A Study Of Our Navy Personnel Situation

A STUDY OF OUR NAVY PERSONNEL SITUATION

By Captain J. K. Taussig, U. S. Navy

 

Motto: "Men fight, not ships."

 

Foreword

 

In a recent address, the president of the Naval War College said:

 

The sole purpose of a navy is that it may afford the country adequate protection against the aggression of possible enemies. To this end it must not only be adequate in material strength, but must be intellectually and materially ready to attack at any time, because the most efficient mean? of naval defense is a prompt offensive against the enemy's naval forces.

 

The elements of efficiency are:

 

1.  

    

    

    

    

    

    

    

   1. • A fleet of adequate strength in each type of vessel that is necessary to the fighting efficiency of the whole.
      • A personnel thoroughly trained in handling such a great force with the maximum possible efficiency.
      • Thoroughly digested plans to meet the strategical and tactical plans of our possible enemies.
      • A logical organization for the administration of the navy as a whole, its maintenance in readiness during peace, and its successful operation in war.

 

Of the four elements, the most important is the second, that is, a personnel thoroughly trained in the art of naval warfare…

 

This is a clear and concise statement of the elements of efficiency as they concern the navy. A noteworthy feature is the emphasis placed on the fact that the personnel is the most important. It is fitting that this should be brought to the attention of all who are interested in a proper development of our navy. It is especially desirable to keep in mind, in any study or consideration of our navy's needs, that this element—the personnel—has more to do with the ultimate efficiency of the navy than has any of the others. This point is set forth at the beginning of this paper because it is the custom in the navy to treat personnel as secondary to material: because it is the custom for the people of the country, their representatives in Congress, and even the naval administrators, to estimate the strength of the navy entirely on the numbers and types of ships carried on the navy list. These are customs of long standing. They are fundamentally in error. We should come to the true understanding that whether or not we build proper types of ships in adequate numbers; that whether or not we have thoroughly digested plans to meet the strategical and tactical situations which may arise; that whether or not we have a logical organization for the administration of the navy; that all these depend primarily on personnel.

 

We should cease to consider when speaking of the strength of the navy that it is sufficient to refer only to the material strength; that is, the number of ships. Consideration should be given as to whether or not we have the trained personnel properly to command and fight these ships. This certainly is the primary element of strength. Lord Fisher aptly stated: "Men fight, not ships." Mahan's often repeated quotation, "Historically good men with poor ships are better than poor men with good ships," is just as true to-day as in the past. It is certain that good men will get the most there is out of poor material. It is also certain that poor men will get nothing worth while out of the best material.

 

Our personnel situation shortly prior to the entry of this nation into the late great war is an excellent illustration of the contention that the importance of personnel has not been understood by the people of the country. It was generally known that we had a large number of fine ships. It was generally supposed that the navy was ready for any emergency. Whether or not we had the trained personnel properly to fight these ships was not even thought of. The understandings and suppositions in regard to the fighting strength of the navy were so far from the truth, it is important, now that we are reverting to pre-war conditions, to make a brief summary of the actual status of our navy in 1916.

 

The facts are:

 

1. The authorized complements of the ships in commission were "peace" complements and were from 15 to 30 per cent less than were required in time of war.

 

2. The ships did not have even these inadequate peace complements on board—the battleships being many officers short, and having an average of over 100 vacancies per ship in the enlisted force. This meant that each of our battleships lacked from 300 to 400 men of the numbers necessary for their war complements.

 

3. There were 42 ships with only three-tenths of their peace complements on board; 16 ships with only one-tenth of their peace complements on board; 38 ships out of commission with no personnel on board. There was no personnel, active or reserve, available to fill these vacancies.

 

4. In case of war the immediate requirements to place all our available naval material on a fighting basis were 106,000 enlisted men and 4440 commissioned line officers, with staff officers in proper proportions.

 

5. There were actually in service at that time only 1920 line officers and 53,000 enlisted men. The organized reserves consisting of the upper classes of midshipmen, the retired list, the naval militia; and the unorganized reserves comprising those officers who had resigned, and those ex-enlisted men who would probably rejoin, amounted to 24,000 men and 1420 line officers. The total trained personnel was, therefore, only 77,000 men and 3340 line officers. This left the country short of actual requirements for immediately using such naval material as was available by 1100 line officers and 29,000 men. There was no trained personnel in the country to supply this deficiency.

 

6. The staff corps were correspondingly deficient in officers.

 

7. Much additional personnel would be required as the war progressed, and all these would have to be partially trained before being available for sea service.

 

It is no wonder, of course, that all our first line battleships instead of being employed immediately in the role for which they were intended, were converted into training ships. The reason becomes clear when we understand these facts, why we did not immediately throw all our supposed strength into a whole-hearted offensive against the enemy. The truth is that while we had the ships, we did not have sufficient trained personnel to fight them. Consider the embarrassment that would have been ours had some unforeseen calamity happened to the Allied fleets. Our battle fleet instead of being ready to fight, was actually depleted of much of its trained personnel, and was actually engaged in training recruits instead of preparing for battle. This is not pleasant to contemplate.

 

We got away with the war. This is now being used as an argument by those who again are doing their utmost to deplete our naval personnel to the status in which it was just prior to the great war. It is a weak argument. No consideration is given to conditions that prevailed at that time. The fact that the fleets of our allies kept the enemy at bay is not taken into account. It is not appreciated that it was the British grand fleet which permitted our navy to prepare in security after war was declared, and it was because of this British fleet that our capital ships were not immediately called on to take the offensive, for which role they were not prepared owing to lack of trained personnel. To rely again on an ally to hold the enemy in check while we prepare would be the utmost folly. Such conditions are not likely to occur again. Should another war come it behooves us to be ready to jump at the crack of the, bat. This cannot be done unless our active fleet is continually kept in commission with full complements of trained officers and men.

 

It is hoped that the study which follows will not be taken as a plea for a large navy, or an argument against the reduction of armaments. Nothing of this sort is intended. Nor is it the intention to estimate the numbers and types of ships this country should have in the navy. The object is to show the necessity for an active naval personnel sufficient as to numbers and suitably educated and trained in order to be able efficiently to employ such material as we now possess, and to ensure our being ready in case of an emergency.

 

The Numerical Strength Authorized by Law

 

The numerical strength of the enlisted personnel is fixed by statute. The authorized numbers are as follows:

 

Enlisted men proper 131,485

Apprentice seamen 6,000

Authorized enlisted strength 137,485

 

In addition to the above the law provides for a hospital corps which shall equal three and one-half per cent of the authorized enlisted strength of the navy (137,485) and of the marine corps (27,000), which is 5561. This number added to the authorized strength gives:

 

Total authorized enlisted strength 143,396

 

The number of commissioned line officers (exclusive of chief warrant officers) is automatically fixed at four per cent of the authorized enlisted strength; i.e., 4 per cent of 137,485, which is 5499. This number is distributed in the various grades as shown in the following table:

 

Table I.—Distribution of Authorized Line Officers by Grades
Grade	Per cent of total	Number
Rear admiral	1	55
Captain	4	220
Commander	7	385
Lieutenant commander	14	770
Lieutenant	32.5	1,787
Lieutenant (J. G.)	…	…
Ensign	41.5	2,282
Total commissioned line officers	…	5,499

 

The number of commissioned officers in each of the staff corps is fixed at a certain percentage of the line officers, with the exception of the medical corps and chaplains, in which cases the numbers are fixed on percentages of the total personnel in the navy and marine corps.

 

The distribution by grades is shown below for each corps:

 

Table II—Distribution of Authorized Staff Officers by Grades
Corps	Number	Rear Admiral	Captain	Comdr.	Others
Medical	1,225	6	49	98	1,072
Construction	275	1	23	39	212
Supply	660	3	26	53	578
Civil engineer	110	1	6	15	88
Chaplain	151	…	15	30	106
Total	2,421	11	119	235	2,056

 

The numbers of chief warrant officers and warrant officers are not limited by law excepting in the pay and hospital corps. The total number of officers of this class at present approximates 2000.

 

The remaining authorized regular naval personnel not so far listed is:

 

Dental corps 189

Flying corps (officers) 150

Midshipmen 3,136

Total miscellaneous 3475

 

The total authorized personnel is summarized in the table below:

 

Table III.—Total Authorized Active Naval Personnel
Enlisted men	143,396
Commissioned line officers	5,499
Commissioned staff officers	2,429
Chief warrant and warrant officers	2,000
Miscellaneous	3,475
Grand total	156,799

 

?

It should be borne in mind that the above numbers are those that are authorized by law, and that the actual numbers in the service are far short of these figures.

 

The Factors Which Determine Our Personnel Needs

 

The law passed in 1916 which fixed the numerical ratio between the enlisted men and officers, and at the same time distributed the officers of each corps in the various grades in accordance with definite percentages, was the most important constructive personnel legislation that had been passed in many years. It did much towards stabilizing this part of the service. The anomalous feature of the law was the fixing of the ratio between officers and men, but establishing no basis for estimating the required number of men. As a rule the estimates did not take into consideration the proper balance between the material and the personnel necessary to operate the material. So long as the enlisted men were not provided for in proper numbers, it followed, of course, that the officers were likewise not in proper numbers relative to the material.

 

This condition has long been recognized as being one of the chief drawbacks to an efficient naval personnel. The deficiency in numbers affects the efficiency throughout because this deficiency is what causes the instability of which there is so much complaint.

 

The General Board appreciated this, and well expressed the evil results therefrom in its annual report to the Secretary of the Navy for the year 1916. This portion of the report stated:

 

The authorized enlisted strength is in no law known to the General Board fixed in any way relative to the material strength of the navy, and when additions to the fleet are made it has often been impossible to obtain the corresponding additions to the personnel which should be provided for at the same time as the ships themselves. That condition still exists. The enlisted strength of the navy is not established on any fixed basis relative to the material strength of the navy, and the efforts of the Navy Department are directed and the time of Congress is given up to annual consideration of the question of strength of the enlisted personnel. The General Board believes this condition to be illogical and it recommends that legislation be sought from Congress that will fix automatically the total strength of enlisted personnel relative to the needs of the navy on some recognized basis to be determined in the wisdom of Congress at the presentation of the matter by the Navy Department.

 

The whole scheme of personnel will then be established on a logical basis and one that will not require annual reconsideration by Congress. The enlisted personnel will be fixed by the material strength of the navy and the duties to be required of it. The commissioned personnel of the line will be four per cent of the enlisted personnel and the distribution of the officers in the grades will be in accordance with the percentages established by law; thus the growth of the navy in personnel will go hand in hand with the provision for the ships in a logical manner, one established by the Congress itself, and one that will not require annual consideration of the whole question with the consequent great loss of time as the least evil, and an adequate provision of personnel as a greater evil, and one that has so frequently occurred in the past.

 

The Navy Department has not presented this matter to Congress. The two evils pointed out are still in evidence. It now appears that the "inadequate provision of personnel…that has so frequently occurred in the past," is about to be repeated with the authorization of an enlisted personnel strength far below the actual needs.

 

If the enlisted strength is to be placed on a safe and sound basis in some such manner as recommended by the General Board, there are two questions which immediately present themselves. These questions are:

 

 

 

 

 

1. • Is it practicable to fix on some recognized basis the total strength of the enlisted personnel relative to the needs of the navy?
   • If so, what should this basis be?

 

The first question can be answered in the affirmative without discussion. To answer the second question involves a somewhat long process of reasoning. To determine the basis for automatically fixing the relation between personnel and material there are a number of factors which must be considered. It will first be necessary to ascertain the enlisted strength required to operate our navy as it stands to-day on a peace basis. At the same time the officer strength will be considered. This will demonstrate whether or not the present authorized percentages as applicable to the officers, are correct.

 

The factors which must be considered in determining the navy's personnel strength in times of peace are:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. • The types and numbers of fighting ships that are to be maintained in full commission, in reserve, and otherwise.
   • The complements of these ships.
   • The number of auxiliaries necessary for the maintenance and operation of these fighting ships, and the complements of these auxiliaries.
   • The types and numbers of ships under construction.
   • The shore stations and shore activities for which officers and enlisted men are required.
   • The number of officers at the War College and those taking post graduate courses, and the number of men to be kept under training at all times.
   • The number of men on general detail, on re-enlistment leave, and in hospital.
   • The numerical strength of our trained reserve force.

 

The Status of our Fighting Ships in Peace Times

 

If there is a Department policy in regard to what portion of our fighting ships should be maintained in full commission in peace times, this policy has never been promulgated to the service.

 

In reality there is no such policy. There is, however, a fixed Department practice in regard to this matter. The practice is to keep in commission just as many fighting ships as our limited personnel will permit. This, of course, is a backward process. The logical thing is to establish a policy as to the size of our active fleet in peace times, and then obtain the officers and men necessary to carry out the policy.

 

The necessity for such a policy is felt by the service just as keenly as is the lack of balance between the personnel and material. When the General Board took up the personnel questions shortly before the great war, it recognized the necessity for establishing a department policy in this matter, and in its reports to the Secretary of the Navy for 1915 and 1916 made a number of recommendations which, briefly summarized, were:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. • Keep in full commission all battleships under 15 years of age from date of authorization.
   • Keep in full commission all destroyers and submarines under twelve years of age from date of authorization.
   • Keep in full commission half the cruisers.
   • Keep in full commission all the gunboats.
   • Keep in full commission all the auxiliaries necessary for the maintenance and operation of the fleet.
   • Provide 50 per cent of the full complements for battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines which are not to be kept in full commission, but which would be used in war.
   • Provide adequate complements for the material upkeep of all other ships.
   • Provide adequate personnel for the shore establishments and replacements.

 

Had not the Great War intervened it is probable that the Department would have carried through, and established as a policy, the recommendations of the General Board as summarized above. This statement is made because the Secretary of the Navy in his annual report for 1916 gave a list of ships of the navy as it would be in 1921 on completion of the then recently authorized three years building program, and stated that all the ships listed would be in service in the status recommended by the General Board. The number of ships thus contemplated to be kept in commission in the ordinary course of events, is illuminating when compared with the actual number which our present personnel permits.

 

The anticipated status of the ships is given in the following table:

 

Table IV.—Contemplated Composition of the Fleet in 1921 had not the Great War Intervened
Type of ship	Total number	In commission full crews	In commission half crews
Battleships, front line	27	26	1
Battleships, second line	25	0	25
Battle cruisers	6	6	0
Armored cruisers	9	1	8
Scout cruisers	13	10	3
Cruisers, first class	5	3	2
Cruisers, second class	3	1	2
Cruisers, third class	10	5	5
Destroyers	108	72	36
Fleet submarines	12	12	0
Coast submarines	130	115	15
Monitors	6	0	6
Gunboats	18	18	0
Supply ships	4	4	0
Fuel ships	15	15	0
Transports	5	5	0
Tenders to torpedo vessels	6	6	0
Special types	8	8	0
Ammunition ships	2	2	0

 

The significant point in this table is concerning the large ships. It is important to note that the Department contemplated carrying out the recommendation of the General Board which called for a battle fleet in 1921 composed of 26 dreadnaughts and 6 battle cruisers. The full commissioned complements of these ships alone are 42,000 men.

 

The Great War prevented the three-year building program from being completed in 1921, and resulted in the acquiring of an unusually large number of destroyers and small craft of other types. It made unfeasible the carrying out of the General Board's policy of keeping in, full commission ships in accordance with their age. It made evident the necessity for adopting a policy that would state the size of the battle fleet that should be kept in full commission in peace times and for keeping in commission the auxiliaries that should go with the battle fleet.

 

The Department, so far as is known, not having adopted a policy in regard to the size of the battle fleet, it becomes necessary, in order to determine the personnel requirements, here to formulate one.

 

The Size of Our Active Fleet

 

In determining the number of ships that should be kept in commission in peace times, it would be desirable from a strictly naval point of view to eliminate the questions of cost and of politics. We can readily see that our navy would be more efficient at all times if all of our ships were kept in full commission. But we must count in the cost and the politics, and attempt to frame a policy that will be within reasonable bounds. The first realization must be that the present political situation will not permit of our keeping in full commission the 26 dreadnaughts as the Navy Department had contemplated five years ago. What then is the least number of dreadnaughts that should be kept in commission in peace times in order that we may assure ourselves that the navy will be ready for an immediate offensive should there be another war?

 

Before attempting to answer this question it is well to state that all personnel estimates will be based on the assumption of a return to the sound principle of having a single united active fleet instead of the two squadrons which are now appearing under the designation of fleets. It is essential for training in fleet tactics that the battle fleet be of sufficient size to make fleet tactics applicable. A fleet cannot be trained by dividing it into two parts any more than a football team can be developed by practicing each half in widely separated places. We will not have an efficient fleet in time of war unless our officers and men have fleet training in times of peace.

 

The War College, the Post Graduate School for officers, the Naval Academy, the trade schools and training stations for the enlisted men are all necessary adjuncts for the training of the officers and enlisted men; but none of these educational institutions, nor all of them together, will produce officers and men with the necessary practical training to fight a fleet. This practical knowledge can be had only through actual maneuvers at sea, and the units employed in these maneuvers must be of sufficient size to show the proper relation they bear to one another. If the active fleet in peace times is not of sufficient size to give the higher commanding officers practical experience in handling large forces, it cannot be expected that these same officers will be as efficient as should be in case of war. If the policy of economy on the part of the legislators is such as to deprive the navy of the necessary personnel to insure adequate training at sea, the onus from failures due to this neglect, should, of course, be placed on the legislators. But history has shown that wherever a military or naval failure has resulted from any cause whatever, the onus is placed on the commanders in the field. Therefore it behooves us from a personal, as well as from a patriotic, point of view, to do everything in our power to bring about conditions that will insure adequate training for the Admiral down through the lowest rating.

 

If we ignore the always changing international and strategic situations as a basis for determining the size of our active fleet in peace times, we must determine its size from the tactical viewpoint. That is, no matter what the strategical and international situation may be, our active fleet must be no smaller than is required for the proper training of the personnel. The game board has demonstrated that so far as the training of the higher command is concerned, this cannot be done in squadron units such as we now have in our so-called fleets. For proper fleet training there must be a battle fleet composed of no less than three squadrons of battleships, with a separate fleet flagship. Each squadron should have two divisions. Our present standard organization calls for four ships in a division. We can train with three ships in a division. Therefore, in order to effect the economy which is recognized as being essential, we adopt as a policy for the basis of our fleet organization in peace times, a battleship force composed of six three-ship divisions with a separate fleet flagship and one extra ship for replacement purposes—making a total of 20 dreadnaughts to be kept in full commission. This is the least number that permits of adequate training for the personnel. It is six less than was contemplated by the General Board in its 1916 recommendation.

 

So long as the battleship is the backbone of our naval strength, the other ships to be kept in commission should be in such numbers as to balance the fleet. There is no other way in which we can train the personnel to the degree which will insure efficient coordination and cooperation on the part of the different forces which constitute a fleet. And without efficient coordination there can be no victory.

 

The necessity for the balanced fleet in peace times was appreciated by Admiral Jellicoe, who, in his book, "The Crisis of the War," wrote:

 

In the matter of organization we must be certain that adequate means are taken to insure that the different arms which must cooperate in war are trained to work together under peace conditions. A modern fleet consists of different types—battleships, battle cruisers, light cruisers, destroyers and submarines It is very essential that senior officers should have every opportunity of studying tactical schemes in which various classes of ships and kinds of weapons are employed.

 

That the six battle cruisers which are under construction should be kept in full commission as soon as completed is conceded as essential. These battle cruisers will form a squadron of the battle fleet. They will be used in conjunction with the battleships in determining the number of destroyers that should be maintained in commission.

 

In considering the destroyers, the impracticability of determining the size of our peace fleet by the ages of the vessels is made evident. The stimulus given destroyer building during the war has resulted in a force of about 300 destroyers, all of about the same age. The necessity for economy will not permit of all these vessels being kept in full commission, which would be done if the age policy was adopted. There is no prospect of additional destroyers being built for some years; so if the age determined the status we would find in 12 years from now all of our destroyers being placed in reserve, and leaving none with the active fleet.

 

For many years it was the custom to consider that there should be four destroyers for each capital ship. This was before the submarine became so effective. The war has demonstrated, and maneuvers on the game board have shown, that from the tactical point there must be, for efficient cooperation, not less than one squadron of destroyers for each division of capital ships. Each destroyer squadron should be composed of three divisions of six ships each, and as we are entirely lacking in flotilla leaders, there should be one additional destroyer in each squadron to act as leader. This makes 19 destroyers in each squadron, and as there are eight divisions of capital ships in the fleet there should be eight squadrons of destroyers—a total of 152. It is regretted that the question of economy does not permit a policy of keeping more of these new vessels in full commission, as it is criminal to permit them to deteriorate in idleness on account of lack of, personnel to keep them going. It does seem, however, that it will be desirable and necessary to keep at least two additional squadrons in commission for service in the Philippines and elsewhere. We should therefore make personnel estimates for 38 destroyers in addition to the fleet destroyers, making a total of 190 destroyers to be kept in full commission and leaving 135 with reduced crews.

 

Every tactical and strategical game shows that we are woefully lacking in light cruisers. The other cruisers which we now have would be useful in certain roles. But none of them have the necessary speed that will permit of their use with the battle fleet. The ten new scout cruisers which are now completing must of necessity perform the double role of the scout cruiser and the light cruiser. It is essential that all of them be kept in full commission as a part of the active fleet. As the other cruisers are not required in fleet training, the best policy to adopt in regard to them is to keep one-half in full commission. This is in accordance with the recommendation made by the General Board. It will be necessary to keep these vessels in service as flagships of detached squadrons, and for the performance of police duty—a certain amount of which is always essential. Nearly all gunboats will be required for detached duty. Those so employed must have full complements.

 

Our submarine force has grown large. On account of the intricate construction of these vessels they must have highly trained crews. It is impracticable to have a reserve of sufficient experience to be qualified to perform submarine duty in an emergency. So all the submarines, with the exception of a few of the older ones, must be kept in full commission.

 

The Great War resulted in the development of certain types of vessels that previously were considered of little importance. These are the aircraft carriers, mine layers, mine sweepers, eagles, and submarine chasers. Sufficient numbers of these must be kept in full commission during peace times in order to insure development along special lines, and to insure the nucleus of trained officers and men for the certain expansion which would take place in case of war.

 

In determining the necessary personnel provisions for peace times it must be taken for granted that all ships carried on the navy list will be used in case of war. Some of them may not be used for fighting, but they will be used for training or housing purposes. Therefore, in order to insure the upkeep of these vessels there must be provided personnel to keep them in material readiness. The argument has been advanced that it is ridiculous to suppose that all the vessels carried on the navy list will be used in case of war. The same argument was used prior to the war. It was refuted by what actually occurred. Every vessel on the navy list was used for some purpose—even those like the old Constitution and the Granite State being of value. In addition many ships were purchased. There can be no logic in considering that this government is maintaining in peace times men-of-war that would not be used in case of war. Such an expenditure of public funds would be extravagant waste. If there are such vessels on the navy list they should be scrapped. So long as we carry them, they must be considered in the personnel estimates.

 

Table V.—Proposed Status of the Fighting Ships on the Navy List
Type	Class	Total No.	Full commission	In reserve	In ordinary
Battleship	Battleship, 1st line	27	20	7	0
	Battleship,2d line	22	0	13	9
	Monitor, 2d line	6	0	4	2
Cruiser	Battle cruiser	6	6	0	0
	Cruiser, 2d line	16	8	8	0
	Light cruiser, 1st line	10	10	0	0
	Light cruiser, 2d line	3	0	3	0
	Aircraft carrier	1	1	0	0
	Mine layer	4	2	2	0
Destroyer	Destroyer, 1st line	304	190	114	0
	Destroyer, 2d line	21	0	0	21
Submarine	Submarine, 1st line	94	94	0	0
	Submarine, 2d line	48	34	6	8
	Fleet submarine	12	12	0	0
Patrol vessel	Eagle	55	5	50	0
	Gunboat	30	19	0	11
	Yacht	10	5	5	0
	Submarine chaser	60	30	30	0
Total	?	729	436	242	51

 

Having decided the composition of our active fleet in so far as the fighting ships were concerned, and having adopted the principle that all ships on the navy list must be considered in our personnel estimates, it is practicable to divide these ships into three groups for determining their personnel status. These groups will be designated under the headings of full commission, in reserve, and in ordinary, and the vessels listed there under according to whether they are to have full crews, partial crews, or nucleus crews.

 

Experience has shown that this large number of fighting ships require many auxiliaries. As those now on the navy list are not sufficient in numbers to supply and repair the fleet, it is essential that all of them, with the exception of the fleet tugs and mine sweepers, be kept in full commission. There will not be included in this list however the large number of small craft which are required for service at the naval districts, naval stations, and navy yards. The fleet auxiliaries are as follows:

 

Table VI.—Fleet Auxiliaries to be Kept in Full Commission
Type	Number
Destroyer tenders	9
Submarine tenders	8
Aircraft tender	1
Repair ships	4
Store ships	6
Colliers	12
Oilers	13
Ammunition ships	2
Cargo ships	2
Transports	3
Hospital ships	4
*Fleet tugs	44
*Mine sweepers	46
Miscellaneous	7
*Twenty fleet tugs and twenty mine sweepers to be kept in full commission.

 

Complements of Ships in Peace Times

 

One would naturally suppose that the complement of ships in full commission should be the full numbers of officers and men that are necessary to fight the ships. This, however, was not the case prior to the war. As a result the battle fleet suffered greatly in efficiency. Nor was it appreciated at the Navy Department, or at least by those in authority at the time, that our fleet was lacking in efficiency owing to lack of sufficient personnel. In fact the departmental reports invariably announced that there was sufficient personnel and that the fleet was in a high state of efficiency. At the same time, the commander-in-chief was bitterly complaining of the unsatisfactory personnel conditions. That part of the report of the commander-in-chief on the subject, made after the fleet target practice in the spring of 1915, is so pertinent, in view of the present conditions, that it is quoted here:

 

Shortage of Personnel.—The most vital weakness in the Atlantic fleet is the shortage of officers. It takes approximately ten years to educate and train an officer and no amount of legislation can provide officers when trouble is imminent. Expansion of the navy is limited by the number of officers available. The fleet is handicapped not alone by the shortage of officers but by the inexperience of the large number of young officers that have been added to the navy in the past few years. This condition, coupled with the shortage of officers, has resulted in officers being ordered to duties beyond their capacities and for which their experience and judgment do not fit them. Owing to the short enlistments our men require continuous training and the shortage of officers is certain to result in a lessening of efficiency. The shortage of officers is not confined to battleships, but exists in all classes of ships.

 

Second in importance to the shortage of officers is the shortage of men. The shortage of men is put as of secondary importance to that of officers since there will always be a reserve of trained men; and trained men can be made efficient in a much less time than is required for developing officers. The shortage of men in the Atlantic fleet, coupled with the shortage of officers, has prevented the fleet from attaining the degree of efficiency which is to be expected. Too much emphasis cannot be placed on what I believe to be the most serious weakness in the fleet to-day—lack of trained officers and shortage of enlisted men. To equalize the shortages in the different vessels there results a constant exchange of officers and men, tending to promote instability and to weaken the efficiency of the various units of the fleet. With a few exceptions, every vessel in the Atlantic fleet is short of the complement of officers and men necessary for battle. The shortage of enlisted men in the battleships alone, as I reported in January, 191 S, exceeds 5000 men. It is evident that under-manned and under-officered ships can not be kept in a state of preparedness and efficiency to meet on equal terms similar types in other navies. I believe that all ships in full commission attached to the active Heel should be kept fully manned for battle, ready for any duty to which they may be called. In no other way can the units of the fleet be kept in a thoroughly efficient state.

 

This quotation is worthy of the most careful consideration. It is one of the few expressions on the part of a commander-in-chief of our fleet in which the true difficulties and the lack of efficiency, together with the causes therefore, have been forcibly stated in an official document. It should' demand attention as the report was made at the time when the public believed that the fleet was in a high state of efficiency. A lesson should be learned from it as the conditions in our fleet to-day, so far as personnel is concerned, are similar in many respects to those stated in this report. And what is of more significance is the tendency to reduce still further the personnel strength, and thereby further reduce the fleet's efficiency.

 

We can, of course, with a reduced personnel, keep a comparatively few ships in commission. By providing just sufficient officers and men for these few ships, they can and will reach a high state of efficiency as individual ships. But this will not answer for the fleet training which is necessary if our purpose is to win battles. And in all our peace procedure, we must not lose sight of the great and only function of a navy: that is to be able to defend the country in case of war.

 

Believing that the navy will fail in the next war unless full preparation is made beforehand, and knowing that this preparation cannot be made unless we keep in commission in peace times sufficient ships with adequate personnel to insure sufficient training, there is here laid down a policy which keeps in service with full complements of officers and men the least number of ships that will meet these demands.

 

Table VII gives the full commission complements of all classes of ships in the navy with the exception of the numerous small craft required at the shore stations.

 

Personnel Requirements for the Active Fleet

 

Having determined the number of ships to be kept in full commission and the complements for each of these ships, it is now practicable to ascertain the personnel required for the ships of the active fleet maintained on a peace basis. The fighting ships are taken first, and, in order to avoid too many statistics, the figures will be carried through only for the line officers and the enlisted men. The proportion between line and staff and warrant officers is, of course, in accordance with the complements of the individual ships.

 

Prior to the war some of our colliers and oilers were operated with merchant crews. This was done because there were not sufficient men of the regular navy to provide crews for them. Under a false impression of economy, Congress did, however, annually appropriate the money for running this adjunct service in connection with the navy. In reality it was not economy. The pay of the merchant crew was less than the pay of a navy crew. But when we consider that there is no eight-hour day in the navy, and the less cost of repairs due to better upkeep, the final cost to the government is less with the navy crews. In addition, the halfway status between merchant ships and men-of-war led to a number of difficulties in the operation of these ships. Vessels belonging to the train of a fleet should be manned entirely by naval personnel and be subject to the naval regulations instead of merchant laws. The position of these ships was untenable as soon as war was declared; their merchant crews were discharged; they were placed in commission with regular naval crews, and this separate organization came to an end. We must not go back to any such anomalous situation. Therefore all the naval auxiliaries that may be expected at any time to accompany and to operate with the fleet must be manned by regular naval crews.

 

Table VIII.—Personnel of Commissioned Line and Enlisted Force Required for Active Fighting Ships in Peace Times
?	No. of ships	Captains	Comdrs.	Lieut. comdrs.	Lts.	Lts (J.G.)	Ensigns	Enlisted men
Battleships, first line	20	20	20	100	220	220	220	27,000
Battle cruisers	6	6	6	30	66	66	66	8,400
Cruisers	8	8	8	24	48	48	48	5,000
Light cruisers	10	10	10	30	40	40	40	6,000
Mine layers	2	…	2	2	8	8	…	640
Aeroplane carrier	1	1	1	3	4	4	4	300
Destroyers	190	…	63	190	507	380	…	21,850
Submarines	140	…	23	117	257	280	…	4,480
Gunboats	19	…	10	19	48	57	…	3,610
Eagles	5	…	…	…	10	10	…	300
Yachts	5	…	…	5	5	10	…	500
Submarine chasers	30	…	…	…	30	30	…	750
Totals	436	45	143	520	1,243	1,153	378	78,830
Total number of line officers, 3482.

 

A perusal of Table IX shows that no commissioned line officers are assigned to cargo ships, colliers, oilers, fleet tugs, and mine sweepers. This is because these ships could as well be officered by chief warrant and warrant officers, the complements being in accord with those given in Table VII. Some of these ships were formerly officered by merchant officers. The unsuitability of this has been pointed out. Our chief warrant and warrant officers will make excellent captains, executives, engineers, etc., for these vessels. By officering these ships with officers of this type it will materially increase the number of warrant officers, thereby keeping open the avenue of promotion for the enlisted man.

 

The chief warrant officers long pressed for legislation that would give them the rank of lieutenant commander. Their error was in that they made a point that all should be promoted to this grade. There is no question as to the value of the warrant officers. But it is not fair to the government to advance any class beyond their value. It is held that a chief warrant officer who does not qualify for a position higher than boatswain of a ship or as subordinate in the engineers division, or something corresponding, should not be advanced above the grade of lieutenant. But any chief warrant officer who qualifies as the commanding officer of an auxiliary, or as the chief engineer of a vessel of this class, is certainly entitled to, and should be advanced to, the rank of lieutenant commander. The principle of selection should apply to the warrant officers in the same manner as to the commissioned officers.

 

Table IX.—Personnel of Commissioned Line and Enlisted Force Required for Active Auxiliaries in Peace Times
?	No. of ships	Captains	Comdrs.	Lieut. comdrs.	Lts.	Lts (J.G.)	Ensigns	Enlisted men
Aircraft tenders	1	1	1	3	4	4	0	250
Destroyer tenders	9	…	9	27	36	36	…	3,150
Submarine tenders	8	…	8	16	24	24	…	2,000
Repair ships	4	…	4	12	8	8	…	1,600
Store ships	6	…	6	6	12	12	…	960
Cargo ships	11	…	…	…	…	…	…	990
Colliers	12	…	…	…	…	…	…	1,380
Oilers	13	…	…	…	…	…	…	1,300
Ammunition ships	2	…	2	2	4	4	…	400
Transports	3	…	3	3	9	9	…	1,200
Hospital ships	4	…	4	4	8	8	…	400
Fleet tugs	20	…	…	…	…	…	…	800
Mine sweepers	20	…	…	…	…	…	…	1,000
Total	113	1	37	73	105	105	…	15,430
Total number of line officers, 321.

 

This question is dealt with at length because it has an important bearing on the efficiency of the fleet. We must not have naval vessels officered and manned by merchant crews. We must not increase our regular commissioned officer personnel to the stage where it will meet with opposition simply on account of its size. We must keep open the doors for the advancement of the enlisted men. We must give adequate promotion to the chief warrant officers who are deserving of this promotion. The best way to accomplish this is to officer certain of our auxiliaries entirely with chief warrant officers and warrant officers.

 

Table X.—Personnel of Commissioned Line Officers and Enlisted Men Required at Sea for Aviation Duty
?	No. of units	Rear admirals	Capts.	Comdrs.	Lieut. comdrs.	Lts.	Lts. (J.G.)	Ensigns	Enlisted men
Battleships	20	…	…	…	…	20	40	40	200
Battle cruisers	6	…	…	…	…	6	12	12	60
Airplane tenders	3	…	…	…	12	45	45	45	750
Airplane carriers	1	…	…	…	4	8	20	20	200
Total	30	…	…	…	16	79	117	117	1,210
Total number of line officers, 329.

 

In the foregoing summaries no estimate has been made for aviation personnel required for service at sea. In addition to the regular crew each battleship and battle cruiser should carry the officers and men for the operation and maintenance of three planes. The airplane carrier and airplane tender will both require a large number of officers and men in addition to their regular crews. For the present, at least, it will be desirable to keep in service, as airplane tenders, two of the mine layers, and these will require augmented personnel to maintain and operate the planes. With the development taking place in aeronautics, all vessels carrying planes or acting as tenders for planes must carry additional personnel for training.

 

As the number of men in the hospital corps should depend on the total number of officers and men in the service, the estimates for this corps should be made on the completion of the estimates of the personnel required at sea and on shore.

 

Staff Duty Requirements

 

The commander-in-chief of the fleet, the commanders of forces and other subdivisions, together with the officers and men who compose their staffs, form a vital part of the sea going personnel. The service has been prone to look upon staff duty as of secondary importance. However, the more we study the matter, and the more experience we have—just that much more do we gain an appreciation of the importance of staff duty and the necessity for all flag officers having staff's of sufficient size and adequate training. The Navy Department's policy has been beggarly in the assignment of officers to staff duty. Our high ranking officers frequently have been left to carry on with staffs that were entirely inadequate as to numbers, training and experience. Such a condition invariably leads to the imposition on the commander of a number of minor details which take up the greater part of his time, and prevent him from giving his undivided attention to the big things with which he is concerned. A commander of a force without an adequate staff spends most of his time in administering, and little of it in commanding. The efficiency of the entire command suffers in consequence.

 

The army has long realized the necessity of adequate staffs. Their general officers have more trained assistants than do our flag officers. The navy in peace times must have the staff training that will insure knowledge of how to organize, administer, and command large forces in time of war.

 

The staffs given in Table XI are for the administering of a fleet composed of 550 vessels valued at considerably over a billion dollars, and having a personnel of about 100,000 officers and men. This fleet is the country's insurance against aggression from without. If these essential points are kept in mind it will readily be seen that the size of these staffs is small in comparison with the tremendous responsibilities which they carry.

 

The total number of line officers and enlisted men required for manning the vessels of the active fleet can now be tabulated.

 

Let us have a clear understanding as to exactly what the above summary represents. The total of 4314 line officers and 96,265 enlisted men are the numbers necessary to man fully only those vessels which are assigned to the active fleet. No estimate has so far been made for the additional 284 fighting ships which are carried on the navy list, for the entire shore establishment, the numbers to be maintained under training, nor the requirements for replacements. In making such estimates consideration must be given to the numerical relation between the active personnel and the reserve personnel. That is, the peace quota for the shore establishment, and the partial complements for the ships not maintained in full commission must be such that when these numbers are added to our trained reserves, the total will be sufficient to employ immediately all of the available material.

 

?

Table XI.—Flag and Staff Personnel of Line and Enlisted Force Required for the Active Fleet in Peace Times
?	No. of units	Adm.	Vice Adm.	Rear Adm.	Capt.	Comdr.	Lieut. Comdr.	Lt	Lt. (J.G.)	Enlisted men
Fleet	1	1	1	…	1	4	4	4	4	100
Battleship force	1	…	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	50
Cruiser force	1	…	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	50
Destroyer force	1	…	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	50
Submarine force	1	…	…	1	1	1	2	2	2	50
Mine force	1	…	…	1	1	…	1	1	…	15
Aviation force	1	…	…	…	1	…	1	1	…	15
Train	1	…	…	1	…	1	1	2	2	25
Battleship division	5	…	…	5	…	…	5	10	…	125
Battle cruiser division	5	…	…	5	…	…	5	10	…	125
Light cruiser squadron	1	…	…	1	…	…	1	2	…	25
Destroyer flotilla	2	…	…	2	…	2	4	4	4	50
Destroyer squadron	10	…	…	…	10	…	10	10	…	100
Submarine squadron	4	…	…	…	4	…	4	4	…	40
Detached forces	5	…	…	3	…	3	3	3	…	75
Totals	34	1	4	18	31	16	43	51	18	795

 

Table XII.—Personnel of Commissioned Line and Enlisted Force Required for Active Fleet in Peace Times
?	# of unit	Adm	Vice Adm	Rear Adm	Capt	Comdr	Lt. Comdr	Lt	Lt. (J.G.)	Ensigns	Enlisted men
Table VIII.—Fighting Ships	436	…	…	…	45	143	520	1243	1153	378	78,830
Table IX.—Auxiliaries	113	…	…	…	1	37	73	105	105	…	15,430
Table X.—Aviation	30	…	…	…	…	…	16	79	117	117	1,210
Table XI.—Flag and Staff	34	1	4	18	31	16	43	51	18	…	795
Total	610	1	4	18	77	196	652	1478	1393	495	96,265
Total number of line officers, 4314

 

Complements of Ships in Reserve

 

Not only must the complements of the reserve ships be such that they can be completed when the reserves are mobilized, but they must be sufficient to insure the material upkeep. There is an impression on the part of our legislators that by reducing the active personnel and thereby decreasing the appropriation for the pay of the officers and men, they are saving money for the government. They are right only up to a certain limit. Just as soon as the money appropriated will not permit of a personnel of sufficient size to keep the ships in material readiness, the ships deteriorate in value at a rate in excess of the pay of the personnel which is necessary to prevent such deterioration. In addition, at the time that these ships may be urgently needed, they will not be ready, with the consequent loss of their services, and the necessity for spending large sums of money on repairs. We actually had this experience prior to the great war. A large number of ships were permitted to deteriorate for lack of personnel. They were not ready for service at the time we became a belligerent. Many millions of dollars were spent in making them materially fit. The loss of their services apparently was not felt by the country, because it so happened in this case that even had they been ready, there was no personnel to man them. But had we not been protected by the navy of an ally, the result would have been very different. The truth of the matter is that while the country was saved a few millions of dollars by the inadequate personnel, it lost many millions of dollars in the deterioration of these ships. The net loss would have been much less had the appropriation necessary to place these ships in material readiness previously been applied to the pay of sufficient personnel which would have made these repairs unnecessary.

 

For valuable fighting ships—and all such ships not kept in full commission must be kept in reserve—the least number of officers and men that can keep them in material readiness, and also insure their ability to operate with the joining of the reserves when mobilization takes place, is fifty per cent of the full commissioned complements.

 

The number of fighting ships to be kept in a reserve status is shown in Table V. The personnel required for them is ascertained by applying one-half the full commission complements as shown in Table VII.

 

Table XIII.—Personnel of Commissioned Line and Enlisted Force Required for Reserve Ships in Peace Times
?	No. of ships	Capt.	Comdr.	Lieut. Comdr.	Lt.	Lt. (J.G.)	Enlisted men
Battleship, 1st line	7	7	7	21	35	35	4,725
Battleship, 2d line	13	13	13	26	52	52	6,985
Monitors	4	…	4	4	8	8	700
Cruisers	8	4	8	12	24	24	2,500
Light cruisers	3	…	3	3	6	6	525
Mine layers	2	…	2	2	4	4	320
Destroyers	114	…	19	95	114	114	6,555
Submarines	6	…	1	1	3	3	75
Eagles	50	…	…	…	50	50	1,500
Yachts	5	…	…	…	10	10	250
Submarine chasers	30	…	…	…	…	5	360
Mine sweepers	26	…	…	…	…	…	650
Fleet tugs	24	…	…	…	…	…	480
Total	292	24	57	164	311	306	25,525
Total number of line officers, 862.

 

The administration of this large number of reserve ships will require flag officers and suitable staffs. While the vessels may be distributed at the various navy yards, there should be an organization which will insure practicability of mobilization.

 

Such an organization could be considered as The Reserve Fleet with a commander-in-chief directly under the Navy Department, or it could be a detachment of The Fleet, with a commander directly under the commander-in-chief. The personnel requirements are the same in either case.

 

There remain now only those older ships which have various uses, but which do not warrant the expenditure of the amount of money that would keep them ready for instantaneous mobilization. These ships, in peace times, will require only such personnel that will enable them to be used for experimental purposes, housing purposes, or possibly for loan to the states for naval militia training. If these ships are not to serve any useful purpose, they should, of course, be scrapped. So long as they are carried on the navy list it must be taken for granted that they have their uses.

 

Table XIV.—Flag and Staff Personnel of the Line and Enlisted Force Required for the Reserve Fleet in Peace Times
?	No. of units	Vice Adm	Rear Adm	Capt	Comdr	Lt Comdr	Lt	Lt (J.G.)	Enlisted men
Fleet	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	50
Battleship force	1	…	1	1	1	1	1	1	25
Battleship divisions	4	…	2	…	…	2	2	…	50
Cruiser force	1	…	1	…	…	1	…	…	25
Destroyer force	1	…	1	1	1	1	1	1	25
Destroyer squadrons	6	…	…	3	…	3	3	…	30
Patrol force	1	…	…	1	…	1	…	…	10
Totals	15	1	6	7	4	11	9	4	215
Total number of line officers, 42.

 

Table XV.—Personnel of Commissioned Line and Enlisted Force Required for Ships in Ordinary in Peace Times
?	No. of ships	Capt	Comdr	Lt Comdr	Lt	Lt (J.G.)	Enlisted men
Battleships, second line	9	1	1	9	9	9	1,350
Monitors	2	…	…	2	2	2	60
Destroyers, second line	21	…	1	…	21	…	315
Submarines, second line	8	…	…	1	4	…	40
Gunboats	11	…	…	…	11	…	165
Unclassified	20	…	…	…	…	…	300
Totals	71	1	2	12	47	11	2,230
Total number of line officers, 74.

 

This completes the estimates for the requirements afloat. A summary of the requirements of vessels other than those in full commission follows:

 

Table XVI.—Summary of Personnel of Commissioned Line and Enlisted Force Required for Vessels in Reserve and in Ordinary
?	No. of units	Vice Adm	Rear Adm	Capt	Comdr	Lt Comdr	Lt	Lt (J.G.)	Enlisted men
Table XIII.—Reserve ships	292	…	…	24	57	164	311	306	25,525
Table XIV.—Flag and staff	15	1	6	7	4	11	9	4	215
Table XV.—In ordinary	71	…	…	1	2	12	47	11	2,230
Totals	378	1	6	32	63	187	367	321	27,970
Total number of line officers, 977.

 

The total requirements afloat are now found by adding the totals for the active fleet and the reserve fleet together.

 

Table XVII.—Total Requirements Afloat of Personnel of the Commissioned Line and Enlisted Force in Peace Times
?	No. units	Adm	Vice Adm	Rear Adm	Capt	Comdr	Lt Comdr	Lt	Lt (JG)	Ens	Enlisted men
Table XII.—Active fleet	610	1	4	18	77	196	652	1478	1393	495	96,265
Table XVI.—Reserve fleet	378	…	1	6	32	63	187	367	321	…	27,970
Grand totals	988	1	5	24	109	259	839	1845	1714	495	124,235
Total number of line officers, 5291.

 

Let us not forget:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. • That these are requirements for manning in times of Peace such vessels as we actually have in service or nearing completion.
   • That for 363 of these vessels estimates are made for only partial complements. An additional 40,000 men with officers in proportion are necessary to till these complements.
   • No estimate as yet has been made for the peace time requirements of:

    

    

    

    

    

    

   1. • The shore establishment.
      • Personnel under training.
      • Necessary replacements and sick.

 

The Naval Personnel on Shore

 

Prior to the Great War there was an impression in some quarters that all the trained officers and men employed on shore duty would be sent to sea immediately on the outbreak of hostilities. Those who held this conviction were, of course, in error. Not only were many of these officers and men not sent to sea, but it was necessary to actually augment the shore forces with trained personnel that was much needed to fill the depleted complements of our ships. The importance of the shore establishment must be realized, if we are to have an efficient navy. The fleet must depend on the navy yards and stations for stores, provisions, repairs and docking. The fleet must depend on the Navy Department for general information, plans, and instructions, and for the administration of the large affairs not directly concerned with the various units. The fleet must depend on the Naval War College, Post Graduate Schools, Naval Academy, and training stations for officers and men. In fact the efficiency of the fleet depends, in a great measure, on the efficiency of the shore establishment.

 

This brings up the important question as to what personnel is necessary for the conduct of the shore establishment. The answer is—the sea-going personnel. Men who go to sea appreciate the necessity of having the shore establishment controlled and operated by men who thoroughly understand the personnel and materiel requirements of the vessels employed on active duty. And only men who go to sea can thoroughly understand these complex requirements. It is essential, therefore, that a certain number of line officers and enlisted men be retained at all times on duty at the Navy Department, the navy yards, and other shore activities. Navy yards are military establishments and must be operated in accordance with military methods and principles if military efficiency is to be attained. And here again we must not forget that the great reason for the existence of the navy is to defend the country in time of war, and that this defence will not be successful unless military efficiency is attained on the part of the personnel. The foundations for this efficiency must be laid in times of peace.

 

Our shore establishment is big. Whether or not it is bigger than is necessary to maintain the fleet is not the question that concerns us in this study. Our concern is—having this shore establishment composed of a Navy Department, naval districts, navy yards, and many other activities, and having a policy of maintaining all these elements whether or not they are needed for the efficiency of the navy and the welfare of the country—what must be done to insure their efficient operation so that in addition to the overhead cost of keeping them open, we do not add expense owing to neglect of maintenance and to inefficient operation? There must, of course, be a large number of officers and men connected with all these activities. Some of the personnel should be civilian; some of it should be naval. There are cases where the work required at a navy yard or station could be more cheaply done by civilian labor or employees than by navy enlisted men or officers. But the appropriations frequently are not sufficient to pay for the work that must be done. The only remedy is for the Department to deplete the naval personnel at sea by detailing officers and men to the shore establishment.

 

On the other hand civilian employees are used in a number of places where the efficiency of the navy would be improved if naval personnel was assigned. There is some politics in such cases. With our form of government it appears impracticable to keep politics out of the naval and military establishments altogether. So we find here again the questions of economy and politics which, unfortunately for efficiency, cannot be eliminated.

 

Having determined the size of the active peace time fleet and the number of ships to be kept in the reserve status, and knowing the number of shore activities that are actually kept in operation, it is practicable to make an estimate of the number of line officers and enlisted men required for operating such shore activities in a manner that will insure the efficient maintenance of the fleet as constituted.

 

There are a number of factors to be considered in such an estimate. These are:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. • The great value and importance of ships of the navy require in the shore establishment an organization and administration that will insure the efficient operation and maintenance of the navy as a whole.
   • The shore establishment must have sufficient trained personnel to insure a nucleus that will warrant the transition from a peace to a war status without so disrupting the machinery of administration that inefficiency will result.
   • The shore establishment must have trained officers and men in sufficient numbers to educate the officers and train the large number of men that are needed continuously for replacements.
   • There must be sufficient officers and men employed on shore to insure a standard of morale that can be obtained only by periodically detaching the personnel from duty aboard ship and giving them an opportunity to enjoy for a time the more natural method of working and living on shore.
   • There must be on shore sufficient officers, especially in the higher grades, to form the necessary reserve for augmenting the fleet personnel in case of war. It must he home in mind, and considered as important, that these high ranking officers employed on shore are the only real reserve of flag officers, captains, and commanders that we have.

 

The chief naval activities on shore that require naval personnel are:

 

The Navy Department, its bureaus and offices.

The Naval War College, Post Graduate Schools, Naval Academy, training stations.

The naval districts.

The navy yards and stations.

Inspection duty.

Recruiting duty.

Aviation duty.

Radio duty.

 

To one who has not looked into the details of the shore establishment it may be impracticable to appreciate why so much of the naval personnel is required for this duty. To make clear the reasons for this it is necessary to go somewhat more into detail than might otherwise be interesting. But it being the object of this paper to give a clear estimate of our needs, it is essential to set forth the requirements. The series of tables which follow are simply a general summary showing the numerous and varied activities requiring line officers and enlisted men on shore.

 

The first table—that for the office of the Chief of Naval Operations—is gone into detail, because this is really the staff which administers the navy as a whole. The personnel requirements are in accordance with the organization of the office approved in 1920.

 

Table XVIII.—Line Officer Requirements; Office of Chief of Operations
?	Adm	Rear Adm	Capt	Comdr	Lt Comdr	Lt
Chief of operations	1	…	…	…	…	…
Personal aides	…	…	…	1	1	…
Assistant chief of operations	…	1	…	…	1	…
Planning division	…	1	5	9	…	…
Intelligence division	…	1	2	4	5	5
Communication division	…	1	1	4	4	9
Inspection division	…	2	4	3	3	…
Gunnery exercises	…	1	2	2	2	2
Naval districts	…	1	1	…	1	…
Material division	…	1	4	4	4	…
Naval operating forces	…	…	1	1	7	2
Record and files	…	…	…	1	…	…
Totals	1	9	20	29	28	18
Total number of line officers, 104

 

There are three Navy Department bureaus under the cognizance of line officers. These are Navigation, Ordnance, and Engineering. The requirements under these bureaus are summarized in Table XIX. The numbers given were ascertained in the same detailed manner as were those in the table showing the requirements for the office of the Chief of Operations. To insert so much detailed work here would be an unnecessary encumbrance. Therefore, only summaries are given, as these in themselves demonstrate the facts to be presented.

 

Table XIX.—Requirements for Line Officers and Enlisted Personnel, Bureaus of Navigation, Ordnance, Engineering
?	No. of units	Rear Adm	Capt	Comdr	Lt Comdr	Lt	Enlisted men
Bureau of navigation	1	1	7	9	15	5	…
Naval observatory	1	1	1	4	…	…	…
Hydrographic office	1	1	1	2	2	…	…
Branch hydrographic office	14	…	…	4	10	…	…
Naval war college	1	2	5	5	…	…	…
Naval academy	1	1	7	14	50	50	500
Training stations	4	…	4	4	16	16	2,600
Receiving ships	11	…	5	12	11	…	2,200
Recruiting stations	…	…	8	8	25	25	1,500
Bureau of ordnance	1	1	4	9	15	5	…
Inspection duty	…	…	2	8	8	8	…
Torpedo stations	3	…	2	3	6	5	1,900
Ammunition depots	10	…	1	4	4	…	100
Mine depots	2	…	…	…	1	1	50
Ordnance plant	2	…	1	2	2	…	…
Gun factory	1	…	1	3	8	8	…
Proving grounds	1	…	1	1	2	2	50
Bureau of engineering	1	1	4	9	15	5	…
Inspection duty	…	…	8	15	15	5	…
Totals	55	8	62	116	205	135	7,900
Total number of line officers, 526.

 

The naval districts, navy yards, naval stations and bases are essential for the administration and operation of the navy. There are more navy yards and stations than are required for the most efficient operation or the best economy. But so long as these stations are operated they must have sufficient personnel to prevent further waste of the public funds. In Table XX will be given the line officer and enlisted men requirements for all the naval districts, navy yards, naval stations and bases, and minor stations.

 

Under the naval stations and bases are included those in the Philippines, Guam, Samoa, Hawaii and the West Indies.

 

Under miscellaneous are included the General Board, office of the Judge Advocate General, office of the Secretary of the Navy, Naval Examining Board, Shipping Board, Army General Staff College, Supervisor New York Harbor, Naval Home Philadelphia, naval attaches at the embassies and legations, the Pacific Coast Communication Service, and commissions to foreign countries.

 

Table XX.—Line Officer and Enlisted Personnel Requirements for Naval Districts, Naval Stations, Bases, Etc.
?	No. of units	Rear Adm	Capt	Comdr	Lt Comdr	Lt	Lt (J.G.)	Ens	Enlisted men
Naval districts	16	9	14	11	25	18	…	…	3,200
Navy yards	9	9	19	26	52	52	…	…	1,350
Naval stations and bases	14	4	18	18	14	14	…	…	1,400
Air stations	8	…	6	8	16	100	100	100	4,000
Radio stations	…	…	…	…	…	…	…	…	2,200
Miscellaneous	9	9	18	9	5	2	…	…	…
Totals	56	31	75	72	112	186	100	100	12,150
Total number of line officers, 676.

 

A large number of the enlisted men required for duty in the navy yards and stations, and the naval districts, is in connection with the district craft. There are about 1000 of these of various types, including ambulance boats, barges for fueling, etc., derricks, dredges, ferry-boats, car floats, lighters for various uses, pile drivers, scows, tugs, patrol vessels. All of these are in constant use. They should be operated by naval crews because their operation is cheaper than with civilian crews; the regular navy men on these craft form an important part of the trained reserve for the fighting ships; it gives the older men an opportunity for shore duty which is essential for the morale. They must be available for use twenty-four hours of the day, which is practicable with naval crews, but not with civilian crews.

 

The number of officers that take the course at the Naval War College and those that take the post graduate courses depend on the size of the total operating requirements for sea and shore. The number of men at the trade schools and the training stations likewise depend on the size of the operating forces at sea and on shore. The next step, therefore, is to summarize the sea forces and those required for the shore establishment.

 

A summary of the shore duty requirements follows:

 

Table XXI.—Requirements for Commissioned Line Officers and Enlisted Men for Duty on Shore in Times of Peace
?	Adm	Rear Adm	Capt	Comdr	Lt Comdr	Lt	Lt (J.G.)	Ens	Enlisted men
Table XVIII.—Office of operation	1	9	20	29	28	18	…	…	…
Table XIX.—Duty under bureaus	…	8	62	116	205	135	…	…	7,900
Table XX.—Navy yards, stations, etc.	…	31	75	72	112	186	100	100	12,150
Total	1	48	157	217	345	339	100	100	20,050
Total number of line officers, 1307.

 

Table XXII.—Line Officer and Enlisted Personnel Requirements for Sea Duty and Shore Duty in Time of Peace
?	Adm	Vice Adm	Rear Adm	Capt	Comdr	Lt Comdr	Lt	Lt (J.G.)	Ens	Enlisted men
At sea	1	5	24	109	259	839	1845	1714	495	124,235
On shore	1	…	48	157	217	345	339	100	100	20,050
Totals	2	5	72	266	476	1184	2184	1814	595	144,285
Total number of line officers, 6598.

 

The Requirements for the Naval War College, Post Graduate Courses, and Training

 

The Naval War College has at last come into its own and gained its place in the sun. After years of effort on the part of a few enthusiasts, the service has learned to recognize not only the desirability of having all the high ranking officers pass through the college, but the necessity for it. Many officers have gone to the War College either in open opposition as to the benefits claimed, or doubtful in regard to them. If after completing the course there is a single officer who does not feel that he was benefited, or who does not hold that all officers should be required to take the course, such officer has not expressed himself.

 

In the August, 1920, number of the U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings there is published the "Report and Recommendations of a Board Appointed by the Bureau of Navigation Regarding the Instruction and Training of Line Officers." The desirability of and necessity for comprehensive instruction and training of line officers throughout their active service is clearly shown. There can be no question as to the logic of the reasoning and the soundness of the conclusions reached by this board. The numbers of officers required for the carrying out of these recommendations could, of course, be best calculated by the Bureau of Navigation which has approved the report of the board in toto. Such estimates as follow herein are simply given for the purpose of showing that a certain number of officers should be allowed for the colleges and schools, and that the proper numbers can be calculated by a simple method.

 

In peace times the course at the Naval War College is of paramount importance. All officers should have it before reaching the grade of rear admiral. There must be provision in the peace time requirements to allow for the number of officers who constantly should be in attendance. If such allowance is not made the regular sea and shore forces will be greatly handicapped by continual shortages. It is also important that there should be this allowance, as the officers who are in attendance are, together with certain others performing shore duty, the only trained reserve in the higher grades.

 

There should be two War College courses, one for the officers in the grades of lieutenant commander and commander, and one for those in the grade of commander and captain. For convenience in administration, as well as for educational considerations, there should be a definite policy in regard to what officers are eligible for the courses, and the numbers to be in each of the classes.

 

Every officer should preferably complete the junior course prior to commanding a ship as large as a destroyer. Every officer should preferably complete the senior course prior to commanding a battleship or a battle cruiser. If this is adopted as policy, then the officers taking the junior course should be taken from the upper half of the lieutenant commander's list and the lower half of the commander's list; those taking the senior course should come from the upper half of the commander's list and the lower half of the captain's list. It is not held that this is an absolute requirement, as the administrators may find from a more complete estimate than is made here that some other division is better, as in the recommendation of the board referred to above.

 

However, using the above as a basis it is a simple matter to ascertain the number of officers that should be in each of the classes to insure all the officers taking the courses. There are required for shore duty and sea duty a total of 742 captains and commanders. One half of this number, 371, must have the opportunity of taking the senior class course between the times of reaching the upper half of the commander's grade and the upper half of the captain's grade. This normally should be a period of approximately eight years. Therefore, allowing for casualties, there should be 50 officers in each senior class. The proportion of captains to commanders should be the same as that between the two grades, which would make in each senior class 17 junior captains and 33 senior commanders. By the same process of reasoning, allowing a period of 10 years as the average time of passing from the middle of the lieutenant commander's list to the middle of the commander's list, there would be required for each junior War College class a total of 85 officers, distributed in the proportion of 23 junior commanders and 62 senior lieutenant commanders.

 

The assignment of officers to the War College is necessary if our high ranking officers are to have the knowledge required for the successful operation of the fleet in time of war. There is no more important duty for an officer in time of peace. These officers cannot be ordered to take the courses unless there is an allowance for them in the authorized numerical strength. The success of the navy as a fighting organization in time of war depends more than anything else on the qualifications of the high ranking officers. It is unjust to these officers, to the naval service, and to the country, to deny them any opportunity for attaining fighting efficiency. Therefore the few additional officers necessary in order that all may have such opportunity must not be begrudged by the legislators.

 

Younger officers, after they have been commissioned from five to ten years, should be assigned to take the general line course in order (1) to confirm the Naval Academy education in the light of their sea experience, (2) to start them in the study of command and staff duty, and (3) to broaden their understanding of the conduct of affairs in the political, economic and industrial worlds.

 

In addition to the year's work of the general line course, a certain proportion (say 10 per cent) should have special instruction in the theories which govern the design of ships, engines, guns, torpedoes, etc. In order to insure this there must be post graduate technical courses covering these subjects. It is the practice to assign a number of officers who show special inclinations for this duty to classes at the Naval Academy, industrial plants, and certain of the universities. This practice must be continued if we are to develop sufficient officers with the necessary technical knowledge to insure the ability of putting into practice certain things which practical knowledge show, to be necessary or desirable. The great field to be covered requires at all times no less than 100 of the younger officers to be taking post graduate technical courses. These should be evenly divided in the grades of lieutenant and lieutenant (j. g.).

 

A summary of the officers who should be allowed for educational purposes is:

 

Captains 17

Commanders 56

Lieutenant commanders 62

Lieutenants 75

Lieutenants (J. G.) 75

Total 385

 

This is only about 6 per cent of the total line officer requirements.

 

The figures arrived at by this method of calculation are not so large as if the recommendations of the board, above referred to, were followed. It is acknowledged that it would be better to adopt the board's report in its entirety and base all the calculations on the recommendations contained therein. But, as previously pointed out, in all the estimates given in this paper, the question of cost has been considered, and the figures arrived at are not those that would give the maximum efficiency, could cost be eliminated, but are the minimum numbers permissible.

 

It has long been recognized as essential that all recruits should have a preliminary period of training on shore before being sent on board ship. This is in order to give assurance that the incubation period for the contagious diseases is passed, and to teach the young men how to take care of their persons and their clothes. They are also given their first insight into military methods by preliminary instruction in handling boats, infantry, artillery, etc., so that when they appear on board ship they will know what it means to obey orders, and therefore be that much more easily assimilated into the organization.

 

Experience has demonstrated that this period of instruction at the training stations should be four months. The length of this period together with the number of replacements that must be made each year determine the number of men that should always be under training. This is arrived at as follows:

 

It has been shown (Table XXII) that the peace time requirements of enlisted men ashore and afloat are in round numbers 145,000. The average normal enlistments are for four years. We should therefore expect that one-quarter of this total would be lost to the service each year owing to expiration of enlistments. But owing to attrition from sickness, special discharges, desertion, and bad conduct, etc., the annual loss is in reality approximately one-third of the total, and the loss from expiration of enlistments is approximately only one-fifth of the total. The total annual loss, therefore, is one-third of 145,000 or 48,000. Of this number, one-fifth of 145,000 or 29,000 is from expirations of enlistment. The number of replacements with recruits that must be made each year is the difference between 48,000 and the number of reenlistments. What percentage of reenlistments can we expect? A study of the statistics has shown that it varies from 30 per cent to 85 per cent. The average, under normal conditions, can be taken at 60 per cent, which means that out of 29,000 men discharged each year on account of expiration of enlistment, approximately 17,500 will reenlist. Subtracting this number from 48,000 (the total annual replacements that must be made) leaves 30,500 recruits to be obtained each year, all of whom should pass through the training stations. The time to pass through the stations being one-third of a year, there should be approximately one-third of 30,500 men under training at all times. However there is a large percentage of losses, due to various causes before the recruits pass through the training course to general service. To allow for these losses the average number of recruits under training should be not less than 12,000.

 

With the low rate of pay for recruits, it cannot be expected that men who have already learned a trade will enlist in any great numbers. It is therefore necessary for the navy to conduct a number of trade schools in order that the enlisted men may be given the absolutely essential instruction in certain technical matters that will insure the efficient maintenance and operation of the ships. There have been a number of such schools in operation for a number of years. They are essential. They must continue to operate. These schools are for the instruction of torpedo-men, radio men, electricians, machinists mates, yeomen, gunners mates, cooks—all of which there is no supply from civil life. The least number under instruction that can supply the needs is 3000 men. This number added to the recruits, makes a total of 15,000 men that must be under training at all times.

 

Replacements

 

It has been shown that 6598 commissioned line officers and 144,285 enlisted men are necessary to officer and man the ships and shore stations on a peace basis. With the great number of changes continually taking place owing to sickness, transfers to other duty, retirements, expirations of enlistments, promotions, and other causes, there is a continual shifting of the personnel from one station to another. This shifting goes on at a rate detrimental to efficiency. It should be reduced to a minimum. It can only be appreciably reduced by having a surplus for replacement purposes. If there is no authorization for such a surplus, all of our ships and stations are bound always to be short of the number of men necessary for efficient operation. There never has been any allowance for these replacements. This is the main cause for the continual changes that bring forth so much complaint from the fleet. Unfortunately these complaints are usually made in connection with the target practice reports and are therefore considered confidential. Neither the public nor the legislators know anything about them. It is impracticable to reproduce them here, but anyone sufficiently interested need only read those portions of the target practice reports prior to the Great War which deal with personnel to appreciate the great loss of efficiency due to continual changes in personnel. It is clearly shown in these reports that this continual shifting, mainly brought about by inadequate personnel, results in our never getting beyond the elementary stages of training. This is not as it should be. It can only be remedied by having an allowance for replacements. What should the allowance be?

 

The records show that an average of about one and a half per cent of the commissioned officers are unavailable for duty owing to sickness. It shows that about three per cent of the enlisted personnel are unavailable for the same reason. These percentages do not include those who are temporarily ill at their stations, but only those who are actually under treatment at hospitals and on sick leave. With the large number of widely scattered ships and, stations which necessitates much travelling to and fro; with the leave that is necessary after a tour of strenuous duty, and for the men who reenlist; with the necessity of having depots—or receiving ships or barracks, as we call them in the navy—in order that the men may be assembled and distributed, it should be realized that there must be a percentage allowance to take care of these items. This allowance has been found by long experience to be not less than two per cent for officers and five per cent for enlisted men of the total operating forces. Endeavor after endeavor has been made by the administrators in the Bureau of Navigation to reduce this number, but it has been found impossible. The fleet cannot be supplied with personnel to fill vacancies, unless there is such personnel available for distribution.

 

The hearings before the Naval Committees of Congress always develop an opposition on the part of the legislators to provide for these replacements. "Why," they ask, "is it necessary to have several thousand men apparently idle on receiving ships?" It might as well be asked why is it necessary to have store houses with stores in them, fuel depots with fuel in them, reservoirs with water in them. Just as stores, fuel, and water cannot be supplied to the ships and stations without having storage depots for them, so neither can men be supplied and distributed unless they are first assembled at the receiving ships. This is a necessity it is impossible to get along without.

 

These replacements complete the requirements for ascertaining the strength of our active commissioned line officers and enlisted men on a peace time status. The basis for the estimate is the number of ships now on the navy list together with the shore establishment which present policy requires to be operated.

 

Table XXIII.—Summary of Commissioned Line Officers and Enlisted Men Required for Active Service in Peace Times
Rank	Requirements at sea and at shore stations	Additional pay for educational purposes	Additional for sickness. Officers 1.5%, enlisted men 3%.	Additional for replacements. Officers, 2%, enlisted men, 5%.	Totals	Percentages in grades by this estimate	Percentages in grades by present authorization
Admirals	2	0	0	0	2	…	…
Vice admirals	5	0	0	0	5	…	…
Rear admirals	72	0	1	1	74	1.1	1.0
Captains	266	17	5	5	293	4.1	4.0
Commanders	476	56	7	9	548	7.6	7.0
Lieut. commanders	1,184	62	18	24	1,288	18.1	14.0
Lieutenants	2,184	75	33	44	2,336	32.9	32.5
Lieutenants (J.G.) and ensigns	2,409	175	36	48	2,668	36.2	41.5
Totals	6,598	385	100	131	7,214	100.0	100.0
Enlisted men	144,285	15,000	4,300	7,200	170,785	?	?

 

The facts to be learned from this summary together with the reasoning which produced it are:

 

1. That to insure to the country the readiness of the navy for war, should such an event occur, there must be maintained in times of peace a personnel of sufficient size to insure the immediate employment, in an offensive role, of the ships we possess. The number of enlisted men required for this purpose is 170,785. The number of commissioned line offices is 7114.

 

2. That any reduction in these numbers will result in a corresponding reduction in efficiency, which loss of efficiency will always be in greater proportion than the direct shortage in numbers.

 

3. That the present law which places the commissioned line officers at four per cent of the enlisted personnel is satisfactory.

 

4. That the authorized percentage of officers in grade is approximately correct. The chief difference being in the increase of the lieutenant commanders by four per cent, and a corresponding reduction in the grades of lieutenant (j. g.) and ensign. This is mainly due to the increase in the number of destroyers which require lieutenant commanders as commanding officers.

 

5. That as the present percentages in grades for the line officers are correct, it can be assumed that the percentages allowed for the staff corps are also approximately correct. Consequently the numbers in all the staff corps should be increased to correspond to the increases found necessary for the line.

 

It especially should be borne in mind that:

 

1. In this estimate 73 per cent of the enlisted men are assigned to sea duty, while usually it has been found practicable to actually have only 70 per cent on board ships. Therefore any errors that may be in the summary are on the side of an under estimate of the actual requirements. The figures arrived at are conservative,

 

2. That a large number of valuable fighting ships, including dreadnaughts and new destroyers, are provided with only partial complements. That in case of war they cannot be employed until the crews are mobilized, and that they cannot fight until a period of training has been had after the mobilization.

 

3. That there is no reserve for the higher grades other than a certain percentage of the regular officers employed on shore and those taking the special courses in the War College classes.

 

4. That the reserve of lower officers must come from our regular reserve force and from the upper classes of the Naval Academy, a very few of whom have had any real training in the fighting line.

 

5. That the reserve of enlisted men must come from the fleet reserve, as no others of the reserve force are men-of-warsmen except in name.

 

Therefore the next step in our study is to look into the Naval Reserve Force and ascertain whether or not it can meet the demands which will be made on it when employed in connection with the regular active force of 7214 commissioned line officers and 170,785 enlisted men.

 

The Naval Reserve Force

 

In determining the number of officers and men required to man our fighting ships on a peace basis, the estimate was made on the assumption that 292 of these ships would be operated with half crews, and that 71 of them should have only sufficient personnel on board to insure their material upkeep. It would add greatly to the efficiency of the navy if all these ships could at all times be kept in service with full complements. This is impracticable owing to the cost involved. The number of additional men necessary to place these 363 fighting ships on a fighting basis is approximately 40,000. The officer requirements are in proportion.

 

But these 363 ships are not the only ones that require additional personnel in case of war. It is a conservative estimate that an additional 400 vessels would be acquired immediately for auxiliary purposes. The crews of these 400 ships total no less than 60,000 men and officers in proportion. Therefore we are safe in stating that with an authorized active strength of 1 70,000 men and 7200 line officers (which numbers were found to be the peace time requirements) there would still be necessary for immediate use afloat in case of war an additional 100,000 trained sea-going men and 4000 trained sea-going commissioned line officers.

 

These numbers, bear in mind, are needed at sea. Many additional will be required for duty on shore, and for the future employment and replacements, both afloat and ashore, as the war progresses. The requirements for immediate service afloat, together with trained sea-going men on shore, are what should determine the composition of the Naval Reserve Force. Just as there should be no officers and men in the regular navy who do not at some time or other go to sea, neither should there be any officers and men in our naval reserve force who have not been trained at sea and who are not qualified for sea duty and ready to go to sea in case of a call.

 

This statement may not be in accord with the generally accepted belief. It is of great importance in connection with this study. This is because it has been assumed in allowing only partial crews of regulars for a large number of fighting ships that there will be a reserve of trained sea-going personnel available for making these reserve ships immediately operative. There is already in evidence in Congress a marked Antipathy to providing the funds necessary to maintain a reserve force as large as 100,000 men. In fact there are not now available sufficient funds to maintain a force of that size in a manner that will insure its permanency. Therefore our efforts should be placed in securing a reserve of sea-going men and officers, and all that are not in that status should be eliminated. This is the only assurance that the reserve force will be able to survive in a valuable capacity.

 

It is held that unless our reserve force is confined to sea-going personnel, it will not survive. It is also held that any reserve which is composed of officers and men other than those who are qualified for sea duty is not a reserve except in name. There is nothing so dangerous for the success of any future war operations as a reliance on a reserve force which in reality exists only on paper. The people of the country must not be led to believe, as is now being done, that any man who wears a sailor hat is a sailor just because he wears that kind of a hat. Recent developments in Congress show a determination to reduce the authorized enlisted strength of the regular navy on the ground that we have an effective reserve force which, in emergency can step in and take the place of the regulars. This is not in accordance with the facts. It results in false impressions in regard to our naval strength, and if these impressions are allowed to predominate which they will if not refuted, the country gets a false sense of security which may result disastrously. To show that these suppositions in regard to the reliance to be placed in our reserve force are erroneous it is necessary to make an analysis of its composition.

 

The naval reserve laws as they now stand on the statute books are the outgrowth of an appreciation of the necessity for a reserve force. They were framed without an appreciation of the proper composition of such a force, and its relation to the numerical strength of the regular service. The first fundamental principle violated is the neglect of confining the membership to officers and men who really are reserves. From a military standpoint a reserve is one who passes into that status from the regular service, and none should serve in the reserves until he has had service as a regular. By far the greater part of our reserve force as now constituted came into this organization not through the regular service, but direct from civil life. They had no previous military or naval training and therefore were reserves in name only. A large part of this personnel did not go to sea and did not in any way qualify for naval service. Many did not complete their preliminary training at the camps on shore, and a large number spent their entire service at the desks in the numerous offices maintained throughout this country and abroad. Many of them did no duty other than construction work on shore and as stevedores. About 10,000 of them are women. In fact the greater part of them did everything rather than regular navy duty. And these are the men who are now being depended on to complete the complements of our fighting ships in case of emergency and to put in service the four hundred additional auxiliaries that would he required immediately. The folly of depending on this is self evident. The men individually are fine; the principle is entirely wrong.

 

Although the law authorizing the formation of the reserve force became effective several years before this country became a belligerent, the Navy Department was unsuccessful in its attempts to organize an effective force prior to the war. As soon as war was declared, this so-called reserve force grew with leaps and bounds until it reached a numerical strength of 300,000. The reserve law saved the situation for the navy. Not because it was a good law, but because the statutes did not permit of sufficient regulars to man the ships, nor the clerical force necessary to do the work, and therefore both the regular naval service and the civil service of the Navy Department were operated by the enrolled reserves who, in reality, were untrained regulars and clerks. In other words our present reserve force did not come into existence because of the possibility of war, but because of the actuality of war. As certain as this organization found its creation because of the war, just as certain will it find its death because the war is over. It cannot be saved unless the laws are changed, and unless we come to appreciate the fact that the only reserve that should be maintained in times of peace is one that is at all times qualified for sea service.

 

The attrition taking place in the reserve force has been steady since the Armistice. During the year 1921 a large number of enrollments will expire. The majority will not reenroll. In two years from now the reserve force will be a mere skeleton. To keep it alive requires much more money than Congress appears wiling to appropriate.

 

If the limits of this study permitted, further reasons could be given to show that our reserve force cannot survive as an effective force under present conditions. This is evident to anyone who has studied the subject. The assertion is made here because our regular force is being depleted on the false assumption that we are going to be able to rely on a defunct reserve in case of another war. We must do something to make and keep our reserve force effective. The first step is to eliminate the non-sea-going portion and place our efforts into building up the sea-going part. Even with 170,000 men in the regular naval service we require an active sea-going reserve of not less than 120,000 men with corresponding officers. Otherwise the navy will not be able to throw its full force into any future war that may come. The numerical strength of the sea-going reserve is far less than 120,000.

 

Conclusion

 

There are, of course, many elements in addition to the numerical strength which should be treated in a study of our naval personnel situation. Practically all of them are affected by the numerical strength. To discuss them is impracticable within the limits of a paper of this sort. They will be left for future consideration. But it is important to keep in mind that if the navy once finds itself in a position where there is sufficient force to work with, the other problems which confront it will be comparatively easy.

 

Even if our ability to start immediately on a whole-hearted offensive should not effect the final outcome of the next war, it will of necessity have a great influence on the length of the war. It is an historical fact that the longer a war lasts the greater the expenditure in lives and money. It is our duty to make this expenditure as small as possible. This cannot be done unless the navy is always ready for immediate offensive operations. The navy cannot be ready for such operations unless there is maintained an active regular force of not less than 170,000 men with corresponding officers, and an organized sea-going reserve of not less than 120,000 enlisted men with the corresponding officers. These numbers are simply a matter of arithmetic. Should there be partial disarmament, there should, of course, be a corresponding reduction in personnel. On the other hand should Congress make provision for new ships, there must be a corresponding augmentation in the number of officers and men.

 

These potent facts having been pointed out, the navy must guard against the public getting information which is not in accord with the truth. It is such information that leads to false assumptions and consequently to inadvisable legislation. There is evidence now of this in the avowed intention of Congress to reduce the numerical strength of the navy enlisted personnel to 100,000 men. If this is done, it means that the ships of the navy will revert to conditions even worse than those pointed out by the commander-in-chief of the Atlantic fleet in the confidential report made in 1915, previously quoted."

 

Let us not forget that, "Men fight, not ships."