(October 2 to October 10, 1918)
I sit here at my desk, bent upon giving an impartial account of how the German Positions at Sommepy were captured by the French after tenacious encounters, were then occupied by the American 2d Division, and how subsequently the combats around the Blanc Mont developed. As if by magic, my glance is drawn to a white-framed picture on the desk. To my mind returns a vision of the days when we were constructing dugouts in the Sommepy sector. Frequently chips were broken loose from the chalk-limestone which formed the lower stratum. Out of this stone, easily carved with a pocket knife, our men during off- h.ours cut small souvenirs, such as frames, ink blotters, ash trays, etc., for the people at home. When, back in 1916, I was in lines with my battalion—the 1st Battalion, 184th Infantry Regiment—at Sommepy, my servant carved this frame which I now behold out of the same limestone that, incidentally, gave Blanc Mont, or the White Mountain, its name. Presumably, Amen- Fan soldiers in October of 1918 likewise during lulls in the fighting carved similar souvenirs for their loved ones from the limestone of Sommepy, and also, astonishment in their eyes, inspected the many casemate-like, bomb-proof dugouts with their numerous exits and subterranean passages, designed to shelter entire companies, which were hewn into the limestone of the hills south of Py brook.
From the German point of view, the battle at the Blanc Mont represents a portion of the defensive battle in the Champagne and Meuse sectors between September 26 and November 11, 1918. For the Americans, this battle was a part of the Meuse-Argonne offensive which was in turn one of the important steps in the tremendous general attack of the Allies beginning on September 26, 1918, along our entire front, from the Swiss border to the North Sea.
One must know, in order to understand these combats clearly, what had been the aims of the German Higher Command hitherto, and what decisions it had reached at this time.
About the close of 1917, the German Higher Command had decided to bring the warfare in the west to a climax during the coming spring, in other words, before the entrance of the United States might be felt on the Western Front. With its sweeping offensives, the "Great Battle in France" (March 21 to April 6, 1918), the "Battles at Armentieres and around Kemmel Hill" (April 9 to April 29, 1918), as well as the Chemin des Dames Offensive, the "Battle at Soissons and Rheims" (May 27 to June 13, 1918),1 Germany had indeed attained tremendous successes, but had not yet struck a decisive blow. For the future, the Higher Command still held fast to its policy of controlling the enemy's decisions by a continued German offensive. It desired, before substantial forces of the American Army became engaged, to launch a mighty blow in Flanders in the direction of Poperinghe-Cassel, starting from the Ypres—Vieux Berquin line, in order to penetrate the north flank of the British troops, push these and the Belgians against the North Sea coast, and thus force them to enter peace negotiations. Before launching this project, however, it was the belief that still another feint attack was needed, to draw the French reserves from behind the British front. This operation was what is known as the "Offensive at the Marne and in the Champagne," July 15 to 17, 1918.
This offensive was a failure. In an endeavor to ward off the attack following immediately in the woods of Villers-Cotterets by the French General Mangin (July 18, 1918), the Higher Command had to employ part of the reserves it had held ready for the great Flanders offensive. Following upon the fact that during the fighting at Soissons and Rheims, the Allies' casualty list had exceeded the Germans' by 47,192 killed, wounded, and missing, our Higher Command received information that during the second battle at the Marne the losses of the Allies were again greater by 42,065. This total excess of 89,257 killed, wounded, and missing in itself would have represented a giant victory over the allied French and British, had their losses not been compensated by the appearance at the front of fresh American divisions. Germany, on the other hand, was in no way able to replace the casualties her own divisions had suffered. Now, on July 20, 1918, the Higher Command was obliged to abandon its plan of an offensive in Flanders, and turn completely to the defensive.
In the German Army, the World War had brought common acceptance of the principle that, during defensive operations, it was generally less important to hold any piece of terrain than to inflict heavy losses on the enemy for its possession. At any rate, in the situation then existing the possession of any particular line no longer played a very important role. But it was essential that by every possible means the defensive should be so conducted as to inflict ever increasing losses on the enemy, so that, to avoid further bloodshed, they might offer Germany an acceptable peace. Hence the German Army, from July 20, 1918, no longer fought for final victory, but simply to secure for the Fatherland an endurable peace.
Not a thing was left undone by the German Higher Command to prevent a catastrophe and to spare its heroic troops, always willing to sacrifice their lives, an ignominious defeat such as we ourselves had forced upon the French in 1870 at Sedan, and upon the Russians in 1914 at Tannenburg. Even if not everything could be attained in the political field, it was essential that our troops should be able to march back into the Fatherland with their heads proudly held high, conscious that they had remained undefeated in the field.
With these conditions in mind, the Higher Command on September 6, 1918, ordered the Hunding-Brunhild-Argonne position to be fully completed for occupation by the Group of Armies of the German Crown Prince.
For a strategic retreat between the Oise and Argonne, a plan, the so-called "Gudrun Operation," had since 1917 been worked out in all details. It was essential, for further continuation of warfare, that the Higher Command be assured of the possibility of carrying out this scheduled plan.
Since the offensives of the year 1918 had somewhat changed the general aspect of the situation, it developed that the Gudrun Operation had to be worked over accordingly. Fortunately then, it was not too late when, on September 23, 1918, the Group of Armies of the German Crown Prince was able to issue orders for a revised Gudrun Operation which regulated a systematic retreat before an overwhelming attack, such as we were, on September 26, to be subjected to. The details and instructions, insofar as they are of any interest to us, are shown on Map A.
Provisions were made to enable the 7th, 1st, and 3d Armies, provided the strategic situation should demand such action, to retreat within three marching days into the Hunding-Brunhild-Argonne position. This sector extended along the line Grécy sur Serre-Vesles-Sissonne-St. Quentin-Rethel- Amagne—Alland Huy—Mouron—Autry—Condé—Very, tion, utilizing, in its most important portion, the Aisne sector.
These orders presented a definite scheme for a large-scale "withdrawal from contact with the enemy"; at the same time, the Crown Prince's Armies most emphatically retained the power of decision as to the length of time allotted for the defense of the separate sectors. The instructions, issued on September 30, 1918, from the Group of Armies of the German Crown Prince were as follows:
- Forward of the Hunding-Brunhild position as far as Mouron, troops on fronts where heavier enemy attacks may be expected will in general, retreat. The retreat requires previous authorization by the High Command. Any officer who, upon his own responsibility, retreats with his troops in combat without previous permission by higher authorities, will be required to account for his actions.
- In preparation and execution, each separate retreat will be considered a special problem as part of the Gudrun Operation. All practical and theoretical Gudrun preparatory details will be evaluated. Taken together, all the retreat operations will gradually lead to the Hunding-Brunhild position. There will be contact at points east of Mouron with the forward positions of the 3d and 5th Armies. Utilizing all available means, these positions will be maintained and fortified as so-called permanent positions.
- On fronts where at present the troops are engaged in major combat, the battle for the possession of the foremost combat zone will be continued. As soon as a pause occurs, provided the sector heretofore the subject of combat offers no prospect for future profitable defense, a recommendation will be submitted regarding contemplated future operations. In all cases it must be considered whether or not a too early withdrawal of the front lines will not suggest to the enemy an opportune moment for resuming his attacks on a still larger scale.
- Each retreat movement will be utilized to inflict heavy enemy losses wherever possible, even by counterattacks of the most unimportant nature. Only by following this method will it be possible to guard the troops against the moral dangers of retreat and hold them firmly in hand.
- The retreat movements for withdrawals from sector to sector will be prepared in such a manner as to allow their execution within one night provided orders pertaining thereto are issued by 9:00 A.M. prior to the night on which the retreat is to take place.
These instructions are directly responsible for the characteristic aspect of the defensive combats between October 2 and October 11, 1918, which we here review.
At 11:00 P.M., September 25, 1918, the enemy launched a severe surprise fire of all calibers on the entire front of Group Py (Corps Headquarters, 12th Army Corps); at dawn, the hostile infantry, under the protection offered by a destruction fire of tremendous volume, aided by fog, entered the outpost area. This was the attack made by the French 11th and 21st Corps. After vicious encounters that lasted until September 30, 1918, they succeeded in forcing the German divisions from the hills south of the Py brook to the hills to the north of the valley. However, our right flank, located in the vicinity of Marie-à-Py, was able to hold its own.
THE FIRST DAY OF OCTOBER
(See Map B)
An attack against the western portions of the position, which was launched on October 1, was repulsed. While he failed here, the enemy, in an attack made during the afternoon with utmost energy, and with the assistance of armored cars, succeeded in capturing Py Hill northeast of Sommepy. This situation is clearly shown on Map B of 9:00 P.M., October 1.
In estimating the situation of September 29, the Higher Command made the following statement:
On September 27, American and French troops launched a major attack on a broad front between Verdun and Rheims. Continuation of the attack is to be expected. Numerous French and American reserves have been moved behind the front for this purpose. Among the American reserves here we find that there are as yet only four divisions all of which have previously been on the front. However experience proves that even new American divisions are being inserted in the lines to participate in major attacks alongside more experienced and trained troops. Consequently, the advent at the front of the ten additional American divisions, already suspected of being in France, but not yet in appearance, must be reckoned with.
It would be proper to mention here that, after Bulgaria had on September 28 entered into armistice negotiations with the Entente, the German Higher Command on September 29 also demanded of its government an offer for armistice and peace negotiations.
The commanding general of the 12th Army Corps, General of Cavalry Krug von Nidda, on October 1, 1918, gave the following estimate of the situation:
The main stress of the hostile offensive is clearly recognizable as lying between the Sommepy and St. Etienne road and Aure-Semide and will continue to be exerted on that point. The numerous reserves which have crossed the eastern basin of the Py brook in a northerly direction in an uninterrupted flow throughout the day as well as the great number of tanks hitherto unemployed in the line which have disappeared from support positions, leave no doubt that, on October 2, a hostile attack is to be expected in the same combat zone and that it will be at least as severe as yesterday's attack. It can only be warded off if the long and unfavorably located front line is reinforced by fresh forces which could be placed in support in the line that extends from the south Slope of Schlesier Hill to the northwest edge of Rheinischer Grund at the boundary line between the sectors of the 7th and 15th Bavarian Infantry Divisions. The forces of the Group are at present insufficient to properly accomplish this operation, despite the switch position that has been thrown up between Helenen Hill and the southern corner of the Third Main Line of Resistance, the establishment of which was forced upon the command after the combat strength of the 51st Reserve and the Bavarian Infantry Divisions had melted to almost negligible qualities.
There was no attack launched against the sector of Group Langer on October 1, but at about 10:00 A.m., the 42d Infantry Division of Group Perthes repulsed an attack.
At 8:40 P.M. Group Py ordered the following for October 2:
The 200th Infantry Division, 15th Bavarian Division, and 3d Guard Infantry Division will maintain their positions; the 7th Infantry Division will withdraw its lines as far as the line of Tor Hill—along the main line of resistance as far as Altona—Mulde—Stallmulde—the strong point at the east slope of the Helenen Hill. The outpost area will extend as far as the Second Main Line of Resistance.
During the night, all units of the 199th and 203d Infantry Divisions will withdraw from the lines. Those of the 199th Infantry Division will concentrate in compliance with orders of the division; those of the 203d Infantry Division will occupy a support position in the following order: the 406th Infantry Regiment at Orfeuil, the 409th Infantry Regiment at Médeah Hill, the 410th Infantry Regiment at Bémont Ferme.
The relief of the 7th Infantry Division by the 51st Ersatz Division, and the Guard Fusilier Regiment of the 3d Guard Infantry Division by one regiment of the 199th Infantry Division, will be carried out during the night.
The boundary between the 7th Infantry and 15th Bavarian Infantry Divisions is traced as follows: Fuchsgrund—Torholz—Steinberg—Bemont Ferme road.
Support troops: Guard Fusilier Regiment behind the right flank of the 3d Guard Infantry Division.
The boundary between above division and the 15th Bavarian Infantry Division is as follows: west slope of Schanze—center of Berliner Hill—d of the word "Sperlingsgrund-Damm" on Schneisen ridge.
During the night of October 1 to 2, a severe heavy-caliber harassing fire was laid on the roads and villages and camps in the rear. The German artillery replied energetically with harassing fire on hostile troop concentrations and support areas.
At 2:30 A.M. Corps Headquarters ordered the following:
The 7th Infantry Division will be transported to the sector of Group Langer as soon as possible, and will be billeted there. This division will place an assault group in support at the Blanc Mont. This order will be executed by 5:00 A.M., October 2.
Early in the morning the relief of the 7th Infantry Division was completed, the 51st Reserve Division taking over the former's sector.
THE SECOND DAY OF OCTOBER
(See Map C)
This was the situation on the German front when, at 9:00 A.M., October 2, the American 2d Division took over the sector in which it had relieved the French 61st Division during the preceding night. The 2d Division was under the command of the French 21st Corps, which in turn was a part of the French 4th Army. In the front lines the 4th Brigade was employed in the following order: 5th Marine Regiment at the right, 6th Marine Regiment at the left. The 3d Brigade (consisting of the 9th and 23d Infantry Regiments), remained in reserve south of Navarin Ferme. The artillery of the French 61st Infantry Division remained in lines. It had been reenforced by the artillery of the 2d Division and placed under the latter's command.
The American 2d Division formed the left flank of the French 21st Army Corps. It was framed in on its left by the French 21st Infantry Division of the French 11th Corps, on its right by the French 170th Infantry Division of the 21st Corps. However, during the night of October 2 to 3, this latter division was relieved by the 67th Infantry Division.
In reviewing these daily battles, I will consider the events on the American side according to the sources available to me. They are "Monograph 9: 'Blanc Mont'," obtained from the Historical Branch, War Plans Division, General Staff, of June, 1921, and "Summary of Operations, 2d Division" (plus 71st Brigade, 36th Infantry Division, Meuse-Argonne Operation, October 2 to 9, 1918), published by the American Battle Monuments Commission. This will be followed by a characterization of the German side built up with the aid of war diaries, combat reports, orders, messages, etc. This latter source material is substantially more copious as is shown by the following brigade order of the commander of the 102d Reserve Infantry Brigade, which participated in the combats, issued on October 8:
The high importance of future war-historical records makes it the duty of all officers, immediately after the termination of combat activities, to work up the war diaries so diligently that the graphic descriptions, the inspection and perusal of material upon which final compilations are based, and the establishment of lists, shall be completed before new troops are employed in the sectors in question. The fresher the impression, the better and more dependable will be the presentation.
In further instructions he adds this:
Save everything. Save every scrap of paper that is seemingly unimportant, every notice, every word, even the most insignificant-looking piece of paper as long as it has even a remote bearing upon the phases of combat. During combat activities the staffs will at all times, whenever a favorable opportunity offers itself, send all reports, orders, sketches, etc., to the rear when they are no longer needed at the front. Otherwise, much valuable material will be lost; moreover, they are an unnecessary burden.
In this account I will use Central European time. The Americans used Western European Standard time. The difference is exactly one hour: 9:00 A.M., as stated here, is 8:00 A.M. according to the American original reports.
The combined American-French attack was scheduled to be launched as early as October 2, 1918, but had been postponed to the following day. The American 2d Division on this day was confronted only with the problem of forcing the Germans out of their outpost positions, which extended north of Sommepy as far as the same trench which further to the eastward was held by the Americans. As we have already seen, the 7th Infantry Division had received orders to withdraw its lines as far as Tor Hill—Third Main Line of Resistance—Helenen Hill during the same night, so that the Americans were consequently able to occupy the former German outpost position without encountering resistance. Its left neighbor, the French 21st Infantry Division, was still considerably to the rear of the Americans. The right neighbor of the 2d Division, the French 170th Infantry Division, however, had had a series of important battles. We must review them because they are of substantial importance in giving a clear picture of the situation that prevailed on October 3.
At 10:45 A.M. Group Py issued the following order to the 203d Infantry division:
The following regiments will be shifted: The 409th Infantry Regiment will be moved into the area between Schlesier Hill and Medeah Hill; the 410th Infantry Regiment will be moved into the area between Medeah Hill and Steinberg. The elements of the 406th Infantry Regiment still located at the Schanze will be withdrawn and placed in the strips of woods north of Jiiterbog depression; the last battalion of this regiment with its accompanying battery will remain at Orfeuil.
Thereafter, the group ordered that the 203d Infantry Division relieve the 15th Bavarian Infantry Division and the left flank of the 51st Reserve Division (as far as the highway), during the night of October 2 to 3. This relief was to be carried out while an attack, designed to recapture the positions between Tor Hill and Schanze, lost the day before, was still under way. The attack was scheduled to be launched at 5:00 P.M. The elements of the 15th Bavarian and 51st Reserve Divisions then still in lines were not to participate.
However, shortly after 11:00 A.M. the enemy, which, of course, was the French 170th Infantry Division, attacked the front from the Rheinischer Grund as far as Breiter Rucken (broad ridge) which was held by the 15th Bavarian and 3d Guard Infantry Divisions, launching at the same time a bombardment of drum-fire proportions. Employing strong forces, the enemy succeeded in entering our lines and forcing our troops back on Steinberg-Orfeuil and even beyond the long depression. Strong hostile bombing squadrons participated in the action.
It was now evident that it had become impractical to withdraw the 406th Infantry Regiment from the weakly occupied Schanze. Acting upon the report that the enemy had entered our lines at the Schanze and points west thereof, and was in the act of approaching Orfeuil, Group Py at 1:20 P.M. ordered the 203d Infantry Division to form for and immediately launch the attack that had been scheduled for 5:00 P.M.
During this attack the 409th Infantry Regiment, advancing from a line of departure on Steinberg, succeeded in recapturing the northern trench of the Bemont switch under a severe enemy artillery bombardment. The French could not be dislodged from the southern trench. The 410th Infantry Regiment was checked in its advance in the woods south of the Médéah Ferme, and was unable to advance properly; it had been ordered to recapture Tor Hill. From 2:10 P.M. on, the 406th Infantry Regiment fought at Orfeuil, the hostile infantry offering very little resistance. However, the casualties it had suffered during the advance through the hostile artillery barrage had been so heavy that this regiment, too, was unable to make any headway. Renewing its attacks, the 410th Infantry Regiment succeeded at 9:00 P.M. in capturing and maintaining Tor Hill.
This attack of the 203d Infantry Division coincided with a new French attack which, with the assistance of tanks, had been launched at 5:14 P.M. against the entire front of the 200th Infantry Division but which had been completely repulsed.
On this same day, October 2, furious attacks were launched around Liry Hill in the sector of Group Py which had been temporarily lost but which was then recaptured during a counterattack. Troops at the Liry Hill, Wittelsbacher Hill, and Flieger Hill warded off three serious hostile thrusts, and another final attack against Liry Hill was defeated after a desperate hand-grenade battle. As compared to these activities, things were almost completely quiet in the sector of Group Langer.
What was the combat value of the German troops at this time? In the evening of October 2, 1918, the 3d Guard Infantry Division reported the following:
The heavy losses, the superhuman demands placed on the physical capacities of the men during the past few days, have reduced the combat value of the division, not entirely satisfactory even before employment in lines, to a most dangerous degree. Physically and morally, the troops have now arrived at the extreme limit of their endurance. At the present time the trench strength of the division has shrunk to 350 men, who are holding a line two kilometers long. The division requests to be relieved.
The 200th Infantry Division submitted the following report of a battalion commander then in front lines:
I consider it my duty to call attention to the present condition of the troops. As a result of physical and mental exertions, the troops have grown apathetic and indifferent to such an alarming extent that I can no longer guarantee that, during a surprise attack, they will continue to hold the positions.
Regiments and brigades joined in this Opinion The commanding general, Krug von Nidda, reported to Headquarters, 3d Army:
This excellent division which, for the past ten days, has been uninterruptedly engaged in major combat and has so valiantly distinguished itself, has now reached the limit of its endurance and is urgently in need of relief.
With the 15th Bavarian and the 51st Reserve Divisions, things were still worse. More favorable was the verdict regarding the 213th Infantry Division:
Since the beginning of February this division has had no rest; the necessary training is consequently lacking. Nevertheless, the morale of the men of the regiments, consisting of Lower Saxonians and Pomeranians, is little short of excellent, their health condition satisfactory. There is no doubt but that the energy and strength of the troops have been severely taxed as a result of the continuous helter-skelter movements but at the same time the rifle strength of the separate battalions, even considering the casualties of the past few days, averages about 650 men of whom, however, a considerable portion are not fully trained.
The divisional commander bemoans the fact that his division has always been split up along the front:
If a division is employed in lines uniformly, under its own trusted leaders, and not at numerous points of the front at one time, its men will give their utmost and obey orders in spite of inadequate training. But its combat value may be substantially deteriorated if the practice of scattering organizations under strange leadership is continued and if the troops are thrown into combat only after constant movements have prematurely exhausted them.
That in the evening of October 1 men of the baggage trains had to be employed in lines, and that, at Blanc Mont, a Landsturm battalion consisting of old, poorly trained men who had hardly ever handled a gun, was also thrown into the breach, is shown on the map.
THE THIRD DAY OF OCTOBER
(See Maps D, E, F, and G, and Appendix I.)*
*All appendices to this article will be printed with the last installment, April, 1930. Appendix I shows the order of battle of the French Group of Armies Maistre.
We have now arrived at the day of the major combat, the third of October. On October 2, at 12:00 o'clock midnight, the 2d Division issued its attack orders, which the commander of the 4th Marine Brigade received at 5:40 A.M. The commanding officer of the 6th Marine Regiment, however, did not receive this attack order until the moment when it was necessary to form for the attack, as a result of which he was actually not able to read its contents until his troops had already reached their objective. The two brigades were employed abreast of each other, in the following order: the 3d Brigade at the right with the French 3d Tank Battalion, the 4th Brigade at the left, reinforced by the French 2d Tank Battalion. In each of the two brigades, one regiment advanced in the front lines, the other regiment followed in its wake as a reserve. The foremost regiment advanced in three attack waves, each wave consisting of one battalion.
The attack objective was the road leading from Médéah Hill to Blanc Mont.
The attack was assisted by the fire of the Field Artillery Brigade of the 2d Division, and the artillery of the French 61st Infantry Division as well as the French 252d Aviation Squadron.
It had been decided previously that the infantry was to launch its attack at 7:30 A.M. This hour, however, was advanced so that the attack actually got under way at 6:50 A.M. The artillery preparation had begun at 6:30 A.M.
On the line of departure it so happened that the 5th Marine Regiment was at the right and the 6th Marine Regiment, both of the 4th Marine Brigade, at the left. The latter was now ordered to attack first while the other regiment had to await its turn and then fell in behind the 6th Marine Regiment, whereby it shifted its direction of advance somewhat to the left. More difficulties were encountered by the 3d Brigade. From its position near Navarin Ferme, it had been ordered to reach its line of departure during the night. This, however, as no one knew, was still occupied by the Germans. The guides promised by the French 170th Infantry Division did not show up and consequently the brigade wandered about during the night until at about 4:00 A.M. it occupied a position that lay five hundred meters farther southeast of the Sommepy-Medeah Ferme road; indeed the 23d Infantry Regiment arrived at this point only just before the launching of the assault. When forming for the attack, a gap developed between the sectors of the two brigades of more than one kilometer's width—according to the map it is even two kilometers wide, which, however, was closed up as the two brigades advanced and later captured the remaining German outposts between the two lines.
In the sector of the 3d Brigade we find the 9th Infantry Regiment in lines, with the 23d Infantry Regiment in reserve. At the right, the assault was accompanied by the French 67th Infantry Division. The front-line regiment of the 3d Brigade and the 9th Infantry had in its first line the 1st Battalion, in the second line the 2d Battalion (support) and in the third the 3d Battalion (reserves). When, while forming for the attack, the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry, was subjected to artillery fire, it withdrew into the depressions to the left. The 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry, continued the attack in a straight line. The 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry, again approached the fighting line after progressing through the depression and thereupon both battalions, the 1st at the right and the 2d at the left, continued forward as front-line units. When, at 9:30 A.m., the first attack objective had been reached, the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry, took over the entire sub-sector of the brigade, and the 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry, was placed immediately behind as a support. At the left, contact was established with the 6th Marine Regiment; at the right with the French 167th Infantry Regiment.
As the 4th Brigade formed for the attack, we find that its right flank was located at the road crossing one kilometer northwest of Sommepy. In its front lines was the 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, with its machine-gun company and twelve light French tanks; with the 1st Battalion, same regiment, in the second line there were likewise twelve light French tanks and one machine-gun company, whereas the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines forming the third wave, had but one machine-gun company. The tanks were fired on by German machine-gun strong points, and checked in their advance, the strong points being located at the front and in the gap which at that time still existed between the two brigades. During the afternoon, the 4th Brigade and two companies of the 3d Brigade cleaned them out. While the 6th Marine Regiment was launching the attack with all its three battalions, the 5th Marine Regiment moved to the left into the sector evacuated by the former and followed in its wake, the 2d Battalion in the first, the 3d in the middle, and the 1st in the last attacking line.
During the forenoon, the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, had already been obliged to occupy a front facing west, where they were opposite the Germans at Blanc Mont. The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, now extended these lines to the left, and the 3d Battalion extended the lines of the 2d Battalion still further to the left, so that both battalions had fronts facing west.
After the 2d and 3d Battalions, 5th Marines, had formed for the attack, the 1st Battalion, which formerly had been in lines to the right of the 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, advanced along the Essen trench in a westerly direction. These battalions, during attacks in a northerly direction, had suffered severe casualties from the fire of the machine-gun strong point located on the left flank at the east spur of Helenen Hill, which the Americans had named "Essen Hook." This strong point, as well as a portion of the Blanc Mont sector, lay in the combat zone of the French 21st Infantry Division. This division, since 8:45 A.M., had vainly attacked the German positions at Marie-à-Py. To assist the French attack against this strong point, the 17th Company with one machine-gun platoon, one 37-mm. gun, and several tanks, now advanced from the east while the French attacked from the south. The 17th Company captured this strong point and evacuated it for the French who, in turn, again lost it during the afternoon. On this occasion the company captured one hundred prisoners. In the meantime the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, which had advanced in a northwesterly direction, had swerved completely over to the west and now extended the line of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, to the left. To this point eventually the 17th Company also moved, so that now the left-flank of the American west front was located approximately one kilometer north of the strong point.
As the attempt of the French 21st Infantry Division to advance against the German position had collapsed in its embryo stage under the German rifle and machine-gun fire, General Naulin, commanding general of the French 21st Army Corps, at 10:40 A.M. ordered the withdrawn French 170th Infantry Division to move into the rear of the combat zone of the American 2d Division and attack a line that extended from the west slope of Blanc Mont to the west slope of Sattelberg as far as the wooded terrain eight hundred meters northwest of the strong point. (See Appendix II.) With this project General Naulin seemingly hoped to release the 4th American Brigade for further attacks in a northerly direction. This French 170th Infantry Division during the afternoon obtained contact with the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, and the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, both of which at that time formed the flank protection of the American 2d Division.
Complying with orders of the French 21st Corps, the French 21st Division during the afternoon advanced a mixed detachment, consisting of troops of the 21st and 151st Infantry Divisions, in an easterly direction as far as the Bromberg trench with orders to continue their attack from this point in a westerly direction. During the night these detachments recaptured the Essen strong point and subsequently reached the southeast slope of the Sattelberg where they obtained contact with the American troops. Thus we find here, to the west, throughout the entire afternoon and the following night, a fairly reliable and compact line until the withdrawal of the 5th Marines caused a gap of about one and one-half kilometers' width. At 11:30 A.M. the American 2d Division had reached its objective and established sentries in the outpost area.
Before we review the second attack of the American 2d Division which was launched during the afternoon, let us see what measures were taken by the Germans during this period.
As the harassing fire during the night had attained considerable volume, Group Py at 2:00 A.M. ordered the withdrawal of the assault detachment of the 149th Infantry Regiment, 213th Infantry Division, to a support position at Medeah Hill, and soon thereafter also ordered to a support position the assault detachment of the 74th Reserve Infantry Regiment at the Bemont Ferme. (See Appendix III).
The American attack is pictured as follows:
At about 6:00 A.M. a rather strong fire fell on the terrain in the vicinity south of Orfeuil and the sector of the 51st Reserve Division. The bombardment soon spread out over the entire front of the group. Under its protection, strong hostile detachments and tanks formed for the attack and about 8:00 A.M. penetrated as far as Blanc Mont, reaching the south slopes of Schlesier Hill, Medeah Hill, Steinberg, and Berlin Hill. Against this penetration, the group in the course of the day employed all available forces.
It appears that the completely exhausted front-line battalions were overwhelmed by the American attack. On October 2, 1918, the combat strengths of the 235th Infantry Regiment were as follows: 1st Battalion, 5 officers and approximately 150 enlisted men; 2d Battalion, 7 officers, 41 non-commissioned officers, and 177 men; 3d Battalion, 7 officers, 32 non-commissioned officers, and 194 men. These include officers and men of the machine-gun companies, signaling platoons and battalion staffs.
As no reports from him have been made public, I will quote the report of the regimental commander, 235th Reserve Infantry Regiment, forwarded at 8:00 A.M. and submitted by means of messenger dog:
Assistance is urgently necessary. Line Schlesier Hill—Medeah Ferme has been lost. Situation in regard to enemy still unclear. However, it appears that now he is already facing this line.
I have also the report of the regimental commander, 235th Reserve Infantry Regiment, which, at 9:15 A.M., he forwarded to the 102d Reserve Infantry Brigade:
At 8:00 A.M. the enemy had possession of the crossroads on Medeah Hill; apparently he continues his advance east of the road. Schlesier Hill is now being subjected to serious attacks from an easterly direction. Within the line Schlesier Hill—halfway to Medeah Hill, there are located only the weak 1st and 4th Companies without a machine-gun company. It appears that at the present time this line is not holding its own. The regimental staff has shifted its command post to the vicinity of the western portion of the airport and here concentrates fleeing elements of troops. Enemy appears to be satisfied at present with the possession of Medeah Hill—Schlesier Hill line. At the moment, I have at my disposal no more than six squads of the 235th Infantry Regiment. Have had no more news regarding the fate of the 2d and 3d Battalions, this regiment. Assistance is nowhere to be seen.
(Signed) DOERSTLING
This report is supplemented by another which was despatched at 11:30 A.M.:
The 2d and 3d Battalions, 235th Reserve Infantry Regiment and the Pioneer Battalion, as well as the two companies, appear to have got away with only part of their forces. They have been scattered in a southwesterly direction among the strips of woods and cannot be found. Returned elements of the 1st and 4th Companies, as well as the 403d Pioneer Company, have been employed as a thin reserve line in the terrain west of the highway toward Sommepy in Map Square 1250. They possess no power of resistance. Thus far, no reinforcements have been put in action in the sector of the 235th Reserve Infantry Regiment. The battalion of the 74th Regiment which yesterday was still on Schlesier Hill apparently has marched off, since it was no longer on this spot at 6:00 o'clock this morning. The enemy followed with tanks as far as Schlesier Hill. The presence of men in yellow-brown uniforms has been ascertained there. I consider the continuation of the attack in the course of today possible, as the enemy, with the aid of his countless airplanes, must have ascertained our weakness. The artillery now within the regimental sector has been instructed to retreat, with all its batteries, behind the thin infantry lines. The artillery on Schlesier Hill appears to have been captured in part by the enemy.
(Signed) DOERSTLING
A very vivid picture of the American penetration on October 3 is given by the following combat report of the 2d Battalion, 74th Reserve Infantry Regiment:
During the night of October 1 to 2, this battalion received orders to march from Konigin Luise Lager [camp] to St. Etienne, at which point the assault echelon under the command of Major Streit was to concentrate. From here, the 5th and 7th Companies were branched off to Sattelberg for purposes of support and placed under the command of the 2d Jager Brigade, later on under the direct command of Captain Stoffeld. The regiment, with one platoon of pioneers and one detachment of field artillery, moved to the "R-2 Position" and in it prepared for the counterattack, with the 3d Battalion at the right of the St. Etienne—Sommepy road, occupying a front line five hundred meters long, and the 1st Battalion occupying a corresponding section at the left of the road. The remainder of the 2d Battalion was located at a point five hundred meters west of the road as far as the path that leads from the small woods 139 at the St. Etienne—Sommepy road across Sattelberg to Marie-a-Py. Designated a counterattack reserve, the regiment had been placed at the disposal of the 2d Jager Brigade; Half-Battalion Baudler was designated regimental reserve.
The second day of October was quiet. At 7:00 P.M. the regiment received orders to move, with its 1st and 3d Battalions, to Medeah Hill. Half-Battalion Baudler, reinforced by one platoon of the trench-mortar company, was ordered to remain where it was as a group reserve. The battalion despatched contact patrols to both flanks. To the right and forward there was a large gap, 750 meters wide. The very important Sommepy—St. Etienne road was now bared of troops as far as to the sector where the half-battalion was located. The latter therefore placed one and a half platoons of the 2d Machine-Gun Company on its left flank in order to protect this flank as well as the road.
Suddenly, at 1:00 A.M., October 3, the enemy delivered a severe harassing fire of medium and heavy caliber that fell on dugouts and trenches, especially on the Schwabenk Onig road fork, the fire at 5:00 A.M. increasing to heaviest preparatory fire, while subsequently smoke bombs were also used. All telephonic communication was at once interrupted, and flash signals were impossible because of the smoke. At about 7:00 A.M. the regimental commander, 149th Infantry Regiment, together with the staff, hurried forward and met the commanding officer of the 2d Machine-Gun Company, from whom he obtained information regarding the situation of the battalion and to whom he, in turn, promised assistance of two additional battalions. Unfortunately, this assistance came too late. Even two runners of the regimental staff, 149th Infantry Regiment, despatched with a report for the commanding officer of the half-battalion, encountered dense masses -of Americans on the Blanc Mont—Schwabenkonig road and were unable to carry out their mission.
The 5th and 7th Companies had received orders to launch their counterattack independently if necessary. Men authorized to receive and transmit orders and messages were with Captain Stoffeld under whose command the companies had been placed toward night, as well as with the 2d Jager Brigade. They had been billeted much more comfortably than the men of the half-battalion. There were, even if in insufficient numbers, dugouts available, which at the other sector were missing. Here at about 7:00 A.M. the noise of combat coming from the front lines was audible and orders were issued to occupy the positions. Hardly was the last man at his post when the enemy became visible, urging our men to surrender by waving at them. They had overrun the foremost lines with almost no resistance. Our machine-gun fire, which was launched at once in compliance with orders, brought their advance to a halt. But now the Americans, with the machine guns they had speedily brought into position, opened a furious fire that combed along the surface of the trench parapets. The company commander of the 5th Company, Lieutenant Soldan, as well as another officer, Lieutenant Louis, personally operated machine guns until jams rendered them useless. The bullets of our machine guns, easily finding their mark in the dense masses of the Americans, inflicted heavy casualties. Meanwhile the enemy, utilizing the gaps in our lines, had surrounded the 5th Company on its left flank, having advanced through the Freiburg depression and the dense shrubbery west of that company. They now launched another assault, advancing and firing their light machine guns which were operated, while carried by one man under his right arm, by another walking immediately behind. By the artillery bombardment, as well as the machinegun fire, the company had already suffered bloody losses which amounted to at least 25 per cent. Attacked from the front and left flank, partly also from the rear, the remainder of the company, approximately twenty men, had to surrender. Only a few succeeded at the last moment in escaping and even a portion of these men was immediately mowed down by the ensuing pursuit fire. The company commander succeeded in reaching the battalion command post, from which point, standing and firing free hand, he shared in the defense against the overwhelming attack, until here too the envelopment of both flanks brought things to an end.
In the sector of the 7th Company, the enemy attacked in four strong waves with one portion of their assault troops advancing through the almost complete cover of the Freiburg depression, and the main body enveloping the left flank of this company. Here too, they were gripped in the fire of our light machine guns, which fired away to the last round provided they were not destroyed by a direct hit or put out of action by jams, and at first sought cover in the woods on the right and the left of the Paths and clearings existing there. But now they began to roll up the position of the company from the left flank. After every last one e hand grenades had been d this use up during is encounter, the platoon commander, Vice Sergeant Major de Riese, issued orders for evacuation of the sector. He concentrated the remnants of his platoon in a connecting trench of the barracks camp lying closely behind but was promptly forced to retreat even from here. Thereafter he placed himself and his men— eight musketeers and four machine gunners—at the disposal of the regimental commander, 22d Field Artillery Regiment, as a protective garrison for his guns then engaged in combat at the Pioneer Park.
In the sector of Half-Battalion Baudler the distribution had been planned to provide for both defense and counterattack. Thus the 6th Company had been placed in front of the 8th Company so that the men and machine guns of the latter were able to deliver a so-called overhead fire, there being a steep slope. One half of a machine-gun company protected the flanks within the second line. There was little visibility in this terrain as a result of the woods and dense undergrowth; thick smoke and dust clouds, as well as the artificial fog, also hindered the visibility. The trenches were occupied. One could perceive neither light signals nor the noise of the combat taking place in the front lines. Suddenly the commander of the 6th Company came rushing to the command post with the report that a moment before a wounded officer, the only one who had escaped from the front lines, had hurried past him saying that the enemy had entered the front lines. Immediately a patrol was despatched to secure and maintain contact with the commander of the front-line troops, 5th Reserve Jager Regiment. Shortly thereafter, even before counterattacks could be started, strong detachments of Americans appeared on the right flank, advancing in the direction of Blanc Mont. They were immediately subjected to the fire of the two heavy machine guns on the extreme right flank of the battalion. But now the Americans appeared also at the front, supporting their advance from the direction of Sattelberg with machine-gun fire. Again they walked into a warm reception in the form of our rifle and machine-gun fire. This, however, was greatly weakened by the enemy's previous artillery preparation, which, by direct hits and splinters, had rendered useless about 50 per cent of the machine guns, there having been no opportunity to shelter them by bomb-proof dugouts. The light and heavy machine guns still intact after the bombardment were constantly employed on the flanks, so that there were but two useful light machine guns emplaced along the Blanc Mont—Schwabenkonig road at the time the Americans appeared there too. Our troops succeeded in clearing the road and in forcing them to retreat. But already the enemy, unmindful of the heavy losses suffered, had approached within a very short distance of our lines. The battalion commander put into lines the men of the sub-staff under the command of Lieutenant von der Kammert, the machine- gun officer. They fired free-hand from the parapet of the trench. Despite all this, the Americans came forward until they were at a hand-grenade throw's distance, and also appeared again suddenly, this time greatly outnumbering our own men, on the right and left flanks where the trenches had been completely leveled by the artillery bombardment. They appeared also even in the rear. The Americans must have designated the Medeah Ferme—Blanc Mont Hill crest, as their attack objective, because, had they pushed ahead regardlessly, not one man of our battalion would have been able to escape capture, not even by flight. Further resistance was out of the question, most of the light machine guns having fired their last round, and the half-battalion being surrounded on both flanks. Only a few men succeeded in escaping unharmed, closely pursued by airplanes that fired at random from a height of fifty meters, and their escape was made possible only by the dense shrubbery and by utilization of the changing range of the box barrage. The enemy had appeared at the Sommepy—St. Etienne road, cunningly utilizing the depressions, in extraordinarily superior numbers, according to some reports outnumbering our troops by twenty to one. Here, finally, our men, retreating at last, were forced to fight through the ring of enemies that gradually enveloped them.
On this day the battalion lost 8 officers, 44 non-commissioned officers, and 258 men, a portion of whom, mostly wounded, fell into the hands of the enemy. However, the losses of the enemy were also extremely heavy.
We have seen that the Americans encountered an especially tenacious resistance at the strong point located on the eastern spur of Helenen Hill, which they called "Essen Hook." It should be stated that this strong point was occupied by men of the 2d Company, 2d Cologne Landsturm Battalion. The battalion commander, Major Webendoerfer, reports as follows regarding the activities of his battalion:
In compliance with orders of Group Py, the companies were placed in the main line of resistance. The commencement of the hostile artillery bombardment on September 26 found the 2d Company in the sector of Division Etienne (the 200th Infantry Division), the 1st Company in the sector of Division Medeah (the 7th Infantry Division—later on the 51st Reserve Division), and the 3d and 4th Companies and the 1st and 2d Machine-Gun Companies in the sector of Division Orfeuil (the 15th Infantry Division), later also in the sector of the 203d Infantry Division.
The entrenchment activities of recent weeks have put a heavy drain on the physical abilities of the infantry companies, the members of which consist mostly of old men with little power of resistance. Despite this handicap, they have worked with admirable tenacity of purpose and have proved their worth and maintained their solidarity and self-possession even during the most severe artillery bombardment. Every hostile attack met the Landsturm men with their rifles in their hands at their assigned places.
After the battalion commander describes how brilliantly the companies employed at the Medeah Ferme and especially the ones at Orfeuil fought, he continues:
The 2d Company, too, has fought heroically and deserves the full recognition of the division under whose command it had been placed. Its company commander fell during an attack on a hostile tank.
The fact that separate companies were employed in the lines of strange units considerably impaired the value of their activities. Many officers and men expressed the opinion that had the Landsturm Battalion been employed in its own sector, under its own leader, and as an independent body of troops, it would have had no occasion to shrink back before even more difficult tasks.
It is particularly gratifying that this praise of the Landsturm men of Cologne was confirmed also by their enemies.
At 8:34 A.M. the assault detachment then located at Bemont Ferme (the 74th Reserve Infantry Regiment) was set in march to Blanc Mont in order to recapture the old German lines by a counterattack. This, however, the regiment was not able to do because, as we shall see, it was made use of at Medeah Ferme.
Even Army Headquarters, 3d Army, took a hand. At 8:35 A.M. it placed at the disposal of the group the Army Reserve, the 17th Infantry Division (minus the 75th Infantry Regiment), which at that time was located around Mont St. Martin and was scheduled to be transported to the Bemont Ferme via trucks. Group Perthes was ordered to direct the 89th and 90th Infantry Regiments to Orfeuil and the Bemont Ferme.
Group Py ordered the 17th Infantry Division to restore the situation by launching a counterattack on the boundary line between the 200th and 51st Reserve Divisions.
At 8:50 A.M. the 15th Bavarian Infantry Division, relieved during the previous night, and badly exhausted at that, received orders to call up immediately all troops under its command and give them the following combat mission: blockade of the Third Main Line of Resistance in the vicinity of St. Etienne.
The right neighbor, Group Langer, likewise took a hand in the proceedings. At 9:30 A.M. it imparted information that it had occupied Hasenrucken and that it had set one battalion of the 7th Infantry Division in march to Petersberg. It further stated that the 14th Reserve Division was detraining at the railway terminal at Briquenay and was being transported into the vicinity west of Semide via trucks, at which point its arrival might be expected some time in the afternoon.
The forces thus hurriedly concentrated from all sides for the purpose of checking the penetration of the enemy were all put to use in the course of the afternoon.
We will now again go back and review the attack of the American 2d Division. From the commanding general of the French 21st Army Corps, General Naulin, it received orders to resume its advance but to allow one battalion to follow, echeloned, at the left. At 12:20 P.M., the left neighbor of the 2d, the French 21st Division, with the assistance of the 170th Infantry Division, succeeded in capturing the German trenches and pushed on to the northward.
The commander of the American 2d Division, Major General John A. Lejeune, at 3:00 P.M. ordered the two brigades to resume the attack until a line extending from Scay Ferme to the Blanc Mont—St. Etienne road, one kilometer south of St. Etienne, had been reached, to hold that line, and in addition to advance a line of outposts about one kilometer in front of the then main line of resistance. The commander of the 4th Brigade, General Neville, ordered the 5th Marine Regiment to carry out this attack, advancing through the lines of the 6th Marine Regiment. The commanding officer of the 5th Marines, Colonel Logan Feland, ordered that the attack was to be carried out in "battalion-columns," their order of march being the 2d, 3d, and 1st Battalions, and that it was to begin as soon as possible. The battalions, however, did not receive this order until between 7:00 and 8:00 P.M. Thus it was too late to withdraw them in time from their positions, in which they faced a westerly front. So the battalion commanders agreed among themselves that the attack was not to be launched before 7:00 A.M., October 4.
The commander of the 3d Brigade, located at the right, General Ely, at 3 :30 P.M. ordered that at 5:00 P.M. the 23d Infantry Regiment was to advance through the lines of the 9th Infantry Regiment, with the latter subsequently following as a support. The slope one kilometer south of St. Etienne was designated as the attack objective. Even during the forenoon, the 23d Infantry had placed sentries forward as far as the outpost area of the 9th Infantry. At 5:30 P.M. the 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry, formed for the attack, the 2d Battalion following in the second line,and the 3d, not until 6:30 P.M., advancing as the third line. The main attack was launched at 7:00 P.M.
Generally, the units of the 2d Division during this attack were able to advance only a distance of one and one-half kilometers; in the sector of the 1st Battalion, the attack objective was reached only at one single point and the troops immediately settled in some old training trenches found there. As both flanks were unprotected, the 2d Battalion, 23d Infantry, was drawn up and went into positions at the St. Etienne—Sommepy road as the protection of the left flank. Two companies reestablished contact with the 6th Marines; the two others acted similarly on the other flank, establishing contact with the 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry. The 3d Battalion, 23d Infantry, was brought forward in an easterly direction so that, having taken up positions, it protected the right flank of The 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry. Behind this unit, the 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry, occupied a sector at the narrow-gage railway, east and west of Medeah railway switch, and also took up contact with the 2d Battalion, 23d Infantry. To assist it, the 3d Battalion, 9th Infantry, moved into the woods south of the Medeah railway switch and the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry, moved into the trenches. near Medeah Hill, establishing contact here with the French 167th Division. Consequently, at midnight a position had been reached and occupied that took the form of a triangular wedge. The 9th Infantry was located along the road that runs from the Medeah Ferme to the road crossing two kilometers southwest of the Medeah Ferme. The 23d Infantry was located between this road and Blodnitz Hill. The foremost battalion, however, lying opposite this hill, had contact neither on the right with the French 167th Infantry Division, nor on the left, with the 4th Brigade. The 5th Marines lay somewhat to the northeast of Blanc Mont, the 6th Marines south of it. The left flank of the 4th Brigade was still endangered by the German troops that had not yet been dislodged from the west slope of Blanc Mont. Into this somewhat uncomfortable position the American 2d Division had worked itself by reason of the fact that neither the neighboring French division on the right nor the one on the left had reached their attack objectives. Therefore, General Naulin, in his corps order of 6:15 P.M. (which was supplemented by another issued at 12 :30 A.m.), ordered the French 22d Division to be placed in lines at the right of the 21st Division. Its instructions were to advance on October 4 through the right flank of the French 21st Infantry Division between Hohenzollern Trench and Landshuter Trench, and to attack in a northwesterly direction.
We will now see what took place on this day on the German side in the sectors of the 203d Infantry and 51st Reserve Divisions. (See Appendix IV.) The night before, the 410th Infantry Regiment, groping along in the darkness in the sector of the 203d Infantry Division, had reached the northern German trench on Tor Hill, while the French were still holding their own in its southern portion. Since no contact existed on the left with the 409th Infantry Regiment the regimental commander, Major von Neuhaus, placed six companies behind his left flank and center as a reserve detachment.
On the third of October, the enemy—in this instance the American 3d Infantry Brigade—attacked at 6:15 A.M. After most terrific artillery preparations along the entire front, he penetrated the German lines in the sector of the 253d Reserve Infantry Regiment and west of the Sommepy—Medeah Ferme highway and continued his advance in a northerly direction. Simultaneously, strong hostile detachments (1st Battalion, American 9th Infantry Regiment) forced through the Rheinischer Grund to the northwest. They encountered the 2d Battalion, 410th Infantry Regiment, and defeated it after stubborn fights. The 1st and 3d Battalions, 410th Infantry, located on Tor Hill, were enveloped from easterly and westerly directions, and were either annihilated or captured. The 2d and 3d Batteries, 403d Field Artillery Regiment, drawn into the Gumbinner depression by the 410th Infantry, lost one platoon each; the 1st Battery, located at the Medeah Ferme, lost three guns to the enemy. From the Rheinischer Grund the enemy penetrated through this double ravine as far as Medeah Hill.
Simultaneously, the French attacked the 409th Infantry Regiment from the Bemont switch and the Juterbog depression. On this occasion tanks were also used. The regiment repulsed the first attack and caused the enemy heavy losses; three of his tanks were destroyed. During the second attack the enemy entered the lines and gradually forced the regiment against Steinberg. In the sector of the 406th Infantry Regiment at Orfeuil the enemy four successive times hurled his forces against this front, being assisted by numerous tanks. He temporarily entered the village of Orfeuil but was immediately thrown out again in a counterattack launched under the personal command of the regimental commander, Major von Gotz. All four of these attacks were completely repulsed, the enemy suffering the loss of many men and four tanks.
At 9:00 A.M. the enemy, in the sector of the 409th Infantry Regiment, had captured Medeah Hill; but the 1st Battalion, 409th Infantry Regiment, had been ordered to counterattack; Steinberg-Orfeuil and Berlin Hill were still held by our own troops. At about this time the enemy renewed his attacks against Medeah Hill and Steinberg, accompanying his efforts with a most terrific bombardment. Both hills were lost, but after our own artillery had delivered a bombardment of like volume, the 1st Battalion, 149th Infantry Regiment, cooperating with the 74th Reserve Infantry Regiment, recaptured them.
At the disposal of the 203d Infantry Division, which was now on its way to the front, Group Py had placed the 89th Grenadier Regiment of the 17th Infantry Division. This division had received orders to close the broad gap west of Medeah Hill which extended from here as far as Schlesier Hill within the sector of the 51st Reserve Division. But, as there were signs of an impending attack against the sector of the 203d Infantry Division, this order was immediately amended and the 89th Grenadier Regiment was placed at the Bemont Ferme as a group reserve. One battalion of this regiment was placed at the disposal of the 406th Infantry Regiment because, meanwhile, a gap of about six hundred meters' length had developed between this and the 409th Infantry Regiment.
At about 5:00 P.M. the hostile attack against Steinberg and Orfeuil was in full swing, a great number of tanks participating. But at no point along the front did any hostile troops or tanks succeed in entering even our outpost positions. At several points, as for instance in the sector of the 406th Infantry Regiment, even the fire of our machine guns, themselves heavily shelled, prevented the advance of the hostile infantry. Here only the tanks were able to go forward, and when they noticed that their own infantry was not following, they turned about and retreated without having accomplished their mission.
This successful repulse reacted favorably on the morale of the men and it was, especially in the sector of the 406th Infantry, almost excellent. Steinberg, Orfeuil, and Berlin Hill remained completely in our possession.
Toward 5:45 P.M. the enemy expanded his attacks also against Medeah Hill. Here too, they generally ended without result. Only at a few widely separated points were the forward lines of the 74th Reserve and 409th Infantry pushed back on the north slope of the hill. As darkness fell, the regiments held the general line, north slope Medeah Hill—Steinberg—Orfeuil—Berlin Hill against repeated attacks during the morning and afternoon. The enemy had suffered heavy casualties, and seven of his tanks had been destroyed in our artillery fire. At 7:10 P.M. the 3d Battalion, 89th Grenadier Regiment, which had been placed at the disposal of the 406th Infantry Regiment, arrived in the Hirschgrund. The remainder of the regiment was still in the act of marching to Bemont Hill.
The 51st Reserve Division (See Appendix III), after the enemy had carried out his penetration of its lines, at 10:55 A.M. reported as follows to Group Py : "Schlesier Hill and Medeah Hill are being held." Corps Headquarters answered by telephone: "You will hold on to your last man. Reenforcements will arrive which will counterattack in a southerly direction. Every man who can carry a rifle will take part."
From the point of view of the 51st Reserve Division, however, its fate appeared most dubious. The operations officer of the division at 11:30 A.m. telephoned to the operations officer of Group Py: "There is scarcely a doubt that little is left of the 51st Reserve Division."
At 1:20 P.M. the 17th Infantry Division reported to the 51st Reserve Division that the 90th Fusilier Regiment was being brought forward in the direction of St. Etienne to launch an assault along the boundary line between the sectors of the 200th and 51st Reserve Divisions. It was said to be under orders to recapture Schlesier Hill provided it had been lost again, and to hold the Bemont switch on both sides of Schlesier Hill. It would take up contact at the right with the 149th Infantry Regiment north of Blanc Mont, and the 74th Reserve Infantry Regiment, located at Medeah Hill, at the left.
At 2:25 P.M., October 3, Army Headquarters of the 3d Army issued the following order:
It is most important that Group Py, by forward pressure of all its units, shall prevent an expansion of the hostile invasion west of the highway. Most energetic artillery fire will be placed on Blanc Mont, Schlesier Hill, and Medeah Hill. In expectation of hostile tank attacks sometime this afternoon and tomorrow morning, large quantities of horse-drawn field artillery will be placed at the disposal of the infantry regiments.
The commander of the 102d Infantry Brigade, Colonel Count von Ledebur, submitted at 4:00 P.M. the following telephonic report:
Remnants of the regiments are being concentrated at the Romerschanze. Brigade is of the opinion that 90th Fiisilier Regiment must not attack but should simply endeavor to hold its own in the Medeah Hill—Grenadier Hill line. We can't carry on further, there's no combat value left in the infantry.
Various telephonic conversations now followed carried on between the operations officers of the division and group respectively, as to whether or not the attack could be effective with only the 1st Battalion of the 90th Fusilier Regiment participating and whether or not it should be carried out at all. All doubts were definitely removed by the telephonic information submitted at 6:15 P.M. by the operations officer of the group: "His Excellency, Ludendorff, has called up. He demands that Schlesier Hill be captured."
Just how things stood with the 51st Reserve Division is clearly shown in an order that was forwarded at 1:15 P.M. to the officer in command of the trains:
You will concentrate every last man of the trains that you can spare. Leave only enough behind to enable the moving of the trains. Equip them with arms, ammunition, and a supply of food, at least enough for a number of days. Divide them into companies under guidance of officers and non-commissioned officers. March them off at once to divisional headquarters at Leffincourt.
At 7:50 P.M. the 51st Reserve Division issued the following order to the 90th Fusilier Regiment:
Group Py orders as follows: The hostile elements who have broken through will be attacked from the line of departure Petersberg—St. Etienne—Blodnitz Hill. Neither darkness nor attacks of small hostile detachments which have broken through will prevent the 90th Fusilier Regiment from carrying out its mission and final attack objective: "Recapture of Schlesier Hill." The accomplishment of this task is the more important since, west of the highway Semide-Sommepy also, two battalions of the 89th Grenadier Regiment are now advancing with whom contact is to be established. In this way were speeded forward the attacks against the American 2d Division, which had broken through.
But who actually did intercept the advance of the Americans in the direction of St. Etienne? To this question the War Diary of Group Py (Corps Headquarters, 12th Army Corps) gives the following answer:
In many combats of swiftly changing issue Blanc Mont, Schlesier Hill, Medeah Hill, Steinberg, and Orfeuil were repeatedly lost to the enemy and recaptured by our own troops. At 5:00 P.M. Blanc Mont and Schlesier Hill were again in the hands of the enemy. Penetrated elements lodged between Ludwigs Riicken and Etienne and south of Blodnitz Hill. They were checked in their further advance by the 15th Bavarian Infantry Division and elements of Group Langer which had blockaded the Petersberg—St. Etienne line.
Even as early as 3:40 P.M., the 31st Bavarian Infantry Regiment, assembled from men who were still able to fight, under the command of Major Reiss, had occupied Blodnitz Hill. Among these combats, the following act of heroism stands out:
Vice Sergeant Major Kohnle of the 1st Machine-Gun Company, 31st Bavarian Infantry Regiment, on October 3 had been ordered with his platoon to occupy the southeast slope of Ludwigs Rucken. When, advancing in dense masses, the Americans descended the slopes of the hill opposite them, he quickly opened fire and kept it up until the enemy, rushing forward with death-defying carelessness, approached within a few meters of his gun, which he was personally operating as gunner. Suddenly his gun received a direct hit. It was Lot, however, damaged too badly to prevent his firing away the last round of ammunition. At the same moment he noticed that the enemy had come around him on one side. With lightninglike decision he grabbed his hand grenades, hurled them against the enemy, and was thus able to delay them long enough to allow him to shoulder his machine gun and withdraw into the designated retreat position.
We shall see how successful was this regiment under Major Reiss on October 4 in its efforts to ward off the American attack.
We come now to the combat activities of the 200th Infantry Division (See Appendix V). Formerly, the command post of this division was located on Blanc Mont. In it were now located artillery staffs and the orderly officer of the division, First Lieutenant Richert.
This officer at 8:15 A.M. telephoned to Division Headquarters, to whom reports concerning the vicious fire and the advance of the hostile infantry behind tanks had been previously made, as follows: "The enemy has reached the top of Blanc Mont. We can hear them talking above." The operations officer answered him: "Hold out as long as you can."
In another dugout on Blanc Mont sat the staff of the Jager Brigade, who, however, were not able to despatch messages. But the 3d Jager Regiment at 8:26 A.M. telephoned, "All attacks repulsed." It received instructions: "Take everything at your disposal and employ them at the left where it is necessary that you block the advance." First Lieutenant Richert reported at 8:30 A.M.: "The Americans are now sitting on top of the command post and have led away a third of our men as prisoners. Someone says that they have moved off this minute."
First Lieutenant Richert (8:48 A.M.) speaks again (a number of carrier-pigeon messages regarding the American attack having reached the division): "According to reports from the 4th Jager Regiment, it appears that every attack against our front has been repulsed. Strong hostile columns of infantry, following in the wake of tanks, are advancing from Sommepy in a northerly direction. We are opposed by only one battalion located on both sides of the cable trench."
The answer comes: "You will simply have to grab troops of some sort, perhaps the 149th Infantry Regiment, and restore the situation." First Lieutenant Richert replied: "Very well, sir. I'll collect every available man and occupy Main Line of Resistance No. 3."
Following further carrier-pigeon reports received by the division to the effect that all attacks against our front had been repulsed, Lieutenant Richert again communicated: "Our own officers have occupied the entrance to the dugouts. Presumably the enemy has halted at the highway. He has now but weak sentry posts on Blanc Mont." At 9:08 A.M. he resumed: "Hostile reenforcements reported as being in advance from Holsten road and Rensburger road; artillery fire requested on these points." This request was complied with. However, from 9:24 A.M. on, messages ceased to come in from First Lieutenant Richert. But one telephone operator quickly yelled to the man at the other end of the wire: "The Americans have sent one of their men down into the dugout, who is demanding our surrender." Thus the Americans captured here, in addition to Lieutenant Richert, the entire staffs of the artillery long-range and close-combat weapons, one officer of the Scout Detachment, one pioneer officer, a number of telephone operators, wireless men, pioneers and Uhlans. In contrast, the staffs of the Jager Brigade, hidden in another dugout, managed to escape in the nick of time.
Notwithstanding this, division headquarters at 10:00 A.M. received the following carrier- pigeon report, despatched by the 149th Infantry Regiment: "Elements of the regiment have arrived at a point south of Blanc Mont, which is still in our hands, and are forming the defensive flank from Blanc Mont to Ludwigs Riicken." Ten minutes later the 200th Infantry Regiment ordered the following wireless to be distributed to all regiments: "Positions in the front will be held at all cost. Sufficient reenforcements are on the march to protect the left flank."
And there was still another message from Lieutenant Richert. Wild rumors were afloat, and therefore, shortly before he was captured by the Americans, he had ordered a motor-cycle courier to race through to the rear. This man correctly brought an instruction from the division, directed to the brigade: "The division informs us of the following: according to a scout's report, the enemy is said to have penetrated our lines as far as Sattelberg (the hill south of Blanc Mont). Do you have any new reports at Brigade Headquarters? What reports have you from Stoffleth?"
The adjutant of the Jager Brigade was at 10:24 A.M. able to report:
Brigade staff has managed to escape from Blanc Mont. Colonel Lehmann is located on Petersberg. Three-quarters of an hour ago Captain Stoffleth reported to us that he was holding the east edge of Sattelberg. The regimental staff of the 149th Infantry Regiment is located at a point north of Sattelberg; one battalion has been ordered to envelop Blanc Mont in an attack from the north. There is little doubt that the 2d Battalion, 74th Reserve Infantry Regiment on Schlesier Hill, has been overcome. Everything seems to be in order to the south of us. On Blanc Mont Americans are located. (6th Marine Regiment of the American 2d Division.)
It was now decided to withdraw the 74th Reserve Infantry Regiment from its sector near Bemont Ferme in order to advance against Blanc Mont. But this was not possible because the regiment had already launched an attack against Medeah Hill. However, as the left flank of the Jager Regiment at about 10:13 A.M. had been forced back as far as Holsten road, it was decided to place at its disposal the 1st Battalion of the 368th Infantry Regiment of Group Langer for the protection of its left flank. But at 10:25 A.M. the 4th Jager Regiment had warded off a hostile tank attack and blocked the terrain on the left at Kaiser road with the pioneers of the 105th and 282d Pioneer Companies. Still, contrary to all reports, it seems that at 10:25 A.M. Sattelberg was in the hands of the enemy.
In the meantime a battalion of the 165th Infantry Regiment of Group Langer occupied Petersberg.
The situation in the sector of the 200th Infantry Division was now such that its right flank held Marie-a-Py and the positions south of the Py brook, while its northern or left flank was continually pushed back. After it had been ascertained that the 90th Fusilier Regiment, which for purposes of recapturing Schlesier Hill was to advance in attack between the 200th Infantry and the 51st Reserve Division, could not arrive before 2:00 P.M., Group Py instructed the 200th Infantry Division at about 1:10 P.M. as follows:
If possible, begin now to withdraw your elements from the southern to the northern bank of the Py brook in order to protect your left flank. Objective for the day: capture of Blanc Mont and Schlesier Hill. Objective for the night: withdrawal of your troops as far as the point of contact with your right neighbor on Hasenrucken.
Hereupon the operations officer of the 200th Infantry Division replied: "Impossible to carry out this withdrawal during the day." At 1:59 P.M. Captain Stoffleth had recaptured Sattelberg, assisted by the guns of the 17th Machine-Gun Sharpshooters' Detachment and the 2d Machine-Gun Company, 18th Jager Battalion. At his left, he was in contact with the 149th Infantry Regiment on Blanc Mont. Of this regiment, however, there were located at this point only the regimental staff, two battalion staffs, three companies, and one machine-gun company. At 2:18 P.M. the division stated that it was not enough that the 149th Infantry Regiment should occupy Blanc Mont, where meantime the wireless station of the division had also been re-erected, but that the regiment should also capture the trenches on its east slope and then participate in the attack of the 90th Fusilier Regiment against Schlesier Hill.
The location of the Telephone Detachment on Blanc Mont was far from comfortable. This we can see from Lieutenant Felten's report at 3:38 p.m: "The Americans on this point are located only thirty meters from our dugout. Here are two companies of the 149th Infantry Regiment. It is a question whether they can hold out much longer."
By 3:58 P.M., Captain Stoifieth with his troops had again been forced from Sattelberg. He held on at the west slope. From here to Blanc Mont there was a gap through which the Americans had filtered, and tanks had been seen at Blanc Mont. Elements of the 18th Jager Battalion still held their own in Kaiser trench, north of Sattelberg. Two companies of the 168th Infantry Regiment had been placed between the sector of Stoifieth's Battalion and the Second Main Line of Resistance.
When, at 4:20 P.M., the enemy launched another attack against Marie-A-Py, it was impossible to despatch reenforcements to the troops at that point; they were instructed to hold the town until nightfall, when the line was to be withdrawn in any case. But matters were soon much worse on the left flank. A carrier-pigeon report from the Jager Brigade, despatched at 6:00 P.M. and received by the division a half hour later, stated:
To judge by the noise of combat, the enemy has penetrated a good distance to the north beyond Schlesier Hill. Captain Stoffleth—fifteen men are with him—lies at the point where Kaiser road converges with Main Line of Resistance No. 3. He is without ammunition. The 149th Infantry Regiment has occupied this line at a point south of Numeral 210; east of 210, the enemy is lodged within our main line of resistance. The 149th has in addition several machine-gun strong points east of the St. Etienne—Blanc Mont road, but has at its disposal only three companies and one machine-gun company; the remainder of the regiment has not yet been found. The serious shortage of ammunition and depleted number of troops make it at present impossible to launch an energetic counterattack. Major von Billow of the 4th Jager Regiment will now roll up that portion of Kaiser road which lies between the Main Line of Resistance No. 2 and Sattelberg and is thickly occupied by the enemy, but up to 4:45 P.M. he has not yet been able to get the 3d Battalion, 368th Infantry Regiment, to the front lines for that purpose. To judge by the noise of combat, the enemy has now reached the vicinity of Ludwigs Rficken. Not possible to tell from here whether or not he is engaged with our own troops that were advancing in that neighborhood. The 149th Infantry Regiment tells us that there were also Frenchmen located on the eastern portion of Blanc Mont. They have captured prisoners of the French 99th Infantry Regiment.
The divisional observer ascertained that at first our own troops retreated from Ludwigs Rikken, freshly advancing German troops recaptured that hill, and finally it fell again into the hands of the enemy.
From the 15th Bavarian Infantry Division was received at 6:57 P.M. the following report: "Fight around Blodnitz Hill going on." Here is the next report, of 7:30 P.M.: "The enemy is located on Ludwigs Rficken ; advances against St. Etienne where the 32d Infantry Regiment is now being placed in lines. Blodnitz Hill in our hands." Still another report of 8:51 P.M. states: "We have finally lost Ludwigs Riicken Hill. Strong enemy forces now feeling their way forward against Etienne. We are too weak to hold this point longer (eighty men)."
The loss of Ludwigs Rficken had rendered the situation of the 200th Infantry Division extremely difficult. At 9:02 P.M., the operations officer telephoned to the group: "I doubt very much that the 90th Fiisilier Regiment will be able to capture Schlesier Hill; at any rate, we can hardly remain on Blanc Mont. The enemy will attack through the 'hole' at Ludwigs Rficken and advance upon Machault and Cauroy." At 9:30 P.M. he conversed with the operations officer of Group Py:
Tomorrow morning we will have the 149th Infantry Regiment on the left flank, with one battalion in reserve. Battalion Stoffleth is wiped out. Artillery is beating its way back via Pierre-a-Ames. Tomorrow the 7th Infantry Division will also have to attack from Petersberg. We simply must have Ludwigs Rucken back. If extremely lucky, the 90th Fusilier Regiment may be able to connect with Blodnitz Hill, but never with us. First of all, we need a solid line which we will find in Petersberg—Ludwigs Rucken—Blodnitz Hill, and then we will be able to attack the enemy from the south tomorrow.
At 9:50 P.M. the following order was forwarded by the division to the Jager Brigade:
The two battalions of the 368th Infantry Regiment which we have promised you will not come. Early tomorrow morning, the 4th Jager Regiment and the 149th Infantry Regiment will eventually assume a front to the north, in the direction of Ludwigs Rucken. Blanc Mont will be held.
Of the recapture of Blanc Mont on October 3, the regimental commander, Major Grfindel, 149th Infantry Regiment, gives the following account:
Hurrying forward far ahead of my troops, I reported personally at 6:30 A.M., October 3, to the command post of the 2d Jager Brigade and was given the following orientation and impressions in regard to the combat situation: Only a few negligible remnants of the 18th Jager Battalion are located on Sattelberg, warding off strong attacks from the south. They have no contact to eastward and in particular are uncertain whether Schlesier Hill is still in our hands.
I personally obtained additional information in regard to the latter question when I repaired to Battalion Headquarters, 3d Battalion, 74th Reserve Infantry Regiment, located on Schwabenkonig, where, at 7:50 A.M., I found Captain Baudler. With his battalion staff, he told me, he was fighting only for the possession of his command post. The enemy had overcome his battalion on Schlesier Hill and now pressed forward in the direction of Grenadier Hill. From this point I hurriedly rode back to Blanc Mont and despatched mounted messengers to the batteries and the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 149th Infantry Regiment, whose arrival from Russenkreuz was expected. They had been less fortunate in their efforts to rush through the box barrage which, since 5:30 A.M., had covered the rear area, than I had been with my battalion staff.
At 8:30 A.M. Captain Sassenberg arrived with the advance guards of his battalions. By 9:00 A.M. the staff, 2d battalion, 149th, the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Companies, the 2d Machine-Gun Company, and the 10th Company were on the spot. All companies had suffered losses in the strong box barrage which they had had to contend with ever since they left Russenkreuz. The most severely hit of all, the 6th Company, 149th, arrived here only in platoon strength. At 9:00 A.M. the situation had developed as follows: Since about 8.15 A.M. the command post had been shifted from Blanc Mont to the rear. On Blanc Mont were elements of the 18th Jager Battalion amounting to about twenty men with three machine guns, the latter without ammunition, barely able to stick to the northwest slope, and hard pressed by the enemy who dominated the heights. In contact to eastward: 2d Battalion, 74th Reserve Infantry Regiment, which was practically annihilated. Here a strong enemy force was in the act of advancing from Schlesier Hill across Grenadier Hill in a northerly direction; other detachments, rushing along the highway from the east, were advancing against Blanc Mont.
With this situation in mind, I ordered the 2d Battalion, 149th, with the 10th Company, to counterattack along both sides of the highway Blanc Mont—Schwabenkomg, with the front to the northeast. In an energetic assault, the knoll of Blanc Mont was torn out of the hands of strong enemy forces by the 5th Company, 149th, and occupied. The 8th Company following up the 7th Company, with the remnants of the 6th Company on both sides of the highways, and the 10th Company on the northern or left flank, advanced quickly and brilliantly, but, after having penetrated the wooded terrain on both sides of the highway to a distance of about three hundred meters, they encountered so superior an enemy that they were forced to halt, front to the east, and take up the defensive. Consequently the north flank, in this wooded terrain where observation was very limited, was completely "in the air." It was, moreover, from the beginning on overrun by the enemy, who outnumbered our troops five to one, and there was nothing to prevent them from enveloping it since all available troops had been employed in the front lines. No reserves were available, the bulk of the 3d Battalion, 149th, was still a long way off. The most critical danger to this flank was overcome by placing there also the advance guards of the 3d Machine-Gun Company which had arrived around 11:15 A.M. Captain Schmidt, commander of the two accompanying batteries of the 2d Detachment, 272d Field Artillery Regiment, arrived at 9:45 A.M., having hurried far ahead of his troops; his batteries did not arrive here before noon.
Thus my greatly weakened infantry (only four and one-half companies strong) opposed for hours an enemy assaulting from all sides, and who, on the north flank, was all ready to envelop the sector. Among other methods employed in his attacks, the enemy directly at the beginning of the affray used two tanks and a number of low-flying combat planes, which, however, vainly sought to break our resistance. Unopposed by any German troops, the Americans farther to the east, leaving Schlesier Hill behind them, were resuming their advance upon St. Etienne and could reach our flank and the rear by way of Ludwigs Rucken at any moment. With the still available guns of the 3d Machine- Gun Company we immediately began to lay a barrage from a permanent machine-gun position located somewhat to the northwest. More, however, could not be accomplished at that time in the way of protective measures for the rear and the flank.
All of which makes it clear that the original situation in which the regiment found itself at 9:00 A.M., October 3, contained the core from which later developed the almost complete encircling of Blanc Mont by our troops. What was needed was the participation of forces from the rear in the direction of Ludwigs Riicken in order to somewhat relieve the regiment in its flank and the rear. Enough, I believe, had been demanded of the weakened elements of the regiment when, as we have seen, it had withstood all assaults against Blanc Mont until the reenforcements from the rear rendered effective assistance.
Around noon, the 18th Jager Battalion was completely exhausted. Its wretchedly weak remnants had evacuated Blanc Mont and the western point of contact, by this action throwing also upon my regiment the burden of taking care of the western contact with the 4th Jagers. This contact would never have been established had not finally the 3d Battalion, 149th Infantry Regiment, arrived about noon. On its way to the front it had suffered even heavier casualties than the 2d Battalion, and of its 9th Company especially there was left but a pitiful handful of men. Thus I was provided with only two companies with which to fill the gap created on my right by the dropping out of the annihilated 18th Jager Battalion. These two companies were established in contact with the 5th Company, 149th, in lines fronting south. Here they were at once subjected to heavy attacks from the direction of Sattelberg, but on their right flank they at least succeeded in making contact with the 4th Jager Regiment.
Thus, within a limited part of Blanc Mont, the 149th Infantry Regiment now dominated the situation, since this brilliant troop had no fear of enemy attack and envelopment from the front, and five times, with no help whatsoever, warded off hostile attacks. With its own limited resources, however, the regiment could do nothing against the threatening envelopment from the north, where the dominating Ludwigs Hill, completely abandoned by our troops, offered opportunity for enemy use.
If the enemy on October 3, did not swerve his forces from the direction of Ludwigs Rucken against our own sector, it was simply because he already looked upon us as sure prey.
At 3:00 P.M. the commanding general, General of Cavalry Krug von Nidda, issued the following group order:
During the coming night, the 1st Army, together with Group Langer, will withdraw into the Brimont-Berru position and will establish contact with the 200th Infantry Division by way of Martin switch position.
As darkness falls, the 200th Infantry Division will shift the bulk of its forces into the Third Main Line of Resistance. Covering parties now in the present outpost area will follow the withdrawal of Group Langer, beginning at about midnight, and will then withdraw into the Dresdener Hill—Kronenberg—Sattelberg line. This will form the foremost line of the outpost area; patrols will remain in the First and Second Main Lines of Resistance.
On October 4, the group will hold its positions.
Having been designated Army Reserve, the 55th Infantry Regiment of the 13th Infantry Division, with attached field artillery, in the evening will relieve the 75th Infantry Regiment of the 17th Infantry Division in its position at the Sachsen-Kuppe (knoll). The 75th Infantry will place itself in support at a point south of the Bemont Ferme and will there be under the command of the 17th Division.
Two thirds of the 89th Grenadier Regiment, with the attached field artillery, will place itself in support at a point west of the Bemont Ferme, its third battalion remaining north of Orfeuil.
With its attached field artillery, the 90th Fusilier Regiment will place itself in readiness north of Blanc Mont as an assault troop.
The 15th Bavarian Infantry Division will move into the vicinity of Etienne as the Group Reserve.
At 10:45 P.M. the commanding general ordered that the 51st Reserve Division was to continue on October 4 its attack against Schlesier Hill. Finally at about 11:30 P.M. he ordered the shifting of about one-third of the assault troops of the 1st Bavarian Infantry Division to Etienne, of portions of the 15th Bavarian Infantry Division to Blodnitz Hill and Etienne, and of elements of the 7th Infantry Division to Petersberg. The 200th Infantry Division was ordered to hold Blanc Mont and the main line of resistance west of it. The 51st Reserve Division was to attack at daylight with its right flank advancing across Grenadier Hill, the objective being Schlesier Hill. The 7th Infantry Division was to attack Ludwigs Riicken from the west, the 15th Bavarian Infantry Division was to attack it from the northwest, while the 200th Infantry Division, throwing all its available resources into lines, was to attack it from the south.
Telephone conversations between general staff officers of the divisions and the group continued, however, throughout the night. In a conversation with the operations officer of Group Py at 11:47 P.M., the operations officer of the 200th Infantry Division said: "The Blanc Mont—Etienne road is free of the enemy. Presumably they have advanced along the Sommepy-Etienne road and have turned more to the north than to the west. On Petersberg are located our own troops, the 5th Jager Regiment and elements of the 165th Infantry Regiment. As for ourselves, we can make no further attack. Two battalions of the 368th Infantry Regiment have been directed to march to a point north of Etienne—by whom, I do not know. This division has now a total strength of only about five hundred men, all of whom are physically worn out. Just a minute ago Group Py sent us an order to the effect that the two battalions of the 368th Infantry Regiment and one battery would be at Petersberg tomorrow morning after all." To this the operations officer of Group Py answered: "With these you can attack tomorrow morning and take Ludwigs Rucken." This brought forth the reply of the operations officer, 200th Division: "Some time or other you simply will have to relieve the troops or else we shall lose all our good officers and Jagers." At this moment the chief of staff of the 3d Army picked up the receiver and declared: "We are now dealing with a matter of most serious political nature. The left flank of the 1st Army must remain secure. This means that we must take possession of Blanc Mont!"
It was plain to all divisions concerned that, on the next morning, a new major attack would have to be reckoned with. The rushing to the front of strong reenforcements had been reported; and there was also information that a cavalry regiment with a large tank squadron had been placed in support at Sommepy. The divisions were of the opinion that, confronted with such an attack, a solid front was needed; to waste the last good troops would be folly. On October 4 the commanding general of the 3d Army, General-Oberst von Einem, distributed the following order by telephone:
For their tenacious resistance during yesterday's repeated assaults of a numerically superior enemy, and the aggressive spirit manifested during counterattacks I wish to express my sincerest appreciation to the valiant divisions of Group Py.
It is most astonishing how the brave Jagers of the 200th Infantry Division were able to resist the French divisions that advanced on their sector from the south and east, and protected the strong masses of artillery located immediately behind them (See Map F). This feat is the more worthy of admiration when one scans the report which on October 2 was forwarded by the commanding officer of the 2d Jager Brigade to the 200th Infantry Division:
The troops under my command have again fought without rest through a hard day, completely repulsing an attack preceded by terrific artillery bombardment, and inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. Twenty-seven prisoners remained in their hands. All this the battalions accomplished despite their depletion to pitiful remnants, and despite the fact that their mental and physical strength was sapped to the last ounce. It may be considered certain that the enemy, for a number of days at least, will continue to launch his attacks, which, in view of the growing depletion of our own forces, and the flanking thrusts at the left which hourly assume more threatening proportions, it will be increasingly difficult to oppose. Despite the satisfactory morale still prevailing among the men, it is to be feared that some day their physical strength will suddenly snap as a result of overstrain and exhaustion, and thus the last remnants of the regiment will be annihilated. Penetration by enemy forces of the Second Main Line of Resistance would then be inevitable, with the very probable loss of the artillery located behind the sector. I am convinced that this moment is close at hand.
Moreover, it is to be feared that, through a continued employment in lines, the last officers, Oberjagers and Jagers, of the old school and active service, to whose training and influence must be accredited the present excellent morale of the troops, will be also lost. And still further, it is to be feared that, in the event of the aforementioned failure of strength, the excellent reputation of the Jagers, which has been further increased by the recent combats, will be lost, and in the end, instead of well-deserved appreciation for previous achievements, blame will be heaped on their heads for the final defeat.
In view of these considerations, I regard it my duty to recommend the quickest possible relief of the regiments under my command.
On October 2 the combat strength of the brigade, including the 7th Company, 234th Infantry Regiment, and the 2d Company, Cologne Landsturm Battalion, consisted of 885 men with 50 heavy and 23 light machine guns and 5 trench mortars.
(To be continued in the next issue)
1 Translator's Note: The author here refers to books published under these titles.