(October 2 to October 10, 1918)
(Continued from the February issue)
The Sixth Day of October
(See Maps Q and R)
The commanding officer of the 6th Marine Regiment, Colonel Harry Lee, made an agreement during the night with the commanding officer of the American 23d Infantry Regiment, Colonel E. R. Stone, to launch a combined attack of the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, and the 2d Battalion, 23d Infantry, together with a platoon of wire cutters from the 2d Engineers, against a German machine-gun strong point southeast of St Etienne. The attack began at 7:30 a.m. As the Germans offered tenacious resistance, three additional companies of the 23d Infantry were at 8:05 a.m. inserted into the gap between the two battalions, while the 4th Company, 23d Infantry, was employed on the right flank. After two additional companies of the 23d Infantry had been put in at about nine o’clock, the strong point was finally captured at 10:30 a.m.
At 9:00 a.m. Colonel Stuart of the 9th Infantry received orders to move forward with his regiment in order to establish contact with the right neighbor, the French 173d Infantry Division, which had advanced into the sector of the American 2d Division, in order to protect the American right flank.
The 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry, formed for the attack, advanced two companies to a line south of the St. Etienne-Orfeuil road, and established contact with the French troops northwest of the Médéah Ferme.
Within the left half of the sector the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, advanced to the left flank of the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, while the 2d Battalion was now to the rear. No continuous contact with the left neighbor, the French 22d Infantry Division, was maintained. The right flank of the French 7th Division lay about five hundred meters south of St. Etienne and enveloped this village on the west and north, while the Germans were still in possession of the southern portion and the cemetery outside of the town. The American sector was not occupied in a continuous line and, also at some points deviated from the St. Etienne-Orfeuil highway to the extent of several hundred meters. The only shelter afforded was the so-called “foxholes” which the men had dug themselves.
In this position the division remained until it was relieved, during the night of October 6-7, by the 71st Brigade of the American 36th Infantry Division. This relief I will take up in my account of the events of October 7.
The German reports differ substantially from this account based on American sources. Thus the report of the 368th Infantry Regiment reads as follows (See Map P):
During the night of October 5 to 6, the enemy suddenly launched a severe harassing fire on the positions and the rear in area of this regiment. It increased towards morning, and at 6:30 a.m. was concentrated as a drumfire on our front lines. Fifteen minutes later heavy masses of hostile infantry attacked the whole front of the regiment as well as the right and left neighbors. In general, they were repulsed with our machine-gun and rifle fire, but the enemy renewed his assaults again and again. The attacks were turned back at first on all parts of our front, but finally the enemy, numerically far superior, succeeded in entering our lines at a number of points. After repeated hostile thrusts, and when its right neighbor, the 149th Infantry Regiment, was also pushed backward, the 2d Battalion, 368th Infantry Regiment, had to withdraw its own right flank.
Simultaneously, the enemy gained a foothold on the right flank of the 1st Battalion, 368th Infantry Regiment. Here the 3d Company, 368th Infantry, had been forced to yield to a renewed hostile attack, since its machine guns had fired away their last round of ammunition and its hand grenades were all gone. From this position, in the course of the afternoon, the American assault troops rolled up the trenches of the 1st Battalion, 368th Infantry Regiment, towards the east.
Our companies, one after another, yielded to the pressure of the enemy and occupied the edges of the wood approximately two hundred meters north, where they entrenched. The left flank of the battalion held the old position.
As early as noon the regiment, in order to reënforce the front-line battalions, had employed one company of the support battalion (3d Battalion, 368th Infantry Regiment), in the right sub-sector and one company in the left sub-sector. From that time on, the 3d Battalion, 368th Infantry, its combat strength shrunk to pitifully small numbers, consisted only of the remnants of the battalion staff and the Trench- Mortar Detachment.
In the afternoon the situation at the front became very critical. Scarcity of ammunition threatened to paralyze the combat strength of the troops. However, under exertion of their last ounce of physical strength, the men succeeded in bringing up a sufficient amount of ammunition from points far in the rear and got it into the positions just in time.
During the afternoon the 1st Battalion, 74th Reserve Infantry Regiment, was placed at the disposal of the regiment as a reserve and put into the strips of woods in Map Square 1049 north of the Scay depression. However, this battalion was not employed during the day. At evening, the regiment still held all of its positions with the exception of several unimportant points which of necessity had to be left in the hands of the enemy. The division now ordered that the regiments must regain possession of the entire sector, just as it was occupied before the hostile attack. The regiment ordered the 1st Battalion, 368th Infantry, to recapture the abandoned trenches by means of a counterattack. In cooperation with the 149th Infantry Regiment, the 2d Battalion, 368th Infantry, was ordered to restore the old front on the west slope of Blodnitz Hill.
We will later on learn how the 368th Infantry Regiment carried out its reorganization during the night. Here is the report of the 149th Infantry Regiment:
At dawn the enemy, attacking with the assistance of a tremendous artillery preparation that fell in the manner of a rolling barrage, attacked the Blodnitz-St. Etienne sector and points west thereof, employing strong detachments of attack troops.
While St. Etienne was completely lost to the enemy, so that he even was able to occupy its north edge, the combat-seasoned 3d Company, 149th Infantry Regiment, skillfully led by Lieutenant Wagner, with unshakable stoicism maintained possession of the cemetery throughout the action. In a similarly exemplary manner, the central company, 2d Company of the 18th Pioneer Battalion, conducted its operations. The final outcome of the combats around Blodnitz Hill forced the 4th Company, 149th Infantry, to withdraw its lines to some extent. A timely and brilliantly led counterattack of the 2d Company, 149th Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant Ferreau, here too restored the situation exactly as it was before the hostile attack. The gravel pit of coarse had to be ignored because it had been subjected to a destructive fire of both German and hostile artillery. At about noon the situation on the left flank might be summarized by saying that, in connection with the combats around Blodnitz Hill, a small dent had been hammered into our lines but the contacts on both flanks still existed and the lines still held. As a much desired reënforcement Lieutenant Bahn arrived during the afternoon with 52 stragglers of the 11th and 12th Companies and seven machine guns. All were placed under the command of the 3d Battalion, 149th Infantry.
At about 6:00 a.m. the enemy launched a surprise attack from the west, his attack objective being St. Etienne. He succeeded in forcing the weak outpost garrison back upon the north edge of the village. The 213th Infantry Division, which now had the 8th Jäger Regiment under its command, ordered the latter, at 3 :00 p.m., to recapture this village. From 2:45 p.m. on, this attack was prepared by an energetic artillery fire. The Jiigers entered the village and after a bitter hand-to-hand encounter along the streets forced the enemy back beyond the south edge of the village. The German artillery observers estimated the fleeing enemy, who, incidentally, were subjected to a very effective artillery fire, to have been in the strength of about three companies. However, as a result of the very severe bombardment which the hostile artillery now laid on the village, especially on the south edge, our own assault troops were again forced out of the town. Thus it came again under enemy control. For this reason the 1st Battalion, 149th Infantry, blocked its right flank on the cemetery against possible flank thrusts by the enemy from St. Etienne.
In its positions west of St. Etienne the 14th Infantry Division also saw very bitter encounters on this day. To begin with, the 476th Infantry Regiment drove out the French who had entered here on October 5. Then at 6:30 a.m. the enemy began a series of vigorous attacks, all of which were repulsed in the course of the forenoon. At 2:30 p.m. the enemy, in a surprise move, again entered the village. They were thrown back, it is true, with heavy losses, by a counterattack of the 59th and 16th Infantry Regiments, but at the same time our own losses were serious. The 16th Infantry Regiment declared that this had been the bitterest hand-to-hand encounter it had fought during the entire year 1918.
Along all the rest of the battle front, which had now seen heavy fighting for the last ten days, the sixth of October might be looked upon as a lull in the fighting, which amounted only to local encounters. But the conflict between the account of this “sixth of October” phase of the Allied offensive as given by me from American sources, and on the other hand the picture presented in the harmonious reports of the German regiments, is difficult to explain. According to these German reports, and judging also from the number of the American troops actually employed, there took place a major attack, with a thorough artillery preparation. If now this attack is to be accredited merely to an agreement reached between these two regimental commanders (6th Marine and 23d Infantry Regiments), for the sole purpose of capturing a single German machine-gun strong point, then these coordinated movements on so large a scale are quite astonishing. There seems to have been no recognition of the fact that St. Etienne was already abandoned again by the Germans in the course of the afternoon.
The Seventh Day of October
(See Maps S and T and Appendix I.)
During the night of October 6 to 7, the American 71st Brigade took over the front of the American 2d Division. The latter, however, had been ordered upon its withdrawal to leave in each brigade sector one battalion with machine guns for an additional period of twenty-four hours and to transfer to the command of the 71st Infantry Brigade the mortars and 37-mm. guns. After a very difficult march, the 71st Infantry Brigade had arrived in Sommepy on October 6; the guides, who were to be furnished by the 2d Division, had not all made their appearance, and the rest had no knowledge of the terrain. As a result the troops spent the whole night in marching back and forth in search of their respective sectors. At dawn they had at last reached their places. The 141st Infantry Regiment relieved the 23d Infantry Regiment, which was ordered to withdraw to Schlesier Hill (named by the Americans “Pylon Hill”). The 141st Infantry Regiment placed its 1st Battalion in lines, the 2d in support, and the 3d in reserve. Adjacent thereto were the corresponding units of the 9th Infantry Regiment, which was to remain in lines. The 142d Infantry Regiment relieved the 6th Marine Regiment, placing its 2d Battalion in lines, its 1st in support, and its 3d in reserve. At the left of the 2d Battalion, 142d Infantry, was found the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, located in the woods south of St. Etienne. The two other battalions of the 6th Marines were withdrawn on the Blanc Mont while the 5th Marines remained in support. Two companies each of the machine-gun battalion were placed at the disposal of and distributed among the 141st and 142d Infantry Regiments.
The commanding general of the 3d Brigade, General Ely, however, retained the command in his sector. At 1 :10 p.m. he in
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formed the commander of the 71st Infantry Brigade, General Pegram-Whitworth, of this fact and ordered him to expand the sector of the 141st Infantry Regiment a distance of 450 meters to the right in order to take over from the French that portion of the combat zone they had occupied.
On this day the Americans were engaged only in making preparations for the attack that was scheduled to be launched on the eighth. A number of contradictory reports regarding St. Etienne had been received by Divisional Headquarters. In one, it appeared that at 7:20 a.m. the Germans had taken possession of this village, under the protection of smoke screens, and that the French, during their attack of 9:30 a.m., had again recaptured it. However, a patrol of the 6th Marines at 12:50 p.m. received fire from the enemy not only from the direction of the cemetery but also from the west edge of this village. At 2:18 p.m. the Marine Regiment estimated the number of Germans located there to be at least two hundred men. As additional reënforcements were seen coming across the heights, it was presumed that the Germans would soon attempt to dear the French entirely out of the village. The commanding general of the French 21st Army Corps, General Naulin, however, was of a different opinion. He was convinced that the village was entirely in the hands of the French and twice ordered the American 2d Division to take over control of the town. During the afternoon reports came in to the effect that the Germans were entrenching at a point one and one-half kilometers northeast of St. Etienne and were in the act of concentrating heavy reserves in the woods nearby. It was also stated that the German infantry had been given orders to hold on for an additional two days while the German heavy artillery would be withdrawn in the interval. The divisional staff suspected that the Germans meant to take up the defensive in a line extending through St. Etienne and the cemetery in a northeasterly direction toward Römerschanze and the hills near Semide.
During the night of October 7 to 8, the French 22d Infantry Division in its sector at the left of the American 2d Division was relieved by the French 7th Infantry Division. (See Appendix II.)
Let us now follow the instructions and reports concerning this day that were issued by the Germans and determine to what extent the observations of the American 2d Division were correct.
The Group of Armies, German Crown Prince, as early as October 7 submitted to the commander in chief a map showing the contemplated position and troop distribution of the Antwerp-Meuse position, which had been planned as the scene of the last great defensive. It reported that the Aisne, Souche, and Serre were everywhere rising above their banks. At the west edge of the Argonne south of Vouziers, there were already numerous small inundations; at all other points of the rivers it was stated that the water had risen from one to one-and-a-half meters above normal level. With the continuance of the present sunny weather there might be no more serious floods for perhaps two weeks, but if rainy weather should come on flood conditions would be brought about within three or four days. However, it was emphasized, measures had been taken to assure safe crossings over the inundated terrain by partly blasting the river dams, in case the forces remained forward of the Hermann-Siegfried position for any extended period. The inundated terrain was stated to be constantly watched by aviators, and a special aerial protection had been provided. Despite all this, the prospect had to be reckoned with that sooner or later the enemy would become aware of the flood conditions and therefrom draw certain conclusions as to our further intentions, as a guide for his own operations.
One can see from this how carefully the Higher Command was taking precautionary measures for the further withdrawals that might some time be necessary, although the troops were still called upon to maintain a stubborn resistance. Acting upon this line of thought, Group Py as early as October 6 had requested Army Headquarters of the 3d Army to make available special reserves to fortify the line running Bautzen Hill southwest of Cauroy-Victoria Hill-Mont Chery. It was stated that there was no doubt that the next American-French attack would have as its objective the possession of the hills lying west and south of the villages Cauroy and Machault, and extending far to the northward. For this purpose it was said to be imperative that even the assault troops be placed in readiness for such construction work. As a matter of fact, the Cauroy-Machault line actually was the subsequent attack objective of the American 2d Division.
The 8th Jäger Regiment had been ordered to recapture on October 7 the village of St. Etienne. Here is the report of the regimental commander, Count von Hüllesen, describing the course of this operation:
The attack of the infantry, plunging forward at 6:15 a.m., encountered generally heavy resistance within the strongly occupied village. According to the statement of a prisoner, it was held by one battalion of the French 62d Infantry Regiment, 22d Division. At 7:15 a.m. the regimental commander received verbal reports via guard detachments transporting prisoners to the rear that the central assault detachment and the one that attacked along the west edge of the village had pushed through as far as the south edge. At 7:45 a.m., in the same manner, a report was received that, in the eastern portion of the village, there was still fighting over the possession of a small strip of woods. At 7:58 a.m. a message came that contact had been established between the companies of the 24th and 4th Jäger Battalions. Our casualties were reported by no means slight. At 9:50 a.m. it was stated that, since 8:10 a.m., the eastern portion of St. Etienne, and thus now the entire village, was in our hands. In this attack our four tanks did not participate as they were unable to cross the Arnes brook, two meters wide. Twenty-four hours earlier, the stone bridge across it had been blasted by the 284th Pioneer Company, and another bridge farther east was not strong enough for tanks.
The main line of resistance now extends around the south exit of the village. There is contact on the left with the 1st Battalion, 149th Infantry, and on the right with the 16th Jäger Battalion. The light machine-gun squad, located at 8:30 a.m. at the southwest exit of the village, was subjected to cross fire of French machine guns and is reported missing since then. The village is still full of Frenchmen who have hidden in houses and cellars and are sniping from ambush. All forces now at the disposal of the Jäger Regiment are being employed to “mop up” the village.
At the southwest exit of St. Etienne, in the direction of St. Pierre and. outside of the village proper, there are barracks and trenches strongly held by French forces. The regiment will make an attempt to smoke these out with its medium-caliber trench mortars. Likewise, there are still strong hostile detachments located in the undergrowth along Arnes brook, as well as in the strips of woods opposite the left flank of our neighboring regiment on the right. They have hampered the combat activities of the 16th Jäger Battalion until they are now practically paralyzed. Their enfilading fire is very effective. It is urgently to be desired that the left flank of the neighboring regiment advance through these strips of woods.
The attack upon St. Etienne was carried out by the 4th Jäger Battalion and two companies of the 24th Jäger Battalion. On this occasion, 105 prisoners were brought to the rear. But at 12:00 o’clock noon, the enemy, after a lively artillery preparatory fire, was already launching his counterattack from the southwest. The Jägers defended their newly won positions energetically but were again forced out of the village. Their total casualties amounted to 5 officers and 203 men, 180 of whom were missing. One weak sentry post held its own in a trench section at the southeast edge of St. Etienne until late at night. This fact apparently aroused among the Americans the suspicion that St. Etienne was still in the hands of the Germans.
At 6:00 p.m. the 14th Jäger Regiment received orders to recapture the village. This attack was a failure.
(Map T) Simultaneously with the Jägers, the 149th and the 368th Infantry Regiments had been scheduled to advance in attack against the gravel pit and the connecting portions of the position. After an advance, which was at first fairly effective, they were forced to a halt by resistance and the short fire of our own artillery. The French attacks against the right flank of the 1st Battalion, 149th Infantry, located at the cemetery, were repulsed. The situation on Blodnitz Hill was unchanged, but the gravel pit remained in the hands of the Americans, who could not be dislodged even from portions of the main line of resistance on the left flank of the 368th Infantry Regiment.
From 4.20 p.m. on until darkness there fell an unusually vicious bombardment, especially on the positions of the reserves. Later in the evening we observed a strong traffic along the enemy rear lines of communication, moving chiefly in the direction of St. Etienne, and apparently also a number of tanks.
The attacks of the French were not confined solely to the recapture of St. Etienne. They attacked, during the afternoon, the 242d Infantry Division in position at the right of the 213th Infantry Division, the former having relieved the 14th Infantry Division. They launched three attacks against the 127th Infantry Regiment located northeast of Clemont, and were repulsed each time with heavy losses. At the same time the French, after a heavy preparatory bombardment, attacked the left flank battalion of the 476th Infantry Regiment which was in lines west of St. Etienne. They penetrated its lines as far as the main line of resistance but by means of a counterattack that was launched at once, were again thrown out. During this attack the 476th Infantry Regiment suffered such heavy losses that it was forced to draw all three battalions into its front lines.
In view of this, Group Langer, in expectation of a major hostile attack to be launched during the following day, ordered that the assault echelons of the 14th Infantry Division hold themselves in readiness to march off at 6:00 a.m., October 8.
(Map U) At 10:20 p.m. Group Py issued the following group order:
- In view of reports heretofore received, it is expected that the enemy on October 8 will launch an attack against the front of the group.
- The present positions will be held.
- Of the Army Reserves, the following will be in readiness from 5:00 a.m., October 8, on:
- The 195th Infantry Division (minus one regiment) under the command of its divisional commander. One regiment will be placed on the points east of the Cauroy-St. Etienne road behind Hohenzollern Hill; one battalion will be advanced on the boundary line of the Army on Habsburger Hill. One regiment with accompanying artillery on and east of the Machault-St. Etienne road south of Hohenzollern Hill; one battalion will be advanced into the vicinity of the southwest edge of Gottorp depression. Combat Mission: Protection of the boundary of the Army and launching of independent counterattacks in case the enemy, in the sector of 231st Infantry Regiment, breaks through Main Line of Resistance No. 4 and advances in a general northerly direction.
- One battalion of the 159th Infantry Regiment with accompanying battery will be placed on the southwestern portion of Mecklenburg Hill. Combat Mission: Mecklenburg Hill will be occupied and held. A penetration of the enemy south of Mecklenburg Hill in the general direction of Semide will be prevented.
- The order of battle of the other elements of the assault groups will be as today.
- After a long pause in the hostile tank attacks it can be safely assumed that tanks will again be used in the expected attack of tomorrow. Approach of tanks has been recognized in aerial photographs. Advanced tank platoons with tank ammunition are required in our own lines. The foremost infantry lines will be reënforced with isolated guns of the field artillery.
- Before dawn October 8, waves of destruction fire are to be employed, so far as the present ammunition supply permits, in view of the expected enemy major attack. Throughout the entire night, St. Etienne will be subjected to a continuous harassing fire of heavy-caliber guns.
- Waves of destruction fire will be utilized in order to restore the line in the sector of the 368th Infantry Regiment.
- The command post of the 195th Infantry Division will be located either at Cauroy or on the Cauroy-St. Etienne road at Hohenzollern Hill.
In the evening of October 7 the combat strengths of the troops of the 123d Infantry Division were as follows:
This made a total strength of
One should keep these figures in mind and take into consideration what these troops had accomplished during the days preceding the combat, as one reviews the major battle which they had to endure on October 8, engaged against the entirely fresh American 71st Brigade totaling in round numbers 300 officers and 7,000 men, as well as the American 2d Division, whose troops were really, relatively speaking, quite fit for front-line fighting.
The Eighth Day of October
(See Maps U, V, and W)
During the afternoon of October 7, the commanding general of the American 71st Infantry Brigade, General Pegram-Whit- worth, was called to Headquarters of the 2d Division where Major General Lejeune gave him verbal orders for the launching of the attack of October 8. The attack was to be carried out in the former combat zone in the direction of Machault-Cauroy and was to be executed by the 71st Infantry Brigade. The 2d Division was designated to protect the flanks with the 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry, on the right, and the 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, on the left, but was otherwise to serve as reserve. Two tank battalions of the French, the entire artillery of the 2d Division, as well as the attached French 29th, 34th, and 452d Field Artillery Regiments were designated to assist the drive.
In the evening General Whitworth assembled his regimental commanders in his own command post and discussed various phases of the offensive. The attack objective was a line that stretched along their own front at a distance of about two kilometers. Each regiment was to designate one battalion as the first, one as the second, and one as the third attack wave. These assault detachments were to “leap-frog,” i.e., as soon as the first sector was captured, the forward battalion was to remain stationary, the two others behind continuing the drive; the first battalion, formerly first in lines, was then to become the third, the former third battalion would consequently then be the second attack wave. At 6:15 a.m. the first attack wave of the infantry was to get under way.
General Whitworth dismissed his regimental commanders at 10:00 p.m. They immediately repaired to their billets and in turn again discussed the attack with their battalion commanders. After this, the drive was again discussed between the battalion commanders and their company commanders, whereupon the latter received verbal instructions. The company commanders of the 141st Infantry Regiment received them between 2:00 and 4:00 a.m., those of the 142d Infantry Regiment not before about 6:00 A.M.
The documentary attack orders of the 2d Division were not issued until twelve o’clock midnight. Thereupon, the 71st Infantry Brigade issued its own written attack orders as late as 4:00 a.m. and it may be assumed that they traveled no further than the respective regimental headquarters.
This explains why the orders for this attack, set for 6:15 a.m., reached the troops only shortly before “zero hour.” Indeed, the front-line battalion of the 141st Infantry learned of this order at 6:11 a.m. The battalion commander of the front-line battalion, 141st Infantry, was just in the act of imparting detailed instructions to his company commanders when the rolling barrage commenced.
In the right sector of the division the front-line battalion, 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry, fell in lines punctually. It immediately was subjected to a severe artillery and machine-gun bombardment. The battalion commander died in action. His troops continued their advance for only a short period, then definitely halted at a point north of the St. Etienne-Orfeuil road.
The 2d and 3d Battalions were to follow in the wake of the 1st. However, at 6:15 a.m., neither of the two was ready to form for the attack because, in the case of the 2d Battalion, the battalion commander had decided at the last moment to change the order of battle of his companies, and in the case of the 3d, it was up to this moment totally unaware of the actual “zero hour.” Hence both these battalions were soon in disorder. However, a few troops advanced as far as the front line of the 1st Battalion. And here, at a point immediately north of the St. Etienne-Orfeuil road, the regiment remained throughout the entire day. The machine-gun company (Company A, 141st Infantry) could not be reached by runners. It was located at the extreme right but formed for the attack soon after 6:15 a.m. and took up. a position north of the road.
(See Appendix II) The 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry, had been designated to establish and maintain contact between the 71st Infantry Brigade and the French 346th Infantry Division which advanced on the right. The battalion was now forced to participate in the attack, captured a machine-gun strong- point north of the road, and likewise came to a halt. It was reported that troops of the 346th Infantry Division had advanced through the lines of the 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, but had then again fallen back behind the lines of that battalion. Now another French battalion advanced in attack at the right of the 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry, and established communication with the French front at Médéah Hill. We can thus see that the French also had not got very far ahead with their drive. Nevertheless, a German attack, launched from the northeast against the American and French lines, was repulsed. Owing to the heavy losses, the 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry, at 3:40 p.m. was relieved by the 1st Battalion, 2d Engineers, together with the 4th Machine-Gun Company. These now took over the flank protection and contact with the French 346th Infantry Division.
The following report has been made regarding the activities of the French Tank Battalion, attached to the 141st Infantry Regiment:
At 7:30 a.m. the tanks attached to this regiment came into action. The runner had been unable to get in touch with the commanding officer of the tank detachment, as a result of which he received the attack orders only after considerable delay. Hence, the tanks did not appear on the left flank of the foremost battalion, the 2d Battalion, 141st Infantry Regiment, until about fifteen minutes after it had formed for the attack. The tanks may perhaps have helped some of the forward squads of riflemen, but there was no cooperation between tanks and infantry, the tanks rolling aimlessly ahead and thus giving almost negligible assistance. But the worst of it was that twice they fired into their own infantry and caused heavy losses. Afterwards all the tanks left the battle field. Acting with the permission of the regimental commander, 141st Infantry Regiment, they were all withdrawn during the afternoon.
With the 142d Infantry Regiment, attacking in the left half of the division sector, matters went still worse. Here, the company commanders did not receive their attack orders until about 6:00 a.m. Consequently, they were unable to study them properly, and made them known to their companies just at the time the rolling barrage opened up at 6:15 a.m. Naturally enough, the launching of the attack by these companies was delayed for from five to fifteen minutes and when they actually went over the top, their rolling barrage had run away from them and their own advance consequently had little effect.
In its advance in a northwesterly direction, the 2d Battalion, 142d Infantry, advancing as the first attack wave, crossed Blodnitz Hill (Hill 160), broke the resistance of the Germans at the west slope of the hill, and thereafter directed its activities chiefly against the cemetery northeast of St. Etienne. Here, upon and between the graves, the Germans had emplaced numerous machine guns having a firing range of from five hundred to one thousand meters and an effective range over an arc of 180 degrees, extending from southwest to northeast. Elements of the battalion succeeded at last in reaching the St. Etienne-Semide road about one kilometer northeast of St. Etienne. Elements of the two other battalions arrived as reënforcements. As time passed, the troops entrenched in a line touching on the right the sector of the French 7th Division, which had advanced northwest of St. Etienne, and extending thence leftward from the northeast edge of the village across the cemetery in the direction of Semide. But from this point to the right flank of the 241st Infantry Regiment there was a gap of no less than two kilometers, and the line of the 241st Infantry was located actually one kilometer in rear of the other lines. Moreover, troops of various units had become completely mixed together, and for these reasons the 242d Infantry Regiment was also withdrawn late in the afternoon to the west slope of Blodnitz Hill.
The assistance given by the French Tank Battalion here was no greater than in the case of the 141st Infantry. When the infantry attacked Blodnitz Hill, the tank on which the detachment commander rode was destroyed by shell fire and the officer himself killed. Thereupon the other tanks withdrew.
At twelve o’clock noon the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, moved into the village of St. Etienne, which had been for the past twenty- four hours in the undisputed possession of the French. The Marine Battalion had only to take over this village, which belonged to the combat zone of the American 2d Division, from its allies. Two companies of the battalion attempted to occupy the trenches located north of the village but were driven out by our fire. They retreated and occupied trenches south of the town. At 5 :40 p.m. the American lines encircled the town, with their left flank in contact with the French 7th Infantry Division. In the evening this line was reënforced by the 2d Battalion, 2d Engineers. That the Americans so speedily evacuated the village which they had occupied a few minutes earlier is explained no doubt by the fact that it was subjected to a heavy bombardment, and holding troops in a village of this type is very uncomfortable and productive of heavy losses. Located as it was in somewhat of a depression in the terrain, St. Etienne had no great tactical value either for the Germans or for the Americans and French.
The losses of the American 71st Infantry Brigade on this day amounted to 75 officers and 1,314 enlisted men, which was 33 per cent of the officers and 23 per cent of the men. The troops, however, had a feeling that these losses were still greater, for as early as 9:45 a.m. the 71st Infantry Brigade reported that its losses amounted to at least 50 per cent. As additional disquieting reports came in, especially in regard to the safety of the right flank, General Whitworth asked the French 21st Corps to move forward at least the American 72d Infantry Brigade and the 131st Machine-Gun Battalion as a reënforcement. General Lejeune forwarded this request and subsequently informed General Whitworth that General Ely, commanding general of the 3d Infantry Brigade, had been instructed to put all available troops into lines. Execution of this order, however, was omitted because the 71st Infantry Brigade had discontinued its attack and no German counterattacks followed. The only operation incident to the order was that the 23d Infantry Regiment was again brought up into the vicinity of the St. Etienne-Orfeuil road as a reserve, behind the gap that existed between the sectors of the 142d and 141st Infantry Regiments.
Not taking into consideration the casualties, the miscarriage of the 71st Infantry Brigade’s attack is explained by the fact that the American artillery had been instructed that the attack was to get under way at 6:15 a.m., beginning on the St. Etienne-Orfeuil road. It was also stated that the preparatory bombardment was to be directed on points three hundred to four hundred meters north of this road. But since actually the lines of the infantry were partly located several hundred meters south of the road, a great number of German machine-gun nests were not subjected to the American artillery bombardment.
Let us now describe the American front line as it existed during the night of October 8 to 9. It began at a point two kilometers northwest of the Médéah Ferme, extended approximately four hundred meters north of the St. Etienne-Orfeuil road in the sector of the 141st Infantry Regiment and, in the sector of the 142d Infantry Regiment began at the northwest slope of Blodnitz Hill and ended at the northeast edge of St. Etienne. But there were no continuous lines; nor did these two infantry regiments have any contact. Moreover, men of various units were mixed together in the trenches, with only such organization as the officers were able hastily to patch up.
Let us now observe the events of the day as they unfolded on the German side. I will first give the collective report of 3d Army Headquarters, and after that the reports of the regiments.
This morning, the full impetus of the hostile major attack which was expected by the 3d Army struck the front from the right flank as far as Liry Hill. The result has been another failure to penetrate our lines. According to captured enemy orders, the first attack objective was the Semide-Machault line. Tenacious resistance of the defenders and a renewed offensive spirit during following counterattacks have thwarted the enemy plans. Today, too, they suffered heavy losses.
The first blow of the enemy against St. Etienne and on the Liry Hill-Orfeuil line was either broken up by our fire, or was prevented from reaching its full development. Numerous tanks were destroyed or forced to retreat. Private First Class Budde of the 1st Battalion, 55th Infantry Regiment, with a concentrated charge (geballte Ladung) wrote the finis of one of these tanks. Its occupants, the squadron commander and his adjutant, were made prisoners.
This last item is especially noteworthy because it may be considered an act of heroism to jump on the roof of a moving tank, fasten the “concentrated charge” (which consists of a number of hand grenades tied in a bundle), at the air slit, and then quickly light the fuse.
The report continues:
The 89th Grenadier Regiment alone destroyed eight hostile tanks. Between St. Etienne and Orfeuil the enemy temporarily won some ground. Our combat reserves hurled themselves against his lines, brought the deeply echeloned attack waves in the sector of the 213th Infantry Division to a halt, and on the right flank of the 17th Infantry Division forced the enemy to retreat out of our main line of resistance which he had entered.
An energetic counterattack of the 2d Reserve Jäger Battalion led along both sides of the Army sector boundary forced the enemy to withdraw on the left flank of the 1st Army, where he had also entered at the same time. Toward noon the enemy again attacked from St. Etienne. This drive, which was delivered with great weight, was here too brought to a halt by our reserves before the enemy had been able to advance more than a few hundred meters. Before he could utilize his local success, the concentrated attack of battalions of the 195th Infantry and the 14th Reserve Divisions struck him squarely. Several renewed attacks against the 203d Infantry Division were either intercepted by our destruction fire or else collapsed closely in front of our lines in our machine-gun and rifle fire. After the termination of the combats, the main line of resistance between the right flank of the Army and Liry Hill, with the exception of several small indentations, was again completely in our hands.
Army Headquarters, 3d Army, ordered the moving forward of the 3d Guard Infantry Division into the vicinity south of Machault. In addition to issuing this order, it had also learned something new: the 74th Reserve Infantry Regiment, after a well- executed raid into the hostile lines at Grenadier Hill, brought back six Americans of the American 36th Division as prisoners. Here is the combat report of the 74th Reserve Infantry' Regiment:
The eighth day of October was again a major combat day for this regiment. After an artillery preparation that lasted about three- quarters of an hour, the enemy at 6:30 a.m., employing strong detachments, attacked our lines. A bitter combat ensued. The enemy threw great masses of troops into the fight and he suffered heavy losses. At about 8:00 a.m. he attempted to roll up the sector of the 1st Battalion, 74th Reserve Infantry, from the flank, but our machine guns prevented this maneuver and inflicted heavy losses in his ranks. Elements of the 2d Battalion were thrown in as a reënforcement and gradually the enemy was again forced to relinquish his hold upon the right flank of the 1st Battalion. At 8:20 a.m. we were justified in assuming that this hostile attack had been warded off. For purposes of flank protection, the right flank of the 1st Battalion, 368th Infantry Regiment, was somewhat withdrawn and in this manner we were able to continue in possession of our sector. It became known that the enemy had penetrated the portions of the front lines to the right and left of the 1st Battalion, 74th Reserve Infantry, and the 1st Battalion, 368th Infantry. Thus contact was lost on both flanks, and the regiment urgently requested reënforcements. The enemy was observed to move, with tanks, through the lines at the right; some of his men were forced by the 1st Battalion, 368th Infantry, to turn about and withdraw. At 10:00 a.m. the situation appeared to be most critical. Nevertheless, we were still able to check the advance of the enemy with our machine-gun fire. We learned that the Americans had gained ground on our right and advanced beyond St. Etienne. Blodnitz Hill was lost to the enemy. As our right and left flanks were without contact with their neighbors, the 1st Battalion, 74th, and the 1st Battalion, 368th, “were in the air.” In order to fill the gaps, small detachments of the 2d Battalion, 74th, were used. Toward 3:00 p.m. orders were received according to which the front-line elements of the 74th, in connection with the withdrawal of the 75th Infantry of the 17th Infantry Division, were to bend back their right flank as far as Map Square 1049. Three battalions of the 195th Infantry Division, assisted by two Jäger battalions of the 24th Jägers and one battalion of the 159th Infantry Regiment, were to carry out a counterattack with the right flank advancing upon the center of St. Etienne and the left flank in the direction of Map Square 1049. This counterattack had good results. The 1st Battalion, 74th, having begun its operations just a minute before, again occupied its old positions and subsequently continued to hold them against all other hostile attacks.
Here is the report of the 368th Infantry Regiment: (See Map V.)
During the night of October 7 to 8, the enemy placed a severe harassing fire on approach roads, assembly areas in the rear, and the battery firing positions. This and other signs indicated the possibility of a major attack on October 8. At 6:00 a.m. the enemy suddenly opened activities with a most intensive annihilating fire which covered the entire regimental sector. The enemy utilized shells of all calibers, as well as gas and fog-producing bombs, so that shortly thereafter the whole expanse of the front lines was enveloped in thick smoke. Simultaneously with the beginning of the hostile artillery bombardment, the hostile infantry began to form for attack, and in some places to work forward toward our lines. These movements were immediately recognized by our own infantry and at once subjected to machine- gun fire. Barrage and annihilating fires were requested and began at once, delivering a full and well-directed fire on the hostile assembly areas. It was fortunate, in this connection, that our artillery had had earlier orders to undertake a heavy bombardment on the hostile lines between 6:10 and 6:30 a.m.
At 6:30 a.m. the enemy advanced for the attack along the entire front. Despite their use of fresh and far superior forces, our own troops repulsed this attack before it reached our position. There was a brief pause, and the enemy again rushed forward, but was repulsed a second time. At certain points where he penetrated our lines, he was at once thrown out again. New ensued a lively infantry action. The enemy battalions, which had previously suffered heavily under the artillery bombardment, again lost severely. Repeatedly the enemy attempted to carry out his planned attack, at some points as many as five times, but each time he was forced to return to his positions.
His attacks were supported by five tanks. These appeared first at points east of Blodnitz Hill, but the machine guns of the 1st Machine- Gun Company immediately forced them to turn back. Thereupon they began to circle around Blodnitz Hill and attempted to attack our lines from the west. Here again, they were subjected to the fire of the 2d Machine-Gun Company. Three tanks were damaged and withdrew; two remained on the battle field, totally destroyed. [We know now that there were actually two different French tank detachments involved in this attack.]
As a result of the long-continued infantry action, there arose on our own side a serious shortage of ammunition. Our losses were also very great, but still our troops held their lines.
As soon as the first smoke of the battle had cleared away, the two battalions established blinker communication with the regiment, submitted reports concerning the situation, and requested—especially the 2d Battalion, 368th Infantry, fighting on Blodnitz Hill—very urgently that reëenforcements and ammunition be sent up. In compliance with these requests, the regiment ordered the 74th Reserve Infantry Regiment to despatch two companies of the 3d Battalion to Blodnitz Hill as a reënforcement with as much ammunition as the men could carry.
The seriously depleted 2d Battalion, 368th Infantry, maintained for long hours its defense of the hotly contested Blodnitz Hill against all hostile attacks. But while it was being most fiercely beset in front, it suddenly observed in its rear strong hostile detachments which had broken through from the west. The enemy, numerically far superior, forced the completely surprised and already decimated battalion to surrender after a brief struggle. Only a handful of men made good their escape. The men of this battalion, who, under the command of Captain Lattmann, had proved their worth in countless combats, regarded it up to the last moment as a matter of honor to hold Blodnitz Hill and fight for it to the bitter end. Against a frontal attack the position would have been held. With the loss of Blodnitz Hill the right flank of the regiment was pressed backward. The elements of troops located on the eastern border of the hill had to be withdrawn to the north, where they were able to establish contact with the 3d Battalion, 74th Infantry, located in the trapeze-shaped woods.
With the capture of Blodnitz Hill, the enemy’s artillery bombardment gradually decreased in volume. The infantry attacks continued for a long time thereafter. Now, however, the enemy discontinued his attacks against this regiment’s sector and concentrated his forces in the direction of St. Etienne where his drive, moreover, seemed to be winning ground. From St. Etienne he also attempted to advance northeast in the valley of the Arnes brook but was prevented from further progress by the machine-gun fire of the 3d Battalion, 74th Reserve Infantry, under the command of Captain Settemaier. When the enemy continued to advance north of St. Etienne, Captain Settemaier decided at 12:30 p.m. that to avoid envelopment it was necessary to withdraw to the southwest slope of Mecklenburg Hill. But early in the afternoon, seeing that the enemy was no longer going forward, he again advanced his battalion into the strips of woods in the St. Etienne-Semide line.
During the afternoon the combat activities considerably abated. Isolated squads and units were able to assemble and establish themselves in the strips of woods. Heavy casualties had occurred, and only remnants of the 1st and 2d Battalions, 368th Infantry, held the positions that afternoon.
At 6:30 p.m. the 159th Infantry Regiment formed for a counterattack with Mecklenburg Hill as the line of departure, in the direction of St. Etienne. Between this village and Blodnitz Hill, this regiment advanced as far as the former positions of the 149th Infantry Regiment, some of its elements even advancing beyond. The enemy withdrew in haste from the village of St. Etienne, having been forced to do so as a result of a threatening envelopment by our own troops and a very energetic artillery fire. The 368th Infantry Regiment had received orders to support this counterattack, which was expected to pass across its lines. This support, however, was not given, for the left flank of the 159th Regiment, advancing toward St. Etienne, went far to the west of the right flank of the 368th. Our troops were not able to recapture Blodnitz Hill. Hence, the ground captured at the right by means of the counterattack was of no value and had no influence upon the location of the 368th’s line. In the evening of October 8, the right flank of the regiment (the 3d Battalion, 74th Reserve Infantry) was located in the trapeze-shaped woods without contact to westward; the left flank stood unchanged in the old main line of resistance, in contact there with the 1st Battalion, 74th Reserve Infantry. Generally speaking, the front faced west or southwest.
Signed: Mannkopf.
This report of Major Mannkopf is summed up by the brigade commander, Colonel von Götzen, in the following words:
This clear, matter-of-fact narrative gives a plain picture of the combats on October 8. The loss of Blodnitz Hill by the weakened elements of the 368th Infantry Regiment, especially the 2d Battalion, was unavoidable. Its attempted recapture by the 159th Infantry did not take place because this regiment was withdrawn from this objective and put to other uses. The conduct and leadership of the 368th Infantry deserve recognition.
Combat report of the 149th Infantry Regiment:
At 6:45 a.m. the enemy, after a brief but severe artillery bombardment, attacked on a broad front which included this regiment’s sector. One hostile tank detachment preceded the attacking troops. The conspicuous employment of tanks in no wise overawed our infantry. On the contrary, our infantry fire frequently brought the tanks to a halt, and it met the oncoming infantry waves with a heroic resistance. Disregarding danger that especially threatened it from the enemy occupation of St. Etienne, and disregarding also the previous losses it had suffered, the 3d Company, 149th Infantry Regiment, located on the right flank, under the command of Lieutenant Wagner, did excellent service. Under the command of Lieutenant Ferreau, the 2d Company, 149th Infantry, unhesitatingly and with complete success hurled itself against the enemy in a counterattack, after the retreat of elements of the 368th Infantry on Blodnitz Hill and also the 4th Company, 149th Infantry, located west of it.
Gradually the hostile infantry, numerically far superior and splendidly assisted by its tanks and, above all, by its strong artillery, succeeded in gaining a foothold on Blodnitz Hill. Simultaneously a fresh squad of six tanks, using Ludwigs Hill as a starting point, moved first toward St. Etienne, then swerved toward Blodnitz Hill, passed the hill in a northerly direction, and finally showed by moving unhindered back and forth along the crest of the hill that the enemy was now in undisturbed possession of this important point.
Naturally, telephonic communication with the 1st Battalion, 149th Infantry, was completely disrupted as soon as the hostile artillery bombardment began. Not until 9:20 a.m. did the regiment receive the 8:00 o’clock report of the 1st Battalion, 149th, which complained above all about the insufficient artillery support. From 7:15 a.m. the regimental observation post had been subjected to a severe, well-directed fire and was now practically useless, so that it was difficult to get a clear, comprehensive view of the situation. Employing all possible means of communication, the regiment at first succeeded in getting a barrage fire from the batteries; and then the artillery headquarters took control. Despite all the efforts of the artillery liaison officer, it was soon proved that communication by means of mounted messengers, and later on even runners, was entirely too slow and insufficient. On this day too, many complaints were voiced concerning “shorts” of our own artillery.
At 7:30 a.m. an attempt was made to despatch to the 74th Reserve Infantry Regiment a written order instructing it to launch a counterattack on Blodnitz Hill. The man who took this order never returned; presumably he was killed. The 74th never received the order.
About this time the enemy launched a new rolling barrage that covered the entire width of the regimental sector between St. Etienne and Blodnitz Hill, where our companies were still holding their ground unshaken. The 4th Company, 149th, was now overwhelmed, but the other companies still held. The Jäger Company, in its sector at the cemetery west of the one held by the 3d Company, 149th, had yielded to strong enemy pressure, and as early as 7:00 a.m. had bent its line at right angles to the north, so that it now held the St. Etienne-Machault highway. This was the situation when, at 9:30 a.m., another strong tank attack—about ten tanks, followed by infantry—stormed against the sector of the 3d Company, 149th Infantry. This company under Lieutenant Wagner, brave beyond all praise, now faced this new blow and held its own, tenaciously clinging to its precious piece of ground. To assist this company, the 12th Company, 149th Infantry, (Lieutenant Böhm) located in the valley of Arnes brook, was shifted to the gully near the St. Etienne-Semide road. During the severe artillery bombardment that fell on the valley of the Arnes, this company had already suffered very considerable losses. In this extremely hard-pressed situation the 3d Company, 149th, held its own until 10:25 a.m., at which moment it fired away its last round of ammunition.
Repeated attempts had been made to bring relief to this company. The 12th Company, 149th, tried a counterattack in an easterly direction, past its sector, but lacked strength to get results. Every time the enemy, charging down from Blodnitz Hill, attempted to roll up their sector, his purpose was defeated by our artillery fire, especially that of our heavy machine guns located on the northern bank of the Arnes. These latter guns were commanded by Lieutenant Fink, who showed his usual coolness and eagerness to use his guns in action.
Toward 10:25 a.m. the last bulwark of our defense on the southern bank of the Arnes brook had fallen; the 3d Company, 149th, outflanked and stormed upon from the front, had fallen into the hands of the enemy after fighting to the last.
This report goes on to describe the organization of a defense on the northern bank of the Arnes, the counterattack of the 159th Infantry Regiment, and the subsequent advance of our own lines after this attack had been successful. It ends with the following praise of the activities of the 1st Battalion, 149th Infantry:
Like the 2d Battalion, 149th, in its fighting on Blanc Mont, so the 1st Battalion, 149th, has proved its splendid spirit on October 6 and 7 and especially on October 8. It has demonstrated anew the truth of the old principle, that the morale of the troops in a crisis depends upon the personality of their leader. These young company commanders, all of them in the rank of lieutenants, yet most of them already regarded as especially competent officers, have now practically without exception justified the confidence placed in them. The regimental command can but hope that all those who surrendered to a superior enemy after steadfast fighting to the last will receive the final recognition which they deserve.
Signed: Grundel
The report of the 2d Company, 18th Reserve Pioneer Battalion, given below affords us an especially lively picture of the isolated combats which occurred on this day:
The relief of the 2d Company from the front lines by the 2d and 4th Companies, 149th Infantry, was accomplished between 3:00 and 4:00 o’clock in the morning. After its relief, the company was designated to be billeted in the vicinity of the Support Battalion—3d Battalion, 149th Infantry, in the Gottorp depression as the divisional reserve. While at 6:00 a.m. the commander, 3d Battalion, 149th, was conversing with the company commander, 2d Company, 18th Pioneers, in regard to further moves, the enemy suddenly launched his drumfire. The company was immediately instructed to occupy the strip of woods in the northwest corner of Map Square 1047 and to block the ravine that leads in the direction of St. Etienne. At a point half-left of our own sector was located the 3d Machine-Gun Company, 149th Infantry Regiment, echeloned in depth, which was to hinder the enemy’s crossing of Arnes brook.
When the company commander again returned to his men a severe box barrage was being laid on the hill crest forward of Gottorp depression. Despite the very heavy bombardment the company succeeded in moving to the designated edge of the woods in a southwesterly direction. Here the men immediately began entrenchments, which were designed for protection against both ground and air observation. Meanwhile the hostile artillery bombardment had reached its culminating point. The use of fog bombs indicated the nearness of the infantry attack.
At 6:45 a.m. the first hostile tanks were observed to be moving in the direction of then German soldiers’ cemetery outside of St. Etienne. On account of the fog, it was impossible to determine their actual number. Upon their approach to the Fourth Main Line of Resistance, two tanks were brought to a halt by a direct hit of either a trench mortar or cannon. The hostile infantry did not immediately follow these tanks. The first Americans appeared at 7:10 a.m. in the west and on the west slope of Blodnitz Hill, and at once continued their advance until they reached the outposts of the Fourth Main Line of Resistance. Simultaneously from five to six tanks detached themselves from the shadow of the strips of woods in Map Squares 1347/48 and moved north in the direction of St. Etienne, but when near the village swerved, passed in a northerly curve around Blodnitz Hill, and again disappeared at the eastern edge of this hill. An hour later three tanks rolled back and forth on the crest of Blodnitz Hill, as if on parade.
Repeating his severe artillery preparation once more, the enemy about 7:30 a.m. penetrated our lines in the Fourth Main Line of Resistance. At 8:05 a.m. the first of them were seen in the strips of woods on Blodnitz Hill; they were Frenchmen. Twenty-five minutes later there debouched from the strip of woods in Map Square 1148 the garrison of Blodnitz Hill, supposedly remnants of the 2d Battalion, 368th Infantry Regiment. Sharp machine-gun fire from the strip of woods opposite soon blocked every line of retreat. A number of men who attempted to escape were shot down. The rest were captured and taken off on the reverse slope.
At 9:30 a.m. the last remnants of the valiant 1st Battalion, 149th Infantry, withdrew their lines across Arnes brook and sought protection behind the lines of the 3d Machine-Gun Company. Here the battalion was in contact on the right with the 4th Reserve Jäger Battalion, located east and west of the St. Etienne-Machault road. As the retreating men failed to halt in the fairly safe positions of the 3d Machine- Gun Company, the company commander of the 2d Company, 18th Reserve Pioneer Company, hurried toward the troops, who were completely disorganized and bewildered, in order to bring them to a halt. He first succeeded in halting the yielding right flank at the St. Etienne- Machault highway, most of the men being members of the 4th Reserve Jäger Battalion. He then divided them into two platoons and gave the command to an acting officer of the Jägers and a vice sergeant major of the 368th Infantry Regiment. Because of the disadvantageous^ located firing field, the men made two more moves to the rear and were then halted. Thereupon entrenchment was ordered and begun.
In the depression that extends from the St. Etienne Pioneer Park to the southwestern tip of the Gottorp ravine, a block house or hut is located. Into this had squeezed a mob of from eighty to one hundred men, some infantrymen, some members of the machine-gun crews, others Jägers. This wildly confused intermixture typified the graveness of the situation. First of all non commissioned officers were picked out and the men divided into squads under their leadership. Then they were instructed to expand the lines from this block house to the left in the direction of the southern tip of the strip of woods located at the north edge of Map Square 1047. Lieutenant Haberland of the 1st Battalion, 149th Infantry, was ordered by the company commander, 2d Company, 18th Reserve Pioneer Battalion, to take command of the reorganized force, and carried out his duties with outstanding skill. The line was subsequently expanded as far as the edge of the woods.
Meanwhile Lieutenant Fink of the 3d Battalion, 149th Infantry, had started an effective machine-gun fire from the block house on the village of St. Etienne and the Pioneer Park, and thus foiled repeated attempts of the enemy to debouch from the village. This was probably about a quarter of an hour after the troops were brought to a halt. At this time a few shells of a medium caliber fell between St. Etienne and the position now held by our troops. So shattered and demoralized were the men that they could no longer be held, despite the most desperate measures of the officers. Slowly, but surely, our front crumpled.
It was quickly decided to withdraw the line of defense abreast of the position then occupied by the 2d Company, 18th Reserve Pioneer Battalion. With three machine guns, Lieutenant Fink covered the retreat from the block house. Meanwhile, the company commander, 2d Company, 18th Pioneers, had gone back to his men and taken all necessary measures to prevent the fleeing of the troops beyond the position which his own sector now formed. At the left, this was accomplished with almost complete success; at the right, however, the Jägers could not be brought to a halt, with the exception of a few men and a light machine gun, the latter under the command of Oberjäger Götzem, 2d Company, 24th Reserve Jäger Battalion, who with splendid devotion to duty held to their post, echeloned on the right flank. As the senior officer present, the commander of the 2d Company, 18th Reserve Pioneers, immediately took over the command of all troops then located in his sector and with them formed a battalion, dividing it into three companies reënforced with light and heavy machine guns, and distributing the officers among these units. The task was thus accomplished of establishing an effective line of defense with a strong right flank. During these critical hours, Lieutenants Fink and Haberland demonstrated a quite outstanding courage and devotion to duty.
At 10:30 a.m. thick lines of American riflemen, descending Blodnitz Hill, advanced in attack in the direction of St. Etienne. Simultaneously the first patrols showed themselves at points north of Arnes brook west of St. Etienne. Our artillery fire, requested to be placed on Arnes brook and St. Etienne, was well directed, and the attack was not carried further forward. The enemy entrenched at a point approximately one hundred meters south of the St. Etienne-Semide road but continued to reënforce his lines.
Between twelve o’clock noon and three o’clock in the afternoon the northwest tip of Map Square 1047 was three or four times subjected to a lively harassing fire by our own field batteries which fired from the direction of the northeast tip of Gottorp ravine. No response was registered to our signals: “Shift your fire forward,” and “Caution; our lines located here.” Twice portions of the position had to be evacuated. It was only with great difficulty that our officers finally succeeded in leading their men back into the position, for their fighting spirit had much deteriorated under the ordeals of the day. Despite the despatch of repeated patrols, it was impossible to establish contact with the forces on our right, though some of our men were seen moving back and forth in the woods around the north corner of Map Square 1046. It was presumed that these men were advanced patrols who, by the time the patrols from this sector had approached their location, had already gone back to their own lines. On the left flank, contact with the neighboring troops, which were elements of the 74th Reserve Infantry Regiment, was established by Patrol Officer Christiansen.
At 5:45 p.m. the 159th Infantry Regiment launched its counterattack on our left. On our right the 14th Jäger Regiment had been ordered to participate, but up to 6:00 p.m. had not yet got under way. According to reports gathered during the day, it appeared that the enemy had thrown strong masses of troops into St. Etienne. Without being assisted by the 14th Jäger Regiment, the right flank of the 159th Infantry Regiment ran a great risk of being enveloped and rolled up by means of a hostile counterattack from the village of St. Etienne. With this exigency in mind, Battalion Commander Böhnke at 6:10 p.m. planned and carried out an attack that accompanied the one of the 159th Infantry Regiment and was protected by it on the left flank. The position which the 3d Machine-Gun Company, 149th Infantry, had held during the forenoon was recaptured. Having arrived here, the troops paused to regain their breath. The 159th Infantry Regiment, whose attack objective was located somewhat diagonally away from the one of Battalion Commander Böhnke, had already begun to advance past it. By this time the Jägers were also seen advancing with their left flank on the Machault-St. Etienne road. The line of attack of the Jägers was in a southerly direction, that of the 159th Infantry southwesterly. Following exactly in their given directions, and taking into account the remaining distance still to be covered, it was estimated that the flanks of the 14th Jägers and the 159th Infantry Regiment would be in contact before they reached the village. The danger that threatened the right flank of the 159th was thus removed. This eliminated the necessity for a further attack by the 213th Infantry Division, and orders for it were therefore rescinded.
Having reached an agreement with the battalion commander, 2d Battalion, 159th, Captain Neumann, the troops were withdrawn into their lines of departure. Only three machine guns under the command of Lieutenant Fink remained at the block house as a boundary detachment between the 159th and 14th Jägers.
After the arrival of the 7th Company, 159th, and in accordance also with the arrangement with Captain Neumann, these two guns too, were designated to withdraw to their line of departure. Relief and regrouping followed later that same night.
Signed: Böhnke
Lieutenant of Reserve and Company Commander.
Here is the order which the commanding general, 213th Infantry Division, forwarded at 1:27 p.m. to the 37th Reserve Infantry Brigade:
At present it is a matter of primary importance to halt the advance of the enemy north and northeast of St. Etienne. No one has the right to yield voluntarily one single foot of ground.
Major General Weidener, commanding general of the 195th Infantry Division, at 2:10 p.m., issued orders as follows:*
1. The enemy is now in the act of advancing from St. Etienne and points farther east in a northerly direction. With the forces now available to him, Lieutenant Colonel Riesenthal will immediately launch a counterattack. The 5th Jäger Battalion is hereby ordered to connect with this attack on its right flank. The right flank of the 5th Jägers will move along the Cauroy-St. Etienne road; the left flank of the attack groups will move in the direction of Blodnitz Hill. Reserves will be located behind the left flank. In order to prevent a penetration by the enemy in the direction of Machault, the lines will be advanced as far as possible.
* See Appendix V
2. The 6th Jäger Battalion will continue under its former instructions: “protection of Hohenzollern Hill.”
3. The 260th Field Artillery Regiment, with every piece available will assist this attack.
4. Three battalions of the 3d Guard Infantry Division will be brought to the lines in the vicinity south of Machault via trucks.
The following report is made by the 14th Jäger Regiment regarding the execution of this operation:
For the purposes of a concentrated attack, the 5th Jäger Battalion east of the Cauroy-St. Etienne road, the 15th Jäger Battalion west of the Machault-St. Etienne road, and the 22d Reserve Jäger Battalion, were placed under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Riesenthal. Two battalions of the 159th Infantry Regiment were ordered to connect with this attack from a northeasterly direction, advancing toward Blodnitz Hill. The enemy was to be pushed back into St. Etienne and contact was to be established between the battalions in a position north of that village. This counterattack got under way after a brief artillery preparatory fire on St. Etienne and Blodnitz Hill. Soon afterward, increasing darkness prevented the continuance of the attack against village and hill.
Complying with an order of Group Py which was issued at 6:30 p.m., the 195th Infantry Division at 8:20 p.m. ordered the following: (See Map X.)
- After accomplishment of the counterattack which will end with the recapture of the Fourth Main Line of Resistance, the 14th Jäger Regiment will remain employed in lines and have contact with the 8th Jäger Regiment, holding a line that extends as far as Blodnitz Hill. The elements of the 213th Infantry Division now located in the sectors of these two regiments will be withdrawn and placed in support southeast of Machault.
- The 8th and 14th Jäger Regiments will come temporarily under the command of the 213th Infantry Division. It is contemplated that, on the evening of October 9, the 195th Infantry Division will take over the command of these two regiments etc.
- After termination of the counterattack, the 5th Jäger Battalion will be relieved by the 14th Jäger Regiment and withdrawn. The 2d Reserve Jäger Battalion will not be relieved and withdrawn by Group Langer before the night of October 9 to 10. Until 5:00 p.m., October 9, the 6th Jäger Regiment (minus its 2d Reserve Jäger Battalion) will remain in support south of Hohenzollern Hill on both sides of the St. Etienne-Machault road as the Army Reserve.
- The commanding officer of the infantry will be charged with establishment of a machine-gun blockade on Hohenzollern Hill within the sectors of the 8th and 14th Jäger Regiments. For this purpose, he will have at his disposal the two machine-gun companies of the 6th Jäger Battalion.
But how did it come about that the 2d Reserve Jäger Battalion had to be employed in lines in the sector of the 242d Infantry Division of Group Langer ? The answer is that the left neighbor of the American 2d Division, the French 7th Infantry Division, had also launched an attack at this point. Of this, the 242d Infantry Division reports as follows (See Map W):
The enemy attacked just as we had expected him to. After a half hour of drumfire suddenly begun on the infantry lines, the enemy attacked with strong forces at 6:30 a.m. in the sector of this division. In the sector of the 475th Infantry Regiment, this attack was repulsed with heavy losses for the enemy. By the 127th Infantry Regiment it was recognized at once—as soon as the hostile troops had concentrated—and, under our immediately commencing and well-directed artillery and machine-gun fire, it never even developed.
The left flank of the 127th and the sector of the 476th Infantry Regiments were attacked by the enemy with especially strong forces, aided by tanks. After a stubborn encounter the right flank of the 476th was forced back a distance of some 1,200 meters, as a result of which the connecting left flank of the 127th had to be also withdrawn somewhat to the northeast. At about 10:20 a.m. our counterattack, scheduled to be launched automatically, came under way. It was assisted by the 3d Battalion, 127th, which was located behind the left flank of the sector of the 127th. During the first few minutes this attack made fairly good progress. But, when at about twelve o’clock noon the enemy, again employing strong forces, repeated his attacks against the 2d Battalion, 127th, located on the left flank of this regiment, our own counterattack came gradually to a halt.
At 9:55 a.m. the 56th Infantry Regiment of the 14th Infantry Division was ordered to immediately close up and fill the gap of some three hundred meters that had sprung up between the 127th and 476th Regiments as a result of their withdrawal. It was further ordered that the 16th Infantry Regiment, in its old combat zone, was to move close behind the Reserve Battalion of the 127th Infantry.
At 10:00 a.m. the 242d Infantry Division took over the command in the former sector of the 14th Infantry Division.
A hostile attack at about twelve o’clock noon, directed chiefly against the breakage in the lines on that portion of the sector that lies in Map Square 1143, was unsuccessful. Meanwhile, the 127th Infantry, energetically assisted by the elements of the 16th Infantry Regiment which had come up, again succeeded in getting its counterattack under way and completely regained our former lines within the main line of resistance. On this occasion, fifty-one members of the French 103d and 265th Infantry Regiments were brought in as prisoners.
The 476th Infantry Regiment, assisted by elements of the 56th Infantry Regiment, likewise renewed its counterattack and succeeded in advancing its lines for a distance of 150-200 meters to the east. But after it had covered this distance, it encountered strong resistance and came to a stop.
The counterattack of the 2d Reserve Jäger Battalion, which had attacked simultaneously with the 467th Infantry, advanced fairly speedily and terminated its attack after it had added to its sector 400 meters’ width of an intended switch position immediately behind the main line of resistance. The commanding officer of the 6th Jäger Regiment now ordered his battalion to discontinue its advance and instead to echelon in depth as otherwise the right flank of the 6th Jäger Regiment might become exposed and too much endangered.
Toward 4:00 p.m. a severe harassing fire fell on the sector of the 213th Infantry Division, subsequently shifting to the left flank of the 476th Infantry. However, our artillery immediately delivered a well-directed, very effective bombardment and the attack never developed.
The 476th Infantry had suffered very heavy casualties. It was ordered that, beginning at 6:00 a.m. October 9, the 476th was to recapture its portion of the main line of resistance. The badly depleted 2d Battalion, 476th, was concentrated behind the sector of the 3d Battalion. One battalion of the 16th Infantry was placed at the disposal of the 56th Infantry Regiment as reënforcements. The 57th Infantry Regiment was placed immediately behind the sector of the 56th Infantry. Lieutenant Colonel Schwab was placed in command of these counterattacks.
Let us now consider the efforts of the Germans in defending their positions against the attacks of the right neighbor of the American 2d Division.
In the sector of the 17th Infantry Division and on the right flank of the 203d Infantry Division, the enemy, penetrating our main line of resistance, advanced west of the highway to some seven hundred meters farther north. East of the highway, in the Johann-Albrecht-Mulde (depression) and Herzogsgrund, he also gained ground. After a combat of frequently changing issue, the 75th Infantry Regiment, fighting on the right flank of the 17th Division, succeeded in recapturing a substantial portion of the Fourth Main Line of Resistance. The 89th Grenadier and the 409th Infantry Regiments, assisted by elements of the 1st Bavarian Infantry Division, also launched counterattacks. During the forenoon the 406th Infantry Regiment repulsed two strong attacks directed against the Orfeuil-Berlin Hill line, and inflicted severe losses on the enemy.
At about 4:00 p.m. a new drumfire commenced falling on points on both sides of the boundary line separating the sectors of the 17th and 203d Infantry Divisions. The 406th Infantry again warded off enemy attacks.
Thus by the courage of the German regiments the major attacks of six hostile divisions were warded off. According to statements of prisoners, these divisions had placed cavalry divisions in readiness as close behind the front as Sommepy, whose mission was to utilize the expected penetration of our lines.
The statements we have obtained from American sources coincide precisely, as we have seen, with those on the German side. The only discrepancy we discover in the American narrative is the omission of the major counterattacks launched by the 195th Infantry Division, by which the lines of the American 142d Infantry Regiment were pushed back to a certain extent. On the contrary, this withdrawal of the American lines is represented to have been a voluntary one, accomplished merely because desired for special reasons. There is, however, complete agreement on the point that St. Etienne, as a result of a severe artillery bombardment, was evacuated by the Americans of their own accord; for, as we see in the German reports, the counterattack of our troops was halted before it reached the town.
(To be concluded in the next issue)