Naval Boilers
(See page 685, August, 1928, Proceedings)
Mr. J. H. King, Associate Member, U. S. Naval Institute.—Lieutenant Carl J. Lamb, U.S.N.R., repeats the erroneous statement that appeared in The Engineer, London, and was quoted in the Proceedings of March, 1928, pages 235 and 236, which said, “It is of interest to note that the boilers in both the Saratoga and Lexington—the highest-powered ships ever built—are of British design.” This statement is entirely untrue and it is to be regretted that Lieutenant Lamb should premise on this statement his remarks that “such foreign-designed machinery is subsidizing foreign equipment builders because of the royalty money sent abroad.”
The boilers for the Saratoga were supplied by the Babcock and Wilcox Company of New York, which, as is well known, was founded and is still owned and managed by citizens of the United States. These boilers were designed and built in the United States by the Babcock and Wilcox Company. The Saratoga boilers as well as similar boilers of this type are known as Babcock and Wilcox Express Type Boilers, but this boiler is often referred to as the “White-Forster” boiler.
The original White-Forster boiler was of British design, but many years ago the Babcock and Wilcox Company purchased the right to build and sell the White-Forster boiler, modified the design somewhat to meet the conditions of service in this country, and in addition made a number of specific improvements in design and construction. The modified boiler, as stated, is known as the Babcock and Wilcox Express Type Marine Boiler.
The boilers for the Saratoga are the largest boilers of this type that had, up to the time of installation, ever been built. No British design for boilers of this size and construction was ever made. These boilers are quite different in design from the original White-Forster boiler and were designed and built at the plant of the Babcock and Wilcox Company at Bayonne, New Jersey. Accordingly, not one penny of “royalty money” has been sent abroad.
The boilers on the Lexington are Yarrow boilers, designed and built in the United States. While the writer cannot speak authoritatively, as the boilers were built by another company, nevertheless, it is well known that the original Yarrow patents have expired and it is therefore quite certain that no “royalty money” was sent abroad for the Lexington boilers either.
A large number of the destroyers and scout cruisers are fitted with Babcock and Wilcox Express Type (so-called White-Forster) boilers, all of which, with the exception of those on the now obsolete destroyers Warrington and Mayrant, were entirely designed in the United States and all of the boilers were built in the United States.
The boilers for scout cruisers Nos. 24 to 31 now building are all to be equipped with this same type of boiler and all were designed and built in the United States.
In reference to the boilers for the treaty cruisers Pensacola and Salt Lake City and class, the statement of 700-pounds pressure is erroneous, as Lieutenant Lamb states. These boilers are designed for 300-pounds pressure and no superheat. In regard to these ships not being fitted with boilers for higher pressures, it should be noted that these cruisers are “treaty” cruisers and are limited to a total of 10,000 tons. Obviously, weight and space are paramount and it is essential that all machinery be as light as is possible, consistent with reliability.
The writer has been in close personal contact with these scout cruisers from their design stage and is therefore quite familiar with the facts concerning the selection of boilers for these cruisers. Previous to opening bids, the Bureau of Engineering advocated higher pressures for these ships. However, after a close study was made by the Navy Department and the successful shipbuilding contractor, it became evident that the increased weight, together with the lower boiler efficiency resulting from the higher boiler pressure in this express-type boiler, was not warranted. This situation is perhaps fully covered by the following paragraphs extracted from page 251 of the May, 1928, issue of the Journal of American Society of Naval Engineers:
In the usual express-type boiler, an increase in pressure will result either in an increase in drum thickness or an increase in the ligament between lubes or both. If the drum thickness is increased very much, the weight of the boiler increases and for even a moderate increase in pressure, the plate required may not be practicable to use or even manufacture. With an increase in the ligament, the tube spacing is such that the boiler is not as good a heat strainer and so the boiler efficiency may drop off more in proportion than any possible gain may be obtained by the turbine. Therefore, with the limitations of weight and space required for the Navy, the present express type of boiler practically prohibits higher steam pressure in naval vessels.
The solution of this problem lies in some new design of boiler that will be light, compact, and give a very high boiler efficiency with a resulting low stack temperature. The Babcock and Wilcox Company has been working on this problem for a number of years and expects to be in a position to offer such a boiler in the very near future.
There is absolutely no question of the very great economy to be gained by the use of higher pressures and temperatures in steam machinery. It is certainly to be expected that in the near future machinery will be designed that will meet the naval requirements of minimum weight and space so that the resulting economies with higher steam pressures and temperatures will be available for the Navy as they already are for merchant ships.
The Old Naval Auxiliary Service
(See page 592, July, 1928, Proceedings)
Brockholst Livingston.—Commander Whitted’s article brings to my mind the loss of the collier Cyclops in March, 1918. My father was then assigned to Barbados as consul. It was on a Sunday afternoon, March 3, if I remember correctly, that I sighted an odd-looking vessel entering Carlisle Bay. From pictures I had seen, I recognized her to be a naval collier. The signal station confirmed my belief. The consul immediately went on board and informed us upon his return that the ship was the Cyclops, bound from South America to “a port in the United States.” She carried, as we all now know, a full cargo of manganese ore. She had touched at Barbados to take on bunker coal. One engine also was out of commission, I believe.
Upon my return from school the next afternoon, I found the master, George W. Worley, Assistant Surgeon Burt J. Asper, and Counsul General A. Moreau Gottschalk, of Rio de Janeiro, at the consulate for tea. Mr. Gottschalk was a passenger, as were also a number of prisoners from the then- existing South Atlantic squadron. Everyone seemed anxious to be back home. No one, of course, thought there was any danger in the voyage. Before leaving, the men signed my sister’s autograph book and their signatures are probably the latest ones in existence.
About five o’clock our guests left and we watched them from the beach as they went on board. There were some blasts on the whistle and the Cyclops backed. Then, going ahead, she steamed south. We did not consider this course odd until a few weeks later we got a cable requesting full details of her visit to Barbados. The Cyclops was missing! No estimate of the situation was ever more thorough in “possible courses” than the one in this case. The master was German, the majority said. She had been sunk by the enemy, others volunteered. A dozen suggestions were made by amateurs, and all proved false. That she disappeared from natural causes is undoubtedly true. The absolute truth will perhaps never be known until the day when the seas roll back. The loss of life was great on this ship, 309 men losing their lives.
We have been told that position reports were sent in by the Cyclops after she left Barbados, but ex-Secretary Daniels, in his book, states that the last message received was the notice of her arrival at Barbados. The records of the Navy Department can clear up this question.
The visit of the Cyclops brought Barbados near to the war. We then felt we were not completely out of the picture. The “home guard.” even became more alert, expecting a raid from the enemy craft that had supposedly destroyed "this valuable vessel. However, we never were paid the expected visit and we soon settled down to the routine of a self-satisfied island.
Commander Whitted concludes his article with the advice that “should a shortage of naval officers and men occur again and our auxiliaries have to be manned from other sources, reserve officers and reserve crews should be used.” He is undoubtedly correct. It is this possibility that makes it imperative for us to “get going” on our merchant marine reserve and have the members sufficiently indoctrinated in naval procedure to become a part of the train in war time without endangering the whole fleet through lack of knowledge. Congress is getting more generous, but it still has a long way to go.
A Naval Research Reserve
(See page 976, November, 1928, Proceedings)
Commander N. H. Heck, U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey.—It is necessary to state my background with reference to the proposal of Captain McDowell in order that my viewpoint may be understood. My war experience was at the New London Naval Experimental Station as third in rank and responsibility under Captain McDowell for a considerable period and later I was associated with him at London Naval Headquarters. Since the war my duty in the Coast and Geodetic Survey has included application of methods developed during the war to speed up wire-drag work in the location of submerged pinnacle rocks and to the application of radio acoustic position determination and echo sounding to hydrography. At the present time I am in charge of the work in terrestrial magnetism and seismology. As a member of the division of physical sciences of the National Research Council and secretary of the section of engineering of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, I am brought into close contact with many of those concerned in the problem of a naval research reserve.
T A brief review of the development of the Naval Experimental Station will bring out some points of value. It was developed in the emergency from almost nothing in personnel and material and with only a limited amount of preliminary research work elsewhere in the special problems. In a comparatively short time it was functioning and much valuable work was done, but there was much lost motion and many things were ineffectively done under great pressure which should have been finished before. As an illustration a member of one of the cooperating electrical companies was asked by me why certain apparatus put into use was only partially effective. He replied that in peace time five years would be required for experiment and test of such an apparatus while only a few months had been available in war time.
Obviously the same situation cannot arise again with the Naval Research Laboratory at Anacostia to serve as a nucleus for the development of such an organization as might be needed in emergency. This organization is doing useful work on naval problems, though restricted by limited appropriations. With all the work that can be done there and elsewhere in all the various activities of the Navy, naval problems have grown in complication so that without some such plan as that proposed another emergency might find the same relative situation. An obvious example of an increase in complexity is the very different needs of antisubmarine defense as compared with 1917. It is essential that all important problems be solved in peace time and that only new problems be left for the emergency since in most naval wars no such time is available as there was in the last war. No one in this country wants war but it is the duty of the Navy to be prepared.
It will not be as easy to organize an effective research reserve as it has been for the other branches. There are scarcely two types of man whose training and methods are so far apart as the line officer and the research worker. One cannot become a specialist and the other must do so in order to succeed. One must produce immediate results under difficult conditions and the other is open to the criticism of omitting some consideration if he produces results too quickly, and often a year of study must be spent on a problem. A characteristic naval attitude was that of an officer commanding a naval destroyer in European waters during the antisubmarine campaign. He strongly resented the necessity of remaining in port for the installation of antisubmarine devices. A little later after a few successes he wanted to know why these had not been installed long before.
The form of organization suggested by Captain Nimitz is necessary. He realizes the differences in viewpoint that I have mentioned and makes it clear that not every type of naval officer can be effective in this duty. Understanding and patience are two essential requirements. The research worker has certain peculiarities, often an intense individualism and a single-track mind. Organization of research is tending to change this but there are some research workers who would not fit into the proposed plan.
I realize Dean Probert’s viewpoint in his comments in the November number when he states that rank and recognition are relatively unimportant. He means that the research worker is not interested in this part of the problem. I am compelled to take issue with him in both matters. A research reserve officer can accomplish little and would soon become dissatisfied unless his rank is appropriate to the character of his work. His very position on board a battleship is dependent on his rank. It seems doubtful to me whether the plan can become wholly successful unless there is provision for rank above lieutenant commander in a limited number of cases. As to recognition research workers are human and they are all appreciative of recognition. I know several prominent scientists who would be happier today if their important contributions to the Navy during the war had been recognized. The restriction of medals and other forms of special recognition to the regular naval personnel as was almost entirely the case in the World War will have to be changed if full success in the proposed plan is to expected.
Captain McDowell has emphasized the important results of such investigation in the solution of problems important to the merchant marine and to commerce and industry in general. There is no doubt that there would be such results. However the aim should be the solution of naval problems. Very often a slight change in an already organized research would solve a naval problem. I believe that constitutional authorities hold that the function of the Navy is to provide for the common defense and only indirectly to promote the general welfare.
The relation with private research should not be carried too far. American individualism should be preserved and organized research tends to lose some of it. There is a strong tendency for the scientific branches of the government to restrict investigations to matters of immediate practical value. If this were applied to research as a whole the work would eventually come to an end. At New London many new facts were found about the physics of sound and it became necessary for one investigator to stop his work on applications and to devote most of his time to pure research in order that his colleagues might not go in a wrong direction.
It is essential to the success of the plan that a liberal and correct policy with regard to patents be worked out if this has not already been done.
The relation of the National Research Council to the proposed plan is important and full utilization of its resources by the Navy in this matter would be of mutual benefit. In the executive order of President Wilson of May n, 1918, it is stated among other things that its purpose is to direct the attention of scientific and technical investigators to the present importance of military and industrial problems in connection with the war and to aid in the solution of these problems by organizing specific researches.
In conclusion it seems to me that Captain McDowell has found the solution to the problem of obtaining from the work of research laboratories and university investigations results of great importance to the Navy. The Navy’s problems are difficult but they are not incapable of solution provided there is thorough analysis, and a desire to solve them.
The invention of Greek fire was stated to have been worth thousands of men in the first naval defense of Constantinople in 717; the availability of antisubmarine methods in use at the end of the war, in 1915 would have produced incalculable changes in history. The utilization of the immense resources of the country in the solution of naval problems may add immeasurably to the strength of the Navy without commensurate increase in cost.