In Early warfare there was little distinction between military and naval forces. An Athenian strategos might command either on land or sea. His heavily armed hoplites might fight either in a densely ranked phalanx ashore or upon the decks of swiftly rowed triremes. These frail galleys had to be drawn up at night on sandy beaches. Often one fleet attacked the other before its ships could be launched, and the resultant battle was fought more on shore than at sea.
The Norsemen, some twelve centuries later, still fought this style of amphibious warfare. The same warriors who might fight a sea battle behind the serpent-shaped figureheads which decorated the prows of their galleys might next day go berserk in a pitched battle ashore or scale the walls of a fortress.
The Spanish sea power of the sixteenth century was merely an extension of their military power to the sea. Their ships were commanded and fought by soldiers. Their fleets were led by generals. The mariners and pilots who worked the sails and manned the tillers of their clumsy galleons were mere menials who did as soldiers ordered, these tasks were considered beneath the dignity of Spanish fighting men.
The British and Dutch, on the contrary, wanted no soldiers on their ships. They built up naval services which had no connection whatever with their armies. From that time, four centuries ago, all great powers have realized the necessity for having both military and naval services. In some countries geographic conditions have given priority to one service or the other. In our country the Army and Navy have been considered of equal importance. That is the best policy.
The functions of the two fighting services have been quite distinct. In general, the Navy operates on the water and the Army on land; although on occasion there have been exceptions to this general principle.
You will note that the Navy fights on the water. Not only on the high seas have our sailors fought, but wherever there has been enough water to float their ships. In 1813 Commodore Perry won the permanent command of Lake Erie and permitted General Harrison to invade Canada. Commodore Chauncey gained the temporary command of Lake Ontario on various occasions and allowed General Pike to capture Toronto. In 1814 Commodore Macdonough won a decisive victory on Lake Champlain and compelled the retreat of an immensely superior British invading Army. In 1815 Commodore Patterson with a few ships in the Mississippi gave a helping hand to Andrew Jackson at New Orleans.
In the Civil War the Army tried the experiment of building and operating a gunboat flotilla on the Mississippi. Naval officers were loaned to command the ships. But this was not enough. A year’s time conclusively demonstrated that the military service was not fitted to operate a force on the water. By act of Congress the entire flotilla was transferred to the Navy Department and organized as a naval force. Under Admiral Porter it cooperated with General Grant in the famous campaign which resulted in the capture of Vicksburg. Farragut ran the Mississippi forts and captured New Orleans. Pensacola and Mobile fell. Flotillas pushed their way into North Carolina and Virginia waters and penetrated far up their rivers.
Wherever there was water, be it salt or fresh, broad ocean or narrow river, the Navy went hand in hand with the Army. Each was necessary to the other. As Commodore Foote said, they were like the two blades of a pair of shears. Each was helpless without the other in these coastal and inland operations. In the Spanish war our Navy, in addition to defeating the Spanish fleets at Santiago and Manila, protected the passage of Army expeditionary forces to Manila, Cuba, and Porto Rico. It assisted their operations, landed their supplies, protected their lines of communication, attacked and blockaded the enemy coasts, and patrolled our own coast line.
When we entered the World War the German High Seas Fleet was so inferior as to give it little hope of success in battle. As a last desperate resort, unlimited submarine warfare against merchant shipping had been commenced. The phenomenal successes of the German submarines produced a situation very dangerous to the success of the allied cause. They threatened the very existence of Great Britain. Attention should be focused on the fact that this fierce submarine campaign was fought almost entirely in the coastal waters of Great Britain and France and to a lesser degree in those of Italy, Portugal, Greece, and the United States. The submarine offensive was defeated not by the .battle fleets of the allied powers, but by other naval forces spread along their coasts with the specific mission of protecting allied shipping in the coastwise sea lanes. Our destroyers, submarines, and small patrol craft, based on Queenstown, Brest, and Gibraltar, played a primary part in this protection of allied shipping, which included the supply ships and transports necessary for building up our great army of two million men in France. For two years this difficult problem was equally important to that of defeating the
German High Seas Fleet. This might not have been the case had the two fleets been more nearly equal in fighting strength.
When we entered the war, aircraft already had demonstrated their usefulness in the bitter antisubmarine campaign being waged by the Allied Powers. Our government decided that we should devote special attention to this new antisubmarine weapon. As it operated over the water and against hostile naval craft its development and use was made a function of the Navy. While the twin-pontoon seaplanes and large flying boats were being developed for coastal patrol, their pilots were being trained at Pensacola, Miami, and Key West. Coastal patrol stations were established in England, France, and Italy. Our aircraft operated from them with excellent effect.
In addition to seaplanes and flying boats, lighter-than-air craft came into use. Small nonrigid blimps patrolled the coastwise sea lanes and escorted convoys of shipping along these coastal routes and into the great base ports. Kite balloons were towed above patrol craft and escort vessels. American naval aircraft played a large part in beating the submarine in European waters.
At home also we established coastal air stations to be prepared when the submarine should pay us her expected visit. These stations were under the commandants of the six naval districts among whom the responsibility for protecting shipping in our Atlantic coastwise sea lanes was divided. The aircraft based in these stations acted in close conjunction with the other naval district forces: submarines, destroyers, submarine chasers, mine sweepers, and other patrol craft. In addition to protecting the coastwise shipping, they escorted all convoys leaving our ports for Europe until they were well out to sea. These convoys carried the sinews of war to our Army in France and the detachments of our fleet in European waters.
The Navy Department long feared an attack upon the shipping carrying fuel oil from the Gulf of Mexico up through the Florida straits to American or European ports. It therefore established a special force of some twenty-five cruisers, gunboats, yachts, and submarine chasers, which based at Key West.
The admiral commanding this detachment, on whose staff the writer served as senior aide, carried out a long series of maneuvers to develop the tactics of aircraft, surface vessels, and submarines in antisubmarine operations. The aircraft at Key West were manned by Naval Reserve personnel of the highest caliber, but entirely without naval experience. There was not a single regular officer at the station; Pilots and observers at first could not distinguish between the various types of naval and merchant craft. They knew little of the capabilities and limitations of surface craft and submarines. Their planes had no means of communication with them. However, as their training with the surface craft of the patrol detachment and the submarines of the Seventh Naval District progressed, they rectified these deficiencies. They became, in fact, an essential part of the naval forces responsible for the defense of the vital lines of shipping which run through the Florida straits bottle neck. Had German submarines ever attacked that vulnerable coastwise route, they would have encountered well-trained naval forces in the air, on the surface and under the water— forces able to act alone or as part of a fighting team. Had it been proposed that Army planes—unable to alight on the water and manned by pilots and observers entirely unfamiliar with naval vessels and tactics— should assume the duties of our naval aircraft along the coast in addition to their own military functions, it would have been treated as a huge joke.
Nevertheless, only two years later this very joke was perpetrated on the House of Representatives. In the Army Appropriation Bill for 1920 there appeared an apparently innocuous sentence, which later became known as the “Mitchell joker.” It read:
That hereafter the Army Air Service shall control all aerial operations from land bases, and that naval aviation shall have control of all aerial operations attached to a fleet.
This was one of the opening moves of a carefully prepared campaign to reduce the Navy to a submarine force and to establish a separate air service. At that time we had no aircraft carriers and there were only a few planes attached to the fleet. Practically all our naval aircraft were operating from shore bases. Had this joker become law, nearly all our naval air service would have been abolished or transferred to the Army.
As the Navy Department does not ordinarily keep close touch with the amendments to the Army Appropriation Bill, this attempt to legislate its naval air service out of existence was not discovered until the move had gained considerable headway. When it finally came to light a controversy of large proportions arose. Naturally much ill feeling resulted from the attempt of a subordinate officer to engineer through Congress a restriction against another department—and this entirely without the consent or even knowledge of his own secretary. The Secretary of War admitted the impropriety of such conduct and stated that he had taken action to prevent a recurrence. An amendment was attached to the appropriation bill joker. While this was subject to a number of interpretations, it had the effect of nullifying the restrictions originally placed upon the naval air service.
General Mitchell, undaunted by this initial repulse, continued his agitation. Finally, he openly attacked the Navy Department. As a result he was convicted and sentenced by military court-martial. He resigned from the Army. The controversy ended.
During these years there was continual discussion between the Army and Navy as to the functions of Army and Navy aircraft. While the determination of these functions where land meets water has always been an involved problem, their discussion in the joint planning committee and joint board was most frank and amicable. The joint board has issued a series of decisions from 1920 to 1928. In addition to setting forth the functions of both air arms, the joint board has approved the five-year air programs for Army and Navy and has certified that they involve no duplication. While exception can be taken to individual points, these decisions have been, on the whole, eminently satisfactory. As they involve compromises between two opposing viewpoints, some dissatisfaction has been voiced, but this counts for little when compared with the good feeling which existed between the two departments for many years.
In this year, however, the entire question of the use of aircraft along our coastwise sea lanes and in the vicinity of our outlying possessions has been revived. A correct solution of this problem is vital to our national defense. Unfortunately, this is a highly involved technical question. Let us glance briefly at the salient points and reduce the problem to its simplest terms.
Aviation is essential to both Army and Navy. Its addition to the two services does not change the old rule that the Army fights on the land and the Navy on the water. But the fact that aircraft can operate over both land and water makes necessary a somewhat freer interpretation. It is impossible any longer to draw a dividing line at the water’s edge. Instead of this narrow line, let us imagine a dividing band extending on the one hand twenty-five miles inland from the coast line and on the other twenty-five miles out to sea. The water outside this zone we may quite definitely assign to naval aviation. The land inside it may be given equally definitely to military aviation. The 50-mile band is covered by both naval and military aviation.
To illustrate these ideas a little more concretely let us visualize a war fought along or near our coasts and frontiers. In such a case practically all our naval forces must be concentrated into the United States Fleet to oppose the main fleet or fleets of the enemy. In the same way the greater part of our military forces must be concentrated into one or more mobile armies to oppose the hostile armies. But neither Army nor Navy can afford to neglect altogether those parts of our coasts and frontiers which are not directly threatened by the principal enemy forces. Also, due provision must be made for the security of the Panama Canal— even though it be not so menaced.
There are four main reasons why:
(1) The fleet itself requires security against harassing attacks while in its bases, while entering or leaving them, and while cruising along the coastwise sea lanes.
(2) The lines of communications for our fleet run along the coastwise sea lanes. Fuel oil, a most important item in the fleet’s supply, is largely transported along these coastal routes.
(3) There is valuable merchant shipping running along the coastwise sea lanes and from them to the Panama Canal. Through this canal we maintain an important intercoastal trade and keep open contact with many foreign countries.
(4) There are valuable and vulnerable military, naval, and industrial facilities along and near the seacoast and at the Panama Canal. How may the enemy attack these four important objectives?
(1) Cruisers may attack our merchant shipping or naval auxiliaries along the coasts or en route from the Panama Canal, destroy inferior surface craft attached to the naval districts or the fleet, lay mines along the coast or off the canal, and bombard undefended ports.
(2) Carriers may launch air bombing squadrons to attack our fleet in port or near the coast, naval or military establishments on or near the coast, important coastal cities, or the Panama Canal.
(3) Submarines may attack merchant shipping or naval auxiliaries along the coasts or en route from the Panama Canal, torpedo important units of the fleet, and lay mines along the coast or off the canal.
(4) Specially prepared merchant vessels may be sunk in the approaches to coast ports or the canal to block the channels.
(5) A military expeditionary force, supported by a detachment of the fleet, may attack the Panama Canal with a view to its permanent occupation. It is possible, but highly improbable, that such an attack might be launched against a minor objective on our coasts with a view to temporary occupation and demolition of military or naval facilities. Any attempt at permanent occupation of territory along our coasts is almost inconceivable.
To counter these widely varied forms of attack two measures are necessary: (1) they must be detected; (2) they must be repulsed or evaded.
To perform these dual missions the naval districts along our coasts and at the Panama Canal will have very limited numbers of destroyers and submarines and considerable forces of aircraft, patrol vessels, and mine sweepers. These forces will be assisted by an extensive system of lookouts along the coast and a complete communication service, including numerous radio-compass stations. In case of necessity, re-enforcements will be sent from the fleet.
The Army Corps Areas will have fixed and mobile coast defense batteries, antiaircraft batteries, fields of electrically controlled mines at important harbors, coastal aircraft, and possibly several divisions composed of mobile troops of all arms. The latter, except at the Panama Canal, will probably be in process of mobilization and available only in case of emergency for countering serious enemy attacks.
It is obviously necessary to detect hostile attacks as early as possible. A submarine patrol off the enemy bases will be useful for observing and reporting the exit of large hostile forces. While this is an indication of the time and strength of a possible serious attack, it gives little or no idea as to where it will strike. As there will be continuous movements of small detachments and individual ships about the hostile bases, the information which our observing submarines may gain of minor attacks will be too vague to use as a basis for protective measures.
Thus we must rely primarily upon a patrol of the coastal waters themselves to detect hostile attacking forces. This patrol must be carried far to sea, so that measures may be taken to counter the attack before it reaches its objectives. This is specially important when we have to deal with air attacks launched from carriers, cruiser raids on shipping, surprise bombardments or mining operations. In such cases the attacking forces would approach the coast under cover of darkness at high speed and commence operations at, or even before, daybreak. It evidently would be highly desirable to locate the enemy before he commences his night run toward the coast. It is essential that he be located at dawn or immediately thereafter. Our patrol should extend at least 300 miles from the coast. In the approaches to the Panama Canal it should be even farther advanced. To detect submarine operations or blocking and landing attacks, such advanced warning is not required because of the slower speed of the enemy forces, but a continuous daylight patrol extending out at least 150 miles from the coast is necessary. The failure of the Germans to detect the British attack on Zeebrugge proves this. A further form of coastal patrol is the screening of the fleet when under way in coastal waters and the escort of convoys of merchant shipping and naval auxiliaries along the coast.
It would be impossible to maintain such overwater coastal patrols with surface craft alone. The number of ships to make them effective would be enormous. Even if the ships could be obtained, it would be out of the question to maintain them so dispersed over the ocean in the face of hostile attacks. Aircraft have solved this important problem of coastal patrol. Due to their high speed they can cover far more area than surface craft. They are practically immune from hostile attack. In clear tropical waters they can detect submarines completely submerged or even fields of mines. They require smaller operating personnel and can be built more quickly and at less expense. Many commercial aircraft are available for rapid conversion into naval patrol planes. Aircraft therefore are perfectly suited for coastal patrol and essential to its efficiency.
Once an attack is detected by patrolling craft, it must be repulsed before it can reach its objective or the objective itself must evade the attack. It will naturally be advantageous for the patrolling craft discovering the enemy to attack him. This results in the attack being delivered quickly, surely, and often with the aid of surprise. If the enemy craft be a submarine it is obvious that only the patrolling craft which sights her has any chance of making a successful attack. If other air or surface craft have to be summoned to the spot to attack, the submarine has several hours to make off under the water and she must again be located, probably with listening devices. Also, if the hostile craft be an aircraft carrier about to launch an air bombing attack from her decks, it is obvious that the best chance of defeating such an air attack is to damage the flying deck before the planes can take off. This can be done only by the patrolling craft which has made contact.
As our patrol will consist principally of aircraft, it is important that they should have means of attacking enemy craft when detected. Their most effective weapons are bombs. Naturally a plane used for offshore patrol must devote its load mostly to gasoline. But it will still be able to carry several small or medium bombs which would cripple a submarine or injure a carrier’s deck. It would be nothing short of folly to prohibit the patrolling planes from carrying a load of light bombs effective against submarines, destroyers, aircraft carriers, and cruisers, and thus prevent these planes from taking advantage of opportunities for surprise attack.
Frequently the enemy force located will be too powerful for a single patrol plane to attack. Then it is the plane’s duty to maintain contact as long as possible and continuously report the movements and dispositions of the enemy. For this purpose it must have a good radio set and defensive machine gun armament. The naval district in which the contact has been made will fix continuously the positions of the contact plane—and consequently of the enemy—by means of its radiocompass stations. This information, together with the strength and disposition of the enemy force, will be broadcasted to all coastwise shipping so it can seek shelter in port or otherwise evade the enemy.
A striking force must then be organized to attack the hostile detachment. If this attack has to be delivered some distance at sea, say 150 miles, aircraft will be the only type available for immediate use. As the planes formerly used for patrol now have only to go to a definite locality, attack and return, they can reduce their load of gasoline below that required for patrol duty and substitute a formidable armament of bombs. If some of them are equipped for launching torpedoes, a peculiarly naval method of attack, this will be advantageous. These aircraft may be reenforced by the patrol planes of adjacent air stations or even by planes launched from the aircraft carriers or cruisers of the fleet. Such air attacks should be effective against all but the strongest hostile forces.
The patrol plane squadrons manifestly should be operated by the Navy. They operate altogether over the water and usually well out at sea. Therefore they must be seaplanes of the twin-pontoon or flying-boat type. Large long-range multiple-engined flying boats are essential for distant offshore patrol. Smaller medium-range, single-engined, twin-pontoon seaplanes may be used for closer inshore patrol, but flying boats are used in peace time. All development of both these types of aircraft has been made by the Navy. For patrol and attack their crews must be familiar with all types of naval and merchant vessels and know their capabilities and limitations. They must know naval tactics and be able to operate and communicate with surface craft and submarines. They must work continually with the naval radio-compass service. They must be prepared to operate with the fleet when it enters their area, or they reenforce it for a decisive battle. All overwater coastal patrol and all attack on vessels at a distance from the coast can be conducted most efficiently by naval planes.
In case an enemy air bombing attack is successfully launched from carriers against important objectives ashore, it must be countered by pursuit (or fighting) planes. Antiaircraft guns constitute a final method of defense. As both these weapons are used over or very close to the land in repulsing such attacks they have appropriately been assigned to the Army.
In case, as is highly improbable, the enemy attacks in strength and pushes in toward the coast for a bombardment, blocking or landing raid, as at Zeebrugge, the naval district forces—aircraft, submarines, destroyers, and mine layers—are reenforced by such elements of the fleet as are available and dispute the advance of the enemy. If they are unsuccessful in repulsing him, control of the defense passes to the Army. The fixed and mobile coast defense batteries come into action. These batteries have their specially attached planes for the observation of gunfire. Finally, if a landing is attempted, mobile troops of the field army or oversea garrison enter the action, supported and assisted by their attached aviation—pursuit, attack, bombardment, and observation. Possibly there may be additional bombardment aviation attached to the coast defenses, distinct from that attached to mobile troops and over-sea garrisons. If, as appears probable, there would be little use for such specially assigned bombardment aviation, it would serve a good purpose as a reserve for the mobile army. This Army aviation attacks the hostile ships close inshore, and enemy troops in small boats or on shore. It is neither designed nor trained for operations at a distance from land and is most effective when used in close cooperation with the other army elements.
The attacks on the coast thus pictured are necessarily those of a temporary nature. Such a raiding attack, while improbable, might be made in the temporary absence of our fleet. An attack in force with permanent occupation of our home territory in view would be attempted only after the total destruction of our fleet, including its planes and submarines. Even under these highly improbable conditions the chances of success would be very slight.
There is some possibility, however, of such an attack in force being launched against the Panama Canal. To meet this possibility the Army has provided a garrison of all arms—including all types of aircraft. The Navy has provided a strong submarine force. A considerable naval air force has been based there, primarily for the protection of shipping in the approaches to the canal and to detect the advance of hostile forces, particularly aircraft carriers. In the case of an attack in force upon the canal these naval patrol planes could and would be utilized for attacking the enemy with heavy bombs and torpedoes.
In general, similar peace-time precautions have been taken for the naval defense of Hawaii and the Philippines in case of a war in the Pacific. The naval vessels based in the Philippines are not considered district forces, but are called the Asiatic Fleet. Also, because of treaty restrictions, the naval air squadrons there are based on a ship, not ashore. Their war mission, however, is generally the same as that of the naval district forces at Hawaii and the Panama Canal.
We have pictured the normal air patrol of our coast lines and the water zone extending several hundred miles to seaward. We have stressed the execution of its primary mission of protecting shipping and the lines of communication of the fleet and have shown its usefulness in detecting and resisting attacks on the coast itself. There are other uses of our naval district aircraft which require emphasis. When our fleet bases on a part of our coast, enemy activity of every sort will be directed against it whenever it puts to sea. Before it does so, air patrol against submarines and mine layers must be constant. These duties should be performed by district aircraft—leaving fleet aircraft intact for operations against the hostile fleet.
If our fleet is making a sortie to offer battle with the enemy fleet off our coast, it is essential that every naval plane available should be on hand to help gain the decision. The importance of winning the decisive battle for the time supersedes that of coastal patrol. In a day’s time every district plane could be assembled to take part in this battle. After the battle has been fought or our fleet has returned to port, the planes would again resume their patrol duties.
Assume that an enemy naval or air force should base at some point from which it could directly threaten our coastal routes or those leading to the Panama Canal. From such vantage points enemy attacks of a most dangerous nature could be launched. It would be imperative that the enemy be dislodged from such key positions. Our aircraft would be a most effective weapon. As they must fly to the attack across wide- water areas, seaplanes should be used. An attack force could quickly be assembled from our district patrol squadrons for this important purpose.
Again, the enemy’s main fleet might shift its base southward for operations against the Panama Canal. Here there are ideal operating grounds for seaplanes. As soon as pressure upon our coast relaxed, a large proportion of our district patrol squadrons could be released for operations in connection with our fleet in the new theater of operations. Should our fleet shift its base to the Panama Canal, it would have the immediate support of a strong patrol air force. This would allow fleet aviation to be kept intact for battle. Also, in case of a naval battle off the canal the patrol planes could be armed with heavy bombs and torpedoes and reenforce the fleet. If our fleet contemplated remaining in port for some days, all or a part of the fleet aircraft could shift from carriers to the flying field of the naval air station for operation, training, or repair. In case a carrier were put out of action, or held in port for routine overhaul, its planes could operate in this way until repairs were effected.
Finally, in case the theater of operations should shift to a distant area, our district patrol squadrons would be assigned to tenders and accompany the fleet in its oversea movement.
Our patrol squadrons, while in home waters or at the Panama Canal or Hawaii, would act normally from shore bases. In the Philippines we are prohibited by treaty from building naval air stations ashore. Our air squadrons in that area are based on a tender. Insofar as the defense of the Philippine Islands is concerned, this places a serious restriction upon our naval air operations. Patrol squadrons can operate more effectively and economically from shore bases than from ships. It is a self-evident fact that the operating ground, not the base, determines whether a force should be operated by the Army or Navy. While our patrol squadrons will normally base ashore, they will operate over the sea, usually at great distances from the land, and in the closest cooperation with all elements of the fleet and the naval district forces. That makes them a logical part of the naval establishment.
In peace time it is impracticable for financial reasons to maintain strong naval district forces within the continental limits of the United States. It would require a considerable time for large hostile forces to reach our shores. Merchant vessels, yachts, and naval craft out of commission could quickly be mobilized to form these naval district forces. In the same way naval aircraft not now in service and commercial planes could quickly be mobilized for coastal patrol. Until they are ready the United States Fleet will provide the necessary naval defense in home waters.
In the Panama Canal, Hawaii, and the Philippines conditions are different. In those advanced key points early enemy activity may be expected, possibly even before a declaration of war. District vessels and aircraft could not be furnished quickly from the home country and in some cases could not be sent at all. The fleet in some situations would not be able to provide direct naval defense. Therefore, the Navy has considered it essential to provide local forces during peace time for the protection of these outlying possessions and for the patrol and control of adjacent water areas.
We believe certain conclusions have been established in regard to the use of naval aircraft in coastal warfare:
(1) The patrol and control of water areas along our coasts and around our outlying possessions are distinctly naval functions of great and, under certain conditions, vital importance.
(2) Aircraft are the backbone of this overwater patrol and an important element in counterattacking enemy craft entering these coastal water areas. It is essential that these aircraft be operated by the Navy during both patrol and attack.
(3) These naval district aircraft are required for the screening of the fleet and its protection against harassing attacks when it is operating in or near their normal patrol areas.
(4) They constitute a naval air reserve which can be concentrated for intervention in a fleet action in coastal waters or to accompany the fleet in an over-sea movement.
(5) In emergency those naval aircraft based on outlying possessions may contribute effectively to the repulse of enemy attempts to capture these key points of our national defense or to a decisive victory in a fleet action fought in adjacent waters.
(6) Any restrictions concerning the basing of such aircraft or the weapons they may carry will greatly reduce their effectiveness—to the detriment of both national defense and economy.
(7) The provision of naval aircraft for Hawaii and the Panama Canal for patrol and attack, as contained in the Congressional five-year naval aviation program, is essential to an effective national defense.
(8) An acceptance of the foregoing conclusions leaves to the Army important air functions in coastal warfare. These are:
(a) The provision of observation planes to control the fire of fixed and mobile coast defense batteries.
(b) The assignment of pursuit planes to counterattack hostile aircraft over or near important objectives, as well as the use of antiaircraft guns for this purpose.
(c) The use of all kinds of military aviation, when attached to mobile troops and over-sea garrisons.a
If the Army desires to supplement the naval patrol squadrons with bombardment squadrons not attached to mobile troops or over-sea garrisons for close inshore bombing of ships, boats, or troops on shore, there should be no objection, but this should not take the place of any naval aviation.
(9)The five-year programs assign eighteen hundred planes to the Army against one thousand to the Navy. This would seem to give the Army its full share of our air power. If any revision of this ratio is made, it should be in favor of the Navy.