What Might Have Happened at Jutland
(See page 1143, July, 1925, Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander H. H. Frost, U. S. Navy.—Many students of Jutland have doubtless conjectured as to what might have happened had Admiral Scheer considered it advisable to adhere to his original plan of trying to catch the British battle cruisers between two fires as they advanced at full speed to the southeastward in pursuit of Vice Admiral Hipper. It has now been intimated that the Germans lost a chance to win the war at Jutland.
The idea of surrounding the enemy and wiping out his entire force has always been an attractive one. But how often has it succeeded? Hannibal accomplished it in the open field at Cannae with perfect success; he succeeded by ambuscade at Lake Trasimene and was partially successful at the Trebia; the effectiveness of his combinations was enhanced by the inefficiency and carelessness of the Roman generals. Caesar also accomplished this feat against an half-hearted enemy in Spain more by intrigue than by fighting. The Germans, with the aid of overwhelming numbers and a neutral frontier, were able to surround the French at Sedan. Hindenburg was able to repeat this feat with partial success at Tannenburg and in the Winter Battle in East Prussia; Falkenhayn was successful on a small scale at the Red Tower Pass. This about completes the list of “Cannaes” in land warfare; even Austerlitz cannot be classed as such a victory.
In naval warfare no occassion where an enemy naval force on the open sea was ever caught between two fires comes to mind; that is, a case where the enemy force was destroyed; there have been some cases where a flank was partially enveloped without any marked effect.
The reasons why a surrounding attack is almost impossible are readily apparent.
First, there is the enormous difficulty of coordinating the enveloping forces. If such handling of military forces is difficult, how much more complicated must it be to coordinate a number of forces in the attempt to surround an enemy naval force superior in speed. This is difficult enough when the commander-in-chief can see all of his forces and the enemy that he is attempting to surround. If one of his forces is out of sight and he can obtain its position only by delayed and inaccurate reports, this doubles his problem; if, in addition, the enemy force must be reported by one of our forces which does not even know its own position it requires no proof to show that it is probably one of the most difficult problems in naval tactics. We have only to note that Hood, endeavoring to join Beatty, appeared on the farther side of the German fleet, while Jellicoe ran into Beatty where he did not expect him and found the German fleet in an entirely unexpected position.
Second, if one of our forces is in contact with the enemy, it is liable to be destroyed if we delay to arrange a trap; this is particularly the case where our force is inferior in both speed and power.
Third, our separated enveloping forces are liable to be beaten in detail if there is any failure in the enveloping attack.
Fourth, other forces of the enemy fleet not yet sighted may appear and attack our separated forces.
As against these disadvantages, our enveloping forces have the sole advantage of surprise. The fact that our forces can open fire almost as soon as they are sighted by the enemy gives us a chance of inflicting damage before the enemy realized the change in the situation; the delay in the turn-away of the fifth battle squadron at 4:50 is an illustration. This advantage is decreased by two further facts: first, the enemy may have light cruisers spread in advance and on the flanks of the force we are endeavoring to surround; second, the use of destroyers and smoke screens provide a force caught in a dangerous situation with a means of disengaging itself without heavy loss. The battle furnished illustrations of both these facts.
With these principles in mind, let us now examine the actual tactical situation.
At 3:45 Admiral Scheer received a despatch from Vice Admiral Hipper that he was engaging six battle cruisers on a southeasterly course. It must be remembered that the fifth battle squadron had not been sighted by Admiral Hipper at this time and no report was made of its presence. By 4:05, the battle fleet having closed up, course was set to the northwest and speed increased to 15 knots; at 4:20 p. m., course was changed to west. The purpose of these movements was to “bring the enemy between two fires.”
Just as the last change of course was being made a despatch was received which altered the situation completely. “While this alteration of course of the main fleet was in progress,” reports Admiral Scheer, “the II scouting group reported that a British squadron of five battleships was joining in the action. The position of the I scouting group, which was now opposed by six battle cruisers and five battleships, might become critical. In consequence, everything depended upon effecting a junction with the I scouting group as soon as possible: I therefore altered course back to north.”
Before the receipt of this signal the conditions had been unusually favorable for Admiral Scheer’s plan. If the difficulties of coordination were great and there was not a very large chance of trapping the British battle cruisers, the Germans themselves were running no risks and if the combination failed they would be little worse off than if they had not attempted it. In the first place, the German battle cruisers, being in an inferiority of but five to six in numbers and only about 2 knots in speed, were in no particular danger while the trap was being prepared. In the second place, the enveloping forces would be in no danger of being beaten in detail by such a weak enemy force. In the third place, as only battle cruisers and light forces had been sighted, the battle cruiser fleet alone was on the scene, and as no battleships had yet been attached to this fleet, there was little danger of the dispersed German forces being attacked by superior British forces suddenly coming onto the battlefield.
Now, however, all this was changed. First, the entrance of the fifth battle squadron into the engagement did render the situation of the I scouting group critical. Not only might this situation appear critical to Scheer, but it undoubtedly was critical. “The gunnery superiority,” reads the official report, “and advantageous tactical position were distinctly on our side, until at 4:19 p. m., a new squadron, consisting of four or five ships of the Queen Elizabeth class, with a considerable superiority in speed, appeared from a northwesterly direction, and took part in the action with an opening range of about 20,000 meters. This rendered the position of our cruisers critical. The new opponent fired with remarkable rapidity and accuracy, the accuracy being partly due to the impossibility of returning his fire. At 4:26 p. m., the distance between the opposing battle cruisers was about 12,000 meters and between our battle cruisers and the Queen Elizabeth’s about 18,000 meters.”
It is interesting to note that the fifth battle squadron closed the range on the German battle cruisers 2,000 meters in seven minutes, thus leading the Germans to believe that it had a superiority in speed. The official report of Rear Admiral Evan Thomas shows that he decreased the range to 17,000 yards at one time. Another proof of the critical situation of the I scouting group is that the second leader of the destroyers ordered all of his available destroyers to attack to “relieve the pressure” on the battle cruisers. This he did on his own initiative. It is true that the attacks of the German destroyers and the turn-away of the German battle cruisers to avoid the British destroyers did ultimately relieve the pressure. It is also true that, had he so desired, Hipper might have skirmished at long range with Beatty instead of voluntarily meeting him in fair fight; in this way he would have avoided getting caught at moderate range by the fifth battle squadron, but he would never have won the splendid success over the British battle cruisers—successes probably greater than any which would have resulted from a trap and particularly favorable from a moral viewpoint in that they were won in fair open fight over superior enemy forces.
As the battle actually was fought, Scheer was able to come to the assistance of Hipper at 4:45; in accordance with the proposed form of the trap, he would not have been able to open fire for thirty additional minutes during which time a lot might have happened.
Second, the danger of trying to surround a force of eleven capital ships with twenty-one was very much greater than the plan to trap six battle cruisers. It must be remembered that Hipper had not been able to inform Scheer of the loss of the two British battle cruisers and that the fifth battle squadron was reported as having five and not four ships. Also, the German second line battleships, mounting only four 11-inch guns and having but 18 knots speed, could hardly be counted on to surround a force mounting almost exclusively 13.5-inch and 15-inch guns and having a minimum speed of 25 knots. Under the changed conditions, it was evident that if Hipper was to be one of the surrounding forces he would have to be reinforced. Scheer thus had the problem of simultaneously reinforcing Hipper and using the remainder for an enveloping attack. It is even proposed to divide the German battle fleet into three separate detachments, in addition to Hipper’s force. The arrangements to provide for four separate forces simultaneously surounding two enemy forces of superior speed—and all this on the basis of delayed eports received from a distance—would certainly have taxed the skill of a Napoleon and a Nelson rolled into one. If anything went wrong, the Germans were themselves in danger of having one of their enveloping forces beaten as the enemy broke through the circle.
Third, the presence of battleships indicated the proximity of the British battle fleet. This was the first occasion on which the fifth battle squadron operated with the battle cruiser fleet and even in this case it resulted from chance and not design. If the British battle fleet were to come upon the Germans while their forces were dispersed in the attempt to surround Beatty and Evan Thomas, they would have found themselves in a dangerous position, particularly as they were inferior in speed.
Fourth, even if the envelopment were made successfully, it is very problematical as to how many British ships would have been caught, as, with their superior speed and strong light cruiser and destroyer forces, they could have disengaged themselves from at least half of the German forces and could have fought the action on even terms, with the disadvantage, however, that any of their ships reduced in speed would be lost.
Finally, even assuming that the entire British force were destroyed without loss to the Germans, the battle, while increasing greatly German prestige, would by itself have had no decisive effect. There was no question of winning the war by such an action. The British would still have had twenty-eight battleships and five fast battleships or battle cruisers as against seventeen battleships and five battle cruisers; they had also four capital ships nearing completion as against three for the Germans. Counting all of these capital ships they had a total of thirty-seven ships against twenty-five, still a very good margin of superiority. The British also had an incomparable advantage in the strategic position and a big superiority in light cruisers, destroyers and second line ships of all types.
Everything considered, it is believed that Scheer made a correct and normal decision in coming immediately to Hipper’s assistance; the risks to be run in attempting to surround the British forces were out of proportion to the probable successes to be gained. The admiral later proved that he was not averse to runing risks, so it is certain that he did not give up his plan of envelopment because of any lack in resolution.
Now we will consider the conduct of Admiral Hipper during this episode. He has been criticized because of a signal sent at 4:20 p. m., reporting the entry of British battleships into the action. A perusal of the official German report, however, shows that this despatch was sent, not by Hipper, but by the commander of the II scouting group in the light cruiser Frank furt. Therefore, we have not the slightest information concerning any despatches sent between Hipper and Scheer in either direction after the report from Hipper that he was engaging battle cruisers; even this signal was sent before the action actually began. Did Scheer send any instructions or even information concerning his plan to catch the British battle cruisers between two fires? Did Hipper send any information concerning his movements and those of the enemy? Until we can definitely answer these questions our criticism and comments will not be worth much. However, if no such despatches were sent, will it not be charitable to assume, until we have the facts before us, that there was some good reason why they were not sent?
While it was Hipper’s duty to keep his commander-in-chief informed of the developments of the battle cruiser action, it must be admitted that a commander engaged in a desperate fight against overwhelming numbers has many other even more important things of which to think. If one looks at the track of the German battle cruisers during this time and notes the numerous changes of course and formation, it will be recognized that Hipper was enjoying a most busy afternoon. The situation was so changeable that a report of the happenings at any one particular time would have been of little value, and might even have been misleading, unless supplemented by a series of reports announcing all of the new events; this was clearly impracticable from a communications viewpoint and would have given Scheer a mass of conflicting information; many mistakes must have been made in the position of the German forces and the information concerning the enemy forces, as is illustrated by the inaccurate reports of Commodore Goodenough, who has been justly praised for his excellent work in sending in information.
Could Hipper well have sent a reassuring signal to Scheer at any time before he disengaged himself at about 4:40, when he was already in visual touch with Scheer? Did he even know that the two British battle cruisers had been lost? This is by no means certain. Von Hase states that he did not notice the loss of the Indefatigable. The Queen Mary could not have been reported until 4:30, only two minutes before Scheer saw the ships in action and ten minutes after he had given up his plan to catch the British battle cruisers between two fires. Even at that, could a commander engaging an equal force of enemy battle cruisers consider the situation reassuring when four battleships, armed with 15-inch guns against his 11- and 12-inch guns, had gained 2,000 yards in seven minutes and was bringing his rear ship under fire at 17,000 yards and hitting? Von Hase states that the Derfflinger was zigzagging to avoid the fire of the British battleships. The leader of the destroyers and the commander of the IX flotilla both decided to attack on their own initiative to relieve the situation. The situation was not relieved until Scheer was on the scene.
Furthermore, a statement in the official report, at about 5:20, may have some significance: “He (Hipper) was unable to report this, as intended, for a short time previously the main and auxiliary W/T stations in his flagship (Lutzow) had been put out of action by a heavy shell.”
Under the circumstances, it would seem somewhat premature to accuse Admiral Hipper of having caused the breakdown of the German plan at Jutland. At any rate, it cannot be denied that he did some pretty nice fighting and maneuvering that May afternoon with results not soon to be forgotten by the naval profession—results as great, in our opinion, as any that were probable in an attempt to surround in the open sea a force of ten capital ships with superior speed, supported by numerous light cruisers and destroyers, always remembering that the grand fleet might have come upon the scene and surprised the Germans while in the execution of their plan.
Diesel Engines for Capital Ships—A Military Necessity
(See page 1217, July, 1925, Proceedings)
Rear Admiral C. W. Dyson, U. S. Navy.—I have read with great interest Captain Proctor’s article and am free to confess that he makes out a very strong case for the adoption of the Diesel engine for capital ship propulsion.
I am afraid, however, that he is unduly optimistic and counts upon the availability of this type of power producer for much higher powers than it can be used for on board ship.
He neglects the question of the propeller entirely except in one paragraph, where he states, “Under more extreme conditions, with some sacrifice of propeller efficiency, a speed of 1,400 feet per minute would give about 175,000 B.H.P.”
A four-shaft Diesel arrangement, with revolutions 175, could undoubtedly be fitted on board our latest battleships if suitable engines could be obtained, but for any considerable power over that which is now fitted on those vessels consideration of tip clearances between the propellers and the hull and between adjacent propellers places such limitations on the diameters of the propellers that can be carried, that we are driven to increase in speed of revolutions in order that the propellers with these limited diameters may be able efficiently to absorb the power.
It is very doubtful whether Diesel engines, arranged on four shafts, can be used for the development of any propulsive power much in excess of that of our latest battleships, and it is an absolute impossibility to use them for such powers as those of our light cruisers and aeroplane carriers, both on account of the necessary limitations of piston speeds of the engines and the resultant low revolutions of the propellers.
Diesel Engines for Capital Ships—A Military Necessity
(See page 1217, July, 1925, Proceedings)
Rear Admiral J. K. Robison, U. S. Navy.—Captain Proctor’s interesting and timely article gives the general proposition of machinery for naval vessels without, it seems to me, consideration of all the factors involved.
The tendency of all engineering progress is toward an increase in the amount of useful work to be derived from the thermal unit of the fuel. Upon this basis the future, as Captain Proctor so ardently argues, lies in the use of Diesel engines. For the Navy, however, the prime essential is neither efficiency of the thermal engine nor even low weight or cost. First, naval machinery must be safe to operate; second, it must be reliable; it must be possible for a ship’s force, composed of such material as we have on naval vessels, to operate and to maintain naval machinery in such condition as always to be capable of whatever service it was designed to render.
Naval machinery is usually operated at a small fraction of its maximum power. Usually also it is necessary that this machinery be ready to develop full power upon demand. One of the prime limitations is that of weight and space required for its installation in a vessel. Machinery should be such as will permit its being placed entirely below the water line to secure the most complete protection against the attack of an enemy.
In determining the machinery that we should install upon any new vessel it is necessary to take into account not only the present state of the art of machinery design and manufacture, but also such considerations as have been above suggested. Conservatism may be variously defined either as “old fogyism” or as safety. Any naval vessel may, at some time, bear in itself the onus of maintaining the national honor. It is my personal and official opinion that progress that is enduring is made by steps rather than by jumps. It is wiser to make improvements than to attempt a possible but improbable miracle.
Diesel Engines for Capital Ships—A Military Necessity
(See page 1217, July, 1925, Proceedings)
Commander S. M. Robinson, U. S. Navy.—This article is a very timely one as it brings forward for discussion a subject that is being given the greatest amount of thought and consideration at the present time by all officers who are interested in or responsible for the design of naval machinery. The advantages that would accrue to a fleet due to the increased cruising radius of Diesel engine ships are so well known that they need not be dwelt upon especially.
However, insofar as the methods of obtaining these results are concerned, it is not believed that an installation of the type outlined in this paper is feasible at the present time, nor is it believed that the tendency of design points toward that means as a final solution. Experience with Diesel engines on submarines has shown conclusively that the smaller engines are not only more reliable, but are actually lighter per horsepower than are the larger engines, and it is believed that installations of high power with Diesel engines for military ships will be limited to small high-speed engines using some one of the various forms of reduction gear that are being tried out at the present time.
Service-Since-Graduation vs. Age-in-Grade Retirement
(See Page 737, May, 1925, Proceedings)
Captain J. K. Taussig, U. S. Navy.—Commander McCain has given a very complete and lucid estimate of the situation in regard to the effect, or rather the differences in effect, that would be felt by the members of the class of 1907 should the present laws in regard to forced retirements continue in force and that which would be produced should the law be changed to one in which length-of-service retirement is substituted for age-in-grade.
The first thing that impresses one after reading the paper is that, with the assumptions as given, the same number, or practically the same number of forced retirements will take place under either system. This is because the figures are based on an assumption that the lengths of service since graduation which would be used in a change in the basic law correspond nearly exactly, for the average age of officers, to the ages at which the present law requires all officers to retire if not promoted.
It is seen from this that the advocated change from age-in-grade retirement is based entirely on the effect on certain individuals and not on the effect on the service as a whole. Commander McCain has shown that the proposed change would not materially affect the total number of officers of the class of 1907 who are eventually promoted, but that it would very materially affect the relative chances of some of the individuals in that class.
The writer of this discussion has held right along that the effect on a few individuals is not the criterion for making a change in the present basic law. The real trouble for the class of 1907 is not so much with which individuals, the young or the old men, will have a better chance for promotion, but is in the fact that, whichever method is in force, such a small percentage of the class will be promoted.
The remedy for this situation is not to be found in the change to length-of-service retirement. It can not be entirely remedied under any conditions. But the situation for this class, as well as for all classes, can be based materially, if, under the basic law, certain adjustments are made in the various percentages in grades, and in the ages at which forced retirements will take place. Such adjustments will not only benefit the class of 1907, but they would also have a favorable effect on the entire service, not only insofar as individuals are concerned, but also for entire classes. These adjustments will require the lowering of the ages at which lieutenant commanders and commanders are forced to retire. At present those near the top of these lists are considerably below the retiring ages, so the sooner these adjustments are made the better it will be. That is these retiring ages can now be reduced without forcing out unduly large numbers of commanders and lieutenant commanders, but if the necessary change is delayed too long there will be an abnormal disruption the first year it is placed in effect.
The conclusion drawn is that we waste our time in attempting to obtain legislation which simply changes the chances for promotion of a few individuals and does not improve the situation for the service at large. What is needed is a smoothing out of the promotion curve throughout the entire service. It has previously been pointed out, and is here repeated on account of the necessity for emphasis, that the change in basic law which substitutes length-of-service retirement for age-in-grade retirement will not remedy the situation for the larger part of the service. The only way it can be remedied is (1) by changing the percentages in the various grades; (2) by changing the forced retiring ages for lieutenant commanders and commanders; and (3) by introducing some form of elimination in the grade of rear admiral and in the grades of ensign, lieutenant (j. g.) and lieutenant.
It is concluded, therefore, that the service as a whole will be greatly benefited if legislation can be obtained which will do away with the unevenness, and, in some grades, abnormal number of forced retirements that the present law will eventually require. A change from age-in-grade to length-of-service retirement will not produce this desired condition.
There is one sentence of Commander McCain’s paper which particularly attracts attention. This is: “. . . . Thus it seems that the class [1907] does have a slight advantage under the present law, but so slight is the advantage and so marked is the discrimination against individuals that it may be called a Pyrrhic victory.”
To whom accrues the slight advantage which the class of 1907 obtains under the present law? The answer is simple. The advantage accrues to several individuals of the class who, owing to their ages, have good chances for promotion, but who would have this chance materially lessened by a change to length-of-service retirement. Who are the individuals against whom the referred marked discrimination of the present law strikes? It is a few of the older members of the class. But Commander McCain admits that a greater number of the class of 1907 will be promoted under the present law than will be under the proposed change. Therefore, the change would operate unfavorably against a larger number of individuals than does the present law, from which we see that adherence to the present law is a Pyrrhic victory” only insofar as a few individuals are concerned, but would be a real victory for the larger part of the service.
Why deny so-called benefits to be obtained by certain individuals under tie present law and try to take these benefits away in order that certain other individuals may obtain them at their expense? It looks as if the whole agitation for a change in the basic law is due to the effect on a few individuals not on what might be the effect on the entire service. This s certain, just as long as there must be a large number of forced retirements, the average number will be the same under either system if the length-of-service which is to govern retirements corresponds, for the average officer, to the ages at which retirements are forced by the present law. But under the present law only a few individuals are adversely affected, while in the proposed change to length-of-service retirement a larger number of individuals will be adversely affected insofar as actual opportunities for appearing before the selection board are concerned. Therefore, the change would be worse for the service as a whole. We had better stick to our present basic law, making only such adjustments as will smooth out the curve. This will give assurance of promotion to a larger percentage of the members of the abnormally large classes, such as 1907.
Commander McCain deals quite extensively with the methods that might be pursued by the various selection boards. The writer of this discussion believes that as soon as the situation is presented where a large number of officers, who, if not promoted, will be retired during the coming year, the board will discontinue the selection of officers only from the very top of the lists. Instead, they will give serious consideration to all officers in a block which ends with the name of the last officer in his normal position who will be retired during the coming year, if not promoted. The board must select, “having in view solely the special fitness of officers and the efficiency of the naval service.” The relative fitness of officers cannot be determined by the individual reports of fitness. These reports are not a true test. The fitness reports of the large majority of captains near the top of the list averages so nearly in equality that these reports in themselves cannot possibly be an accurate gauge. Nor can the “quantity” of favorable reports be used as a criterion for determining relative fitness. It is well known that some of the ablest and most efficient officers have very little in “quantity” in their fitness jackets, but that their limited number of reports and letters unmistakably demonstrate “quality.” And it is quality that we are after.
The fitness reports being so nearly on a par, and in most cases being absolutely impossible for relative classification, the question of “efficiency of the naval service” comes to the fore. The efficiency of the naval service demands the selection of those captains whom the board considers would make the best flag officers. Service reputation, which is determined not only by the efficient manner in which an officer performs the duty assigned, but which has behind it the character, class, or kind of duty performed, the military and moral character of the officer, his willingness to take responsibility, physical condition, etc., etc., must carry great weight with the board. It is conceded that when the members of the selection board vote on which captains are to be selected we may expect to find a more or less scattered opinion, depending on the basis which the board, or its members, adopts in making the selections. But, if each member of the board should place himself in the position of the commander-in-chief of the United States fleet in a time of strained relations, and from the top twenty or thirty captains list the six or eight whom he would desire to have as his subordinate fleet flag officers, it is believed that the general service reputation of the officers being considered would result in a sufficient consensus of opinion in the board to select seventy-five per cent of those to be promoted on the first ballot.
It is believed that it will do no good to attempt to determine one’s relative chances for promotion under the present law, because it is inconceivable that certain features of the law will not be changed within the next few years. These changes must come not because the basic principle of age-in-grade is wrong (which it is not) but because the present authorized percentages in the various grades and the ages at which forced retirements are required do not bear the proper relations for obtaining a smooth and equitable flow of promotion. The remedy is not to be found in a change of the system from age-in-grade to length-of-service retirement. It can be attained by making a few simple adjustments in the present law.
Airplane Carriers
Editor’s Note: The Washington Post recently published an article on lighter-than-air aircraft carriers, which was partially quoted in the Proceedings, Professional Notes (page 848, Volume 51, May, 1925, issue); and also quoted in U. S. Air Services. The following letter from Lieutenant Warlick, author of the textbook, Naval Aviation, used by the midshipmen at the Naval Academy, was published in U. S. Air Services, and is herewith reprinted because of its bearing upon the Washington Post’s article as quoted in our May issue.
United States Naval Academy,
Annapolis, Maryland.
To the Editor: (U. S. Air Services)
It was with much surprise that I saw your unqualified quotation of the Washington Post’s editorial concerning airship airplane carriers. The sanctioning by a reputable aviation magazine of such an exaggeration not only fails to help the cause of aviation but actually hinders it. Aside from this is the harm done by the shadow of discredit cast upon other articles of value.
I will give briefly the grounds upon which I base my statements:
The airplane carrier to be of use in war must fulfill certain necessary requirements. It must be capable of maintaining all its planes in flight for the duration of air engagement. It must house the crew that fly the planes. It must supply the planes with fuel to keep them in the air during the battle. It must supply them with munitions. It must furnish at least a moderate amount of repair facilities. The exercise, by the carrier, of these functions requires that a certain amount of weight carrying capacity be sacrificed to each.
Let us take each of these functions in turn and investigate the carrying capacity that each will require, considering the airship described—five million cubic feet, 7,000 miles range at 60 knots, and to carry thirty bombers and 150 pursuit planes.
Each bomber requires two men to operate it. The pursuit planes require one each. The most meager equipment with which each man could be expected to exist is twenty-five pounds. '
Each bomber will certainly require 2,000 pounds of bombs.
Fuel consumption for the following table is computed at the rate of six- tenths pound per horsepower per hour, and allowing one full endurance flight per plane—a niggardly allowance:
The thirty bombers with personnel and equipment will weigh 295,500 pounds. The 150 pursuit planes with personnel and equipment will weigh 303,750 pounds.
The total weight of this equipment will be 599,250 pounds.
Weight of the airship’s crew 7,000 pounds.
Dead weight of airship (twice Shenandoah) 164,000 pounds.
Weight of the airship’s fuel 200,000 pounds.
Total weight to be lifted 970,250 pounds.
The full weight of this ship, then, when ready to fly, will be 433 gross tons. This figure does not include such minor weights as food, water, repair facilities, and anti-aircraft defense armament for the airship.
A craft of this sort would indeed be a formidable weapon for national defense! Three times the size of the Shenandoah, carrying as many planes as both the Lexington and Saratoga—and at a cost of only $2,500,000! Why does not the Navy Department see this?
Here is the reason:
Now that we have built such a splendid “Castle in the Air” lets test its worth. Return to the laws of physics which made the airship possible and investigate the aerodynamical properties of this craft.
The total buoyant effort of five million cubic feet of helium is 135 tons! This is the total effort. But our ship requires 433 tons to lift it from the earth. In order that it may rise into the air, all the equipment must be discharged except the airship’s crew and fuel. It is even doubtful whether such a ship could leave the ground with fuel sufficient to carry it 7,000 miles at such high speed as 60 knots.
There is little doubt that airships will in the future act as plane carriers but they cannot possibly carry many planes and these must be small ones. For the five-million-cubic-feet ship to carry planes at all it is necessary to discharge some of the fuel, thus reducing either or both speed and range.
The figures I have given above can be readily verified at either of the air services.
- Very sincerely yours,
(Signed) William W. Warlick,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.
Blood Is Thicker Than Water
(See page 91, January, 1925, Proceedings)
Major E. N. McClellan, U. S. M. C.—There seems to be so much discussion about Tattnall’s historic exclamation, “Blood Is Thicker than Water,” that it might be well for your readers to have access to the following report of “Josiah Tattnall, Flag Officer, Commanding, East India Squadron,” dated “U. S. Steam Frigate Powhatan, Flag Ship, East India Squadron, Off Peiho River, July 4, 1859,” copied from the original archives in the “East Indian Squadron” Letter Book of Flag Officer Tattnall, located in the Navy Library:
Sir,
The last despatch which I had the honor to send you reported this Ship, in company with the chartered steamer Toey-wan, at Sea, off the Yang-tse, on her way to the Peiho, with our Minister to China, Mr. Ward, and suite on board.
That gentleman has reported to the Government the result of his interviews and correspondence with the Chinese Commissioners at “Shanghae.” I shall only refer, therefore, to that subject, so far as is necessary to your understanding the circumstances which placed us in a very unexpected position on our arrival at the Peiho and produced as unexpected results.
The Chinese Commissioners were those with whom our late Minister, Mr. Reed, concluded the Treaty last year at “Tient-Sin,” and with whom he, subsequently, arranged the tariff at “Shanghae,” where they have remained ever since.
In the interchange of visits between these Commissioners and Mr. Ward, the latter was escorted by a number of the Officers and sixty Marines of our Squadron, this being not only suited to the dignity of Mr. Ward, but intended as a compliment to the Chinese Commissioners, to whom Mr. Ward wished to extend the greatest consideration.
Mr. Ward informed them that he was on his way to “Pekin,” to exchange the Treaties, which it was obligatory on both parties to do, on or before the 18th June, now near at hand.
They replied that having signed the Treaties they must themselves exchange them, that they could not reach “Pekin” from “Shanghae” in less than sixty days, and that by agreement with Lord Elgin, the late British Ambassador, they were expected to remain at “Shanghae” until the arrival of the present British Minister, Mr. Bruce.
Mr. Ward then offered to exchange our Treaty at “Shanghae,” which they evaded, on the ground that the Treaty was at “Pekin” and they proposed to Mr. Ward that he should remain at “Shanghae” until the arrival of the British Minister.
Mr. Ward, although doubting their sincerity, in a spirit of consideration and forbearance, accepted the proposition, thus having the specified time of exchange.
The British Minister, on his arrival a day or two after, refused to hold official intercourse with the Commissioners, on the ground (as I understood it) that, “Pekin” was the place specified in the British Treaty for the exchange and that he was on his way there for that purpose.
Unsuccessful in their endeavor to detain the British and to re-open the negotiation at “Shanghae,” the Commissioners apparently yielded, and dispatched Couriers (who they asserted would arrive in a week) to Pekin to prepare (as they said) the authorities for the arrival and reception of all the misters and their conveyance to “Pekin,” where the Treaties would be exchanged by a special Commissioner on the 25th June, the day specified in the British Treaty.
The commissioners notified Mr. Ward of this arrangement and requested him to accompany the British and French to the Peiho. To this he consented, thereby, to a certain extent, assuming the same platform with the latter.
I will here remark that, the sincerity of the Chinese Commissioners was much doubted at the time, some of their countrymen at “Shanghae” declaring that delay was their object, as they were fortifying the Peiho very strongly, and had placed in command, a Mongal Prince, of high Military reputation, who was known to be very hostile to the “Treaties.”
We reached the anchorage off the Peiho on the 21st June where we found the British and French Ministers and their fleet.
On my first interview with the British Admiral, James Hope, I learned that the Ministers (English and French) had announced to the authorities on shore the object of their visit and that they should proceed by the river to “Tient-Sin,” on their way to “Pekin,” conformably with their “Treaties.”
The Chinese had positively refused them the ascent of the river, the entrance to which they found very strongly fortified, and across which several lines of barricades had been constructed.
The Chinese declared that this river, which we had all navigated as the Peiho a year ago, was only one mouth of the “Tient-Sin” river, and that there was another entrance ten miles to the North, which entrance was called the Peiho and was the point referred to in the Treaties.
They insisted that the Ministers should remain off this Northern entrance until the arrival of the Commissioners from “Shanghae” (which could not be short of two months) when arrangements would be made to convey them to “Pekin” by this route.
The British and French Ministers considering this an evasion with a view to gaining time to strengthen their defences, had referred the matter to their respective Naval Commanders, who notified the Chinese that, if the obstructions in the Channel of the river were not removed by the 25th June, the day for the exchange of Treaties, they would themselves proceed to remove them.
I will here remark that in the Chinese charts there is a small river emptying into the sea ten miles to the North of this, and which, diverging gradually from the course of the Peiho, as you ascend it, has its source far in the interior. Some twenty miles from its mouth it is connected with the river we know as the Peiho by a narrow creek, said to be dry at low, and having but five feet at high water.
After due deliberation, Mr. Ward and I decided to enter the river we had known as the Peiho, in the steamer “Toey-wan,” as far as the barricades, as though ignorant of access having been refused the English and French. If the forts should fire across our bows to bring us to, we would anchor and communicate; if into us, having no guns, we would retire and act accordingly.
Twelve British and one French steamer, all small, had previously concentrated within the bar, at the mouth of the river, just out of gun shot of the batteries.
We entered the river in execution of our plan at 11 A. m., on the 24th ult., and passing through the British Squadron, without communicating, pushed up towards the barriers.
At this time not a man was to be seen at the Forts nor a gun in an embrasure, nor, although flag staffs were on the parapets, was a flag displayed. There was nothing to indicate that the Forts were armed or manned.
Subsequent events show this to have been a deception and ambuscade, intended, I do not doubt (in the confidence of their own strength and the small force of the English) to invite a conflict in order to annul the Treaties of last year.
We had approached to within three hundred yards of the first barrier, at which point, should we not be fired on, I had purposed anchoring, when we grounded, and failed in all our efforts to back off. The tide was falling fast and our situation was critical, not only from the facility with which the batteries might demolish us, but as we were on the edge of a steep bank, from the probability of the Steamer falling over and filling.
At this moment I received from Admiral James Hope, an attention and kindness which must place me under lasting obligations to him.
Although he had reason to think that she would be fired upon by the Forts, he sent a Gun Boat to my aid, with the message that, had he known of my intention to pass up he would have furnished me a Pilot, and that he expected to see me fired on.
The Gun Boat failed in her effort to extricate me and there being, as I have said, a probability of the Toey-wan’s falling over and filling, the Admiral despatched a second Gun Boat to me, placing her entirely at my disposition with the handsome and generous offer that I should hoist on board of her the American Ensign and my own personal flag.
I declined the offer, with a just appreciation, however, of the personal kindness to myself and the delicate compliment to our service.
The Toey-wan was more fortunate than I expected and a favorable wind having sprung up we got her off at high water.
About two hours after grounding we sent a boat to the nearest Fort with my Flag Lieutenant, Mr. Trenchard, and the Interpreters, to inform the Commanding Officer that, the American Minister was on board the Toey-wan on his way to “Tient-Sin” and “Pekin,” in accordance with our Treaty and an understanding with the Chinese Commissioners at “Shanghae.”
There we met at the landing by an officer, professing to be of low rank, who said that his orders were, not to permit the removal of the barriers, and to fire on those attempting it. That he believed that a high officer had been appointed to meet the Ministers at the North. He also asserted, most falsely, as subsequently shown, that there were no Troops and only a few country Militia in the forts.
Although the Interpreters were allowed to get out of the boat for greater facility of conversation, they were not permitted to approach the Forts.
The Toey-wan floated late in the evening, when I observed that the British were arranging themselves, apparently, for action. I therefore dropped down to the mouth of the harbor, and below them, so that my lights might not interfere with their Signals or my position with their operations.
The British, in the night, removed, with their boats, a portion of the lower barrier, but the Chinese restored it in the morning.
At 2:45 P. al. on the 25th, the day specified for the exchange of Treaties, the British stood up the river for the barriers, Admiral Hope leading in one of the Gun Boats.
His whole force consisted of ten Gun Boats, including one French, and three larger steamers, of a class denominated Dispatch vessel, carrying in all about fifty guns. They also had on board of some Chinese Junks, at the mouth of the river, a reserve of boats with seamen and Marines.
On the Admiral's reaching the first barrier the Forts suddenly swarmed with men and a terrible fire from very heavy guns was opened on him from all the forts on both sides of the river.
Two of his vessels at this moment grounded near the spot the Toey-wan had grounded the day before.
The British and French fought with the most determined valor but fifteen minutes sufficed to show me without a hope of success.
The fire of the Chinese was directed with fatal skill and was chiefly concentrated on the Admiral and the vessels nearest to him. His Flag Vessel being disabled and her crew cut up, he shifted his flag to a second and on her meeting the fate of the first he again shifted it to the Cormorant, one of the larger (Dispatch) steamers. Here again the fire was concentrated on the flag of the gallant Admiral.
By this time, 4 p. m., several of his vessels had been sunk and it was evident to me that nothing could enable him to extricate himself and retire from the hopeless conflict, but the reserve of boats and men at the Junks, but at the time the tide was running too strong for the crowded boats to stem.
The officer in charge of these boats now visited one. He said nothing of aid, but his silent appeal was powerful indeed. In the few moments he was on board he would look anxiously, alternately at his Admiral and at the boats.
After he left I held a consultation with Mr. Ward, and he agreed with me perfectly that, under all the circumstances of our position with the English and the aid the Admiral had tendered me the day before, I could do no less than to tow the boats to his relief.
I made the offer which was thankfully and promptly accepted.
While the boats were making fast to hawsers which I veered astern, I insisted on Mr. Ward and his suite leaving the Toey-wan, and going on board one of the Junks, for reasons that will be obvious.
He at first reluctantly yielded, and left us, but soon returned in one of the English boats, declaring that, as the Toey-wan was his home and was going under fire with his approbation and concurrence, he would remain in her. I reluctantly yielded to his gallant impulse.
At this time a young British officer came to me from the vessels engaged to say that the gallant Admiral was dangerously wounded and had but six men left. He (the officer) had two boats sunk in reaching me.
I towed the boats through the British line to within a short distance of the Admiral whose flag was flying on the Cormorant, when casting them off I retired to the rear of the line near the French Gun Boat and anchored for the night.
I took up this position as it might enable me to aid the wounded and should boats be sunk to rescue their crews.
After anchoring I thought of the Admiral and of his chivalrous kindness to me the day before, which from an unwillingness to intrude on him when he was preparing for action, I had in no way yet acknowledged.
I therefore, with my Flag Lieutenant, Mr. Trenchard, went in my barge to visit him. When within a few feet of the Cormorant, a round shot struck the boat, killed my Coxswain, and slightly bruised my Flag Lieutenant. We fortunately reached the Cormorant before the boat entirely filled.
I found the Admiral lying on his quarter-deck, badly wounded. I informed him that I had called to pay him my respects, and to express my regret at his condition. After remaining on board the Cormorant about ten minutes I took advantage of an English boat that was passing to return to the Toey-wan.
The Cormorant after this was sunk and the Admiral shifted his flag to a fourth vessel, the Coromandel, (a thing I believe unprecedented) thus evincing an indomitable valor under very disheartening and almost hopeless circumstances.
At dusk, about 8 p. m., a desperate attempt was made, by landing from boats, to storm the forts, but they stood in an impassable Morass, and the assailants were repelled with heavy loss.
On the morning following this day and night of slaughter, the action still continuing, but the fire more feeble and distant, I found that six of the English vessels were sunk, and that the remainder had withdrawn to a more distant and safer position, from which they could easily retire out of gun shot.
I now prepared to return to the Powhatan with Mr. Ward, but first called on board the Coromandel to take leave of the Admiral and also on board the French Gun Boat to enquire after the French Commodore (Tricault) whom I had met on board the Cormorant when I called on the Admiral and who had subsequently been wounded.
I deferred my departure, by request, that I might tow to their Ships at Sea, two Launch loads of the wounded English.
On reaching the Powhatan I again despatched the Toey-wan into the harbor, in charge of Lieutenant Johnston (first of the Powhatan) with orders to remain at the mouth of the harbor, out of fire, and to afford all aid consistent with our neutrality. After an efficient performance of this duty for 24 hours he rejoined me.
The Sea Officers with me in the Toey-wan on this service were Captain Pearson, Lieutenants Trenchard and Semmes, all of the Powhatan, and Midshipman Merchant of the Germantown. The Engineer Officers were Messrs. City and Archer, Captain A. S. Taylor of the Marine Corps was also with me. I have to thank them for their zealous services.
My Coxswain, John Hart, whose death I have to lament, was the son of John and Mary Hart, now living at Jamaica, Long Island. He was a widower but has left a young daughter eight years old.
I shall communicate the sad event to his parents, and as his child whom he supported will be entitled to a pension, may I beg the favor of you, Sir, as soon as the proper papers shall be filed at the Department, to direct that the pension be issued without unnecessary delay.
Hart had been a long time in the Navy, having served under me fifteen years ago.
The English retired this morning from the river, having recovered and brought out three of their sunken vessels and destroyed the others.
Their loss is about four hundred and fifty killed and wounded, including twelve French. Eight officers are killed and twenty-three wounded. Among the wounded are the four Senior officers, including the Admiral, and the French Commodore Tricault.
They attacked with about twelve hundred men.
The above report was made to Secretary of the Navy Isaac Toucey.