Cruiser Types
(See page 278, March, 1927, Proceedings)
Captain H. C. Dinger, U.S.N.—This article gives a readable and interesting discussion of cruiser types and employment, and, as such, it is of interest and value, but the conclusions reached do not appear to be in agreement with the best authoritative views. Our cruiser building program, as well as that of the other leading naval powers, has been decided upon after much deliberation by authorities that should be very well informed on the matter. A thorough study of the situation would apparently indicate that the type of cruiser so generally decided upon is a sound one.
The question of cruiser types has been discussed for years. There has not been much unanimity about it and those that have been built have been fantastic and heterogeneous, based on fads, fancies, and the whims of amateurs. In this, France has given us more variety than any other country. The purpose of a battleship has come to be rather clearly understood and designs have been evolved which have applied sound engineering principles and skill to solve this problem as best it may. With cruisers there has been no definite crystallization of careful military thought in regard to the characteristics of cruisers. Until very recently most of the cruisers built have been but indifferently designed for the essential purposes that a cruiser is to carry out in war.
A cruiser visualizes a vessel of speed and of considerable radius of action, with an armament capable of meeting small craft or vessels of the same type, but not a vessel intended to fight battleships. Such a vessel should have some fairly heavy guns, but if these are assigned, there is not much weight left for protection and armor. In fact, real protective armor is out of the question. Cruisers are now limited to 10,000 tons and to eight-inch guns; and, in fact, this is about as large a displacement and as heavy a gun as appears desirable for a vessel of this type; a somewhat less displacement might even fill the bill.
Cruisers are costly; no navy can afford to have a very large number. Is it better to have half a dozen different types, as the author seems to think, or one type that, after due consideration, appears best to meet cruiser needs? I think the answer is, one type, unless we are to build more than twenty. Under present conditions, this means a 10,000-ton ship with eight-inch guns. We may shuffle the cards as to high speed and radius; more guns or less ammunition, and curtail everything to give some armor protection. However, any considerable armor is inconsistent with heavy guns, reasonable ammunition supply, high speed, and great endurance. Something has to be left off and that something is obviously armor protection. If some measure of protection can be given by special construction without requiring much weight, well and good, but an armor belt or heavy protective decks are out of the question in a properly designed cruiser.
The so-called armored cruiser is neither one thing nor the other. It is not a desirable design and has not shown itself so. A considerable number were built but they never filled any really important role. The light cruiser has a primary role as scout and as screening vessel for the fleet and a secondary role as convoy vessel, raider and commerce destroyer. The armored cruiser is larger and more costly than required for this purpose and has neither the speed nor the endurance essential to this role.
New additions to our Navy should be made in consideration of what serviceable vessels we already have, so as to round out the fleet and make it as effective as possible. We have battleships, a generous number of destroyers and submarines. The Navy is weak in modern cruisers and has no destroyer leaders. Here are essential needs. A few destroyer leaders will tend to make our destroyer force more potent and a suitable number of light cruisers will add to the effectiveness of our battle fleet. After much consideration, our naval authorities have adopted a type of light cruiser of 10,000 tons, a rather heavy armament of eight- inch guns, high speed and large steaming radius, but with relatively little or no armor protection. This type is also being built by the leading foreign powers. As a type, this, by weight of authority, appears to be the one that best meets the apparent needs. The details of such a design may, of course, be open to possible improvements. Personally, I think they are, perhaps, too heavily gunned at the expense of ammunition supply. Their steaming radius could be improved by utilizing more economical machinery, and by using three instead of four shafts, various very desirable advantages would be gained. But the type is sound and appears to be the only one that the United States should be engaged in building at the present time.
This author appears to base his observation on a rather rosy ideal of plenty of funds and the possibility of building a considerable number of vessels of varying types. If we look facts in the face and give reason some sway, we will come to the conclusion that this day-dream of prolific funds for navies in times of peace will only remain a dream, for at least some years. We may, with reasonable hope, expect a yearly appropriation of about $350,000,000, and possibly as much as $50,000,000 of this may be spent for new construction. With this in view, we cannot seriously plan for a multiplicity of cruiser types. As a matter of fact, everything but the light cruiser of from 5,000 to 10,000 tons and a limited number of destroyer leaders is out of the picture. We are now concentrating on light cruisers of 10,000 tons with a building project of eight of them. This represents the total new construction program of combatant surface vessels authorized for the Navy since the World War. Some destroyer leaders are also very desirable. The most effective and economical design to fill this particular role should be used; it will be well under 3,000 tons displacement. Outside of our battleships, the most valuable naval force we have are our three hundred destroyers. The leaders will make this destroyer force more valuable. It would be quite inadvisable to start the building of numerous other cruiser types which would be more or less side issues.
The author discusses the various fields of cruiser activities and then finds that the cruiser type now being built by all the principal navies is a questionable one. A true cruiser is necessarily a rather unprotected vessel and the memorable words of Farragut, “Our best defense is the well directed fire of our own guns,” applies. Protection involving any considerable weight on cruisers, fast mine layers, and destroyers, is simply out of the question. A cruiser needs speed, endurance, and a well designed and well placed battery much more than armor protection. Protection is only a half-way measure at best, which, in the design of light, high speed vessels, must be given but secondary consideration and which cannot be allowed any considerable weight.
The author repeatedly refers to acceleration of speed, but does not explain what is meant thereby. Possibly this refers to special types of machinery. All of our modern ships are quite satisfactory in this regard and there is no particular difference between different types of machinery, such as electric drive, direct turbine drive and geared turbine drive. For light cruisers neither electric drive nor oil engines, except as an auxiliary and cruising installation, can be seriously considered at the present time from a practical engineering viewpoint.
Convoying and commerce protection is also stressed. Convoying and commerce protection may have to be resorted to in future wars by the United States; but, on the other hand, depending upon the enemy, his forces and manner in which they are used, it may not be required. It is not likely to be as vital as it was to England and France in the World War. Commerce can be protected by improvised means when such a course is necessary and it appears to be more advisable to spend our limited current funds upon vessels that can be used definitely for offensive as well as defensive activities. We cannot afford to dissipate our very limited funds upon types that have merely an incidental military value.
Destroyer Scout.—This vessel would be something like the proposed destroyer leader, though not so fast; hence, it could not really fill this important role. It would appear that there is some reasonable need for certain number of destroyer leaders, but there is comparatively small justification for a 3,000-ton cruiser of thirty-two knots speed. If such a vessel is to exercise the function of a destroyer leader, it should have the speed of our destroyers, which should certainly be somewhat more than thirty- three knots. As long as we have in service numerous old cruisers that are more economical to maintain, it is not necessary to use these new vessels for the so-called gunboat duty; but, when wanted, a vessel specially designed as a destroyer leader can perform such duty fully as well as the proposed destroyer scout. Such a vessel is too large and too slow to function properly as a destroyer leader and too small in size and cruising radius to perform full cruiser service.
Scouting.—Under this heading, reference is made to the ability of a vessel to work up to maximum speed, as being dependent upon the type of vessel and design of power plant. This may create an erroneous impression. As far as I know, any of our steam naval vessels can get underway in fifteen or twenty minutes and in an emergency could work up to full speed conditions within an hour. All our recent designs are quite satisfactory in this respect and there is no great difference among any of our high powered vessels in regard to this matter. The so-called rate of acceleration is more largely a function of the operating personnel than anything else. Certainly there is no essential difference in the rate of acceleration between a thirty-two knot and a thirty-five knot vessel and the chances are that the thirty-five knot vessel would attain the speed of thirty-two knots quicker than a thirty-two knot vessel would. The Diesel engine has some advantage in being more ready in stand-by condition, but these are out of the picture for the main drive of cruisers.
As to the twenty-four-inch torpedo, why stop at that? A thirty-inch would be bigger and might be built. However, the twenty- one-inch torpedo was not developed over night. The author does not state wherein the twenty-four-inch torpedo may be superior to the present torpedoes. Why have only one plane; would not two be better? As long as we have the gear necessary to service one, the additional plane itself would not add much weight.
The assumption that the smaller vessel will see the larger one first is only fathered by hope. A 100 per cent difference in displacement is not likely to affect this very much.
Coastal Motor Boat Carriers.—The use and efficiency of such a vessel seems rather hazy. Why spend money on types that have no clear and definite purpose, when there are inadequate funds for truly essential types, such as light cruisers and destroyer leaders. The author seems to think this venture might not be practicable until appropriations are more generous. However, it is almost as unjustifiable to waste money when the appropriations are large, as it is when they are small.
Armored Cruiser.—These designs have been the embodiment of ingenious endeavors to get something for nothing. These vessels cannot fight in line with the battleships and are too big and ordinarily slow to go with the cruisers. There is no particularly essential fighting service for vessels of this type, except in fanciful roles and hence they are used for anything that comes along; often for services that a much less expensive vessel could render fully as well. When they are available, they are used, and so is anything else that happens to be around. The statement that the cost of building and maintaining an armored cruiser would be less than a scout cruiser cannot be accepted without examination. If the armored cruiser is to be large, heavily armored, thoroughly protected and of moderate speed— say twenty-five or thirty knots—she will be more costly than the type of vessel known as a light or scout cruiser, 5,000 to 10,000 tons displacement, thirty knots or more. The author further states the scout cruiser is admittedly an unsound type. Is this the reason that the six foremost naval powers have these as one of the principal items of their building programs? I fear the armored cruiser is more nearly of the unsound type, and none have been laid down anywhere since before the World War. At best, the armored cruiser is a weakly designed battleship and an uneconomical design to adopt.
There appears to be a definite place in our fleet for the capital ship, the airplane carrier, the light or scout cruiser, the destroyer and destroyer leader, submarines, and minelaying vessels. Any of the older types of cruiser, if still in good material condition, can be used for convoy and scouting work and will be so used, together with converted passenger vessels. It is not justifiable to build new vessels for this type of service until after the demands of the essential vessels for the fleet—the six types first mentioned—have been met. This practically means that armored cruisers and cruisers for convoy work would never be built as such from new designs. We would use our partially obsolete and made-over vessels in this field and devote funds for new construction to the more essential types. This appears to be the more logical way of spending any money Congress may see fit to give the Navy for new construction. We have a cruiser building program, but, as yet, no destroyer leaders are authorized. There is essential need for this type and it is hoped, now that cruisers have been provided for, that some destroyer leaders will be authorized in the next naval bill. It is believed undesirable for the Navy to sponsor the building of a considerable variety of types. If this is done the arguments for the different types weaken each other and nothing is achieved. Let us have some real definite and consistent aim in our new construction program.
Nanking, March 24, 1927
(See page I, January, 1928, Proceedings)
Mr. W. C. Lowdermilk, formerly Professor of Forestry, University of Nanking. —The United States Naval Institute Proceedings (January, 1928) was sent to us at Pasadena and on my way up here by train I read with great interest Captain Smith’s account of the Nanking affair. Having been through it from the beginning to the end it was a very interesting account to me. It happened that I was with Dr. Williams when he was shot; he fell at my feet. I expected to be shot at the same time. I telephoned Consul Davis of it; then on that terrible Thursday evening, after the barrage which stopped all attacks on us, the ultimatum issued from the river induced the Chinese military authorities to send us an escort of a subordinate officer and four small Cantonese soldiers to go with the two automobiles which my assistant had secured, to look up the missing foreigners. Dr. Bowen called on me to go, so I first went to the American consulate to get in touch with Davis for he had not heard that Davis had been attacked, nor of the Socony Hill incident; in fact we had received no news at all. I found the consulate looted, with papers of Consul Davis’ office strewn all about. Then I hurried back into the Hansemen gate section where I knew some twenty foreigners were hidden and spent until 10:30 a.m. hunting for them. The local Chinese feared treachery and would not give out any information until finally I was able to locate Anna Moffett, who had been shot twice, had lain in her own blood since 7:00 a.m., and might have suffered serious consequences had I not found her. Next day I rounded up other foreigners in scattered parts of the city. Then with W. P. Roberts, I got in touch with the gunboats, but it was the Japanese landing party which relayed our signal to the American destroyer to inform Admiral Hough that we wanted to go aboard to report.
Those were stirring days in Nanking. It seems that the United States takes all sorts of insults, with no come back. Personally I think that if the general who was responsible for that outrage had been dealt with at the time in a summary manner, some good might have been done; as it is, the foreigners lost “face,” prestige, and respect. The soldiers are insulting and are not controlled. It is a difficult situation I know, but the voice of those naval guns was something that was clearly understood, without explanation. Immediately after the barrage began the looting troops and a platoon that were making an attack on eighty of us with a demand of $1,000 a head or death to us were called off by bugles and whistles.