THE NAVY'S PAPER WORK
Rear Admiral Caspar F. Goodrich, U. S. Navy
Twenty-five years ago, just before he became Secretary of the Navy, I told Governor Long that the volume and burden of official correspondence had grown to such dimensions as to be almost intolerable. I recall one expression of mine which seemed to impress him by its earnestness. "You can have efficient men-of-war under you," I said, "or perambulating offices, but you can not have both in the same ship." If this was true in those days, what, I venture to ask, is service opinion on the subject now?
Even then, the Navy Regulations had grown from the modest pamphlet of 62 small pages in 1832 to a book of 440 octavo pages in the 1896 edition. The latest issue within my reach contains 417 pages of regulations plus 569 of instructions (a distinction without a difference) not including appendices. What may be the bulk of the current volume I do not know. It must be a staggering tribute to the god of centralization. His ever-present cult is intimately related to our subject. Due to it, there follows, as naturally as water runs down hill, a steady and vast increase in official correspondence that absorbs time on the part of the captain afloat which were better employed in preparing his command for battle or of the commandant of a naval station which should be devoted to the larger duties of his post rather than to signing his name to perfunctory endorsements hundreds of times daily.
Furthermore, I told Governor Long that, in order to stand well in the estimation of the Navy Department, a commanding officer had only to keep his correspondence voluminous and up to date, scrupulously exact and according to Hoyle in each particular, every "t" crossed and every "i" dotted. Whether his vessel was dirty and slack, or unable to maintain her trial speed or to hit the target, mattered little in comparison. I added that I, personally, stood low in the scale because I made it a rule never to write to the Department unless absolutely necessary and never to reply to its communications except when positively directed to do so, although I was sure that my own command was second to none of her class in condition and efficiency, while the crew were happy and contented to an unusual degree. I wonder if the same unfortunate standard still prevails, modified, as it must be, by the new and admirable requirements as to gunnery and steaming competitions. I trust that some one, better informed than I, can reassure me on this point.
A glance at the twenty-odd pages in the Instructions, listing the reports and returns, raises the question whether many, if not most, of them could not be eliminated to advantage. Would it not be well to exact specific reports when things go wrong or when a ship's efficiency falls o& in any respect or when some especial occurrence should be brought to the attention of the Department or a bureau and to suppress periodical reports which merely state that all is right? Why not take the latter for granted?
Often have I thought that, given the power, a Secretary of the Navy might do a wise and patriotic thing were he to call in his chiefs and notify them that at the end of the current fiscal year he would discharge half the clerks under the Department in Washington and elsewhere; that after the close of the ensuing six months, he would discharge half the remainder, thus giving ample notice in order that these bureau chiefs could, at their leisure, adjust their business accordingly. While this is a mere figure of speech, not to be taken au pied de la lettre, is not the fundamental idea sound? Does any person think that the Navy would suffer seriously through the introduction of such a measure, even in part?
It is rather a distressing reflection that this constant growth of paper work is due to ourselves in general and, in particular, to such of us as, occupying important positions at the Navy Department, fail to resist appeals by the clerical force for new reports and returns which, for the most part, serve only to bring grist to that force's mill; to increase the use of stationery; and still further to impair the initiative of the men afloat or otherwise away from Washington.
A certain amount of centralization is undoubtedly necessary but every effort to increase it beyond the irreducible minimum should be resisted to the last extremity and never yielded to until proved, beyond peradventure, to be essential. Can any sane man imagine a like code of minutiae being laid down by the main offices of our great industrial organizations such as the Standard Oil or the Pennsylvania Railroad? The practice in civil life is to place at the head of each division a competent man, held to strict accountability for results and clothed with commensurate authority. In this way, success is assured and dividends earned. Moreover, decentralization stimulates subordinates to think for themselves and to act promptly, in accordance with the known policy of their superiors, when occasion arises with no time available for reference to headquarters. Such a self-reliant practice must be of inestimable value to naval officers in times of national complications or any other emergency. Our history is replete with such instances. The Navy is one of the largest business corporations in the land. Its stockholders are the American people. It rests upon us naval officers who administer its affairs to make sure that the people get one dollar's worth of value for every dollar expended; and to see that all waste be cut out. Besides countless other things which are not within the scope of this article, are there not extravagance in stationery here, an unnecessary clerk there, too many typewriters and red tape everywhere, costing the nation, in the aggregate, quite a notable sum of money coming from the already overburdened taxpayer? The moral effect on the service is even more regrettable in causing even trivial matters to be referred to headquarters which could at least as well, if not indeed better, be dealt with by the man on the spot.
"Many a mickle makes a muckle," say the canny Scot. These small savings would not only total something worth while but the example of these petites economies would be followed in larger things. Is it not our duty, especially in these days of lessening appropriations, to stop all avoidable waste and devote the savings to the fleet? If so, we ought to act in a negative sense by carefully scrutinizing all suggestions for increasing our paper work and, positively, by cutting what we now have to the bone.
It is astonishing to what extent we hamper ourselves by excessive amounts and careless methods of correspondence. During my last service on the active list, I was commandant of the New York Navy Yard. Supported by Mr. Newberry as Assistant Secretary and, later, as Secretary of the Navy, I inaugurated many short cuts in official correspondence which reduced the time consumed in handling any subject to a remarkable degree; greatly simplified every step; and eliminated much paper work. In my own office, when a vacancy occurred in the clerical staff, I was able to report that it need not be filled. My heads of departments were of the opinion that, on any job, the time required to get it started fell from an average of ten days to forty-eight hours. For this reason I speak as one not without experience. What I advocate can be done because it has been done. I am, by the way, under the impression that this departure from former practice was subsequently disapproved and forbidden.
The Department is and must be guided by the counsels of its chosen advisers. They, in turn, reflect service opinion. If naval officers like to be governed and directed in every trivial matter by word from Washington; to be deprived of individual initiative in carrying out loyally the expressed policy of the Department or any one of its bureaus; they can do no better than to encourage and foster this tendency toward complete centralization with its flood of reports, returns, etc., but if they aspire to discharge, with credit to themselves and honor to the Department, that trust embodied in their commissions in the President's own words, they should lose no opportunity to combat the rule of the typewriter, that potent instrument of centralization. In so doing, they would free themselves from unnecessary hobbles; further the just aims of the Navy; and aid our chiefs of bureaus in ridding themselves of a mass of details that make it difficult for them to study the really great problems which they alone are competent and authorized to solve. I can but feel that these important officers, charged with the weightiest responsibilities, would welcome the help of an active interest in this subject by all and sundry with the support of a strong service public opinion. It is to call the attention of my brother officers to this seemingly unimportant question that these words have been written. If I am wrong in my beliefs, some one who knows might take great pleasure in correcting me and thank me for the opportunity I offer of setting me right.