“War is simply a political movement . . . .”—Mahan
CERTAIN questions arise when we consider the right to arm and defend a nation. Treitschke wrote:
The highest duty of the state is self-preservation. Self-preservation is for the state an absolute moral obligation. And therefore it must be made clear that of all political sins, that of weakness is the most heinous and despicable. The sin of weakness in politics is the sin against the Holy Ghost.
Pacifism, however, is wont to cast reflections on this duty which past ages have bequeathed to us. In the eyes of those who are, perhaps unintentionally, blinded, war has become a thing to be abhorred. And, oddly, the blame for war is put upon those who wear the uniform and carry the arms. The credit for such peaceful endeavors as have been begun goes to those who wield the pen and dress in the apparently more pacific garments of diplomacy. The armed forces are looked upon by most people as the cause of war. It is in an attempt to prove the fallacy of such belief that this discussion is undertaken.
If we are to delve into the rights with which the various branches of government are empowered, we must look to the instrument upon which is based our system of governing. Because of the varied interpretations now given this document, it is wise to follow back to its source and inquire what meaning was intended when certain clauses were inserted by its makers.
The most important duty of the Congress is the carrying out of such powers as are assigned this legislative body. Among those is the important one of providing for the common defense, (by) raising armies; (by) providing and maintaining a navy; and (by) declaring war (if necessary). Madison in one of his papers on the Constitution remarked: “How could a readiness for war in time of peace be safely prohibited, unless we could prohibit in like manner, the preparations and establishments of every hostile nation?’’ With this in mind, the Constitutional Convention made provision for “the common defense.” This defense was to be confided to the federal. government in order that better preparation might be had and the common facilities of the entire nation opened to this great task of preparing against war. The individual states, empowered to organize a militia, may not keep ships of war. The Union, alone, may maintain standing armies and ships of war.
The right to maintain armies and navies is questioned only by those whose outlook is blinded by an overzealous desire to rid the world of so-called war-making instruments. The use of armed force is something which may be properly or improperly executed depending on the political desires of the politicians. There have been cases when the politicians of a country were also its militarists. So far, America has not been thus afflicted. There seems no possibility of such a state of affairs. Oar political make-up is a governor of such happenings. The Constitution was so wisely framed that no one branch of the government was permitted absolute control. We may have military control of this nation only when a majority of the Congress is held by what have come to be known as “militarists.” From the way things have been moving lately, there is no possibility of such a change.
American government is, undoubtedly, the ideal one where the voice of the people is concerned. So far as is possible, the people are heard through their representatives in Congress. It was the wish of the majority when, in 1917, the joint session of the two Houses voted that a state of war existed between the United States and the government of Germany. It was the voice of the people that resounded throughout the entire nation when men and money and munitions were cast into the lot which succeeded in breaking the power of the enemy and winning the war in which we were engaged.
To whom must go the blame for declaring the war which we now have happily concluded? Perhaps the pacifist, in his rambling way, would accuse the military. But who carried on the preliminary notes, the protestations and the repeated threats that war would result if certain acts were continued? Was it the Secretary of War? No. The Secretary of State, after the failure of his procedure, was forced to consult with the President who, acting in accordance with constitutional precedent, advised Congress to declare that a state of war existed and to use the armed forces in the carrying on of the conflict which he and his statesmen believed necessary to redress the wrongs done to this nation. It was not until after a state of war was declared by the Congress that the military and naval establishments became a part of the procedure and, following the desire of the people, brought Germany’s strength to the point where overtures might be made for peace. The armed forces had had no part in bringing on the war and had no part in the conclusion of peace except to make secure any agreement which was entered into by the statesmen.
War, consequently, is, as Mahan has written, simply a political movement. We may consider the question of neutrality. Hamilton in his discourse on The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commerce and the Navy wrote: “The rights of neutrality will only be respected when they are defended by an adequate power. A nation, despicable by its weakness, forfeits even the privilege of being neutral.” Neutrality, a movement of the statesman, is, consequently, only possible when it is backed by force—the military. How shallow neutrality is when it is but the utterance of a statesman, and yet its pronouncement comes from the statesman and force is only called upon when the weight of the spoken word is insufficient. Force, as we shall call the military and naval forces, has had no hand in the formulation of policy. It is not consulted. The statesman issues policy and, if necessary, calls upon force to war. Force is but an intermediary between policy and peace. Policy, having caused war, calls upon force to bring about a satisfactory peace by a victorious war.
No matter where we look in history, we find war the result of the statesman who, having failed in his negotiations, calls upon force to wage war. In our campaign against Mexico in 1914, when lives were lost at Vera Cruz, Woodrow Wilson, then President, addressed a gathering at the Brooklyn navy yard in memory of those who had been killed. In the course of his address he said:
What gives men like these peculiar distinction is not merely that they did their duty, but that their duty had nothing to do with them or their own personal and peculiar interests. They did not give their lives for themselves. They gave their lives for us, because we called upon them as a nation to perform an unexpected duty.
We, the nation, had called upon these men to do their duty and they had died in its fulfillment. Can it be said that they were responsible for the conflict in which they perished? This bloodshed was the result of purely unmilitary actions. Neither the Army nor the Navy had had any connection with the causes which led to our occupation of Vera Cruz. The arrest of our seamen at Tampico was but a final insult to American sensibilities. The nation through its representatives, called upon the Navy to redress the wrongs which had been committed and, in the course of carrying out this task, our men were killed. They had performed their duty, but “that duty had nothing to do with them or their own personal . . . . interests. . . . . They gave their lives for us, because we called upon them . . . .”It may seem strange to quote Woodrow Wilson in a discussion of this sort but, because of his great love of peace, his thoughts on the Navy seem especially well fitted to be placed along with those whose motives have been seemingly less pacific.
In an address in May, 1915, when the nations of Europe were struggling for the mastery of that continent and America was looked on as the deciding figure of the world, Wilson spoke on “The Ideals of the Navy.” After outlining the ideals of the Navy—“a body specially entrusted with the ideals of America,” he said:
The mission of America is the only thing that a sailor or a soldier should think about. He has nothing to do with the formulation of her policy. He is to support her policy whatever it is. . . . . So with every man in arms who serves the nation; he stands and waits to do the thing which the nation desires.
No one who has studied government can truthfully say that force has caused war. The purpose of force is to support but not to urge policy. The American Navy, even more than others, has properly carried out its purpose.
While force has no place until policy has decided for war, the greatest successes of the past have been found where the statesman and the military commander are one and the same person, or, failing that, where the statesman and the military commander are during peace in constant intercourse with one another, so that policy and preparation for war go hand-in-hand. This cooperation is necessary that force may be better able to understand policy and prepare for the possible and most probable wars into which we may be drawn by circumstances which are totally within the scope of policy. No matter how close, however, the relationship between the statesman and force, the decision to wage war is solely within the province of the former.
Wilkinson in his book, War and Policy, has brought out the failure of military histories to recount what has taken place prior to the opening of a war. He says: “Military histories almost always pass over in silence the transactions between the head of the state and his military advisers which as a rule precede the outbreak of war.” Perhaps if we were to trace the course which policy has taken prior to war, we might find that force was as often for peace as for war.
As a specific example of the circumstances leading up to war, Wilkinson makes the following remarks in reference to the success of the French in the early Revolutionary wars:
In 1805, Austria suffered the tremendous overthrow of Ulm and Austerlitz, usually attributed to the genius of Napoleon. No one will wish to underestimate the personal force of Napoleon. But he had the advantage of an army which he had carefully formed and organized for a campaign upon a grand scale. What was the position of Austria? At the head of her army in 1804 was the Archduke Charles, at that time the best commander in Europe after Napoleon. That general’s papers have lately been published, and show that in 1804 he implored the Emperor to avoid a rupture with Napoleon . . . . and begged that if such a war were contemplated it should be postponed until after several years of hard work in preparation. He was overruled and deprived of his command . . . . . In 1808 he again protested against a new war with France, was again overruled, but this time persuaded to take the command.
Policy, having decided on war, overruled force with the results which we all know.
When nations disagree with reference to some matter, unless it be a trivial issue which does not involve their honor or integrity, there is no known way of settling the dispute other than by force. In minor matters, it has been feasible to refer the question to arbitration or to compromise. It is usually only serious questions which lead to war, for war is a serious matter. There are, however, times when it alone can rightfully decide the propriety of a claim or affront.
No matter where we open the history of the world, we find policy deciding the question of war, and force engaging in war at the behest of policy. Take, for example, our own war between the states. Was it not the civil government of the North which, to uphold the unity of the nation, called upon the military and naval forces to down the rising power of the Southern armies? And was not the might of the South -employed in obedience to the policy of the provisional government which believed in its right to secede from the Union which the North held inviolable? In the crushing of rebellion or in the carrying of the flag to new lands, it is policy which decides, force which executes.
“War,” says Spenser Wilkinson, “is merely a means to an end; it is a piece of political action.” He agrees in this with every writer who has studied the subject and traced the origin of war. Since the power to declare war is in the hands of the Civil authorities, the military and naval forces can have no part in plunging the nation into war. The bogy of standing armies and large navies being a cause of war is reduced to an actual myth since no matter how large the force, it, of itself, cannot bring about war. Perhaps with a limitation of statesmen, war will become less probable. Certainly, reducing armed forces will not bring about the result with which these endeavors are clothed. World peace is not a question of armaments but a question of human nature and statesmanship. Let the diplomats save us from war and we shall find armies and navies unnecessary.
In those stormy days when Wilson returned from the Versailles conference and attempted to persuade the people of the United States that the way to peace was through a League of Nations which would dictate to the world how it was to exist, certain statements were made which seem to have been forgotten by those who now wish to rid us of armaments prior to that day when men will cease to meet on the field of battle and will be willing to settle all disputes at the council table with no weapons sharper than the tongues of the trained diplomats. One of those statements by Wilson himself was: “Armed force is in the background in this program (the League), but it is in the background, and if the moral force of the world will not suffice, the physical force of the world shall.” Accordingly, through the wishes of men who have known the ways of statesmen, provision has been made for the League to call on member nations to provide the armed forces which may be necessary to compel compliance with the dictates of this body. Even the League—a harbinger of peace—found it necessary to provide for armed forces. But, as always, force appears on the scene only at the call of policy.
Throughout the training of the American Navy, the point is held uppermost that force is but an instrument of policy. At the Naval War College, every lecture brings forth the fact that the Navy exists to serve the nation, not to formulate but to support policy. Captain Belknap impressed this when he stated:
What it is in the nation’s interest that the nation’s military power may have to contend for can be answered only by the statesman. He, more than any other, is concerned in there being military power ready and adequate for any probable needs, for this is provision against forcible interference with the nation’s lawful rights, lawful by nature. What those rights are and where, by whom, and when they may be forcibly contested are questions for the statesman.
In a speech in the House of Representatives last January, Congressman Frederick M. Davenport remarked: “The Department of State is charged with maintaining peace . . . . with getting rid of many strained relations which eventually may result in war. Its great function is to prevent war.” He added, "War is the failure of diplomacy." Historian, military leader, and legislator all agree that war is an act of the statesman. Force cannot declare war. Policy alone is thus empowered.
It is needless to go further in our quest for the branch of government upon which to place the blame for war. We have seen that no blame can be attached to the military or naval forces. They, as we have said, are but the instruments of policy. Policy is not necessarily a war-seeking functionary. It is, however, only through this functionary that a state of war can be brought about. We have yet to find a single war of our history that was forced upon us by our armed forces. Each time we have gone to war it has been “because we called upon them (the military) as a nation. . . . .” Each time they responded and brought peace to a land that policy had plunged into war.