PROFESSIONAL NOTES
Prepared by Lieut. Commander R. A. Hall, U. S. Navy
FRANCE
The Changing Elements of Sea Power.—If from 1870 to 1900 the French Navy can be said to have adhered to a policy of her own, in turn indulging in gardecotes, battleships, small torpilleurs, croiseurs-cuirasses, and croiseurs-corsaires, there began with the 1900 Lanessan program a new period that extended up to the war, in which Gallic constructors sought their inspirations mainly in Great Britain. Thus the Patrie type was meant to outdo the British Majestic; the Danton was an improved copy of the Lord Nelson, the Bouclier class of destroyers embodied the good points of the British "rivers," the Barts owed something to the designs of the British-built Sao Paulo, and the Bretagne was a pretty close copy of the Orion. And no wonder, since the great bulk of French naval men professed openly the British "Doctrine Navale" (expounded by Daveluy and Darrieus) on all important questions of tactics and of strategy; and, as happens often enough, the imitators went further than the model they were copying. They prepared solely and exclusively la bataille d'escadres—fleet actions—and the Lapeyrere program (28 battleships) was framed on the assumption that the gun alone mattered, and consequently comprised none of the fast fleet auxiliaries for which the shipbuilding policy of Lord Fisher so wisely provided.
To-day the position has been completely reversed. Les Frangats brulent ce qu'ils ont adore. Just like Percy Scott in England, Daveluy (the French Mahan) finds pleasure in torpedoing the battleship idea and in sapping the very foundations of the Doctrine Navale which he contributed so much to bring into existence. True, battleships yet preserve many influential partisans in the service, especially among flag-officers and captains; but in a few years those conservative-minded cuirassephiles will have joined the dense and thick ranks of the retired navy, de la marine d'hier, and will no longer possess "voix au chapitre" or consulting vote. And, of course, it would be futile to ignore the fact that the great majority of our young or younger officiers de vaisseaux are very far from entertaining in their hearts the same gun and armor worship that has so long been the gospel of their fathers. Sad to note, they show scant respect for the mighty battleships of the Bart-Bretagne types, being struck less with the hitting powers of these imposantes citadelles flottantes than with the size and vulnerability of the target which they represent to mines, torpedoes and aerial bombs. In the minds of many there is a conviction that the incompleted Normandies will be the last of French battleships. The battleship not only has lost its former prestige but it is considered to be unsuited to France's needs.
In this respect it is not too much to say that a new era begins for the French Navy which will henceforth forge ahead, strictly on lines of her own, little influenced by what great ocean powers like Great Britain, America, and Japan can do, and this for both financial and doctrinal reasons. The cost of battleships is becoming prohibitive, save for the richest powers, and solely for those powers that are, from their geographical positions, freed from the heavy military obligations that will ever be the lot of France so long as she has to live side by side with a united and overpopulated Bocheland; and. on the other hand, the development of torpedo and aerial flotillas is attaining such proportions, and entailing such expense, that even if France could afford to increase twice over her Budget de la Marine (this year amounting to some 1,200,000,000 francs, including the expenditure for the Guist'hau program) she could not manage to simultaneously have an efficient battle-fleet and adequate flotillas.
It is felt that henceforth sea power will be represented by two distinct classes of navies, viz., those relying on large armored fleets for the command of the oceans and those composed entirely of poussiere navale of a "defense-mobile" order. The question for France is whether she is to rank last among ocean powers, or to lead among "les marines-defensives." Without denying the fighting worth of the latest types of armor-clad (a point on which even jeune ecole protagonists are careful to express themselves with prudence and moderation), the majority of our naval and Parliamentary men are fond of picturing France as "la premiere des marines sousmarines et aeriennes," and as being in a position, by virtue of her geographical situation, to command the most important European sea routes.
The Guist'hau program (6 cruisers, 24 destroyers, and 36 submarines) is merely a "programme de transition," the result of painstaking and creditable efforts consented with a view to giving the illusion "de faire quelqne chose." In reality it satisfies nobody. It is no secret that Chief of General Staff Grasset and all our gunnery experts would have welcomed, instead of an overgrown 8000-ton scout, a bona fide fighting cruiser of some 12,000 tons; and—by the way not a few French officers have sympathy with the strike-hard-and-run idea embodied in the British Glorious. Conservative old officers who cling to the battleship openly sneer at those so-called Guist'hau eclaireurs that will scout "en theorie" for a phantom fleet, whilst uncompromising partisans of "poussiere navale" pure and simple are denouncing the madness responsible for the construction, in these times, of "vulnerable show mastodons of 8000 tons!"
M. Delpierre, the able editor of the "Moniteur de la Flotte," has on the question of the naval policy suitable to France sought the opinion of some three score ofhciers de vaisseau, mostly of the younger generations, and the results of this consultation he sums up as follows:
1. France owes to her traditions and prestige, as well as to her comprehensive maritime and colonial interests, to remain a first-class sea power; all the more so as her military power and security on land depend to a great and growing extent on her efficiency at sea and in the air. Practical unanimity exists on this point, especially since events are showing that alliances are essentially precarious and constitute no firm ground to build upon. Therefore the need of planning and acting just as if friends of to-day could become the enemies of to-morrow, and building a naval force strong enough to discourage aggression on the part of the strongest powers.
2. The French fleet, for the immediate future at least, needs no battleships, for the twofold reason that armored fleets can never again rule the waves and that France is too poor to construct them. For the price of three 50,000-ton battleships, that would cost over one milliard francs and have mostly a nominal value, 200 submarines could be built that would count very much in the balance of sea power.
3. Therefore the naval effort must exclusively aim at supremacy for three classes of weapons, viz., submarines, flying machines, and super cannon. "If faut faire peau neuve," the past to be erased, and a blank slate to write upon.
A truly attractive dream on paper, but it is only a dream. No masterpieces of eloquence and literature and no magic stroke can possibly change in a few days, or in a few years, the "orientation," the ways and methods of that antiquated and venerable institution called "l'amirante de la Rue Royale," that will be for many years to come in the hands of highly estimable officiers de vaisseau, who only know and appreciate that part of their trade that concerns pre-war methods of sea-fighting. Old dogs, especially of the Gallic species, do not learn new tricks, as is shown by the inner history of the Paris Admiralty within the last few decades. "La superiorite aerienne, indeed!" England possesses half-a-dozen efficient seaplane carriers in commission, and America is conducting aerial experiments on a realistic scale and with a thoroughness worthy of the admiration of every naval student, whilst France has accomplished, as always, wonderful strides on paper, but very little as yet at sea. To squarely face the truth is the road to self-improvement; mental and verbal agitation and bold program making are poor substitutes for undeferred action.
Admiral Bienaime approves the policy of England in leading the way in the matter of battleship displacement, this being the only safe course to minimize aerial and submarine dangers and to ensure superior speed on economical lines. Whereas the Hood steams 32 knots with 140,000 horsepower, no less than 290,000 horsepower would be necessary for propelling four ships of 10.000 tons at the same rate of going, 72,500 horsepower for each vessel; and, moreover, the superior armed and defended Hood could smash her four antagonists to pieces with impunity. Contrary to the prevailing opinion, the advent of the aerial and submarine dangers has strengthened, rather than otherwise, the case for large displacements.—Naval and Military Record, 17 August, 1921.
French Naval Policy.—With regard to the naval policy of France, there appears to be considerable ambiguity as to what this policy really is. Whilst the Republic naturally remains one of the world's great sea powers, the complete change in the strategic outlook is causing her to occupy her position in this respect in rather a negative manner. As Mr. John Leyland has pointed out current French naval policy is ruled in great measure by the dominant necessity for retrenchment.
But although this is unquestionably a very potent factor, it is not the sole determining influence. French naval opinion is very much disturbed by a conflict of views on the subject of warship design. The doubts regarding the capital ship with which we have become so familiar on this side of the Channel are even more pronounced in France. The outbreak of war found all five battleships of the Normandie class, provided for in the budget of 1912, in the water, but a long stage from completion. It was not until January, 1920, that President Poincare gave his formal assent to continuation of work upon these vessels. M. Georges Leygues, the Minister of Marine, announced, however that it had been decided to abandon further progress upon these vessels.
This step was taken as a result of the conclusions arrived at by the Superior Council of the Navy. The grounds for it were that it would be unwise to continue the construction of battleships which would prove inferior in so many respects to the ships they might be called upon to engage. The Normandie type are of 24,802 tons, and designed to mount twelve 13.4-inch guns, in three turrets. The last of them to be launched, the Beam, is now being used as a seaplane base and barrack-ship at Toulon.
The truth is that when the late Lord Fisher openly denounced the capital ship as obsolete in consequence of the development of new conditions of sea warfare naval thought in France was moving in much the same direction. The more moderate school urged that at any rate both the subject and the circumstances warranted and allowed of exhaustive consideration. Various high-placed officers frankly advocated a reversion to the principles of the Jeune Ecole, which Admiral Aube defined as "le nombre, la Vitesse, rinvulnerabilite, et la specialization." That the principles of the Jetine Ecole had been responsible for reducing the French Navy to a relatively inferior position was not overlooked. But the development of the submarine and the aircraft seemed to harmonize so completely with the doctrine laid down by Admiral Aube that it was contended that what was demonstrated as a dangerous fallacy towards the close of last century had now been rendered fait accompli by changed conditions.
It appears, therefore, that the disciples of number, and speed have triumphed, although how far they will attain invulnerability remains to be seen. Admiral Rene Daveluy, whom Mr. John Leyland terms the master mind of the French Navy, has ranged himself definitely on the side of the prophets of radical change in the methods of sea warfare. In writing upon the ship of the future he declares that the solution of the problem lies in the adoption of forms altogether different from traditional ones.
This academic form of destructive criticism has unquestionably profoundly influenced the policy of naval construction in France. No armored ships are to be built at all, but a great swarm of "mosquito" craft. The inevitable effect of this principle, if it is persevered in, must be to restrict the naval activities of France in her colonial zones. The characteristically logical reply to this is that it is useless to maintain naval activities with types of warships which would be unable to meet the vessels of other great sea powers. But such an admission is tantamount to a renunciation of all further competition in the balance of naval armaments.—Naval and Military Record, 14 September, 1921.
Naval and Aerial Progress.—The enhanced effectiveness of the naval arm for colonial as well as for coastal warfare is once more demonstrated by the latest developments in Morocco. Where Spanish infantry had failed, the big guns of the Espanas told with rapid effect. This confirms the lessons of the Belgian coast, of the Black Sea, and of the Franco- British co-operation in Syria as to the fact that ballistic progress has considerably lengthened the arm of old Neptune and vastly increased his influence in land affairs. But much more is to come in this direction with the advent of mastodon seaplane-carriers, capable of unexpectedly appearing at any point off an enemy coast and of promptly extending their scouting and bombardment radius of action over a hundred miles inland, sowing destruction and panic in districts far removed from the belligerent zone, with disastrous consequences for the staying power of the enemy. Henceforth no coast is to remain immune from attack; no inland port militaire, however proof against direct bombardment by warships (as in the case of Brest, Rochefort, Bizerta, Portsmouth, Rosyth, etc.), is to be regarded as being safe against destructive attacks by seaplanes, at least so long as the enemy possesses a margin of aerial supremacy. In this respect a new chapter may be said to open in warfare; the world will next time witness true "guerre inteyrale" with the whole of the belligerent nations sharing in the fight and in the dangers. It is to discuss and decide about the practical consequences of this totally new situation that the active Minister Guist'hau has called to Paris those experts who took a leading part in the Prins Eugen and Blarn experiments.
Up to the present the British and American navies are the only ones possessing bona fide seaplane-carriers, and are thus in a position to carry on la grande guerre on the above-mentioned lines. The experiments in the Beam just concluded have merely demonstrated the many difficulties that stand in the way of a thoroughly serviceable navire porte-avions, and which only time and patient training can overcome. The landing on board in practically all weathers of light and short scouting Spads and Nieuports is a relatively easy affair, and is being smartly carried out. Far more difficult is the problem with heavy bombers, so much so that many officers consider it probable that most of the bombers, after carrying out their mission overland, will fail to return to their mother ship and become a total loss in rough weather, which is a powerful argument in favor of the croiseur aerien autonome designed with a view to being at home on the waves as well as in the air and independent of any mother ship or convoyer. It is interesting to note that comparative experiments and paper calculations have led to a return to the metallic monoplane type with raised fuselage, being an improvement of the German Dornier boats. Experience has shown biplanes and triplanes to be unsuited to sea conditions, float and lower wing accidents being daily occurrences. But whatever strides autonome flying boats may make, the seaplane-carrier has come to stay and will constitute an important element of sea power.
There are signs that monster airships and submarines, that have long existed on paper, are coming nearer to realization. Ingenieurs Simonot, Laubeuf, and others have prepared plans for submarine "transports" of 10,000 tons and above, and the suggestion has been made that state subsidies should go towards encouraging the construction of submersible cargo boats (for which plans are ready) that would ensure in war time safe communications between France and her oversea dominions. Jeune Ecole partisans are waxing enthusiastic over the idea, but the failure of the so-called insubmersible Leparvientier boats, that were constructed in America, is a timely reminder of the danger of unmatured, imperfectly studied innovations. France is now too poor to afford to waste time and money as she did with the 1906 Pelletan program, comprising four boats, of which the Charles-Brun was a total failure, and the Mariotte and Bourgeois were lame ducks, without speaking of the Bertin boats, that proved unserviceable and did so much towards depreciating the submarine in the public eye. Indeed, it pays to proceed on safe ground and to leave nothing to chance, when is considered the check which the development of any weapon receives from failure, all the more so as the obvious advantages of size have great drawbacks as a counterpart. Thus the fine British K-5 submarine and the gigantic R-38 dirigible came to grief mostly because they considerably exceeded the dimensions of preceding craft and required excessive care in construction and in handling—such at least is the contention of those on this side of the Channel who advocate number rather than size, oppose the taking in hand of improved copies of the Zeppelins (of which pleasing designs have been drawn both by private firms and by the section technique), and are satisfied with the 1100-ton submersible of the Guist'hau program. Exaggerated vulnerability is what they object to. Monster aeroplanes of 50 to 70 meters span, as prepared by the leading French aeronautical firms may have splendid qualities on paper and carry many tons of 400, 500, and 1000 kilo Michelin bombs, besides armor; but there remains the fact that they will be relatively slow to rise and maneuver, and therefore fall an easy prey to the ultra-rapid and marvelously handy avions de chasse of the Spad class (300 kilometers per hour). And yet an irresistible tendency in leading circles is bringing, nearer the day of monster aerial and submarine craft. Aptitude to dare and run risks has ever proved for individuals and nations alike the best qualification for success. Difficulties and disasters, far from cowing down strong races, have the effect of spurring them to action. Thus it is safe to say the sad sacrifice of the aeronauts of the R-38 has not been lost upon go-ahead British ingenieurs and inventors, and may lead to the conquest of the aerial supremacy by England.
The French Air Secretary, M. Eynac, has just prescribed at St. Malo a "fet-e aeronautique" and an aviation display, in itself of no very great importance though interesting to note, as it shows which way the wind is blowing. In the air even more than at sea it is the human element that will tell; so in the historical roadstead of the old Breton nid de corsaires a dozen aviators offered the spectacle of a keen competition in bomb-dropping from various heights at changing rates of speed. Interesting results were obtained so far as accuracy is concerned, but much remained to be done in that direction. The effect of sand-filled 12- and 13-inch shells in the Prinz Eugen was most remarkable, but the low percentage of hits on the motionless target has been a matter for derision in naval circles, the practical value of the experiment being denied by old officers. A single shell of one ton or more will disable any mastodon provided it is dropped on the right spot; it is with a view to ensuring the realization of the latter desideratum that Minister Guist'hau has decided to introduce aerial battle practice into the navy. The new sport will, further, be encouraged by prizes offered by the great constructor Michelin and several others.
The Minister of Marine has just authorized the opening of a commercial harbor in Toulon roadstead, to the disgust of many old officers who still cling to the idea that efficiency and secrecy are synonymous terms. The development side by side of naval and commercial ports, as in England, is now seen to offer no end of advantages in the way of increased personnel and materiel resources of all sorts. Our ports militaires are becoming semi-commercial, even Lorient receiving the 23,000-ton British Scynthia and several small liners to complete or refit.
Similarly, in all French circles where efficiency and economy are appreciated there is a dead set against the monopoly enjoyed by the arsenaux de la marine, centers of laziness and anarchy, that immobilize no fewer than 35,000 workmen, most of them with good technical training, and are a millstone round the neck of the Marine Francaise, entailing the yearly waste of over 300 million francs and acting as a check upon the development of the French shipbuilding industry. With the advent of new aerial and submarine weapons, that require expert and careful workmanship, the unfitness and to a growing extent the uselessness of our huge arsenals is asserting itself in the minds of all Gallic naval students. Electoral considerations alone stand in the way of their reduction. Yet if France is to survive financially and escape bankruptcy she will have to get rid of some of her 700000 bloodsucking parasites, and here lies the hope for the contemptors of the arsenals.—Naval and Military Record, 14 September, 1921.
New French Training Methods.—The Parliamentary vacations are drawing to a close, and this brings nearer the prospects of angry debates in the Chamber and of a possible Ministerial crisis, as deep dissatisfaction prevails as to the way in which French interests have been defended on the High Silesia question; and no wonder, since the safety of France and the possibilities of an all-around disarmament depend on the maintenance of a strong Polish State capable of preventing an anti-French (and also indirectly anti-English) coalition of Boche and Bolshevist forces. Still, confidence is felt in the tried ability of Premier Briand, and also in his well-known pro-English sentiments, to find a satisfactory issue out of the apparently inextricable situation. Meanwhile, designing, experimenting, and reorganizing are proceeding apace at Rue Royale. Indeed, splendid work has been done in all branches of the service during the last two months. "Vacations" is a blessed word in the state departments of our republic; it means methodical progress uninterrupted by ceaseless meddling on the part of good intentioned politicians.
The Premiere Escadre de combat has regained Mediterranean waters after two months of visiting, feasting and banqueting in Channel and Atlantic ports, intermingled with bona-fide training in coastal navigation and combined exercises with the Brest and Cherbourg flotillas, that have received heavy reinforcements and are becoming redoubtable mosquito forces since being placed under the authority of the pugnacious Prefets Maritimes Schwerer and Barthes, who are never more happy than at sea with their pennants hoisted on board small torpedo-craft. Thus the first part is being completed of the program which the new commander-in-chief Admiral Salaun, had set himself when he assumed in July last charge of France's principal battle squadron. The second and more important part of his work he will shortly tackle in the Mediterranean, as soon as circumstances permit him to array under his flag the six 24,000-ton Bart-Bretagnes and the three 14,000-ton croiseurs cuirasses that are nominally to compose his force, together with several escadrilles of torpedo and aerial auxiliaries. Besides being the embodiment of well-directed activity, the Breton commander-in-chief belongs to the Jeune Ecole persuasion, priding himself on being the successor of another illustrious Breton naval man. Admiral Aube. And, as he means business, the scheme of preparation for war on novel lines, which he is going to apply this year and next, deserves to be watched with attention, all the more so as his crews, that are gradually being brought up to the full complement, have nothing left in them of the spirit of the Black Sea rebellion. Energetic weeding out, the practice of sports, and, above all, the greater percentage of Breton seamen on board, are raising anew the Flotte Francaise to its old standard of efficiency, without mentioning the beneficial effect of better attention to the welfare and contentment of the lower deck.
Constant sea practice, as announced by Minister Guist'hau, is, of course, to be the motto of the battle force; and gunnery, which remains the raison d’être of battleships, is to be carried out on new lines, as an improvement of the methods inaugurated during the war by Admiralissimo Gauchet. Turrets in all our dreadnoughts have been modified, and permit firing up to some 27,000 meters distance, which is judged to be sufficient, though our 340 mil. cannon used against the Boche have fired at over 40 kilometers. Accuracy at these extreme ranges is a matter of aerial control of stable, well-equipped flying machines, of thoroughly trained observers, and of a perfect signaling system. Whilst on paper all problems have been solved by our clever mathematicians, but little has been done in practice; and it is practice that will tell in the extreme range sport. Happily, professional interest will not be lacking, to judge from the fine preliminary preparation work conducted by the recently-constituted aviation d'escadre, that outwardly possesses the necessary elements of success.
Moreover, Admiral Salaun, who has had in the last war a comprehensive experience of operations at sea, and is, besides, a go-ahead man of progress, will not repeat the mistake of some of his predecessors, who considered the gun as their ultima ratio and their all-in-all, and, consequently, limited their field of mental activity to the study of those problems that had something to do with artillery duels at moderate range. Although the 24,000-ton Bretagnes might be superior ballistically to the remarkable Dorias of Italy, they would nevertheless represent a small and somewhat fragile asset of strength if their value were to reside solely in their guns and in their training for fleet actions in pre-war style. More is aimed at, and no wonder, as under the novel conditions of sea warfare France's power in the Mediterranean may be said to be invested mostly in the offensive radius of action of Bizerta, Oran, and Corsica points d'appui, as well as in the capabilities of the torpedo and aerial flotillas that will dot her extensive sea frontage. Six or seven battleships, even if in good fighting trim, are little in themselves, but they may become much if they can ever be assured of striking in co-operation with the adequate and well-trained coastal flotillas and super-cannon batteries, if when moving across the Western Mediterranean, at all times spanned by wireless and aerial transport communications, the admiral-in-chief can feel, at a safe distance across his van as well as abeam and in the rear, a double and imperviable screen of weatherly and reliable aerial and submarine satellites, guarding against all possibilities of surprise, and giving time for tactical maneuvers and for his heavy guns to pound with some effect on an incoming enemy. This picture—it is for the present little more than a dream—while requiring time and finances, is above all a matter of will and stability at the head and of enthusiasm among subordinate officers for the hurricane-like character of the contests of to-morrow that will be a game of speed, initiative, and daring. To bring his heavy guns early and effectively into the fray is no longer to be the main preoccupation haunting the brains of French chiefs, if swifter and more decisive results can be got with less risks out of the torpedo and bomb. We are entering a new world in strategy and tactics, and efficiency will be more and more governed by the growing interdependence between sea, land, and air power; and for this reason the pioneer work M. Salaun will accomplish at the head of the Hotte de combat cannot fail to be epoch-making in Gallic annals.
The prevailing opinion in British, and also in French, official circles that the world conflict has conclusively demonstrated the utter inability of the submarine to ever control the seas is meeting with an increasing number of objections, mostly as the result of the reaction in favor of submarining determined by recent German publications. Admiral Daveluy boldly stated that Bocheland would have won had she invested in submarines instead of in battleships, and now, even in semi-official organs, the opinion is volunteered, with the support of statistics that the Boches had actually the means of winning the war but for the meddling of politicians with the conduct of submarine warfare.—Naval and Military Record, 21 September, 1921.
GERMANY
From War to Trade.—Although the conversion of warships into merchantmen is an expedient which has little to recommend it in normal times, it has been adopted to a fairly large extent since the war. So far as we are aware, no work of this description has been done in Great Britain; but in Germany, France, the United States, and Italy quite a number of former men-of-war are now sailing under the mercantile flag. It is in Germany, where the dearth of tonnage is most acute, that this policy has been carried to its greatest length. The German merchant navy now includes ex-warships of every type, from battleships down to submarines, though the latter, needless to say, have been modified to navigate on the surface instead of below it. We recently published particulars of the tank ships Oberschlesien and Ostpreussen, which were built up by joining together the hulls of unfinished U-cruisers, and are propelled by oil engines originally designed for U-boats. Further tankers of the same type are now building in Germany. It appears also that the old coast-defense battleship Hagen has been reconstructed as a motor cargo ship and undergone highly satisfactory trials.
Other notable cases of this kind are the Hertha and Victoria Luise, large protected cruisers, which have been refitted as merchantmen and are now in regular service. Among naval types the destroyer would seem the least susceptible of adaptation to commercial purposes, owing to the fineness of the lines and the limited space available for cargo or passenger accommodation. Nevertheless, several big destroyers have been rebuilt in Germany as merchantmen and are proving quite satisfactory in their new role The motor ship Heisdorf, now running between German Baltic and Russian ports, was originally one of the many destroyers laid down under the German war program but not completed before the armistice. Apparently she belongs to the so-called "1916" class, representing the largest and most powerful destroyers ever built. As reconstructed she has a new bow section, but otherwise scarcely any change has been made in the hull. She is fitted with a 420 B. h. p. Diesel engine, driving a single screw, and develops a speed of 9 knots. This installation is so compact that the greater part of the internal space is left free for cargo, of which 1350 tons can be carried. It is of interest to learn that the former U. S. destroyer Freble and three sister-boats have been converted into merchantmen and are now sailing under the Nicaraguan flag.—The Naval and Military Record, 7 September, 1921.
Invisible Torpedoes.—One of the most important revelations made by Admiral Scheer in the special interview which has been appearing exclusively in the "Naval and Military Record" concerns the introduction of the so-called "trackless" torpedo. To those who are unversed in the technique of naval warfare it may seem a matter of small consequence that a torpedo has been invented to rush through the water without leaving a tell-tale wake of air bubbles. But naval men will readily appreciate the significance of this innovation. At a very early stage of the war it was found that torpedo attacks, whether made by U-boats or destroyers, could often be defeated by keeping a sharp look-out for the track of oncoming torpedoes and making use of the helm to evade them. The first occasion on which this occurred was during the battle of the Bight, when Beatty's battle cruisers, although repeatedly attacked by U-boats, managed to dodge the torpedoes by the use of the helm. In the Jutland fight our battle fleet was kept busy altering course to evade the German torpedoes, and in alluding to one such attack Admiral Jellicoe wrote that "the tracks of some of the torpedoes were seen by the observers stationed aloft, and were avoided by very skilful handling of the ships by their captains." In another place he writes: "The fact of the tracks of so many of the enemy's torpedoes being visible was a matter of great surprise to me, and I think to other officers. Reports had been prevalent that the Germans had succeeded in producing a torpedo which left little or no track on the surface."
We now know these reports to have been well-founded, but, fortunately for us, the trackless torpedo did not become a practical proposition until the close of the war. Had the Germans possessed it at Jutland and earlier engagements the torpedo danger would have been greatly aggravated, while its use by their submarines and ours would undoubtedly have increased very considerably the percentage of torpedo hits. There is, of course, nothing mysterious about the trackless torpedo. It has been evolved by substituting electric motors for the compressed-air engines formerly installed, and in this way the emission of highly compressed air through the exhaust and the consequent wake of bubbles have been done away with. The only drawback is a marked loss of speed, for the electric motor is not nearly so efficient per unit of weight as the Brotherhood engine. This handicap may be overcome sooner or later, but even as it is the elimination of the tell-tale track increases the chances of hitting to such an extent that the loss of speed is more than compensated. We may be sure that the development of the new electric torpedo is engaging the attention of all the leading navies of the world to-day.—The Naval and Military Record, 31 August, 1921.
Germany's Growing Tonnage.—The remarkable progress made in the restoration of the German merchant marine since the conclusion of the armistice was recently described in the "Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung," one of the Hugo Stinnes organs. Reduced from around 5,000.000 to 419,000 gross tons between the outbreak and the close of hostilities, the German merchant fleet will probably total 1,140,000 tons by the close of this year. While seven ships of 30,117 tons were completed in German yards during 1918 and none in 1919, 76 of 388,506 tons were turned out last year, which record may be surpassed in 1021.—The Nautical Gazette, 1 October, 1921.
"Bayern's" Maiden Voyage.—The Hamburg-American Line's new passenger steamer Bayern sailed on September 15 from Hamburg to New York on her maiden voyage. The Bayern is the first German passenger liner to sail for the United States since 1914.—The Nautical Gazette, 24 September, 1921.
New German Sailing Craft Show Up Well.—Convinced that the motor sailing ship is the most economical type to operate, the Krupp Germania yard at Kiel after the war constructed for its own account 40 such units ranging from 75 to 318 -feet in length and from 115 to 5600 tons deadweight. These vessels are fitted with motors of sufficient power to give them a speed of 6 knots an hour. The smaller of these ships have engines of the surface ignition hot-bulb type with from one to two cylinders. The larger craft are equipped with four-cylinder marine Diesel engines of the submarine type.
Difficulties of various sorts delayed the completion of these vessels but a number of the smaller boats have been finished recently. In order to exhibit their sailing qualities the builders had them tested out in a heavy blow for the benefit of a number of experts on board of a chartered steamer. They behaved admirably and carried out all orders signaled with promptness and despatch.
The successful outcome of this test has convinced the Krupp people more than ever of the advantages of motor sailing ships. With auxiliary motors installed even quite small vessels are in a position to make long voyages without having to take aboard a large bunker and feed-water supply to the detriment of their cargo-carrying capacity. The recently imposed heavier taxation of coal and resultant increased cost of that fuel in Germany cannot but cause German ship-owners to resort more to the employment of motor sailing ships. On these craft the first cost, weight and fuel consumption of their engines are very much lower than in the case of steamers of similar sizes, while their cargo-carrying capacity is greater and a smaller number of engineers have to be employed.—The Nautical Gazette, 24 September, 1921.
GREAT BRITAIN
A South African Navy.—A beginning is being made by the Union Government of South Africa with the provision of a naval force of its own. A surveying sloop and some minesweeping trawlers are being taken over, and the Admiralty have called for 27 volunteer ratings to complete their crews. These men will sign on for three years, with an option to extend the engagement by one or two years. The bulk of the crews will be obtained locally, in which connection the existence of the South African Division of the R. N. V. R., enrolled under the South African Defence Act of 1912, is a great advantage. The progress of this latest of the oversea naval forces will be watched with sympathetic interest. That the Union should go in first for surveying and mine-sweeping craft, instead of cruiser and destroyer types like Australia and Canada did, is typical of the changed conditions now as compared with pre-war days. It is only fair to point out, however, that for some time the new South African force cannot relieve the mother country. It will still be necessary to keep a squadron of the Imperial Navy at Simonstown, for, as the naval correspondent of the Morning Post recently pointed out, with the best will in the world the Union cannot yet awhile provide and man a seagoing naval unit capable of controlling trade routes vital to South Africa and to the empire alike. Yet the home government will apparently be deprived of the yearly contribution of £85,000 towards the cost of maintaining the Cape squadron which has been paid since 1902.—Army and Navy Gazette, 24 September, 1921.
New Capital Ships.—Tenders for the construction of the four new British capital ships, it is expected, will be invited this month, writes a correspondent. All the shipbuilding firms in a position to carry out the contracts will be notified that they may tender. It is understood that these are to be practically the only war vessels to be built outside the Royal Dockyards for the present. At any rate, very little shipbuilding that can be carried out at the Royal Dockyards will go to private yards.—Naval and Military Record.
Destroyers: A Vanishing Quantity.—The Navy Estimates for 1921-22 authorize the commencement of four capital ships, one minelayer, and one submarine. No provision is made for laying down light cruisers or destroyers, and it is commonly supposed that our present reserves in both types are sufficient to meet all requirements for many a year to come. This may be true as regards light cruisers, of which we possess about 50 under ten years of age, though it should not be forgotten that only two of these vessels, Emerald and Enterprise, are equal in speed to the cruisers now building for other powers. If speed be accepted as the most important quality in light cruisers, then our position, albeit not unsatisfactory, is hardly so favorable as a mere counting of noses would indicate. And when we turn to destroyers the outlook is much less promising. It does not seem to be generally realized that a large proportion of the destroyers we had at the end of the war are no longer available. They have been scrapped wholesale, and scores of boats that nominally remain on the effective list have been allowed to deteriorate to such a degree that their reconditioning, if practicable at all, would entail almost as much expense as the building of new ones. "Fighting ships" for last year gives a total of 198 British destroyers, but we doubt whether at the present moment more than two-thirds of this number could be got ready for sea at a week's notice, irrespective of the manning difficulty.
While it would be foolish to pretend that this sweeping reduction in the size of our destroyer fleet affords ground for immediate alarm, the fact that we are well below our paper strength in a very important type of fighting ship should not be allowed to pass without remark. By the end of the year we shall have at most 150 effective destroyers, that being a liberal estimate, and as the one-Power standard has been officially adopted, no harm will be done by comparing this figure with the corresponding establishments abroad. According to the latest returns the United States Navy now contains 312 destroyers, of which 280 are less than three years old from the date of launch. Including some 40 old boats and a number of new ones not yet laid down, Japan has, or will eventually have, about 140 destroyers. The inference to be drawn from these figures is that in the course of a year or two, if nothing has been done in the interval to limit armaments by international agreement, the Admiralty may find it necessary to bring forward a new destroyer program, for the type is one that would be absolutely indispensable in any future naval campaign, no matter where or under what conditions it was waged.—Naval and Military Record, 14 September, 1921.
Not Electric.—Rumor is the inevitable preliminary to a general knowledge of the design of new warships. And so, the Admiralty having announced that the specifications of the four capital ships which are to be built are "not completed," various reports regarding the wonderful features they are to embody promptly get into circulation. One of these is to the effect that electric propelling power will be employed. We may easily trace this to the fact that the United States battleships are all being fitted with electric propulsion. As usual, before this statement has well started upon its career it is chased by an authoritative denial. But rumors of this character want a lot of overtaking.
The fact is that naval engineers on this side of the Atlantic remain unimpressed by the merits of electric propulsion for big warships. That well-known specialist, Mr. Alexander Richardson, M. P., in discussing the performances of the New Mexico says there are many incidental disadvantages to the system of electrical transmission between the turbine and the propeller. The New Mexico has two turbo-electric generating sets of 11,400 kilowatt capacity. These have no mechanical connection whatever with the propeller shafts. The electric power is transmitted to motors of 6600 nominal horse power, one on each of the four propelling shafts, the motors being close to the stern of the ship.
These are reversible motors, so that there are not, as in the ordinary turbine mechanical transmission system, separate turbines for going astern. During trials the New Mexico developed 3197 horse power more than specified in the designs, and averaged 21.08 knots for six hours. This increased power, however, was not due to electric transmission, but to the fact that, with oil fuel and steam turbines, overloads can easily be maintained for long periods. Where the real gain of the system comes in is that when running at a fraction of the full power it is only necessary to put into operation one or more turbo-electric generating units to supply the electricity to the motors. Therefore the turbo-electric generating unit can be worked at nearly full power, and consequently be made to yield maximum efficiency.—Naval and Military Record.
Points of Contention.—The advocates of electric propulsion maintain that the ability to use the full motive power of the ship in going astern is of great tactical value. The answer to this, however, is that the limit to the power of going astern in a turbine ship is determined by the danger of cavitation, which is likely to give trouble in high-speed vessels if, on reversing from full-ahead to full-astern, the power transmitted suddenly exceeds about 50 per cent of the full-ahead power.
At Jutland electric gear of every kind gave trouble. Under the shock of heavy gunfire switches were thrown out and circuits broken. On the other hand, mechanical and hydraulic installations maintained their functions under these conditions. The high turbine efficiency claimed for the electric drive at cruising, or economic, speeds is discounted for two reasons. First of all, the advantage is small to the point almost of negligibility when the most approved arrangement of cruising turbines is fitted to a gear-driven vessel, and, secondly, the loss of power with electric transmission is higher than with geared turbines.—Naval and Military Record, 17 August, 1921.
Battle-Cruisers.—When the Tiger reduces to two-thirds complement at Devonport at the end of the present month there will not remain a single battle-cruiser of the Jutland era with the full commissioned fleet. Sir Walter Cowan's command will still consist of two ships only, the Hood and Repulse, for although the Renown nominally belongs to the battle-cruiser squadron, the "particular service" for which she is detached will keep her away from it for at least nine months.
Of course, the battle-cruisers which are being maintained at three-fifths complement in reserve are practically as available, should they be suddenly required at any time, as though they were in full commission. It has been suggested that the ships of the Lion group might well be adapted to burn oil fuel only. But it is very doubtful whether the Admiralty are prepared to sanction a big expenditure upon any vessels of the 13.5-inchgun type. The Hood, Repulse, and Renown are, of course, all armed with the is-inch weapon, and therefore thus far remain the "last word" in smashing power.—Naval and Military Record, 14 September, 1921.
The "Cat" Squadron.—Whether they are modernized or not, the Lion. Tiger, and Princess Royal are bound to remain a valuable trio of first-line ships for a considerable time to come. They possess the qualities of very high speed, wide sea-keeping radius, and good protection, whilst their armament still remains very formidable, even when compared with the latest developments in naval artillery. No doubt they will be completely outclassed by the four capital ships it has been decided to lay down. But, then, if we are going to discard our fighting ships as fast as they are improved upon, our navy will become reduced to the last completed batch of the latest class.
The fact is that obsolescence travels in very uneven cycles. Jutland proved our capital ships to be adequate to anything in the way of gun power, but unsuspectedly defective in protective qualities. This means that ships have been condemned not because they were not still capable of putting up a staggering attack, but because they were weak in their defence. It should be quite feasible to reconstruct these ships on the same principle as in the case of the Repulse. But here again arises the consideration of worth while, for would the relative value which the Lion type would bear to the latest design, after reconstruction, justify the heavy expenditure involved? The Repulse is a 15-inch-gunned ship, so the question does not apply to her in anything like the same degree.—Naval and Military Record, 14 September, 1921.
Post-Jutland Battleships.—The launch of the American battleship Washington on September 1 has brought the number of post-Jutland capital ships now afloat up to five, of which three are owned by the United States and two by Japan. Although often labeled as such, the Hood is not really a post-Jutland ship, for her designs were completed several months before the battle, and the modifications introduced subsequently did not and could not embody all the experience derived from that action. But the Washington and her two sisters previously launched, viz., Maryland and Colorado, were planned long after Jutland, as also were the Japanese ships Nagato and Mutsu, so that all five vessels are credited by naval authorities with a very much higher degree of tactical efficiency than that possessed by the most powerful ship laid down in the pre-Jutland era.
At least three years must elapse ere the British Navy includes any capital ships equal in armament and protection to the Washington or the Nagato, and by that time both the American and the Japanese navies will have been reinforced by several more ships of greatly increased dimensions and power. The Washington belongs to the "Maryland" class, the fourth unit of which, the West Virginia, is still on the stocks. Her length over all is 624 feet; breadth, 97 feet 3 ½ inches; the displacement at full load being 33,590 tons. She will be propelled by turbines with electrical transmission, designed for 28,900 horsepower, and a speed of 21 knots. Her main armament consist of eight 16-inch 45-caliber guns in four turrets, discharging projectiles of 2100 pounds. She will carry in addition fourteen 5-inch q. f., four 3-inch A. A. guns and two torpedo-tubes. In the latest American battleship type, now building, the displacement has been increased to 43,200 tons, the armament to twelve 16-inch 50-caliber guns, and the speed to 23 knots.—Naval and Military Record. 7 September, 1921.
Minelaying Vessels.—It appears from a reply to a question in Parliament, just before the adjournment, that the new minelayer which is to be built at Devonport is likely to make quicker progress than either the experimental submarine at Chatham, or the capital ships in the private yards. Mr. Amery stated that the boilers for the vessel are already available, as well as portions of the main machinery and the accessory auxiliary machinery. This is all to the good, as it must always be a desirable thing, once a new design has been approved, to translate it into practical shape at the earliest moment. So many excellent designs in the past have, owing to slow construction, been rendered out of date before they could be tested in service by the ships for which they were adopted. In the case of the new minelayer she is an entirely new departure. All our minelaying vessels hitherto have been converted cruisers, ex-merchantmen, or ordinary fighting craft like destroyers and submarines temporarily diverted from their original purposes. The new ship will be the first to be designed and built for the primary duty of laying mines. As to the object in building her, anyone who gives a thought to the matter must realize that minelaying in the next war will be vastly different to that in the last, when the distances to the places to be mined were so small. Where vessels were then able to make a run of a hundred miles, lay their mines and return, in future they may be required to travel a thousand miles to perform the same operation. Even if they could go so far, it would be ridiculous to use for such an undertaking vessels like the Paris, carrying only 79 mines, or destroyers, carrying 40 mines each, or trawlers, carrying 25 mines, such as Admiral Bacon tells us he had to be content with in the Dover patrol.
If we turn to our present position in regard to minelaying vessels, it will be found that the war left us with none which is likely to be of future service, with the possible exception of the Princess Margaret. In August, 1914, there were in commission the seven ex-cruisers of the Apollo type, which had been fitted to lay mines, but they proved too slow to be of much use. Until November, 1914, we laid no mines whatever, and the minelayer squadron attached to the Grand fleet was utilized instead to assist the hard-worked cruiser patrols. In 1915, however, a different state of things prevailed, and the Admiralty chartered the Canadian Pacific liners Princess Irene and Princess Margaret for conversion into minelayers, of which the former was unfortunately blown up in Sheerness Harbor on May 27, 1915. The Princess Margaret was, however, employed in the North Sea, the Dover Straits and elsewhere during the war, and in 1919 was attached to Rear Admiral Cowan's force in the Baltic. On her return she was paid off on January 20, 1920, and is now in charge of a care and maintenance party at Portsmouth.
The experience gained in the war will naturally be taken advantage of in the design of the new vessel, even though she is likely to be very different to anything then used. When the Americans came across the Atlantic to assist in laying the northern barrage, they were able to rely chiefly on small craft because they had the advantage of a friendly base in the neighborhood. This may not be the case with us in a future war, and we may therefore have to depend entirely on the capacity and enduring mobility of our minelayers, just as the Germans were entirely dependent upon fast vessels like the Meteor, which made a minelaying raid into the Moray Firth in August, 191S, when the destroyer Lynx was blown up. The casual strewing of mines by German submarines and vessels under neutral flags as far overseas as the Cape is in a different category, but the difficulties they had to encounter shows the need of a properly equipped mining vessel which can either lay a field herself or act as a depot-ship for minelaying submarines operating in hostile waters.—Army and Navy Gazette, 10 September, 1921.
Turbo-Electric Propulsion.—The rumor that one of the four new battle-cruisers of this year's naval program is to be fitted with a turboelectric system of propulsion still persists, though it is very difficult to imagine on what grounds it does so. The turbo-electric is a system of transmission for marine purposes that has been received with little favor in this country. Whether because marine engineers are not usually expert electricians—and, if so, it is rea.lly mere prejudice—or whether as the result of a careful consideration of its merits compared with those of mechanically geared turbine installations, the fact remains that attempts to introduce it into Great Britain have hitherto signally failed. There is therefore available here very little actual experience on the subject beyond what may be gathered from foreign sources. As a result of comparative trials made on three 12,000-ton colliers fitted respectively with twin screws, driven by reciprocating engines, geared turbines, and turbo-electric machinery, the United States Navy Department fitted electric driving to the battleships of the New Mexico and Tennessee class, and has adopted it for the new battleships and battle-cruisers now under construction. With these remarkable exceptions, vessels fitted with this type of machinery are very scarce indeed.
The progressive nature of the Admiralty Engineering Department towards all developments which offer promise of success is well known, but it is hardly likely to lead the Department to make its first experimental installation on a scale more than twice that of any British power station. In fact, very few stations in the world contain a plant capable of a steady output of 125,000 kilowatts, which is what the new installations represent. That in the New Mexico was 24,000 kilowatts. The history of United States battleship machinery since their first dreadnought Delaware was constructed has hardly been consistent. We have seen reciprocating engines, twin-screw direct-connected turbines, four-shaft turbine installations, more four-shaft installations, a reversion to reciprocating engines, then another twin-screw turbine and a reciprocating engine, then partially geared turbines and the electric drive follow one another year by year, and the last step was determined on while the latest battleship was fitted with piston engines. The all-geared installation has not been tried in United States battleships. There is no doubt that the United States Navy Department exhibited extraordinary boldness in passing directly from the New Mexico type to battleships of 60,000 and cruisers of 180,000 shaft horsepower. The latter are to be propelled by four shafts and the application of motors of 45,000 horsepower to each will be a very noteworthy feat. In the New Mexico, the shaft revolutions were brought down to 165 at 21 knots, which enabled very efficient propellers to be adopted. The Hood's revolutions were 210 for 32 knots, and anything much less for transmitting those enormous powers is likely to lead to difficulty in the manufacture of the shafting, the tail shafts for the latter being no less than 28 ½ inches in diameter, so that with electric driving other conditions than the motor affect the speed of rotation. The general claim made for the advantage of electric driving is that (a) the turbine speed is independent of the propeller shaft; (b) one generator can be run, for low powers, at nearly its full capacity and drive all the motors, the full capacity rendering it more economical than four separate units each running at a quarter of the power which is being developed; and (c) there is no astern turbine. It is very difficult to get marine engineers in this country to admit the advantage of any one of these points. With mechanical gearing, the turbine speed can be made almost anything desired, and with turbines driving generators, it is the construction of the generator which often controls the turbine speed. The highest turbine speed which can be used depends on the necessary area through the low-pressure blading for the desired vacua and blade efficiency, in association with the strength of blade and centrifugal stress. It may be necessary to reduce the revolutions when the power is high in order to increase the area for steam to pass through the blades without unduly increasing its velocity. This condition is frequently met with nowadays in destroyers and cruisers, and when a design approaches it there is no more to be gained from the economical point of view by putting up the revolutions. If anything, the geared installation has an advantage in this respect over the electrical drive. The latter must rotate at revolutions which suit the number of cycles employed; the former may run at any odd number. As regards (b), owing to the power being so high for the speed, neither turbine has any advantage over the other as regards full power economy, and while one turbine generator, run at nearly full power for, say, quarter-power, will be more economical than four units each run at one-sixteenth, there is no gainsaying that when both generator and motor efficiencies are considered the difference will be materially reduced. As regards point (c), that there is no astern turbine, this is merely a small matter. With gearing, no trouble accrues from the small size of astern turbine now fitted. Against these claims there are some formidable disadvantages. First of all, the combined motor and generator efficiency at full power is materially less than that of reduction gearing. Secondly, as the turbines will be practically identical, because they will each be run at practically the maximum revolutions, and piping and condensing plants are similar, we have, in one case, the gear wheel, pinions and casing, and in the other, generator, motors and switchboard and wiring to contend with, and the weight of the latter is obviously far more than that of the former. Thirdly, as regards the astern turbine, the motors and switchboards must contain corresponding complexity to enable reversal to be effected. Summarized, we might say that turbo-electric propulsion in the eyes of British marine engineers offers three salient disadvantages: (a) Lower economy at all except very low powers; (b) considerably greater weight; and (c) more complexity by the full extent of the whole system of electrical control, the steam clement remaining practically as before.
For these reasons in general, without entering into many minor points, it is most unlikely that the Admiralty advisers would commit themselves to an experiment on a colossal scale. We invariably hesitate to criticize a system which is endeavoring to fight its way, and least of all on hearsay evidence. But we admit that prior to being willing to support the Admiralty Engineering Department in an experiment on turbo-electric propulsion on even the scale of a light cruiser, we should like to know a great deal more about the performance of the New Mexico and Tennessee than has hitherto appeared. Experience of small merchant vessels with this class of machinery has been anything but satisfactory in some cases, though a number of vessels in the United States are to be fitted with it, we shall look to the future development of the type with much interest.—The Engineer. 9 September, 1921.
Submarine Lifting.—Some very interesting experiments have lately been carried out in the Albert Dock with an immense magnet which, it is claimed, will prove of great value in raising submarines that cannot recover their buoyancy sufficiently to come up again. Charged with electricity this magnet is said to be capable of raising up to 15 tons, and during the course of the demonstration brought up an iron body weighing 2 ½ tons from five fathoms of water.
It is, of course, possible that submarine mishaps might occur in which salvage operations would be quite feasible by the use of such a magnet. But as a rule the cause which leads to loss of reserve buoyancy results in complete flooding. The submarine then becomes a sheer dead-weight of several hundreds of tons. If it is only necessary to employ a lifting force representing a few tons to recover a sunken submersible, probably divers and slings would prove quite as prompt and even more effective than plumbing with a magnet. The idea is one which should prove of great utility in many directions, but we scarcely imagine that the recovery of submarines is likely to be one of these.—Naval and Military Record, 7 September, 1921.
Rolling of Warships.—It is understood that experiments are being carried out with a new form of gyroscopic equipment, with a view to minimizing the rolling of ships in a seaway, and that if the results are considered satisfactory the idea is likely to be generally adopted in the navy. The gunnery people will be particularly interested in these tests, since steadiness of platform is one of the chief factors in efficiency of shooting.—Naval and Military Record, 31 August, 1921.
British Helicopter.—Tests with the Brennan helicopter—the new type of flying machine for rising straight into the air—are progressing satisfactorily at Farnborough, but until the experiments are completed the work will be confidential.
It will not be easy to maintain privacy when the helicopter takes the air in more ambitious flight, as it is expected to do very shortly, but for practical purposes open-air flights will probably be tried in the twilight hours.
A point of special interest is the superiority of the British type over designs favored elsewhere. It promises a notable innovation in aviation, alike for military and civil purposes. For instance, a ship mothering aeroplanes will no longer need to be equipped with cumbrous reaches of decking, as a modest area will suffice for the helicopter.
When space can be similarly economized in land stations, the prospect opens of the helicopter's invasion into the busiest of populous centers—making it as easy to take as train or tram.—Naval and Military Record.
Five Lives Lost in Dismantling of "Deutschland."—A disastrous explosion occurred in the ex-German submarine Deutschland on Saturday at Birkenhead Yard, where the vessel was being dismantled. Three 17-year-old apprentices were killed at once and two others succumbed to injuries later in the day. The cause of the explosion is a mystery.
The Deutschland was the big German U-boat which made the voyage to Baltimore in June, 1916, under the command of Capt. Paul Konig. She carried a cargo of precious stones, dyes, and patent medicines to German firms in the United States. Following upon this trip she took part in unrestricted submarine warfare, and after the armistice was handed over to Great Britain.—Naval and Military Record, 14 September, 1921.
English Admirals to Earn Their Salt.—The British reserve fleet is about to be reorganized in such a fashion that its "admirals will earn their money." As at present constituted the reserve fleet consists of only a few light cruisers and destroyers, and yet it has one vice admiral and four rear admirals. Moreover, it is scattered among the home dockyard ports, at which there already is an admiral who is a naval commander-in-chief and an admiral superintendent of the dockyard, so at each port there are three officers of admiral's rank.
To correct that abuse, in the future there will be only one admiral commanding the reserve fleet. The other admirals will be assigned to the active Atlantic fleet for training. They are to go through a war course, a course of weapon technic, a submarine and anti-submarine school, an air-force school of co-operation with the navy, and, finally, three months' active duty with the Atlantic fleet. The three months will be divided among various portions of the fleet: a fortnight each with battle cruisers and light cruisers, a week with the rear admiral of destroyers, a week with the senior officer of submarines, a week on board a fleet aircraft carrier and a month on the fleet flagship.
When with the cruisers the reserve admirals will be permitted to handle them in tactical maneuvers, and toward the end of the month on the fleet flagship they are to maneuver the whole Atlantic fleet for two days each. At the close of their training, the commander-in-chief of the Atlantic fleet is to communicate confidentially to the Admiralty his opinion of their capabilities as fighting commanders. A brief comment is that at the close of those courses "the country will get full value for its money."—Philadelphia Public Ledger, 10 October, 1921.
Normal Conditions Restored Around British Isles.—The Admiralty announces that the work of clearing the Heligoland Bight minefield has now been successfully accomplished by the Germans. This marks a definite stage in the work of restoring the seas to normal conditions since the entire North Sea is thus rendered clear of moored mines. The waters surrounding the British Isles are now entirely cleared. The Mediterranean Sea is practically cleared, only three small areas on the Albanian coast remaining, the clearing of which should be completed this year.
Four small areas remain in the Arctic, for which Germany is responsible, and a German mine-sweeping flotilla is at present at work there, but in all probability ice has affected their clearance during the last four winters. In the Baltic mines still exist between latitudes 56.30 N. and 60.30 N. to the eastward of 17.30 E., and here mine clearance is in progress. In the Adriatic the three small areas still to be swept will be cleared in the near future, one by Italy and two by Yugo-Slavia.
With one exception, the fields enumerated above constitute the only areas which now remain to be made safe for shipping. The one exception is the Black Sea. Here are still numerous minefields. No international agreement exists for their removal, and the region is now in a far worse condition than when the British mine-sweeping forces withdrew, more mines having been laid by the Russians.
This work of clearing the seas has been carried out under the aegis of the International Mine Clearance Committee, brought into existence as a result of the Allied Naval Conference on clearing the seas of mines after the war. During war time seaborne trade was regulated by the convoy and other systems, but on the arrival of peace no such restrictions could be imposed, and shipping had to be warned of the existing dangers and of the changes as they occurred.
The committee's mine warnings obtained a worldwide reputation. Not one report has been received of a vessel striking a moored mine while obeying the committee's instructions. Considering the vast tonnage afloat and the enormous aggregate mileage covered, it is remarkable that accidents have been so few, and where these have occurred it has in all cases been proved that the casualty was directly caused by a breach of the instructions.—Naval and Military Record, 14 September, 1921.
British and German Shipyard Activities Contrasted.—In a series of articles entitled Germany on the Seas, the London Daily Telegraph asserts that before the war only 25,000 men were employed in German yards as compared with 100,000 in May last. Of these 70,000 were working on vessels which were to be paid for out of the funds voted by the German Government to replace ships lost by the terms of the Versailles peace treaty.
Deliveries by the yards to German firms began on a large scale only during the present year. In the first quarter of 1921 the Hamburg yards completed eight steamers of 36,000 tons, while in the succeeding quarter the output rose to 16 vessels aggregating 106,000 tons. At present 64 steamers of 300,000 tons deadweight are on hand on the Elbe alone. Eighteen of these are for the Hamburg-American Line, while 5 are to be constructed for foreign owners.
"While the shipyards of the Clyde and Tyne are deserted and silent," continues the Telegraph, "those of the Elbe are teeming with busy men and ringing from morning till night with the rattle of the pneumatic riveter. While ten to fifteen million tons of Allied and neutral cargo space lie rusting in the back waters, Germany is not merely building new ships as fast as she can, but is also buying back many of those she was compelled by the Versailles Treaty to surrender."—Scientific American.
Economic Condition of British Shipbuilding.—What may well be taken as a direct reflection of the general state of affairs in the shipbuilding industry is the announcement which Messrs. Yarrow and Co., Ltd., of Scotstoun, on the Clyde, have recently made to their workmen and sent to the press. They intimate that they have decided to temporarily close their works, with the exception of the experimental and research department, on or about November 30, and will reopen when conditions enable business to be carried on with some chance of success. They state that owing to repeated strikes, reduction of output, and demarcation disputes which have taken place in various industries throughout the country, the cost of shipbuilding has become excessive; in addition to which it is impossible to promise dates of delivery. As an illustration both of shipbuilding difficulties and their reluctance to close down, the firm states that a recent offer which they made for a British steamer, an offer involving about £25,000, which would have left them no profit, and which turned out to have been the lowest in this country, was underbid by a Dutch firm to the extent of £6000. Another instance of the same kind, although experienced by another firm, may here be referred to. Messrs. Rennie, Ritchie and Newport Shipbuilding Co., who operate several yards throughout the kingdom recently lost an order for 50 barges owing to a Dutch firm cutting in at one-third less their price, and in a way which throws a striking light on the manner in which the British labor troubles are sending work abroad. The order for these 50 barges for South America had actually been placed with the firm, and the contract was on the point of being signed. As the barges, however, had to be delivered through Antwerp, enquiries were being made in that port. In this way a firm in Antwerp got wind of the business, and they applied direct to the principals, offering to build the vessels at one-third less than the English firm. This was accepted, and forthwith the Antwerp firm handed the order over to Holland builders and got 10 per cent on the business. Such facts as these (and they are by no means isolated) are convincing evidence of the deplorable condition of affairs which have for a considerable time operated against the British builders securing orders, and whose continuance is now causing firms to close their works. This is the second Clyde shipyard which the adverse state of affairs has so seriously affected. Some little time ago the Lloyd Royal Beige Co., at Whiteinch, practically closed their works, owing to the inability of the ship-owning concern, the Lloyd Royal Beige Co., of Antwerp—who were operating the yard chiefly on their own account—to continue building at a great loss, tonnage they were finding could be produced at reasonable cost in Antwerp. While the case of Messrs. Yarrow—who have renown and experience chiefly in types of ships other than plain merchant vessels—may be thought to be exceptional, there is abundance of other striking evidence of the pass to which the general state of shipbuilding has now come. The slump in shipbuilding contracts, and the delays in the completion of work actually on hand, alike point to this. While costs of shipbuilding material have certainly fallen somewhat since the end of the coal strike, and the supply and price of coal has become more normal, there are still other factors which contribute to the perpetuation of the depression and the increase of the unemployed. Wages in every branch must be lowered considerably before any tangible revival can be hoped for, especially considering the low volume of world's trade, and the superabundance of existing shipping tonnage to deal with it. It must surely be recognized by all workers that it is better to be employed at such remuneration as industry can really afford, and thrive upon, than to employ a small number and leave the great masses of workmen idle. Happily, we now have the welcome news of the shipyard joiners having accepted modified terms in connection with the 12s. per week deduction, against which the joiners have struck for nearly nine months past. There is also strong hope of the proposed reduction of 12 ½ per cent on the wages of the engineering trades being accepted shortly. Unless these and other modifications in wages are made, unemployment, which has affected at least 40 per cent of the ship building workers for too long a period already, will be prolonged and aggravated. The new and reconditioning of work that has offered of late has, because of the prevailing state of things, been diverted to other countries, where wages and other conditions are normal and more favorable. Unless British workers can content themselves with less wages there will be less and less work for British ship yards and their closing down will occur, not in single cases only, but in groups.—The Marine Engineer and Naval Architect, September, 1921.
The White Star "Majestic."—The White Star Line quadruple-screw steamship Majestic, 56,000 tons, now nearing completion, will be the largest vessel in the world, and, by reason of the altered economic conditions consequent upon the war, will doubtless be the last word in mercantile shipping for some time to come. A recital of the dimensions of this vast steamer, and a few particulars of her principal features should testify to the outstanding position the Majestic will hold in the world's commercial marine when, as is anticipated, she takes her place in the White Star Line's mail and passenger service between Southampton, Cherbourg and New York next spring.
With a length over all of 956 ft., a height from keel to boat deck of 102 ft., and a breadth of over 100 ft., the Majestic will have a gross tonnage of about 56,000, and a displacement of 64,000 tons when loaded to her marks. The turbine machinery will develop a maximum of 100,000 horse power, and it is intended that the Majestic shall have an ample reserve to steam an average of 23 knots per hour at sea—Marine Engineer and Naval Architect, September, 1921.
JAPAN
Super-Submarines.—A sensational story comes from New York about the "giant" submarine which Japan is said to be laying down. The well-known Sulzer firm of Winterthur, Switzerland, which specializes in Dieselmotor manufacture, is reported to have received an order from the Japanese Government for several sets of submarine engines, each set to consist of three or four units developing collectively from 16,000 to 20,000 horsepower. If this news is authentic, it means that the Japanese under-water craft will be larger and faster than any that have been built up to now. The fastest submarines in the world are those of our K class, steam-driven on the surface, with a speed of 24 knots, these turbines developing 10,000 horsepower. Next in point of speed, so far as British submarines are concerned, are the J boats now in Australia, with Diesel engines of 3600 horsepower, giving a speed of 19 knots. America is building nine "fleet submarines" of large displacement, which are reported to be equipped with motors of 8000 to 10,000 horsepower.
All these figures, however, are cast into the shade by the Diesel installations which Japan is said to have ordered from the Sulzer firm. The Japanese naval authorities are known to have been much impressed with the ex-German submarines that fell to their lot, and there have long been rumors that a Japanese edition of the U-cruisers type is building. That submarines of 3000 tons or thereabouts, with a high surface speed, great cruising endurance, and good accommodation for the personnel would be extraordinarily useful for war service in the vast wastes of the Pacific Ocean goes without saying. Even as it is, the Japanese Navy has built submarines of much larger dimensions than those with which they are credited in the naval text-books. Although the latest New York story may not be entirely accurate, it is within the bounds of possibility that the power which owns, for the moment, the largest battleship afloat has decided to take the lead in introducing submarines designed on the same grandiose scale.—Naval and Military Record, 17 August, 1921.
Japanese Navy's Fuel Supply Ship on Ways.—In the presence of a number of Japanese naval officers and officials of the United States Navy, the keel of the fuel supply ship Kamoi for the Japanese Navy was laid at the plant of the New York Shipbuilding Corporation at Camden, N. J. Named for a mountain in the province of Hidakia, Japan, meaning "dignity of God," the Kamoi will be 500 feet long and have a deadweight tonnage of 13,000 tons. The contract calls for a speed of 15 knots an hour.—The Nautical Gazette, 24 September, 1921.
Japanese Airport.—Japanese aviation authorities, it is announced, are making preparations for the establishment of an aerial port near Tokyo. This port is intended to be the first of many airdromes to be constructed in Japan, Korea, Saghalien, etc. It is to comprise a training ground, landing place, warehouses, customs house, hospital, wireless installations, a signal tower, etc., also equipment for night flying. The fact that this air port will be placed under the control of the Imperial Japanese Aviation Bureau will serve to make it an important military asset in time of war.—Aviation, 3 October, 1921.
Pacific Strategy.—Some three weeks ago, before Japan had formally signified her acceptance of the American invitation to confer on the subject of armaments, it was reported from Tokyo that the Imperial Government was then considering a proposal which originated with the Japanese naval authorities, having in view the non-fortification of island zones and a declaration of the freedom of the Pacific. This proposal, the message added, was to be forwarded to Washington with a view to its being placed on the agenda for the conference. As nothing further has been heard of the suggestion up to now, it may have been dropped. In any case it is very unlikely that America would have approved a plan so obviously disadvantageous to herself. The effect of such an agreement would to deny to the United States the right of providing secure bases for her fleet in the Western Pacific, and would consequently close that area to the American Navy for all practical purposes.—Naval and Military Record, 17 August, 1921.
Japanese Naval Maneuvers.—A fortnight hence will see the Japanese naval maneuvers in full swing. This year's exercises are said to be planned on a larger scale than any which have been held up to now, and will surpass those of October, 1919, as regards the number of ships participating. According to a detailed account just published in the New York Herald, the principal maneuver zone will be the Sea of Japan, though the operations will also extend to the open waters of the Pacific. The leading role has been assigned to the 1st and 2d fleets, based on Yokosuka and Kure respectively, but the 3d fleet, with its headquarters at Sasebo, will also take part. Irrespective of small craft and auxiliaries, upwards of 40 ships are to be commissioned for the maneuvers. They will include 12 dreadnoughts and battle cruisers, some of the older armored ships, and a large force of light cruisers. Destroyers, submarines, and aircraft will be well represented. The maneuver fleet will be headed by the battleship Nagato, flying the flag of Admiral Tochinai.
Early in September the 1st and 2d fleets are to rendezvous at Saiki Bay, in the Bungo Strait, between the islands of Kyushu and Shikoku. For a week or more this combined force will carry out tactical exercises and various practices under the supreme command of Admiral Tochinai. The second phase will begin on September 12, when the force will be split into two fleets—one representing the Japanese battle fleet and the other an "enemy" squadron bent on forcing its way into the Japan Sea through the Korean and Tsushima Straits. Admiral Shimamura, chief of the naval staff, will probably embark in the Nagato to observe the proceedings. The object of the tactical plan is to determine whether the Japanese fleet is strong enough to carry out the dual task of guarding the Pacific coastline from attack and simultaneously holding the approaches to the Sea of Japan. Interest will center mainly round the defence of the Korean and Tsushima Straits, for the problem before the defending fleet is a magnified version of that which confronted the British naval authorities at Dover during the war.
It is true that the islands of Tsushima and Iki, situated midway between the coasts of Korea and Japan, are heavily fortified, and could do much to hinder the passage of enemy surface ships during daylight. But the channel on either side is from 30 to 40 miles wide, so that hostile submarines would have a good chance of getting through unmolested. Nevertheless, the Japanese are endeavoring to make this passage inaccessible to submarines, for they are well aware of the danger that would menace their communications with the mainland were enemy boats able to penetrate into the Sea of Japan. A considerable part of the Japanese air fleet is to be mobilized for the maneuvers, and it is expected that 80 machines will be in service. Two years ago a series of "raids" took place on the principal coast towns, and the object lesson proved so effective that public opinion demanded the speedy reinforcement of the air fleet.
It appears that at the close of each maneuver period the results are investigated by a commission of admirals and staff officers, who award praise or censure in accordance with their findings and permit no personal considerations to influence their judgment. "Efficiency," says the Herald, "is the sole standard by which officers are measured, whether their rank be high or low. The Emperor of Japan never meddles in technical matters. In this he is unlike the ex-German Kaiser, who, although innocent of practical knowledge, never hesitated to pronounce final judgment on the most complex problems of sea strategy."—Naval and Military Record, 31 August, 1921.
Japanese Naval Policy.—According to the Osaka journal Mainichi, the Japanese defence program in the Pacific is steadily advancing towards completion. It involves not merely the expansion of the fleet on the lines of the well-known "eight-eight" scheme, but the building of fortifications and bases at various points that would possess high strategic importance in the case of a naval campaign in the Pacific. During the current year strong batteries have been erected at the Bonin Islands, which are situated some 500 miles south of Yokohama. These islands had hitherto been undefended, and there were no special facilities for the accommodation of warships. A portion of the press criticizes the government for spending money on the fortification of the Bonins, but from the strategical point of view this measure was undoubtedly justified. Had they remained defenceless they would have been liable to seizure by a fleet operating against Japan. The islands have been Japanese territory for 60 years, and would no doubt have been fortified long ago but for the fact that only within comparatively recent times has Japan found it expedient to devote serious attention to her naval frontiers facing the Pacific, instead of contenting herself with the attainment of absolute supremacy in the Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea, and the East China Sea. The Bonins, it should be noted, are on the direct route between Yokosuka, one of the principal naval bases, and the Mariana Islands, the southernmost island of which is Guam, the only American naval station in the South Seas. Thus Japan, without violating the terms of the mandate under which she occupies the former German islands of the Mariana group, and which inhibits her from putting them to military use, has nevertheless contrived to establish a strong point d'appui within 750 miles of Guam.
Fortifications are also in course of construction on several islands of the Luchu archipelago, which extended between Formosa and the southern coast of Japan (Kyushu). Batteries have been mounted at Amarni, Oshima, and Yajima. In view of their geographical position these works must be regarded as purely defensive in character. Miyake Shima, an island off Idzu Province, lying 100 miles due south of Yokosuka, is to be provided with a naval signaling station and an aerodrome. These and similar measures—including the conversion into a second class naval base of Mako, in the Pescadores Channel—reported to be in contemplation, indicate a desire on the part of Japanese strategists to leave undone nothing which is calculated to make Japan and her outlying possessions secure from attack. Foreigners may be at a loss to understand the motive of all these preparations against an invisible enemy, but the Japanese evidently think them necessary or they would not be spending large sums on defensive works at a time when money is notoriously short.
The large flotilla leader Yukaze (Evening Wind) was launched on May 28 at the Nagasaki yard of the Mitsubishi Co. in the presence of Admiral Takarabe, commander-in-chief of the Sasebo naval station, who named the vessel. Belonging to a group of eight leaders authorized in 1920, the Yukaze is a representative of the largest and most powerful type of Japanese torpedo craft. The papers describe her as a "torpedo cruiser" of 2000 tons, 36 knots speed, with an armament of 4.7-inch guns. It is feared that the construction of many warships, from battleships to submarines, now in hand at the Kawasaki and Mitsubishi yard in Kobe will be delayed by the labor troubles that broke out in that city a few weeks ago. Practically all the workmen at both yards downed tools, and their attitude became so threatening that troops and gendarmes were called in to guard warships lying on the stocks and in the fitting-out basins. Naval officers hurriedly despatched from Tokyo made eloquent appeals to the strikers to abstain from committing any act of sabotage against the warships, and these appear to have been successful, for no damage to the vessels is reported.
As a counterblast to Mr. Ozaki's speech-making tour in favor of a reduction of armaments, the Imperial Marine Association—a society formed in 1900 for the promotion of Japanese maritime interests—has decided to embark on an intensive publicity campaign to popularize the navy among all classes of the nation. For this purpose a special naval committee has been appointed, under the presidency of Prince Higashi-Fushimi, with the title of "Kaibo Kyokai" (Naval Defence Association), to arrange lectures and kinema displays on naval subjects, especially in inland districts, where knowledge of the navy and its functions is limited. A fund equivalent to £400,000 has been placed at the disposal of the committee. Part of this sum will be held in reserve to subsidize inventors who are working to improve naval architecture and naval weapons. The movement is obviously receiving official support, for the Navy Department has sent the battleship Satsuma from Maidzuru on an "educational" cruise along the coastline fronting the Sea of Japan, and, the papers state, "her chief mission is to diffuse the maritime spirit among the people at the various ports of call." At each port visited the ship is thrown open to the public, and officers specially borne in the vessel deliver lectures at the local schools on Japan's need of sea power.
The first Japanese press comments to hand on the note issued by the foreign office last month (agreeing that "if any situation arises whilst the Anglo-Japanese alliance remains in force in which the procedure prescribed by the terms of the agreement is inconsistent with the procedure prescribed by the Covenant of the League of Nations, then the procedure prescribed by the said covenant shall be adopted and shall prevail over that prescribed by the agreement ") show that in Japan, at any rate, the alliance is already regarded as defunct. The Mainichi says it is completely null and void, the Kokumin speaks of it as "the ghost alliance," and the Yorodzu writes: "From to-morrow the Anglo-Japanese treaty of alliance will practically be a dead letter. In fact, the alliance came to an end with the assistance given by Japan to Britain during the Great War. Though it may formally continue in force for a maximum period of one year, unless it be renewed in the interim, it will be of no effect whatever. Even if it be renewed in future it will be only in such a form as may accrue solely to the benefit of the Anglo-Saxon race. In any case, the whole world is falling under the sway of that race." Language of greater warmth than this is used by other journals, whose indignation at the supposed annulment of the alliance is strangely in contrast to the views they expressed at the height of the war, when they spoke of it as obsolete, and even recommended its substitution by a German-Japanese compact.—Naval and Military Record, 7 September, 1921.
Japan's Attitude.—Having notified her willingness to take part in the Washington Conference on the limitation of international armaments, Japan is now reviewing her naval position and naval needs. She is measuring her strength against the United States and Great Britain with perfect frankness and impartiality, obviously for the reason that these are the only two sea powers to be reckoned with in the Pacific. And the conclusion to which the Japanese Admiralty' are reported to have come is that a proportion of two ships to the American three and the British four would be a perfectly adequate provision. These calculations are arrived at on the basis of distances. The United States seaboard is some 5000 miles away from Japan, and hostile operations by the United States would necessitate the employment of at least this ratio of superior numbers to stand any chance of success.
The one qualifying possibility in this computation which is very much exercising the minds of Japanese naval administrators is the development of Guam and Manila into first-class naval bases. Such a step would obviously profoundly affect the strategic situation, and Japan makes no secret of the fact that the question will have to be satisfactorily resolved at the Washington Conference. We cannot find anything unreasonable in this view, for the fortifying of these two geographically important spots could only have reference to Japan as an objective. Flanking the great eastern highway as they do, the matter is likewise not one of indifference to this country. The practical response to such a policy would be the corresponding development of Singapore, and it is because Japan clearly realizes this that she takes British naval potentialities into her calculations.
Presuming that the United States were to persist in the expansion of Guam and Manila into great naval bases, Japan declares that her security would demand a fleet at least as large as that of America. But, having laid down this proposition, she candidly admits that it would involve an intolerable financial commitment. A capital ship of the latest type cannot be built in a Japanese yard for less than 18,000,000.
A program of competition with the United States Navy would therefore be ruinous, for we may certainly assume that America would promptly take up such a challenge and increase her shipbuilding accordingly. In both countries the position is clearly realized, and the burthen of obligations will undoubtedly form the great determining influence at the Washington Conference. The real negotiators, indeed, are America and Japan. If they can agree it will be a comparatively simple matter for us to harmonize our own policy with their decision. And we believe that they will agree, if for no more lofty reason than that neither can afford the colossal expenditure which would be imposed by the alternative.—Naval and Military Record, 14 September 1921.
Razing of Forts Talked of.—Japan will consult with other members of the League of Nations relative to the desire of the United States to receive equal treatment in mandate islands of the Pacific as a feature of the settlement of the Yap question, it is said by newspapers here. Japan will also study the American claim to land ownership in Yap, as foreigners do not have the right to land ownership in Japanese territory.
It is estimated that this country's expenses at the Washington Conference on limitation of armaments and Far Eastern questions will be about $2,000,000. Government leaders believe the conference will be in session for two months.
It has been decided that the chief of the Japanese delegation shall sail for the United States on board the steamer Kashima Mani on October 15. This steamer will take to America a number of Japanese business men, who will proceed to England after visiting the United States for two months.
It is believed that Japan is awaiting information regarding the character of the British and French delegations before finally deciding on the man who will act as chief at the Washington Conference. H. Ijuin, former Ambassador to Italy, has been suggested as one of the men who might be chosen chief, while there are reports that Premier Hara is attempting to induce Viscount Chinda, former Ambassador to the United States and to England, to accept the post.
Another meeting of Japanese field marshals and the Supreme War Councillors has been held, and the Yomiuri Shimbun says that the army's attitude on the limitation of armaments is as follows:
"Japan will maintain her already settled principle of national defense, and no change or alteration will be made until the time arrives when international disputes and trouble can be settled without relying upon, or resorting to, armed force. This is because of Japan's particular national status, and the situation which exists in surrounding the states."
This would indicate a change from the previously announced decision of Japan, which supported, in principle, the maintenance of 21 army divisions. It would seem she would be disposed to follow other nations in actual reductions.
Leading newspapers declare that it is the intention of army and navy authorities to propose definitely the reduction or abolition of fortifications in the Hawaiian Islands, the Philippines and Guam in exchange for the dismantling of Japanese fortifications on Formosa and the Pescadores Islands, and at Port Arthur and Bonin. Confirmation of this report, however, cannot be secured, but the opinion is general that this proposal may prove one of the principal points of the Japanese proposals.
"Perhaps the idea of dismantling fortifications in the Pacific," said an authority yesterday, "is a hope rather than an expectation. Certainly the making of a fortress out of Guam, which is near Japan, might be considered a theoretical menace in the same sense that America would look upon a British fortress in Jamaica in the same light."—New York Times, 25 September, 1921.
Japanese Shipyards Inactive.—Indicative of the continued depression in the shipbuilding industry of Japan, Trade Commissioner H. A. Butts states that during the month of June only two ships were launched in the Osaka district, one of 2600 tons and one of 114 tons. Three vessels were completed one of 2560 tons, one of 969, and one of 99 tons. Out of 45 shipyards, 28 have gone out of business, the remaining 17 maintaining operations with difficulty.—Nautical Gazette.
UNITED STATES
Navy Department—Bureau of Construction and Repair
Vessels Under Construction, United States Navy—Degree of Completion, As Reported September 30, 1921
Type, number and name | Contractor | Per cent of completion | |||
Oct. 1, 1921 | Sept. 1, 1921 | ||||
Total | On ship | Total | On ship | ||
Battleships (BB) | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? |
45 Colorado | New York S.B. Cpn. | 80.7 | 79.2 | 78.4 | 76.8 |
47 Washington | New York S.B. Cpn. | 69.7 | 63.5 | 69.3 | 63.0 |
48 West Virginia | Newport News S.B. & D.D. Co. | 62.5 | 55.5 | 61.0 | 53.4 |
49 South Dakota | New York Navy Yard | 34.6 | 27.0 | 34.1 | 26.5 |
50 Indiana | New York Navy Yard | 32.5 | 24.3 | 31.2 | 24.0 |
51 Montana | Mare Island Navy Yard | 27.6 | 19.0 | 27.3 | 19.0 |
52 North Carolina | Norfolk Navy Yard | 36.6 | 27.1 | 36.5 | 27.1 |
53 Iowa | Newport News S.B. & D.D. Co. | 29.5 | 25.0 | 29.0 | 24.8 |
54 Massachusetts | Beth. S.B. Cpn. (Fore River) | 10.4 | 3.9 | 10.4 | 3.9 |
Battle Cruisers (CC) | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? |
1 Lexington | Beth. S.B. Cpn. (Fore River) | 25.5 | 16.5 | 24.2 | 15.0 |
2 Constellation | Newport News S.B. & D.D. Co. | 14.5 | 12.6 | 13.3 | 11.1 |
3 Saratoga | New York S.B. Cpn. | 28.4 | 20.0 | 27.4 | 18.7 |
4 Ranger | Newport News S.B. & D.D. Co. | 2.7 | 1.1 | 2.5 | 1.0 |
5 Constitution | Philadelphia Navy Yard | 11.1 | 6.3 | 10.7 | 6.0 |
6 United States | Philadelphia Navy Yard | 10.7 | 5.9 | 10.4 | 5.7 |
Scout Cruisers (Light Cruisers CL) | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? |
4 Omaha | Todd D.D. & Const. Cpn. | 94.7 | 87.9 | 94.6 | 87.2 |
5 Milwaukee | Todd D.D. & Const. Cpn. | 92.5 | 84.6 | 92.4 | 84.0 |
6 Cincinnati | Todd D.D. & Const. Cpn. | 87.4 | 80.8 | 87.1 | 79.5 |
7 Raleigh | Beth. S.B. Cpn. (Fore River) | 63.7 | 45.6 | 63.7 | 45.6 |
8 Detroit | Beth. S.B. Cpn. (Fore River) | 68.5 | 50.6 | 66.3 | 48.2 |
9 Richmond | Wm. Cramp & Sons Co. | 74 | 64 | 70 | 59 |
10 Concord | Wm. Cramp & Sons Co. | 68 | 53 | 66 | 49 |
11 Trenton | Wm. Cramp & Sons Co. | 51 | 35 | 50 | 34 |
12 Marblehead | Wm. Cramp & Sons Co. | 46 | 30 | 46 | 30 |
13 Memphis | Wm. Cramp & Sons Co. | 40 | 25 | 40 | 25 |
Auxiliaries | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? |
Repair Ship No. 1, Medusa (AR1) | Puget Sound Navy Yard | 69.3 | 53.9 | 68 | 51.2 |
Dest. Tender No. 3, Dobbin (AD3) | Philadelphia Navy Yard | 56.3 | 66 | 66.3 | 66 |
Dest. Tender No. 4, Whitney (AD4) | Boston Navy Yard | 34.9 | 31.1 | 32.8 | 28.1 |
Sub. Tender No. 3, Holland (AS3) | Puget Sound Navy Yard | 21.5 | 5.5 | 21.6 | 5.5 |
Aircraft Tender, Wright (AZ1) | Tietjen & Lang | 92 | … | 90 | … |
Patrol Vessels | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? |
Gunboat No. 22, Tulsa (PG22) | Charleston Navy Yard | 70.8 | 54.5 | 70.6 | 53.4 |
Destroyers | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? |
338 Wasmuth | Mare Island Navy Yard | 99.5 | 99.5 | 99.2 | 99.2 |
339 Trever | Mare Island Navy Yard | 97.5 | 97.5 | 97.3 | 97.3 |
340 Perry | Mare Island Navy Yard | 76.3 | 74.5 | 71.6 | 70.7 |
341 Decatur | Mare Island Navy Yard | 75.2 | 69.4 | 65.4 | 64.5 |
Authorized but not under construction or contract: (1) Transport No. 2.
Destroyers authorized but not under construction or contract: (12) Nos. 348 to 359 inclusive.
Our Deplorable Position in the Western Pacific—Maritime nations have always been rivals for sea trade, just as the merchants in any town are rivals for the trade of that town. In every town there are laws which govern precisely the relations between the merchants, there are courts to which merchants may appeal in case of bad treatment by other merchants, and there is a police force to compel obedience to the decision of the courts; but on the sea there are no laws, no courts and no police force to insure fair dealing among nations. For this reason each nation has to maintain its own armed force to guard its rights.
This does not mean that all nations are enemies of each other any more than it means that all merchants are enemies of each other. The rivalries of nations and of merchants are usually of a friendly character; for in both international relations and mercantile relations it is realized that war and strife are losing procedures in the main. For this reason many measures are taken to foresee and control the causes of war and strife.
One of the measures taken is to remove temptation to robbery and theft, by guarding possessions: for an unguarded possession presents a distinct temptation to a rival. Therefore, no nation regards the arming of a colonial possession as an evidence of unfriendliness or distrust, any more than a merchant regards an insistence on suitable guarantees as an evidence of unfriendliness or distrust. The closest friends and even relatives observe business methods in their business dealings with each other; rightfully regarding such observance as a necessary precaution against possible misunderstandings, and therefore as an insurance against a possible rupture of friendliness. Any man who would disregard such precautions would put himself in the power of other men and be regarded as a fool.
Yet this is exactly what the United States has done in the West Pacific by failing to defend the Philippine Islands. By so failing, we have put ourselves in the power of our good friend, Japan, by making it possible for her to capture them with very little effort and to prevent our recapturing them, except at the cost of an effort that we may not be strong enough to make.
It has been said that Japan does not want the Philippine Islands: that she prefers to expand on the mainland of Asia. This may be true; but it may be pointed out that the Philippine Islands cover more than two-thirds as much area of land as Japan does; that they cover more than twice as much area as the state of New York; that they are vastly richer in natural resources than either Japan or New York; that they lie as conveniently near to China as Japan does; that their harbors are fully as good as those of Japan; and that, if properly defended and developed, they will form a better commercial base than Japan itself for prosecuting trade with China, and for building the railroads and doing the other kinds of public work that have already been begun.
Furthermore, even if Japan should not want the islands for herself, it is inconceivable that she likes to see us there, because the Philippines flank Japan's lines of communication not only to Guam, but to Yap and her other newly acquired Pacific islands, and even to the Mediterranean. Japanese steamers stop at Philippine ports while going to and from the Mediterranean.
Since it has always been the custom for great nations to defend their insular possessions, and since it seems distinctly advisable for us to defend the Philippines, it may be asked why we have not defended them. There are two reasons:
1. The American people have never realized ,the practical value, both commercially and strategically, of the Philippines, and have been misled by the phrase "give the Filipinos their independence." The word "independence" has an effect on an American that is amazingly appealing; he will instinctively agree to almost any proposition granting "independence" to almost anybody. For this reason the American people were slow in deciding to retain the islands after Dewey captured them, and Congress adopted a resolution virtually declaring the intention of the United States to give the Filipinos their "independence."
Now this looks superficially like a fairly good reason for not defending the islands. In fact, it seems to be regarded by some people as virtually obliging the United States to present the islands to the Filipinos, and to constitute an actual bargain with them. But really it does neither; for the reason that it was a mere statement of an intention held long ago, at a time when the importance of the Philippines was not understood, and when it was not realized that to hold the Philippines undefended made them actual hostages in the hands of Japan and put us in her power. Such, however, seems to be the fact, because both nations know that the ability of Japan to capture the islands enables her to hold a constant threat over our head; both nations realizing that, if the Japanese should capture them, public opinion would force us to try to recapture them, that the cost of the attempt would be prodigious, and that the attempt might not be successful. Remember that we have no base except in the islands, that the Japanese might adopt Fabian tactics, and remember also the fate of Hannibal in Italy after Fabius refused to fight.
2. The other reason for not defending the Philippines is that it has been deemed impossible to defend them, except at a cost in money wholly prohibitory. But, as I pointed out to the General Board of the Navy in the winter of 1910-1911, and have continually reiterated since, it is perfectly possible to defend them at small cost if we will only take advantage of the power that the airplane put into our hands several years ago. The airplane gave us the power to prevent troops from actually invading the islands, by dropping bombs on them before they could reach the shore.
Remember that any transports carrying troops destined to invade the Philippines would have to anchor at some distance from the beach selected as a landing place. Remember that the boats would then have to be gotten out and lowered into the water and placed alongside the transports at designated spots: that then all the men, ammunition, supplies, equipments and artillery would have to be placed carefully in the boats; and that then those boats (small, open boats) would have to be towed to the shore, crammed full of their living and unliving freight. Remember, too, that during every instant of the procedure thus briefly sketched, the transports, boats and men would be helpless against bombing airplanes, and that those planes could drop -so many bombs on the boats that it would seem no boat could escape being hit; for the bombs need not be more than a pound in weight, and each plane could carry hundreds of bombs. The escorting ships could not even fire at the airplanes, because they would be more apt to hit their own boats than to hit the airplanes.
But even granting that the boats could reach the beach (it seems more than doubtful that even one boat could do so), how could the troops possibly land on the beach, get out from the boats all of their supplies, equipments, munitions and artillery, and then form and march over the long rough road to Manila if attacked persistently with bombing airplanes?
It may be objected that the enemy might bring airplanes and use them against the bombing airplanes. True, but airplanes operated from the stable and commodious conditions of the land and of the quiet little bay's abounding in the Philippines could be launched in much greater numbers and much more quickly than from the crowded and unstable conditions of shipboard.
It may also be objected that pursuit planes could be sent from Formosa. True, but the southernmost tip of Formosa is two hundred miles from the northernmost tip of Luzon, and three hundred miles from any good landing beach. Now, three hundred miles is a great handicap to pursuit planes.
It may also be objected that no planes might be in readiness to bomb the would-be invaders when they arrived. This is possible, of course, on the general theory that almost anything is possible. But the great speed of airplanes, combined with the facilities given by the radio telegraph, endows airplanes engaged against relatively slowly moving bodies, such as ships and soldiers, with a degree of concentratability hitherto unknown. By means of this concentratability and the help of scouting airplanes the probability seems to be almost one hundred per cent that no transports could land troops in Luzon before airplanes could reach the landing beach.
It may also be objected that Japan might use bombing airplanes instead of troops, or in co-operation with troops, to bomb out the present defenses of the Philippines, and then to bomb Manila itself, and thus force it to surrender. This is true, but it is respectfully suggested that this fact, instead of constituting an argument against defending the Philippines with airplanes, constitutes an unanswerable argument in favor of it, because the best defense against airplanes is airplanes.
It is a matter of frequent remark that the three countries most deeply interested in the coming Conference are the United States, Great Britain and Japan. Now these countries are great friends, and in some ways their interests are identical and a continuance of friendly relations a great desirability. Yet the fact stares us in the face that the most fortunate thing commercially for any one of those countries would be that the other two should go to war against each other, because such a war would make her the mistress of the commerce of the world. If we and Japan, for instance, should go to war, and Japan should take the Philippines, our national resources would be strained so much and for so long a time that it seems probable that Great Britain would soon resume her place as mistress of the sea. What would happen to the United States cannot clearly be foreseen.
Doubtless "everything will come out all right," but one may feel justified, nevertheless, in regretting that our weakness in the Philippines should have been permitted to exist for so many years, and to continue to the present crisis. No harm is done by alluding to it publicly, because it is perfectly understood by foreign nations; in fact, Mr. Bywater devotes many pages to making it clear in his recent book, "Sea Power in the Pacific," and expresses surprise that America does not seem to realize it.—Army and Navy Journal, 21 September, 1921.
Air Craft vs. Surface Vessels and Submarines.—The bombing by the army and navy aviation services of the enemy and obsolete surface and submarine vessels really proved only what was already known; that is, that what man has made he can unmake. As practice such tests are useful; as demonstrations of what will happen in war all firing at targets—of course the tests were nothing more—are unreliable, because the retaliation, and what is just as important, the fear of retaliation, cannot be simulated.
Before the tests anybody could be sure that if the airships kept on dropping more and more high explosives on the vessels, the vessels would ultimately be sunk. Everybody who had read and thought about the matter knew that aircraft nowadays is an essential weapon of offense and defense in naval warfare, but nothing in the bombing tests has proved that any class of surface or submarine vessels is obsolete because of the dangers from attack by aircraft. The tests did illustrate, of course, that if large quantities of high explosives are likely to be dropped on the decks of vessels or in the water near them, it is desirable that the vessels be constructed with reference to giving as much protection as possible against such attack.
Everybody knows that no protection is absolute and that there is no more reason to suppose that absolute protection can be given against aircraft attack any more than it can be given against gunfire from surface vessels. In war people are likely to get hurt and we must not discuss war from the point of view of the German-American citizen who sat on a coroner's inquest listening very intently to the evidence, the corpse lying before them under a sheet. Finally, in a pause in the proceedings he arose, lifted a corner of the sheet and glancing at the dead face turned and said in a tone of horror to the coroner and his fellow jurymen, "My God, gentlemens, dis man vas dead."
In future wars vessels will be destroyed and the crews killed just as they have been for some thousands of years in past wars. Machine guns will kill infantrymen—millions were so killed in this way during the World War, but nevertheless infantry is not obsolete. The infantry minimizes its casualties by lying down, crawling around or attacking the machine guns with mortars and artillery. What is true of men is true of the materiel, both on land and sea. The fact that in a naval battle many ships are destroyed, does not mean that it is useless to build ships. The victor may lose most of the ships but if the vanquished has lost all of his the fruits of victory are adequate to the losses.
Let us not be carried away or become hysterical and go to one extreme or the other. During the war there was a constant cry that the old methods were obsolete and the training must be wholly for trench warfare. General Pershing was not carried away, but insisted on our troops being trained for open warfare, and it turned out to be one of the wisest decisions that was made in our behalf during the war. The truth is that no class of surface and submarine vessels is obsolete and that in any future wars the auxiliaries, that is the submarine and the lighter vessels of the enemy will have to be neutralized by our auxiliaries and the heavy fighting done by the line battleships—the infantry of the sea—as it always has been. What is and always has been obsolete is an unbalanced fleet. We have never had a balanced fleet and the sooner we recognize this fact the better. If we are willing to trust to agreements and the gentleness of human nature, then we do not want a fleet. But if we are not, and we think that war is a possibility, then it is the height of folly not to have a balanced fleet that is adequate to conquer any enemy we may have to fight.
Heavily taxing the people to build and maintain an unprepared or unbalanced fleet is a useless extravagance.—National Service, October, 1921.
American Naval Progress.—The launch of the battleship Washington at Camden, N. J., on September 1, means that three of the ten 16-in. battleships authorized under the building program of 1916 are now in the water. The others are the Maryland, launched on March 20, 1920, and the Colorado, launched at Camden on March 22, 1921. These ships are all to carry eight 16-in. guns in their main armament, and so will the West Virginia, which is rather behind them in point of progress, having only been laid down in April of last year. The other six battleships, however, of the South Dakota type, are larger and more powerful, with a main armament of twelve 16-in. guns. No date has yet been mentioned for their being put afloat, but it was stated by Mr. Amery in his speech on the shipbuilding vote in the House of Commons on August 3 that they would be completed by the end of 1924 or the beginning of 1925. In other words, they will be ready no sooner than the four British capital ships which are about to be ordered to replace some of those scrapped since the armistice. These new British ships are expected to occupy three years in construction from the date of the signing of the contract. It cannot be assumed, of course, that there is any sort of competition between the two countries in this respect. If there was, it would be necessary for us to be laying down something like sixteen big ships this year instead of four, since we have only the Hood as a post-Jutland ship to put against those laid down by America since 1917, and even the Hood has only is-in. guns. However, there will be much mutual interest displayed in both countries in each other's designs. One thing which the progress of the new American ships does emphasize is the expansion of the resources for the construction of war vessels and the manufacture of naval war material in the United States. It is understood that there is a minimum of fifteen slips capable of taking the largest ship yet contemplated. Now that our own public yards have unfortunately been left behind owing to the events of the war, so that none of them possess a slip capable of taking such a ship as the Hood, it would be interesting to know exactly how the private yards stand in this respect. We should rather doubt whether they have as many as fifteen slips; on the other hand, the official period of three years from the contract date shows that it is anticipated that they will be capable of more rapid construction than has hitherto been achieved with the new American ships.—Army and Navy Gazette, 17 September, 1921.
Sinking of "U. S. S. R-6."— The U. S. submarine R-6, in command of Lieut. I. R. Chambers, U. S. N., sank at 9.15 p. m., September 26, while alongside the U. S. S. Camden, her tender, in San Pedro Harbor, Calif. The following men are reported drowned: Frank Amzi Spalsbury, electrician, 2d class; next of kin, mother, Mrs. Bessie A. Spalsbury, Box 123 Powers Lake, N .D.. John Edward Dresfein, seaman, 2d class; next of kin, sister, Mrs. Minnie Strait, Moline, 111.
The accident, according to official dispatches received at the Navy Department from Vice Admiral W. R. Shoemaker, U. S. N., commanding the battleship force of the U. S. S. Pacific fleet, was caused by an outboard shutter of a torpedo tube being left open. This caused the opening of the inner tube door, as the interlocking device failed to work. Besides Lieutenant Chambers, the ship's company consisted of Lieuts. S. D. Jupp and J. M. Steele, and twenty-seven enlisted men. Operations to raise the submarine were at once ordered, and as her conning tower was reported to be only six feet under water, it is expected that she can be easily raised. The R-6 is a first fine submarine, launched March 1, 1919, and she was commissioned May 1, 1919.—Army and Navy Journal, 1 October, 1921.
Bars Use of Sailors as "Stool Pigeons."—Secretary of the Navy Denby does not purpose to permit the use of sailors as police "stool pigeons" or the use of the navy uniform in fighting vice in coast cities. He made this plain by denouncing the alleged employment of sailors as "stool pigeons" by the San Diego (Cal.) police.
His denunciation echoes the sensational disclosures of the alleged use of enlisted men of the navy as "stool pigeons" to stamp out vice at Newport, R. I. A formal statement said, in part:
"Attention of the Navy Department has been directed to evidence given in a trial at San Diego, Cal., in which it was stated that sailors of the navy had been used as 'stool pigeons' by the police. Secretary Denby, on reviewing the published reports of such action, sent a dispatch to the commander-in-chief of the Pacific fleet. Admiral Eberle, expressing the department's determined stand against the use of enlisted men for this purpose and calling attention to the navy's written instructions regarding the extent of co-operation with the civil authorities and directing the commander-in-chief to make a personal and thorough investigation of the matter,
"The statement, as reported, was made at San Diego, at the hearing of Police Judge Ed. L. Davis, under grand jury indictment for misconduct in office. In his defense Judge Davis, in referring to a case where a woman charged with having agreed to relations with two sailors who, it is claimed, were used as 'stool pigeons,' is quoted as saying.
"'I was told that the sailors had been given marked money to give to the woman, and that policemen broke into the room at a prearranged time. It struck me as horrible that boys away from home in training for citizenship, both morally and physically, should be hired for such despicable work. I considered it the duty of the court to discourage such practice and that is why I dismissed the case.'
"In regard to vice conditions in San Pedro, the Secretary on June 9 sent the following letter to the commandant of the eleventh naval district:
"'The department does not desire that the commandant handle the vice conditions that may exist in the eleventh naval district in the manner described in his letter, and accordingly directs that F. W. Becker, enrolled as a lieutenant, United States Naval Reserve Force, be not employed as recommended.'
"'The department desires that the commandant co-operate with the civil authorities for the suppression of vice, as it affects the naval personnel. The primary responsibility for social conditions within any community rests on the civil government, and the department does not desire that the personnel of the naval service, the uniform of the naval service or persons employed by the navy be utilized for services that properly belong to the civil police.'
"At the same time Secretary Denby wrote to Meredith P. Snyder, Mayor of Los Angeles, disapproving recommendations made by the Los Angeles Chief of Police that members of the police force of that city be permitted to wear the uniform of the navy or the marine corps in the discharge of their duty."—Baltimore Evening Sun, 23 September, 1921.
Harding Approves Navy Yard Economy.—President Harding will not intervene in behalf of the 50,000 civilian employees of navy yards whose wages recently have been reduced by the Navy Wage Board. The judgment of the board and Secretary Denby, it was learned authoritatively to-day, will be final, and the wage cuts are in line with the administration's policy of getting back to normal.
Numerous protests of the reductions, which became effective September 16 in all the navy yards of the country, have been presented to the President by representatives of the men and union leaders in an effort to force a reopening of the award. Although the President has made no formal review of the findings, he is understood to approve generally. Secretary Denby was positive to-day in his assertion that the award will not be reviewed.
"The matter is a closed incident," said Secretary Denby. "The cut is made already, is in effect and is going to continue."
The administration has little patience with the criticism of the governmental policy which does not keep all the navy shops and plants in full operation at the present time. The President and his advisers regard as absurd the view that wartime activity should be maintained in navy yards, even if present appropriations would permit of such a course. Curtailment both in the activities of the navy yard plants and in the payrolls, is the definite program to be followed to eliminate the abnormal conditions which grew up during the war.—Philadelphia Public Ledger, 23 September, 1921.
Shipping Board is Rapidly Whipping Bareboat Charter Plan into Shape.—The bareboat-charter plan for the disposition of the Government fleet is now rapidly taking form under the three operating vice-presidents, and will be put into effect with a modified allocation system. The main points of the changes in policy which the Board will adopt have now become public. Under this scheme the government vessels will be continued in operation until fundamental conditions in shipping have been reversed and the vessels can be sold.
While the final form of the charter party has not yet been drafted, indications during the week are that this will contain the following provisions:
- The Shipping Board will bear the expense of hull and machinery insurance.
- The charterer will pay voyage repairs.
- The Shipping Board will pay for repairs made necessary by latent defects in construction.
- The charterer will assume the cost of protective and indemnity insurance.
- The charter rate per deadweight ton will probably not be more than fifty cents per month, and will vary according to the conditions on separate routes.
Several vessels have already been chartered by the Board on substantially these terms, and while officials deny that the plan is in final shape there is good reason to believe that the public announcement in the near future will show these cardinal features of the charter party. The Board is now getting the views of steamship owners and operators on the proposition and will consider their opinions in drafting the plan. The original purpose of Chairman Lasker to make the bareboat charter system operative at once, with full abandonment of the allocation policy, has been modified considerably within the last few weeks. It is evident at present that this will be only one feature of a more comprehensive policy which will also include a certain amount of support for the steamship operators.
A study of the Merchant Marine Act has convinced the commissioners that the Board must continue certain strategic services regardless of the expense. Chairman Lasker has stated definitely that the law will be observed. This means that on trade routes which hold out immediate prospects for profitable operation, the Board will charter vessels under the new plan. But on the other services where traffic is poor and a constant loss is shown, the Board will continue temporarily to operate a minimum number of vessels on the existing commission basis. According to the intentions of the Board at present indicated, the bareboat charter system will be in force from certain ports from certain routes, while on others the allocation plan will be undisturbed.
In making the decision not to eliminate the allocation of ships entirely, the Board has taken drastic measures to cut the losses of operation to a minimum and to avoid competition between government vessels. Where two or three steamship lines are running on the same berth, with insufficient traffic and constant loss, the Board will concentrate the ships in the hands of one or two companies, and will continue in service only enough tonnage to care for the trade on a regular sailing schedule. In carrying out this plan Chairman Lasker expects by the middle of October to have not more than 350 ships in operation, or approximately one-fourth of the government fleet. These will be the best constructed and most efficient of the war-time, fleet and will be retained by the Board as the foundation upon which to build up an American merchant marine. It is the belief of the chairman that the operating losses by this means can be kept down to $5,000,000 a month, or eliminated entirely if trade conditions improve or the Jones Law is made fully effective.
The Board has already begun to put its new policy into effect. Within the last week announcement has been made that the Pacific Steamship Co. has chartered two ships for the movement of grain in bulk from the Pacific Coast to Europe. The action of the Admiral Line in chartering these vessels has discounted the arguments presented to the Shipping Board that it would be almost impossible just now to place ships on the charter basis.
In fixing the charter hire, which in the case of the Admiral Line was 50 cents per deadweight ton per month, the Board will consider the condition of trade, the amount of competition and the financial ability of the companies. It is expected that in some instances the rate will be nominal, only one or two cents a ton, while in others the Board may actually offer to pay the protective and indemnity insurance or voyage repairs to compensate certain companies for the charter hire. The Board will make the most favorable terms possible to get its ships under charter and to avoid the continuance of the allocation plan.
The Shipping Board Claims Commission is now actively at work, and within the last week has disposed of eight cases in which the attorneys for the Board and the claimants reached an undisputed agreement. All of these were for amounts less than $2000 each. As a general policy, the Commission has announced that it will have its own examiners investigate each of these negotiated settlements, partly as a precaution and also as a protection to the attorneys for the Board, whose firms in many instances are representing claimants.
As fast as the Board notifies the Commission that it is ready to proceed with certain cases the latter will schedule a hearing. The claim of the Downey Shipbuilding Corporation, involving $4,000,000, will come up shortly.—Nautical Gazette, 1 October, 1921.
AERONAUTICS
What the Virginia Capes Aircraft Bombing Tests Show.—The conflict between the air bombing squadron and the ex-German battleship Ostfriesland off the Virginia Capes was an epoch-making incident in the ever-present conflict between the old and well-established and the new and untried. The new device proved successful and indicated a future.
When the United States entered the world war in 1917 it did not possess a single military flying machine, and of the two score training planes then owned by the army and navy there were barely a baker's dozen capable of an hour's flight. Not quite four years have elapsed between the foundation of American military aeronautics and the sending out of the unprotected David of the air with a few bombs to do battle with the Goliath of the sea protected with armament representing forty years of sustained development costing billions of dollars. The battleship went to the bottom of the ocean in less than twenty-five minutes. Still the aircraft engineers responsible for this remarkable performance thoroughly realize the crudeness of the airplane, especially as regards the sighting, aiming and bomb-dropping devices.
The battleship can be made larger and faster, but this will not make it less vulnerable to aerial attack. The airplane, however, is only at the threshold of its development. The question seems to be one of time when the battleship will be driven from the sea.
American engineers have particular reasons to glory in the success of our flyers. The planes used were chiefly of American design, driven by a typical American motor. The bold conception of the test was on a par with the big things done every day by our engineers, and the daring of the men who flew for over a hundred miles out to sea in plants which had no facilities for landing on the water is something of which the nation may well feel proud.
Great honor must be given to the persistent and marvelous organization of the Air Service, which carried this difficult task to such successful completion. This is due in large measure to the enthusiasm and leadership of General Mitchell and his extremely able corps of assistants. Colonel Bane, chief of the Engineering Division of the Air Service, is another who should receive no small amount of praise and congratulations.
From my experience in connection with the production of the first depth bomb for the navy, I am convinced that it is the only device capable of reaching the vulnerable parts of a battleship. The enormous sledgehammer blow that is delivered to the ship's structure by a depth bomb at a distance is something prodigious. The compressibility of water being only 1/150 at the pressure of one ton per square inch, it acts to all intents and purposes as a perfect solid in transmitting the enormous concussion. Mass action is the secret of the success of the depth bomb, as is shown in the following formula:
P = (0.68WK)/(D1.89)
where P is the effective pressure in tons per square inch against the target from the depth bomb ; D the distance from the center of the charge to the face of the target, in feet; K the coefficient, which for the TNT equals 3.17; and W the weight of the charge in pounds.
In early bombing days, from the heights to which anti-aircraft guns drove the aircraft it was kicky if the bomb was able to hit the township containing the target. The precision obtained since that time in the various elements of the bombing equipment is due in no small measure to the astute, practical mathematician, the man who is 100 per cent mathematician and also 100 per cent engineer, in being able to point out a practical and physical, as well as simple, solution of otherwise very perplexing and abstruse formulas. This, together with the new method of stabilizing, finding and being able to hold the exact vertical reference line, and precision flight due to great care on the part of the pilot, are all important elements, but in the last analysis the level head and horse sense of the "man behind the gun" constitute no small part of the answer.
So aircraft, which is the natural American heritage, is coming not only into its own, but assuming nothing short of sovereign leadership in direct offensive action, and it has remained for America again to lead the way.
There are many defensive actions in which aeronautics will from now on take prominent leadership, and all are based on the most highly organized engineering analysis and skill. I, therefore, recommend that our Aeronautic Division make a close study of these intensely interesting activities so as to be in readiness to extend first aid in this all-important development.—Mechanical Engineering, September, 1921.
Bending Strength of "ZR-2."—If ZR-2 buckled while she was making a sharp turn at high speed—and more than one witness has testified that she did—she was the victim of a lack of girder strength which is inherent in all airships of the rigid type. By this we do not mean to say that all dirigibles are weak to the point of danger, but we do wish to emphasize the fact that the frame of a dirigible is so constructed that it cannot be considered as a trussed beam, and therefore its great diameter or depth cannot, as in the case of a bridge truss, be taken as a measure of its bending strength.
This inherent weakness is due to the fact that the presence of the huge gas bags prevents the introduction of any longitudinal, diagonal ties across each section or panel. To use these it would be necessary to provide gastight tubes passing diagonally through the gas bags—an obviously impossible construction. An attempt is made to provide longitudinal strength by bracing and tying together the longitudinal girders and the exterior polygonial frames, so as to secure something of the stiffness of the shell of a tube; but the whole construction, to the eye of an engineer, looks extremely frail when it is applied, as in this case, to a structure that is eighty-five feet in diameter and some 700 feet in length.
There is, of course, an interior truss running along the bottom of the framework—a triangular truss of great strength and stiffness—but it is shallow as compared with the vast skeleton frame along the bottom of which it lies. When the heavy cross-bending strain, induced by setting the rudders hard over when the ship was running at high speed developed, stresses of compression and tension were set up in the frame of the ship, which the relatively small triangular truss below could not do very much to relieve.
In making the above suggestion we do not wish to throw any doubt upon the practicability of lighter-than-air navigation. Faults either of design, material, or handling existed in the ill-fated ZR-2; but this does not prove that dirigibles of the great size of this one cannot be built of sufficient strength to stand any of the reasonable mischances of the air. Now that the wreck is being salvaged and the log of the commander of the ship has been recovered, we shall probably learn in due course just where the break occurred and why. Every new art has its failures and alas, its disasters accompanied by large loss of life; but the art goes forward. We are among those who believe that the day may come when gas bags can be eliminated and the whole body of the ship sheathed with some light alloy so that it can serve as the container. The all-metal dirigible, for reasons of strength and safety, is as desirable as the all-metal airplane.—Scientific American, 10 September, 1921.
The American Air Tests.—The American naval authorities have no use for theatrical secrecy, and they pride themselves, with reason, on laying all their cards on the table. When, for instance, any particularly interesting experiment is to be carried out, such as the bombardment of an old battleship by gunfire or air bombs, they always invite newspaper men to attend, and even provide special facilities for the "chiels" who are "takin' notes." They adopted this method on the occasion of the recent bombing practice against ex-German warships, with the result that very complete accounts of the event have been published for all the world to read. In our view this policy of frankness is infinitely to be preferred, from every point of view, to one of secrecy and mystification, and we venture to congratulate the American naval chiefs on having adopted it—not merely in this particular respects, but equally in regard to their naval programs and new construction and we wish that other Admiralties would follow their example. As the initiated know, there are very few naval "secrets" that are really secret, yet in certain countries the public is still bluffed into believing that an elaborate display of mystery is essential to the national safety. This, however, is a digression, our purpose being to emphasize the great importance attaching to the recent bombing tests by the U. S. Army and Navy. It is the first time' that experiments of this kind have been carried out on so extensive a scale and in circumstances simulating war conditions, and of the two lessons that have emerged it would be difficult to say which is the more significant. These lessons are, first, that a modern heavily armored capital ship is liable to be destroyed by bombs dropped from aircraft; and, second, that the application of wireless control to practically every type of vessel used in naval warfare is a perfectly feasible proposition. It may be argued that both these results might have been, and were, anticipated, but the fact remains that they have now been conclusively demonstrated, and we have advanced from the uncertain footing of theory to the solid ground of knowledge.
If, on the one hand, the small percentage of hits registered on the moving target ship Iowa should serve to check the exuberance of aviation enthusiastics who have been chanting dirges over the Dreadnought; on the other, the appalling effect of very heavy bombs on the Ostfriesland should give pause to the sceptics who have hitherto denied aircraft any serious role in future naval warfare. When we read of two or three 2000-pound bombs being sufficient to disable and sink a battleship that embodied all but the very latest ideas of protection, it is time to ask ourselves whether this new form of attack can be safely ignored. That the conditions under which the Ostfriesland was sunk bore little relation to those of war is doubtless true enough, but at least there was as much realism about this experiment as existed when the earliest tests of the torpedo and the submarine were made. There has been up to now a tendency to deny the value of bombing aircraft for naval purposes on two grounds, namely, that they cannot aim straight and that, even when they do hit the target, their bombs cause only superficial damage. The first contention has yet to be disproved, for in the recent experiments only a very small percentage of the bombs appear to have taken effect; but, in view of what happened to the Ostfriesland, it is clear that the heaviest bombs now in use are capable of destroying any modern capital ship. If bombs could be dropped from the air with anything like precision, the big ship would indeed be in mortal jeopardy, and it would be criminal extravagance to build any more of the type. But, happily or otherwise, no such degree of precision obtains at present, and for the time being the big ship stands a fair chance of survival against this form of attack, provided she is well enough armed with the anti-aircraft guns to keep the attacking machines at a height too great for accurate bomb-dropping.—Naval and Military Record, 17 August, 1921.
Aerial Planes to be Used in "Alabama" Attack.—New weapons of aerial warfare will be given an initial test when the army air service conducts its next bombing operation—a night attack on the old battleship Alabama. The plan is to stage the attack about September 15, probably at the scene of the recent tests upon the former German craft, off the Virginia Capes.
A "light barrage," composed of giant aerial flares, each of more than 200,000 candle-power, will be one feature of the attack. Army engineers have submitted such enthusiastic reports on this weapon that larger flares, estimated to be equal to 1,000,000 candles, have been placed under construction.
Giving a greenish-white light, literally "brighter than day," the flares to be used in the Alabama test will illuminate an area of five square miles and, expert flyers say, should enable the aviators to obtain greater accuracy than in the daytime. The flares are attached to a parachute of white silk, which reflects the light downward with sufficient intensity, it is believed, to blind the officers and gunners on the ship under attack, so as to demoralize any plan for defense, while keeping the upper air reaches shrouded in gloom.
Just before the armistice was signed flares of 200,000 candle-power were perfected by the ordnance branch of the Army Air Service. They were equipped with 18-foot parachutes, which kept them aloft while the magnesium burned for a period of from 7 to 11 minutes. No opportunity was afforded for a test against the enemy, however.
Although disappointed that they cannot have the Alabama equipped for battle with radio control, as they hoped, the army flyers are exerting every effort to conduct the bombing tests with war conditions as nearly simulated as possible.
It will not be the object of the army pilots to see how quickly they can sink the Alabama, but rather to try out special gas and non-extinguishable phosphorous bombs on her as well as to ascertain the effect of small demolition bombs. Bombs up to 4000 pounds each may be used.
The Alabama is at Philadelphia and practically ready for delivery to the air service.—Aerial Age, 12 September, 1921.
Navy Blimp Destroyed.—Twenty minutes before she was to have started for the hangar at Lakehurst, N. J., the naval balloon D-6, the largest and newest non-rigid dirigible possessed by the navy, burned, with her hangar and three other balloons, at the Rockaway Point Naval Air Station August 31.
No lives were lost, but Machinist's Mate Donald B. MacKay, in the car when the fire started, was severely burned.
The D-6 was fully inflated and contained about 190,000 cubic feet of hydrogen gas. The other balloons, not inflated, were the kite balloon A-P and two small dirigibles, the C-10 and the H-1.
A board of investigation was immediately appointed by Commander F. H. Strong, and after a three-hour conference, in which all members of the crew of the D-6 were questioned, a report was forwarded to Admiral Moffett, in charge of the Bureau of Naval Aviation in Washington. Commander Strong would not make public the results of the investigation.
It was thought that gasoline fumes from a leaky fuel pipe may have been ignited by a spark from a hammer. A new tank had been installed and mechanics were busy connecting up the feed pipe.
Lieutenant Charles E. Bausch, who was to command the crew of seven men, had just ordered them to get their luggage when he saw flames shooting toward the gas bag. He ordered every man out of the hangar and turned in an alarm which brought all of the 250 men at the station.
The reserve hydrogen tank, containing about 50,000 cubic feet of gas, a steel structure of the cylindrical type, standing 100 feet from the hangar was used as a vantage point from which the sailors turned streams on the burning hangar and nearby buildings, keeping the sides and top of the tank under two streams of water. Lieutenant Kloor and Commander Strong led the sailors. Their forces were supplemented by fire companies from the Rockaway Park station, and soldiers hurried over from Fort Tilden.
The combined forces kept a water barrage going for more than an hour on all sides of the burning hangar. A stiff breeze was blowing off shore and threatened for a time to carry the fire to the barracks, the Naval Hospital and store houses and across the dry grass to cottages along the shore.
The D-6 was 200 feet long and 50 feet in diameter fully inflated. She was propelled by two 125-horsepower Union type motors, and could make 55 miles an hour. She had a lifting power of about 10 tons. The D-6 carried 200 gallons of gasoline and had a cruising radius of 1000 miles. She was assembled at the Rockaway Point Station under the direction of Lieutenant Bausch.
The gondola and engines were built at the League Island Navy Yard in Philadelphia and the balloon was made at the navy balloon plant in Akron, Ohio. The D-6 was equipped with the limousine type of gondola, completely enclosed, which made it possible, the authorities believe, for the men in the hangar to escape before the balloon ignited. The trip to Lakehurst would have been her maiden voyage, although she had been taken for several short test spins over Jamaica Bay and Coney Island.
The Navy Department has under way plans for several other ships of the D-6 type.—Aerial Age, 12 September, 1921.
General Mitchell Attacks Bomb Test Findings.—A chapter has been added to the "aircraft versus capital ships" discussion that has caused so much comment in Washington this year.
This new development comes from a report made by Brig. Gen. William Mitchell, Assistant Chief of Air Service, on the bombing tests held two months ago off the Virginia Capes. The report was submitted to Maj. Gen. Charles T. Menoher, Chief of Air Service, in the form of a memorandum.
The report has not been issued for publication by the Chief of Air Service. Its appearance is expected to cause a greater sensation than that which occurred in the Air Service administration last spring when General Menoher warned General Mitchell to "speak softly."
Statements made by General Mitchell in his report are at considerable variance with the findings of the Joint Army and Navy Board which was appointed to report on the bombing experiments conducted with seacraft off the Virginia Capes last summer.
The outstanding statements in the Mitchell report are:
Aircraft can operate under conditions when seacraft is helpless.
Aircraft can safely protect the entire coast.
Seacraft should cease operations when within 200 miles the coast.
All naval activities should be confined to the high seas.
Had the army air service been permitted to attack as it desired, the seacraft attacked would not have lasted 10 minutes.
The first provisional air brigade could have put out of action the entire Atlantic fleet in one attack.
The problem of destruction of seacraft by airplane is finished. It has been solved.
The scheme of national defense should be revised at once on the following basis: A department of national defense, with sub-secretaries for army, navy and air service; a department of aeronautics co-equal with the departments of war and navy must be created at once.
The report stated that at present there is a complete lack of liaison or system about our national defense. It scored the present coast defense system, asserting that at least $1,870,000,000, had gone to create a coast defense that is little more than useless against hostile aircraft and hostile sea forces.
The report, as printed by The New York Times, says in part:
"Air forces with the types of aircraft now in existence or in development, acting from shore bases, can find and destroy all classes of seacraft under war conditions with a negligible loss to the aircraft. It is not necessary to destroy hostile seacraft at a distance greater than 25 miles off shore in order to protect the coast, as this distance exceeds the range of the most powerful guns at present installed. Aircraft, acting from suitable floating airdromes, can destroy any class of surface seacraft on the high seas.
"Conditions of weather affecting the air and sea conditions do not alter the statement made above, as aircraft can operate in conditions under which seacraft cannot operate. There are no conditions in which seacraft can operate efficiently in which aircraft cannot operate efficiently.
"The weapons used in the recent exercises against the seacraft were bombs alone. Torpedoes, gas, gunfire and mines were not employed. The army air service was not permitted to attack the targets, as it would under actual conditions, and never was more than one-tenth of the brigade employed in a single attack.
"Had the army air service been permitted to attack as it desired, none of the seacraft attacked would have lasted 10 minutes in a serviceable condition. The first provisional air brigade could have put out of action the entire Atlantic fleet in a single attack. The value of the airplanes in the first brigade did not exceed the cost of a modern destroyer."
General Mitchell then explains how battleships under war conditions are much more vulnerable than the targets used in the bombing tests. A battleship with full steam up and speeding ahead is a target much easier to hit and to put out of commission than the targets used, he asserts.
"The problem of destruction of seacraft by forces has been solved and is finished," the report goes on. "It is now necessary to provide an air organization and a method of defending not only our coast cities, but our interior cities against the attack of hostile air forces. Our recent maneuvers show an enemy having gained control of the air—which gives him control of the sea—may land air forces from airplane carriers on any of the islands or keys along our coast, which cannot attack by troops or artillery, and from those points launch air attacks against our great centers of population, extending even to Chicago, St. Louis and other Middle Western cities."
The report then explains how Chicago, St. Paul, Omaha, Kansas City and other cities in the Central West would be laid open to airplane attacks and their cities bombed with high explosives and the citizens killed with gas and incendiary bombs.
In conclusion, General Mitchell makes the following recommendations:
- The establishment of an air force for frontier and coast defense.
- The equipment of the navy for offenses on the high sea, and not for coast work.
- Navy control should cease 200 miles from shore, protection of the land and the coast defenses being left to the army and the air service.
- A more co-ordinate and working understanding between the different arms of the service. The present system, a heritage of our early wars, has clearly demonstrated that the present lack of co-operation is a serious fault.
"In this connection," the report states, "an efficient solution of our defensive needs will not exist until a department of national defense is organized with a staff common to all services. Sub-secretaries for the army, the navy and for the air service must be created."—Aviation, 26 September, 1921.
The Lesson of the "ZR-2" Disaster.—The two chief questions which, in connection with the accidental destruction of the rigid airship ZR-2 (or R-38) come to the mind of the average person are:
- What was the matter with the ZR-2?
- Was her purchase by the United States Navy justified?
While it is yet premature, pending the findings of the official inquiry, to state with finality what caused the terrible disaster, it is not difficult to visualize what went wrong with the ZR-2. Statements by survivors seem to establish pretty definitely that the big airship broke in two not under the strain of full speed trials, as had first been assumed, but that the longitudinals snapped when the helm was put hard over. The commander of the dirigible, who was rescued, has declared that at the time of the accident the ship was making 50 knots—as against 65 knots "all out." On the other hand, another survivor. Lieutenant Bateman, states that just prior to the accident the ship had made turning tests, and that two turns had been managed without difficulty, but that on the third the vessel broke her back. His statement is particularly significant in view of the fact that he was able to observe the working of the rudders as he was seated in the stern cockpit, which is aft of the rudders.
So it becomes obvious that the ship was turned too suddenly for the speed at which she was flying, although this maneuver might have been totally harmless at a lesser speed.
This is still a further point to be considered: information reaching this country from men who were in close contact with the development and trials of the ZR-2 shows that her control surfaces were overbalanced. That is to say, the balanced portion of the rudders was so large that they were extremely sensitive to air pressure, so that when the ship was under way a slight turn of the steering wheel would suffice to whip about the rudders. At high speed this would naturally cause a tremendous strain on the 700-feet-long framework.
It would therefore seem that the design of the ZR-2's rudders was faulty. This defect, which might have been easily remedied, would not have been a serious matter on a stronger ship. But the ZR-2, far from being a strong ship, was what one may call an "extra-light" vessel—a feature which borders on structural weakness. To understand the why and wherefore of the situation we must look at the history of rigid airship development, which takes us back to Count Zeppelin.
Germany launched her first "super-Zeppelin," a 2,000,000 cu. ft. vessel, in 1916, after fifteen years' experience in this branch of engineering, in which period she built some sixty Zeppelins ranging all the way from 400,000 cu. ft. to 1,250,000 cu. ft. In the fall of 1916 one such super-Zeppelin, the L-S3, was brought down fairly intact in England and the British Admiralty instructed its airship designers to duplicate it. Up to that time British experience in rigid airship design and construction was limited to that obtained from a number of experimental ships that were being built after very incomplete drawings of pre-war Zeppelins. The British copy of the L-33 called the R-33 was only finished after the armistice, her trials taking place in the spring of 1919. Although the vessel embodied some improvements found in another captured Zeppelin, the L-40, which had come down intact in France, it should be pointed out that while the latter ship had a useful load of 39 tons, and the L-33 one of 30 tons, the British copy of these 2,000,000 cu. ft. dirigibles had only a useful load of 24 tons. All of which is merely mentioned to show that a painstaking copy of an engineering structure will not necessarily be identical in all respects with the prototype—although they may look alike.
But while the R-33 carried a smaller useful load than her German sisterships, she seemed to be in every way as strong as the latter. How strong the hull of these ships was, the R-34 (sistership of the R-33) demonstrated at Mineola, Long Island, where for four days she withstood the buffeting by winds, although on one occasion with the anchorage fitting of the main handling rope was pulled clean out of the framework.
The success of the R-32 class airships prompted the British Admiralty in 1918 to prepare drawings for a much larger class of airships which were to be superior to the German L-71 type. This was the ill-fated R-38 (the ZR-2, as we call it) class, which incorporated numerous novel and original ideas. Now, it should be emphasized that when this class was laid down, all the experience the British had in rigid airship construction had been derived from copying German ships. The only firm which eventually was to produce a highly successful original design Vickers. Ltd., with their R-80) had not by then emerged from the experimental period of their work; their experience was therefore unavailable.
And what may strike the reader as particularly odd, the Admiralty gave the contract for the construction of the R-38 (or ZR-2) to Short Bros, of Bedford—a firm that had never before built a Zeppelin, type airship and whose entire experience with rigids was obtained from the building of R-31 and R-32, which were patterned after the plywood-framed Schuette-Lanz type.
Here then we have, in part at least, the answer to the question which heads this article: What was the matter with the ZR-2? This ship was built in a factory that had no previous experience with duralumin airship construction, and to plans which were not based on practical experience. To cite but one instance, the well-proven radial truss of the transverse frames was replaced on the ZR-2 by a tangential truss system, the merit of which had yet to be demonstrated. In this connection I cannot do less but pay a respectful homage to the memory of the late Colonel Campbell, chief airship designer of the Admiralty, who had sufficient faith in his ideas to go up on the ZR-2 during her several trial trips and who lost his life with the ship.
Knowing the circumstances which surrounded the construction of the ZR-2, we begin to understand why, as one report has it "several girders were strained in the factory when as many as thirty fitters crowded on them in the course of the assembly work." It is quite conceivable that workmen accustomed to the resiliency of plywood girders would do such a thing and that their foreman, not knowing any better, would not warn them. And a 700-foot airship is such a gigantic structure that the engineers familiar with the vagaries of duralumin—whom the Admiralty had detailed to the Short Works—could not personally supervise every detail.
For the sake of completeness it may be added that when Messrs. Short Bros, closed down their airship department, the Admiralty took over their factory and completed the ZR-2, whereupon she was handed over to the British Air Ministry.
That the hull of the ZR-2 was structurally weak was first demonstrated on the inflation of the ship when, due to unequal load distribution, several girders buckled. The failing members were repaired, but during the first trial flight trouble was again experienced from several intermediate longitudinals and transverse frames, so that it became necessary to reinforce certain portions of the framework. Details are not available as to the exact nature of the stiffening work, but one might suggest that by reinforcing certain girders others may have been further weakened. Of course, this is merely a guess.
Judging however from all that has been said before it appears beyond a doubt that the ZR-2 was structurally weak—a condition brought about by the desire to carry the greatest possible useful load. This, as originally designed, was to be in excess of 50 tons, but it was subsequently reduced by the fitting of a bow mooring gear, not to speak of the reinforcement of the hull.
As to the second question we have placed at the head of this article: "Was the purchase of the R-38 by the United States Navy justified?"—it would seem to the impartial observer that it was not.
Indeed, why should the government spend abroad $2,000,000 on a foreign-built, untried type of dirigible?
On the one hand the navy is desirous of developing rigid airships in this country. This cannot be brought about only through experimentation, and it will be admitted that if the necessarily heavy financial outlay has to be faced it will better serve its purpose if the money is spent here rather than abroad. American inventive genius is second to none in the world and can be relied upon to solve the problems of rigid airship construction just as well as it has solved other engineering problems.
On the other hand, if the Navy Department—which is in charge of rigid airship development to the exclusion of the army—wanted to have a ready-made airship of proven design, it would seem that it could have secured from Germany, without cost, by virtue of America's participation in the victory—a dirigible that would have been far superior to the R-38. This will be seen from the appended table which gives the chief characteristics of the R-38 and of the L-71, Germany's largest Zeppelin, which was surrendered to Great Britain, while her sister ship, the L-72, was surrendered to France:
Type | Capacity, cu. ft. | Length, ft. | Diameter, ft. | Total H.P. | Useful load (tons) | High speed miles per hour |
R-38 | 2,720,000 | 695 | 85 | 2100 | 50 (?) | 75 |
L-71 | 2,420,000 | 745 | 79 | 1740 | 48 | 75 |
It is not generally know that while the war spoils of the United States include a great number of airplanes and engines, the lighter-than-air material of Germany was entirely divided up between Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, the United States merely playing the role of a disinterested spectator. That this was a grievous mistake, will be readily conceded by all those concerned with the development of American airships.—Scientific American, 17 September, 1921.
Settlement for the "R-38."—When the time comes to take up the matter of the financial adjustment incident to the wrecking of the R-38 a proposal will be made to the British Government that one of the one time German dirigibles be turned over to the United States. Just how this suggestion will be received by the British cannot be contemplated, but the naval officers connected with aviation, particularly lighter-than-air craft, are hopeful it will bear fruit.
The British Government has three of the one time German airships. They were turned over to the British Government under the terms of the armistice.
They are much smaller than the R-38. One of them is only half the size, while two are about two-thirds the size.
The contract price for the R-38 was $2,000,000, of which amount $1,500,000 had been paid to the British Government for the account of the manufacturers. Under the terms of the contract the United States was to pay half and the British Government half in the event of an accident.
Nothing has been done as yet regarding a financial settlement. The officers of the navy have felt that this matter could wait until the bodies of the victims had been buried.—Aviation, 26 September.
What Crumpled Up the "ZR-2?"—This is likely to be discussed for many months by engineers. The answer will have an important bearing on the future of aerial navigation. Few technical authorities have yet spoken. The daily press seems doubtful—the point of general agreement being that a disaster like that which befell the ill-fated dirigible is certainly not normal. Something was the matter. What was it? One of two voices, to be sure, may be heard to suggest that after all perhaps it could not have been otherwise, and to point to what they assert to be a fact—that no German Zeppelin ever lived more than six months. Most writers, however, assume that the accident was avoidable, and the technical papers that have so far commented on it attribute it to structural weakness, which from one standpoint is reassuring, for that which is weak may be made stronger. An editorial writer in The Engineering News-Record (New York) declares that one or two of the numerous points of obscurity concerning the disaster should be cleared up soon. He writes:
"The first is the fundamental question of competence in the construction: Was every opportunity taken to apply the knowledge gathered from past experience? In other words, was the collapse the result of faulty or neglectful design, or does the accident truly represent insufficiency of existing knowledge? Next, but related to the preceding, is the question of whether this dirigible was planned on a scale so far beyond the range of past experience as to make the failure attributable to that fact itself. The danger of an abrupt change of scale of construction is known from many past experiences, and if excessive size is the secret of the present accident, there is less occasion for alarm. But in that event it becomes more surprising that 45 or 50 valuable lives were put at risk in a machine whose safety was still questionable.
"One fact of the disaster, in some respects its most damning feature, yet gives reason for a hopeful view as to the possibilities of the dirigible; the fact that the fall was due to a structural failure, not to defects of the lifting or driving equipment. If the constructors of aerial vessels have mastered all their problems other than structural, if they have made gas bags, machinery, and controls quite dependable, the outlook is bright, for nothing remains but to perfect the structural element of the vessel, and the road to this objective is a well-explored one. The loading must be determined, and thereafter it is only necessary to apply the resources of a well-developed art to obtain completely sound construction. The difficulties which lie in the determination of the loads may need to be approached by gradual steps; for the phenomena involved in the resistance of a slender bag structure hundreds of feet long to air forces are as indeterminate as those of wave loading on a ship's hull, and at the same time vastly more complex than the latter. But certain it is that every experience in aerial navigation will contribute to building up an increasing body of knowledge, leading constantly closer to the required certainty and safety.
"In the infinitely more difficult field of airplane construction, a truly wonderful degree of reliability has been attained—and this during a period much shorter than the history of lighter-than-air navigation. This result was achieved by ceaseless, undismayed work at the solution of the many baffling problems presented. Very much of the knowledge had to be gained at the cost of accident, but each accident was used as a step to fuller knowledge and sounder construction. If the only remaining problems of dirigible construction are of the structural kind, a simpler and more rapid development may be forecast.—Literary Digest, 24 September.
"ZR-2" Memorial Services in Westminster.—Airmen of the United States Navy and the British Royal Air Force united September 7 in a service for the victims of the ZR-2 disaster "amid the memorials of Great Britain's most illustrious dead," as one of the prayers expressed it, in Westminster Abbey.
Air Commander Maitland, D. S. O., and Commander Louis Maxfield, U. S. N., were especially mentioned in the official program, but among the mourners no distinction was made, and the wives of ordinary riggers and of scientific experts sat side by side in seats reserved for them. Ambassador Harvey, Vice Admiral Niblack, Rear Admiral Twining and Consul General Skinner were among the well-known Americans seated in the choir. Near them were representatives of the King and Queen, the British Cabinet and the naval, military and air forces. The Lord Mayors of London and Hull and the Mayors of Westminster and Bedford attended in State, and a large number of British flying officers, with rows of ribbons worn by hard adventure worn across their tunics, also came to pay tribute to their fellow-aviators.
The general public filled every seat in the nave, hundreds being turned away disappointed. Just before the service began a detachment of sailors from the United States battleship Utah marched in. Near them was another group of American sailors of still more significance. They were all that are left of the crew of the ZR-2, men who were left behind at the Howden aerodrome as she started on her last cruise.
An address was read from the chancel steps by the Rev. H. D. L. Viener, chaplain in chief to the Royal Air Force. He described how the Americans and British air forces had been associated in developing "a once formidable engine of destruction into a pioneer of closer commercial relations," and dwelt upon the horror of the catastrophe when long months of training were over and only the eagerly awaited voyage home seemed to remain.
"The price of progress and the toll of science," he explained, "are bitter enough. Yet, thank God, there is never lack of splendid men ready to do and to dare. It is best so. To be in the forefront of the fight to conquer what half a generation ago was an untried field will ever appeal to our splendid manhood."
As he finished the choir broke into "Mine Eyes Have Seen the Glory of the Coming of the Lord," and never did the old battle hymn seem to come with more appropriateness. The service closed with prayers and a hymn which here is imperishably associated with trials, vicissitudes and triumphs of the great war, "O God, Our Help in Ages Past." Then, after the blessing, the congregation stood motionless as the bugle notes of "The Last Post," wailed through the lofty arches and the American and British national anthems were sung.
Secretary Denby has been advised that the British cruiser Dauntless, which is bringing home the bodies of the officers and men of the navy who lost their lives in the ZR-2 disaster, will arrive in New York late on September 16, or early in the morning of the 17th.
The ship will dock at South Brooklyn and ceremonies will be held on the dock at 2 o'clock Saturday afternoon, September 17. All arrangements in connection with these ceremonies will be made by the commandant of the Third Naval District, Captain C. T. Vogelgesang.—Aerial Age Weekly, 19 September.
Bombing Tests of the U. S. S. "Alabama."—To enable the Army Air Service to pursue bombing experiments against warships supplementary to the tests conducted last June and July off the Virginia Capes, the Navy Department has turned over to the War Department the obsolete battleship Alabama.
The objects of the tests conducted with the Alabama are described in an Army Air Service communiqué as follows:
Objects of the Tests.—(a) To determine what explosive or gas effect is needed to put seacraft out of action. It has been demonstrated that seacraft may be utterly destroyed; but obviously, if the system of fire control, communication and mechanical installations of vessels can be disrupted and the nervous systems of the human beings who man seacraft can be shattered, the efficiency of the craft is destroyed without necessarily sinking it.
(b) To determine the effect of smoke bombs in concealing the attack of aircraft and of the effect of white phosphorous clouds in neutralizing antiaircraft elements.
(c) To determine the effect of machine gun fire and fragmentation bombs in clearing the ship's decks of anti-aircraft units.
(d) To determine the feasibility and effect of night attacks on seacraft. There will be two distinct phases in the operation—the first, purely experimental in its nature to determine the effects of various auxiliary agents in the attack, the second, to consist of attack proper, simulating as nearly as practicable service conditions.
Location of Target.—Target will be located in Chesapeake Bay in the vicinity of the ex-San Marcos. Operations at the target will be controlled from the subchaser.
Board of Observers.—A Board of Observers consisting of three Air Service officers, two ordnance officers and two officers of the Chemical Warfare Service will inspect the results of tests and attacks on the battleship as indicated hereafter.
An advanced airdrome will be established near the target. A radio station will be established at that point by the communications section. The sub-chaser, one gig, and the Sea Hornet will be stationed at this airdrome during the operations for the purpose of transporting the Board of Observers and other visitors to and from the scene of the bombing, and for rescue work. During bombing the Board of Observers will be stationed aboard the sub-chaser.
Description of Tests and of Attacks.—In the preliminary tests a sufficient number of bombs and flares of all types will be dropped to determine the effect of each and the best method of tactical employment. It is anticipated that experiments with tear gas bombs will give important data on the attack of battleships by gas bombs. In similar manner the effect of phosphorous and smoke bombs will be determined. It is believed that smoke screens may be used with great effect in protecting the attacking airplanes from anti-aircraft defenses of seacraft. In order to determine this a series of tests will be held in which the various branches of aviation will make simulated attacks on the battleship through smoke screens.
Night Attacks.—The tactical effectiveness of .flares in illuminating the attack of battleships will be determined in the preliminary tests as well as the effect of white phosphorus in outlining seacraft at night with sufficient distinctness to permit accurate attacks.
Tests will also be conducted to determine the effect of the 1100-pound armor-piercing bomb.
Upon the completion of the above-named tests an attack will be made on the battleship. This will be for tactical purposes and will employ the 1100-pound, 2000-pound and 4000-pound demolition bombs.
First Day. Tests with Chemical Agents.—In order to determine the effect of each of the following type of chemical bombs, tests will be made in the order listed below:
Tests | Planes | Types of bombs | Number of bombs |
1 | 1-M.B.11 | 50-lb. smoke bomb, navy type | 4 |
2 | 1-D.H.4B | 25-lb. Mark I, phosphorous | 4 |
3 | 1-M.B.11 | 100-lb. Mark II, phosphorous | 4 |
4 | 1-M.B.11 | 50-lb. Mark III, white phosphorous | 2 |
5 | 2-D.H.4B | 25-lb. Mark I, C&CT | 16 |
6 | 2-M.B.11 | 50-lb. Mark I (lead lined) tear gas | 8 |
In each attack one plane carrying the same number and type of bombs will accompany the attacking planes to the objective but will not release the bombs unless one of the planes is forced to abandon the mission.
Second Day. Smoke Screen Tests. In order to determine the best method of employing smoke screens with the various branches of aviation, experimental flights will be made by pursuit planes, light bombing planes, and heavy bombing planes. Only light bombs will, however, be used and their effect on targets observed. List of tests in the order in which they will be conducted follows:
Tests | Planes | Types of bombs | Number of bombs |
1 | Fl. of 3 D.H.4B | 50-lb. smoke bombs, navy type | 12 |
? | Fl. of 5 SE-5’s | 25-lb. Copper bombs | 20 |
2 | Fl. of 3 D.H.4B’s | 100-lb. Mark I leaded with phosphorous | 12 |
? | Fl. of 3 D.H.4B’s | 50-lb. smoke bomb, navy type | 12 |
3 | Fl. of 3 D.H.4B’s | 50-lb. smoke bomb | 12 |
? | Fl. of 3 M.B.11’s | 100-lb. demolition Mark I | 12 |
4 | 1 M.B.11 | 1110-lb. armor-piercing shell | 1 |
Upon the conclusion of each test there will be an examination of the Alabama by the Board of Observers to determine the results obtained.
First Night. Tests of Illuminating Bombs and Flares.—In order to investigate the results of bombing at night and the illuminating effects of parachute flares and white phosphorous bombs as an aid in accurately locating the objective, the following tests will be conducted in conjunction with the dropping of illuminating flares and bombs.
Tests | Planes | Types of bombs | Number of bombs |
1 | 1-D.H.4B | 50-lb. Mark III (leaded with white phosphorous) | 2 |
? | 1-D.H.4B | 25-lb. Mark I, demolition | 4 |
2 | 1-D.H.4B | Michelin flare, Mark I | 4 |
? | 1-D.H.4B | 25-lb. Mark I, phosphorous | 4 |
3 | 1-D.H.4B | 50-lb. Mark III (loaded with white phosphorous) | 2 |
? | 1-M.B.11 | 100-lb. Mark I, demolition | 8 |
4 | 2-D.H.4B | 30-lb. Mark III (leaded with white phosphorous) | 4 |
? | 2-M.B.11 | 100-lb. Mark I, demolition | 12 |
4 | 1-D.H.4B | Michelin flare, Mark I | 4 |
? | 1-D.H.4B | 100-lb. Mark I, phosphorous | 2 |
? | 1-M.B.11 | 100-lb. Mark I, demolition | 6 |
Upon the conclusion of these attacks there will be an examination of the Alabama by the Board of Observers to investigate the results obtained.
Second Night.—On the second night an attack will be made for the purpose of destroying the Alabama. Following will be the order of attacks:
Tests | Planes | Types of bombs | Number of bombs |
1 | 1-H.P. | 4000-lb. demolition (if available) (successive attacks will be made by a single H.P.) | 3 |
2 | 8-M.B.23 | 2000-lb. demolition | 8 |
First Day of Tests.—The first day of tests (chemical agents) was September 23. The following particulars of these tests are reproduced by courtesy of The New York Times:
A fleet of planes from Langley Field poured a constant fire of chemical bombs on the ship, at times hiding her completely from view in dense clouds of white smoke and flooding her decks with tear gas.
At noon a Martin bomber flew by at 75 miles an hour, dropping four 100-pound phosphorous bombs, each of which struck squarely on the vessel. As the "eggs" hit the battleship the phosphorous splashed up and fell to the decks in gray clusters of spray. Flashes of flame flowed through the thick smoke, but were almost instantly obscured by a cloud of dense white fog.
The Alabama was hit on the after fighting top, on the bridge, just aft the forward turret and on the stern. For a long time flames burned the planking of the Alabama's deck, and when the army and navy observers went to view the effect upon the target the fire was still raging.
As no men were stationed on board the Alabama during this or any other test, the personnel of the ship was represented by wooden boxes at various posts. Practically every one of these was scarred and discolored by the phosphorus gas, showing that if the ship had been manned her officers and enlisted men would have been knocked out by the choking chemicals.
Besides phosphorus bombs, smoke bombs were used to show that a heavy smoke screen could be so dropped that it would entirely hide oncoming aircraft and also the target itself.
Still another experiment was conducted with tear-gas bombs. Three direct hits were made with bombs manufactured at Edgewood Arsenal especially for use during the Mingo Miners' war.
These contained only a 10 per cent mixture of tear gas for they were intended to frighten rather than to injure for a long period. The bombs were so drastic in their effect that forty-five minutes after they struck the vessel observers were unable to penetrate the ship without gas masks.
Night Bombing Test.—The night bombing test, September 23-24, resulted in several direct hits being made on the Alabama by attacking airplanes.
Sopwiths darted down at an angle of 45 degrees as they neared the vessel, and the airmen let loose their machine guns as in actual battle combat. The purpose of this was to destroy the morale of the attacked ship's personnel.
As they crossed over the ship from prow to stern the aviators dropped their demolition bombs in pairs. The gleaming missiles were easily seen as they fell through the air. Many struck in the water near the ship. One hit the forward turret and another the aft basket mast. Still another struck a searchlight and a fourth smashed the bridge to pieces.
The aviators seemed to gain better aim each time they returned to the target. At first they were inclined to shoot short of the vessel, but, learning the wind, they held their fire until close in at about a 200-foot range.
Following the Sopwiths came the four Martin bombers. The first dropped two of her 300-pound bombs in the sea beside the Alabama from a height of 1500 feet, but the third machine let go her two bombs directly on the forward deck. As the first bomb struck the prow of the Alabama a column of flame shot up.
This hit was considered a feat by the Air Service observers because the wind had shifted and the Martin bombers were crossing the target amidships, leaving a narrow target.
Second Day Test.—The second day test, September 24, started with nine DH-4 Air Service machines laying a smoke screen across the windward side of the Alabama. Some of the smoke bombs did not ignite, but eight caught fire and a fan-shaped cloud arose which hid all the vessel except her bow.
This test was followed by bombing attacks with 300-pound bombs dropped by Martin bombers. One of these bombs hit on the bow of the ship and tore through her first deck, spreading the sides of the jagged hole upward so far that the guns of her forward turret would have been unable to sight above the wreckage.
The crew's quarters below this deck were demolished. A second bomb, dropped with the first, followed through the hole made by the first, causing more destruction.
In addition to the Martin bombers, a fleet of eight SE-5 planes dropped thirty-two bombs, many of which struck the ship in vital spots. Her communication systems were shot away, her fighting masts badly damaged and some of her searchlights were put out of commission.
So terrific were some of the explosions that the battered Alabama tore loose from her anchor chains and drifted down toward the wreck of the San Marcos and the Indiana.
The next morning the ship was seen to be on fire, and mine sweepers made fast to the hulk and fought the fire back into the holds, where it was not believed it would accomplish much additional damage.
The Alabama is Sunk.—The final attack on the Alabama, on September 26, resulted in the ship being sunk by a 2000-pound demolition bomb.
The bomb tore off her mast, destroyed her superstructure and turned her over on her side in shallow water. Six other planes almost simultaneously rained 1000 and 2000-pound bombs on the hulk as she went down. Four hit the vessel as she trundled over and the remainder landed in the water within 20 to 30 feet.
The plane which gave the Alabama her death blow flew over the vessel and dropped a 100-pound sighting bomb. Her pilot then guided her back, and from observations taken the 2000-pound bomb was dropped in the identical spot where the sighting bomb hit—directly at the base of the mainmast.
The scoring by the seven planes participating in the final attack was 100 per cent, Air Service officers said.—Aviation, 3 October, 1921.
New Italian Airship.—The French Government is reported to be investigating a new lighter-than-air flying machine which is under construction at Naples. Using no gas, it is based upon the principle of the lightness of rarefied air. By a variable exhaustion of air in a series of envelopes, levitation is obtained.
The machine is the invention of two Italians, Vaugeau and Gargiulo. They do not form anything like a perfect vacuum, but by a system of enclosed reservoirs, the center one of which has the greatest rarefication, they say that they have obtained the result that the pressure of the outside atmosphere is lessened to a degree which makes the frail envelope practicable.
There are three features of the construction. The first is a double envelope one part with another. In the outside envelope an atmosphere of seven-tenths is maintained, whereas in the center envelope the air is much more rarefied. The layer of seven-tenths atmosphere weakens the outside pressure upon the interior of the balloon, which exercises the levitation force.
The second feature is a series of hollow beams forming the frame of the machine, through which compressed air circulates in a manner to exert a counteracting pressure against the outside atmosphere.
The third feature makes use of air heated by the motors to obtain a further decrease of the outside pressure.
Professor Garuffa, an Italian expert, holds that the new machine means a revolution in flying. It will do away with the expense of the use of hydrogen and, it is said, will greatly reduce the crews needed.
The inventors say that the machine when perfected can make 350 miles an hour with 750 horsepower.—Aerial Age Weekly, 19 September, 1921.
British Aerial Transport.—A type of aircraft which is quite new in some of its features is being constructed at Bristol for the government.
In describing it a Daily Mail correspondent says: Viewed even from a distance the colossus looks astonishingly large. Seen close at hand, with the framework of its tiers of wings, as yet uncovered, stretching one above another on either side of its tremendous hull, the machine almost takes one's breath away.
Gone is the day of aeroplanes as we have pictured them hitherto. This machine wants a new name. Its body makes one think of the slim lines of a speedy sea vessel. Then, when you are inside it, the impression is rather like that of some Pullman-car express on a glorified scale. But it is not really like a ship or any earth vehicle. Those working on it merely call it an "aerial transport."
It may be used to carry troops. It is big enough to act as a tender for a squadron of aeroplanes, carrying fuel and spare parts for them. It may be fitted up as a Red Cross craft of the air and have its lofty main saloon equipped as an operating theatre.
Concentrated Power Units.—There is an engine-room inside the monster's hull. Banished here at last is that "amateurish" scheme of dotting motors with their propellers out somewhere on wings where they are inaccessible. Here there is a battery of engines, with their many gleaming cylinders, grouped in orderly precision; and—what makes the expert pause—such a system of gearing and power transmission as has never been fitted to any flying craft before.
It is from this engine room that the power will be transmitted to propellers on the wings; and if the experiment succeeds it will open up a completely new field. There is talk, for instance already, of obtaining a number of the huge 1000 h. p. aero engines now reaching perfection and using them for an enormous craft which may surpass our wildest dreams.
This Bristol giant will fly by night and day. The peril of forced landing—that bugbear of the aeroplane—is practically eliminated. If any portion of the power-plant gives trouble there will be mechanics in the engine room to put it right while the machine is in the air, the other working units being accelerated meanwhile to give the power sufficient to maintain altitude and speed.—Naval and Military Record.
The Parseval Semi-Rigid Airship "PL-27."—The development of the German non-rigid PL airships occurred between 1906 and 1917. These two letters stand for "Parseval Luftshiff." The Parseval airships are all built according to the patents of Major August von Parseval, Dr.-Engineer, by the Luft Fahrzeug Gesellshaft (L.F.G.) at Berlin and Bitterfeld. That the Parseval airships were successful is attested by the fact that they were used before the war in Austria, England, Italy, Russia, and Japan.
Since 1913 all Parseval airships were constructed with envelopes having the Parseval patent trajectory band system of car suspension, which is a very efficient system of non-rigid construction. The PL-27, built during 1916, is in reality a semi-non-rigid, although classified in Germany as a non-rigid one. Within the envelope of this ship there is a V-shaped keel extending almost the entire length of the aircraft and containing the narrow runway or "catswalk" common to all large airships of the Zeppelin or rigid type. Forward, beneath this, is the navigating car or gondola,' while immediately behind it is the first power car in a central position. In the center of the dirigible, on each side of the keel, are two power "eggs" or cars similar to those used on the later types of Zeppelins. At almost the extreme aft end of the keel is located another power car. All of the power cars are carefully streamlined. The gasoline tanks and water ballast bags are located on each side of the runway, the same as in rigid airships. PL-27 is the largest "semi-non-rigid" airship built to date, and her performances have been extremely good, especially as regards useful load and speed. Nothing has heretofore been published about the carefully guarded development of this type of ship that took place in Germany during the late war.
The interesting and important main dimensions, weights, performances, etc., are as follows:
Capacity, 1,000,000 cubic feet; length over all, 518 feet; diameter, 64.3 feet; total load, 74,700 pounds; useful load, 30,600 pounds; number of engines, 4; make of engines, Maybach; total horsepower, 960: propellers, 4 two-bladed of wood; speed, 72 miles per hour.
Account must be taken of the complexity of a non-rigid airship of such dimensions. It has the advantage, however, of not being so liable to break its back, or certain girders thereof, as happened in the case of the ZR-2, with such unfortunate results. If, instead of prohibiting experimentation of any sort with airships by Germany in the Versailles Treaty, the United States had allowed construction and experiments to continue to a certain limited extent, she would undoubtedly have benefited thereby in her new policy of aircraft construction, as proper tests of PL-27 would probably show her to be superior to the Zeppelins as regards economy and useful weight lifted, although at present the latter type of airship is considered in Germany to be better for long-distance transportation.—Scientific American, 1 October, 1921.
Lieut. Macready Sets New Altitude Record by Flight of 40,800 Feet at Dayton Field.—Lieutenant John A. Macready, a test pilot at McCook Field, to-day shattered the world's altitude record, attaining a height of 40,800 feet in the same La Pere biplane used by Rudolph C. Schroeder, who set a record of 38,180 feet on February 28, 1920.
Lieutenant Macready was in the air 1 hour and 47 minutes, requiring all but a few minutes of the total flying time to reach his mark. At 39,000 feet ice formed on his oxygen tank, but he pressed on until the altimeter registered 41,000 feet. At this point his engine coughed and died. He then glided safely to the ground.
Macready's new record is 2620 feet higher than that of Schroeder, and in this flight the pilot suffered none of the hardship met by the former chief test pilot. Schroeder's eyeballs froze and excessive dilation of the heart kept him in a hospital nearly two weeks after the flight. On landing Macready declared he suffered only from numbness. He climbed out of the plane unassisted and posed for photographs.
Lieutenant George B. Patterson, chief of the technical data section of the field, took charge of Macready's instruments, and following calibration announced the official altitude as 40,800 feet.
Macready was clothed in the heaviest furs with special helmet and goggles. To insure clear vision a special gelatin was used on the goggles to prevent collection of ice. The suit was electrically heated throughout.
A centrifugal air compressor operated by a gas turbine forms the supercharger which made the flight possible. The turbine derives its power from the hot exhaust gas of the Liberty motor with which the ship is equipped, and air thus compressed is, fed to the carbureter at the same pressure as air at sea level.—New York Times, 29 September, 1921.
NAVIGATION AND RADIO
The Voyage of the "Quest."—It is possible that the voyage of the Quest, under Sir Ernest Shackleton, may lead to a substantial addition to the sum of knowledge of the conditions obtaining in the upper air. Sir Ernest recently offered his services to the British Air Ministry to carry out meteorological observations and to gather topographical information during his forthcoming expedition to the Atlantic, Southern and Indian Oceans. The Quest has been furnished with instruments and equipment necessary for carrying out observations, and she has been constituted an official reporting ship to the Meteorological Office. She has also been supplied with photographic apparatus and with kites similar to those employed in the investigation of the upper air over the Atlantic during the voyage of the steamship Montcalm prior to the flight of R-34 in 1919. It is further proposed to take records of the temperature and pressure of the upper air by using a seaplane which is to accompany the expedition. As the ship will, among other places, visit the islands of SL Paul's Rocks and Tristan d'Acunha, in the Southern Atlantic, some valuable data should be collected. The first of these groups lies on the route which would probably be followed by aircraft flying via a position almost midway between South America and South Africa.—Aerial Age Weekly, 30 September, 1921.
Wireless Direction Service on British Columbia Coast.—The first modern device for directing steamers by wireless on the British Columbia Coast has been erected at Tatoosh, and is now in operation. All shipping masters are invited to make full use of this apparatus by which, it is claimed, steamers can be directed in a fog as easily as they can find their way in broad daylight.—Nautical Gazette, 1 October, 1921.
ENGINEERING
Brueggerman Water-Tube Boiler.—The feature of the Brueggerman water-tube boiler is a water-storage reservoir that is connected with the drums of the generating part of the boiler. The upper part of the reservoir is utilized as a steam dome. The water of circulation passes through the main chamber of the reservoir, and the gases of combustion pass around it.
The generating part of the boiler consists of the upper and lower drums A and B, which are connected by a bank of inclined tubes C. Water is supplied to the drum B from the vertical cylindrical reservoir, which is divided by the tube plates E and F into three compartments, the upper one, G serving as a steam dome. The center portion as a water reservoir, and the lower chamber I connecting through the nozzle J with the lower drum B. The drum A is connected to G by the pipes K which are arranged below the water line. The steam space of the drum A is connected by the pipes L with the steam space of the chamber G. Tubes M extend from the upper plate E through to the corresponding lower plate, and serve to carry the water of circulation.
The feed water enters through the pipe R and discharges from the tube H just above the plate F. It then rises and passes to the pipe N overflowing to the horizontal plates that are arranged around the pine N in step fashion. As the hot water rises through the pipe N it overflows on the plates, which breaks up the hot water and frees the air.
Circulation of the water from the drum A through the pipes K to the lower part of the steam drum G and downward through the tubes M through the nozzle J and tubes C to the drum A. The hot water in passing downward through the tubes M heats the water in the storage reservoir and this water will be heated also by the flue gases which pass around the outside of the reservoir.
The furnace gases follow the course shown by the arrows. From the back of the furnace the hot gases pass upward in the flue in which the reservoir is located, over the vertical baffle P, shown by dotted lines, and then down and out through the discharge flue Q to the chimney.
The lower part of the chamber I is fitted with a blow-off. The water enters the coldest part of the boiler, and, rising in the reservoir, is heated, serving to separate and deposit the scale-making materials, which collect on the lower plate F and can be blown off when desired. This boiler is patented by Albert L. Brueggerman, Newark, N. J.—Power, 27 September, 1921.
The Airship Disaster.—When the Quebec Bridge failed the general feeling in the engineering profession was that the disaster was due not to lack of competence on the part of the designers and erectors, but rather to a lack of knowledge of the behavior of structures of such size.
In the early days of ore transportation on the Great Lakes there were several failures of steel ore boats which simply broke in the middle and plunged to the bottom like a stone. This, again, was ultimately found to be due to peculiar and, until then, unknown stresses to which vessels of such great length were subjected in certain parts of the Great Lakes. Once this became known, a comparatively simple change of design was made and ore transportation became safe.
There is good reason to believe that the fundamental cause of the airship disaster lies also in lack of knowledge of vital elements underlying the design of large airships. It is, at times, difficult to realize how slight our knowledge of airship engineering really is. We are dealing with structures 600 to 700 feet long, weighing in the air next to nothing. At both ends of these immensely long structures we have operable planes (rudders and elevators) of very considerable size, presenting resistance to the air equal to a pressure estimable in tons, which, with a leverage of some 300 feet, must impose tremendous stresses amidships. What these stresses are we do not know, nor have we either experimental or mathematical bases for computation. This is particularly so, as we do not even know to what extent the theoretically rigid dirigible is capable of flexure.
Such a situation would have been bad enough if we were dealing with materials with whose behavior we are familiar, but we are not. The main resistance parts of the dirigible are constructed of the so-called "duralumin"—an alloy of aluminum and copper, or aluminum and zinc, or all three of them. Duralumin is, however, a new alloy, practically a "war baby," and we have only scant knowledge as to its behavior and next to no knowledge as to its ability to withstand repeated stresses—something of particularly great importance in a structure that is vibrating like a string all the time. In airship design we have therefore to meet unknown stresses with a material of unknown qualities, which would be bad enough in itself but is stupendously aggravated by another circumstance, and that is the very low factor of safety employed in airship construction.
In a bridge, an ore boat, an automobile, generous factors of safety are used wherever there is doubt as to the stresses to which a member is likely to be submitted, because there is no vital gain outside of the cost consideration, which should be secondary in using excessively light members. But this is not so in an airship. If the latter is designed to fly across the Atlantic it must carry a certain weight of gasoline, oil and useful load, and every pound of these supplies reduces by a pound the weight of the metal that can be put into the structure, and hence the factor of safety, with the result that members one-sixteenth to one-eighth of an inch in thickness are by no means uncommon in dirigible construction; and members of such slender dimensions in duralumin, under the tremendous stresses they are called upon to withstand, no longer possess a factor of safety, but rather a factor of daring.
The airship has a certain military value, and in a war structure the lack of sufficient safety may not be considered a vital objection to its employment For peace purposes the airship can probably be also made sufficiently safe after enough time and money have been spent in experimental work. It may be of interest to note that out of about fifty big dirigibles built so far at least one-third have met a violent end.
It was evidently from such a point of view as that, that the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics passed a resolution recommending the government to continue its work on dirigibles, and to purchase for this purpose a discarded German Zeppelin. A more thorough investigation of the properties of duralumin, its heat treatment, "ageing," behavior under alternating stresses, etc., might also be of interest, and not for the design of dirigibles airships only.—Mechanical Engineering, October, 1921.
ORDNANCE
Official Trials of German Armour Plates.—Trials have recently been undertaken to test the quality of various types of German armor plates for the purpose of comparing them with plates of corresponding thickness manufactured in this country. The plates were obtained from the ex-German battleship Baden, and are therefore thoroughly representative of the German product.
The following table setting forth the results of these trials indicates the marked superiority of British armor plates. In the table the average limiting velocity of penetration for British plates is taken to be 1000 feet per second in each case, and the third column shows the comparative figures for German plates. The shells used at these trials were of similar mark and quality to those used in testing British plates of the same thickness.
Thickness of plate in lb. per sq. in. | Index number representing limiting velocity of penetration
| |
? | British | German |
80 Bulkhead plate | 1000 | 1000 |
160 Turret roof plate | 1000 | Less than 955 |
200 Turret roof plate | 1000 | Less than 935 |
320 K. C. armor | 1000 | 940 |
400 K. C. armor | 1000 | Less than 895 |
480 K. C. armor | 1000 | Less than 835 |
560 K. C. armor | 1000 | 915 |
British Naval Cordite.—Questions were asked recently in the House respecting the sum of £106,700 which is being spent on plant for the treatment of cotton silver at Holton Heath cordite factory, near Portland. As the Admiralty will now supply their own cordite from this place, it is intended that all work connected with its production should be concentrated there. During the war risks had to be taken which were unavoidable in the circumstances, and the navy has not the confidence that it ought to have in its cordite at the present time. Hence the anxiety of the Admiralty to have the bleaching and cleaning of the cotton used under their own supervision.—The Marine Engineer and Naval Architect, September, 1921.
Army Experts Develop Flashless Powder, Which Enables Firing at Night Without Lights.—Flashless gunpowder, making possible night firing without illumination, one of the recent developments of the Army Ordnance Corps, will be demonstrated at the third annual meeting of the Army Ordnance Association at the Aberdeen proving ground.
Since the invention of smokeless powder, which eliminated the location of guns in daylight, ordnance experts have been working to prevent similar "spotting" at night. This has been accomplished, it was learned to-day. Night firing with guns as large as five-inches have recently been conducted with no more than a momentary dull red glow.
This has been accomplished by introducing substances into the powder which when the gun is fired are volatilized, diluting and cooling the hot inflammable gasses. Salt and chlorine of potash, it is said, are two substances used to eliminate the flash.
Other features of the program include the firing of the "heaviest single unit of ordnance in the world," the recently perfected 16-inch 50-caliber gun mounted on a disappearing carriage. The gun measures 69 feet in length, weighs 340,000 pounds, and requires 850 pounds of smokeless powder to propel its 2400-pound projectile approximately 22 miles.
Another rifle of the same type has been mounted on a barbette carriage, permitting an elevation of 45 degrees, and is expected to have a greater range than any gun now carried by naval craft.
A new and enlarged Browning rapid-fire gun of .50 caliber intended for defensive use against aircraft and tanks will be demonstrated. The ammunition used by this weapon is twice as large as that used in the World War and the rate of fire has been greatly increased.—New York Times, 5 October, 1921.
MISCELLANEOUS
The Spanish Navy.—.We have not heard much about the Spanish Navy during the troubles of that country in Northern Africa. Probably this is principally due to the fact that the Moors are not giving warships much opportunity to take a hand in the fighting, and that the services of these, therefore, are not of an active character. Whilst the navy of Spain is only a very minor force as sea armaments are measured these days, it is unquestionably stronger and more efficiently organized at the present time than at any period of its modern history.
The program to which this result is due was framed in 1913. It provided for an expenditure of about £11,000,000, a large proportion of which was to be devoted to the development of the naval dockyards. This work, however, does not appear to have made much progress. Since the war the program has been revised and extended and is now in steady course of materializing. Two additional light cruisers, of 5590 tons apiece, have been added to the list of new construction, together with six destroyers, twenty-eight submarines, and three gunboats. The Spanish naval authorities are manifestly impressed with the great defensive value of the mine, and they are forming big depots of these weapons, and adapting ships for laying them.
Distinctly the most interesting feature of recent Spanish naval programs has been the disposition to build vessels of a larger size than heretofore. Three battleships have been completed at Ferrol, the Alfonso XIII, Jaime I, and Espana, and two more of a similar type are to be built. These vessels, in point of design, may be classified as minor dreadnoughts. Of 15,460 tons displacement, they carry eight 12-inch guns in four turrets, the midship pair being echeloned, but in such a manner that all the weapons can be fought on a very wide arc of fire.
The speed of these ships, which are propelled by Parsons' turbines of 15,300 s. h. p., is barely 20 knots. Their armor protection is very inadequate; the broadside belting is of 9.4 inch Krupp steel, and the heavy gun turrets are of 10 inch, of the same material. Whilst these Spanish battleships appear to embody the maximum value in collective qualities for their displacement (for they are only 460 tons bigger than our London class), they are assuredly less useful than had they been much faster and more lightly armed; for, as battleships, they are so hopelessly outclassed nowadays that their definition becomes little more than a misnomer. But, as armored cruisers of the same tonnage, they might have been really valuable ships. It is the old story of crowding too much weight of armament into a hull, to the sacrifice of other essential features, so that her resultant low standard of tactical mobility gives her very slender prospects of deriving any advantage from her hard-hitting power.
In their light-cruiser designs the Spanish naval authorities show this same disregard for the essential quality of speed. The Reina Victoria Eugenia, launched at Ferrol in 1920, is only good for 25 knots, although she displaces 5590 tons. The Reina Augusta Victoria, of 5778 tons, launched subsequently at the same port, will probably prove a little faster. Three more cruisers of the same type are in hand.
In our own C class (or, more strictly speaking, classes) of light cruisers we get a speed of 29 knots on displacements ranging between 3750 and 4190 tons. The Reina type carry nine 6-inch guns; the C group five 6-inch guns. We fancy that the, five knots extra speed of the British ships would more than compensate for the lesser number of guns in a running action—and the tactics of all modern naval battles are of this character.—Naval and Military Record, 14 September, 1921.
Spanish Submarines.—The Spanish Minister of Marine announces that Spain has ten submarines ready for service. The government intend to purchase eighteen others shortly.—Army and Navy Gazette, 17 September, 1921.
The Industrial Situation in Italy.—Every effort was made by the Italian Government to avoid the closing of the dockyards at Trieste that had been threatened for some time as a result of the abolition of the subsidies arranged through the Nava decree. The Minister of Industry has arranged a subsidy of 600 lire per ton, which will be granted in the case of ships that were one-quarter constructed on June 30, 1921. Twenty-eight ships will benefit in this way.—Engineering and Industrial Management, 15 September, 1921.
Austrian Merchant Flag.—According to an official decree the flag which is to be used in future by Austrian merchant ships is to consist of three horizontal stripes of equal width of which the middle stripe shall be white and the upper and lower stripes red. The height of the flag in relation to its breadth shall be as two is to three.—The Nautical Gazette, 24 September, 1921.
The Russian Navy.—Even the Soviet Government apparently believes in the Cromwellian doctrine of keeping your powder dry. The Red Army, of course, is chiefly maintained for the purpose of supporting the present regime, and it is more for the purposes of political distraction at home that it is employed on other adventures. The Russian Navy, not being necessary in this role, has been allowed to lapse into a condition of neglect and disorganization without precedent in the history of fighting fleets. But apparently an awakening is taking place, and the Soviet Government is beginning to realize that sea power cannot wholly be left out of its calculations.
This, at any rate, is suggested by the negotiations which Russia has opened with a view to regaining various ships of which the British Navy took possession during 1918. These consist of several ice-breakers, which arc indispensable auxiliaries to the Russian Baltic fleet, and the five-funnelled cruiser Askold, which was such a familiar occupant of Mudros Harbor during the Dardanelles operations. It is very difficult to form any idea of Russian naval strength from a reference to the official text-books, because, although some very formidable dreadnoughts were building when the war broke out, there is no data as to the stage of progress reached in most of these, whilst the condition of dilapidation of the older ships of the fleet renders it impossible to even approximately assess their fighting value.—Naval and Military Record, 15 September, 1921.
The Dutch Shipping Combine.—It is not quite clear how far the arrangement between the principal Dutch companies is an amalgation of all interests. The reports speak of their pooling their surplus tonnage. But as the capital of the new organization—which is to be called the United Netherlands Steam Navigation Company—is to be no less than ten millions sterling, it is clear enough that it is to be a very big thing. Moreover, the fact that the companies concerned are thus brought into so close a relationship will make it certain that, whether actually amalgamated or not, they will hereafter work in close union. The raison d’être of the operation seems to ht a recognition of the fact that at the present time there is not enough profitable employment for all the ships owned by the constituent companies on the routes which they have hitherto traded. They accordingly propose to open up new routes in directions not previously served by them, wherever inducement seems to offer. The six companies concerned are (1) the Royal Netherlands Steamship Company; (2) the Steam Navigation Company of the Netherlands; (3) the Holland-America Line; (4) the Rotterdam Lloyd; (5) Messrs. Phillip van Ommeren; and (6) Messrs. van Nieveldt Goudriaan and Co. The Chairman of the combine is Mr. van der Houven van Dort.—The Marine Engineer and Naval Architect, September, 1921.