PROFESSIONAL NOTES
Prepared By Lieutenant Commander F.W. Rockwell, U.S. Navy and Lieutenant J.B. Heffernan, U.S. Navy
GREAT BRITAIN
The New Battleships.—The contracts require that both ships be completed in three years and the contract price is about six million pounds apiece. The displacement of the vessels will be in accordance with the treaty limitation, 35,000 tons each: Their length will be 660 feet: their beam 106 feet, and their speed will be symmetrical with that of the older British battleships—23 knots. It is reported that both ships will have oil-burning boilers, and that they will be driven by turbines through reduction gearing. The fuel oil capacity provided for will give these ships a far greater cruising radius than any other British capital ships. The plans call for three triple gun turrets, mounting 16-inch guns. Thus these ships will have nine 16-inch guns, and it is interesting to note that after predicting the failure of our triple turrets the British have at last adopted them, and not only that but they will have the 16-in. triple turret before we do, because the Maryland, Colorado, and West Virginia—our 16-in. gun ships—carry their eight 16-in. guns in twin turrets. Statements in some papers are to the effect that two of the three turrets are to be located on the forecastle, while the third is to be located just abaft the bridge and forward of the funnel. If this is the case then the quarter-deck will be entirely clear and there will be practically no possibility of astern fire. It is further reported that a heavily armored citadel will enclose the barbettes of the three turrets, the conning tower, and possibly the uptakes to the funnel.
Reports in the press have differed in regard to the armor protection of the ship, but it is now reported that the main belt will be a maximum thickness of 13 inches. Apparently there are to be three armored decks, including the weather deck.
The anti-aircraft battery is said to consist of twelve 4-in. high angle guns, mounted in pairs. The secondary battery will consist of twelve 6-in. guns, mounted in three 2-gun turrets on each broadside. There will be above-water triple tubes for torpedoes, fitted it is said for the 21-in. Whitehead torpedo.
As mentioned above the quarter-deck will be large and free from obstructions and it has been reported that it is designed so in order to provide a flying off deck or landing deck for airplanes. It is further reported that the turrets will be operated by hydraulic gear and that the steering gear will be hydraulic.—J. B. N.
Britain's Naval Holiday.—A special interest attached to the laying down of the new minelayer at Devonport last Wednesday. The vessel herself may not be a unit of the first magnitude, but she has the distinction of being one of the only two men-of-war that are now under construction for the British Navy. Thirteen months before—on November 1, 1921, to be precise—the keel of submarine X-1 was laid at Chatham, after a pause of three years in new naval construction. During those thirty-six months that succeeded the armistice, when the only work in British dockyards was confined to finishing off vessels begun under the war program, the laying of new keels went on apace in the yards of America and Japan. The post-war building activities of those two Powers included a score of capital ships of the largest dimensions, a still larger number of fast cruisers, and shoals of torpedo craft, surface and submarine. It is true that the Washington Treaty has temporarily suspended work on most of the capital ships, but all other types are being proceeded with, and the light cruiser and submarine forces of Japan alone will soon be superior to ours.
There is, of course, no precedent for the stagnation in naval shipbuilding which has prevailed in this country since the war. Admitting that the circumstances, both political and financial, have justified our negative policy in this respect up to now, it becomes a question as to how much longer we can afford to keep our dockyard slips vacant. If battleship competition has ceased, there is still a pronounced rivalry in other man-of-war types whose tactical value was revealed by war experience. Can Great Britain look on with equanimity at the rapid multiplication of foreign cruisers and submarines, and do nothing to maintain her own position with respect to these indispensable craft? It would, no doubt, need some courage to bring forward at this juncture, a new program of any description, having regard to the state of the budget and the staggering cost even of minor naval construction. But that is nevertheless the duty that must be undertaken by the Admiralty in the near future if our naval position is not to be hopelessly compromised. There is one question we would put without any tendencious purpose, but merely to focus attention on the hard facts of the situation: At the present rate of progress shall we have anything to match the splendid fleet of twenty-five light cruisers—with an average speed of 33 knots—which Japan will have in commission three or four years hence?
Details of the new minelayer are not yet available, but her principal features will be approximately:
Displacement 7,000 tons
Length 500 feet
Beam 58 feet
She has been designed by Sir E.H. Tennyson d'Eyncourt, and the design marks a new departure, so that she may be regarded as an experimental ship; and, although the character of her armament is at present confidential, it is believed that she will be heavily armored for a vessel of this class. Whether her construction will be rapid or otherwise is not yet known—this will depend upon the Government's naval policy in the future, and upon international developments; but the Navy Estimates for the current year only provide for £294,990 to be spent upon her up to the end of next March, and of this sum £50,000 is appropriated for dockyard labor and £75,000 for dockyard materials. The estimated expenditure upon the vessel up to the end of last March was £82,588, so that the total estimated expenditure up to the end of the financial year will be £377,578. It is an interesting fact that no other Royal yard will this year lay down a vessel of the dimensions of the new mine-layer.—Naval and Military Record, 6 December, 1922.
Aircraft-Carriers.—The new aircraft-carrier Hermes is omitted from the Admiralty statement, probably because she is rapidly approaching completion. This vessel has been something of a mystery ship up to now, and the details of her which appear in Dr. Parkes' new book. Ships of the Royal Navy, are therefore of particular interest. In general design she is, it appears, a smaller edition of the Argus but, unlike that famous ship, the Hermes has a funnel and a tripod mast, both of which are placed over on the starboard side amidships. Her equipment, which includes all the latest types of gear for landing, handling, and launching aircraft, is considerably in advance of anything formerly employed for the purpose.
As the ship can steam at 25 knots and mounts the respectable armament of seven 6-in. guns, four 4-in. anti-aircraft, and nine smaller pieces, she would be no mean antagonist as a cruiser, although the big area of vertical and horizontal target she presents would handicap her in a duel with any conventional warship. Our largest aircraft carrier, the Eagle, is now emerging from her big refit with an extra funnel and a tripod mast, together with numerous other improvements which, it is to be hoped, will render her thoroughly efficient for the work she has to do. From beginning to end this ship must have cost an enormous sum of money.—Naval and Military Record, 13 December, 1922.
New Submarine Depot Ship.—Converted into a submarine depot ship at a cost of over £200,000, H.M.S. Cyclops, late repair ship, was commissioned at Chatham on Thursday for service with First Submarine Flotilla. The Cyclops is to take the place of the Pandora.—Naval and Military Record, 27 December, 1922.
The Training of Naval Engineers.—An announcement of capital importance to the Navy in general and the engineering branch in particular was made by the Admiralty on December 15. It signifies the virtual abandonment of the scheme which aimed at suppressing the distinction between the executive and engineering branches of. the Navy. Introduced in 1902, this scheme has been in force twenty years, though it did not become absolute until 1905, entries of engineer students having been continued, on a much reduced scale, for three years after the system of common entry had been adopted in principle. The premises upon which the Admiralty of 1902 based its decision to revolutionize the method of entering and training officers for the engineering branch were set forth at length in the Selborne Memorandum of that year, and amplified in the Cawdor Memorandum issued three years later. In both documents the commanding influence that machinery had come to exert in the naval sphere was emphasized. "In the old days it sufficed if a naval officer were a seaman. Now he must be a seaman, a gunner, a soldier, an engineer, and a man of science as well." Therefore, it was argued, the logical course was to train the future officer to be equally at home on the bridge or in the engine room. Fervid partisans of the scheme predicted a time when the deck officer and the engineer would no longer be specialists in the sense that one could perform deck or engineering duties better than the other. They were, in fact, to be absolutely interchangeable. This idea, like so many other daring innovations, sprang from the fertile brain of Lord Fisher, but it is now almost universally admitted to have been one of his least happy inspirations. Certainly it never evoked enthusiasm in the engineering world—as our own comments at the time clearly showed nor was it ever warmly approved by the Navy as a whole. The first departure from the basic principle of interchangeability was foreshadowed in 1918, when, under the Admiralty regulations promulgated that year, a large majority of engineering specialists renounced the option of reverting to deck duty between seven and a-half and nine years' seniority. The process of separation was carried a long stride forward in 1920, when the First Lord announced in his statement on the Navy Estimates that officers selected for the engineering branch when sub-lieutenants would, after taking the advanced engineering courses, be definitely ranked as engineer officers, and never thereafter revert to deck duties. It was essential, the First Lord added that the majority of officers forming the engineering branch should be "whole-time" officers, in view of the fact that a definite distinction existed, both as regards knowledge and capabilities, "between those who are to be trained in the science of naval war and strategical and tactical methods of fighting, and those who are to deal with the upkeep and maintenance of engineering and mechanical appliances which are necessitated by the complex machinery and weapons of modern war. Each side requires a special study, and for this reason final separation of the branches is essential." These are truths that one would have supposed to be as patent in 1902 as they are today, for even twenty years ago the whole tendency of the professional and industrial system was toward greater specialization. In July, 1920, an Admiralty statement explained the new policy in detail. In accordance therewith, the transfer of duties in connection with the electrical installations of warships was arranged, these duties, hitherto vested in the torpedo lieutenant, a deck officer, being taken over by the engineering department. This change is to be made gradually, and will not be completed until a sufficient number of engineer officers who have qualified in the advanced electrical course are available to relieve the torpedo specialists throughout the fleet of responsibility for the electrical installations on board.
But while the two branches are henceforth to be entirely separate so far as their professional duties are concerned, the present system of common entry for both executive and engineer officers, and for common training until a certain stage is reached, will be continued. This means that the one thoroughly commendable feature of the original Selborne scheme is to be retained. Common entry undoubtedly fosters that close mutual understanding and co-operation between executives and engineers which, in the Admiralty's words, are "essential to the efficient use of a fleet in modern warfare." The future deck and engineer officers of the Navy will therefore enter Dartmouth together, and together undergo that early training which stamps the impressionable mind of youth so indelibly. Both will be bred up, as it were, in the traditions of the great Service to which they belong. Final separation will come immediately on passing out of the cadet's training ship, when those destined for the engineering branch will undergo a course of four years in mechanics and electricity at Keyham College and in H.M.S. Vernon before being assigned to duty afloat. Some years must, of course, elapse before officers trained under the new system become available for duty as engineer officers, and consequently, the present method of specialization is to remain in operation for the time being. The final selection of officers to specialize under the existing scheme is to be made early in 1924, and the final course will commence in October, 1924.—The Engineer, 22 December, 1922.
FRANCE
Nine New Submarines.—A telegram from Toulon announces that the Minister of Marine, M. Raiberti, has reached an agreement with the naval commission of the Chamber of Deputies for the rapid construction of nine submarines. Two of these boats will be constructed in the workshops of the Toulon Arsenal.—New York Sun, 10 December, 1922.
Naval Construction.—The debate on the Navy Estimates in the Chamber of Deputies did not cover the entire program of naval construction, for no reference was made to the light cruisers which it is proposed to build, and the credit of 1,045 million francs asked for is intended for the reorganization of the marine as well as for the construction of a dozen submersibles. It is argued that while the country had to concentrate on military armaments during the war the navy went back to the extent that it is no longer regarded as an efficient arm of defense. The most urgent need is, therefore, to reorganize it on a more scientific basis, with laboratories and facilities for carrying out experimental work and special attention must be paid to the training of an expert staff, which should be maintained in the highest state of efficiency. As the policy is based upon coast defense, the two chief factors are aeroplanes and submarines, in both of which it is claimed the country is deficient. Of the forty-seven existing submarines, it is stated that only eighteen are of any real military value. There are fifty seaplanes and thirteen airships, but in view of the progress of aviation, it is considered that the airship has become too vulnerable and there is no intention of building others. The program consists, therefore, in making the coast impregnable with the aid of seaplanes and submarines, which would keep hostile ships at a distance, while cruisers in which protection is entirely sacrificed to speed would assist in keeping the sea route open between France and the North African colonies. The construction of battleships warranted by the Washington Treaty, not yet ratified, although advocated in some quarters, has been abandoned for the time being on account of the necessity of devoting all the funds available to a purely defensive organization.—The Engineer, 22 December, 1922.
New Personnel Law.—We have commented several times on the proposed bill governing commissioned personnel. The following are the changes to take effect in each corps and show the principal modifications under the new law.
Line Officers. As compared with commissioned personnel, allowed by law of January 1, 1919, the new bill calls for the following reduction:
Vice Admirals 2
Rear Admirals 3
Captains 25
Commanders 20
Lieutenants 92
Lieutenants (jg) 85
Ensigns 164
Lieutenant Commanders 105
The requirements necessary for promotion to the grade of Captain and Rear Admiral have been made more rigorous. Command at sea is one of the conditions absolutely necessary for promotion to the rank of Captain and Rear Admiral. Sea duty in command for a period of one year to eighteen months for promotion to Captain, and from two to three years for promotion to Rear Admiral, is required by the new law.
In addition, with the suppression of the rank of Captain, "residence fixe," the new bill provides for the following reduction of commissioned personnel from the cadre of "residence fixe":
Commanders 5
Lieutenant Commanders 9
Lieutenants 5
The age limit for officers of "residence fixe" will be the same as for officers of the corps other than the line : i.e.
Captains 58 years
Lieutenant Commanders 56 years
Lieutenants 53 years
This will have as a consequence the addition of two years on the age limit of Captains and Lieutenant Commanders of the corps of "residence fixe." For all other corps, except the Line, the new age limit will be below that in vogue at present.
Engineering Officers. As compared with the commissioned personnel, the new law calls for the following increase in the Engineering Corps:
Captain 1
Commander 3
Lieutenant Commanders 10
and for a reduction in the Engineering Corps as follows:
Lieutenants 46
Lieutenant (jg) 100
This important reduction in the lower ranks of the Engineering Corps is partially compensated due to the creation of forty-five Mechanic Warrant Officers.
Direct promotion from civil life is also open to the grade of Ensign (Engineering Corps) for young men with Engineering Diplomas from the school of Central Arts and Manufactures. The number of vacancies reserved for this class should not be more than one-fifth of the Ensigns promoted to Lieutenant (jg) during the preceding year.
The number of vacancies reserved for Chief Warrant and Warrants for promotion to Lieutenant (jg) should not exceed one-third of the number of Ensigns promoted to Lieutenant (jg) during the preceding year.
Naval Construction Corps. As compared with the commissioned personnel, the new law calls for the following reduction in the Construction Corps:
Vice Admirals 1
Rear Admirals S
Captains 9
Commanders 6
Lieutenant Commanders 2
Lieutenants 20
and for an increase in the Construction Corps' as follows
Lieutenants (jg) 1
Engineers d'ArtiUerie Navale. As compared with the commissioned personnel, the new law calls for the following reduction in this corps:
Vice Admirals 1
Rear Admirals 2
Captains 5
Commanders 4
Lieutenant Commanders 9
Lieutenants 20
and for an increase in this corps as follows:
Lieutenants (jg) 1
Supply Corps. As compared with the commissioned personnel, the new law calls for the following reduction in this corps:
Rear Admirals 2
Captains 1
Lieutenant Commanders 13
Lieutenants 12
and for an increase in this corps as follows:
Commanders 4
Lieutenants (jg) 8
The course of study at the Commissary School is increased from one to two years.
In case the proposed measures of the bill will be insufficient to bring the commissioned personnel down to the minimum required by the new law, steps will be taken to reduce the excess by not filling vacancies as they occur, except as follows:
For officers of high rank one promotion for each two vacancies that occur.
For officers of the lower grades two promotions' for each three vacancies that occur.
We have no need to insist on the inconvenience that will be caused by such a method. It will not only cause a slump in promotion, but the reduction in certain corps will not become effective for a long time. This measure will in the long run be detrimental from an economic standpoint, as well as to the service and the general welfare of the officers.—Moniteur De La Flotte, 2 December, 1922.
French Navy Notes.—As 100,000 tons of other fleet auxiliaries are to be provided under the Raiberti program, the French Fleet in 1940 may include just over 700,000 tons of warship displacement, that is about the English battleship tonnage under the Washington agreement. But taking into consideration the actual trend of French naval and Parliamentary opinion, it is safe to say that the 1922 twenty-year program will undergo considerable modifications, poussiere sousmarine et aerienne being certain to usurp the place allotted on paper to larger classes of ships. The only certainty is as to the yearly outlay on new construction, which will average 300,000,000 francs (hardly £4,000,000 in pre-war value).
Coastal batteries are apparently part of la Marine Frangaise nouvelle, and with triumph in his voice, Admiral Guepratte spoke of beaux canons of 18-in. bore, in groups of four, to form strategic batteries on selected points of our littoral. The power and range of 1,500-kilo shells are impressive enough, and bomb-proof, aerially-controlled batteries of that caliber perched up on high promontories no enemy battle fleet coming within twenty miles of the French coast could afford to ignore, at least in daytime.
Of course, monster guns, well posted and overlooking narrow straits (Dover-Calais, Gibraltar, (Bizerta), could exercise permanent and even weighty influence; but then smoke-producing and asphyxiating shells and bombs are new and effective antidotes to fixed batteries, and the mistake has been in ignoring those faits notiveaux. The fact is that the Marine Frangaise has not changed its methods, and proceeds by fits and starts: the latest craze is the defense des cotes, in foolish disregard of secular experience. Guerre de mouvements invariably gained the upper hand over guerre de position.
From the discussion in the "Commission des Aflfaires Etrangeres" and the significant declarations by Minister Raiberti, the Poincare Government has decided, to the surprise and disgust of the majority of French naval men, to ask for the ratification of the "Panama Canal battleship limitation agreement" by the Chambers, and this with the least possible debate, so as to avoid regrettable public criticism of Allied government. Considerations of foreign policy alone have determined that unexpected move: viz., to provide no "handle" for anti-French slanders by the Boche subsidized propaganda, to give to the world an example of respect of international agreement and treaties even when conditionally contracted under circumstances foreign to fair play, and also to avoid lowering the prestige and power of French Premiers (as would be the case if ex-Premier Briand were disavowed).
Treaties signed France will always ratify and respect, but she claims her sovereign rights in what concerns other classes of defensive vessels, and will not be tricked again into Washington traps. La France a besoin d'une marine pour defendre son prestige, son empire colonial et sa propre existence. Il faut continuer notre effort, creer l'aviation maritime et organiser la defense des cotes." (Minister Raiberti's declarations in the Chamber.)
The Paris Journal de la Marine Le Yacht publishes a timely illustrated article on the Armament du Croiseur leger, at the moment when the Raiberti Administration is contemplating the laying down of the three remaining cruisers of the Guisthau program (to be named Bouvert, Cassard, Sureouf), and considering anew the question of size and offensive power. Fine ships, the fastest yet projected, as the Primauguets in hand at Lorient and Brest undoubtedly are (8,000 tons, 100,000 h. p., 35 knots, armored sides over motors), they have a weak point: viz., an inferior armament of eight 6-in. weapons, exceedingly improved naturellement and fres superieurs to all weapons ejusdem farinoe; and no amount of literature can make them a match for the British Raleighs, that are armed with seven excellent 7.5-in. weapons, nor even for the American Omahas, which carry 12 guns of 6-in., firing six ahead. Speed is a splendid asset in cruisers, but it is ephemeral; safety lies in speed and caliber combined, as demonstrated at the Falklands.
A battery of six guns of 7.6-in. bore is considered adequate for a 10,000-ton cruiser of 34-knot speed, although eight such guns in twin turrets disposed for end-on fire have many partisans. Le Yacht successively examines five different ways of distributing the armament. Single gun positions, as in the British Raleigh, combine the advantages of all-round volume of fire, reduced vulnerability, and end-on fire, but the disposition affording the best utilization of the armament—five guns axially and six abeam—is one comprising two amidship turrets en echelons and a single gun on the bows and stern respectively.—J.B. Gautreau in Naval and Military Record, 27 December, 1922, and 3 January, 1923.
GERMANY
The Wasps' Nest in Flanders.—In a series of articles contributed to the Marine Rundschau, Commander E. E. Schulze describes in some detail the work of the German light forces which operated from the bases in Flanders during the war, and, as the writer was attached as senior staff officer to that command, his account may be accepted as authoritative. Referring to the net barrage laid by vessels of the Dover Patrol on April 24-25, 1916, extending from the Scheldt estuary as far as Dunkirk, he pays a tribute to the seamanlike skill with which this work was carried out. He affirms, however, that our patrols only watched the barrage during the hours of daylight, and that as soon as dusk fell they invariably withdrew to Dunkirk. It was therefore a simple matter for the Germans to remove, under cover of darkness, enough of the nets to leave channels clear for the passage of their U-boats. Only in the last year of the war was the barrage patrolled at night, and although this, it is claimed, did not prevent sweeping operations from being continued with success, the writer admits that the increased vigilance of our patrols was very trying. "We were particularly worried by the small British motor torpedo-boats (C.M.B.'s), which from the spring of 1917 were more and more in evidence. Their high speed and the difficulty of seeing them made these boats a danger not only to our submarines, which were forced to cruise on the surface in the shallow coastal waters, but to all surface crafts well, and we were therefore compelled to abandon the practice of keeping our destroyers constantly on patrol before the swept channels."
Why the Germans did not themselves make more use of mines and other obstructions in order to render the Flanders coast secure from attack is explained by Commander Schulze. The chief reason was that mines had proved to be as dangerous' to friend as to foe, and especially to the U-boats. which could never be certain of approaching the coast from a given direction. Thus mine-laying was but rarely resorted to in the Flanders zone, and then only for definite objects—as, for instance, in the winter of 1914-15, when a field was laid off the Scheldt in anticipation of "a British breach of neutrality." The fact that on May 7, 1917, the destroyer Maori was mined on the Thornton Bank, north of Zeebrugge, so impressed the British, we are told, that for a long time afterwards they feared mines where none existed.
With the development of the U-boat war on trade every other branch of the German naval service was subordinated to the furtherance of this special campaign. In the beginning, however, the possibilities of the Flanders coast as a base for submarine operations were not realized by the German Fleet Command. The first submarine to enter Zeebrugge was the U 12, which arrived on November 9, 1914, and was followed some time later by the U 11, both boats making several cruises from that base. On March 16, 1915, U 28 brought the first prize into Zeebrugge. None of these boats, however, was permanently stationed there, and the first to bespecially detailed as a unit of the Flanders command was the U B 10, which had been put together in Antwerp. The "Flanders U-boat Flotilla" did not come into existence till March 29, 1915. Thereafter it increased steadily in numbers and dimensions, until October, 1917, it was found expedient to divide it into two formations. It attained its maximum strength in July, 1917, when thirty-eight boats were in service. These Flanders submarines, we learn, were responsible for sinking 2,554 vessels with an aggregate of some 4.4 million tons, and thus accounted for thirty-three per cent of the total tonnage destroyed. Their own losses comprised eighty boats, 145 officers, and far more than 1,000 men.
The main value of the Flemish bases for U-boat raiding lay in the fact that they were nearer by about 300 miles than the German home ports to the main traffic routes of the Channel, the south coast of Ireland, and the west coast of France, and the distance thus saved on the outward and homeward voyage increased by so much the radius of the boats in the actual zone of operations. True, it was contended by some that this advantage was nullified by the greater danger incurred in passing through the Dover Strait, but according to Commander Schulze that was not so. The proportion of casualties to tonnage sunk was no higher in the Flanders flotilla than elsewhere. Not until the year 1918, when the British, after prolonged and fruitless attempts, at length succeeded in closing the Strait with mines moored at a great depth, thus making submerged navigation almost impossible, did the tale of U-boat casualties become so high as to be prohibitive. When that happened the boats were compelled to proceed to their hunting grounds by the north-about route round Scotland.
The writer argues from this that the U-boat ruthless war on trade began too late. It was only adopted, he declares, when the prospects of success had already dwindled appreciably, and when the enemy's counteroffensive was becoming formidable. "It is not possible today, any more than it was at the time to offer mathematical proof that the U-boat war, begun at the right moment, would have been successful, but that is what every U-boat commander and all of us firmly believed. It is in any case the fact that it was begun a year too late. In spite of the limited number of boats, more could have been achieved in the spring of 1916."
This is an article of faith with nearly every German commentator on the war at sea, but it is not borne out by an objective study of the facts. Had ruthless submarining commenced a year earlier it is probable that Allied counter-measures would have been developed as effectively then as they were at a later date, while the far smaller number of U-boats in action would have tended to simplify the problem. Moreover, if the U-boat challenge brought America into the fray in 1917, it would no doubt have had the same effect in the previous year, and there is no reason to suppose that American intervention in 1916 would have been less prompt and vigorous than it proved to be twelve months later. One may even share German regrets that U-boat frightfulness was postponed so long. Had it been adopted in 1916 the war would almost certainly have ended in 1917, the result would have been the same, and millions of lives and infinite treasure would have been saved. Intelligent Germans know this very well, and we may therefore dismiss their laments at the belated introduction of ruthless submarining as propaganda of the "face-saving" variety.
The zone of operations for which the naval command in Flanders was responsible embraced the east coast of England from the South as far north as Flamborough Head, the Channel, the French west coast, the Bay of Biscay, and the southern area of the Irish Sea. It was plotted into large squares, to each of which a U-boat was detailed, though without being definitely restricted thereto. Only the mine-laying boats had stringent orders not to deviate from their prescribed route. The imposing dimensions to which the Flanders force had grown by May, 1918. Are revealed by a tabular statement of the units it then comprised. There were nineteen destroyers, organized in four half-flotillas, under the command of Commander Conrad Albrecht; sixteen torpedo-boats of the small A class; a motor-boat division of seven units; a minesweeping division composed of twenty- four motor boats and four launches; and a few auxiliary craft. The submarine force of two flotillas had a total strength of thirty-four boats, twenty-two of which were of the U B type and the remainder U C mine-layers. The whole organization was as perfect as four years of intensive work could make it, all accounts agreeing that the Commander-in-chief, Admiral von Schroder, and Commander Bartenbach, in charge of U-boat operations, were officers of conspicuous ability. It will be seen, therefore, that the Dover Patrol had to deal with no mean antagonist. In the light of these revelations, and bearing in mind the comparatively meager resources at their disposal, it becomes a question whether full justice has been done to the work performed by Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon and his successor, Admiral Sir Roger Keyes.—Hector C. Bywater in Naval and Military Record, 20 December, 1922.
JAPAN
New-Type Cruisers Ordered by Japan.—When the Washington Conference fixed the limit of displacement for warships below capital rank at 10,000 tons, it was fairly evident that the majority of such vessels laid down thereafter would be of this maximum size. Japan, in fact, at once tore up the plans she had prepared for a series of 7,000-ton cruisers and redesigned them on a basis of 10,000 tons. The first two ships of this formidable class were ordered last fall, and according to information just received from Tokio they are to be commenced early in the coming spring, the one at Sasebo and the other at the Kawasaki yard, Kobe.
They will be the most powerful ships of their type in any navy, far surpassing the American Omaha class of 7,700 tons and leaving behind even the 9,700-ton Raleigh class of the British navy. They will be over 600 feet in length; sixty feet in beam, and of high freeboard, this latter feature, which is characteristic of all recent Japanese cruisers, giving them fine seagoing qualities. Turbine machinery, with gearing, and oil-fired boilers will enable them to steam at 33 ½ knots, but when a full supply of oil, ammunition and war stores is on board the speed will probably be brought down to 32 knots. A few of the boilers will be fitted for coal burning.
So great is the fuel capacity that with all burners full these vessels will be able to steam 14,000 miles at moderate speed. Along the sides in way of machinery spaces there is to be strong armor plating which, together with the horizontal deck protection, will interpose at least five inches of hardened steel between the ship's vitals and an enemy's fire. Below the water line the hull is so honeycombed with compartments that the explosion of one torpedo, or even of two, would probably not disable the ship.
The main battery will consist of six 8-in. rifles of high power and long range. They will be mounted in double turrets, two of which will be forward and one aft. As the second turret will be raised to fire over the first, four guns can be trained right ahead, two astern and all six on either broadside. The 8-in. guns are of the very latest model, designed and built in Japan, and are thirty-four feet long. On mountings specially designed for rapid loading, each gun can fire six aimed rounds per minute, and as the shell weighs 250 pounds, the six guns firing on the broadside can discharge 9,000 pounds of steel and explosive per minute.
Besides these six big guns there will be a battery of 4.7-in. rapid-fire pieces on high-angle mounts, enabling the guns to be used against either surface or air targets. Finally there will be twelve torpedo tubes.
Each ship will be equipped for carrying and launching four airplanes. With the exception of some minor fittings, the whole of the material and equipment of the four vessels will be of Japanese manufacture. The contracts for the first two call for delivery, complete for sea, inside thirty-four months from the date of laying down. The third and fourth representatives of the class have been ordered, but may not be commenced till late in 1923.
When these vessels are completed, Japan will possess' a cruiser squadron absolutely unique in battle power and steaming range. The cost per ship is estimated at $11,000,000.—Hector C. Bywater, in Baltimore Sun, 11 January, 1923.
Japan Dissatisfied.—According to a Tokio despatch to The Times, dated December 17, "there are unmistakable indications' that the Opposition leaders reflect the growing obsession that Japan had given all and obtained nothing at the Washington Conference." The same despatch quotes a professor of the Tokio University as asserting it to be impossible to approve the American attitude while Japan was steadily carrying out the program of naval and military retrenchment agreed to among the Powers. "Japan today has probably gone farther in carrying out the Washington agreements in the letter and spirit than any of the five Powers. The dismantled ships seen on her coast, her reduced naval and military personnel, and her withdrawals from the mainland testify to this."
These statements are not quite in accord with information previously received. Whatever the Japanese public may have been taught to believe, their naval and military authorities are under no illusion as to the immense strategical advantages which the Washington agreement has conferred upon the island Empire. The compact maintaining the status quo with regard to Pacific fortifications has more than recompensed Japan for the reduction of her battle fleet by making her practically invulnerable to direct attack. That agreement alone has rendered her more secure than the complete fulfillment of the "eight-eight" Dreadnaught program would have done, while at the same time she has saved well over 100 million sterling in building costs, to say nothing of the heavy outlay on new docks' and other incidentals that would have been necessitated by the execution of the program. The statement that she has given all and gained nothing by the Washington treaties is, therefore, quite untrue. Nor can the assertion that she has gone further than any Power in carrying out the Washington decrees be allowed to pass unchallenged. So far not one of her effective ships condemned under the Limitation Treaty has been scrapped, or even dismantled. It is true that a few of the oldest pre-Dreadnaughts have been broken up, and that the Kashima, Ikonia, and Kaurama have had their turrets removed; but all these vessels absolete, must soon have been discarded in the ordinary course of events. The new battleships Kaga and Tosa, launched in 1921, are to be used as targets and then broken up—but only if the treaty comes into force. Not a plate has been removed from them as yet. In other words, Japan is following precisely the same policy as' the United States in declining to anticipate the naval clauses of the Washington agreement. Great Britain alone has taken that step, and precious little credit she has got for it up to now.—Hector C. Bywater in Naval and Military Record, 27 December, 1922.
UNITED STATES
Tentative Plans for War College Courses.—Following a conference called on December 14 by Assistant Secretary Roosevelt of the ranking officers of the Navy, a tentative plan has been drawn up.
The proposed plan which may be slightly revised after it has been studied by the other officers who participated in the conference before it is finally approved by the department is as follows:
- Retention of the present War College at Newport. Admission to it shall be selective, governed by the fitness of an officer to attend the course. This fitness will be determined by appropriate entries on the officer's record made by the reporting senior. Eligibility to attend shall begin with the upper half of commanders.
- The course at the War College shall be a one-year's course for the majority of those attending, with, however, a two-years' class selected from the most promising of the officers taking the one-year course. The work of the second year will embrace the problems of the higher commands.
- A school for the training of junior officers in the principles of strategy and tactics and the essential problems learned at a staff college; this school to be under the superintendence of the President of the War College. This is to be known as the Junior College and the course will be one year. Admission will not be selective but shall be limited in general to officers between the upper half of the lieutenant's list and the lower half of the commander's list, inclusive.
- At every shore station where there are a considerable number of officers assembled, schools for the training of such officers as desire to make use of them. These should be along. the lines indicated for the Junior College but entirely on a voluntary basis.
- Continuation of the present correspondence school emanating from the War College as it is being conducted, making it available for any officer, ashore or afloat, who desires to take it.
- The school of the Fleet for the purpose of giving instruction to each officer in the elementary principles of strategy and tactics which should be considered as a part of the regular routine work of each major unit of the fleet. This work to be under one competent officer in each ship and supervised by the fleet tactical officer.
- Establishment of a Fleet School at home bases where forces of the fleet assemble periodically or are regularly stationed as at San Diego or Charleston. These schools would serve the purpose of instructing all officers of the force, particularly in the problems relating to the force and also in those joint fleet problems relating to the methods of war afloat. They should be available to all officers of the fleet through proper interchange.
- When opportunity presents itself for the commander-in-chief, through appropriate officers, to indoctrinate, in conferences, such officers of his force as he deems desirable, with his views, his estimates, his decisions and his critiques of the fleet maneuvers conducted.
- That the Naval War College and the Army War College maintain close touch and intimate co-operation. To this end a reasonable number of naval and army officers should be assigned to the other college. The establishment of a limited naval course at the Army College and a similar war course at the Naval College, under interchange instructors, is also recommended—Abstracts from M. H. McIntyre in the Providence Journal, 21 January, 1923.
Wants Marines to Stay.—Managua, Nicaragua, December 20—President Diego Manuel Chamorro in his annual message to Congress, supports the Central American conference at Washington as a means toward peace and prosperity. He favors continuance of the legation guard of American Marines, which, he says, remains with the consent of the Nicaraguan Government and is in no way connected with the civil and political life of the country.
The president commends American co-operation in the financial rehabilitation of Nicaragua, strongly refuting charges that it tends toward intervention in the sovereignty of the country.—Boston Evening Transcript, 20 December, 1922.
Argentine Objects to Brazil Naval Mission.—La Preiisa, one of the leading South American newspapers published in Buenos Aires, takes exception in a recent editorial to the action of the United States in sending a naval mission to Brazil. The paper declares that the mission being sent and officially recognized by the United States, serves a notice to the South Americans, especially the Plate republics, that Brazil has the support of the United States in her military policies. The publication also asserts that Brazil is preparing for a future offensive or defensive movement
The paper stresses the fact that Captain Vogelgesang is in command and that he previously accompanied a diplomatic mission to Brazil, referring to the recent visit of courtesy made by Secretary Hughes to the international exposition. La Prensa says that the United States cannot be ignorant of Brazil's published program, which includes the acquisition of large naval units, the construction of five military bases and other preparations, nearly all of which are along the Argentine and Uruguayan frontiers.—The Naval Monthly, January, 1923.
America's Outpost in the Pacific.—A broad-gauged and scientific policy for the development and maintenance of shore establishments for the American Navy has been submitted to Secretary Denby by the special board headed by Rear Admiral Hugh Rodman, ranking American flag officer in the North Sea during the World War, appointed last fall to determine what naval bases, yards and stations are necessary to the maintenance of the efficiency of the fleet and its operation in peace and war.
The general plan of shore establishment recommended by the Rodman board contemplates six primary bases for the use of the fleet, two of which would be advance bases in the Hawaiian Islands and the Canal Zone, the development of secondary bases at San Diego, in Alaska, the Eastern West Indies, the Key West region, the Boston-Portsmouth region and at Charleston, and lays down a definite and stable policy with respect to the retention or abandonment of navy yards, air and radio stations and other naval shore activities.
In regard to the Hawaiian Islands the Board says an advanced base should be developed on Oahu capable of serving the entire fleet to the maximum, subject only to the natural limitations imposed by the size and character of this island. This project will necessitate the development of Oahu Island to the maximum and probably the dredging of Kaneohe Bay, as Pearl Harbor alone is not adequate to serve as a Pacific advanced fleet base, and the use of any other anchorage in the Hawaiian Islands in war is open to grave objections. This advanced base should have priority of development over the fleet bases.
By the joint development of Pearl Harbor, Honolulu Harbor and Kaneohe Bay there could easily be developed in Hawaii facilities for a fleet of a thousand vessels. As the "cross-roads of the Pacific," experts are agreed the United States should lose no time in exploiting its' possibilities to the limit. Oahu, besides being an impregnable Navy base, could become the principal garrison of the United States Army, with a permanent force of 25,000 troops. Their function exclusively would be to serve as the defenders of the fortress' in case of an attack requiring close-range fighting. Their numerical strength, of course, always would be too insignificant to count as an expeditionary force for offensive operations further afield.
Would Defend Pacific Coast
Oahu's chief bulwark would be its fortifications, its long-range guns, its mined approaches and it floating strength in the form of warships of all types. With a supplementary equipment of aircraft it would completely fulfill its two basic purposes—to hold at bay assailants who came by sea or air to attack the western coast of the United States, and to be a sally port for American forces.
At Pearl Harbor there now are a naval station, a one thousand-foot dry dock and repair facilities for ships of the largest size. To carry out the Oahu scheme there will need to be considerably more extensive berthing space, shop, warehouse, and storage facilities and extensive dredging operations. Oahu could be converted into a vast coaling station and contain immense oil reservoirs for the fueling of American merchant ships plying Pacific trade routes or crossing that ocean to or from the Panama Canal.
As a half-way house (2,100 miles from San Francisco and 3,500 from the Philippines) Oahu is ideally situated for the purposes of an international fuel depot. If ships of the American merchant fleet or other marines can refill coal bunkers or oil tanks at our Hawaiian base, each and every one of those vessels can carry correspondingly heavier cargoes, using for them space otherwise needed for fuel.
In the Canal Zone an advanced base for repair and supply of vessels in transit, utilizing Canal Zone facilities as far as possible; a submarine and aviation base should be developed. In this connection it should be borne in mind that in the future the Canal Zone may play a part only slightly, if any, inferior to that of our main bases. For this reason the development of the Canal Zone as an advanced base must be considered as a naval base development project of the future. This advanced base takes priority for development after the four main bases.
Proposes Station at Alameda
Secretary Denby instructed the board to report also what additional stations might be necessary for the effective operations of the fleet in peace and in war. The only additional station recommended which falls completely within this description is the proposed naval base at Alameda, on San Francisco Bay.
"The base at Alameda," the Board states, "when supplemented by all other existing naval activities in San Francisco Bay, including the Navy Yard at Mare Island, should be capable of serving the entire fleet in all respects. Land in addition to the Alameda site will have to be acquired on San Francisco Bay for a mine base. The Board's recommendation that a marine storehouse be built in San Francisco contemplates that Government-owned land is available for a site."
The Rodman board urges that at least two adequate fleet bases should be maintained on each coast. Its survey of the situation has resulted in the recommendation that on the Atlantic Coast one of these fleet bases should be established in Chesapeake Bay and the other in the New York-Narragansett region. San Francisco Bay and Puget Sound are recommended as the ideal locations for the primary fleet bases on the Pacific Coast.
Naval Policy Study
American naval policy as determined by national policy was studied by the Rodman Board, which recognized that on the naval policy of the Government depended the size, composition and purpose of the naval establishment and its proposed utilization in peace and war, together with the merchant marine in war. Consideration also was given to the size, composition and proposed use of the naval forces in war and the organization, allocation and operation of the fleet in peace.
"The shore establishment for the service of the fleet," the board reported, "and its existence and efficient operation are essential to the very being of the fleet, both in war and in insuring material readiness in peace. War on the sea is conducted by floating naval forces, but they draw their sustenance from bases. The periodic return of units of the fleet to the bases is inevitable, the service rendered by the bases must be highly efficient, as the issue of the sea campaign may depend upon the complete readiness of the fleet to keep the sea."
Considering the general principles underlying the selection of sites for naval bases and stations and their missions, which rarely change, the board emphasized the fact that new international situations do change naval strategy and policy, and declared such changes require corresponding changes in locations and mission of naval bases if maximum efficiency was demanded.
Lays Down General Lines
The Rodman Board lays down the following broad lines of policy for naval shore establishments:
"The location and mission of naval stations and the necessity for the establishment of new naval stations are dependent upon considerations of strategy, which are in turn, dependent upon existing naval stations, and should be abandoned until the application of this policy shows that it will not contribute in peace or in war to the maintenance of the efficiency of the fleet or its effective operation.
"As the successful operation of the fleet is dependent upon adequate shore bases and stations, the development of which is second in importance only to the development of the fleet, the development of the shore establishments must be carried out on a definite program to complete all essential bases and stations in a given number of years.
"In time of peace the stations of the shore establishment should be maintained on an operating basis only to the extent necessary to support the fleet in those necessary naval operations conducted alike in peace or war. The stations that are reduced in activity or made inoperative must be maintained in condition quickly to be made fully operative in time of impending hostilities."
Primary consideration was given by the board to the subject of the main fleet bases to be operated.
"The problem confronting the board in making recommendations as to such bases would have been greatly simplified," it says, "if it were possible to create the ideal condition of having at least two adequate fleet bases on each coast, namely the New York-Narragansett Bay region and Chesapeake Bay on the Atlantic, and San Francisco Bay and Puget Sound on the Pacific, with advanced bases in the Canal Zone and Hawaiian Islands, and to concentrate naval shore establishments in and around these waters.
"The general policy followed at the time when most yards and stations were established was one of coast or local defense, so that more navy yards have been established than are required for fleet bases, and some are in places not adapted for development into bases. The board, realizing the fact that the ideal condition does not obtain, must accordingly make its recommendations to utilize the yards and stations now in existence to the best, advantage from the standpoint of utility and economy, and having in mind always the general policies hereinbefore laid down."
The board, therefore, recommended the development of bases, arranged in the order in which they should be developed as follows:
"San Francisco Bay—A base capable of serving the entire fleet in all respects. To include all existing naval activities in San Francisco Bay and its tributaries. The board concurs in the recommendations of the Helm Commission in reference to Mare Island, except the establishment of submarine and aviation bases there, and also the recommendation of the Ball Committee, particularly in reference to the establishment of a naval base on San Francisco Bay at Alameda. The board believes that this latter is imperative.
"Puget Sound—A base capable of serving the entire fleet in all respects. To include all naval stations in the Puget Sound region."
Would Dredge Hell Gate
"New York-Narragansett Bay region—A base capable of serving the entire fleet in all respects. To include all stations now located in New York Harbor, Long Island Sound and Narragansett Bay. To make this base effective. Hell Gate must be dredged to permit the ready passage of the largest vessels from Long Island Sound to New York Harbor.
"Chesapeake Bay—A base capable of serving the entire fleet in all respects. To include all stations now located in Lower Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries.
"The development of the other fleet bases, advanced bases and secondary bases will, in some instances, probably involve the acquisition of additional property or other extensive development work, such as the dredging of Hell Gate, which is recommended as a part of the development of the New York-Narragansett Bay base. The development of this base will also necessitate the acquisition of wharfage facilities for the naval supply depot. South Brooklyn, and of a site for an air station if Rockaway Beach cannot be retained."
Most of the navy yards are included in the bases recommended by the board. Of the other yards and stations the report favors the retention of those at Philadelphia. New Orleans, Washington, Newport, Guantanamo Bay, St. Thomas and Culebra.
Order of Reductions, if Necessary
The order, by groups, in which it is recommended that navy yards and stations should be reduced in activity or made inoperative, should conditions of economy require such action, based on conditions as they exist today, is as follows:
Group 1—Key West Naval Station; New Orleans Naval Station.
Group 2—Boston, Charleston and Portsmouth Navy Yards.
Group 3—Philadelphia, Navy Yard.
Group 4—Mare Island, New York, Norfolk, Pearl Harbor and Puget Sound Navy Yards.
The report recommends that the four main and two advanced fleet bases, besides facilities for operation and maintenance of destroyers, should have special facilities for serving submarines. It suggests the sale of the submarine base at Squantum, Mass.
The board recommends retention of the naval air station at New York, saying that if the present site at Rockaway Beach cannot be kept a new site should be provided.
To Retain Radio Stations
Important recommendations are made with regard to naval radio stations, most of which are to be retained, although the abandonment or transfer of twenty is recommended.
The naval radio station is declared to be an integral part of the navy, which must be maintained and operated during peace in such a way as to be of the greatest value in time of national emergency.
Concerning radio compass stations, the report says their utility to commerce demands that they be established "at all important seaports as well as at points of importance solely to the fleet."
"The development of radio telegraphy is so rapid and the administrative considerations which govern the operative status of present stations and the creation of new stations are subject to such frequent change," says the report, "that the board makes no recommendation as to reducing the operative status of any existing station or the development of new stations. However, there are some stations which are not considered necessary, and which should be abandoned. All other radio stations should be retained."
The Board considers that three training stations, one on the Atlantic, one on the Pacific and one on the Great Lakes—are necessary. It recommends that training activities on the Atlantic coast be centered at the Newport Naval Training Station and that the training station at the Hampton Roads naval operating base be closed.
The Board recommends that the torpedo station, Alexandria, Va., be continued for the present, but ultimately transferred to the torpedo station at Newport, R.I., and that the temporary torpedo depot at San Pedro be moved to San Diego. It finds all other torpedo depots necessary.—Boston Transcript, 20 January, 1923.
MERCHANT MARINE
Subsidy Bill Laid Aside.—The ship subsidy bill was temporarily laid aside in the Senate last Friday to allow consideration of the naval appropriation bill. On the two days preceding Senators Harrison of Mississippi and Dial of South Carolina spoke against the bill, while Senator Calder of New York earnestly advocated its passage. In the course of his long address he reviewed the history of the merchant marine of the United States from the earliest days until the entrance of the nation into the World War and the resultant ship construction program.
Discussing the value of a merchant marine as a naval auxiliary. Senator Calder pointed out that Great Britain's merchant fleet contains 194 vessels capable of a speed of over fifteen knots, while the fleet of this country contains only fifty such vessels. These vessels, he pointed out, are the "second line of defense" and give Great Britain the naval supremacy over this country in a four to one ratio.
The subsidy bill remains the unfinished business before the Senate. Senator Jones of Washington, who is in charge of the measure, has announced, however, that he would move to lay it aside and take up rural credits legislation as soon as a bill providing for the relief of the farmers is reported to the Senate from the Committee on Banking and Currency.—Nautical Gazette, 30 December, 1922.
Revision of Navigation Laws Urgently Needed.—According to Secretary of Commerce Hoover, the result of the attempted revision and codification of the navigation laws of the United States undertaken by the Shipping Board in conjunction with the Department of Commerce will be laid before Congress during its present session. They include a marked simplification of the administration and supervisory work of Government agencies in charge of shipping.
Of the need of such revision Commissioner of Navigation Carson says in his report for the fiscal year 1921-22 that at present there is scattered throughout the Treasury, War, and Commerce Departments the administration of laws having to do directly with the movement of our merchant fleet and safeguarding the lives of thousands on board those vessels. This results in an unnecessary duplication of the floating equipment and officers of the Federal Government with the necessary duplication of expenditures.
During a recent investigation of the conditions in the harbor at New York it was found that the Coast Guard service was operating six small vessels in those waters enforcing the anchorage regulations, boarding of vessels, and to some extent enforcing the navigation laws. The supervisor of the harbor, acting under the Secretary of War, was employing six vessels of a similar size in the enforcement of the dumping regulations. The Public Health Service was operating four vessels of a similar size in connection with the quarantine station at Rosebank, one of them being a fumigating vessel. The cost of the above services aggregates approximately $270,000.
In addition to the above, this bureau has stationed at New York during the greater portion of the year a small motor boat engaged in the enforcement of the navigation laws at an expense of approximately $15,000. The work performed by the above services having to do almost exclusively with the merchant marine, obviously should be under the direction of one department.—Nautical Gazette, 23 December, 1922.
French Motor-Ship of 22,000 Tons.—A merchant .ship for the French Merchant Marine is being constructed at the yards of Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engine Company, Glasgow, Scotland.
Dimensions of ship
Displacement tonnage 22,000
Length 184 metres 61
Beam 22 metres 15
Engine Installation
?
Diesel motors 2 cycle
Type—Marin Sulzer 12,000 h.p. (total power)
Various Details of Engines
Number of motors 4
Power (each one ) 3.000 h.p. effective
Bore of cylinder 70 cm.
Stroke 98 cm.
R.P.M 130
Number of cylinders par motor 6
Consummation of fuel oil per h.p. per hour 185 grammes. The scavenging is done by Turbo blowers.—Press Reports.
ENGINEERING
The Theory of Lubrication.—General reasoning is so often at fault as almost to justify the conclusion that general reasoning is generally wrong. Some engineers, after a cursory study of Osborne Reynolds’ theory of lubrication, decided from general reasoning that the conditions on which is was founded were seldom realized in practice, basing their conclusions largely on the circumstance that, according to Reynolds theory, the frictional resistance developed depended on the viscosity of the lubricant, whilst practical experience showed that the actual coefficient of friction, even in a fully-lubricated bearing, was nearly the same whatever the lubricant used.
The fallacy of this argument was very thoroughly exposed in the able and interesting Thomas Hawksley lecture delivered to the Institution of Mechanical Engineers last Friday evening by Dr. Stanton, of the National Physical Laboratory. What Reynolds' critics had overlooked was that, according to the theory, the friction of a bearing, was also a function of the thickness of the oil film, and, with stated conditions of load and speed, this thickness was less the less the viscosity of the lubricant. Dr. Stanton gave in his lecture the results of a calculation of the frictional resistance of a bearing run at the same load and at the same speed with different lubricants. When the viscosity of the lubricant was 0.233 the calculated coefficient of friction came out as 0.00094, whilst when the viscosity was 0.824, or nearly fourfold, the coefficient of friction was 0.00099, or only some five per cent more.
The very careful and ingenious experiments described in the lecture very thoroughly vindicate the wide applicability of Osborne Reynolds' theory, but at the same time thoroughly substantiate the objections raised to the policy of the Committee on Lubricants in attempting to experiment on an ordinary journal bearing. It appears from the lecture that all the troubles anticipated by the opponents of this course were encountered, and that it was impossible to obtain figures sufficiently accurate for a comparison with theory, until the attempt to reproduce practical conditions was abandoned, and in the end it was found expedient to make the bush six per cent larger than the journal, so that the effective bearing area subtended but some twenty degrees.
On this head much misapprehension prevails. Some engineers have got obsessed with the idea that for lubrication to be effected on Osborne Reynolds' principle it is necessary for oil to be "dragged in" between the opposing surfaces. As a matter of fact the oil pressure that keeps the surfaces apart is due to the objection of the oil to be extruded from between them, and hence, if a cylinder rolls over an oil covered plane, lubrication is effected on Osborne Reynolds' principle just as much as it is in the case of a journal, although there is no "dragging in" of the oil. In short, the oil film is already there, and before it can be extruded the cylinder has rolled on a point where the film retains its original thickness.
In Dr. Stanton's experiments the maximum pressure observed amounted to about three and one-half tons per square inch, the lubricant being castor oil, and the least thickness of the oil film was found to be 0.000046 in. It is interesting to compare these figures with the corresponding values for the film between the teeth of marine reduction gears, as determined by calculation and tabulated on page 453 of our issue of October is last. In the case of the S.S. Melmore Head the computed thickness of the oil film was 0.000035 in., and the maximum pressure in the film 23,100 lbs, per square inch. In general, however, the average film thickness turns out to be somewhat greater than that found in the Teddington experiments which is in part due to the better lubrication due to the rolling motion, although the "effective" curvature of the opposing surfaces is also a factor in the problem, as is also the relative speed.
The high pressures at Teddington were obtained with castor oil and with heavy cylinder oil. When the attempt was made to carry the same load with lighter oils, such as sperm, the vibration became so great that the experiment had to be abandoned for fear that "seizing" might occur and the bearing be spoiled. The exact converse of this is reported to have occurred with certain high-speed bearings of large diameter, in which the surface speed was of the order of 100 ft. per second, and the clearance between brass and journal 4 mils per inch. In this case it is stated that heavy vibration occurred until the oil warmed up, thereby reducing its viscosity. On this condition being attained the bearing ran steadily and quietly. Unfortunately, complete data are not available, and it is not clear whether the vibrations were encountered merely in running up to speed or continued afterwards. If the first-named hypothesis be correct, the explanation may possibly be found in the fact that, with a bearing at rest, the least distance between brass and journal is at the bottom of the brass, but in the stable running position the point of closest contact lies to the trailing side of the brass, and to attain to this position it is necessary for the shaft to be lifted. This operation does not in all cases appear to be effected quietly as the shaft after beginning to lift, sometimes slips back again, and it is only after a certain speed is attained that quiet running is achieved. It is at least conceivable that the vibrations noted, when it was attempted to run the Teddington bearing with light oils and heavy loads had a similar origin, but other explanations are certainly possible.
One very important observation at the National Physical Laboratory was that, provided the journal was run up to speed before the load came on, there was no wear of the brass, the two solid surfaces being completely separated by the film of oil. Another highly important conclusion reached was that "seizing" might occur whilst the oil film was still very many molecules thick. This observation accords very well with the view repeatedly advanced in these columns: viz. that lubrication fails and a bearing seizes, when the shear stress on the oil exceeds a certain limit, which depends on the physical properties of the oil and of the bearing metal. In order that oil may be dragged in between the opposing surfaces it must adhere to them, but the strength of the bond will vary with the lubricant and with the metal. Should the shearing forces developed in the film exceed the strength of this bond slip will occur and, the pressure being no longer maintained, the opposing surfaces will come into contact and "seizing" occur. A rise of temperature may be expected to weaken the bond and to promote "seizing," the more specially as at the same time the viscosity of the lubricant will be diminished, thus thinning the film and increasing the shear stress. On this view the superiority as lubricants of animal and vegetable oils lies in the fact that they form a stronger bond with the bearing metal than do the mineral oils, a fact which Mr. R.M. Dally appears to have been the first to observe.—Engineering, 8 December, 1922.
Leaks, caused by corrosion, in a large water main in America were stopped by electric welding without cutting off the water, which had a pressure of 90 lb. per square inch. The process, described in the Engineering News-Record. was as follows: Where a hole in the pipe was discovered the flow of water was stopped with a pine plug. The plug was then cut off flush with the surface of the pipe and covered with a metal cap held fast by tacking it on the side with an electric arc. The cap used was of metal of approximately a No. 11 gauge and was slightly concave. Over this cap metal was welded, extending far enough to get a firm hold on the pipe.—The Engineer, 8 December, 1922.
Electrical Instrument Applied to Measurement of Fluids.—In measuring the flow of steam or other fluids, the application of electricity has been in use a number of years and its advantages are well recognized. The one apparent objection to electrically operated flow meters has been the error due to fluctuations in the voltage of the lines from which they are operated. Where the voltage varies uniformly over a moderate range—for instance, from 108 to 112 volts—the electrical instruments can be set for a mean value, say no volts, and the average result over a period of time will be sufficiently accurate for practical purposes.
However, in many cases it is impossible to obtain an average voltage with sufficient accuracy, owing to poor voltage regulation or other conditions not under control. It is for this latter group primarily that the writer has developed an electrical integrating instrument that is practically free from voltage error. This instrument is as simple as the ordinary alternating-current watt-hour meter and equally dependable, if not less likely to get out of adjustment.
The instrument is not a watt-hour meter, neither is it an ampere-hour meter. Considered as an electrical instrument, it sums up, or integrates, the conductance—that is, the reciprocal of the resistance—of a circuit with respect to time, and therefore might be called an integrating "mho-meter." When used in connection with a device by which the electrical conductance increases (and the resistance decreases) as the rate of flow of a fluid increases, the instrument becomes a fluid flow integrator or totalizer.
Without using mathematical equations, the elementary principles of this instrument may be set forth and its chief characteristics explained by reference to the diagrammatic drawing. Fig. 1, and to other instruments whose principles are well known. In the diagram an aluminum disk D mounted on the shaft 5" rotates in the air gaps of two pairs of electromagnets having the winding C1 and C2, respectively. The coils C1 are connected in series with each other and across the secondary of the transformer N. The coil C2 is connected in series with the resistance R, the two being across the secondary of the transformer in parallel with the coils C1.
Pipe P carries the steam or other fluid to be measured and the orifice O causes a pressure drop, or differential pressure, between the two sides of the orifice. The differential pressure raises the mercury in the U-tube B, the mercury thus short-circuiting more or less of the resistance R. By construction, the resistance of the circuit through C2 and R can be made to vary inversely (and the conductance directly) as the rate of flow of a fluid at constant density.
The coils C1 contain a large number of turns and are highly inductive, for which reason the lag of the current behind the voltage approaches ninety degrees. The coil d, however, has a smaller effective number of turns, and being in series with the resistance R, which is large in proportion to the inductive reactance of the coil, the inductive effect of C1 is practically negligible and the current is nearly in phase with the voltage. Since the currents in these two coils have a large and practically constant phase difference, the corresponding magnetic fluxes of F1 and F2 react on currents induced in the disk to produce a torque thereon in a manner similar to that of the ordinary induction-type watt-hour meter. This accelerating, or driving, torque varies as the product of these two fluxes, a relation well known and used in all induction-type meters. A change in frequency may tend to modify the torque, but this tendency has been rendered negligible for the usual frequency fluctuations by incorporating in the meter, as manufactured, special features not here shown without in any way departing from the fundamental principles under discussion.
As the disk rotates under the action of the driving torque, it cuts across the fluxes of F1 and F2 and by this movement has currents induced in it which oppose the motion and thereby give a retarding, or dragging torque. This action is similar to that in a watt-hour meter where one or more permanent magnets, sometimes called drag or damping magnets, provide the retarding torque. By construction the flux of F1 is made so large in comparison with the flux of F2, that the retardation is due almost entirely to the flux F2. Thus the electromagnet with the windings C1 functions in a manner similar to the permanent magnets of a watt hour meter in giving the retarding torque and at the same time does its part in producing the accelerating torque. This retarding action varies directly as the speed of the disk and as the square of the flux and therefore as their product, a relation applying to the permanent magnets of watt-hour meters or to any magnet whose flux is cut by a conductor forming a closed circuit.
Referring again to the relation that the driving torque varies as the product of the two fluxes of F1 and F2, it will be seen that, for any fixed value of R, F1 and F2, will each vary directly with the voltage from the transformer N. Hence the accelerating torque varies practically directly as the square of this voltage. It also follows that the retarding torque, since it varies as the square of the flux F1 likewise varies as the square of the voltage. Neglecting friction on the disk, which is very slight, the speed will take such a value that the accelerating and the retarding torques will be equal and opposite; and since each varies practically in the same way with the voltage, ordinary fluctuations of voltage will have substantially no effect on the speed of the disk. This is a condition desired, for the reason that the velocity of the fluid in the pipe P has no connection with changes in voltage of the transformer N.
By construction, as previously mentioned, the resistance R is made to vary inversely, and the conductance of the circuit directly, as the rate of flow of the fluid to be measured. But the current in the coil C2, and hence the flux of F2, varies directly as the conductance and therefore directly as the rate of flow of the fluid. The driving torque increases as the flux of F2, increases, hence the speed of the disk will be proportional to the velocity of the liquid through the orifice. Any changes in F2, caused by fluctuations in voltage will be accompanied by corresponding changes in F1 so that the accelerating and the retarding torques will be equally affected and the speed of the disk will vary only with the rate of flow of the fluid.
Obviously, if the speed is proportional to the rate of flow, the total number of revolutions of the disk is a measure of the total quantity of the fluid passing through the orifice. These revolutions are counted by the usual gear trains with dials, so that the dial indications give a direct summation or integration of the total flow in any desired units.
This integrating instrument has been adopted by the Republic Flow Meters Company, of Chicago, and is now standard equipment, replacing the type formerly used.—E.H. Freeman in Power, 26 December, 1922.
New British Magneto.—This new magneto is dust-proof and watertight with the extremely light weight of six and a half pounds in which the magnet, not the armature, rotates. Special fan-shaped stationary pole shoes are used with the construction of the rotor shoes achieving an effective lamination of the magnetic structure which is superior to the best rotating armature construction. This arrangement is supposed to account for the excellent starting characteristics of the new machine and the greater range of speed than called for in service. The firing is claimed to be effective at such slow crank shaft speeds as fifty to sixty revolutions per minute at which speeds effective carburetion is not achieved. The use of the stationary armature enables a thorough provision for insulation and the elimination of such evils as rotating high tension winding condenser connections.—Tech. Engineering News, January, 1923.
The Discharge of Oil from Ships.—From Monday of this week henceforward, it will be an offense for a ship to discharge oil, or allow it to escape, into the sea within a distance of three miles from the British coast. The Act of Parliament under which such a proceeding has been made punishable with a fine of 1100, should serve to remove a just cause of grievance expressed by many visitors to and users of our seashores, for within recent years great discomfort and damage have been caused to many interests by the oily scum or tarry matter which has been washed landwards from ships using oil fuel when cleaning their bunkers or replacing their ballast water. The Act applies not only to ships, but to the discharge or escape of oil from any place on land or from any apparatus used for transferring oil to or from a ship, and definitely forbids its transference during the night time. From our own experience, we know of two places at which the trouble now guarded against has reached acute conditions. At one the oily drift has practically eliminated all off-shore fishing, and at the other the tar deposit has rendered the beach almost useless for pleasure purposes.—The Engineer, 5 January, 1923.
The Contra Propeller.—This article forms a very comprehensive treatment of the development, recent experience with, and technique of the contra propeller. The pre-war development was restricted to the early work of Dr. Wagner, who in 1912 published the results of trials on a German torpedo boat in which, at a speed of 28 knots, a saving of twelve per cent in power was effected by the introduction of the contra propellers. The war interrupted the development, but since the war considerable progress has been made. Savings of power ranging from ten to twenty per cent have been repeatedly proved on service, and many complete details of actual trial data are given. In the Stecknits, belonging to the Norddeutscher Lloyd, carefully carried out trials were made in the spring of 1920. First the vessel was tried with its old propeller; next, as this propeller was inefficient, a new propeller was fitted with a resultant saving of power of seven to eight per cent. Then the guide blades were attached and the result was a further saving of fifteen per cent. Trials on the Brevik mile of the Norwegian vessel Hovmoy of 1,300 tons d.w. carried out under the technical superintendence of Professor Morch of Trondhjem University, showed the astonishing saving of seventeen and two-tenths per cent. The Norwegian steamer Granit, of 1,000 tons d.w., showed a saving of fifteen to sixteen per cent. The case of the Norwegian passenger vessel Brevik, which owing to its age could not maintain its speed on service is interesting, for when fitted with the contra propeller the necessary speed was easily obtained. The Norwegian vessel Neptun, of 1,200 tons d.w., first had its old propeller removed and a new one installed with a resulting improvement of six to eight per cent. The fitting of the guide blades resulted in a further saving of eleven and six-tenths per cent at 11 knots and sixteen per cent at 12 knots. In the Norwegian vessels Ottar and Frednes, which were fitted with guide blades, no definite comparative trials were run, but in the case of the Frednes a saving of coal consumption of ten and seven-tenths has been made. In the S.S. Eikland, of 2,040 tons d.w., a saving of eleven and five-tenths per cent was obtained. The Hamburg Amerika liner vessel Andalusia showed a saving of twenty per cent over the performances of its sister ships Alesia and Arabia. Altogether eight applications of the propeller have been fitted. Fourteen vessels up to a deadweight of 8,000 tons are yet to be fitted. An objection which at first was thought to be a serious one—that of the breakage of the blades—has not proved so on service. Only in one case, that of the Andalusia, has a blade been broken. In this case one of the blades was severed at about its half length, but strangely enough the saving in power was not adversely effected. This accident lead to experiments being carried out on the problem at the Hamburg Experiment Tank, the results of which showed that the diameter of the guide blades could be considerably less than that of the main propeller without destroying its beneficial influence. This reduction of diameter will considerably increase the safety and strength of the guide blades. An interesting feature of the contra propeller is that it increases the maneuvering qualities of the vessel to which it is attached. In the case of the Neptun the tactical diameter was reduced to five-eighths of its former value. Detail plans of actual contra propellers are given with the articles, and their routine construction is carefully gone into. The final portion of the article is devoted to the theory of the contra propeller, and the treatment, based upon the latest and most reliable theories, shows that the savings which have been realized in practice are of the order which theoretical investigation leads one to expect.—W. Kucharski, Werft Reederci Hafen, November 22, 1922, p. 715; 18 pp.; 18ff.—Abstracted for the Marine Engineer and Naval Architect, January, 1923.
AERONAUTICS
Strength of Aircraft Squadrons—According to a recent weekly operations report of Naval Aviation the Aircraft Squadrons attached to the Battle Fleet had the following number of planes in active commission:
Observation Plane Squadron 1—Five Vought and three DH4B.
Observation Plane Squadron 2—Six DH4B. (Six Vought VE7SF planes in commission for training.)
Fighting Plane Squadron 1—Three VE7SF, one VE7T, one VE7GF and one JN4H.
Fighting Plane Squadron 2—Five JN4JH.
Torpedo and Bombing Plane Squadron 2—Six F5L and two 1W9. (Two F3L for replacement.)
The Aircraft Squadrons, Scouting Fleet, consist of Scouting Plane Squadron 1 (F5L planes), Torpedo and Bombing Plane Squadron 1 and Kite Balloon Squadron 1.—Aviation, 25 December, 1922.
European Air Strength.—The present relative strengths of the air forces of this country, France and Belgium, now stationed in Europe, have been revealed in a written reply supplied by the Secretary for Air to Lieutenant Commander Kenworthy. It appears that while we have serving in Europe, fifteen squadrons of twelve machines each, France has ICG squadrons of nine machines, and Belgium fourteen of ten machines each. Our total active service strength is thirty-two squadrons, as compared with 128 for France and fourteen for Belgium. The personnel of the Royal Air Force serving in Europe includes 1,158 trained pilots, seventy-five observers and 19,421 other ranks engaged on ground duties. France has made provision for maintaining in Europe 3,039 flying officers and 30,477 other ranks. Information is not available as to how the first of these figures is divisible as between pilots and observers, while in the case of the second the figure excludes a large number of those engaged on ground duties who are obtained from the army. The Belgian total establishment is 2,000 of all ranks, but reorganization is now being undertaken. In the course of a reply to Major Attlee, the Minister stated that the number of machines on the French Civil Register on December 1 was 660, and that during the first eleven months of this year the French aircraft industry had produced 3,300 machines for civil or military purposes, including those exported to foreign countries.—The Engineer, 29 December, 1922.
Pilotless Plane Safe from Enemy Control.—Pilotless bomb-carrying airplanes controlled by wireless will be the most dangerous weapon in future wars, says the French inventor of wireless instruments, Branly, who insists that French apparatus has been developed to such a point already that it is impossible for enemy wireless experts to interfere with control. Not only would an enemy be obliged to know every secret wave length used, but the French controls under experiment were so delicate that special and intricate signals could be so sent as to operate directly many small parts of mechanism.
"As a result," says Branly, "the enemy would have to have full knowledge of the mechanism used, and this can be changed every time the plane leaves the aerodrome; and stolen secret codes henceforth will be useless. Of course, parasite waves could be sent out in all directions, which might make our control more difficult, but under such conditions the enemy would be interfering with his own wireless also."—Aerial Age, January, 1923.
Seven Hour Gliding Record.—Lieutenant Thoret, a French military aviator, on January 3 beat all glider records by keeping in the air 7 hr., 3 min. at Biskra, Algeria.
The feat was accomplished in a regulation army airplane with the propeller previously wedged to prevent its operation. In addition to its motor, gasoline, and oil supplies, the machine carried an extra weight of 500 lb. It was in no way modified for gliding.—Aviation, 15 January, 1923.
The Japanese Air Appropriations.—The news item from a French contemporary that the Japanese budget for the present fiscal year includes an appropriation for military and naval aeronautics of approximately $21,000,000 is highly significant. The fact that this appropriation is seventy-six per cent of the total appropriation for the United States Army and Navy Services ($27,661,450.00) for the current fiscal year is important in itself, for it shows that the Empire of the Rising Sun has fully grasped the value of Air Power. What increases the value of this demonstration is that the Japanese naval air appropriation included in this sum is $16,000,000 as against $14,800,000 for the United States Navy.
As the naval ratio of Japan is, under the Washington treaty, sixty per cent of the American naval strength, it may be seen that Japan is spending money on her naval air force far in excess of her allotted ratio of naval strength, aiming in that service evidently at parity with that of the American Navy. This is a development which should be watched with sustained interest.—Aviation, 15 January, 1923.
Blackburn Deck-Landing Naval Spotting Machine (British).—The Blackburn Aeroplane and Motor Company, Limited, of Leeds, continued during the year to devote its attention principally to naval aeroplanes of the torpedo-plane type. The firm's Swift type of torpedo-plane, which we illustrated in our Annual Review two years ago, has been supplied to all the principal foreign Governments as well as to our own Air Ministry. The firm's latest development in this direction is a large type of coastal defense torpedo-plane and bombing machine, now being built for the British Government. The machine is intended to carry and discharge a 21 -in. torpedo or bombs weighing 1,800 lb. Its long sea range will permit it to work from a coastal basis. The machine will be driven by a Napier "Cub" 1,000 horsepower engine, and is claimed to be the first aeroplane specially designed from the beginning to employ that motor.
Another interesting naval machine of the Blackburn Company's production is the deck-landing reconnaissance and spotting machine of which a photograph is reproduced herewith. This machine carries a crew of four—a pilot, observer, wireless operator and gunner, and is driven by a 450 horsepower Napier "Lion" engine. The machine is designed in such a way that many of its principal elements are interchangeable with those of the firm's Swift torpedo-plane—also a deck-landing machine—so that the spare parts carried on board the mother ship may be reduced in variety. The interchangeable units comprise the engine and its mounting, the radiator and piping, the reserve water tank, oil tank, propeller, main planes and ailerons, tail plane and elevators, fin and rudder, tail skid and wheels. The machine is designed to take off after a run of 100 ft. on the deck of a ship moving at 20 knots. Should it be necessary to alight on the water, provision is made for dropping the landing wheels. Internal air bags are arranged to keep the machine afloat for a considerable period and slings are provided for hoisting in on board the mother ship. The pilot sits slightly in front of the leading edge of the top plane, while the observer is stationed just aft of the trailing edge, and is sheltered from the wind—so that he may be the better able to use his field glasses, range finder or camera—by carrying the cowling over his head. The gunner's cockpit is in rear of the observer, while the wireless operator is housed between the pilot and the observer. The pilot can bring an additional gun to bear by firing it through the propeller. The wing spars and the longerons are of spruce, but elsewhere the structure is mainly in steel. The machine is designed to have a top speed of 99 knots, a landing speed of 40 knots, and a ceiling of 16,800 ft.—The Engineer, 5 January, 1922.
Helicopter Makes Flight With Two Men on Board.—For what is said to be the first time in history, a two-man helicopter flight was made early at McCook Air Field.
The De Bothezat helicopter, invented and built at McCook Field, was the machine used in the tests, which came a little more than a month after the first successful flight, December 18, when only one man was aboard.
In the machine on the two-man flight were Major T.H. Bane, former McCook Field commandant, and Art Smith, veteran civilian aviator, now attached to McCook Field.
The helicopter ascended about three feet from the ground, rising vertically. It descended without trouble, and the flight was repeated several times with both men aboard.
The tests today are said to mark an important step in the development of the successful De Bothezat helicopter.—The Baltimore Sun, 20 January, 1923.
ORDNANCE
To Modernize Our Battleships.—In order to take immediate steps to prevent our naval strength from falling behind that of other navies or dropping below the ratio established in the arms conference last year, President Harding has submitted a supplemental estimate for a special appropriation of $6,500,000 to begin the work of modernizing our battleships. The entire program involves the necessary rejuvenation of thirteen capital ships, the total cost of which will amount to $30,000,000, according to the director of the budget, whose approval was given to the estimate. Eventually this expenditure will amount to $60,000,000, in the opinion of the naval officers who are familiar with the situation.
Foremost among the work of modernizing our fleet is the increase in the range of the guns. The startling declaration has recently been published that all but five of our super-dreadnaughts are out-ranged more than 5,000 yards by practically the entire British fleet of capital ships, rendering our vessels virtually obsolete.
Other features of the program involve the conversion of six of the battleships from coal to oil burners, the protection of the decks from aerial attack by the addition of armor, and the increase in the defensive measures against mines and torpedoes. This latter feature includes the process of adding tanks or compartments to the sides of the ships to afford protection against torpedo attack from other surface vessels and from submarines. This type of construction became known as "blisters" during the war because of the warty effect the compartments lend to the dreadnaughts; they add to the fuel capacity of the oil burners, as well as give protection to the vitals of the ships from the torpedoes and mines.—Army and Navy Register, 9 January, 1923.
United States Fleet Battle Practice.—From the responses received to Secretary Denby's invitation to Congressmen to witness the maneuver of the United States in March, there will be a distinguished party. The maneuvers will come after the adjournment of Congress and will give an opportunity to the members of the Naval Affairs Committee to witness the firing upon the old battleship Iowa.
It is planned to get as much out of the test with the radio controlled Iowa as possible. In all probability the Iowa will be sunk in the closing phase of the test, when a fire of 14-in. guns from the Mississippi will be directed against it.
Using the Iowa as a moving target five problems will be worked out against her. The first test will be with secondary batteries of 5-in. guns, which will try out the present fire control system with a rapid change of range. The Iowa will be run at varying speeds while under fire and the observers can thus ascertain whether the fire control system is effective under these conditions.
The second test will be for 14-in. turret guns, in which the two ships will change their courses frequently as commanders would in a duel between two battleships.
Turret guns will be employed in the third practice. The test here will be to determine whether accuracy of fire from turrets turning from the right to left can be obtained when the enemy turns to the right or left at frequent intervals.
The fourth test will be night attack. Searchlights, star shells and other modern systems of illumination will be employed, and 5-in. rifles will be used.
In the fifth exercise 14-in. guns will be used in indirect fire upon the Iowa. In clear weather the range will be 25,000 yards, but in hazy weather or with a smoke screen the range will be reduced to 15,000 yards. In this maneuver aircraft will be used for observation and spotting.—Army and Navy Journal, 6 January, 1923.
Navy is Experimenting With Peppermint Oil.—Every ship of the United States Navy afloat and every naval training station have been supplied with a certain quantity of peppermint oil by the Bureau of Ordnance for use in gas warfare training.
The idea of supplying the oil is to acquaint the personnel with the properties and use of the gas mask. When the instructions issued on the use of the oil are followed out, the oil can be detected by its odor when not wearing a gas mask, but is absorbed by the chemicals in the gas mask, so that, when wearing a gas mask, the personnel cannot detect the presence of the vapor of the oil. Similarly, it can be used to test the proper fit of the gas mask in that if a man wearing a gas mask perceives the odor of the oil there is certainly a leak in the mask.—Boston Evening Transcript, 5 January, 1923.
RADIO AND NAVIGATION
Radio Bearings.—The Hydrographic Office has printed on the back of North Atlantic and Central American Waters Pilot Charts for January and the North Pacific and Indian Ocean Pilot Charts for February a Radio Bearing Conversion Diagram developed by Commander F.C. Martin, U.S. Navy, of the Hydrographic Office. This diagram will also be issued as H.O. Chart No. 5193.
The purpose of this diagram is to easily convert the radio or true bearing which is received by the vessel into a mercator bearing so that it may be laid down by the navigator in the ordinary way, thus allowing him to dispense with tedious interpolations from tables or computation to obtain this correction. The diagram gives at once without any other special facilities just what is needed, hence making any available mercator chart good for plotting of radio bearings. This renders the application of this valuable aid to navigation within the reach of all mariners regardless of whether or not they carry a specially constructed set of radio compass charts.
Sonic Survey. West Coast.—The U.S.S. Hull and Corry completed, on December 22, a sonic survey of the West Coast of the United States, from Point Descanso, Mexico, to San Francisco. Lines of soundings were run at five-mile intervals from the hundred fathom curve to the floor of the Pacific, from Point Descano to Point Conception. From Point Conception to San Francisco, the lines of soundings were at ten-mile intervals. In all 6,800 miles of soundings were taken and it is reported that several uncharted banks were discovered. The sounding operations were conducted upon request of the Carnegie Institute of Washington to be used in connection with the Institute's study of the cause of earthquakes.
New Naval Aircraft Instruments.—The annual report of the Naval Observatory contains the following reference to new developments of aeronautical, navigational, and aerological instruments:
Two new types of aero compasses were tested in March. The Briggs-Heyl earth inductance compass was tried out in a D H 4 plane at Anacostia and was later given a thorough test at the Naval Observatory shop and compass house. The Sperry gyro compass was tried out in an F5L plane and later tested at the naval air station at Anacostia. Unfortunately neither one of these compasses is yet properly developed for use in heavier-than-air machines. The Sperry gyro compass could be satisfactorily used in large airships of the ZR type.
The aerial sextant as designed by Lieutenant Commander Byrd is considered the best artificial horizon sextant that has been tried out. Five Navy Standard sextants fitted with Fischer artificial horizon attachment have just been received from Keuffel and Esser Company, and it is believed that these instruments will be an improvement.
The British low-reading altimeter as manufactured by Short and Mason, of London, has proved successful and is the best low-reading altimeter that we now have for issue. A temperature-compensated high-reading altimeter was developed by the Bureau of Standards. Further experiments are necessary.
Altitude azimuth instruments for observing pilot balloons have been delivered to the Observatory from three sources: Keuffel and Esser Company, E.S. Ritchie and Sons, and the Washington Navy Yard. These three types of instruments are different, though intended for the same purpose. They are being tested by the aircraft tender Wright. Pilot balloons, 6 and 9-in. and 7 ½-in., as manufactured by the United States and Faultless Rubber Company, respectively, have passed excellent tests and are now being issued to the service.
A plotting board designed by Keuffel and Esser Company for plotting the positions of these pilot balloons in their ascensions is being tested at Anacostia.
A luminous-ground wind indicator, manufactured by the Air Transport Equipment Company, of Long Island, is being tested at Anacostia. This indicator is in use at McCook Field and at Hazelhurst Field.
The air stations and the U.S.S. Wright, Aroostook, and Langley have been fitted out with complete sets of aerological instruments. All twenty-four-hr. drum aerological instruments have been changed to Seven-day ones.
A chapter on aerial navigation for the new book on navigation that is to be used by midshipmen was compiled by the officer in charge of the aeronautic desk at the Naval Observatory.—Aviation, 8 January, 1923.
Wireless Lighthouse Deemed Superior to Radio Beacons.—A wireless lighthouse has been installed on Inchkeith designed for use in fog. By means of reflectors wireless waves are concentrated into a beam with a radiation of about 100 miles, which revolves and in passing each point of the compass assumes a distinctive signal. The installation will be of service only to vessels equipped with wireless. For ships possessing direction-finding instruments it will be a simple matter to determine precisely their position, while other craft with wireless sets will be able to deduce their whereabouts approximately.
An apparatus twenty feet high is employed and with the reflector the diffusion of the waves is prevented. The broadcasting wave is 360 metres and it is held that the shorter the wave-length the freer it is from interference. The wireless lighthouse is considered an advance on the American system of establishing radio beacons on the Atlantic seaboard by the aid of which vessels with directional apparatus can- work out their position in a fog.—The Nautical Gazette, 23 December, 1922.
MISCELLANEOUS
Great Britain and the Naval Treaty.—According to an American press dispatch imputed to the Navy Department, "the scrapping hitherto done in Great Britain has affected only vessels formerly classified as wholly obsolete." This called forth a rejoinder from the British Embassy, which said that the dispatch could hardly have come from official sources "because what is stated is contrary to facts officially known to the Washington Government."
What are the facts? Up to the present date all but one of the nineteen British dreadnaughts doomed by the treaty have been stricken off the list. Nine of them have been actually broken up or are now undergoing that process; the remaining nine have been stripped of all essential fighting gear—the turrets being removed in some cases—and will be sold for demolition as soon as purchasers can be found for them. The sole survivor of the nineteen is the Lion, the order to dismantle her having been suspended a few weeks back for reasons not yet officially disclosed.
Now, if the eighteen discarded ships were compared with the Maryland or the Japanese Negato, they certainly might be termed obsolete, but measured against such vessels as the Michigan, Delaware or the Japanese Settsu—none of which have yet been scrapped—they would still rank as thoroughly effective. In fact, several of them are considerably more powerful than the dreadnaughts that will remain in the American and Japanese fleets after treaty-scrapping operations are concluded. To elucidate this point further I have prepared the following short table showing the characteristics of certain British ships already scrapped and of dreadnaughts reserved for future duty in the United States Navy.
Some British Dreadnoughts Already Discarded
3 Orions—Completed 1912, 22,500 tons, 21 knots, 10 13.5-in. guns.
1 Erin—Completed 1914, 23,000 tons, 21 knots, 10 13.5-in. guns.
1 Agincourt—Completed 1914, 27,500 tons, 22 knots, 14 12-in. guns.
1 Princess Royal—Completed 1912, 26,350 tons, 28 knots. 8 13.5-in. guns.
Some United States Dreadnaughts to Be Retained in Post-Treaty Fleet.
Utah, Florida—Completed 1911, 21,825 tons, 21 knots, 10 12-in. guns.
Arkansas, Wyoming—Completed 1912, 26,000 tons 20 ½ knots, 12 12-in. guns.
We therefore arrive at the cardinal fact that Britain has practically disposed of all the ships she is pledged to give up under the treaty, although that instrument is not yet operative, and that among them were half a dozen of later design and consequently greater war value than certain ships which the United States and Japan will retain in their post-treaty fleets. As this is well known to the Washington Navy Department, the British Embassy had good reason to doubt whether the department had inspired the misleading press dispatch alluded to above.
When explaining to Parliament last week the steps that have been already taken to scrap warships under the treaty, an Admiralty spokesman said that the British Government had desired to show its intention of giving a lead in the direction of naval disarmament by carrying out the spirit and letter of the treaty.
That such a desire has animated British statesmen is true enough, but candor compels the admission that motives of a slightly less exalted nature have contributed to the premature sacrifice of so many valuable ships. During 1920, when the increasing scarcity of funds made it imperative to cut down naval expenses, the Admiralty placed eleven of the earlier dreadnaughts on the "disposal list," which meant they were to be stripped and sold as opportunity offered. This was done, not because the ships were obsolete, but simply because there was no money to maintain them. These eleven vessels would therefore have been scrapped, treaty or no treaty.
On the other hand, the eight additional dreadnaughts condemned by the treaty would unquestionably have remained on the active list for years to come, seeing that they were individually more modern and powerful than several of the first-line ships to be retained by the United States and Japan. The circumstances that seven of the eight have already been dismantled is probably due as much to financial reasons as to any wish to give the other powers a lead in disarmament.
Let us, as Dr. Johnson enjoined, clear our minds of cant. But, having done so, let us recognize facts as such. Great Britain has anticipated her treaty obligations. The United States and Japan, on the other hand, prefer to wait until the agreement is ratified, and no doubt they are wise to do so. British opinion recognizes the attitude of both powers as being perfectly correct and no sane person here blames them for hesitating to scrap good ships before there is a concrete guarantee of reciprocal action.—Baltimore Sun, 22 December, 1922.
France and the Naval Treaty.—Last year, in a remarkable study of the super-dreadnaught, the English Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon wrote:
"We must consider that Continental Europe, from a naval point of view, is exhausted. The triple alliance has faded away; France and Italy cannot build any large number of ships due to financial reasons; Russia is no longer a world power. Also, the theater of naval operations is removed from the North Sea, the English Channel and the Mediterranean, and is transferred to the Atlantic and Pacific."
One might believe that this theory will rest correct for quite a time. France has not as yet received any reparations, and Italy is under a financial strain. These two nations—which have no aggressive ideas—something which Sir Bacon might well have noted—are certainly not in a measure to construct a Navy as the English Admiral remarked. But, thanks to the errors which have been committed in the Orient, Russia has already commenced to play an important role in the equality of naval power.
Even this morning, while the conference at Lausanne was discussing the future of the straits, the Russian delegates made their appearance at the conference. They did not appear as allies nor as a vanquished power. True, Russia has not as yet commenced to build up her Navy, still the ships which she does not even yet possess, seem to already worry the British Admiralty. At Lausanne, in reply to the Russian expositions of this morning, England will, no doubt, ask that her Navy be permitted to pass the straits and enter the Black Sea. At Bucarest, it is represented to our friends the Romanians that the English Fleet will be their protector against Russia. In the Straits England has massed a strong naval force, which the London Times gives its formidable composition as follows: three battleships at Constantinople; one battleship near Prinkipo; two battleships at Echanak; and one other battleship near Gallipoli, without counting seven light cruisers, thirty-three destroyers, two aviation carriers, six submarines, etc. thirty-one units, of which two battleships belong to the Atlantic Fleet, without mentioning the battle cruiser Hood which has been ordered to Gibraltar. Thus—England strips the Atlantic to concentrate her ships at the entrance to the Black Sea. How then can we pretend that Russia is not a Naval power. Since the defeat of the Greeks has made England decide to mobilize her ships we again hear, from the other side of the channel, with more insistence than ever, the voice reclaiming the putting into force the Washington Agreement.
Last Wednesday replying to a question in the House of Commons, M. Eyres-Monsell explained that England has already commenced to comply with the Treaty, and that eight of her capital ships have been sold to be broken up, and six others have been rendered useless for future use. On December 1 the Paris edition of the New York Herald published a telegram on this subject. We found therein a list of the ships to which Mr. Eyres-Monsell had reference. The eight battleships sold to be broken up were: Commonwealth, Dreadnaught, Saint Vincent, Inflexible, Hercules, Indomitable and the Temeraire. One is tempted to believe that these ships have been recently demolished, when the fact of the matter is—that they did not figure in the list of the British Fleet dated February 1, 1922. In America it was intimated that England simply got rid of the ships that were of no further use as fighting craft. In England, as will be seen from the London Times of Friday, they strongly protested against this accusation. On the other hand, if the United States destroy the ships which the Washington Conference calls for they will only destroy old ships. But that is not the real question at issue.
The Treaty of Washington stipulates also the ceasing of work on certain ships under construction. If we look at the British list of February 1, 1922, we see that the stopping of ship construction is not equally divided. England has not at present any ships under construction. Japan must destroy two battleships now under construction except she can transform them into aviation carriers. The United States must cease building the seven battleships now underway (the six of the South Dakota class, 43,200 tons and four battle cruisers 43,500 tons). We then see—that the grand affair at Washington did not only concern itself with the demolition of ships, but also with the stopping of construction on ships now in the stocks. In case the construction of ships had continued, England would have had to make a strenuous effort in order that she would not have been out-done by the United States.
Is the United States really disposed to apply the treaty of Washington? The Administration, at least, has no intention of changing its policy. The Washington Conference has been a coup diplomatic for Mr. Hughes, and we know too well the character of this statesman to think that he will disavow his work. Even the recent election results will not change his mind. Certainly the United States has the right to state that the Treaty is not executable since it has not been ratified by all parties. On November 14, in the House of Representatives, the Committee examined the budget for the Navy for 1923-24. Giving an account of this meeting, where the proposals put forth by the Administration were not seriously objected to, the New York Herald writes as follows: The program of construction will continue, and the question of demolition will be suspended, until such time as all parties ratify the treaty of Washington.
In London they are very desirous that France ratify the Treaty. Italy can hardly refuse to do so. As the other three powers have already declared their intention to sign the Treaty, the Treaty would then soon become operative, in which case the United States would not be able to continue the construction of battleships.
But now comes a new side of the affair of which we have spoken previously. Russia has appeared again as a Naval Power, and England is so fully aware of this fact that she has massed her Navy in the Straits. Is it wise to ratify the Treaty and put it in vigor—when there is no limit placed on the Russian armaments? These armaments, which are almost inevitable if the question of the Straits is decided against Russia, do they not risk being the cause of the pretext for abrogating the Washington agreement?
The situation is embarrassing and, for our part, we only see two possible solutions.
To ratify the treaty with reserves—the reserves depending on the consequences, either direct or indirect, which will be produced by the building of the Russian Navy. That would amount to the Washington Treaty not binding the European nations.
Or, recognize that all limitation is in vain if Russia is not taken into consideration, and try and negotiate separately a broader agreement with Russia.
The second of these solutions is perhaps the most laborious. But it is certainly the most loyal and that is why we would prefer it.—Le Temps, 5 December, 1922.
Adopt Pacific Treaty in French Committee.—Paris, January 17 (Associated Press).—The commission on foreign affairs of the Chamber of Deputies today adopted the report submitted by Deputy Raynaldy to the sub-commission yesterday in favor of ratification of the Washington Conference agreement concerning the Pacific.
The commission decided to recommend the same reservations as those made by the American Senate concerning military intervention.
The report of Deputy Guernier on the Washington naval agreement will come before the commission in a fortnight.—New York Times, 18 January, 1923.
Italy Expected to Ratify Washington Treaty Soon.—It is reported from a confidential and reliable source that it is the intention of the Italian government soon to ratify the Washington agreements relative to naval disarmament, the Pacific and Far Eastern questions.
Some delay has been caused through disagreement with the Chinese government over the matter of disposal of certain Austrian Lloyd ships that were interned in Chinese ports during the war and since have been seized by the Chinese authorities. It is the Italian point of view that the Versailles Conference decided to pool all former enemy ships thus seized by the allied or associated powers and to redistribute this tonnage among the victorious powers in proportion to the merchant tonnage lost during the war. China suffered no such losses, and hence is not entitled to any vessels, according to Italian official opinion.
Notwithstanding this unsettled question, it now is the intention of the Italian government to ratify all of the Washington agreements, including those relative to China.—Army and Navy Journal, 30 December, 1922.
Three-Power Pact Favored by Japan.—Tokio, December 25.—If France and Italy fail to ratify the Washington Naval Treaty, an agreement for carrying it out might be arranged among England, America and Japan, the peers were told today by Admiral Ide, speaking in place of Premier Kato, who was indisposed.
Admiral Ide explained that such an agreement would be made easier by the fact that Japan already was proceeding with preparations for the naval reorganization. He added that as long as America did not alter her program for auxiliary ships Japan would pursue her revised scheme announced last summer, maintaining a ship ratio of six to America's ten.
Questioned as to whether there was danger that the Japanese Navy would be overbalanced by the American Navy, the Admiral replied that Japan's Navy was superior in the speed of ships and the accommodations of dockyards.—Baltimore Sun, 26 December, 1922.
British Skeptical About Further Limitation.—London, December 21.—Much interest has been aroused in British naval circles by the news that the House of Representatives has adopted the Navy Committee's request that President Harding shall invite the five powers affected by the original limitation treaty to negotiate a fresh compact for the restriction of auxiliary combatant tonnage. It is doubted, however, whether the moment is opportune for such a step, however desirable it may be.
The feverish energy with which Japan is adding to her navy fast cruisers and big submarines—two types specially adapted to offensive warfare and commerce raiding—has not escaped notice on this side of the Atlantic, and it is well understood that the United States has reason to be perturbed by this hectic activity in the dockyards of the Far East. It was fully expected here that a large appropriation for new construction would be submitted to Congress this month, and there was consequently some surprise at Mr. Secretary Denby's recent statement that no new ships would be asked for at the present juncture. The delay is ascribed to political and financial reasons. But failing an immediate program of cruisers and submarines, the relative position of power which the treaty assigns to the United States will be hopelessly lost, and her navy rendered incapable of fighting a successful war in the Pacific, or in any other ocean for that matter.
In these circumstances a new treaty to make good the shortcomings of the original pact is no doubt a very attractive idea, but whether it can be realized is far from certain. Every effort was made during the first conference to bring auxiliary tonnage under the same restrictions as were imposed upon capital ships, but without avail. France firmly refused to accept the rate of submarine tonnage allotted to her and stood out for a considerably higher figure. This made it impossible to restrict the number of destroyers, which are par excellence the antidote to the submarine. Then the British delegates pointed out that the development of ocean-going U-boats with heavy armament had also brought light cruisers into the category of anti-submarine craft, besides which these vessels were the natural protectors of the destroyer, and it would therefore be impracticable to limit either cruisers or destroyers if no check were placed on the expansion of submarine tonnage.
Japan, on her side, was opposed to restricting auxiliary ships, which Admiral Baron Kato declared to be essentially defensive. But thanks to France's refusal to accept the submarine ratio, the Japanese delegates were relieved of the invidious task of demanding a free hand in regard to auxiliary tonnage, though it is known they were prepared to do so had it been necessary. Even the American naval representatives are understood to have been against restrictions on auxiliary tonnage without a corresponding check on underwater craft.
Such was the position a year ago and nothing has occurred in the interval to modify the attitude which the powers respectively took upon that occasion. On the contrary, France is more convinced than ever that her naval future lies with the submarine. Since the conference she has begun or ordered twenty- four U-boats, which are stated to be only the first installment of her future submersible fleet. It is therefore in the last degree improbable that she would now agree to limit the dimensions of this fleet, even if she were offered a much higher ratio than it was proposed to grant her at Washington. And so long as France remains free to build as many submarines as she pleases. Great Britain could not with safety bind herself down to a fixed ratio of anti-submarine craft, which, in the opinion of her experts, comprise both cruisers and destroyers.
As regards Italy, that power has made it clear that she will enter into no naval commitments which do not equally affect France. It is for this reason that Rome has delayed ratification of the original treaty, and now that a strong Nationalist Government has come into office, there is less prospect than ever that Italy will agree to compromise her maritime position vis-a-vis France.
It will be seen, therefore, that the existing situation in Europe is decidedly unfavorable to an early extension of the naval disarmament scheme. Nor is it likely that Japan would welcome such a proposal, since she justifies her present big program of auxiliary construction on two grounds, military and economic. With a battle fleet of only ten capital ships it is essential, she argues, that she be adequately provided with other means of defense, such as cruisers and submarines, and the program now in course of execution is declared to be the absolute minimum consistent with national safety. Yet this program will eventually give her twice as much auxiliary tonnage as she would have possessed if Mr. Hughes’ scheme had been adopted.
The economic reason for the program is the necessity of saving from ruin the shipbuilding and allied trades, which form so important a part of the Japanese industrial system, and any proposal to cut down the number of auxiliary warships now building or ordered would be fiercely resisted by the business community as a whole, whose influence on national policy is second only to that of the militarist party. Moreover, the Government fears, or affects to fear, the social unrest that would be provoked were the naval shipbuilding yards and armament factories to lose the work they now have in hand, and thus be compelled to discharge many thousands of their men. It has been estimated than 80,000 families in Japan are directly dependent for their livelihood on the industries in question.
If the foregoing summary of prevailing conditions is correct, there is scarcely any hope of negotiating a new treaty of naval limitations within the near future. And since the Washington Cabinet is obviously in touch with the actualities of the world situation, it is considered most improbable that President Harding will act upon the invitation transmitted to him by Congress. No government cares to expose itself to a serious diplomatic rebuff, yet that risk would undoubtedly be incurred by any government which proposed at this time to summon a conference for the restriction of minor sea armaments.
Naval opinion here is faithfully, if somewhat bluntly, interpreted by one of the service journals, which writes as follows: "It is, after all, mainly a question whether the American people are prepared to pay for their own defense. The financial strain entailed by a building program sufficient to equip their fleet with the cruisers and submarined it needs would not be a serious one in proportion to the national wealth. British taxpayers have readily agreed to spend £14,000,000 on two warships which they believe to be essential for security, and their burden is already infinitely heavier than that of the American taxpayer."—Hector C. Bywater in Baltimore Sun, 4 January, 1923.
Japan Opposed to Limit on Smaller Warships.—Tokio, December 18—The Naval Appropriation Committee's proposal at Washington to supplement the naval treaty by another pact limiting auxiliary ships and submarines is not likely to receive the endorsement of Japanese naval officials, who do not expect the proposal will result in any definite action.
The question of limiting other than capital ships when brought up in the Washington Arms Conference met such opposition that officials believe the Powers could not reach an effective agreement now. Japanese officials and the public generally are eager to see final ratification of the Washington pact, and news that France will decide on it in January was hopefully received.
Should France and Italy or either withhold ratification or cause further delay it is safe to say Japan would be willing to join the United States and Great Britain in a three-Power treaty limiting capital ships, as agreed in the Washington Conference. Further than that she is not now inclined to go.—Boston Evening Transcript, 18 December, 1922.
Table of Comparison of Warships—United States, Great Britain, Japan.—The tables given below show the number of modern warships of various classes of the United States, Great Britain and Japan, either completed, building or projected, as shown by the official records of the United States Navy Department for October 1, 1922.
In the table of modern combatant ships completed whose numbers are not affected by treaty, it will be seen that in destroyers the United States is far in the lead, and she also is largely ahead in submarines of the first Line. In fleet submarines, however, Great Britain has six against three for the United States.
In cruisers of the first line of 27 knots Great Britain has four while the United States and Japan have nine. In light cruisers of 27 knots Great Britain also has the advantage, having forty of this class of vessel, while the United States has none and Japan has ten.
Referring to the table of combatant ships building or projected, it will be seen that the United States has no cruisers of 27 knots projected, while Great Britain has two vessels of this class projected and Japan has four.
In light cruisers of 27 knots Japan leads slightly in numbers, having eleven vessels projected, against ten by the United States and two by Great Britain. The tonnage of the ten United States ships, however, exceeds that of Japan by 8,480 tons.
In submarines under this head the United States enjoys a big advantage, having thirty-five building or projected, against twenty-one by Japan, and six by Great Britain. In fleet submarines, however, Japan is far in the lead, having twenty-five fleet submarines building or projected, against three by the United States and two by Great Britain. Japan is also in the lead in destroyers, building or projected, having thirty-nine under this head, while Great Britain has only five, and while the United States had authority to build twelve, this authority was suspended.
The aircraft carriers are all limited by treaty, and the table as to this type of craft shows that the United States and Great Britain each have 135,000 tonnage completed and Japan has 81,000 tons.
Results of the Conference.—On December 30, 1922, the Secretary of State addressed the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association on the subject: "Some Aspects of our Foreign Policy." The following paragraphs cover about one-fifth of the entire address:
Policy of the Naval Treaty.—The policy of limiting armaments by international agreement has widespread approval. There is no doubt that it has the support of a preponderant sentiment in this country. It seems to be the only way to avoid either a self-imposed sacrifice of security by independent limitation or a competition involving most wasteful expenditures and provocative of war. If you wish peace, you must pursue the paths of peace. Reasonable precaution in a prudent preparation for contingencies is one thing; a bellicose disposition and threatening gestures and preparation are quite different. Competition has its dangers for those who live under constitutional government where the purse strings may be closely held. Those who constantly insist that we should go our own way, scorning the agreements of peace, using our great resources to establish a superiority in armament which would brook no resistance, need a word of caution. It is very important not to wake up the wrong man. At the last it may turn out that you have stirred up fears and corresponding activities elsewhere while your own people refuse to respond to your stimulus. While power and resources may be abundant, the power may not be exercised and you may lose the race which your bravado has encouraged. To a peace-loving democracy what could be more agreeable than reasonable security under an agreement which halts a wasteful competition in armament?
The question really comes, not to the advisability of such an agreement in the abstract, but to the fairness of a particular agreement. One indication that the present Naval Treaty is fair to all may perhaps be found in the fact that in each of the three countries, the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, there were loud complaints that the treaty was to the advantage of the others. As all could not be right, it may be proper to assume that what the naval authorities of these countries in attendance at the Conference approved, was relatively fair. The definitions with respect to standards of measurement and displacement are the same for all Powers. No unfair advantage is given to anyone.
There was general agreement that capital ship tonnage should be used as the measurement of strength of the respective navies. Of course there would be differences of view as to any matter of this sort, but this was the opinion of our experts and of others. With this as a basis for the agreement, we took the existing strength of the different navies as they were. What could be fairer than that? If one Power could better its position, so could another, and the race would inevitably continue. We insisted, and this was entirely reasonable, that vessels under construction should be counted simply to the extent of the work done at the date of the Conference.
The Conference put a stop to competition in capital ships—the great fighting ships of the rival navies. It put an end to the existing competitive programs in capital ships. It established the ratio based on existing strength and took the measure of that strength as shown by the proportion of capital ships built and in course of construction. Based on that standard of measurement, and taking into consideration the factor of age, the Treaty provides for scrapping which will reduce the present capital ship tonnage of the United States to 500-650 tons; of the British Empire to 580,450 tons and of Japan to 301,320 tons, the ships to be retained being named in the Treaty.
On the completion of the two ships of the West Virginia class and the scrapping of the North Dakota and the Delaware, in accordance with the Treaty, the total capital ship tonnage to be retained by the United States will be 525,850 tons. On the completion of the two new ships to be constructed by the British Empire and the scrapping at that time of four of the older ships, as provided in the Treaty, the total capital ship tonnage retained by the British Empire will be 558,950 tons.
The replacement tonnage of the capital ships of the United States, British Empire and Japan is fixed in the ratio of 5:5:3, and the total capital ship replacement tonnage of the five Powers is to be as follows: For the United States, 525,000 tons; for the British Empire, 525,000 tons; for France, 175,000 tons; for Italy, 175,000 tons; for Japan, 315,000 tons.
Fortifications. Failing to find unfairness in these provisions of the Treaty, there has been some criticism of the agreement to maintain the status quo with respect to fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific Ocean. The United States, British Empire and Japan agree to maintain this status quo in their respective territories and possessions specified as follows:
"(1) The insular possessions which the United States now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska and the Panama Canal Zone, not including the Aleutian Islands, and (b) the Hawaiian Islands;
"(2) Hongkong and the insular possessions which the British Empire now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, east of the meridian of 110 degrees east longitude, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of Canada, (b) the Commonwealth of Australia and its Territories, and (c) New Zealand;
"(3) The following insular territories and possessions of Japan in the Pacific Ocean, to wit; the Kurile Islands, the Bonin Islands, Amami- Oshima, the Loochoo Islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, and any insular territories or possessions in the Pacific Ocean which Japan may hereafter acquire."
With respect to the United States this means that we cannot increase our fortifications and naval bases in the Philippines, Guam and the Aleutian Islands. We are free to add to our fortifications and naval bases in the Hawaiian Islands, and in the islands adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska and the Panama Canal Zone, except the Aleutian Islands.
It is hardly necessary to say that every naval strategist has looked at Guam as an island of great strategic value. In fact, its position presents such opportunities that commensurate fortifications and naval facilities, however peaceful might be our actual intent, could hardly fail to be regarded as a menacing gesture of no slight consequence.
But while naval facts are important, political facts are just as important. The strategist will accomplish nothing without his Congress. The political consequences of the action he desires cannot be ignored. We have heard so much from naval experts about Guam that I must refer to what Senator Lodge said about this island during the debate in the Senate on the Naval Treaty. He said that he had been "a good deal amused at the agony of apprehension which some persons have expressed in regard to Guam." We had taken that island in the Spanish-American War; it was taken by the cruiser Charleston. But we had had so little interest in the island that we had never passed any legislation to provide for its government. It had been left in the hands of the navy which captured it. The captain of the ship represented the captors and ruled the island. The Senator added that we had never fortified it and nobody would vote spending money in fortifying it.
Was it not better that at a time of considerable tension, instead of threatening Japan by a proposal to fortify Guam, we should agree that for fifteen years we should rest content with the situation with which we had been satisfied for the past twenty-three years? And it should be remembered that in the same treaty Japan undertakes to maintain the status quo in the Kurile Islands, the Bonin Islands, Amami-Oshima, the Loochoo Islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, and any other insular possessions she may hereafter acquire.
My conclusion is that the Naval Treaty will stand the test of analysis and fair statement taking all the pertinent facts into consideration; and that it will be a desirable safeguard and not a menace to our security and at the same time an important assurance of peace. These happy results will be attained, however, on the condition that we act toward other nations in the same spirit of reasonableness and friendship that we expect them to exhibit toward us.
Auxiliary vessels—Light Cruisers, et cetera. The original American proposal contemplated a limitation of auxiliary combatant craft in a ratio similar to that recognized by the treaty as to capital ships. It was proposed that the tonnage of auxiliary surface combatant craft including light cruisers, flotilla leaders and destroyers should be as follows: for the United States 450,000 tons; for the British Empire 450,000 tons; for Japan 270,000 tons. Unfortunately this limitation was not secured. I shall not review the reasons for this, but I may say that the failure is not attributable to us. The American position is just the same as it was at the Conference and we should welcome the opportunity to make the agreement upon this subject that we then proposed. So far as I am able to see the difficulties that then stood in the way of such an agreement between the Powers signatory to the treaty still stand.
It should be noted, however, that while the Naval Treaty does not limit the total tonnage, or the tonnage of particular classes, of auxiliary combatant craft, it does limit the size and armament of individual vessels of this sort. The Treaty effectively limits capital ship tonnage, and a capital ship, in the case of ships hereafter built, is defined as a vessel of war, other than an aircraft carrier, with a displacement of more than 10,000 tons or which carries a gun exceeding a caliber of eight inches. The tonnage of aircraft carriers is limited. The Treaty provides that no vessels of war exceeding 10,000 tons (except capital ships and aircraft carriers as stipulated under the Treaty) may be constructed by, for, or within the jurisdiction of, any of the contracting Powers. This is a substantial limitation.
As to light cruisers, the United States is not as well supplied as it should be, but the Treaty does not interfere with adequate provision by the United States to supply this want and it should be supplied. This may be done on a basis which I have no doubt all Powers would recognize as reasonable and without starting an injurious competition. Moreover, at the worst, it should be remembered that competition in combatant craft of not more than 10,000 tons with 8-in. guns is a very different thing than unlimited competition in the monster battleships of over 30,000 tons and which in the case of projected Hoods were running to nearly 50,000 tons.
While the three great Naval Powers are not under an agreement as to limitation upon the total tonnage of auxiliary combatant craft, it ought to be possible to arrange a modus vivendi which would preclude a wasteful and unnecessary competition. While plans are now being made by other Powers for new construction of auxiliary combatant craft, there is nothing that can be called in any degree alarming. The point of difficulty, so far as the United States is concerned, is that there is not a proper balance in its navy because of the lack of light cruisers, but as I have said this could properly be remedied.
Naval Construction in 1922.—So far as Europe and the United States were concerned, the past year was one of almost complete stagnation in the sphere of naval shipbuilding. Only one capital ship was actually laid down, and no new program of heavy construction was adopted. This inactivity was due in part to the economic embarrassments bequeathed by the war, and in part to the Limitation Treaty negotiated at Washington. As a direct consequence of the latter, four capital ships of the largest dimensions, which would now have been on the stocks in this country, were cancelled in November, 1921, and building operations on thirteen similar vessels for the United States Navy were suspended at or about the same date. France, having definitely discarded the battleships she was building at the outbreak of war, made a start last year with her modest program of light construction, which is limited to three cruisers, twenty-four destroyers, and twelve submarines. Italy is at work on a few small craft, but her cruiser program foreshadowed in 1921 has not yet matured. With the exception of Spain, none of the secondary Powers is paying much attention to naval development, and to most of them the present building costs, even for the smallest types of craft, are prohibitive. Only in Japan were the shipyards busily employed throughout the year on naval construction. There the effects of the Washington Treaty, which put a stop to the capital ship program, were partly mitigated by the Government's decision to press on with the building of ships outside the scope of the agreement, and that has been done to such purpose that the aggregate of fighting tonnage now under construction in Japan greatly exceeds the total for Europe and America combined.
Great Britain
The outstanding event of the year was, of course, the allocation during the second week in December of the contracts for the two capital ships, each of 35,000 tons, which Great Britain is empowered to build under the Limitation Treaty. One is to be built by Armstrong, Whitworth and Company, Limited, at their Walker yard on the Tyne, the engines and boilers being manufactured by the Wallsend Slipway Company, Limited; and the other by Cammell Laird and Company, Limited, on the Mersey, the propelling machinery in this case being supplied by the builders. Preliminary work was begun immediately after the contracts had been awarded, and the keel of the Cammell Laird ship was laid at Birkenhead on December 29. Further particulars of the contracts and their effect on the general industrial situation have been given in our columns so recently that they need not be repeated here. Exactly nine years have elapsed since the last battleships were begun for the British Navy, work on the Royal Sovereign and the Royal Oak having commenced in January, 1914. The Hood, a battle cruiser, was laid down in September, 1916, so that no new capital ship has been put in hand for this country for well over six years. From the Armistice of November, 1918, to the present date, only two new keels have been laid for the naval service—a submarine and a mine-laying cruiser. What this almost complete cessation of naval orders has meant to the shipbuilding and allied industries can best be appreciated by recalling the volume of work which they enjoyed during the four years preceding the war, from 1911-14 inclusive. Within that period the following vessels were laid down:
4 battleships. King George V class, each 23,000 tons, 92,000 tons
4 battleships. Iron Duke class, each 25,000 tons, 100,000 tons
5 battleships. Queen Elizabeth class, each 27,500 tons, 137,500 tons
5 battleships. Royal Sovereign class, each 25,750 tons, 128,750 tons
1 battle cruiser Queen Mary. 26,500 tons, 55,000 tons
1 battle cruiser Tiger, 28,500 tons, 55,000 tons
6 light cruisers. Town class, each 5,400 tons 32,400 tons
16 light cruisers, Arethusa class, each 3,500 tons, 56,000 tons
75 destroyers, each averaging 800 tons, 60,000 tons
30 submarines, each averaging 650 tons, 19,500 tons
147 vessels Aggregate displacement, 681,150 tons
In addition to the above, many auxiliary ships were built for the Admiralty, and a considerable number of foreign naval contracts—including four battleships—were booked during the four years in question. These figures justify the assertion that the shipbuilding and naval armament industry has suffered more severely than any other branch of trade by reason of the post-war policy of retrenchment.
The completion of ships begun under the war program has continued to give a limited amount of work to the Royal Dockyards. According to an Admiralty statement in Parliament on December 5, the following vessels were then under construction:
Light cruisers 4
Cruiser mine-layer 1
Flotilla leaders 2
Destroyers 4
Submarines 8
Coastal motor boats 3
Excepting the cruiser mine-layer, one submarine, and the three C.M.Bs, all the above-named vessels were begun during the war. The four light cruisers are: the Frobisher, 9,750 tons, laid down at Devonport in August, 1916, and launched in March, 1920; the Effingham, a sister ship, commenced at Portsmouth in April, 1917, and launched in June, 1921; the Enterprise, 7,600 tons, begun at Clydebank in June, 1918, and launched in December of the following year; and the Emerald, a sister ship, laid down by Armstrongs in September, 1918, and launched in May, 1920. As we have previously described these ships, it is only necessary to say that the first two belong to the well-known Raleigh class—the nameship of which was wrecked off Labrador last August—which combines high speed, great cruising endurance, and heavy armament; while the second pair were specially designed for fast steaming and are expected to attain 33 knots in light condition. The flotilla leaders are the Keppel and Broke—formerly Rooke—sister boats begun just before the Armistice by Thornycrofts, and subsequently towed to Portsmouth for completion. Their leading particulars are: length, 329 ft.; beam, 32 ft.; draught, 14 ¾ ft.; displacement, 1,750 tons; speed, 36 knots at 40,000 shaft horsepower; armament, five 4.7-in. guns, one 3-in. anti-aircraft, six torpedo tubes. Of the eight submarines, one is the K-26, a steam-driven boat of 1,880 tons, with a designed surface speed of 24 knots; and six belong to the L class, 890 tons, 17.5 knots. The eighth boat is X-1, laid down at Chatham on November 1, 1921. Her details have not yet been published, but she is understood to be of large dimensions and to embody novel features suggested by war experience. The building operations are being conducted with great secrecy.
The keel plate of the cruiser mine-layer, to be named Adventure, was laid at Devonport on November 29. She represents a type new to the British Navy, but her functions are sufficiently indicated by the description. During the war Germany built two small cruisers, Brummer and Bremse, of very high speed, for the special work of laying mines. The ship building at Devonport appears to be considerably larger than these. Her dimensions are unofficially stated to be:—Length, 500 ft.; beam, 58 ft.; displacement, 7,000 tons; the ratio of breadth to length indicating that a high speed is aimed at. According to a Pres's report published last month, the design, which is the work of Sir E.H. Tennyson d'Eyncourt, "marks a new departure, so that she may be regarded as an experimental ship; and although the character of her armament is at present confidential, it is believed that she will be heavily armed for a vessel of this class." As the Navy Estimates for the current fiscal year provide for only £294,990 to be spent upon her, it looks as if slow progress is to be made with the building of the ship, in the earlier stages at least.
The present year is expected to witness the completion of the aircraft carrier Hermes, the first ship to be specially designed for the duty designated. Begun by Armstrong in January, 1918, she was launched in September, 1919, and then towed to Devonport for completion. Her length is 594 ½ ft. over all; beam, 70 ft.; draught, 18 ¼ ft.; displacement, 10,950 tons. She has geared turbines of 40,000 shaft horsepower for a speed of 25 knots. The armament includes seven 6-in. guns and four 4-in. anti-aircraft. The boiler uptakes are led into a single large elliptical funnel which, together with a light superstructure and a tripod foremast, is placed on the extreme starboard side, thus leaving a large area of deck space clear for machines to take off and alight. The ship has light armor over vital parts, and it is protected against underwater attack by bulges. Another aircraft carrier, the Eagle, which although nominally completed in 1920 has since undergone a refit involving partial reconstruction, is also expected to hoist the pennant this year. Laid down as a battleship for the Chilean Government, but taken over by the Admiralty and converted into an aircraft carrier, the Eagle is 661 ft. long, 104 ft. in beam, and displaces 22,790 tons. She burns coal and oil, and has a designed speed of 24 knots. Originally equipped with one funnel, she now has two, and these, with the upperworks and tripod mast, are disposed on the starboard side, as in the Hermes. The hull has armor and bulge protection. Armament: nine 6-in. guns, six 4-in. anti-aircraft. The number of aeroplanes she will carry when in service has not been disclosed. A third vessel of the same generic type, the Furious—designed initially as a fast cruiser to mount two 18-in. guns and afterwards converted into a carrier—has been at Devonport since last June, undergoing a refit, the extensive nature of which is indicated by the large sum, £300,315, set apart in the current Estimates to be spent on her. As the center-line position of her huge funnel tended to cause "air pockets," and the superstructure was inconveniently placed for machines alighting on the deck, it is understood that she will emerge from her refit minus these obstructions and fitted with horizontal ducts for the emission of furnace gases and smoke from the side, as' is the case in the Argus.
United States
In accordance with the provisions of the Limitation Treaty, work was suspended early last year on the seven battleships and six battle cruisers which are surplus to the tonnage ratio accorded to the United States, and the only capital ships now completing are the Colorado and West Virginia. These belong to the Maryland class, the nameship of which entered service in the autumn of 1921. On October 1, 1922, the latest date for which official figures are available, the Colorado was 93.8 and the West Virginia 84.1 per cent complete. The money voted for their completion is so limited that they have made very slow progress, and neither ship is sufficiently advanced as yet to be ready for her trials. The probable dates of completion are noted as July and September, 1923, respectively. The ships have been fully described in previous issues of this journal. Displacing 32,600 tons, and equipped with the system of turbo-electric drive, which has been adopted for all recent capital ships of the United States Navy, they incorporate many structural and military features based upon war data. Their armor and sub-surface protection is particularly strong. When commissioned they will form, with the Maryland, a squadron of post-Jutland battleships unequalled as a tactical unit, though the Japanese ships Nagato and Mutsu are, perhaps, rather more powerful individually. The light cruiser program, voted in 1916 but not actually put in hand till 1918-20, has been greatly delayed by shortage of funds. Early last year work came to a standstill on several of the ten vessels, and so far as is known very little has been done upon them during the past twelve months. The Omaha, which was launched in October, 1920, and in January last was so well advanced that her trials were anticipated for the summer, is still unfinished. A few months of active work would suffice to make ready for sea the Milwaukee, Cincinnati, Detroit, Richmond, and Concord, but at the present rate of progress it is impossible to say when they will be in service. At the close of the year there remained on the stocks the Raleigh, Trenton, Marblehead, and Memphis. The first, laid down at Fore River in August, 1920, was sixty-one and nine-tenths per cent complete in July last; the second, building at Philadelphia, since August, 1920, was fifty-two per cent complete; the Marhlchcad, also begun at Philadelphia at the same time, was thirty-six per cent; and the Memphis, which has been in hand at the same yard since October, 1920, only twenty-eight per cent complete. The Detroit was launched on June 29 last. All ten ships are built to a standard design of 7,500 tons, and have geared turbines of 90,000 shaft horsepower for a speed of 33.7 knots. If this velocity is attained they will be the swiftest cruisers in the world. The design, it will be recalled, was modified late in 1920, the armament being increased from eight 6-in. guns to twelve, this involving an increase in displacement and a corresponding reduction in speed. They will be the first American ships of war to be fitted with a tripod foremast.
Three destroyers, the Trever, Perry, and Decatur, were delivered last year, leaving no further vessels of this type under construction. The boats named are "flush deckers" of 1.215 tons and 35 knots, and were built at the Mare Island Navy Yard. On July 1, 1922, there were forty submarines still under construction, but about twelve of these have since been delivered. Thirty-seven are of the 5" class, displacing from 800 to 990 tons, with a surface speed of 15 knots. They are regarded as the most successful type of submarine which has been built in the United States so far. The majority of the class have the following dimensions: length, 231 ft.; beam, 21 ft.; draught, 12 ½ ft.; displacement, 854 tons on surface, 1,052 tons submerged. Two sets of 600 brake horsepower Diesel engines are fitted, and the fuel supply is sufficient for a run of 5,000 miles at ii- knots speed. They are armed with four 21-in. bow tubes—five in a few boats—and one 3-in. or 4-in. gun. A special feature of this class is the heavy construction and careful subdivision, intended to minimize the effect of depth-charge attack. The remaining three boats, V1 to V3, are "fleet submarines," or submersible cruisers, 335 ft. long and displacing 2,025 tons in surface trim. They are understood to be fitted with two sets of 2,400 brake horsepower engines for a speed of 21 knots. Armament: four bow and two stern tubes, and one 5-in. 51-caliber gun. Their cruising radius is estimated at 12,000 miles. Work has been resumed on the former battle cruisers, Lexington and Saratoga, which are in process of conversion to aircraft carriers, displacing 33,000 tons each. The machinery, which will remain unchanged, will develop 180,000 horsepower through sixteen boilers and General Electric turbines with electric drive. Authentic details of their armament and capacity for aeroplanes are not yet available. They will be rigged with one large funnel placed on the extreme starboard side, a cage mast, and a light superstructure. Other vessels building, and all much delayed, are: the repair ship Medusa, 10,000 tons; the destroyer tenders Dobbin and Whitney, each 10,600 tons; and the submarine tender Holland, 10,600 tons. As Congress does not appear to have made any further appropriations for speeding up the completion of unfinished ships, it is expected that work on these vessels will continue at the same leisurely pace during the present year. A new program—including sixteen cruisers each of 10,000 tons—which it was proposed to introduce last month, is understood to have been deferred for financial reasons.
Japan
The Washington Treaty having put a stop to all capital ship construction in Japan the shipyards there have been compensated by large orders for cruiser, destroyer, submarines, and auxiliary tonnage. This has been made possible, not by increasing the number of these vessels projected before the Treaty came into force—the original program has, in fact, been curtailed—but by increasing their dimensions and antedating by one year the period in which the program is to be completed. Two light cruisers were launched last year: the Yura, at Sasebo, on February 15, and the Kinu. at Kobe, on April 29. They are modified versions of the Kuma class, displacing about 5,600 tons and designed for a speed of 33 knots. The armament consists of seven 5.5-in. guns. The following light cruisers are on the stocks or about to be laid down: Ayase, Otonase, Minase, Abukuma—believed to be sister ships of the Yura: the Yubari, Kako, Naka, Sendui, Jintsu, Kinugasa, and Fiirutori—of 7,000 to 7,500 tons; and four ships not yet named, of 10,000 tons, to be armed with 8-in. guns. All Japanese light cruisers' completed recently have proved very fast, most of them exceeding their designed speed of 33 knots, and behaving admirably at sea. Twelve or more destroyers are completing afloat, and a further twenty-four, with an average displacement of 1,500 tons, are to be begun at an early date. The present position with regard to submarines is uncertain. It is believed, however, that eighteen or twenty boats are in various stages of construction, and that twenty-four more are soon to be laid down. Among the boats launched last year was No. 62, on April 13, with a surface displacement of 1,500 tons. The former battle cruisers Amagi and Akagi, re-designed as aircraft carriers of 33,000 tons, are building at Yokosuka and Kure respectively, and both are expected to take the water this year.
France
A start was made last year on the new naval program, and the following vessels are now, or shortly will be, under construction:
Three light cruisers: Duguay-Trouin, Lainoite-Piquet. Primaguet; displacement, 8,000 tons; geared turbines and eight oil-fired boilers, 98,000 shaft horsepower=34 knots: radius of action 4,875 miles at 15 knots. Armament: eight 6-in. guns in four turrets on the center-line, two forward and two aft; four 3-in. anti-aircraft guns, and twelve 22-in. torpedo tubes. The Duguay-Trouin and Primaguet are building at Brest, and the Lamotte-Piquct at Lorient.
Six flotilla leaders: Jaguar, Panthere, Leopard, Lynx, Chacal. Tigre. Displacement, 2,500 tons: 48,000 shaft horsepower = 35.5 knots; radius of action, 2,600 miles at 18 knots. Armament: six 5.1-in. guns, twin-mounted; two 3-in. anti-aircraft guns, and six 22-in. torpedo tubes. Their large size and powerful armament bring these vessels very near the light cruiser type.
Twelve destroyers: Bourrasque, Cyclone, Mistral, Orage, Ouragan, Sicque, Sirocco, Tempete, Tramontane, Tighbe, Typhon, Tornade, Displacement: 1,400 tons; 30,000 shaft horsepower = 32.5 knots. Armament: four 5.1-in. guns, two 3-in. anti-aircraft, and four 22-in. torpedo tubes.
Six first-class submarines: Requin, Morse, Narval, Dauphin, Marsouin, Souffleur. Displacement: 1,100 tons; two 1,400 brake horsepower engines = 16 knots.
Six submarines "de moyenne patrouille": Sirene, Ariane, Circe, Calypso, Naiade, Ondinc. Displacement: 600 tons, 14 knots.
The former battleship Beam is undergoing reconstruction as an aircraft carrier. No naval vessels were launched last year.
Italy
The new Italian Government is reported to have proposed the construction of two cruisers, four destroyers, and four submarines, at an estimated cost of 200,000,000 lire. According to Press reports, one cruiser is to be built at the Orlando yard, Leghorn, and the other at the Cantiere San Rocco, Trieste. Naval work during the past year was limited to the completion of the three "scouts," or destroyers, Leone, Pantera, and Tigre, 2,200 tons and 34 knots; six smaller destroyers, Generale class, of 813 tons and 33 knots; and a few small gunboats of 230 tons. The project of reconditioning the battleship Leonardo da Vinci, which was sunk by an explosion and afterwards salved, has been given up.
Minor Navies
There is little of interest to report in connection with the smaller navies. On August 1 there was launched at Horten Arsenal the first submarine boat to be entirely built and engined in Norway. She is of 420 tons and 14.5 knots speed. Another boat, similar in type, is on the stocks. Germany is building at Wilhelmshaven a light cruiser of 5,600 tons, which will probably be launched this year. Holland is completing the two cruisers, Sumatra and Java, of 7,050 tons and 30 knots, and three small submarines. Spain is building two 4,725-ton cruisers of 29 knots speed; three gunboats of 1,335 tons; and five submarines of 610 tons.—The Engineer, 5 January, 1923.
NOTES
"The Elder Dempster Motor Liner Adda.—(A detailed and illustrated description of this ship's main and auxiliary machinery)—The Engineer, 15 December, 1922.
"A New Lifeboat Engine"—(An article in The Engineer for March 1st, 1912, covers all motor lifeboat installations from 1904-I1. This article describes the new Peulee lifeboat, 45 ft. by 12 ft., speed 8.4 knots, with engine completely enclosed in watertight casing)—The Engineer, 22 December, 1922.
"Hadfield on Corrosion of Ferrous Metals"—The preparation of the various Ferrous Metals used in the Corrosion Research of the Institution of Civil Engineers, together with their physical and mechanical properties, and some general considerations on the subject of corrosion), by Sir Robert Abbott Hadfield, with an abstract of the discussion upon the paper. Published by the Institution, Great George Street, Westminster, S.W.I. "X-Rays as a Means of Determining the Composition of Alloys"—(How the composition of unknown alloys may be determined by comparison of its absorption power to that of a known standard), by T.S. Fuller in General Electric Review, December, 1922.
Pertinent Articles in: The Engineer, 5 January, 1923:
"Naval Construction in 1922";
"Electrical Engineering in 1922, No. 1";
"Aeronautics in 1922, (Illus.)";
"1922—A Retrospect."—Editorial;
"Motor Ships in 1922. (Illus)";
"Shipbuilding in 1922, (Illus)."
Current History, January, 1923:
Cortesi.
- "The Lausanne Conference."
- "Franco-British Split on German Reparations."
- "Betrayal of Greece by Lloyd George," by Paxton Hibben.
- "What the British Elections Mean," by Sir Gilbert Parker.
- "Five Years of the Russian Revolution," by Nikolai Lenin.
- "The Tide That Swept Italy's Fascisti to Power," by Arnaldo.
- "Basic Causes of the Present Plight of France," by J. Ellis Barker.
- "Why Egypt Is in Revolt," by A British Publicist.
- "Nationalism Marches on in India," by V. B. Metta.
- "Our Navy Unready for War," by Graser Schornstheimer.
- "Russia's Departure From State Socialism," by Alexander I. Nazaroff.
The Contemporary Review, December, 1922:
- "The Defeat of President Harding"—(An interesting review of the recent elections from an Englishman's point of view), by S.K. Ratcliffe.
- "The Tangier Crisis"—(Somewhat along the same lines as Admiral Niblack's "Letter" published in the December, 1922, Proceedings, and of special interest to those who have studied this particular phase of Mediterranean problems) by George A. Matthey.
- "The Future of the Philippines"—(A discussion as to whether our sovereignty is to be withdrawn, or whether some new form of government is to be ventured upon in place of the present tenuous connection), by Charles Edward Russell.