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Lieutenant R. A. J. English, U. S. Navy.—In his splendid and timely article, Lieutenant Krause analyses our war training as he believes it to be today. His theory as to what is wrong with our engineering, the training of which he states is a hit-and- miss arrangement resulting from “poor organization . . . false standards or doctrine . . . defective individual training,” merits further comment. The hypothesis of the author that ensigns one year after graduation are made chief engineers of destroyers no longer obtains. Although in the main I concur that all officers should have special training before assuming responsibility of a vital part of the organization, the proposal to train destroyer engineers on an obsolete battleship is as antiquated as the above mentioned hypothesis.
Destroyer engineering cannot be learned any other place than in the plant of an active destroyer operating under a severe schedule —no school ship can by virtue of imagination assimilate the tension, alertness, and vigilance which in service requires quick, accurate decisions of operating personnel. Another argument against the establishment of a school ship for the training of engineer officers is the experience of the past. The destruction wrought to the material of those two destroyers used a decade ago on the west coast as school ships will long be remembered by those who succeeded the embryos. .
The proposal to mold a destroyer engineer in twelve weeks ashore is neither feasible nor conceivable; twelve months of diligent work with the idiosyncrasies of the bowels of his own vessel would be far more profitable to the individual, to his vessel, and to the Navy, for his services as a watch stander would not be lost thereby. The practice of detaching officers in wholesale fashion for instruction purposes ashore during the summer months invariably works hardships on the few remaining souls aboard who cruise all summer.
The author is apparently not familiar with the methods of training engineers in the west coast destroyers where exist no “false standards” as generalized in the subject article. Here the prospective engineer pursues a well-defined course of study of the Manual of Engineering Instructions and other publications which prescribe the best naval practices, at the same time learning the layout and detailed construction of every machinery unit in the plant. This course is the product of many years’ labor by staff engineers and embraces not only operating practices but also organization, supplies, paper work, overhaul by ship’s force, tender, and navy yard, battle casualties, stability control, machinery derangements, and plant analyses. The processes learned are then applied practically by the student during his watch standing. He is required to stand at least four watches in every billet in the plant, to learn the duties of every man in the department, to take data on the plant, and to show in his report what measures he took to improve the operation and score. The curriculum comprises fourteen assignments each of which contains numerous questions on subject matter studied, sketches of the layout and machinery, report of watches stood, report of repair work accomplished since last assignment, and plant analysis showing plant efficiency, etc. These assignments are corrected by the division engineer who, at the completion of the course, conducts a final examination while the ship is under way, in the nature of a review of most economical combinations of machinery for each steaming
condition, machinery derangements, battle casualties, and emergencies.
It is submitted that such a well-established and proven-in-service method of individual training cannot be classified as “hit and miss,” and that any attempt to replace it by a shore-going school or an obsolete, slow- moving battleship plant would fall far short of its mark. _
It is well recognized in engineering circles that the best officer engineering material is developed in destroyers; the arduous study, early acquired responsibility, and unusual fortitude developed in “keeping her moting” all react to the benefit of the service as well as the individual. No shore school or battleship artificiality can replace the unique training gained in a destroyer engineering plant during gun and torpedo firings, full-power runs, torpedo attacks, fleet maneuvers, depth charge barrage laying, and darkened ship operations at high speeds.
The success of destroyer operations depends in no small degree upon the ability to sustain speed, and training for war is no less important in the engineering department of a vessel than in any other. The only school needed is the school of experience, for is not “learning while doing” the best teacher ?
Lieutenant James Kirkpatrick, Jr., U. S. Navy.—It is to me regrettable that the interesting article of Lieutenant Krause advocating more service schools for officers and men should be to a certain extent weakened by his comments on subjects with which he appears to be unfamiliar. In particular his statement regarding the lack of torpedo knowledge of submarine personnel, as compared to that of destroyer men, appears to me to be drawn from a single example rather than from a thorough knowledge of this subject. Since completing the officers torpedo school at Newport, ten years ago, save for a tour of shore duty, having served entirely on destroyers and submarines, I feel that the comparisons offered are not generally correct and show a lack of knowledge of the submarine branch of our Navy. .
The evident conclusion of Lieutenant Krause that submarine torpedomen do not know as much about torpedoes as destroyer torpedomen should not go unchallenged. In the first place, knowledge and ability are not restricted to any class or group in original assignment, although it is in the favor of submarine personnel that they are usually men of previous naval experience and to a certain extent selected. Consequently, the relative skill in torpedo firing of destroyer and submarine personnel must depend largely upon the opportunities afforded for training and the methods employed.
Having spent the past year as squadron torpedo officer of Submarine Squadron 3 as well as torpedo repair officer of the Submarine Base, Coco Solo, I feel that certain definite advantages exist in training submarine torpedomen at Coco Solo as compared with the torpedomen of destroyers. In the first place, a shore based submarine squadron has at its disposal a torpedo repair shop on land, which affords more space and facilities for instruction than a shop on a tender. In addition, during periods that the submarines are at the base, the shop is more accessible to the interested personnel of all vessels than a shop on a tender could possibly be. With the greater opportunities for training offered the submarine torpedoman, it becomes merely a comparison of the uses each force makes of its opportunities.
We will assume that the instruction in torpedoes that is of greatest value is shop work. In Submarine Squadron 3, a continuous school for torpedomen is in operation, which enables each torpedoman of the submarines to refresh his torpedo knowledge by four weeks of supervised work annually. In addition, whenever a submarine’s torpedoes are under overhaul, at least one torpedoman from the vessel remains in the shop for inspection and such assistance as may be necessary. Inasmuch as overhauls are made after each firing and the firings are normally spread over a considerable portion of the year, a glance at the “orders for gunnery exercises” will indicate how often they are in progress. Inasmuch as the personnel of submarines and the base of a squadron are almost as closely related as those of the various divisions of a capital ship, both from the standpoint of living together and being transferred from one unit to another, the base torpedo shop is in effect a mere central station or club for all the torpedomen in the squadron. Thus information is disseminated informally as well as supervisedly, and the average man has every opportunity to keep abreast of his specialty.
The unfavorable comment on torpedo knowledge of submarine torpedo officers as compared with destroyer torpedo officers can only be based upon the fact that while practically all destroyers have torpedo officers who are torpedo-school graduates, probably only about 25 per cent of the submarine torpedo officers fall into this category. The short course afforded at the submarine school is not designed to teach more than outstanding features and the adjustments for firing. To balance this, we have assigned to submarine torpedo duty officers who are generally of longer commissioned service and presumably better executives. Moreover, the torpedo duties of a submarine torpedo officer are not as great as those of a destroyer torpedo officer, as the former is concerned only with the material, while the latter must make firing estimations which are the function of the submarine commanding officer. The facilities for instruction of the enlisted men are also available for the torpedo officer of the submarine squadron and several of the most competent submarine torpedo officers that I have observed have never attended a regular school, while I recall specific instances of torpedo-school graduates who were not as familiar with their work as those aforementioned. A school cannot produce a useful individual except with the individual’s cooperation, and there are many young officers who will learn much less about torpedoes from a full Newport course than if, when on a small ship, the commanding officer forced them to learn or stay aboard.
As far as a comparison of torpedo performance of submarines and destroyers go, it must be remembered that the problems are different. The great handicap to 100-percent success in submarine torpedo firing is the fact that the torpedo is in a flooded tube under pressure for a time before firing. Tightness of the torpedo is most essential and tightness tests are relative and depend upon the thoroughness of the personnel concerned rather than any knowledge they may have acquired through instruction. The next unfortunate feature of submarine firing is the more complicated tubes required for underwater ejection. There is no comparison between the number of things that may go wrong with a submarine’s tubes and a destroyer’s, and to make matters worse the details on the submarine are relatively inaccessible.
In fairness to our submarine service, I do not like to have it generally assumed that its personnel are the inferior of their brothers of the destroyer forces. Each has its problems, and I am glad to learn that the destroyers of the battle force are meeting theirs with their San Diego torpedo school, for it has been my observation that the submarine force also is improving itself in ways to fit its needs and is not forgetful of its mission, “In time of peace, prepare for war.”
Special Boats for Landing Operations
(See page 520, April, 1931, Proceedings)
Major S. M. Harrington, U. S. Marine Corps.—It is thought that any naval consideration of landing operations is based on the premise that a landing operation will be necessary under special circumstances imperative for the success of the fleet. On such a premise every means which will contribute to success should be used. To assure the success of a landing operation against opposition, it must be assumed that we will have a superiority of force, equipment, and training. This presumes preparedness to overcome a maximum opposition and involves an understanding of the probable maximum opposition.
' Whether the beach to be seized is carefully prepared for defense with concrete emplacements or is hurriedly manned as the landing boats are approaching, it is certain that the defense will seek to lay down bands of machine-gun fire at the water’s edge, which will forbid human landing and will further seek by the fire of weapons similar to the 37-mm. gun or higher caliber to sink all boats approaching. We are accustomed to think of the machine gun and of the 37mm. gun as the most mobile, accurate, and easily supplied weapons for defense of this nature. Our landing boats must, therefore, be prepared to withstand at least the accurate 37-mm. fire and to silence the hostile machine guns laying down bands of fire, before a landing from boats at the beach on to the shore is attempted.
The means of withstanding the accurate 37-mm. fire must be sufficient armor to lessen the likelihood of sinking the boats or stopping the engine. The nature of supporting naval gunfire is such that it will probably have lifted in sufficient time for the hostile 37-mm. guns to get into action while our boats are still nearly 1,000 yards from the beach. The means of silencing hostile machine guns (and 37-mm. guns) will be an anti-machine-gun (and anti-37- mm.-gun) weapon. The weapons commonly used in the war for this purpose were the 37-mm. gun, the 3-inch mortar, and the machine gun. Our landing boats should be armed with one or several of these weapons.
But, it is held the landing boats will not be stable enough for accurate fire from these weapons, owing to surf and wave, either in approach or when beached; so that we cannot silence the hostile machine guns and will have great difficulty in getting ashore. This is the situation in which we need the armor of the landing boat and its armament in a form that can be moved ashore and used to deliver accurate silencing fire from solid land. The answer is the tank which, in suitable numbers and at appropriate intervals, carried on a self-propelled lighter, should be a part of or the leading subwave of the first wave battalions as shown in the diagram on page 523 of the April, 1931, Proceedings.
Some Aspects of the Merchant Marine Act of 1928
(See page 892, July, 1931, Proceedings)
Lieutenant R. R. McNulty, U. S. Naval Reserve.—The subject article should accomplish much in enlightening the regular service on potentialities of personnel strength now lying dormant in the merchant service. It is hoped that this article will be diligently studied by those detailed to the task of developing reserve strength, and that the impetus sorely needed to transform our Merchant Marine Naval Reserve from a body of straw men to as efficient a force as the British Royal Naval Reserve will be created.
The conclusions which Captain Jacobs has ably deduced after study of benefits derived from the Jones-White Act contain considerable food for thought. A modern merchant fleet is being built under specifications approved by the Navy Department. In the event that future naval disarmament conferences or domestic economy measures decree the pruning of the Navy to bare limbs, it is recognized that such a modern fleet will prove of inestimable value to the nation during periods of national emergency. Indeed the last paragraph of this article draws the picture quite vividly.
Much of the article deals with the utility of these modern commercial ships as cruisers, aircraft carriers, transports, mine layers, etc. Given fleets of modern vessels and mail contract payments to offset higher expenses as compared with competitors, it is thought that these fleets will be operated successfully and make available a well-maintained and efficiently manned force, when needed by the navy and army transport service. Probably such will be the case. It would have made Captain Jacobs’ article more comprehensive had he gone deeper into the question of merchant personnel both afloat and ashore. Cognizance is taken of the clause which permits naval officers on the active list to serve on these vessels and the clause which compels mail contract operators ultimately to employ American citizens to the extent of two-thirds of the crew. But what of the caliber of personnel ashore and afloat at present and, what is more important, the personnel of the future? This is a subject which should be given careful consideration.
In Captain Jacobs’ conclusion may be noted the statement that the act of 1928 will provide the quality of seamen suitable for a naval reserve. He fails to show how this will be accomplished. Are readers to understand that the author believes officers and crew of a modern and expensively equipped merchant vessel will be inspired to higher levels after affixing their signatures to shipping articles? If that is the impression he wishes to convey, it would seem that he has written mainly for the benefit of regular service wherein esprit de corps certainly does exist. The vessels of which he writes are not of the Navy. Many persons engaged in shipping may find it difficult to understand how the Jones-White Act will enhance the quality of those who operate and man these vessels. That men make ships and ships do not make men is a deep-rooted conviction of those experienced in the operation of merchant fleets. Too many of them have lost money from expensively equipped vessels at the hands of incompetent personnel. By the same token, there are many who have received their meager dividends from ancient crocks manned by efficient personnel. Possibly that esprit de corps found in military services may be developed in those serving on merchant vessels; but can it be accomplished by merely serving on modern vessels? Hardly. Merchant seagoing personnel must have incentive as the personnel of any service or industry must have. And such incentives must be developed, if the Act of 1928 is to bear fruit for the Navy and peace-time ship operators.
American youths of the type entering our colleges and service academies are not and never will be “driven” to a merchant career. America’s personnel problem is unlike that of European sea powers. Those of our youths who earn diplomas and degrees and have a thirst for adventure and foreign shores seek the government’s military and diplomatic services or a berth with private industry engaged in foreign fields. However, being “driven” to merchant vessels is quite different from being “attracted” to a shipping career. American youngsters of the better type can and should be attracted. From present indications, the development of the New York Merchant Marine Academy and the California School Ship with extensive shore facilities, there should exist but little doubt that better types will be attracted. But can they be kept in shipping? Should there not be more incentives for them to stay? Cannot the Navy give a hand in creating incentives?
Just what has the Navy done to aid in the attracting of better material to the merchant service? With the building of modern fleets by the grace of the Jones-White Act, approving of plans for future utility as naval auxiliaries, and the trend towards cutting regular naval strength, what will the Navy do to develop reserve strength available in merchant personnel ?
There exists the thought, held by many engaged in ship operation and employed on merchant vessels, that the Navy has not done enough to boost the standards of personnel afloat. Ancient prejudice of merchant personnel against naval service is not intermingled in this thought for there are indeed many holding this view who would welcome and, in fact, are begging for closer cooperation between the two services.
Because of a congressional act dating back into the seventies, the Navy will supply a school ship to certain seaboard states making such a request. To date, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Washington, and California have taken advantage of this offer and thereby have graduated thousands of engineers and mates who either would have had to serve their time in the forecastle or to select jobs ashore. What more can be expected of the Navy? Ask the American school-ship graduate who has met the graduate of Britain’s Worcester, Conway, or Pangbourne.
It is the matter of an efficient American Merchant Marine Naval Reserve which is the foundation for the complaint that the Navy is not doing its utmost to develop a higher professional standard for American merchant officers and crew. Ship operators and personnel employed on their vessels, as well as the average layman who reads the press, are of the opinion that our Navy is equal in strength to the British Navy. The ratio granted at disarmament conferences is well known. However, they are too well informed on the quality of the British Royal Reserve and in comparing that group with the American Merchant Marine Reserve can only conclude that our Navy has done little since the creation of this branch of the American Naval Reserve in 1925. Granting thousands of commissions without professional examinations, no training on combatant vessels, and not even correspondence courses other than navigation and international law surely, they reason, cannot result in a force comparable with the British Royal Naval Reserve. American ship owners know the value of the Royal Naval Reserve to British shipping. They wonder if our Navy’s policies will ever approach that of the British Admiralty.
There are other items of interest which cause merchant personnel to wonder whether the Navy is doing its best. Cadets of the state school ships wonder why naval R.O.T.C. students enrolled at Yale, Georgia Tech, and other schools are known as “Naval Cadets, U. S. Naval Reserve,” and are reported to receive a fee or allowance. They are aware that the British Admiralty permits Pangbourne students to be enrolled in the Royal Naval Reserve as naval cadets. They also know Worcester, Conway, and Pangbourne cadets are awarded Royal Navy appointments (special entry) and are permitted to be enrolled as midshipmen, Royal Naval Reserve, after graduation and before obtaining their second mate’s certificate. Why is it that the American cadet is not enrolled as a midshipman, Merchant Marine Naval Reserve or, if that rank is at too high a level, then as cadet, Merchant Marine Naval Reserve? What about two cadets per year from each school ship for Naval
Academy appointments ? Could it not be arranged to have each graduating class of a state school ship spend three months or so at the Naval Academy after graduation ?_ Another disconcerting bit of information is the report that the Bureau of Navigation recently promulgated a policy whereby preferential treatment would be given former naval petty officers for billets in the Merchant Marine Naval Reserve. No doubt there are petty officers of the Navy who can render more efficient service than some now holding mate’s and engineer’s licenses; but it must be remembered that pride in profession also exists in the merchant service. If petty officers of the Navy will make excellent merchant officers, why doesn’t the Navy keep them to make excellent naval officers? This would be the logical reasoning of those having pride in their merchant profession. _ _
Further, regarding departmental policies for constructive development of Merchant Marine Naval Reserve: Should the impetus sorely needed to transform the Merchant Marine Naval Reserve from straw men to a corps as efficient as Royal Naval Reserve be created by Captain Jacobs’ article, would it not be beneficial to detail an officer of the Merchant Marine Naval Reserve to lend a helping hand? Probably none of them has spent any time at the war college (the British Admiralty selects high ranking officers of Royal Naval Reserve to attend their war college), but not all of them have merely the knowledge to pass the low standard of examination demanded of them by the Steamboat Inspection Service, which are so easily passed by petty officers of both the Navy and Coast Guard, who have never spent any time on merchant vessels.
Would it not be of advantage to the Navy and American shipowners to conduct a thorough research relative to the merits of developing the Merchant Marine Naval Reserve along constructive lines? If Great Britain has benefited, why can’t we? The writer can think of no regular officer better fitted for this research study than Captain Walter F. Jacobs. Will he accept the job?
Uniforms That Are and Uniforms That Aren’t
(See page 745, June, 1931, Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander B. S. Bullard, (C.C.), U. S. Navy.—Lieutenant Folk has
very ably called attention to one point wherein the present uniform fails to meet the requirements of the service. He has prepared an able case, with more or less irrefutable arguments, for the addition of khaki to a naval officer’s uniform wardrobe. The necessity for a light summer working or service uniform other than the present white service has been apparent to many officers for some time. The present white uniform is utterly impractical for use as a working uniform either afloat or ashore and should be replaced by some more suitable outfit. Both the Army and the Marine Corps have a white uniform, yet neither attempts to wear it for other than semi-dress. In the naval service, the aviators are apparently the only ones that have been able to prove to the department that the white uniform is not suitable for use as a working uniform. Both afloat and ashore, they wear a prescribed khaki uniform when at work. Surely the duty that an aviator is called upon to perform is no dirtier or harder upon the uniform than that performed by any other officer aboard ship.
Lieutenant Folk’s case for the adoption of a khaki uniform is complete as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough. He has shown very clearly that a khaki uniform is necessary for use aboard ship and for landing parties from ships, but he has not mentioned the necessity for a khaki uniform for use by officers serving at navy yards and naval stations. If a khaki uniform is necessary aboard ship, it is even more necessary at naval establishments ashore. Officers on duty at navy yards and naval stations are required by regulations to wear uniform, except when engaged in athletics, when within the limits of their stations. Duty in the industrial department of a navy yard is particularly hard on officers’ uniforms. Neither the blue nor the white service is a practical outfit for the prosecution of work through shops and on ships. It is true that dungarees may be worn but, as pointed out by Lieutenant Folk, by no stretch of the imagination can dungarees be considered a uniform. For particularly dirty bilge diving, no outfit will serve other than a suit of dungarees. There are many other cases, however, where dungarees are not necessary but where blue or white service would be ruined. It is for cases such as these that the need for an outfit similar to khaki is keenly felt. Officers on duty ashore have as great a pride in their personal appearance as officers serving afloat. In order to present a neat appearance, cleaners’ bills for blues and laundry bills for whites mount rapidly. This is particularly hard on officers ashore. Afloat advantage can many times be taken of ships’ laundries whose prices are only a fraction of those charged by commercial laundries ashore.
I can suggest no substitute for the blue service uniform ashore when the temperature is such that blues must be worn. The wear and tear on blue uniforms must be accepted as part of the penalty we must pay when serving in the industrial department of a navy yard. On the other hand, there is no valid reason why khaki should not be substituted for white as a working uniform. The additional cost of such khaki uniforms as are necessary would soon be saved by the reduction in laundry bills. We would then have a practical uniform in which an officer ashore could present a neat appearance and still perform his duty without constant fear of getting dirty or of utterly ruining a white service uniform.
In further agreement with Lieutenant Folk, I believe that the khaki uniform should consist of brown shoes, khaki trousers, shirt, and coat, the coat to be similar in cut to that now authorized for aviators. Khaki cap cover for the regulation cap would also be necessary. In addition, I would recommend that a khaki helmet be made an optional article of uniform for use in the tropics where the regulation cap is not practical. I would further suggest that a white helmet be also authorized for wear with the white uniform on ships and shore stations in the tropics. Such a helmet was at one time authorized by the uniform regulations but its use was abandoned for some reason unknown.
In conclusion, I may state that the substitution of khaki for white as a working uniform presents so many advantages that there should be no question of its adoption by the Navy Department. As a class, however, we as naval officers are essentially conservative, not prone to change our ways, with the result that the most obviously desirable changes connected with our daily life are not adopted.
Lieutenant (J.G.) Alex M. Patterson, U. S. Navy.—Since the publication of Lieutenant Folk’s article, I have heard numerous discussions on the subject, and the consensus of opinion has been decidedly in favor of such a uniform. We on regular line duty often have occasion to envy our brother officers who are aviators or submarine officers, and who are privileged to wear a comfortable uniform in hot weather. A striking example of the need for such a uniform may be cited in the torpedo school and destroyer gunnery school on North Island, San Diego, California. About sixty of us are either students or instructors in these two schools. They are both located in an old building which has a low, metal roof, and the sun beats down on this roof with such force as to make the interior compare favorably to a steaming fireroom.
Now to point out the injustice of the situation. A classmate who is an aviator is attending the torpedo school and, of course, wears his khaki uniform. The rest of us, not wishing to ruin our best uniforms, are wearing dilapidated old suits which are certainly below the standard of gentleman’s attire. On the other hand, the aviation officer is the most immaculately dressed man in the house. His uniform consists of khaki trousers, shirt, and tie, a uniform which is serviceable, neat, and military in appearance. I call attention to this particular situation in the hope that it may add something to the ideas expressed in Lieutenant Folk’s splendid article. Our uniforms are as hard to change as old tradition, but it seems to me that a change which will add materially to the comfort of our entire officer personnel and which will certainly not detract from their appearance is well worth considering for adoption.