The World War demonstrated the absolute necessity of having available a body of trained men to augment the fleet personnel in a national emergency.
The reserves available in 1917 consisted of the Naval Militia, volunteers, and last, but not least, of men enrolled or commissioned from the seagoing population of the country.
It is interesting to compare our naval reserve with that of the other belligerents, especially Great Britain. The British Navy depended for their first-line reserve entirely on the seagoing population. These officers and men served on combatant as well as auxiliary vessels, and performed their duties, owing to their training in the reserve, without decreasing the efficiency of the various units to any marked extent. The non-seagoing contingent of the British Naval Reserve (the so-called wavy-navy, because the officers wore wavy stripes) was used chiefly for administrative duty.
In our service, many reserve officers were assigned to combatant ships during the World War. In cases where the officer concerned had no other training but that of the state militia, he was often (especially where he held rank above that of ensign) unable to perform his duty adequately, and automatically assumed a training status, becoming for the time being a liability instead of an asset to the Navy. The same criticism, but to a far lesser extent, applied to the officer who had been a master, mate, or engineer in the merchant marine. The ways of a man o’war were new and strange to him, but since he knew the sea and life aboard ship, men of this type adapted themselves to their environment in far less time than their shore-going shipmates.
Today we have the Fleet Reserve, the Merchant Marine Reserve, and the Volunteer Reserve. The training in the Fleet and Volunteer Reserve is more comprehensive than that of the former state militia, but the practical sea training (fifteen days yearly) falls far short of the requirements. On the other hand, we have excellent material in the Merchant Marine Reserve. This body of men could, with the necessary training, be developed to the point where auxiliary cruisers, converted yachts, etc., could be manned entirely by reserves, under command of a regular officer. It would seem more to the purpose to spend funds available in training men who already are well versed in seamanship, navigation, and marine engineering, rather than train shore-going people who still have everything to learn about the Navy.
By changing the Merchant Marine Reserve to the Fleet Reserve, and designating the present Fleet Reserve the Volunteer Reserve, transferring out of the latter all former regular Navy men and men who served at sea during the war, the Navy could develop a first-line reserve consisting of men already highly trained in seamanship, navigation, and steam engineering. The Volunteer Reserve, consisting largely of professional men, could be used for shore and administrative duty.
It remains to provide proper training for the merchant marine men. Instruction in their case should be concentrated on such subjects as gunnery, naval regulations and customs, infantry drill, and signaling. Perhaps the British system of training naval reservists could be successfully adopted by our Navy, with a few changes to meet our special conditions.
An obsolete gunboat or small cruiser (one on each coast), could be fitted out with a modern secondary battery and manned with a selected skeleton crew. This vessel would be used as a special training vessel for reservists. In about three months of rigorous training, officers that had passed a strict educational examination could acquire enough training to meet the requirements of a reserve officer in all but capital ships, modern cruisers, and submarines.
The necessary incentive to induce men to take this training could be supplied by giving preference to trained reservists in manning the fast modern liners now being constructed with government aid. If the experience of the British Naval Reserve officers counts for anything, it will be found that steamship companies will be anxious to bid for the services of these trained officers, because they are reserve officers should be a guaranty of superior professional ability, education, and moral worth.
Congress should be made to realize that the appropriation necessary for this project would result in greater security for our country, without increasing the regular Navy, and also in lifting the standard of the American merchant marine to a higher level.