The Departments of War and Navy have begun a movement to bring about a closer co-ordination between the two services. This is a matter of the greatest importance. In time of peace it will conduce to economy of expenditure in preventing duplication, and it will prepare the Army and Navy in their peace routine to work together in their war plans toward a common purpose in securing harmony of action in the event of war. It is the essence of preparedness.
This ideal was sought years ago under the administration of President Taft, when an “Army and Navy Joint Board” was first organized with Admiral Dewey at its head. This board was made up of members of the Army General Staff and the Navy General Board, and it began a work that promised substantial results and sensible preparations that would enable the Army and Navy to co-operate promptly and effectively at the first alarm of war.
Forbidding the Joint Board to Meet
Astonishing as it may seem, however, this vitally important project was nullified in 1915 by an order of the President and the Secretary of the Navy, forbidding any meetings of the joint board. Experts of the Army and Navy could not even convene to discuss the possible emergency of war. They were not permitted to think of the probability of this country being eventually involved in war, although the world had been on fire for more than a year, and it should have been evident that the United States ought, at least, to anticipate such a contingency and not be caught napping. In explanation of this remarkable policy, the statement was subsequently made by the Navy Department, in testimony before the Senate after the World War, that the joint board was not permitted to meet in 1916 because it was feared that the army and naval officers might be encouraged to turn their minds actively toward preparations for war. This was considered dangerous.
No parallel can be found in the history of intelligent nations for this complete stifling of our naval and military minds in 1915- These officers were not seeking war. They were quite powerless to precipitate hostilities or to interfere in any manner whatever with the policies of the civil administration. They had no desire to do so. It was a mere organization wisely to safeguard the nation in an emergency—that was all. Organization costs nothing. It is harmless. It is a sensible form of insurance against the pandemonium of unpreparedness. It requires no appropriation of public money. Nevertheless, officers of the Army and Navy were sentenced to sit at their desks in mental and professional idleness, carrying on a daily routine in which there could be no dream of war.
Making War “Informally”
And, stranger still, this absurd fear of joint Army and Navy activities looking merely to harmonious co-operation continued after we entered the war. A rear admiral and a brigadier general in active command in the Pacific suggested to the Navy Department that joint Army and Navy boards be organized in every seaport of the United States to consider the means to be taken in the event of hostile operations in its vicinity. No matter whether there was any imminent danger or not, such a precaution was manifestly sensible. There were persistent rumors, for instance, that the Germans would send cruising submarines to the Pacific. But the Navy Department turned down the suggestion, saying that such boards could not be officially recognized, but that officers would be permitted to meet “informally” to discuss ways and means. And so we were to make war “informally.” Such was the policy of the Navy Department in the spring of 1917.
An Amusing Incident
That the word “funny” would best describe the situation was subsequently proved. Several months after this common-sense plan had been submitted to the Department and disapproved, a sergeant in Fort Rosecranz at San Diego reported three German submarines off that port. Naturally there was a state of picturesque confusion. There was no co-ordinating plan. There was no head at San Diego. A half dozen naval and military commanders were there, working zealously at cross purposes in compliance with the Navy Department’s scheme of making war “informally,” with no well considered organization for an emergency. The wires between the Pacific Coast and Washington were hot with flying messages. The inquiry finally reached the senior naval officer who was in San Francisco at the time,—“Why was there no co-ordination at San Diego?” The answer was given that the files of correspondence for several months would explain the matter—the Navy Department had forbidden the effective organization of joint boards to handle such a situation. This resulted in a change of attitude at Washington. Joint boards were encouraged in the Pacific ports, and the joint Army and Navy board at Washington was subsequently revised and has greatly developed in usefulness since the Armistice.
It transpired that the watchful sergeant had cited three whales spouting along their way up the coast and had mistaken them in the mist or haze for hostile submarines. Of course, the result was excellent. It aroused the Navy Department. This funny incident becomes still funnier when we consider the fact that three spouting whales on an innocent cruise accomplished more in perfecting an ultimate organization for coast defense in the Pacific than the combined efforts of a rear admiral of the Navy and a brigadier general of the Army.
Army and Navy Air Forces
It is welcome news, therefore, that the country may no longer be dependent upon the appearance of floundering whales off the coast to bring about an organization for defense in which the Army and Navy will act in hearty and effective co-operation. There are many problems to be solved by the two departments in defining the exact duties of each to secure the best results when an enemy appears from across the sea. One of the most important questions is that of the army and naval air forces. The Act of June 5, 1920 provides that: “Hereafter the Army Air Service shall control all aerial operations from land bases and naval aviation shall have control of all aerial operations attached to the fleet, including shore stations whose maintenance is necessary for operations connected with the fleet, for construction and experimentation and for training of personnel.”
This wording of the law is not sufficiently wide in its scope and does not explicitly cover the details in the assignment of duty to Army and Navy air forces. The two services necessarily overlap m many particulars, and herein the Army and Navy board must harmonize conflicting claims in order that the Army and Navy may act, as they always should, like a “band of brothers” in any emergency.
A Sensible Compromise
A disturbing factor in the discussion is found in the suggestion that has been urged by air enthusiasts in favor of a “United Air Service,” under an air minister quite independent of the Army and Navy and quite equal in authority to the Secretaries of War and Navy. Such is in effect the condition in England today. But the British Navy takes decided exception to this organization and demands a separation of its air service from that of the Army and civil establishment. A recent discussion in Parliament covers both sides of the controversy, and although the claims of the Navy were admitted to be strong and may ultimately be approved, it was the decision of the British Government to make no change for the present except to give to the Navy a more complete control of its air forces under the general supervisory administration of the air minister.
There are strong reasons for maintaining our air organizations as they now exist until air navigation is further developed. Noting the English experiment and their indecision as to the best solution, it would appear to be the part of wisdom to permit the Army, Navy and civil departments each to perfect and develop its own material and its own activities under a co-ordinating system until the verdict of a few years’ experience may demonstrate to Congress the wisdom of a change.
In the meantime, the people of this country have reason to be proud of the records of the Army air service, the Bureau of Naval Aeronautics, and of the air mail service under the Post-office Department. Each has so splendidly triumphed with small appropriations, inadequate material, and in the astounding absence of all laws for the control of aviation in this country, that we may predict the quick development and wide usefulness of air power in national defense and in commercial life as soon as Congress is awakened to the vital importance of this new force that has come into the world.