Nations, after seasons of strife, find stimulus in reflection. Peace brings revision and reforms. The lessons learned are eagerly studied. Mistakes are acknowledged and there is ever present the resolution to profit in the future by giving heed to the experience of the past. When menaced by enemies, beset by hardships, welded together by love of country and loyalty to a cause, the people of a nation attain the highest state of discipline. A leader appears and they advance irresistibly to victory. The leader is, and never can be other than, the organized military branch of the government. But when there is no immediate need of its protection the people of a nation soon forget the wise maxim that “in peace we should prepare for war,” and the military arm is forgotten. Peace disperses people to their normal pursuits. Every art, every science, every profession may have its genius, but neither individually nor collectively does it possess a leader. Individual entities composing a nation may struggle for existence and even be wiped out, though the nation itself may prosper. The absence of a common danger or a corporate necessity is destructive of discipline in its truest sense.
Discipline is the life blood of the Navy. There is no substitute. Without it, the hardships and privations of an unnatural existence could not be endured by its members. The young man entering the Naval Academy, realizing that he has forfeited family and home to the service of his country, takes his first breath of it. The boy who enlists in the ranks and finds that he has become a part of an organized body is brought face to face with it.
To the average mind, discipline is synonymous with punishment. The average individual thinks of infractions of numerous rules and regulations, and visualizes punishments and other corrective measures. Such mechanisms are but instruments for restoring order. They are the means for compelling obedience to the lessons experience teaches as essential to the life of a military body. They may have a bearing upon, but do not inculcate, discipline. Discipline has no relation to force. It is a reciprocal relationship between men of different stations which accomplishes the highest degree of efficient, spontaneous, and intelligent cooperation in all of the hardships and trials of service. Among seafaring men discipline attains true definition. Upon the trackless wastes, men must depend upon each other. The mode of life requires them to rise above self-interest, to understand the problems of their fellows, and to cooperate in the attainment of the mission of the whole.
An untrained, uneducated body of men may, for a time, be made submissive to strong will but eventually rebellion ensues. Train the body of men, educate it to reason and to understand, and it will cooperate willingly. Under efficient and sympathetic leadership, the highest state of discipline is reached. The mission of the Navy now, and at all times, is to attain that state of discipline which binds its members together and makes the thought of the common good rise above mere physical superiority.
The Act of March 27, 1794, “to provide a Naval Armament,” marked the beginning of the Navy under the Constitution. Although some sort of a Navy was in being prior to this time, there existed no machinery with which to efficiently officer and man whatever vessels might be constructed. Ships authorized by the Act were presumably to be used to protect our commerce from the depredations of the Algerian corsairs. The Navy at this time being under the War Department, McHenry, the head of that department, set about to officer and man the frigates to be built. Barry, Nicholson, Talbot, Barney, Dale, and Truxtun were appointed captains. All had served with distinction in the Continental Navy.
On April 30, 1798, the Navy Department was created by Act of Congress, and Benjamin Stoddert became the first Secretary. There followed the first step toward proper organization. Training and discipline, however, did not enter into the general scheme. The absorbing function seemed to be that of procuring officers and men, somehow. Besides those officers who possessed the background of service and experience in the Continental Navy, many others had to be obtained. They came from all walks of life. Captains obtained commissions for their friends. Many were appointed at the solicitation of members of Congress and other officials prominent in the political life of the nation. It seemed to be of little consequence that junior officers possessed little or no seafaring or naval knowledge and experience, so long as the captain and his immediate assistants were able seamen.
The crew presented a problem too difficult for the Navy Department to solve. Procurement of men was left to the captains. Like the Canadian Mounted Police, they “got their men.” How they went about it was of no apparent consequence. All that was asked or expected was that the ships be kept fully manned. Seemingly but one requirement was exacted: no man could be required to remain in the service after his enlistment had expired. This caused no hardship, however, for men could be discharged in whatever port a ship might be. As a result, many a citizen of foreign countries, innocently taking a constitutional along the waterfront at night, or indulging in a glass of beer with friendly American seamen, awoke the next day to find that he had become a member of the crew of an American man-of-war.
Throughout the strictly sail era of the Navy, knowledge was concentrated in a few. The captain was every inch a king. His cabin in the after part of the ship was his palace. None but orderlies and servants dared to violate the privacy of his quarters. Officers entered only by invitation, and usually in fear and trembling. He was the fire- control officer. He required no range finder or other instruments of precision. Extreme battle range was the distance at which the whites of the enemy’s eyes might be discerned. The captain was an expert seaman. He knew how to perform all known evolutions under sail, and he had with him just enough officers of ability along those lines to satisfy all requirements—to make the ship and crew perform.
There were midshipmen aplenty. Like the mass of officers, they were appointed without thought of whether or not they were suited to the service. The Department appointed as many as could be accommodated on board ship. There was apparently no criterion upon which to base fitness. As a rule, the Secretary appointed those who had the strongest backing. The official importance of the sponsor of a boy was the only basis upon which to judge the character of the appointee. Even then many incorrigible youths who were beyond parental control found their way into the steerage mess through the influence of parents who hoped the rigid regulations and laws of the Navy might be their salvation.
Crews of ships were recruited everywhere and by every possible means. No records of recruiting were kept prior to 1824. Had records been kept, it is doubtful whether they would bear publication. In general, men were enlisted for particular ships. Seamen were always scarce although there was an abundance of ordinary seamen and boys. Until about 1812, one-sixth were foreigners. Backed by the iron will of the captain, the officers, aided by a handful of petty officers, were able to force obedience to every command. During the war with France there were only a dozen rates on the muster roll. Thirty years later the total number remained unchanged. In the meanwhile, however, the yeoman-of-the-gunroom had passed out, and in his place appeared the schoolmaster. During this time there was little improvement in the quality of enlisted men. They knew but little of the duties of a mariner. Rough and tumble fighting was to their liking and they relished not at all the business of manning the guns. Their backwardness, however, was overcome by the ever-present marines who forced them to “stick to their guns” when occasion required.
Judged by present-day standards, the methods of procurement of officers and recruitment of men during the sail era were extremely lax. Moreover, no attempt was made to afford officers the opportunity to prepare themselves for the dignified and responsible duties of command. It is true that schoolmasters were appointed to ships for the purpose of instructing midshipmen in the rudiments of navigation and mathematics; little could be taught, however, on board ship, and the office of schoolmaster soon became a soft snap.
For many years, the Secretary of the Navy procured and assigned officers without regard to their fitness for the positions to which they were assigned. The actual orders involving assignment to duty were prepared by a clerk in the Secretary’s office. In view of the state of affairs, it is not a matter of wonder that during the early years of the Navy, personnel was far from being content and happy.
The advent of steam wrought a great change. Management of the engineer department and operation of the heavy, cumbersome machinery were beyond the knowledge of the captain. Although efforts had, upon occasion, been made to interest Congress in the necessity of providing schools on shore, they were received with little sympathy and marked by no success. Now it was different. Captain Matthew C. Perry, a leader in the efforts to organize and establish suitable means for training officers and men, renewed his efforts in 1837 to obtain trained men for the Navy. His efforts were rewarded by the establishment of the rates of fireman and coal heaver. In 1842 the Engineer Corps was established.
When the value of steam machinery as a propelling agent became fully apparent, the difficulty of obtaining men trained in its operation was realized. The old system of recruiting men was inadequate to meet the needs, and the Navy possessed no facilities for developing technicians from mariners. During the preceding fifteen years, ratings had increased from about twelve to twice that number. Musicians appeared, marking an apparent effort to improve life on board ship. But there was little joy in the lives of the engineers. The need for them was accepted, but no provision was made for their comfort; they took what was left. Both officers and men of the engineer force spent most of their time on deck, when off duty, seeking shelter where they could find it.
In 1843, the whole number of officers and men numbered 10,843. A year later enlistment was suspended and many men had to be discharged, as Congress limited the enlisted strength to 7,500 men and boys. About this time the Secretary repeatedly recommended a reduction in the number of officers, and toyed with the idea of “selection out,” finally giving it up in despair. Morale was low in consequence of such unsettled conditions. As evidence of complete lack of understanding, the Secretary in one breath proclaimed the love of seamen for the service, and in the next breath stated that violation of the law on shipboard had assumed serious proportions. His observations, however, took one serious and important trend. He decried the lack of proper educational facilities and urged the establishment of schools on shore. A year later he urged that a school be established at Fort Severn, Annapolis. The Secretary of War immediately transferred the fort to the Navy Department, and Commander Franklin Buchanan was ordered to organize the school.
The next fifteen years comprise the period leading up to the Civil War. During this time the Naval Academy became firmly established and graduated many officers who were destined to win fame and glory during the great conflict. No facilities were provided, however, for training men, other than seamen. Most of the rated men and all technicians were given their rates upon enlistment. Their only experience was gained on shore or on coasting and river steamers. Naturally the quality was not high. By this method many men were brought into the Navy who knew nothing of naval life and cared less for its good name. Discipline therefore showed no improvement among the 11,895 officers and men who constituted the average personnel strength during the year preceding hostilities. Corporal punishment had been abolished by Act of Congress but no provision was made for the punishment of minor offenses. Men soon realized that speedy punishment for their offenses disappeared with the lash and they soon became indifferent to authority. Morale of officers and men alike suffered from the chaotic conditions.
The first gun of the Civil War awoke the Navy from its state of lethargy. Ships were built as rapidly as possible. Many were purchased. Men were recruited without difficulty. Officers of more or less ability were obtained for general purposes, but engineers were scarce. The need was so great that almost anyone who could show a letter of recommendation from the chief engineer of a man-of-war, or from a prominent politician, was given an acting appointment as assistant engineer. Many had no practical knowledge of marine machinery. Men of education and ability along other lines, actuated by the desire to serve their country, were appointed to engineering positions on shore. One patriot, a village schoolmaster from a New England state, was appointed, although his application disclosed the fact that his engineering knowledge had been obtained from pictures of engines he had seen in a textbook. Another gained his engineering experience as captain of a tug boat. The Department was greatly concerned by the large number of machinery breakdowns, and in the hope of impressing upon chief engineers the importance of their tasks, issued a general order stating that “Engineers will hereafter understand that the condition of machinery under their charge on the arrival of a vessel from a cruise, will be considered as a test of their efficiency and fidelity in the discharge of their duties.”
The Civil War demonstrated the necessity for still more men of special qualifications, capable of performing new duties, so that in 1866 there were fifty-three ratings carried on the muster roll. It was at this time that the subject of proper training of officers and men began to receive most serious consideration. The Naval Academy, which had retreated to Newport during the war, was reestablished at Annapolis and expanded. The operations of the Navy contributed to the success of Federal arms by throttling commerce, and weakened the opposing armies by depriving them of arms and other supplies. We had become a naval power. To maintain our position it was apparent to all that the best talent in the country must be obtained for officers, and that adequate means for securing ability and experience must be provided. It was fully recognized that ours must be a disciplined Navy and the only method of accomplishment was through education and training.
During the period intervening between the Civil War and the conflict with Spain, new types of ships were constructed. Torpedoes and mines were developed into useful and practical weapons. The short-range guns were supplanted by high-power rifled cannon. Ericsson’s turret came into its own. Machinery for propulsion improved in reliability and increased in power. These things further demonstrated the fact that men to man our vessels could not be recruited without regard to quality. Enlistment standards were accordingly raised. It soon became apparent that skilled artisans could no longer be obtained upon call. Accordingly schools were established. Ships for the sole purpose of training seamen were commissioned. Gunnery ships and gunnery schools were provided for the purpose of training officers as well as men. Comfort of officers and crew was considered in the design of new ships, and measures were taken to make life more agreeable for personnel, so that when the Secretary of the Navy reported that “Our sailors are held by affection and choice; they love the service,” he sized up the situation correctly. They were in fact acquiring esprit de corps, an essential to discipline.
In 1862 the Bureau of Navigation was established, with supervision over the Naval Observatory, Hydrographic Office, Nautical Almanac Office, and the Naval Academy. Recruiting was assigned to the Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting. Detail of officers, which lends itself so readily to political and personal favor, remained in the office of the Secretary. The Civil War demonstrated the fact that, as a general rule, experience cannot be disregarded in the assignment of officers to duty. It is a partial gauge of ability. Accordingly, in 1865, detail of officers was entrusted to the bureau. Later it was charged that a small group of officers ruled in the matter of detail, so that favorites were given the most desirable commands. In order to remove all possible grounds for suspicion, the Secretary of the Navy in 1884 vested the power of assigning officers to a board of bureau chiefs. A year later detail of officers was restored to the bureau.
In 1889 recruiting was assigned to the Bureau of Navigation. Subsequent changes in the organization of the Navy Department ultimately placed all personnel matters under the Bureau of Navigation, so that by the time war with Spain was imminent, the bureau was equipped to handle the vast amount of work incident to providing officers and men for the augmented Navy prior to and during the war.
It is interesting to note how changes in types of ships, methods of propulsion, and armament have caused new ratings to be introduced in order to provide experienced men to supervise the tasks to be performed. In 1860 there were fifty-three ratings in the Navy. Fifteen years later the number increased to fifty-seven. During the next fifteen years eight new ratings were added, making sixty-five in all. The number began to decrease, for at the close of 1897 there was a total of forty-nine. During that year the average enlisted strength was 8,685 men and 1,642 apprentices. As an index to the standards of requirements exacted in recruiting, 28,789 men and 3,595 apprentices applied for enlistment, but only 4,544 men and 701 apprentices were accepted. Of this number, 1,388 were men of continuous service. Recruiting of men for service in the Spanish War did not require a lowering of standards, as will be apparent, for during the year 1898, 82,324 men applied for enlistment and but 16,438 were accepted. During that year, of the non-rated men in general service, 66 per cent were native born, 77 per cent were citizens, and of the remainder, 42 per cent had declared their intentions of becoming citizens. The call to arms also necessitated many additional officers, and they were readily obtained. By October 1, 1898, 856 appointments for temporary service were made. Additional candidates to the number of 194 passed the required examinations but were not commissioned.
The first few years after the Spanish War ushered in a period of naval increase. Vessels of all types were rapidly laid down and constructed. This resulted in more officers and men being required. Many suggestions were made as to how an equitable basis might be established from which to figure the strength of officer personnel. Little more was done, however, than to increase the number of appointments to the Naval Academy. It was a help, but the results were not felt until four years later when the first enlarged class had graduated. Relief was obtained from Congress in the matter of enlisted personnel, however, for in 1908 a law was passed allowing a strength of 38,500. This caused a large influx of non-rated, inexperienced men. In addition, it was necessary to increase the number of petty officers to a great extent. Training became more and more important. It was, in fact, at this time that the era of training started in earnest. The attention of officers everywhere centered upon the task of improving methods of practice, drill, and instruction. So interested were they in the subject that officers freely criticized the methods in vogue, in the hope of finding something better.
Gunnery was the absorbing topic. Although our marksmanship during the Spanish War achieved results, the record was nothing of which to boast. The British had been making wonderful progress in gunnery since about 1895, and results attained by our service suffered greatly by comparison. Captain Percy Scott, R.N., the officer responsible for this marked progress in the British Navy, met and explained the British system of training to Lieutenant William S. Sims while the latter was on duty on the China Station in the opening years of this century. Lieutenant Sims carried his championship of improved methods of gunnery training directly to President Roosevelt, after failure to secure recognition from the Navy Department and the Secretary of the Navy. This bold stroke resulted in Lieutenant Sims becoming inspector of target practice for six and a half years, and the evolution of gunnery to present-day standards.
In the midst of the strenuous efforts to obtain trained men to perform the multiplicity of duties of the new and improved Navy, a new science appeared upon the field. It was aviation. Accepted at first as a novelty of questionable use to the Navy, it soon started serious minds to thinking of the future, and in 1910 it was of sufficient importance to be mentioned in the Secretary’s report for the first time. A year later, aviation development and aviation training were placed under the Bureau of Navigation. During that year, three officers were placed in training and soon qualified as aviators. Late in 1916, on the eve of our participation in the World War, the Navy boasted of nine aviators. There were also sixteen students under training, and a new class of twenty-two students was in process of formation.
Training had progressed so rapidly that in 1917 it had reached a well-organized status, and the Navy was prepared for the intensive training that followed our entry into the war. By this time the requirements for ratings had been thoroughly sifted. During the interval since the termination of the Spanish War, many rates were established and many were cancelled, so that the sum total remaining in 1917 was exactly the same as in 1897, namely, forty-nine.
The training effort expended during the years 1916, 1917, and 1918 is evident from the vast increase in personnel. In June, 1916, there were actually in service 54,234 men. A year later the number had increased to 150,000 enlisted men, 48,000 reserves, and 15,000 Naval Militia and National Naval Volunteers. After eighteen months of war, there were over a half million men in the naval service. In the meanwhile, Congress passed an act authorizing a permanent enlisted force of 131,485 men and 6,000 apprentices. The matter of officer personnel was settled by designating the strength of the line as 4 per cent of the permanent enlisted strength. At that time the number was adequate, but in the years that followed, aviation expanded so rapidly, requiring such a large number of aviators to be recruited from officer personnel, that further expansion will soon become a matter of serious concern.
The years 1919 to 1921 wrought havoc to personnel of the Navy. Officers and men who entered the Navy to serve during the emergency went out by the thousand. Thousands of men were affected by the departure of shipmates and were not satisfied until they had been given special-order discharge. Officers, too, were caught in the current of unrest and hundreds resigned. The loss of experienced men made it necessary to redouble the training effort. Recruiting became difficult and men of lower educational qualities had to be accepted. This made the problem of training increasingly difficult.
The advent of new appliances on shipboard, and the rapid development and improvement of all of the many mechanisms that go to make up the modern fighting ship have placed increased burdens upon all officers. The bureau has endeavored to lighten this burden by expanding the scope of the postgraduate school and by offering other special courses of instruction, besides providing officers with the means for self-education. For the benefit of enlisted personnel, service schools have been greatly increased. Systematic training on board ship has been inaugurated and educational pamphlets are supplied by thousands. During the past three years, a total of fifty-eight different rating courses was printed and supplied; eighty-four general educational courses were also compiled and furnished in large quantities. No efforts are made to require personnel to study; it has not been found necessary. With the limited funds at its disposal, the bureau finds it increasingly difficult to prepare enough courses to meet the demand.
The Navy is a business and industrial institution as well as a fighting machine. It utilizes in some form or other the product of practically every industrial invention. It contributes as much to the welfare of the nation as industry contributes, and only through its existence is the nation’s commerce able to survive. The modern man-of- war and its auxiliary, the naval airplane, are monuments to the skill and perseverance of the engineer. The -efficiency of the Navy and the safety of the nation depend upon the accuracy and reliability of mechanisms, and the skill of those who operate them. The men who furnish the intelligence required to direct the operations of the fighting force must possess a technical background. Future success depends upon their vision, their constructive genius, and their administrative capabilities.
The modern seaman has discarded the marlinspike and the belaying pin and has become the master of tools and instruments of precision. There is no form of labor on board the man-of-war that is not in some degree skilled. The duties of officers and the demands upon their professional resources involve problems of design, construction, administration, and operation. The many and diverse responsibilities of captains and admirals require the exercise of skill, patience, tact, and education. In order to maintain the Navy as an efficient machine, the best talent of the country must be found among the officers and men who conduct the operations, and make the sacrifice to service. Welded together by thorough sympathy and mutual understanding, they attain that reciprocal relationship which stood out preeminently on board the sloop-of-war Oneida in 1870, when rammed and sinking, without sufficient boats to save the crew, officers and men calmly placed the sick in the few boats available for their salvation, then coolly went to their stations to meet death.