The position taken by the United States government in recent years with respect to the strength of the Navy it shall maintain is that it should have a Navy equal to that of the British Empire and stronger than Japan in the ratio of 5 to 3. This policy was first enunciated by Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes at the Washington Conference for Limiting Naval Armaments which met in 1921.
Although the Washington conference failed to bring about an all-inclusive warship limitation, the 5-5-3 ratio was cheerfully accepted by both the British and the Japanese.
Lord Balfour, speaking on behalf of the British Empire delegation at Washington, said, with reference to the American proposal to limit every type of warship according to the ratio:
We have considered it with admiration and approval. We agree with it in spirit and in principle. We look to it as being the basis of one of the greatest reforms in the matter of armaments and preparations for war that has ever been conceived or carried out by the courage and patriotism of statesmen…
They have, as we think most rightly, taken the battle fleet as the aggressive unit which they have in the main to consider; and in the battle fleet you must include those auxiliary ships without which a modern battle fleet has neither eyes nor ears, has little power of defense against certain forms of attack, and little power of observation; little power of dealing with any equal foe to which it may be opposed.
Taking those two as really belonging to one subject, namely, the battle fleet, taking those two, the battleships themselves and the vessels auxiliary and necessary to a battle fleet, we think that the proportion between the various countries is acceptable; we think the limitation of amounts is reasonable; we think it should be accepted; we firmly believe that it will be accepted.
Admiral Baron Kato, speaking on behalf of Japan, said;
Japan deeply appreciates the sincerity of purpose evidenced in the plan of the American Government for the limitation of armaments. She is satisfied that the proposed plan will materially relieve the nations of wasteful expenditures and cannot fail to make for the peace of the world.
She cannot remain unmoved by the high aims which have actuated the American project. Gladly accepting, therefore, the proposal in principle, Japan is ready to proceed with determination to a sweeping reduction in her naval armament......................................
Japan has never claimed nor had any intention of claiming to have a naval establishment equal in strength of either the United States or the British Empire. Her existing plan will show conclusively that she had never in view preparation for offensive war.
The consideration which led Japan to accept a lesser strength than that of the United States was the now famous Article XIX of the Washington treaty which prohibits the development of naval bases in the Philippine Islands, Guam or the Aleutian Islands.
With an actual ratio of 5-5-3 then, it would be extremely hazardous for the United States to undertake a war in the western Pacific. On the other hand, an Asiatic power would be at a disadvantage operating near our coasts. That was the theory which led to the Washington treaty limiting naval armament.
But the 5-5-3 ratio applies only to capital ships and aircraft carriers. Due to the French refusal to accept the ratio of 2.5 (the most favorable proposal to France) in submarines as compared to 5 for the British Empire and the United States, and the consequent refusal of the British to discuss limitation of the weapons which fight submarines, the way was left open for unlimited building of cruisers, destroyers and other auxiliaries. Not only was the way left open but the road was taken with the result that five years after the signing of the Washington treaty the 5-5-3 ratio was only a phrase which bore little relation to actual naval strength.
In the post-conference building activity, the United States was left far behind. When therefore, Great Britain, Japan and the United State met at Geneva at the invitation of President Coolidge in June, 1927, the American proposal was simply to extend the capital ship ratio, already fixed by treaty to all classes of warships. It asked for a return to the spirit of Washington which had been accepted in principle by the other powers.
The American people, judging by editorial utterances from hundreds of papers, are well-nigh unanimous in support of the official American position at Geneva. It is in keeping with our pacific intent: equality to prevent aggression or unjust treatment of American citizens, trade or property in any part of the world and at the same time equality to avoid fostering suspicions and fears among other peoples.
Many considerations enter into the determination of our need for a Navy equal to the strongest. Among them may be enumerated our population, wealth, foreign trade, ocean-borne coastwise commerce, out-lying possessions, national policies, foreign investments and geographical position.
The latest estimate of the population of continental United States is 115,000,000. In the Philippines and other outlying possessions are an additional 12,000,000. In comparison with other peoples the American standard of living is high, the general level of education is good. Self-government prevails. Behind the wall of our defenses, if they are maintained, we shall be able to work out our lives and problems free from the interference of any other powers.
The population of the other naval powers is as follows: Italy, 45,000,000, practically all in Europe; France, 100,000,000 of which 400,000,000 are in the home country; Japan,
800,000,000 of which 60,000,000 are Japanese; and the British Empire, 440,000,000 of which about 315,000,000 arc native Indians. The United Kingdom has 43,000,000; Canada, 9,000,000; Australia 7,000,000; South Africa 6,000,000; the Irish Free State 3,000,000; and New Zealand 1,200,000; or about 70,000,000 in the home land and the self-governing dominions. In addition to the 315,000,000 of native Indians who are British subjects, there are about 40,000,000 African blacks under the British flag.
In national wealth the United States has by far the most to protect—something over 4,000,000 of dollars. The British Empire has about one-third as much; France one-sixth; Italy one-tenth; and Japan about six per cent.
The foreign trade of the United States now approximates that of the United Kingdom and is close to $10,000,000,000 annually. The foreign trade of Japan is about $2,000,000,000 annually. While France and Italy have large continental trades the ocean- borne commerce of these countries is comparatively small.
Of all the principal naval powers Great Britain is the least self-sufficient, particularly with reference to food supply. In the event of a war with a non-European power, however, the British Isles could readily draw food and supplies from the continent. In the event of a war with an European power the British naval superiority, fixed by treaty for capital ships at three times stronger than either the French or the Italians and actually much stronger than this ratio compared to any European power, would secure her communications across the Atlantic.
The United States, on the other hand, has, with the exception of her trade with Canada and Mexico, to depend on long ocean lines of communication. And while we produce the greater part of our food supply, it must not be forgotten that we import food stuffs in excess of the food we sell.
Food, however, while one of the considerations, is not the most important to us. The United States Army War College has prepared a list of materials essential to American industries and particularly necessary in making war. It includes over two dozen articles which are not produced in continental United States or produced in negligible quantities. The list includes chromium and manganese, essential in the production of high-grade machine steel and armor; hemp, jute and manila fiber which have many uses but the most important of which is in harvesting and shipping crops; rubber for automobiles, airplanes, gas masks and a hundred other uses. Antimony, nickel, platinum, quicksilver, tin and tungsten are some of the metals essential to the machine civilization on which the United States has placed its dependence. Wool and silk are textiles in the same class. Essential medicines of which we have no supply are opium, quinine, camphor and strychnine. Few of these materials have satisfactory substitutes.
In addition to the foreign trade of the United States, now of equal importance with that of Great Britain, the United States has an ocean-going, coastwise trade equalling in volume its overseas foreign trade. This does not include Great Lakes shipping which, in itself surpasses either our overseas foreign trade or our ocean-going coastwise trade. The purely coastwise trade of none of the principal naval powers begins to approach it. The trade of Great Britain with the dominions and colonies is considered foreign trade. The intercoastal trade of the British Isles, which must traverse exposed waters, is not great.
Combining, therefore, our foreign trade and our ocean-going coastwise trade which may be subjected to hostile naval attack we find that the trade of the United States on the seas is greater than any other nation, even including that of the British Isles plus the considerable interchange among the British dominions and many colonies. That our ocean-going commerce is greater than that of the British will be surprising no doubt, to many.
A moment’s consideration will show that the enormously valuable coastwise shipping of the United States calls for naval protection. Long distances are traveled in carrying it. Ten million of tons of our coastwise shipping pass through the Panama Canal each year, which means that the minimum voyage for this tonnage is over 4,000 miles.
Furthermore, it is trade which could not readily be transferred to inland highways. Coastwise shipping is largely long haul shipping. Motor trucks could not undertake to carry the cotton from Galveston and New Orleans to the New England mills; or Alaskan or Washington lumber to New York. Neither could the railroads handle this great increase in business, nor any large part of it. During the World War our railroad facilities were overtaxed. Since the war our population has increased nearly ten per cent but railway mileage has not increased at all. Cessation of our coastwise shipping would merely mean that 80,000,000 tons of needed materials and food would simply not move.
All of America’s coastwise trade is carried in American bottoms. Only about a third of our foreign trade is transported under the American flag but considering the value of our exports and imports, and the number of items essential to our industries, it is evident that such merchant marine as we have must be afforded ample protection. In the event of hostilities the American merchant fleet would be inadequate to supply ships to the naval train and at the same time move essential products across the oceans. Every ship sunk would be a telling loss. Nations, however, which have a surplus of merchant vessels employed in carrying cargoes for foreign countries would not be so critically circumstanced.
Our geographical position, with long coast lines bordering the two oceans, the vital strategic value of the Panama Canal and the desirability of affording protection to the far-distant Philippines are considerations which are generally acknowledged as calling for an American Navy equal to the strongest.
National policies, long established and generally accepted, such as the Monroe Doctrine, the “Open Door’’ in China, the freedom of the seas, cannot be maintained by good intentions alone.
The investment of American capital abroad is conservatively placed at $25,000,000,000 including about $10,000,000,000 advanced to the Allies by the government during and immediately after the war.
Despite the oft-repeated assertion advanced abroad and frequently at home, that we are impregnable, self-sufficient, with lines of communication protected and immune from hostile attack, the fact is that we are much more dependent on the outside world than is generally realized. Certainly our high standards of living and the actual necessities of millions of our workers are contingent on the uninterrupted flow of our foreign and coastwise commerce. It is easy to say we produce enough food to sustain our population. The United States has many mouths to feed. We are part of a highly organized society. Interruption of rubber imports would throw many thousands of workers out of employment. Cessation of cotton and wheat exports would mean privation to millions of farmers. It would be small consolation to them to know there was food somewhere but not in their reach. Our well-being, if not our lives, is bound up with the outer world. Amply able as we are to provide the protection which our position demands, it behooves the United States to maintain a navy equal to the strongest.
Such a navy as has been intimated above makes no threat of aggression but secures the lives and property of Americans not only at home but wherever they may be throughout the world. The first purpose of the Navy is not, as generally supposed, to fight and win battles. It is to be so obviously able to support the policies of its government that these policies will be given respectful attention and acted on according to their merits and not be brushed aside because of the impotence of the nation to support its policies.
With such a Navy America will be secure and will be an agent of stability in a troubled world. The United States Navy is at all times directed and governed by the civil authority. The civilian president must send it on its most minor operation which affects another country. Only Congress can declare war. After that it is the business of the Army and the Navy to bring about peace.
Public opinion in the United States would not permit of the unjust employment of our military forces even if it were the desire of the administration so to employ it. Certainly public opinion in America on this point can be trusted to demand fairness as well as public opinion in any other country.
The situation then, as regards wealth, ocean-going trade and foreign investments, is that the United States has most at stake. So far as fully enfranchised citizens are concerned the United States is, also, in the lead. We have one fleet to protect continental United States on two oceans and to safeguard the Philippines, Hawaii and the Panama Canal. Furthermore, we have the money to maintain the fleet without noticeable hardship to our tax-payers. The price of one picture show from every American each year in addition to the present naval budget would provide the difference nicely!