British and German Battle Cruisers Maneuver at Close Range on the Eve of Hostilities
In the forenoon of August 4, 1914, two British battle cruisers, Indomitable and Indefatigable, at a speed of twenty-two knots on a westerly course, were searching the waters of the Mediterranean for the German battle cruiser Goeben and her consort, the light cruiser Breslau. France and Germany were at war but England was still hesitating. Early that morning the German cruisers had fired the opening shots of the naval war by bombarding French shipping and shore establishments at Bona and Philippeville on the North African coast. The Goeben and Breslau were now withdrawing on easterly courses toward Messina, and by coincidence were heading almost directly for the approaching British battle cruisers. Visibility was excellent across a tranquil sea under a pleasant sky. The stage was set for a dramatic encounter. The attending circumstances were such as to cause naval officers to ponder.
The two British battle cruisers were under command of Captain Kennedy in the Indomitable. They were part of the English Mediterranean fleet of three battle cruisers, four armored cruisers, four light cruisers, and sixteen destroyers based on Malta. The instructions under which Captain Kennedy was operating were in brief: to shadow the German cruisers wherever they went; to prevent their escape via Gibraltar; to cover French troop transportation from Africa; to protect trade in the east basin of the Mediterranean; and to be ready to act upon the opening of hostilities between England and Germany, which was imminent.
There was also to be considered the following telegram sent from London on August 2:
Admiralty
To Commanders-in-Chief, all stations.
Today, August 2, at 2:20 the following note was handed to the French and German Ambassadors. (Begins) The British Government would not allow the passage of German ships through the English Channel or the North Sea in order to attack the coasts or shipping of France. (Ends) Be prepared to meet surprise attacks.
On the German side, Vice Admiral Souchon, flying his flag in the Goeben, had received secret instructions to proceed at all possible speed to Constantinople. The Goeben was short of coal, however, and the German cruisers were en route to Messina to refuel before making a break for the Dardanelles.
At this particular time Admiral Souchon was in a tight corner. A potential enemy, the British fleet, was to the eastward, and an active enemy, the entire French fleet, was to the westward. Caught between the two he was cut off from German and Austrian bases, and had only neutral ports in which to seek refuge in the comparatively narrow waters of the Mediterranean. But the so-called “Goeben luck” had already begun to operate in his favor.
In early morning of this day, when Admiral Souchon announced his whereabouts by the bombardments of Bona and Philippeville, the French fleet, also in search of the two German cruisers, was conducting a sweep to the south in three groups. The east group was heading for Phillippeville, the center group for Algiers, and the west group for Oran. At 6:30 the French commander-in-chief, Vice Admiral Lapeyrere, had signaled to Vice Admiral Chochepret, commanding the eastern group of six battleships, three armored cruisers, and twelve destroyers: “Bona attacked this morning by German cruisers. Maneuver so as to make contact as quickly as possible and to combat them.”
Admiral Chochepret at once changed course for Bona and increased speed. At 8:00 a.m. this eastern group was so situated, forty-two miles to the northwest of the Goeben, that, had course and speed been maintained, the two enemies would have met at 10:00 a. m. Also Captain Kennedy with the two British cruisers then would have been only twenty miles to the east and approaching at a speed of twenty-two knots.
In this critical situation Admiral Lapeyrere made an important change of plan. One hour and fifteen minutes after he had sent the message to the commander of the east group to make contact with and combat the German cruisers, he received a radio in plain language saying that the German cruiser that had attacked Philippeville was continuing west at full speed. Although it was suspected that this message might be of enemy origin it apparently influenced the French commander-in-chief to modify the previous instructions to Vice Admiral Chochepret by the following order, sent at 7:30 a.m.: “Make course for Algiers as rapidly as condition of Mirabeau will permit.”
Of this sudden change of plan, Admiral Lapeyrere has said: “I gave order to the eastern group to change from course for Philippeville and to head for Algiers at all possible speed in order to bar the passage of the enemy to the open sea.”
Twenty minutes later, at about 8:00 a.m., Vice Admiral Chochepret received this order to proceed to Algiers, and the entire east group executed the required ninety degree change of course. The three cruisers now advanced and deployed ahead, while the battleships and destroyers continued in close formation. As the distance between ships in the cruiser line was extended only 3,200 yards, the track of the inshore ship on the extended flank was about four miles south of the track of the battleships. At 9:15 a.m., the Goeben passed approximately twenty miles from this cruiser. Visibility was about fifteen miles, so, within the limits of navigational errors the margin of escape from a sight contact was about five miles.
It was an extraordinary piece of luck for Admiral Souchon that this abrupt change in the French plan was made just in time to prevent a contact between the Goeben and the east group under Vice Admiral Chochepret. It was also a stroke of good fortune for the German side that the French formation was comparatively compact. Had the French cruisers and destroyers been sent out ahead to do a little scouting they could hardly have failed to find the enemy. It is true that the slower French capital ships might not have been able to bring the faster Goeben to immediate action, but the destroyers had superior speed and could not have been shaken off. They would have had favorable opportunity later on to make night torpedo attacks. Even had the German cruisers succeeded in reaching Messina, definite knowledge of their whereabouts, combined with the presence of French destroyers and cruisers in the vicinity of the west entrance, would have rendered Admiral Souchon’s subsequent break for the Dardanelles an almost hopeless venture.
Notwithstanding these factors of a modified French plan and inadequate French search operations, the Goeben and Breslau were not yet out of difficulty. They had evaded one enemy only to become involved with another. While these maneuvers were being made in the west, the British battle cruisers Indomitable and Indefatigable were approaching at high speed from the east. Captain Kennedy had wisely laid a course well offshore, and at 10:35 a.m., the Goeben was sighted almost directly ahead. Admiral Souchon made a turn to port, and Captain Kennedy promptly replied with an alteration to starboard in order to close. The Goeben then turned back to starboard and the ships passed each other on opposite courses at a distance of about 8,000 yards. England had not yet entered the war, but the break was imminent and the prospective enemies watched each other’s movements closely. The guns on both sides were loaded and the crews were at battle stations, but the turrets remained in the position of secure, trained fore and aft. The usual salutes of courtesy were not exchanged.
Vice Admiral Souchon at first thought that Admiral Milne was on board one of the battle cruisers. In that case, as the English admiral was senior, the Goeben should have fired the first salute. The German narrative written by Ludwig says that Admiral Souchon contemplated sending a signal to explain that no salute was being fired because the guns were all loaded. In the end he decided not to do this. It may be that as the ships approached each other, it was noted that neither of the British vessels was flying an admiral’s flag. As a matter of fact, the German commander was the senior and, if courtesies were to be exchanged, it was for Captain Kennedy to fire the first salute. The ships passed in silence. Then the two British battle cruisers countermarched in a wide circle and proceeded to shadow with the Indomitable on the Goeben’s starboard quarter, and the Indefatigable on her port quarter.
This was the second dramatic encounter at sea that had taken place between warships soon to become enemies in the World War. A few days earlier the French dreadnoughts France and Jean Bart were returning from Russia with the president of the republic, several ministers and other officials on board, when, on July 31, the German High Sea Fleet was met in the North Sea. At this time it was known that there was no hope of avoiding war. Germany had it within her power to destroy at one blow the governmental leaders of her future enemy together with their two newest and most valuable warships. For the French, the situation was the more embarrassing because the guns of the new dreadnought France were without breech blocks and without ammunition. After an anxious interval the German flagship saluted the standard of the French president with twenty-one guns, and the salute was immediately returned gun for gun.
In the Mediterranean meeting, Admiral Souchon probably had a more narrow escape than he realized at the time. Captain Kennedy at once reported that he was shadowing the Goeben, and the information was forwarded to London. Upon receiving it, the first lord of the Admiralty submitted the following memorandum:
(Most Urgent)
Prime Minister Sir Edward Grey.
German battle cruiser Goeben and fast light cruiser Breslau have been found west of Sicily and are being shadowed by British battle cruisers Indomitable and Indefatigable. It would be a great misfortune to lose these vessels as is possible in ' the dark hours. She is evidently going to interfere with the French transports which are crossing today. The following telegram has already been sent: “Good. Hold her. War imminent.” We wish to add to this: “If Goeben attacks French transports, you should at once engage her.” An immediate decision is required.
W.S.C.”
The prime minister, Sir Edward Grey, agreed to Mr. Churchill’s suggestion and the Admiralty at once sent to Captain Kennedy the order:
If Goeben attacks French transports, you should at once engage her. You should give her fair warning of this before hand.
While this message was being framed and transmitted, the chase continued in the direction of Messina. The German ships showed their speed superiority; in the afternoon the Goeben made over twenty-five knots and for a time exceeded the speed she had made on her endurance tests. The British battle cruisers had difficulty in making twenty-three knots; they were shorthanded and since the evening before had been under the strain of steaming at twenty-two knots. The Indomitable also was in need of overhaul and she soon began to drop astern. The Indefatigable was able to do better, but shortly after 4:00 p.m., she also lost sight of the quarry. It was about this time that the authorization to engage the Goeben if she attacked the French transports was received.
To get the full purport of this message it should be read in conjunction with the previous telegram sent on August 2:
Admiralty
To Commanders-in-Chief, all stations.
Today, August 2, at 2:20 the following note was handed to the French and German Ambassadors. (Begins) The British Government would not allow the passage of German ships through the English Channel or the North Sea in order to attack the coasts or shipping of France. (Ends). Be prepared to meet surprise attacks.
The note quoted in the above message was a solemn warning in the nature of an ultimatum that had been sent to Germany two days before. Although the Goeben had passed through the North Sea long before this note was written, and although no mention was made of the zone in the Mediterranean also under British surveillance in accord with the Anglo-French naval entente, the same principle was involved. The outstanding fact was that the Goeben had attacked the colonial possessions and shipping of France. The German government had had plenty of time to communicate to Admiral Souchon the contents of the note of August 2. Did it or did it not apply? Had Captain Kennedy sunk the Goeben it is a question to what extent, if at all, the integrity of Great Britain would have been compromised. The decision to sink the Goeben, however, would have carried a heavy weight of responsibility, and Captain Kennedy cannot be criticized for not having made it. At that time he could not have foreseen that the Goeben was destined to escape and do such unusual damage to the Allied cause.
The wording of the authorization to engage Goeben if she attacked French transports is not entirely free from ambiguity. Did the Goeben have to be caught in the act? Did the bombardment of ports of embarkation and vessels within them constitute an attack on French transports? It would have been, perhaps, a liberal interpretation to have so termed it.
Nevertheless, at the time of this first encounter with the Goeben, which took place fifty miles off Bona at 10:53 a.m., August 4, had Captain Kennedy had before him both these messages, they would have supplied grounds for engaging the German ships in battle after having given them a fair warning.
The vindication of Captain Kennedy’s decision not to attack is found in a later Admiralty message. Following a cabinet meeting held in London this same afternoon, a telegram was despatched that reached Admiral Milne, British commander- in-chief in the Mediterranean, at 7:00 p.m.:
Admiralty
To All Ships, August 4, 2:50 p.m.
The British ultimatum to Germany will expire at midnight, Greenwich Mean Time, August 4. No act of war should be committed before that hour, at which time the telegram to commence hostilities against Germany will be dispatched from the Admiralty. Special addition to Mediterranean, Indomitable, Indefatigable. This cancels the authorization to Indomitable and Indefatigable to engage Goeben if she attacks French transports.
In view of the Admiralty instructions to cover troop transports and to bar the way to Gibraltar, Captain Kennedy’s tactics at the time of his meeting with the Goeben cannot be criticized. The Goeben first turned to the left and then to the right, making it quite clear that Admiral Souchon wished to pass to the east. Had Captain Kennedy been free to parallel her course at once and maneuver to keep ahead, then the Goeben either would have been compelled to go to the west or accept the company of the British to the east for a much longer period. The 108 mile wide passage between Sardinia and Africa would not have permitted a wide detour, and, in the time available, it is doubtful if the German ships could have made sufficient speed both to overhaul and to outdistance the British cruisers. Had Captain Kennedy known that no transports were at sea, and that the entire French fleet was between him and Gibraltar, he would have had arguments that might have justified the adoption of different tactics; but he did not have this important information. The Admiralty orders were explicit: to cover troop transports ; and to bar the way to Gibraltar. Instead of holding the British ships to the eastward between the enemy and his objective, Captain Kennedy had to turn up astern of the Goeben and thus give the Germans a lead in the race which otherwise might only have been acquired after many hours of hard steaming.
In the German tactics used in this phase there is little to comment upon. Admiral Souchon has been criticized for permitting the British battle cruisers to pass so close aboard, but the only way to have prevented it would have been to flee to the west toward the French fleet and away from his goal, Turkish waters. With Sardinia fifty miles to the north and the African coast fifty miles to the south, he did not have sea-room for a wide detour to avoid the British. The German admiral estimated that the French fleet might be close at hand, en route for Bizerta. Also the Goeben did not have much coal, and time had already been lost in the feint to the west to deceive the French.
Although a British light cruiser was later on despatched from Bizerta to join in the work of shadowing the German cruisers, at nightfall Admiral Souchon succeeded in shaking off all his pursuers, and as the entrances to Messina were not being watched, he was able to make that port and leave his enemies still in doubt as to his whereabouts. This evasion paved the way for the subsequent successful break made by the Goeben and Breslau for the Dardanelles. The episode herein discussed was only one of a series of adventures that attended the strange and historic cruise of these lucky vessels.
All authorities agree that the arrival of the German cruisers at Constantinople had an important bearing on the course of the war, especially in the Balkan area; but opinions differ as to the extent of this influence. Mr. Morganthau, United States ambassador to Turkey at this time, has recorded in his memoirs:
I doubt if two vessels have ever played a similar role in history. Their entry into the Dardanelles, by sealing definitely the Turko-German alliance, was the logical sequel of all the intrigues and machinations that had been plotted during three years by Mr. Wangenheim, representative of William II at Constantinople…It was for this that the war has lasted so many years, because it was the decisive event that separated Russia from the Allies, which led to her defeat and downfall.
In reference to the escape of the Goeben and Breslau, Admiral Tirpitz, Germany’s well-known minister of marine, has written: “The whole Turkish question received its definite favorable ending through the breaking through.” General Ludendorf has given his opinion: “The entry of Turkey as an ally permitted Germany to continue the war two more years.”
Mr. Winston Churchill, then first lord of the British Admiralty, has expressed himself in his book, The World Crisis:
The Goeben was carrying with her for the peoples of the East and Middle East more slaughter, more misery, and more ruin than has ever before been borne within the compass of a ship…The evening of the tenth she entered the Dardanelles and the curse descended irrevocably upon Turkey and the East…Two parties were struggling for mastery in the capital, but in view of the Treaty of Alliance which had been signed on August 2, there could have been no doubt about the outcome. Moreover, in the Goeben and Breslau, to say nothing of the Turkish Fleet, Enver Pasha and the war party had the means to force the Turkish Government to adhere to the covenants which they had entered into on her behalf.
What would have transpired had the Goeben and Breslau been captured or destroyed by the French and British fleets is a question that can never be definitely answered ; but it is not necessary to exaggerate the influence on the war exerted by the escape of these two cruisers. Without theorizing, certain positive results of Admiral Souchon’s strategic victory can be stated: although a secret treaty of alliance with Germany had been signed on August 2, it was the arrival of the German squadron that forced Turkey’s hand and hastened her entrance into the war as an active belligerent ; the accession of two modern cruisers, fully manned by a trained personnel, transformed the almost negligible Turkish Navy into an effective force that supported the shore defense of the Dardanelles throughout the war and controlled essential water communications from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea; this Turko-German “fleet in being” compelled the Allies to maintain a considerable force on blockade duty at the entrance to the Dardanelles; in the person of Vice Admiral Souchon, the Turkish fleet received a commander-in-chief who was a competent organizer, and both the land and sea forces were thus brought under coordinated German control; during the first months of the war, when various Balkan states were divided in council and wavering in inclination, some parties favoring one side and some the other, these early German naval successes exercised considerable political influence; the achievements of Admiral Souchon were exploited to gain allies for Germany, while the friends of France, England, and Russia were depressed by a growing appreciation of the fact that in the escape of the Goeben and Breslau Allied sea power had suffered a defeat that carried unforeseen and sinister consequences.
In the light of knowledge after the event, a feature of this campaign that holds the imagination is the fact that for a brief period in that forenoon of August 4, the Goeben and Breslau at short range were practically within the power of a superior British force. Captain Kennedy had almost, but not quite enough, grounds to justify a decision to open fire and end then and there the career of the Goeben. We now know what a great service would have been done for the Allied cause, what a saving in lives and in money would have resulted, had he availed himself of this opportunity.
But without this knowledge, acquired after the escape of the Goeben and the development of its unforeseen consequences, suppose Captain Kennedy had stretched a point and destroyed the Goeben? What then? In the temper of the time general opinion probably would have been: “What a shame to have done prematurely what was sure to have been accomplished a little later on with perfect propriety after the declaration of war.” The award for the responsible naval officer would most likely have been a court-martial and general opprobrium. But this is conjecture and when one breaks away from the anchor of fact, wanderings become aimless. There is enough to think about in this episode without entering into the realm of fancy.