At first glance the proposal may give the impression of being efficient and economical, especially to one having no intimate knowledge of the activities of the army air servce and of the naval aeronautic organization. The proposal appears to have advocates of two classes, those who, lacking complete knowledge of the military and of the naval duties of aviation, believe that amalgamation would be advantageous to the government, and those who, for personal reasons, see in amalgamation opportunities for increased rank and increased pay.
I shall endeavor to show you that national, as opposed to personal, interest demands that the aviation branches of the Army and of the Navy must be integral parts respectively of the service with which each would ordinarily work in time of war. Officers of naval aviation are practically unanimous in this opinion and hold to it in spite of the fact that many of them might get increased rank and increased pay by the adoption of the proposal. This opposition to the proposal on the part of naval aviators and naval officers in general is based on their knowledge of the impossibility of meeting those needs fully and efficiently except by the Navy itself. It is this unselfish view of naval officers that I desire to explain to you. I believe it to be sound and I desire here to express my complete belief in the statement that national interests demand a separate naval aviation force.
I understand that there is a similar opposition to the proposal, and for the same reasons, on the part of the War Department and the great body of trained and responsible army officers, both within and without the air service. In what I have to say, however, I shall not deal with any except naval aspects of this question.
What relation has the army air service to our national defense, and what relation has naval aviation to our national defense?
I do not think we can come to any correct decision regarding the organization of our aviation forces without a thorough understanding of what those forces would he required to do in case of war, and such understanding must he derived from a study, not only of the possibilities of aviation itself, but also of our national situation, our geographic position in the world. Our government, like every other government, must prepare to defend itself in two general localities, at sea and on land. The Navy is for the defense at sea, and the Army is for the defense on land.
It so happens that our geographic position, in the world, 3,000 miles of water separating us from the nearest great power, throws the burden of the first defense and, we hope, the final defense against aggression on the Navy of the United States. The Army can never act against such aggression unless the foe breaks through the defense of the Navy first, or, in case of aggression on our part, unless the Navy carries the Army overseas,
The present state of development of aircraft is such that a shore based air force can not act offensively against a nation overseas unless it is first carried across the sea in ships. A shore based air force will not he called upon to act defensively against die enemy’s ships until the Navy has failed in its mission of beeping them at a distance. What the future developments of aircraft may he no one can foresee, hut from present indications, it is unlikely that aircraft will ever be able to operate overseas without the use of ships. From the standpoint of national defense these facts point out the supreme importance of naval efficiency in all its branches.
Centuries of naval experience have unfailingly demonstrated that the completest possible teamwork within the naval service is indispensable to success. Naval aviation and naval aviation activities associated with the navy have come to be absolutely necessary to the Navy if it is to be efficient for war.
This brings us to the question of what naval aviation really is.
What Naval Aviation Really Is
The present plan for the peace time organization of aviation in the United States Navy calls for the following: On each battleship, one observation plane and two combat planes; on each light cruiser, two observation planes; on many destroyers, one combat plane each; on some submarines, one observation plane each; on 135,000 tons of airplane carriers, as many planes suitable for scouting, attack, observation and combat as it is possible for them to carry. In addition, scouting seaplanes accompanied by tenders; training stations on shore; other stations at strategic points for the maintenance of naval aircraft in support of fleet operations.
You will note from the above that, as planned, there is an intimate association between naval aviation forces and the fleet.
Loyalty
One of the first problems we have to consider, then, is how to make the aviation personnel thus intimately associated with the fleet most efficient for fleet purposes. The question of loyalty is the first one that arises. If the aviation personnel is a part of the fleet, a part of the Navy; if all the future career of that personnel is wrapped up in the success of the Navy; it their life is to be a naval life, their thought will naturally become exclusively naval, the same as the thought of any other naval officer. They will think of naval success as their primary mission. If, on the other hand, they belong to a third service, not of the Navy, their primary thought is not with the Navy, their keenest efforts are not devoted to the Navy, but what, to them, is the primary organization—the United Air Service. They look forward to the time, perhaps, when they will not have to go to sea but will train and live in another environment, perhaps a softer life.
Then there is the question of serving two masters. One can
U. S. S. “Langley,” Showing Flying Deck |
not be completely and wholly loyal to naval interests and to the interests of a united air service. There will never be complete understanding between the two services. The needs of either the one or the other must take precedence. I think that success, coordination, efficiency of the air service of the Navy depends very largely on this idea of complete loyalty to and life-long association with the Navy and its aims.
There are other somewhat minor considerations of the same nature which may be mentioned here. If the Navy is required to use, in its aviation service, officers who are trained for the air alone, then it will have insufficient work for those officers to do when they are attached to seagoing vessels. The naval aviator on board ship actually spends comparatively little time in the air. So the interests of general efficiency and general morale demand that he be given other duties, and those duties must necessarily be naval duties, the duties of trained naval officers. If the training of the individual officers is such that they are not fitted for these duties, they become somewhat of the nature of idlers on board ship and consequently would bring discontent. If, however, they are themselves naval officers, their air experience, in addition to their naval experience, will qualify them still more highly for the ranks that come to them with increasing years.
Flying is a young man’s job. We have to consider the subsequent careers of officers that are assigned to aviation duties. If the Navy supplies from young officers its own aviation personnel, it sees to it that they are trained for their naval duties as well and that at the proper age they continue their naval careers in the more normal duties of seagoing naval officers.
Spotting
I desire now to point out to you with more detail the principal duties that have to be performed by naval aviators and the necessity we are under of using trained naval officers for these duties if we are to get the maximum results. I will first describe to you spotting of gunfire.
When a ship opens fire at an enemy ship, it fires a broadside and then watches to see where those shots fall—whether they are short of the target or beyond the target or to the right or left. If the target is close by, it is quite easy for an officer of ordinary training to see from the masthead of the ship how much the shots missed the target and to telephone to the guns how they should be laid for the next salvo in order to hit the target; but if the target is distant the splashes made by the shots when they hit the water nearly always appear to be on the line with the enemy ship and, because of the curvature of the earth, it is almost impossible to tell how much those splashes are over or short of the target ship. It therefore becomes necessary to send men high up to see the ship and the splashes made by our shots around it, somewhat as one looks down on a map. This spotting of the shots when firing at great range is a duty which has to be assigned to naval aviators.
I think it is not too much to say that battles may he decided by the skill or the lack of skill of officers aloft in airplanes spotting the fall of the shots of their own fleet. When single ships are firing at each other the problem is comparatively simple, hut when fleets are firing at each other, spotting requires the very highest degree of skill and judgment on the part of the aviator- spotter. He can get this judgment only by constant association with fleets, by constant practice and by constant study of the problems involved. The aviator has to judge not only where the shots are falling hut he must communicate to the firing ships changes of course of the enemy, changes of formation of the enemy, changes of speed of the enemy and any other information that may assist our ships and our fleet toward victory. He must do all of these things with the utmost celerity. It is no unusual thing in our present aviation service for an aviator- spotter to observe the fall of a salvo of shell near the target, to estimate the error of that salvo in range and to radio the correction back to the ship in five seconds’ time. The aviator has to do all of these things under the pressure of the knowledge of his great responsibility. I believe that it would he taking the gravest of risks for us to expect or to demand that duties of this nature be done by officers belonging to any service other than the naval service.
Scouting
Another of the very important duties of naval aviators is scouting. At present scouting by naval aircraft operating from ships is not likely to be carried on more than two or three hundred miles from their parent ships. We have no naval aircraft as yet, nor has any other government, suitable for prolonged scouting operations independently of mother ships. When the Navy sends an airplane into the air to search for the enemy fleet, it is essential that the officer who is to get the information should be able to evaluate, to know what it is that he sees. Anybody aloft can say that he sees a ship or a group of ships but it takes experience to know what kind of ships they are, what they are doing, what the significance of their formation is and what relation those ships bear to the intentions of our own fleet. The scouting operations that are of the highest importance are those that precede battle, No one can foretell which aviator will be the one to report to the commander-in-chief the presence and the formation and position of the enemy fleet. Whoever it is that makes the discovery will see much but must report it in a very few words. He will need a background of naval knowledge and experience as a naval officer that will enable him to pick out the essentials of what he sees and send them through to the commander-in-chief in a very few words. He will see changes in the enemy’s formation, movements which, to the untrained officer, might be meaningless but which to the trained naval officer would convey information of the highest importance. It will require a knowledge of naval strategy and of naval tactics for that aviator to interpret correctly to his commander-in-chief what he sees.
A naval aviator aloft on scouting duty is not a chauffeur driving a machine, but more of the nature of a general overlooking the field of battle, grasping the essentials of what he sees and telling his commander-in-chief in order that he, the commander-in-chief, may take suitable action at once. If he sends incorrect information, falsely interpreted information, to his commander- in-chief, his act may be followed by the gravest consequences. I believe it would be highly contrary to our national interests to entrust duties of this nature to any but trained naval officers.
Attack
The third mission of naval aviation is the attack of enemy ships and here again judgment of a high order is required. The naval aviator must know which are the essential ships to attack and must be able to recognize them from the air. He will not have spread before him a simple picture, easily recognizable in its details, but he will have to select his target, judge its course and speed, and importance to the general engagement through a mass of smoke and through confusing elements that will make his task extremely difficult. As a rule he will carry but one or two bombs or but one torpedo, which will mean that for that particular engagement, as a rule, his first attempt must be successful.
Another duty closely allied with the attack duty is that of laying smoke screens from his airplane. To do this successfully he will have to operate in conjunction with other airplanes and will have to adjust his acts and the movements of his plane to the enemy fleet. His problem will not be to lay a smoke screen in a certain place, but to lay it so that when the fleets arrive in a certain position the smoke screen will be so laid as best to support the efforts of his own fleet. This act will require judgment and naval knowledge of a high order. It could never be expected from any officer not trained as a naval officer, not continuously associated with men of the naval profession.
The attacks must not be isolated or independent affairs, but must be co-ordinated in time and method with the general plan of the naval commander-in-chief. Only careful training and long practice will develop the necessary teamwork among the component arms of the fleet to insure their harmonized working in the general engagement.
Communications
The important role which radio communication plays in naval operations is another reason why it would be very unwise to trust duties so intimately associated with the success of our fleet to other than officers of the Navy especially trained for the purpose.
The various units of the fleet must always be in touch with one another. This contact is based on a complex system of intercommunications of which radio constitutes an essential part. It is complete in itself. It involves intimate knowledge by each one of its elements of the workings of every other element of the system. The entry of an extraneous element, not intimately associated with the workings of the system, is apt to have a decidedly unfavorable effect on the efficiency of the entire system. In the case of the radio service, this unfavorable effect would be particularly noticeable. Only the personnel of the navy radio is capable of giving efficient service in connection with naval operations. No other personnel could do as well because such service requires intimate knowledge of the workings of every branch of the Navy.
Types of Aircraft
There is a widespread opinion that naval and military aircraft do not differ greatly in types, but this is not true. In the first place the Navy operates over the water almost exclusively while the primary duty of the Army is operations over land. Naval aircraft that are forced to alight on the land are likely to be wrecked and army aircraft that alight at sea are likely to be lost. It is true that the Navy uses aircraft that alight on wheels but even in this type the naval aircraft must be especially built for this purpose because of the peculiar requirements of the Navy. Wheeled aircraft used by the Navy must be capable of being shot from catapults on board ship and must be built strong enough and designed especially with a view to alighting on aircraft carriers and being stopped after alighting within a very short distance. The Army, on the other hand, use the length of the field to get into the air and the length of the same field to come to rest after alighting. It is not too much to say that naval aircraft must get into the air in one-fiftieth of the distance the Army uses and must come to rest after alighting on board ship within a hundred feet where army planes would probably use several hundred feet in coming to rest. There are other requirements of naval aircraft that make their type distinctive. For instance the Army is under no necessity of limiting the length of the wings of aircraft whereas naval aircraft that go to sea on ships must have those wings adjusted in length to the place they are to be carried on board ship. As the number of naval aircraft carried on ships will always be limited, the Navy is under necessity of designing aircraft adapted for several purposes, such as torpedoing, bombing and scouting. Efforts are now being made to design a single plane capable of performing all three functions. Operation of naval aircraft involves a thorough knowledge of the making of nautical and astronomical observations, for which purpose naval aircraft must be equipped with special navigational instruments, whereas land planes as a rule navigate by maps. These distinctions of naval aircraft illustrate the necessity of constantly regarding naval aircraft in their relation to the ships from which they are to be operated.
Aircraft Carriers
The effectiveness of these carriers for war purposes will depend very largely upon the seamanship of the aviators attached to the carriers. Questions of the handling of planes alongside the ship, the hoisting them in and out of the ship, of stowing them on hoard ship, of repairing them on hoard ship, of tuning them up, the general sea life of the personnel of the carriers will determine very largely whether they are successful or otherwise. Naval experience indicates that no one sent to sea to do ship duty is efficient until he has been trained for a long time on board ship. This necessity for naval training will be especially important for all those officers who are attached to aircraft carriers. From the standpoint of controlling the manufacture of naval aircraft and aircraft carriers it would not seem to be advisable to vest this control in separate and distinct departments of the government. The design of aircraft carriers and that of naval aircraft are so closely interconnected that their manufacture should be controlled by the same department: i.e., the department which controls the building of all naval ships.
Independent Action of Air Forces One of the principal reasons that has been adduced for a united air service is the belief that action by air forces independent of land and sea forces is likely to be important in time of war. I have already pointed out in the beginning of this discussion that our geographical position precludes such independent action. However, should it ever happen that our air forces would be in striking distance of enemy forces, even then, independent action of air forces is not likely to be profitable. We have found in naval war experiences that it is the concentrated attack that counts. Successes gained by air forces are fugitive unless they can be immediately followed up by ships or troops. It is during a battle of land or sea forces that aircraft display their most efficient function. A ship that is attacked at sea by bombers, when free to defend herself, is quite safe from such attack because she may give her whole attention to repelling it by anti-aircraft guns and with her own aircraft, but where a ship is engaged at the time in battle with other ships, her ability to defend herself against air attack is lessened. It is then that assistance of naval aircraft becomes of vital importance: i.e., when it can be coordinated with the entire plan of the battle.
I do not enter here at all into the question as to whether or not army aircraft should be allowed independence of action. That is a matter for military authorities to settle. I am merely pointing out that such independence of action will afford no benefits to the Navy. There will, of course, occur occasions when naval air raids may be made for a specific purpose.
The above are some of the reasons why I am opposed to a united air service. I believe that any one of them more than overbalances any just claims that may be made in favor of a united air service.
The Navy Department is Responsible for the Design of Naval Aircraft
The general design of an airplane to meet some military or naval need rests upon distinctive characteristics of these respective needs.
Aircraft for naval purposes depend so much upon general naval tactics and naval construction that a decision as to the required characteristics may involve an estimate of the situation as regards some phase of gunnery, torpedoes, fire control, underwater protection, horizontal armor, gas warfare, ship ventilation, anti-aircraft guns, launching and handling facilities, bases, storehouses, and tenders, besides purely technical aviation matters. For example, the principal feature of a bombing plane is the type of bomb to be carried. Should we carry a one-ton bomb, or two half-ton bombs? To answer the question, the relative effectiveness of different types and weights of bombs must be considered with reference to the proposed targets. If the target be a battleship, the question involves an inquiry into the probable
protection the battleship can be given on deck and below water. Furthermore, to decide whether the bomber should be given a high ceiling (ability to bomb from a high altitude) at sacrifice of some other characteristic, one must consider the anti-aircraft measures which are probably to be encountered.
Similarly, the characteristics desired in an observation plane are largely determined by the fire control doctrine of the fleet while, at the same time, the possibilities of the airplane must be considered in forming that fire control doctrine. None but naval officers familiar with all sides of the question can do better than make a more or less intelligent guess. An accurate estimate of a situation involving an intimate knowledge of such broad fields as aviation, gunnery, tactics and naval construction is clearly beyond the scope of one man’s mind, but quite within the capacity of the Navy Department. The agitation for a separate air service appears to be based on, as yet, unproved theories, and seems to ignore the very important material difficulties which are not eliminated by simply ignoring them. Some of these difficulties have already been pointed out. To such material difficulties should be added another vital consideration, and that is the responsibility of the Navy for the success of its actions. This responsibility may legislatively be shifted upon the shoulders of another department, but neither the necessary knowledge nor the final responsibility can actually be so transferred.
The Royal Air Force and the British Navy
Among the arguments advanced by proponents of a single air service are that consolidation of army and naval aviation will promote the development of aviation in the United States, reduce the cost of production of aircraft, and insure greater economy in the administration and operation of our national aviation activities. They point out that for these reasons Great Britain consolidated the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying Corps into the Royal Air Force under a separate department with its own cabinet officer. As a result of this they claim that aviation has gone ahead in England whereas in America it has fallen behind.
Let us look into some of the facts. The amalgamation of the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying Corps took place on April 1, 1918. The critical conditions in England at that time are still fresh in our minds. They were a deciding influence upon those responsible for the creation of the Royal Air Force. The naval war was practically over, the submarine campaign was already doomed to collapse, and the German High Seas Fleet was powerless. On land the situation was very different. The allied armies were in a desperate situation, England was within bombing distance of the German aviators, and victory was by no means assured to the allied cause. It was, therefore, perfectly logical that the British Army should call upon the Navy for such reinforcements as were not absolutely necessary at sea. The British Army was deficient in aircraft, and the Navy was well supplied with aircraft. In view of the fact that the naval war was practically over, urgent consideration was given to the best method of procedure to reinforce the hard pressed armies with naval aircraft. The result was the amalgamation of the two services into a royal air force. The two forces were amalgamated because it was not considered practicable to loan the naval air service to the Army and have the navy personnel work under the direction of army personnel. It was feared there would he friction with resulting inefficiency, it was a military necessity of the time, and the British Navy fully alive to the situation therefore gracefully acquiesced in the amalgamation, realizing that it was a temporary expedient.
But, the emergency created by the war having passed, the First Lord of the British Admiralty in the naval estimates for 1920 and 1921 reported as follows:
So far as can be foreseen naval requirements will be met by the proposal ultimately to form a naval wing under the Air Ministry with a personnel especially trained in naval work.
The foregoing indicates that all was not well, and that aviation was not fulfilling the requirements of the navy. Subsequent representations by the Royal Navy and by the British Army disclose the fact that the opposition to the existence of a royal air force by the Army and Navy was steadily growing with the realization that the respective services should control such air units as were allocated to them. The Navy, particularly, was dissatisfied with the progress made in naval aviation, and it was felt that the fleet was being deprived of one of its most useful weapons.
The First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir David Beatty, recently (summer of 1923) intimated that he and his professional colleagues would feel bound to resign unless the navy should control such aircraft as are an indispensable part of the purely naval equipment of a modern fleet. Since then the Admiralty has been given partial control of the flying army afloat and some supervision of training for sea reconnaissance. Undoubtedly this has improved the naval situation in England, but it is only a temporary expedient and the problem there is still far from a satisfactory solution.
But even had consolidation of all branches of air service in England proved to be successful—which apparently it has not— it would not follow that such a consolidation is to be recommended in the case of other countries where the conditions upon which the idea of consolidated air service is predicated do not exist. The difference in the geographic position alone of England and of the United States is so great that the strategic problems in the defense of the two countries cannot be compared; and, if one bears in mind the peculiar demands upon England which existed at the time of the formation of the Royal Air Force, and considers that similar motives are entirely absent in the case of the United States, the argument that the example of England should be followed loses all force.
Whatever may be the reasons for the opposition by the British Navy to continuance of the Royal Air Service, it cannot be gainsaid that there, at least, the argument for consolidated air service has a substantial foundation in fact. The World War has disclosed the precarious position of England, exposed as she is to air attacks from all sides, a position from which her navy cannot now completely safeguard the country. England's traditional “splendid isolation” has been destroyed by the expansion of warfare into the realm of air. True, loss of control over naval aircraft is bound to have a detrimental effect on the British Navy; but this detrimental effect, the advocates of the Royal Air Service hold, must of necessity take a secondary place in view of the primary importance of a general air defense. The geographical position of the United States makes a similar situation impossible here. The United States, unlike the British Isles, is not open to easy air attack, nor is it likely that future development of aircraft will substantially change this situation. Independent, concentrated air warfare against this country is not conceivable. Therefore, a separate, consolidated air service in the United States has no reason for existence. On the other hand, the detrimental effect of loss of control by the navy over naval aircraft, which in England takes a secondary place before the air demands of the country as a whole, would, in the United States, assume primary importance, because the United States is bound to rely for her protection, in the first place, on her Navy. Any attempt therefore to weaken this first line of defense by depriving the Navy of its control over naval aircraft would be fraught with serious, if not indeed fatal, consequences.
Economy
As to the contention, also based on the example of England, that consolidation of air service would bring about a reduction in the cost of production of aircraft and greater economy in the administration and operation of aviation activities, a survey of England’s situation in this respect does not bear out this claim. Indeed, one of the strongest arguments of the opposition to the continuance of the Royal Air Force is that this service has placed a tremendous financial burden on the government, as shown by the estimates of the Air Ministry.
A reading over of the second report of the special committee on estimates of the British Parliament held in April and May, 1923, will show that the Royal Air Force is duplicating many of the functions of the army and navy. Money is asked for separate hospitals, separate medical corps, nursing corps, air cadet academy, floating equipment, and for separate training stations for boys and men. The air service has its own judge advocate and legal corps for the administration of courts martial, boards, etc. It has its separate financial, accounting and supply organizations and duplicates similar establishments now within the existing organization of the army and navy. There is great waste in personnel, and taking up only the case of aircraft carriers it is shown in the report above mentioned that the personnel on aircraft carriers could be materially reduced with aviation an integral part of the navy. Rear Admiral C. T. M. Fuller states that for every eighteen air officers on the British carriers the number could be reduced to eleven or less with the flying personnel an integral part of the navy. This is due to the fact that the aviators could be used as watch officers, the ship’s regular radio officer could handle the radio, and the ship’s supply officer could handle all stores, etc., etc. He says that there are separate clothing stores, separate work shops, etc., the men of the air service being under a different command from the men of the ship. The admiral also states that in his opinion were it possible to do away with the necessity for the separate functions and have all under one command from one service, it would be possible to make space on the carriers for at least six more planes. Clearly, therefore, the experience of England bodes ill for the hopes of effecting economy in the United States by following her example.
In the United States, naval aviation, by constituting an integral part of the naval establishment, is free from the numerous duplication of costs from which England suffers under the regime of a consolidated air service. The existing administrative, industrial and scientific organization of our Navy Department and all of its resources have been taken advantage of in the development of naval aviation, whose foundation rests upon the Navy with little additional overhead over the general overhead charges of the Department. A saving is thus effected in the United States where in England the cost is rising without prospect of stemming the tide.
A few examples illustrating wherein such saving is effected in the United States may make the point clearer.
Aviation is still in a formative state. In no branch of national defense is it more important to keep in touch with modern development. More than that, if the United States is to hold her place among the naval powers, we must continue to lead in such development. In such work naval aviation must be developed along the lines adapted, primarily, to the needs of the Navy. Only the Navy can know what is really needed, and only the Navy, therefore, can take care of such development, as it has done in the past, through unremitting research, investigation, inspection, designing and redesigning, and through the tireless efforts of the officers on whom fall the administration of these numerous functions and the management of established naval agencies.
The development of naval aviation ordnance, as it is today, for instance, has been carried on by existing naval ordnance agencies. The numerous problems involved, such as bombs, bomb sights, guns, torpedoes, smoke screens, are all predicated on a thorough knowledge not only of aviation alone, but of aviation as practiced in and by the Navy: i.e., aviation as an indivisible arm of the entire Navy. This development, which, under a consolidated air service, would require a vast expenditure of money for separate ordnance laboratory and various other technical establishments, has been accomplished practically without cost to the country above that incurred in the general work of the Navy Department. All these activities came within the daily work of the various establishments of the Navy, which exist now and which would continue to exist, whether part of their work were taken away from them or not.
Take the development of naval radio as another illustration. The conspicuous progress of this branch of naval activity is due to the work of the Bureau of Engineering of the Navy. This bureau is here to stay. Its present status would not and could not he changed by taking aviation radio work away from it and transferring such work to a consolidated air department. What, then, would be accomplished by such a transfer? Leaving out other possible disadvantages, and considering merely the question of cost, a part of the work now effectively performed by the Bureau of Engineering without cost outside of the cost which has to be incurred in any case, would have to be done by a new and separate establishment at a great additional expense. The same is true in regard to various other duties of the Bureau of Engineering, such as testing materials, development of engines, etc.
One of the greatest savings in the administration of aviation is effected through the administration of the supply system through the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts. All purchases of material, all disbursing, supply of provisions and clothing, and general accounting for all branches of the Navy, including aviation, is performed by the supply corps. The storage, issue and transportation of aviation supplies for the Navy are accomplished as an incidental function of the bureau. This important service would necessitate an almost exact duplication of the supply corps of the Navy in a separate air force.
In the production of naval types of planes and their development for the work of the fleet, full use has been made of the services of the expert designers and engineers of the Navy. The experienced naval architects of the construction corps of the Navy schooled to the design and construction of modern naval vessels have provided a large part of the technical skill for aircraft development. An example of this is had in the production of service types of planes now with the fleet, in the development of the catapult for launching planes from naval ships, the development of the arresting gear on the decks of airplane carriers, and the building of the airship Shenandoah. All of this work has, been accomplished by the construction corps as a part of their regular duties. It could only have been accomplished in a separate air force by the creation of a distinct corps of technicians.
Further than this, all inspection work is carried on by the regular inspection service of the Navy; medical service is provided by the naval medical corps; recruiting, training and administration of the personnel is carried on by the Personnel Division of the Bureau of Navigation, which bureau also develops and supplies aircraft instruments and navigational equipment peculiar to the needs of naval aviation. Intelligence work in the form of accumulating data and information on world progress in aviation is done by the Office of Naval Intelligence, and communication work is conducted under the Office of Naval Communications.
Full use is made of the existing industrial facilities of navy yards and naval stations to meet the Navy’s aviation requirements, and the personnel of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, having cognizance of all public works of the Navy, is fully able to cope with the requirements of our air stations on shore.
The divorcing of aviation from the regular naval establishment would necessitate the re-creation of agencies for performing all of the functions enumerated above. It would result in inevitable duplication and duplication is only another term for doubling expense.
I do not wish to be misunderstood as to my position. I am in no sense depreciating the value of cooperation. What I wish to point out is that cooperation should not assume the form advocated by those favoring a consolidated air service. There should always be full cooperation between the aircraft branches of the Army and Navy. Such cooperation is in force today, despite the general impression to the contrary.
Coordination and Cooperation
The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics was established in 1915 and has two members from the War Department from the office in charge of military aeronautics and two members from the Navy Department from the office in charge of naval aeronautics. The reports of this committee clearly indicate the extent of cooperation between the War and Navy Departments and the Advisory Committee. Through subcommittees representatives of both departments are in intimate contact and are fully cognizant of the developments and investigations in hand by the committee for each department. During the war the Aircraft Board functioned for the purpose of supervising and directing the purchase, production and manufacture of aircraft, ordnance, accessories, etc.
Even before the war the two departments had come to an understanding as to the field of service. Since the discontinuance of the Aircraft Board, on March 19, 1919, coordination has been carried on, part of the time through the Joint Army and Navy Board on Aeronautics, and is now carried on by the Aeronautics Board which reports to the Joint Army and Navy Board.
The technical reports of the principal development work of the Army in aircraft and accessories, which is conducted at McCook Field, Dayton, Ohio, are regularly supplied to the Bureau of Aeronautics of the Navy, which also has an officer on duty at McCook Field.
The Bureau of Aeronautics keeps the office of the Chief of Air Service, U. S. Army, and McCook Field, supplied with copies of its technical orders and notes. This bureau also prepares special investigations and reports for the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, which publishes these data. Arrangements are now in existence for the interchange of contracts as soon as they are let by either the Army or the Navy for aircraft material, as well as reports of trial boards on the acceptance of airplanes. Also, where it may be of advantage to one of the two departments, inspections are handled by the field force of the other department. By such coordination and interchange of information, duplication is largely avoided and such duplication as does exist is principally due to the lack of adequate facilities in either department to conduct the volume of work demanded.
True, competition has developed along certain lines, which may have led to something in the nature of duplication, but it is a healthy and beneficial competition which has resulted in important and rapid improvements in aircraft engines, accessories, etc., beyond what might otherwise have been accomplished.
These are some of the facts upon which I base my opinion that a consolidated air force would not realize the advantages claimed by its advocates, and some of the reasons why I firmly believe that such consolidation would be detrimental to national interests and would weaken national defense.