The selection-graded retirement system has now been operating in the Navy for more than seven years. The writer believes that this seven-year test has at least shown that the new system is a great improvement over the cumbersome old plan of promotion by seniority. Future legislation may, and it probably will, work great changes in the system as operated at present; but it seems, from all indications, that the principle involved in selection, accompanied by graded retirement, is with us to stay, and that any new methods the future may bring forth will simply be improvements in the practical application of that principle. It is readily apparent, in the general trend of service comment, that even the sharpest critics of the new system are quick to grant that the underlying principle is correct. Criticisms heard are directed at the manner in which the selection principle is applied. All this indicates that the new system is, if not entirely satisfactory, at least a long step in the right direction. The logical procedure for the future would therefore seem to be one involving an analysis of alleged faults, accompanied by suggestions for their remedy.
It is not intended, in this paper, to undertake so ambitious a program as the general analysis of alleged faults of the present system, with proposed corrections therefor. This paper is intended merely as a small contribution to a general analysis; and its scope is limited to the discussion of one feature of the present selection system which is now operated in what the writer believes is a faulty method.
It seems best in what follows, to present the discussion of this feature and its alleged faulty method of operation, by first stating just what the feature is, and what the writer conceives to be its faults of operation; then by following such statement with an examination of the general facts and the reasons for believing that the fault, as stated, is a real one; and finally by presenting a remedy which the writer suggests as a solution of the difficulty.
The feature of the selection-graded retirement system to be discussed is that part of the plan which will, within a few years, make the grade of lieutenant-commander the point from which the bulk of graded retirements will take place. It is not intended to criticize this part of the general plan; for plainly if selection and graded retirement are accepted at all, then it must inevitably work out that the grade just below command rank will, as soon as the system gets to operating normally, become the point from which the bulk of graded retirements will take place. The difficulty lies not with this feature of the general plan, but with the method by which it is operated. Stated briefly, the alleged fault of operation is the fact that within a few years many officers will be forced out in the grade of lieutenant-commander for the sole reason that they entered the Naval Academy at ages placing them among the older men in their classes. They will be forced out before they have had a chance to be either selected or passed over for the next higher grade. They will simply age out in grade before they have got high enough in the grade of lieutenant-commander to be within practicable reach of the Selection Board.
Before examining the facts and reasons for believing that the above fault of operation is a real one, a word of explanation is necessary as to just what is meant by the expression "within practicable reach of the Selection Board." Of course every officer who has served a certain length of time in the grade of lieutenant-commander, a definite part of which must be sea duty, is technically eligible for selection to the next higher grade. Assume, however, the case of a deserving lieutenant-commander who is technically eligible for selection, but who stands 150 from the top of his grade when he is within a few months of the age limit for the grade. If the next Selection Board has, say, fifteen vacancies to fill in the grade of commander, it is not likely to reach down over 135 heads to save this officer, for the very good reason that such action would involve passing over a large number of other deserving lieutenant-commanders. This assumed case illustrates the situation of an officer who is not within practicable reach of the Selection Board."
In examining the facts surrounding the above alleged fault of operation, the consideration presents itself first that, since selection began operating, no Naval Academy graduate has yet aged out in grade without first having been passed over. Each, so far, has had "his day in court" with the Selection Board. This has been true because the same legislation which, in August, 1916, approved selection and graded retirement for the Navy, also carried with it a large increase in commissioned personnel; and the graded retirement feature of the 1916 legislation was made inoperative for several years following the passage of the act which originated it. As is the case after all such increases, officers began fleeting up to the higher grades; and, by the time graded retirement began to operate, the fleeting up process had placed officers at the tops of the grades of lieutenant-commander, commander and captain who were considerably younger than the retiring ages for those grades, which are forty-five years, fifty years and fifty-six years, respectively. This condition still holds, and it will continue until the allowed number of line officers is reached; for, until allowed line strength is reached, the commissioning of each year's class of midshipmen increases the actual number of line officers and consequently increases in proportion the number allowed in each grade. For example, the commissioning of every 100 midshipmen results in an increase of one in the grade of rear admiral, four in the grade of captain, seven in the grade of commander, and fourteen in the grade of lieutenant-commander; and these increases cause the fleeting up of twenty-six lieutenants to lieutenant-commander, twelve lieutenant-commanders to commander, five commanders to captain, and one captain to rear admiral. If this fleeting up process could be continued indefinitely, no officers would be forced on the retired list by age in grade, without first having been passed over. It will not continue, however, beyond the graduation of the midshipman class of 1927—the junior class now at the Naval Academy—because the graduation of that class will bring the actual number of line officers up to and considerably beyond the allowed line strength. The allowed commissioned strength of the line is 5,499; the graduation of the class of 1923 brought the line up to an actual strength very close to 4,600; the midshipmen classes of 1924, 1925, 1926 and 1927 total up to about 2,400.
It is evident from these figures, even after the most liberal allowances are made for normal losses among officers and midshipmen between now and 1927, that the allowed line strength will be reached in that year. When this happens, promotions will slow up most noticeably, because the flow will then depend solely upon separations of officers from the service, such as by retirements, by graded retirements, by resignations, etc. Lieutenant-commanders will reach the top of their grade nearer, each year, to the retiring age for that grade. Eventually graded retirement will become a potent agent to produce vacancies and to insure a flow of promotion. But, under the present law, it will operate to the great advantage of a certain class of officers and to the immense disadvantage of certain others.
To understand this inequality of operation, it is necessary to make a study of the effect of graded retirement for the next ten years. Such a study calls for a certain amount of calculation, involving some approximation. A careful use of past as well as present Navy Registers will reduce the necessary approximation to narrow limits. Of course the precise effect of graded retirement, in the matter of producing a flow of promotion, cannot be determined for the future in exact figures. An estimate of its effect for the next ten years can, however, be made with sufficient accuracy to show where it is leading us. The writer has made such a calculation, and it was his first intention to set down in this paper each successive step and every figure from beginning to end, with accompanying explanations. It soon became apparent that such a procedure would have to be abandoned because of its undue length. The purpose will be served just as well by a mere tabulation of the main points resulting from the calculations. These main points are as follows:
(1) Graded retirement will not operate more effectively than it has in the past few years to produce a flow of promotion, until 1932 or 1933.
(2) When the line reaches authorized strength in 1927, the junior commander will not be more than twenty numbers below the top of the class of 1909.
(3) In making selections to fill vacancies in the grade of commander, between 1927 and the end of 1933, the Board will not find it necessary to go below the bottom of the class of 1910.
(4) The class of 1911 will not come within practicable reach of the Selection Board until 1934, the year in which those members of the class who entered the Academy at the average age of eighteen, will become forty-five years old.
It is evident from the above figures that the older officers in the class of 1911 will be the first of us to run into "the blind alley"—they will be forced out by age retirement without ever having had the chance of being either selected or passed over. The next year the process will be repeated for the class of 1912, unless the Selection Board spends two years on the younger men in 1911, in which case the situation for 1912 would be even worse. From this point on, events will take their natural course to produce a situation for each successive class wherein those members of the class who entered the Academy at an age beyond seventeen or eighteen will find themselves at a hopeless distance from the top of the grade of lieutenant-commander at the time they reach the age of forty-five years. An illustration will show what little chance there will be of the Selection Board being able to help these men. Suppose the Board is working in class A during the year that A's members of average age become forty-five years old. In that same year, men in class B, one below A, who entered the Academy at nineteen, will also become forty-five years old; and men in class C, two below A, who entered at twenty, will become forty-five years old too. The Board will, after the year 1927, have very few vacancies to fill each year in the grade of commander. In order to save a man in class C, it will be necessary for the Board to pass over large numbers of men in class A and class B. This, the Board naturally will not do, if the younger men in class A and class B are deserving of promotion.
Objection may be made to the above figures and estimates on the two principal grounds that: first, estimates extended over so long a future period are apt to be inaccurate; and, second, the size of the Navy may be increased within the next ten or twelve years, which would change everything.
The first objection may be met by granting it freely, with the reservation that the situation of the class of 1911, as shown by the above figures, is bound to come to some class, whether the above figures and estimates are strictly accurate or not. If it be assumed that the estimates are wrong by the amount of an entire class, either way, it will merely mean that it will be the class of 1910 or 1912 which will be the first to run into "the blind alley," instead of 1911. The fact that the present day Selection Boards take several years to run through a single class, in selecting up lieutenant-commanders, is conclusive evidence that the above depicted situation will be upon us in the near future.
The second objection, that the Navy may be increased within the next ten or twelve years and thus change the entire situation, is of course a valid one. There are, however, several very strong reasons for believing that there will be no increase during that period of sufficient size to affect the commissioned personnel. Among them may be mentioned the fact that the Navy already computes its allowance of line officers on a basis of more than 135,000 enlisted men, while it is operating with an actual strength of 86,000 enlisted men. For an increase to affect the commissioned personnel, the Navy would have to be given an actual strength of more than 135,000 enlisted men, which, as a possibility of the next dozen years, seems most unlikely. Also, it may be mentioned that the Treaty for the Limitation of Armaments now officially and finally ratified, will by its own provisions remain in force at least until December 31, 1936.
It will be convenient at this point, in order to secure a concise method of reference, to designate an officer who entered the Naval Academy near the maximum age of twenty years as an "oldster"; one who entered near the minimum age of sixteen years as a "youngster"; and one who entered at the average age of eighteen years as "average."
It is apparent that the natural operation of the present law will soon place "youngster" in a position of great advantage, and "oldster" under a heavy handicap. Taking the extreme case of a "youngster" who is the youngest man in his class, it must naturally follow that every man senior to him in the Navy is older than he is. That being the case, he is certain of not being retired in grade without first standing number one in the grade; for, if he reaches retiring age in the grade of lieutenant-commander, it will not be until everybody senior to him has left the grade, either to the next higher grade or to the retired list. If he is not passed over in the grade of lieutenant-commander, he will be in the same favorable situation in the next grade. He will, in short, be sure of "his day in court" with the Selection Board. His case presents a marked contrast with that of his classmate "oldster." Assuming the two officers to be of equal ability, "youngster" faces only the necessity of making good, while "oldster" faces the certainty that he will age out in grade whether he makes good or not.
The argument might be advanced that "youngster" is entitled to his tremendous advantage on the ground that "old age must give way to youth." That argument is scarcely pertinent when the maximum possible age difference is four years. Since it is law that young men are of suitable age to become midshipmen when anywhere between sixteen and twenty years, it must have been the belief of those who made that law that there is no great difference in the capacities of young men between those ages to receive instruction as officers. At any rate, they will go through the Academy on a competitive basis, with no handicaps offered or desired on account of age. It is hardly consistent to give them a start which allows a divergence in age of four years, and then to set up barriers, based on definite age lines, at various points further along in their careers. The only points in an officer's career where a straight age retiring line is necessary is at that point in his life where his capacity for work begins to fall off. Final retirement has very properly been based on age, and for the Navy has been set at sixty-four years; but it is to be noticed that none of the reasons for basing final retirement upon age can be used for basing graded retirement on age. Of course, justification of the present system is embodied in the argument that "a line must be drawn somewhere," and the age of forty-five is taken as a suitable point at which to draw it for a lieutenant-commander. Certainly it is necessary to draw a line somewhere, but it need not necessarily be an age line. If a definite age line is drawn, it must surely follow that "youngster" is gratuitously presented with enormous advantages over his "oldster" classmates.
It seems to the writer that a happy solution could be reached by following the precedent of the recent service pay bill, and basing graded retirement upon length of commissioned service, rather than upon age. If the career of "average" is fitted to the present graded retiring ages, the following is the result:
Enters Academy at age of 18 years.
Is originally commissioned at age of 22 years.
At age 45, his total commissioned service is 23 years.
At age 50, his total commissioned service is 28 years.
At age 56, his total commissioned service is 34 years.
At age 64, his total commissioned service is 42 years.
With this as a guide, the law governing graded retirement could be changed so that its effect would be to place a lieutenant-commander on the retired list upon the day he completed twenty-three years commissioned service; a commander upon the day he completed twenty-eight years commissioned service; and a captain upon the day he completed thirty-four years commissioned service. The final retiring age of sixty-four years for all officers would remain unchanged. Such a change would not produce any incongruities of rank and age; it would merely level things off, and place the question of professional success strictly upon a basis of ability.
The age effect of this change would not be felt by "average," because his average conditions would be combined with the present graded retiring ages to be used as a basis.
The age effect upon "youngster" would be slight. If originally commissioned at twenty, he would be forty-three when he finished twenty-three years commissioned service; he would be forty-eight when he finished twenty-eight years commissioned service; and he would be fifty-four when he finished thirty-four years commissioned service. His final retirement for age at sixty-four would remain the same as it is now. Throughout his career he would be only two years removed from present graded retiring ages.
The age effect upon "oldster" would not place him any farther than "youngster" from present graded retiring ages; but it would be in the opposite direction. If originally commissioned at twenty-four, he would be forty-seven when he completed twenty-three years commissioned service; he would be fifty-two when he completed twenty-eight years commissioned service; and he would be fifty-eight when he completed thirty-four years commissioned service. Final retirement for age, at sixty-four, would for him also remain as it is now. Throughout his career he too would be only two years removed from present graded retiring ages.
An illustration, serving also as a summary of the foregoing paragraphs, might make the operation of the proposed plan somewhat clearer. For this purpose, the cases of "youngster," "average" and "oldster," all taken from the same class, may be compared as to age and length of commissioned service at each of the division points in their careers:
At the time of their graduation from the Naval Academy, and their acceptance of original commissions:
"youngster" would be at the age of 20 years;
"average" would be at the age of 22 years;
and "oldster" would be at the age of 24 years.
If all three failed to be selected for promotion to the grade of commander, they would be retired in the grade of lieutenant-commander, with data as follows:
"youngster" would be at the age of 43 years,
and his commissioned service would be 23 years;
"average" would be at the age of 45 years,
and his commissioned service would be 23 years;
while "oldster" would be at age of 47 years,
and his commissioned service would be 23 years.
If all three reached the grade of commander but failed to reach that of captain, they would be retired as commanders with data as follows:
"youngster" would be at the age of 48 years,
and his commissioned service would be 28 years;
"average" would be at the age of 50 years,
and his commissioned service would be 28 years;
while "oldster would be at age of 52 years,
and his commissioned service would be 28 years.
If all three reached the grade of captain, but failed to reach that of rear admiral, they would be retired as captains with data as follows:
"youngster" would be at the age of 54 years,
and his commissioned service would be 34 years;
"average" would be at the age of 56 years,
and his commissioned service would be 34 years;
while "oldster" would be at the age of 58 years,
and his commissioned service would be at 34 years.
If all three became rear admirals, they would finally be retired as they successively reached the age of sixty-four. This age would be reached first by "oldster"; then, at the end of two years, by "average"; and at the end of another two years, it would be reached by "youngster."
There seems to be nothing to object to as regards the respective ages up to which these three officers would be permitted to remain in the grades of lieutenant-commander, commander and captain, before being forced out by graded retirement. Objection might be made, however, to the conditions in flag rank; for if "oldster" were not selected to flag rank until he was close to the age of fifty-eight years, he would then have only a little more than six years to serve before reaching the final retiring age of sixty-four. Under present law, an officer who attains flag rank must do so before he is fifty-six, so that he serves in that rank a minimum of eight years. It must of course be left to wiser heads than the writer's to decide whether six years in flag rank would be sufficient to enable an officer to obtain the necessary experience as a flag officer to fit him for high command of a fleet, and also leave him the time to serve in that capacity. If, however, the proposed plan were set in operation, and if the minimum of six years in flag rank for "oldster" proved to be a feature of the plan meriting criticism, Selection Boards would simply reject "oldster" for promotion to flag rank, and no harm would result. The whole point is that "oldster" would have "his day in court" even for flag rank; and his chances of success in the grades below flag rank would depend upon no other conditions but his ability and usefulness as an officer.
No discussion involving a proposed change in laws governing commissioned personnel of the Navy is complete until the proposition has been carefully examined to make certain that it would not adversely affect the interests of the large number of officers recently commissioned from warrant grades, enlisted personnel and the naval reserve. A mere glance at the proposal to base graded retirement upon commissioned service, instead of age, will show that such a change would be the greatest kind of a boon to these officers. They, more than any of us, find little incentive to professional pride and enthusiasm in plodding along with the certain knowledge that they will be cut down by graded retirement, no matter how thoroughly they make good as officers. Of course the proposed change could not assure the officers of this group, that they would make any definite point in the higher grades. Neither would the change force them to remain on the active list until the final retiring age of sixty-four years, for the laws governing voluntary retirement would operate the same as they do now. The proposed plan would merely assure them of the right to move along on the promotion list until they reached the age of sixty-four, provided they were not passed over before that time. That assurance is the most that is, or can be, asked for any of us.
While we are hearing so much these days of "morale," as applied to almost everything under the sun, we might join the popular movement and apply it to "oldster" under the conditions of a few years hence. If he is operating under the present graded retirement laws, his "morale" will unquestionably be at a very low point. When he pulls down his Navy Register and juggles a few figures, he will have no need of the higher branches of mathematics to produce a result which will not be calculated to boost his "morale." How different would the outlook be if "oldster," and "average" too for that matter, could look forward with the certain knowledge that they would have just as many years as any one else in their class to work their way toward a point where they would be within practicable reach of the Selection Board for promotion to the next higher grade. They would not have to live along in the vague hope that "something might happen" to save them from the fatal error of having entered the Naval Academy two or three years too late. They would know to a certainty that their chances of making their regular promotions and of remaining active members of their chosen profession would depend solely upon their own efforts. Such knowledge could scarcely fail to react most favorably upon their personal enthusiasm and professional attainments.