week on demonstrations, the practice of gas riddance could be mastered.
In general, in the formulation of these plans, it should be kept in mind that chemical warfare means and methods, both as measures for individuals and for collective protection, are but aids in the accomplishment of the tactical mission. The exercise should be so drawn as to cause the crew to apply sound principles in the carrying out of the mission which will be normal in war, and which would logically involve the use of chemical means and methods in an auxiliary role. To this end, care should be taken against unduly emphasizing chemical features to the extent of making them illogical. Protection against chemicals should simply be considered as part of the equipment.