Professional Notes

PROFESSIONAL NOTES

Prepared by Lieut. Commander H. W. Underwood, U. S. Navy

 

FRANCE

 

The French Marine Ministry.—There are signs that Mons. Guisthau, in contrast with his two predecessors, will be a man of action, and will have at heart to be something more than a "Ministre de Parade," and to leave, in a year or so, the Marine Francaise in a better condition than he finds it, being well aware that something more than eloquence is needed to mend matters at this stage. He wisely decided to get rid of the naval advisers responsible for the plight of the service. The situation is critical, and the gravest question of the moment is recruiting. The strength of navies lies not in numbers, not in outward force, but in the spirit, in the discipline and devotion to duty of officers and men, and it is a sad fact that the spirit of the fleet is being poisoned by anti-patriotic propaganda, and that state arsenals, Toulon especially, are hotbeds of anarchy. Stern repression and counter-propaganda are the urgent remedies.

 

Although the Chef d'Etat-Major General de la Marine cannot be said to enjoy quite a great power and influence as those exercised by the British First Sea Lord, he is the most important man at Rue Royale, and the only official in a position to enforce some continuity of views and efforts, and to make up in some measure for the continuous change of improvised Ministres de la Marine. Hence the importance that attaches to the dismissal of Admiral Salaun, who came to power just over a year ago, and was the real Minister of Marine under the nominal responsibility of the honorable Mons. Landry, who received "le portefeuille de la Marine" by mere luck, and was totally unprepared for such vital functions. Whilst there have been no fewer than eight Ministers of Marine since 1914, the number is limited to five Chefs d'Etat-Major, viz., Aubert, de Yonquieres, de Bon, Ronarch, and Salaun, and of these Ronarch appears to be the only one who had a constructional program of his own, and could have achieved something had his authority been greater. As to Admiral Salaun, he came to Rue Royale with a high reputation, and much was expected of him, but the sad fact is that he leaves the navy, in every way, in a poorer condition than he found it; and this is the true criterion of worth. His narrow-minded cuirassephobie is responsible for the loss of four 25,000-ton battleships that could have been completed by now. His dislike for size caused him in 1914 to reduce from 6000 to 4500 tons the 1914 type of eclaireur, and also to oppose the increase of the displacement of the 1919 croiseurs-legers, which ex-Minister Landry described as "petits mais extremement rapides et puissants." There might be plausible arguments for the systematic research of the smallest possible size in every class of warship, but there can be no excuse for the stagnation, waste, and anarchy that have marked the 1920 naval year. The lack of a firm will at the head has never been more patent to observers.

 

It looks as if the Grand Admiral Aube had left behind him only inferior disciples, respectful of the letter, but ignorant of the spirit of his teachings and without his wide intellectual horizon and managing ability. There was no fetishism about Aube. He was not bound to a narrow, absolute gospel, but above all a go-ahead and broad-minded naval chief, a believer in real work, and he proved it in setting arsenals and private yards in full swing, in ordering the first seagoing submersible, the first armoured cruiser (the 6300-ton Dupuy de Lome, which was very large for her time), and the finest lot of light cruisers that the Gallic Navy ever possessed.

 

Whereas Admiral Salaun is a distinguished torpedo specialist and a worshipper of poussiere navale, his successor, Vice-Admiral Grasset, who is 57 years of age, is an eminent gunnery expert, who pins his faith in long-range firing and in heavy mastodons large enough to carry the offensive and defensive qualities required to meet the novel conditions of warfare. In the several scholarly volumes he published before the war he accurately guessed what would be the evolution of the naval art, and many consider him as being the most sagacious and broadminded French student of sea warfare. He is highly respected in and out of the service, and will enjoy the authority necessary for the successful discharge of his responsible duties. Admiral Grasset commanded in turn (as a captain) the cadetship Jeanne d'Arc and the Brest Ecole Navale. He had a comprehensive war experience at the head of the Atlantic Cruiser Squadron, and as Attaché in London. As Prefet-Maritime in Cherbourg, he turned into a position of active duties and go-ahead work, a post that is usually considered as a well-paid sinecure. He enforced discipline in the arsenal, and even bona-fide work, and organized naval sports on a large scale, one of his pet ideas being the continuation on the sporting fields of the Franco-British fraternity of arms. He thus appears to be excellently qualified to try and bring anew the Marine Francaise to life.

 

Minister Guisthau has selected to be Chef de Cabinet Capt. Durand-Weil (44 years of age), who, though being one of the youngest officers of his rank in the service, had been placed in command of the fleet flagship Provence. This brilliant and scholarly officer, who has the distinction of being the youngest Chef de Cabinet on Marine records, possesses considerable personal experience in Admiralty work in war time, and may be trusted to set the cumbrous Rue Royale administrative machine working at a more efficient pace. In naval doctrine he is no bigoted sectarian, but an open-minded champion of efficiency in all classes of vessels, and ready to welcome all sound weapons likely to add to the power and security of his country, battleships included. Like Admiral Grasset, he counts many English friends.

 

Mons. Guisthau's projects of undeferred work will be greatly facilitated by the widespread feeling among the public that glaring incompetence and apathy at the head have "sabote" France's naval weapons ever since the armistice. Verbiage, anarchy, and powerlessness in the Conseil Superieur, squabbles in the Parliamentary Commissions de la Marine, grand paper programmes changed every few months, but no new construction, no bona-fide war training, sum up the activity within the last two years of the ex-grande Marine Frangaise, and waste and decline are the only apparent return the Republic has got for the expenditure of over two milliards francs (1919-20 Budgets). No wonder France at large is utterly sick of words and paper achievements and demands "men of realization" and immediate action.

 

The Ligue Maritime, that counts 175,000 members, has addressed to President Millerand a petition in favor of the completion of the 25 300-ton Normandic, Gascogne, and Flandre that are afloat, with from 12000 to 14,000 tons of materials worked into them, and could be made ready within fifteen months. The Langucdoc, launched in 1915 at Bordeaux and not quite so advanced, is likely to be converted to auxiliary uses. The enormous cost of completing these ships, with a few modifications in the original design, will probably cause only two to be taken in hand, namely, the Gascogfte (fitted, as flagship) and the Normandie. These two ships', now at Lorient, would be completed side by side in that arsenal, that would be temporarily retained as a port militaire. Time and money would be saved by this concentration of battleship work in one yard. It will be agreed that two quadruple-turret battleships (12 guns of 13.4 with splendid shells, 24 guns of 5.5-inch, thick and extensive armor, 22.5 knots expected speed, without mentioning a substantial anti-submarine defense)—equal or superior in gun power to any British capital ship in commission, and far superior to the poorly-protected Dorias of Italy—would be worth more to French sea power than the construction of six inferior croiseurslegers of 5000 tons, all the more so as the five recuperated Boche scouts, due to become available this year, will to a great extent fill the gap for which the cruiser programme was intended. With nine modernized dreadnoughts in the Mediterranean in 1922-3 (mounting 54 guns of 13.4 and 48 of 12-inch), supported by up-to-date aerial and submarine flotillas, France will regain prestige and security and avoid unpleasant incidents. For, as said the grand old man of France, Clemenceau: "La grande guerre n'a pas change la nature humaine; la force reste la seule sauvegarde de paix pour tourte nation pacifique."

 

Professor Flamm's wonderful submarine invention is a further sign that united and thriving Bocheland intends yet making her future on the sea, and renounces none of her former ambitions, but on the technical issue Constructor Laubeuf, the greatest living authority on submarines, has shown the candid Boche assertions to be totally unfounded. "Anybody can design 10,000-ton submarines. I could, if desired, design to-morrow 25,000-ton submersibles, but reliable successful construction is the difficult thing; and then there is the question of cost and military utilization. In the matter of armament, the Boches have found nothing that was not already existing or experimented upon, either in France or in England." For the price of a 10,000-ton submersible it will always be possible to get better value in fast surface ships, or in smaller underwater craft.

 

Much sympathy is expressed with the British Navy on the loss of the fine submarine, K-5. The type is considered as representing a fine constructional achievement, being in the motor part an enlarged copy of the geared turbine French submersibles of the 1912-13 designs. The delays, difficulties, and dangers in diving experienced during the war with the many French steam submersibles have caused the rejection of that type as being "unmilitary." The fate of the K-5 -is an argument against size in submarines and in favor of surface ships.—The Naval and Military Record, Feb. 9, 1921.

 

GERMANY

 

Industrial and Economic Situation in Germany.—In view of the question of reparation having been brought to the front so prominently in the past few days, two publications which we have received are full of interest. The first is a small book in the French language by Mr. Raphael-Georges Levy, member of the French Senate and of the Institut de France, entitled "La Juste Paix," giving "the truth concerning the Treaty of Versailles," and forming mainly a courteous refutation of a book by Mr. John Maynard Keynes. We must confess that we have not read the latter, but the case made out by the French senator is undoubtedly a most able and most complete one. The second communication to which we allude forms a welcome supplement to the first, and is entitled "General Report on the Industrial and Economic Situation in Germany, in December, 1920," by Mr. J. W. F. Thelwall, commercial secretary to H. M. Embassy, Berlin, and Mr. C. J. Kavanagh, British Commercial Secretary, Cologne, issued by the Department of Overseas Trade. Both these communications come at a very appropriate time, in view of the recent inter-allied conferences in Paris, and the meetings last week in London of the Miners' International Federation, to enlighten the general public on the question of Germany's guilt, and on the real value of her assertions as to her incapacity—or, we may say, her capacity for repairing the damage of her own creation—and also on the real state of affairs in that country.

 

Coal shortage has formed a subject for complaint on the part of Germany for many months past, and the plea still continues to be put forward with great insistence. We have never believed that she has ever had an insufficiency of coal for her works, and the figures given and the statements made in the British report Confirm our views in this respect. This report says that a certain proportion of the difficulties encountered in this connection arise from bad distribution, failure of transport, bad commercial markets at home and abroad, lack of orders, seasonal depression, deficiency of raw materials, etc.; a part of these difficulties it is in the power of Germany to remedy without outside aid. That she can do so is clearly indicated by the report, which states that, compared with 1919, railway traffic conditions are much improved, adding "the achievement of German industry and of the government departments concerned is very fine, and shows how great the productive power of the former is if it chooses to make an effort." Among the illustrations given to prove this is one to the effect that the coal situation for the "refining" industry has been considerably eased by the turning over to the utilization of brown coal briquettes, and the building during the war of large power stations at brown coal quarries, thus having provided industry with an economical source of electricity.

 

Further, it is stated, much attention has been devoted by the rolling mills to the utilization of brown coal, and considerable activity has been displayed in modifying plants to burn this fuel, the production of which in the Cologne Basin has been considerably increased. But our readers are not to infer from these statements concerning brown coal and its utilization that there is a lack of black coal in Germany, for such is not at all the case; they simply show that Germany is putting her industrial house in order on economical lines. Germany is still rich in both black and brown coal, as can be gathered from the figures of output for 1913 compared with those of the present day, and is quite able to supply the "reparation coal" demanded by the Treaty of Versailles. In this connection the number of miners employed is also instructive. According to the British report, the average number of miners at work in Germany during 1913 was 601,700, including 390,600 in the Ruhr district, whereas the total for December, 1919, was 724,597, excluding the Saar, but including 471,359 in the Ruhr district. It is not out of place here to note that the German coal exports amounted in 1913 to 34,573.500 tons, or 3,428,400 tons above the total for 1912. Germany's average annual increase in coal exports was over 2,425,000 tons for the six years from 1907 to 1913. On the basis of these figures her present coal exports, had there been no war, would be over 50,000,000 tons per year, or over 4,000,000 tons per month. Her exports for August last were 2,422,979 tons and for September 2,423,266 tons, consisting mostly of coal to the Allies. That the situation for her is not more satisfactory—she would evidently prefer exporting coal in the usual commercial way to supplying "reparation coal"—is no fault of any of the Allies.

 

The question of iron ore supplies is again a vexed question which Germany will probably continue to put forward for many months to come, but she does not lack home iron ore to the extent she pleads, as we pointed out briefly in the course of a former article. At the present time, says the British report, ores are arriving in such quantities as blast furnaces can deal with on their present allotment of coke, but, it adds, steel production is considerably ahead of pig-iron output, partly due to imports of foreign pig, but chiefly owing to the utilization on a large scale of scrap iron. Pig-iron is not made simply for the pleasure of making pig-iron, but for converting it into steel; as Germany obtains her steel chiefly from scrap, and as she has seen to it that she has scrap to last her over a good while, she is not so badly off after all from the metallurgical point of view. At all events, she is not in a worse situation than we are in this country from the iron ore standpoint, as is shown by the following extract from the review by Messrs. William Jacks & Co., on "The Iron and Steel Trades in 1920," which says: "The broad fact remains that the Cleveland district has seen its best days as a mining district. Steel makers have solved the problem of producing high-class steel from basic iron manufactured from Cleveland ironstone only to find that the output of the ore is on the wane." And, we may add, Cleveland steel makers have probably much less scrap to work up than have the German steel makers. Condolence with Germany's situation in this respect is, therefore, somewhat out of place.

 

Moreover, still according to the British report, the German rolling mills in general are well occupied and, though suffering from a shortage of fuel and raw materials, a fair export turnover has resulted. The tin-plate industry is well supplied with orders. Structural engineers continue to be well employed and are reported to have orders in hand for foreign account; the coal strike in England resulted in orders being placed in Germany, and manufacturers were found willing to make fixed quotations and favorable deliveries. Manufacturers in Germany find little difficulty in working to British standard specifications, although the less stringent specifications of the Prussian railways, which, previously, did much to help the industry, work in their favor when accepted by foreign clients. The prejudice against basic material that was prominent in England, but nonexistent in Germany, was not only injurious to the British manufacturer quoting in foreign markets, but of assistance to the German. Another interesting statement which points to the excellent situation of the German metallurgical industry is to the effect that blast furnace and steel works appear to have continued without the large new issues of capital which have been so prominent a feature of the "refining" and engineering trades, "and the explanation is partly to be sought," the report adds, "in the ready market they found for their produce as well as in the good profits obtaining from export." All these remarks are liable to cause foreign ironmasters to view the German metallurgical situation with a certain amount of envy.

 

And the German engineering industry would appear to be in a better situation still, for we read in the British report that engineering and allied trades show considerable improvement in regard to the supply of raw materials, "cast-iron and steel being more plentiful on the market owing to an improved home production, imports, and also to a slump in demand. Further, manufacturers of specialized plant have been busy on foreign account. The coal strike and high prices in England and the inability of British manufacturers to quote fixed prices and deliveries have resulted in orders being placed in Germany for locomotives, oil mills rolling nulls and electrical plant. A perusal of company reports shows that good dividends are being paid. The German market is very receptive for foreign orders, and every effort is made to meet the requirements of customers.

 

Nor does Germany's activity in iron and steel production and in every branch of engineering preclude her from carrying out research work, for she is said to have recently brought out a new alloy styled "electron," suitable for light castings; it is said to have a tensile strength of 12 kg. to 15 kg. per square millimeter (7.6 tons to 9.5 tons per square inch), with an elongation of 3 to 4 per cent. Among the non-ferrous metals, copper, lead, nickel and tin markets are said to have re-established themselves as nearly as possible on previous lines, while zinc interests are expectant in regard to future developments in Australian supplies.

 

Germany, as stated above, is admirably situated for the economic generation of electric current owing to the large resources of brown coal. She utilizes the brown coal on the spot for the generation of current and her overland power transmission schemes went hand in hand with the development of her war industries. These favorable conditions will play an important part in the further economic development of the country. In point of fact, it may be said that, in combination with her activity and also with the concentrated effort which proceeds from the pooling of interests and of experience on the part of manufacturers German trade is again rapidly coming to the front, and the term "German trade" includes not only the industries briefly referred to above, but also the dye and other chemical and various industries at which Germany appears now to be working with extraordinary energy.

 

As stated in the commencement of this article, the Miners' International Federation met in London last week. Among the foreign delegates present were Messrs. Hussemann and Hue, for Germany. The official statement issued after the last meeting pointed to the fact that stocks of coal to the extent of 900,000 tons in the Ruhr and 300,000 tons in Upper Silesia, had now accumulated, and added that transport facilities should be improved and overtime in the mines suppressed, etc. The preceding meeting unanimously resolved that "the socialization of the mining industry in every country was of supreme importance," and "it called upon the workers to redouble their activities in favor of the exploitation of mines by the community." The figures above given by the German labor delegates point to the abundance of coal in Germany; in regard to transport, conditions are better now than they were and are sure to improve still if Germany only wills it. In the matter of socialization, the British report says: "If any proposal is placed before the German working man which will safeguard him and his family from the worst effects of unemployment and will insure for him a modicum of comfort, he is likely to accept it, and not to bother much about saddling himself with responsibilities of administration. He has had time to learn since the revolution that it is possible to possess authority and yet be very badly off; now he will probably be more eager to obtain rather the substance of a steady employment and wages than the shadow of a position which he is unable to fill. As long as the considerable privileges which labor has already acquired for itself are confirmed, it seems probable that it will arrive at a compromise with the employers on the question of socialization, and that the latter may be settled without the political and industrial disturbances which were at first anticipated. As far as German labor is concerned, therefore, British labor would seem to be "preaching in the desert." German labor has benefited directly and indirectly by our coal strike, and would most probably view further strikes in this country with the greatest satisfaction.

 

With regard more particularly to the book by Mr. Levy, and very briefly, the French writer says that Mr. Keynes appears to object mostly to the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles "which transfer intolerable financial burdens from the shoulders of the victors to those of the vanquished." Mr. Levy fails to see why the latter should have better treatment than the former; he, further, refutes Mr. Keynes' low evaluation of the damage caused by Germany in Northern France. He also points out how, shortly before the war, German statesmen, bankers and economists extolled the richness of their country and its marvelous development, how the German works were second only to those of the United States, etc. He gives an abstract of the etude published in 1913 by Dr. Helfferich—former director of the Deutsche Bank, also former Minister of the Interior and Minister of Finances, in which this German expert dealt in detail with the great wealth of Germany as a whole. Mr. Levy also states that the German iron and steel works were running at the date on which he wrote his book—a few months ago—at almost the two-thirds of their former capacity, while the French were running at only a quarter of theirs, and he has the impression that the German people as a whole are conspiring to maintain silence in regard to their output in order to move foreign nations to pity. That is also most decidedly our own conviction. Further, how there can be found men to assert that Germany should be treated kindly at the expense of the Allies passes conception.—Engineering, Feb. 4, 1921.

 

The German 380-MM. 45 Cal. Naval Railway Gun.—General Features.—The 380-mm. naval gun recoils in a cradle which is mounted on a girder-carriage of heavy plating and angle irons, reinforced and braced, the whole resting on two platforms of which the forward one rests in turn on two trucks of five axles each and the rear one on two trucks of four axles each.

 

Principal Characteristics

 

Total length of the tube 17.1 m. or 45 cals.

Length of rifling 140 m. or 37 cals.

Length of powder chamber 2.12 m.

Total weight on rails including trucks 270,000 kgs.

Distance between pivot centers of rear trucks. 5.35 m

Distance between pivot centers of forward trucks 6.70 m.

Distance between platform pivot centers 21.15 m.

Wheel-base (extreme front and rear axles) 31.618 m.

Mean load per axle I5 tons (1 ton = 1000 kgs.)

Mean length of recoil 1250 mm.

Horizontal angle of fire on trucks 2°

Maximum angle of elevation on trucks 17°

Maximum angle of elevation on platform 55°

Type of gun Max. No. 52.

 

The Gun.—The gun (No. 33) is of steel, made by Krupp’s in 1916, weighs 77,522 kgs., and consists of a tube, jacket, and hoops. The forward hoop is out of place on the tube by 10 mm.; the breech hoop has two splays or lugs which are affixed the recoil piston rods. A yoke joins these rods to the counter recoil piston rod which is between them, the machined upper surfaces of the flanges of the counter recoil cylinder casing forming the bearing surface on which the gun slides into the cradle. The breech closing wedge has rapid translator motion by virtue of a long pitched roller screw, and opens to the left. The block has a bracket for the electrical firing device (which bears the inscription: 2.5 amps, 16 ohms, 1200 coil turns). The block (or wedge) weighs 2580 kgs., has a forked ejector and consists of two parts, one of which has a safety lug preventing closure of the breech before the gun is properly loaded. The powder chamber, having a length of 425 mm., is joined to the bore by a centering slope at whose forward end the rifling commences. The lands number 100 and are of progressive pitch. The rifling is to the right. At the beginning (forcing cone end) of the rifling there is marked erosion of about 1.1 m. in length. In travel, the tube is held in the cradle by two heavy couplings.

 

Cradle.—The gun recoils in a cradle of cast steel which has a trunnion on either side resting in trunnion beds on the girders. At the rear end can be seen the pneumatic counter recoil cylinder between the two recoil cylinders.

 

Elevation is effected by means of four hand crank levers, two on either side of the carriage. These crank levers actuate two transversal shafts which are linked by sprocket chain to each other. On the right side of the cradle an arc graduated from 0° to 55° is affixed. The graduations are subdivided into mils. (1° = 16 mils.).

 

Trunnions.—Two strong trunnions are supported in cast steel trunnion beds or collars and appear during laying of the piece to rest on two small axles forming a roller bearing.

 

By appropriate means these rollers bear on a solid casting having uniform power of resistance, and they receive the weight of the gun from cast steel collars affixed to the trunnions by heavy set screws. These collars are flanged outwardly thus concealing part of the perimeters of the rollers. The latter (the rollers) have a diameter of 35 mm. At the instant of firing a lever or beam controlling the uniform bearing on the rollers and having a screw adjustment, probably yields sufficiently to permit the trunnions to bear directly on the trunnion beds. Dismounting the piece not being permitted, it is not possible to give a more definite description of the trunnions.

 

Recoil and Counter Recoil Mechanism.—The recoil cylinders contain perglycerine and the counter recoil is pneumatic. Diameter of recoil piston rods is 160 mm. Diameter of counter recoil piston rod is 500 mm. A gauge located toward the rear and on top of the cradle gives the reading of the interior pressure of the cylinders. (Hydraulic manometer, graduated from to 250 atmospheres.)

 

On the rear head of the counter recoil cylinder there are a charging and a discharging valve, above, there is a safety blow-off, and below, an ajutage bearing the number 45. An inscription (metal plate) shows the capacity (Full: 132 liters), and the mean recoil as 1.25 m.

 

The Girder Carriage.—The carriage consists of two girders made of heavy plating, angle irons, and bracing, bolted and joined together by transoms. On the upper surfaces are fastened cast steel trunnion beds. To the rear of the trunnion bed on the left hand girder the panoramic sight bracket is fastened, also a, hand pump, a case for the sights, and a winch for hoisting projectiles in firing from a platform. A level-arm slide giving the angle of sight by means of the half circle fixed to the cradle, a sight case, and a winch serving the same purpose as the other, are all located on the right girder. The carriage is prolonged to the rear by an iron foot bridge, the two being made rigid by two strong supports and two cables tightened by turnbuckles. A supporting bracket having a roller bearing and moving on a suitable roller path on the rear truck upholds the overhang of the foot bridge. The shot truck travels on rails along the foot bridge.

 

An arched beam bolted to either side of the carriage probably serves to effect the transfer of the projectile from the feeder shot truck to the loading truck, the block and fall suspended from the arch being operated by means of the two winches mentioned above.

 

The carriage is supported fore and aft by two heavy platforms which in turn are supported respectively by the two forward trucks and two rear trucks. The forward end of the carriage has limited lateral motion across the forward platform so as to permit of laying the piece in direction in firing from the trucks. The maximum motion is 1 degree to either side of the longitudinal axis of the carriage, a graduated arc and index enabling off-sets to read to mils. This motion may be made in either of two speeds (low and high) by two cranks and a set of gears fixed to the forward platform. The cranks turn a screw which engages in a rack attached to the carriage. Two inaccessible fly wheels located between the two forward trucks appear to damp any movement of the carriage on the forward platform.

 

Trucks.—The two forward trucks have five axles each. Extreme wheel base (of one truck) 5.12 m. Three of the axles are braked: the middle and the two outer ones.

 

The weight supporting springs, except for the middle axle, are joined by an equalizing beam. Before firing, screw bolts which are raised in travel are screwed down thus taking the weight off the springs, the shock of discharge, therefore being borne directly by the axle boxes. On the right of the axle boxes of the middle axle the screw bolts are replaced by a buffer box.

 

The wheels of the first forward truck have a diameter of 950 mm. Those of the second forward truck have a diameter of 940 mm. These two trucks resemble those of the 280 mm. German Railway Gun. The distance from pintle center to pintle center of the forward trucks is 6.70 m., and of the rear trucks is 5.35 m.

 

The two rear trucks have four axles each. Maximum wheel base is 3.75 m. All axles are fitted with supporting springs and all have the shock transmitting screw bolts. These trucks resemble those of the 240 mm. German Railway Gun.

 

Mean weight per axle in travel is 15 tons (approx.).

 

Mean weight per axle in firing is 30 tons.

 

Minimum radius of curvature for travel is 100 m.

 

Minimum radius of curved epi for firing is 180 m.

 

This materiel is of international standard gauge.

—Journal of the U. S. Artillery, Feb., 1921.

 

GREAT BRITAIN

 

The Navy in the Pacific—There appear to be no grounds for attributing particular significance to the meeting which is about to take place at Singapore between the commanders-in chief on the Australia, China, and East Indies stations. Meetings of this kind took place on several occasions during the pre-war period, in accordance with the rule laid down by Lord Fisher soon after he became First Sea Lord in 1904. He chose Singapore as a convenient rendezvous for the China, Australia, and East Indies squadrons and as a base for their use when they combined to carry out joint exercises as the Eastern fleet. The first reports of the forthcoming meeting indicated that the senior officers of the South African Canadian, and New Zealand commands would also be present, but this turns out to be incorrect. The Singapore conference must therefore be considered simply as a revival of the former practice which naturally fell into abeyance during the war. The value of such conferences is self-evident. They afford the commanders of oversea squadrons an opportunity of foregathering at intervals to exchange ideas and discuss topics of common interest, among which the strategical problems likely to arise in certain eventualities are not the least important. There is no doubt that, were a crisis to occur in the East or the Far East the Royal Australian Nay the China Squadron, and the East Indies Squadron would coalesce into one fleet under a single command, and it is therefore essential that the closest possible touch be at all times maintained between these units. From the circumstances that the Brisbane is to be the only R. A. N. ship present it is evident that on this occasion no joint maneuvers or exercises are contemplated. But the fact that such a meeting is to take place at all shows that British naval policy, no longer fettered by commitment in the home seas, is in process of readjustment to conform with the new requirements of world-wide strategical situation.

 

Although the Imperial naval forces that are immediately available in the Pacific are small by comparison with the other fleets stationed in that area, they are by no means negligible, and once united they should be capable of holding their own until the arrival of reinforcements. The Royal Australian Navy was partially demobilized last autumn, but the ships that were paid off are kept in good condition, and, according to official statements, could be manned and made ready for active service at short notice. Leaving out obsolete ships and auxiliaries, the Australian fleet unit comprises one battle-cruiser, four fast light cruisers, 12 destroyers, and six ocean-going submarines. While the battle-cruiser is not of the latest design, her relative value would be high in the Pacific, where at present the number of ships of this type is strictly limited. On the China Station we have five fast light cruisers and 12 of the latest submarines, and in the East Indies there are two light cruisers—excluding the Highflyer, which is quite obsolete and ought never to have been recommissioned. In case of need, therefore, we could assemble in the Pacific an Imperial squadron consisting of a battle-cruiser, 11 light cruisers, and 18 submarines—a force which no prospective enemy could afford to ignore. Canada is not yet in a position to make any substantial contribution to the Eastern fleet, nor is she well situated geographically to take part in naval operations in the western Pacific. She is, nevertheless, vitally interested in the maintenance of the balance of power in that ocean, and there is no doubt that her future naval policy will be guided mainly by this consideration.

 

It is impossible to dissociate either American or Japanese naval expansion from the strategical problems of the future. Not that there is any serious prospect of our coming to blows with one or other of these nations, but simply because they happen to be the leading Powers in an ocean where British interests are very great. The United States, which recently deemed it expedient to transfer half her battle fleet from the Atlantic to the Pacific, would not be likely to complain if it were decided gradually to build up a powerful British fleet with its cruising ground in or adjacent to Australian waters, nor would Japan misconstrue the taking of any reasonable precautions to safeguard our interests oversea. As regards the United States, it is to be hoped that people in that country have taken due note of the very important statement made in the Japanese Diet last week. On being asked whether Great Britain considered herself exempt from the obligation to assist Japan in the event of a war with America, Count Uchida, the Foreign Minister, replied that the United States was never regarded as a country to which the Anglo-Japanese Alliance applied. Japan, he added, did not interpret the alliance to include England in a Japanese- American conflict. This declaration, superfluous as it may seem from our point of view, should do something to remove the chief obstacle which stands in the way of an Anglo-American naval understanding, for The Times correspondent in Washington assures us that "it is Britain's relationship to Japan which in the last resort will determine American policy as to relative naval strength" with this country. Failing an agreement with America it is difficult to see how we are to avoid the alternative of reinforcing the fleet in the East and elsewhere on a scale commensurate with our vast maritime interests.—The Naval and Military Record, Feb. 16, 1921.

 

"The Future of the Battle Fleet."—Foreword.—These speculations are conceived from the point of view of the British Commonwealth; such procedure is perhaps less impressive than would have been treatment of the subject from an abstract standpoint, but it seems to have the merit of being more practical.

 

War is such a very practical business that in writing about it we should be practical, that is to say, simple.

 

For example, except after a full stop, war should not be written with a capital "W," nor should it be hinted that there is a dark, profound mystery in the business, which can be illuminated and plumbed by catch phrases and sentences torn from Clausewitz's context, or other standard works.

 

To write in this manner is to suggest that there is a War Students' Trades Union, whose secrets will sometimes be partially revealed to the outsider.

 

War only differs from other enterprises undertaken by man in that the issues at stake are more tremendous and dramatic than those depending on the outcome of most transactions of peace.

 

Part I.—In April, 1917, the British Empire was perilously close to defeat owing to the sinking of world tonnage by the German U-boats. In this fact lies the greatest of the many lessons to be learnt from the last war.

 

It will be suggested in these pages that if we mean to profit by this lesson, we must revise our present attitude towards naval warfare and adopt what will seem to be a new attitude, but is in reality very old; we must rid ourselves of many comfortable theories and look into some uncomfortable facts; we must be prepared to find that our ideas as to the composition of a fleet are in error, and that we have spent millions of pounds on a tool which is only capable of doing half the work which may be necessary in war.

 

These statements, if correct, are disturbing; but in a business, if a mistake is made it often pays to cut losses without waste of time.

 

Preparation for war and war is a business.

 

During the past centuries English opinion has almost continuously believed in the doctrine that the immediate purpose of the fleet is to destroy the enemy's armed ships.

 

There has been, and may be still, a school of thought who argue that the navy can efficiently fulfill its task without destroying the enemy fleet in battle, but this opinion has not been that of the majority.

 

It will seem strange to a historian a hundred years hence, that though the evidence shows that the British fleet from 1600-1920 was brought up on the theory that its main business was to destroy the enemy in battle, yet for months on end between 1803- 1805 and 1914-1918 (to mention only two periods) the fleet could not translate its theory into practice. Our imaginary historian (probably a learned civilian) may write rather pompously:

 

"From the middle ages until the close of the Great War practice gradually became divorced from theory. At the conclusion of the Great War a deep impression was created as a result of the nearness to defeat in 1917 of the old British Empire. It was realized that practice must be re-introduced to theory before the next war, and close attention was paid to the scanty records of naval warfare in the pre-Christian era and all examples of later date in which, as at Copenhagen, a fleet destroyed its opponent notwithstanding all obstacles."

 

It is important to establish why the navy was not able to put its theory into practice for long periods during 1803-5 and 1914-18.

 

The answer is simple. The enemy fleet sat in the fortified harbors of Brest and the Elbe River.

 

Were these sufficient reasons to prevent us attacking them?

 

According to our theory they were not, but in practice they were. The truth was that the British fleet was not designed to destroy the enemy fleet in battle, either in 1803 or in 1914. It was designed to destroy the enemy fleet in battle at sea. It was a one-handed fleet, instead of being ambidextrous. This is no new discovery. Our great-grandfathers, leading a life during Cornwallis' blockade off Brest compared to which Scapa Flow was a bed of roses, longed to get at the French fleet.

 

We find Captain Puget (the original author I suspect to have been that dare-devil, Lieut. Ussher), writing to Cornwallis on June 23, 1804, and enclosing his plan for attacking the French fleet in Brest. Cornwallie passes it on privately to Lord Melville, who on July 10 replies:

 

"The national advantages attending its success are too obvious to require illustration."

 

Cornwallis to Melville on September 11 writes:

 

"It is a daring service, hut I have always been of the opinion that much might be done by surprise, and I have formerly thought that our ships, though superior to all the world at sea, were not always so secure at anchor."

 

For reasons which are not all very clear, except that amongst other causes was the fact that the naval members of the board threw cold water on the enterprise, the project was abandoned on the eve of execution.

 

One can imagine Captain Puget, sick at heart with the prospect of another winter's work off Brest, when he wrote to Cornwallis on September 23, 1804:

 

"Sir—The presentation of plans to you lately for harassing the enemy have been so frequent that I have been deterred submitting the enclosed.

 

There is an echo of what must at this time have largely occupied the minds of the officers in Cornwallis' fleet, in a letter from the Mediterranean, written on December 30, 1804. Nelson writing to Cornwallis, said:

 

"We could always beat a Frenchman if we fought him long enough: that the difficulty of getting at them was oftentimes more people's own fancy than from the difficulty of the undertaking: that people did not know what they could do till they tried, and that it was always to err on the right side to fight."

 

Before passing to 1914-18 it is of interest to note that it was fully recognized in 1804 that the seagoing fleet was unsuited for this task of harbor battle.

 

Almost apologetically does Captain Puget ask for special material; he emphasizes the small quantity he will require, but he states plainly to Cornwallis in his opening letter of June 23:

 

"As the success of this enterprise must principally depend on equipment and fitting these vessels (special tire-brigs)…"

 

There is also mention in a letter to Cornwallis from Admiral Young at Plymouth, of special grapnels, the parts of which were made by different men in order to ensure secrecy.

 

More than a hundred years later we come across certain young officers putting forward startling schemes to attack the High Seas fleet in Schillig Roads with fast motor boats and torpedoes.

 

The main idea of the scheme never materializes, but the idea of the motor boat becomes the C. M. B. and does useful work in 1918 at the small harbor battles of Zeebrugge and Ostend.

 

From these episodes, a hundred years apart, two conclusions can be drawn.

 

In the first instance it seems as if in each great war there was an underlying feeling that somehow or other it was wrong just to sit and wait for the enemy to come to sea. If he would not come out, then we must go in; that summed up the matter. But in each instance one has the impression that these disciples of the harbor-attack doctrine did not carry enough weight to impress their ideas on the men who directed British naval strategy. Perhaps they would have been better at forcing their way into Brest or into Schillig Roads than they were at stating their arguments. Why the attacks did not materialize is of secondary importance; it is sufficient for our present purpose to note that this feeling something should be done to get at the enemy fleet has been latent in the navy.

 

The second conclusion which can be drawn is that special material is required.

 

In 1804 it was a special type of fire-brig, with grapnels (specially made), etc.

 

In 1914-15 it was a special form of motor boat with special arrangements for carrying and discharging a torpedo.

 

Nowhere do we find a hint that the main battle fleet itself could do anything save wait in a hopeful attitude.

 

At the risk of becoming monotonous I want to repeat again that the battle fleets of 18th, 19th and 20th centuries were designed and trained "To seek out and destroy the enemy; but only when he was at sea." A man of genius rose superior to this limitation at Copenhagen and to a lesser degree at the Nile, but no genius could have taken the Grand Fleet into Wilhelmshafen in the last war and returned.

 

I propose leaving the first thread of my argument at the point it has reached in the preceding paragraph and picking up the second at its beginning.

 

Lord Melville said of the first Brest proposal:

 

"The national advantages attending its success are too obvious to require illustration."

 

Let us speculate.

 

In 1804 England was experiencing the sensation that she was face to face with a great crisis in her history; we know the feeling, we had it in March and April, 1918. I feel pretty certain the government had it in April, 1917, though the censorship veiled it from the people on that occasion.

 

In the autumn of 1804, Napoleon's great invasion plan seemed nearly ripe to bursting point. Nelson, Cochrane, Cornwallis, and Lord Keith kept anxious watch from Toulon to Boulogne.

 

If the October 8 coaches had carried the news through England that on October 1 the gallant Osborne and Puget with 153 men had destroyed the French fleet in Brest (and it must be remembered that the men on the spot from Cornwallis downward believed it could be done), the country would have breathed one huge sigh of relief.

 

Napoleon's letter to Decres in such circumstances would have been worth reading!

 

Yes, it would have been a notable day and perhaps changed the history of the world and saved Nelson's life; but by no stretch of imagination can we say that upon it depended, or even seemed to depend, the fate of England.

 

Change the scenery and raise the curtain at No. 10, Downing Street. Time: April-May-June, 1917. But first a few stage directions. England, the keystone of the Imperial arch, is, with the possible exception of Japan, the only country in the world which depends for the continued existence of its inhabitants upon food brought across seas.

 

The empire is at war, these islands have become its chief arsenal, and the raw material which modern war consumes so greedily, must also come across the seas.

 

Tonnage is being .sunk by U-boats at a greater rate than it is being replaced.

 

Expert jugglers with figures have proved that if the rate of decrease is not diminished, the minimum figure will be reached on September 1, 1917. They have neglected the morale factor; so let us suppose October 1 to be the ultimate date upon which we shall be faced with the problem of making 2 plus 1 equal 4. Dramatis Personne: The Cabinet; The Admiralty.

 

The Cabinet.—Here is the situation: The fate of the empire depends upon your success in reducing the rate of sinking. What can you do?

 

The Admiralty.—The solution lies in sinking more U-boats. There are two alternative methods of achieving this:

 

 

 

 

 

1. • The rate of U-boat destruction could be increased on the high seas if we had more destroyers, more U-boats, more submarines; in shore, more material.
   • It could be increased were we able to employ the material we have got, close up to the exits from which the U-boats proceed on to the British lines of communication.

 

The first method, which we are now engaged upon, is bad strategy, for our forces are dispersed; the second method, were is possible, would be good strategy.

 

The Cabinet.—Why cannot the second method be employed?

 

The Admiralty.—Because our light craft cannot work off the German bases, since in those ports lie the High Seas fleet. Our craft might be able to work there for a few days supported by the Grand fleet, but we want to work there for several months.

 

The Cabinet.—Since your first method of increasing the rate of destruction of U-boats demands time and more material—two things we cannot produce—we are obliged to fall back on the second method, which seems to demand as an essential preliminary the destruction of the High Seas fleet.

 

The Admiralty.—That is so.

 

The Cabinet.—Can the Grand fleet do it?

 

The Admiralty.—If the army cannot turn the German right flank and take the German coast line in rear, and if the Cabinet's opinion is that it is a case of neck or nothing, then the Grand fleet will seek out and endeavor to destroy the High Seas fleet. But success is doubtful, since the Grand fleet is neither designed nor trained to do this work.

 

The above fantasy very nearly became an unpleasant reality; there can be no doubt that we might have had to destroy the High Seas fleet to save our empire; and it is equally certain that our material was quite unsuited for the purpose.

 

What of the future? Are we likely to be faced with the same problem?

 

In 1914 there was a comfortable saying: it ran something like this, "guerre de course, or war on trade, can never win a war." It was not accurate, for the English forced the Dutch to their knees in the 17^th century by cutting off the sea trade on which the Dutchmen lived; nevertheless, it was a comfortable saying in the ears of Englishmen who depended for their existence on overseas communications.

 

The exploits of the Emden shook it a little, but it perked up on remembering that "we lost more trade ships after Trafalgar than before, and still we won that war."

 

In February, 1915, the German system of U-boat guerre de course made its debut.

 

The "saying" fell into a decline, and by April, 1917, it was dead; heaven forbid that because we won the last war there should be a resurrection.

 

"War on trade can win a war against England to-day." Why was it then that the French in the 18th and early 19th century failed to make it do so whilst the Germans in the 20th century almost succeeded, and possibly only failed because they did not allow Tirpitz to have his way?

 

The situation in the 20th century differed from its predecessor in several important particulars. In the first place, the British islands have during the last 100 years rapidly become highly industrialized, and therefore more dependent for food and raw material on oversea supply. In the second place, Germany employed submarine cruisers which were not only harder to cope with than surface ships, but enjoyed the advantage of operating against our trade, while we were still busily experimenting in endeavors to discover methods by which under-water craft could be located and destroyed.

 

Modern practical submarine work dates from 1907; a similar point in anti-submarine effort was not reached until 1917. These ten years made a big difference, and we have every reason to be proud of the rapidity with which we recovered some of the lost years. If we take the figure 100 to represent either the tonnage, or the food and materials, which normally come to the British Islands in a year, experts can calculate what percentage of this figure would suffice as a bare minimum on which to feed the people in peace, or feed the people and supply the armies in a given war. The value of this percentage has unquestionably increased greatly during the last century.

 

In 1805 it may have been as low as 30 per cent, that is to say, we could have lost 70 per cent of our imports and still continued the war. In 1917 it was probably in the region of 60 per cent. There seems no reason to suppose that in the future it will get less, everything points to it rising. In any event there is no doubt that a certain factor of safety does exist, and that if our enemies can reduce our volume of sea imports below this figure we cannot continue the war.

 

Without guessing at actual figures, whose precise numerical value does not affect the argument, let us assume that in April, 1917, the factor of safety was "X." Then at that moment the strength of the structure was actually X plus DX, where DX was a diminishing quantity which the U-boats seemed likely to be in a fair way to eliminating within a few months Of course they did not eliminate it; we pulled through, and in 1918 "DX" was a little bigger than "DX" had been in 1917. This fortunate circumstance was at least as much due to the hampering effects of politics on the U-boat war as it was to anti-submarine efforts, though the latter were very fine. In the future we cannot bank on enemy politics helping us.

 

I have tried to show in the preceding pages:

 

That though the British fleet exists for the purpose of destroying the enemy's fleet, it can only do so in the special case of the enemy fleet at sea.

 

That this fact has been felt to be a weakness in the past, and that efforts to remedy it all depend upon the addition of special material (and training) to the fleet.

 

That this addition has not been made in peace time.

 

That whereas in the Napoleonic wars the destruction of the enemy fleet in its base may be described as being then a desirable luxury, in the late war it nearly became an imperative necessity, and that in a future war it may become an imperative necessity.

 

That if the above conclusions are sound, they lead to the decision that the safety of the Empire demands a fleet which can insure the destruction of the enemy's main forces wherever they may be.

 

The possible lines of development which, if followed, would lead to such a fleet are considered in the second part of this paper.

 

Part II.—The problem to be solved is as follows:

 

"The enemy fleet is in a heavily fortified base; the destruction of that fleet is necessary in order to win the war."

 

Ignoring combined operations, which are outside the scope of this paper, a solution can be sought in two ways. Either we can attempt to destroy the enemy in his base, or we can attempt to make him come to sea and accept battle with our seagoing fleet.

 

To destroy an enemy in a strong base can never be impossible, but its achievement may demand such expenditure on special material that it becomes uneconomic.

 

No doubt naval constructors could give us a fleet of curious, slow-moving, torpedo-proof, mine-proof, gas-tight, 40-inch armored, net-cutting, submersible monsters, capable of penetrating anything except a breakwater.

 

But they would be built at the expense of the sea fighting fleet; we should still have a one-handed fleet and be no better, probably worse off, than we are at present.

 

Here we face the first difficulty, which is this: How can we give our present fleet a right-handed punch for use against an enemy in harbor without weakening the straight left it needs if the enemy comes to sea?

 

We need special material, but we must put forward modest demands. If this principle be agreed upon we are obliged to eliminate:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. • Any idea of special long-range (100,000 yards) guns mounted in ships unless these guns are going to be equally useful in a sea battle. Their use against a fleet in harbor implies aerial supremacy over that harbor, and the chances are that as we are far from our base and he is at his, the boot will be on the other leg.
   • Bombardment from the air: H we intended to employ this method of destroying him, we should have to devote half our naval estimates to aircraft. Half the navy may be in the air in time, but we shall probably be in our graves or club armchairs before that happens.
   • The construction of a special fleet of harbor penetrators.

 

If the above are forbidden fruit, the only alternative, in the writer's mind, is the adaptation of chemical warfare to this naval requirement.

 

Gas (at present) does not attack material but personnel. In open sea warfare every effort is made to destroy material, since personnel are so tied to their material that the destruction of the ship usually involves that of the men.

 

In land warfare, the distinction between efforts to destroy material and those to destroy personnel are more widely separated.

 

The men who invented grape shot, langridge, shrapnel, and the machine gun realized that a very small missile knocked out a man, and that against exposed personnel 16,000 one-ounce missiles gave much better results than one 1000-pound shell, which might break up into a few hundred effective pieces.

 

The chemist has improved on shrapnel; he has given us gas with its immense number of projectiles in the shape of molecules. The density of the projectiles is such that several square miles can be brought under effective fire. Nothing in that area can hope to be missed by the gas molecules. Though they have a great disadvantage in their slowness of flight, and dependence on the wind, the point to bear in mind at this juncture is that the bedrock of chemical warfare is the immense number of man-killing missiles which can be diffused over large areas.

 

The strength of the position of a fleet in a defended base need not be labored, but it has one conspicuous weakness—as long as the fleet stays in that base it has lost mobility.

 

Naval history is so replete with the difficulties of the problems in which the British fleet has had to find the enemy, that it is evident that the knowledge to within a few miles of the exact position of our objective is a great advantage to us. If the whole problem we are discussing is looked at broadly, this knowledge solves half our difficulty.

 

"We know he is in X. Y. Right. At him then!"

 

How much more encouraging this sounds than:

 

"We know he was at X. Y. a week ago. Right. Where shall we look for him now?"

 

I suppose our present fleet to be as perfect an instrument for open sea fighting as can be built and trained to-day.

 

To that fleet I suggest adding a certain number of submarines fitted to discharge gas and a certain number of gas ships. Both submarines and gas ships would carry gas in liquid form. The employment of these vessels would be somewhat as follows:

 

Method A: The Direct Attack.—The main battle fleet occupies a covering position. The submarines get as close to the base as they can and discharge gas with an onshore wind. The result will be that every man in the hostile fleet, every soldier in its forts, every workman in its dockyard, every inhabitant in the town (should there be a town) will have to put on a mask. Perhaps our gas beats their mask, perhaps it does not. Take the worst case and suppose the mask to beat the gas. Life in a gas mask becomes monotonous after some hours. I do not think dockyard maties or town councillors would like to spend 12 hours of every day in a gas mask. The C.-in-C. might find it rather trying after the tenth day. I believe we could make life so intolerable for that fleet that they would be driven to take the only step which would enable them to avoid the gas, i.e., they'd have to move. They could only move one way, and that way would be to the open sea; we should get our battle.

 

Method B: The Indirect Attack.—The direct attack has failed; the onshore wind did not come up to expectation, or the gas submarines went up on minefields, or the one thing we never thought of unfortunately turned up, etc. The result is a fresh situation, which is dealt with as follows:

 

The main fleet moves a few hundred miles down the coast, leaving submarines off the enemy base. It takes up a covering position between the enemy main base and the flourishing commercial port of X. Y. Z.

 

The gas ships arrive off X. Y. Z.; only half-a-dozen little ships each of 4000 tons, and escorted by suitable light craft.

 

Six hours' notice to evacuate the town is given (if the enemy has been playing the game at sea), and then the gas squadron gets busy. It would probably be unnecessary to use lethal gas.

 

Put Liverpool in the position of X. Y. Z. One can imagine the hurried Cabinet meeting, the hasty reversal of naval policy, the telegram insisting on the fleet putting to sea to drive off the gas ships In the middle of the excitement news is received that two vessels thought to be gas ships have just arrived off the port of P. B. X…

 

We should get our battle.

 

Conclusion.—AW war problems revolve upon the question of overcoming or maintaining the defensive. In France, in the last war, both armies were up against this question. Looked at from the British side our army knew that until they could break down the German defensive system and destroy, or threaten to destroy, the German Field Army, the war would not be won.

 

To break down this defensive, two new things were brought into being:

 

 

 

 

 

1. • Immense artillery power.
   • Mechanical warfare.

 

The army had to devise, make and test these things in time of war, when every moment was precious.

 

Though it is true the navy had to improvise the anti-submarine business it was on the whole more fortunate, in that by the old methods it succeeded in doing its share in the war. We may now hope for years of peace; these are the years in which to overhaul our methods.—Royal United Service Institution, February, 1921.

 

Transatlantic Visitors.—The American Navy is still doing its bit in "clearing up the mess" which the war has left in the remoter parts of Europe and also in the Near East. The result is that its ships are frequently seen in our ports, and Uncle Sam's naval officers and "Jackies" still contribute a respectable quota to the transient population of our capital. Among the latest visitors to Gravesend were the new "flush-deck" destroyers Sands and Williamson, and a representative of The Naval and Military Record who took the opportunity last week to inspect the former vessel was courteously received by her commanding officer, Commander Ghormley, U. S. N. These flush-deckers have introduced a new fashion in destroyer design. They are big, weatherly ships, and those who sail in them speak enthusiastically of their sea-keeping qualities. The complement averages no, including eight wardroom officers, and all on board are most comfortably housed. The United States Navy, like our own, has lost a large number of its best and most highly-trained men through demobilization, but if the destroyer crews are a fair sample, the ratings that remain are of excellent quality. It would certainly be difficult to find a cheerier and harder-working ship's company than that of the U. S. S. Sands. It is interesting to observe the remarkable difference which the recent modification of uniform has made in the appearance of American naval officers. Now that the single-breasted tunic, with its stiff stock, has given place to a double-breasted reefer very much after the British pattern, it is by no means easy to distinguish American from British N. O.'s at any distance, especially as the former seem to be discarding the mustache which their regulations, contrary to those of our service, permitted them to wear sans beard. The only striking difference in the two uniforms is that the American deck officer wears a star in place of the "executive curl." Nor is the resemblance between the two types limited to outward appearance. An hour's chat with a group of American naval officers leaves one wondering what on earth prevents two nations so much akin in ideals, thought, and temperament from "getting together" and working in double harness. Certainly, if the seafaring element had more voice in affairs on both sides of the Atlantic, reciprocal bickering would speedily give place to frank and cordial cooperation between the two peoples.—The Naval and Military Record, Feb. 23, 1921.

 

The Shipping Outlook.—The February number of The Navy contains a most timely and instructive article on "The Principles of Shipping," by Mr. A. M. Pooley, which should bring plenty of comfort to those fainthearted people who have been sounding the death-knell of British shipping supremacy. Mr. Pooley is under no illusions as to the competition which the Red Ensign now has to face, but he shows very clearly that if we fail in the contest it will be our own fault. He mentions as a fact worth noting that the countries which had made a bid for, and ultimately missed, sea power, generally have their capitals situated inland, cases in point being Berlin, Madrid, Rome, Washington, and Paris. The sequence although not chronological, is significant enough. He considers that the final element of success in shipping is the attitude of the government. Maritime development is nowadays the aim of many countries, but history teaches us that "silent sympathy" is the best attitude that any government can assume towards this industry. At the present time nearly every government except the British is subsidizing, regulating, or encouraging by other means the activity of its shipping. But, says Mr. Pooley, "a mercantile marine, while it may be legislated into existence, as occurred in the United States during the war, may equally easily be legislated into oblivion, as occurred in the same country before the war," and as may occur again if Admiral Benson and Senator Jones have their way. "A flourish of trumpets and a vast expenditure cannot alter the course of nature. The attitude of a wise government towards shipping development should be to leave it alone and 'watch the other fellow.' Shipping is a business of natural growth, and any attempt to force its growth is bound, eventually, to meet with disaster. If a government discriminates against foreign ships, there will be international trouble. If it over-develops tonnage other industries must suffer." These be words of wisdom, and, incidentally, of comfort. As a commentary on the alarmist statements about the decline of British shipping which were current all last year, we may quote the latest announcement from Washington, according to which another few hundred vessels of the U. S. Shipping Board are to be withdrawn from service this month and laid up, with very little prospect of ever putting to sea again.—The Naval and Military Record, Feb. 9, 1921.

 

JAPAN

 

Japanese Naval Policy.—Hitherto there has been little enthusiasm in Japan for the "naval holiday" proposals of which so much has been heard elsewhere, but signs are not wanting that the "non possumus" with which every previous suggestion of this nature has been met may soon become less emphatic. It is significant that Mr. Ozaki, a former member of the Cabinet, should have introduced a bill for the partial suspension of the Japanese naval program. The author of the bill was until lately a leading light of the Kensei-Kai, the party which has been most prominently associated with the big navy movement. It is true that a split has just occurred in the ranks of this faction over the suffrage question, in consequence of which Mr. Ozaki has ceased to be a member of it, but his move in favor of naval retrenchment suggests that one of the great political parties of the Empire is no longer throwing the whole weight of its influence into the scale against disarmament. Baron Hayashi, the Japanese Ambassador in London, has assured us that his country has no intention of setting the pace in naval competition. Her present programme is, he insists, a measure of defence natural to an island empire, but he adds that Japan would be only too pleased to join in any discussions between the League of Nations on the disarmament question. That she is unwilling to disarm before an international agreement has been reached is shown by the rejection last week of Mr. Okaki's bill by a majority of seven to one. Undoubtedly there is a Chauvinist Party in Japan, which enjoys the support of the military caste and of the big industrialists, the latter being anxious to exclude Westerners from the markets and resources of China, while the former regard an aggressive foreign policy as the surest antidote for social troubles. It is but fair to add, however, that some of the most violent outbursts of the Japanese press have been provoked by the menacing tone of the Hearst newspapers in America and the uncompromising attitude of California towards Japanese immigration. It must be obvious to every thoughtful Japanese that his country cannot hope to compete successfully with the United States in naval shipbuilding, and that further efforts in this direction, so far from modifying the balance of power in favor of Japan, are likely to produce the contrary effect by giving a fresh impulse to naval construction in the United States. If only Tokio and Washington could reach an agreement on this subject, world-wide disarmament, or limitation of armaments, would follow as a matter of course.—The Naval and Military Record, Feb. 16, 1921.

 

Laws to Relieve Japan's Poor.—Critics of Japan who think she has nothing on her mind but thoughts of territorial aggression would do well to consider the complexity of the problems that follow upon her great home expansion during the war, we are advised by some Japanese editors, who point with modest pride to three impressive pieces of legislation now in process and sure of enactment "possibly with minor modifications." These are the Public Employment Agency Bill, the Home Supply Corporation Bill, and the Slum Improvement Bill. The Public Employment Agency Bill, as The East and West News (New York) informs us, aims to establish an efficient national system of employment. Such a government agency has long been contemplated and is now absolutely necessary because of the vast number of unemployed. The bills provides for public employment agencies in cities, towns, and villages throughout the country, which are to be directed by the local authorities. The local directors will receive instructions from the Central Board of Employment, to be established under the direct supervision of the Minister of Home Affairs. The government hopes through this legislation to set in motion an adjustable mechanism for regulating the demand and supply of labor all over Japan.

 

The Home Supply Corporation Bill is designed to help people obtain homes more easily, and this legislation is said to be imperative because of the fact that rents have mounted by leaps and bounds and the housing famine has become acute. The Tokyo Yomiuri tells us that salaried men and laborers must pay "one-third or even one-half of their income for house rent," and even when they are willing to pay so high a rent it is difficult for them to obtain a place to live. The East and West News explains that the housing bill is—

 

"A kind of special corporation law to be applied exclusively for mutually financing associations created for the purpose of building and supplying houses. Such corporations may be formed by a combination of 20 or more people having desire to obtain homes for reasonable sums. Each member shall pay a fixed sum of money for a certain period of time and get a house which he desires.

 

"The bill contains detailed regulation of the corporation safeguarding against possible fraud to which this kind of organization is susceptible. It is expected that upon the passing of the bill by the Diet the means of obtaining homes will become much more accessible to the lower middle class of people than heretofore."

 

The Slum Improvement Bill purposes general improvement of the slum districts and also stimulation to local authorities toward systematic campaigns for social settlement work. The operation of this bill will cost the local governments some money and also involves subsidy by the central government, and this informant proceeds:

 

"There are particular kinds of slums in all large cities of Japan where 'eta' or discriminated class of people live. These people are segregated and detested by the other classes of Japanese, much as the negroes are segregated in some portions of the United States. The reasons for the exclusion are diverse, but the principal one is the historical fact that 'eta' belonged to a profession of killing animals and selling their flesh and hides at the time when Buddhism came in some 1500 years ago. Buddhism condemns killing of living creatures as the blackest of sins. Hence, when the religion was embraced by a large majority of the people, the 'eta' were held as an abominable class. This traditional prejudice became fixed in the minds of the people and clings even to this day.

 

"Now these segregated people live under an entirely different standard of living from the ordinary Japanese, and constitute the lowest stratum of the society. It is the improvement of this particular class of people and their conditions of living that the bill is especially aimed at. It provides for plans for improving streets and alleys in these quarters, improving houses, establishing better system of sewerage and water supply, extending medical aid, promoting morality and education, and for general betterment of economic status of the people.—The Literary Digest, March 12, 1921.

 

Japanese Navy.—Ever since the last autumn rumors have been afloat in London to the effect that a considerable part of the new naval program which the Japanese Government adopted in July was to be executed in this country.

 

Only a fortnight ago a statement appeared, with all the semblance of authority, to the effect that Cammell, Laird & Co. had secured the contract for two battle cruisers, while Vickers & Armstrongs were said to have received orders for other ships of this type. Orders of this kind would, of course, be a perfect godsend at the present time, when British armor plate mills and gun factories, erected at enormous cost, are lying idle and incidentally eating up capital for their maintenance. But, unfortunately, the rumors have not been confirmed, and I am now able to state that they are premature, to say the least.

 

Captain S. Kobayashi, C. B., the popular Japanese Naval Attaché in London, has been kind enough to furnish me with a statement on the subject, and I cannot do better than quote his remarks.

 

"It is true," he observed, "that a certain amount of barbette and other special armor plate for certain battleships, together with a quantity of armor-piercing projectiles, have been ordered in England by my government, but so far I have no official information touching the construction of capital ships in this country. As you are no doubt aware, the present world-wide financial depression is felt in Japan, and the shipbuilding firms are experiencing a serious shortage of work; they are, therefore, most keen to secure any orders which may be available. Under these conditions I do not think that the Japanese Government would contemplate placing orders for the building of capital ships in a foreign country.

 

"It must be remembered, however, that the Japanese shipbuilding firms are still young in experience, and they may find it necessary to have some of the special material supplied from abroad. In this case, therefore, certain Japanese firms may have placed contracts with British firms for some special machinery or engines; but since this is a matter which concerns the Japanese private firms alone, it would be impossible for me to furnish particulars of the orders in question."

 

Guarded as this statement is, it appears to refute the rumors that battle cruiser orders have been actually placed in this country. At the same time, there is a possibility that such orders will be forthcoming in the near future, owing to the fact that the Japanese shipbuilding and armament industry is not in a position to deal with the immense amount of construction represented by the new naval programme.

 

Four battleships and four battle-cruisers, with an aggregate displacement of 241,600 tons, are now under construction in Japanese yards, and eight additional capital ships, of still larger dimensions, have been voted by the Diet. Other construction now in hand or authorized includes 12 to 16 light cruisers and a very large number of destroyers and submarines. The execution of all this work would tax the resources of the most extensive and highly-developed industry, and it is certainly far beyond the capacity of the Japanese firms, in spite of the remarkable strides they have made since 1914.

 

Moreover, the government appears to be desirous of getting all these ships afloat within the next five or six years, in which case they will have no option but to farm out some of the work to foreign firms, and the high reputation which British shipbuilding enjoys in Japan is a guarantee that in such circumstances our own firms will be given the preference.

 

So far, however, no orders for ships have been received, though a certain amount of other work is being done there on behalf of the Japanese Navy. Messrs. Vickers, for instances, are manufacturing 7600 tons of special curved armor plate for the barbettes and conning-towers of the battleships Kaga and Tosa, and are also building several sets of 1200 brake horsepower engines for submarines, the boats themselves being on the stocks in Japan. Messrs. Hadfields are turning out several thousand armor-piercing projectiles for the 14-inch and i6-inch guns of the Japanese battle fleet.

 

These orders, welcome as they are, appear to be regarded as a promise of better things to come ; and if that expectation is fulfilled the problem of what to do with our armor plate and gun-making plants will be solved, at any rate for the time being.

 

Twenty years ago Great Britain was the main source of supply for the Japanese Navy. Practically the whole of Togo's battle fleet at Tsushima had been built and armed in this country, and as late as 1912 Vickers launched the Japanese battle-cruiser Kongo. Since then, however, Japan has been able to meet her own naval requirements, though a certain part of the material and equipment of her later dreadnoughts was imported from Britain.

 

But she has now embarked on a naval programme which goes considerably beyond the resources of her own industry, and if the ambition of Admiral Kato, the Minister of Marine, to have all the new ships in service by 1926 is to be realized, the placing of large contracts abroad will be inevitable. In any case, I am told that British shipbuilders and armament manufacturers are hopeful that enough work will be forthcoming to tide over the difficult period which now confronts them.

 

It is of interest to learn that the two latest Japanese battleships to be built here, the Katori and Kashima, both launched in 1905, will sail for England next month. The Katori is bringing the Japanese Crown Prince, while her sister ship is to act as escort.—The Naval and Military Record, Feb. 9, 1921.

 

The Latest Japanese Battleship "Nagato."—The First Japanese Capital Ship to Include the Lessons of the Battle of Jutland.—In view of the great public interest just now in the navies of the world, particularly in regard to the proposed reduction of armaments, the accompanying wash drawing of the Nagato, the latest Japanese battleship to be completed, possesses special interest. Although the modern battleships of all nations have reached a commonly accepted type, and are so generally similar in appearance that it takes a trained eye to recognize their individual silhouettes at a distance, the Nagato will be distinguishable at a glance by her remarkable five-legged foremast, with its many superposed platforms and fighting tops or, as they are now called, director stations.

 

The Nagato, which was authorized in the 1916 program and laid down during the summer of 1917, was proceeded with slowly during the war and has only just been completed. She is one of a class of four ships, of which the Mutsu is practically completed and the Kaga and Tosa were begun in January, 1920. The four ships represent the work of Japanese designers and constructors, and the fabrication has been done in Japanese shops and yards. This class of ship invites comparison with the four United States battleships of the Maryland class, since they are of similar tonnage and were authorized in the same year. The main armament also is the same, though the speed is higher. Not much is known about the armor plan, and it is a pretty safe guess that because of the higher speed and heavier motive power of the Japanese ships, their defensive qualities are inferior to those of the Maryland.

 

The Nagato is 660 feet long between perpendiculars, with a beam of 95 feet and a mean draft of 30 feet. It is probable that since she was built subsequently to the Battle of Jutland, the technical lessons learned in that engagement have been embodied in her construction, as they no doubt have been to a great extent in our own Maryland class. This means that particular attention has been paid in the submerged portion of the ship by the incorporation of anti-torpedo devices, though the beam would indicate that the bulge has not been adopted. The belt armor is believed to be not less than 12 inches, and the decks in the wake of the magazines have been strengthened as a protection against plunging fire.

 

The armament is very powerful, and this is the first battleship to mount the 16-inch gun, of which the ship carries eight mounted in pairs of turrets forward and aft. The gun is a powerful piece, firing a 2460-pound shell with a velocity of 2500 feet per second and a muzzle energy of 106,000 foot-tons. The shell is considerably heavier than our naval shell, which weighs 2100 pounds, but the high velocity of our naval gun of 2800 feet per second gives it a greater muzzle energy of 112,000 foot-tons. The secondary battery is also very powerful, consisting of 20 5.5-inch guns carried in broadside on the main and spar decks. The 5.5 gun is a new, long-caliber piece, coming midway in power between our own 5-inch and 6-inch guns. The Nagato carries also four 12-pounder anti-aircraft guns, and she is credited with the unusually heavy armament of eight 21–inch torpedo tubes; but we doubt that so many are carried.

 

Japan early adopted the tubular, tripod mast first used by the British; and she seems to like it so well that she has added three more legs until we have the imposing structure which towers above her fore bridge. It consists of a large central mast about which are built four inwardly inclined legs, the whole terminating in a large fighting platform above which are the separate, enclosed director-control stations, one for the main and the other for the secondary armament. A notable feature is the great number of searchlights, which are mounted upon successive platforms both on the fore and main masts and also on the after smokestack—evidence, this, of another lesson learned in the night-fighting at Jutland.

 

In their later ships, the Japanese have favored high speed, and the Nagato and Mutsu are reported to be 23-knot ships. The motor power consists of turbines of 46,000 horsepower and the propellers are driven through reduction gearing, a system which seems to be giving full satisfaction in the large powers with which it has been used in the later ships of the British Navy, and notably in the battle-cruiser Hood, of 165,000 horsepower.—The Scientific American, Feb. 26, 1921.

 

UNITED STATES

 

Type, number and name	Contractor	Per cent of completion
		Mar. 1, 1921		Feb. 1, 1921
		Total	On ship	Total	On ship
Battleships	?	?	?	?	?
44 California	Mare Island Navy Yard	95.8	95.2	95.5	94.7
45 Colorado	New York S.B. Cpn.	68	65	66.7	62.6
46 Maryland	Newport News S.B. & D.D. Co.	95	94.3	93	92.2
47 Washington	New York S.B. Cpn.	59.5	52.1	57.6	49.8
48 West Virginia	Newport News S.B. & D.D. Co.	47	36.3	44.5	33.2
49 South Dakota	New York Navy Yard	26	17.2	22.3	13.5
50 Indiana	New York Navy Yard	21.4	12.6	18.2	9.4
51 Montana	Mare Island Navy Yard	17.5	10.7	16.6	9.5
52 North Carolina	Norfolk Navy Yard	24.1	16.1	21.8	13.4
53 Iowa	Newport News S.B. & D.D. Co.	14.1	10.5	13.1	9.2
54 Massachusetts	Beth. S.B. Cpn. (Fore River)	2	…	1.2	…
Battle Cruisers	?	?	?	?	?
1 Lexington	Beth. S.B. Cpn. (Fore River)	10.6	2.3	7.7	1.1
2 Constellation	Newport News S.B. & D.D. Co.	6.5	3.8	5.1	2.7
3 Saratoga	New York S.B. Cpn.	16	8	13.3	6.6
4 Ranger	Newport News S.B. & D.D. Co.	1.1	0.5	1	0.4
5 Constitution	Philadelphia Navy Yard	3	1.2	2.3	0.8
6 United States	Philadelphia Navy Yard	3	1.2	2.3	0.8
Scout Cruisers	?	?	?	?	?
4 Omaha	Todd D.D. & Const. Cpn.	88.4	80.7	88.4	80.1
5 Milwaukee	Todd D.D. & Const. Cpn.	81.6	74	79	72.7
6 Cincinnati	Todd D.D. & Const. Cpn.	73.4	60.9	64.2	54.2
7 Raleigh	Beth. S.B. Cpn. (Fore River)	47.5	30.6	42.2	26.3
8 Detroit	Beth. S.B. Cpn. (Fore River)	47.4	30.5	41.9	26
*9 Richmond	Wm. Cramp & Sons Co.	60	…	59	…
*10 Concord	Wm. Cramp & Sons Co.	59	…	58	…
*11 Trenton	Wm. Cramp & Sons Co.	40	…	39	…
*12 Marblehead	Wm. Cramp & Sons Co.	38	…	37	…
*13 Memphis	Wm. Cramp & Sons Co.	31	…	30	…
Auxiliaries	?	?	?	?	?
Fuel Ship No. 18 Pecos	Boston Navy Yard (Oiler AO6)	67.4	65.4	59	57
Ammunition Ship No. 2 Nitro (AE2)	Puget Sound Navy Yard	99.9	99.5	99.8	99.2
Repair Ship No. 1 Medusa (AR1)	Puget Sound Navy Yard	55.5	38.4	51.6	36.6
Dest. Tender No. 3 Dobbin (AD3)	Philadelphia Navy Yard	50.3	50	49.3	49
Dest. Tender No. 4 Whitney (AD4)	Boston Navy Yard	17.6	6	15	4.4
Sub. Tender No. 3 Holland (AS3)	Puget Sound Navy Yard	9.5	…	7.8	…
Aircraft Tender, Wright (AZ1)	Tietjen & Lang	48	…	38	…
Patrol Vessels	?	?	?	?	?
Gunboat No. 22 Tulsa (PG22)	Charleston Navy Yard	55	39	49.9	35.9
*Completion dates indefinite on account of strike.
In addition to the above there are under construction 21 destroyers and 38 submarines.
Authorized but not under construction or contract 12 destroyers, 7 submarines, and 1 transport.
There were delivered to the Navy Department during February, 1921, 7 destroyers and 3 submarines.
Work on all destroyers and submarines (except submarines V-1, V-2, and V-3) is more than 50 per cent complete.

 

Problems That Face Harding.—"Just a few" of the complicated diplomatic problems that Warren G. Harding is facing are listed as follows in a Washington dispatch to the New York Tribune (Rep.):

 

"The Japanese situation growing out of the California land laws, an attempt to smooth over which already has resulted in loud outcries by the California Senators.

 

"The discussions which representatives of the British dominions have been holding with Senator Lodge as to some plan of these dominions and the United States presenting a united front to Japan.

 

"The Mexican situation, which apparently the Wilson Administration intends to leave on Harding's door-step, just as Taft left it on Wilson's.

 

"The disarmament proposal, with its important relations to Great Britain and Japan.

 

"The situation involved in foreign debts to the United States and the interest thereon, about which whole affair either the British Chancellor of the Exchequer is guilty of an extraordinary blunder, or else the Wilson Administration has been concealing the truth from the American people.

 

"The peremptory demand by the United States that Japan cease from occupying the other half of Saghalien Island and cease the attempt to set up buffer states in the south of Siberia.

 

"The protest against Britain and France restricting development of natural resources of mandate territory, notably in Mesopotamia, to their own nationals.

 

"The Cuban situation, which may easily lead at any time to the necessity for intervention.

 

"The dispute with Japan over American rights, particularly cable rights, in the island of Yap, and also the general cable situation.

 

"The Chinese situation, involving both the consortium and the open-door policy.

 

"The Turkish-Armenian dispute, which Wilson has declared involves the whole question of attacks by small states encouraged by larger ones on Russia.

 

"The problem about Russian trade and recognition of Soviet Russia.

 

"The Irish situation.

 

"Panama Canal tolls, involving, if it is raised, as Mr. Harding promised, the reopening of the dispute with Britain over the construction of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty.

 

"The problem presented by American occupation or control of Hayti and other small Latin-American states.

 

"The dispute with Costa Rica over the purchase of the option on the Nicaragua Canal route, and with Salvador and Honduras over the American purchase of a naval base in Fonseca Bay, both disputes being involved in the Nicaraguan treaty.

 

"The Colombian treaty dispute, under which a treaty for the payment of $25,000,000 for alleged injuries in the Panama revolution is still pending.

 

"The question of American interest in the fixing of German indemnities.

 

"These are just a few of the problems, and do not touch on the biggest one of all, the question of an association of nations, to take the place of the League of Nations, except in that they complicate it and make it much more difficult of accomplishment."—The Literary Digest, Mar. 5, 1921.

 

Exchanging Educational Facilities with Mexico.—The "Greaser" and the "Gringo" will perhaps look for more complimentary names for each other in the not distant future. If education succeeds where war and threats of war, with border raids as incidentals, fail to make two peoples friendly, Mexico and these United States may yet come to live in harmony. Business interests represented by various Chambers of Commerce, Rotary Clubs, and Foreign Trade Bureaus are furthering the proposal to establish exchange scholarships to "promote the exchange of educational opportunities between the two countries for deserving young men in college and university, commercial and technical courses, and apprenticeships in factories and business houses in the United States and Mexico." Fifteen institutions of collegiate grade have signified their willingness to establish from one to four free scholarships for Mexican students. The University of Texas has done more, and on December 28 received six Mexican young men for a four years' course. The present movement arose in the American Chamber of Commerce in Mexico, at the suggestion of Mr. W. A. Peairs, of Des Moines, Ia. "What we want," says Mr. Peairs, "is to have free tuition in business colleges, smaller colleges, and universities. We want business men in each locality to assist the Mexican boys by giving them part-time employment, so that they will realize that honest toil is no disgrace, and, what is still more, impress on them the true democracy of our land and its schools." After Mr. Peairs's visit to Louisville, Ky., The Courier-Journal of that city thus set forth his scheme:

 

"Education of young Mexicans in American universities, according to a plan worked out by the American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico, not only will cement trade relations between the United States and Mexico, but also will provide a panacea for Mexican political ills and the feeling of distrust between the two countries.

 

"It is hoped to bring between 1500 and 2000 Mexican young men, living in every part of the country from the United States border to the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, to America in 1921 to study in the universities and work in American business houses.

 

"The universities are being asked to exchange scholarships with Mexican schools, according to Mr. Peairs's outline of the plan. They are not asked to furnish anything more than tuition, however. The commerce chamber requests that American business men provide part-time employment for the young Mexicans so that they may pay for their education, in addition to obtaining a thorough knowledge of American business methods.

 

"'Mexico City had a university when the Pilgrim Fathers landed at Plymouth Rock,' Mr. Peairs says, 'but wealthy Mexicans to-day send their sons to England and the countries of Europe to gain their education. It is not the sons of the rich people that we want, however. We plan to bring the sons of the peons here. They are ambitious. It is not realized generally how much they want education.

 

"'And we don't want young men to come here with plenty of spending money. They should have to earn their own way in order to learn America. We are going to try to scatter them out as much as possible. If they flock together and live in little colonies our purpose of teaching them as much about America as possible will not be completely successful.

 

"'I've been going to Mexico on business trips for twenty-six years, and I know from experience how much easier it is to deal with Mexicans who have been educated in America and know the country. Why, often it's just a matter of showing them where the dotted line is. You can imagine the benefit to American commerce when there will be thousands of Mexicans in the country who understand America.

 

"'The Chamber of Commerce under this plan will be able to furnish Mexican representatives to American business firms without the least difficulty. Suppose an American asks for a Mexican representative. They will send to him an apt young Mexican who will study at an American university and work for him without any extra expense. Then the Mexican will have the double advantage of knowing his employer's business and understanding the psychology of the Mexican business men.'

 

"The plan was proposed by Mr. Peairs at the first Mexican-American Trade Conference last February. It was greeted with favor, and a committee was appointed to take charge. The Mexicans, Mr. Peairs said, are enthusiastic. He has talked to General Obregon about the proposal and found the leader pleased with the plan."

 

The movement should receive help and encouragement everywhere in the country, says the Atlanta Constitution, "but it should appeal particularly to the South." For—

 

"Mexico is our next-door neighbor. The greater part, if not all, of Mexico's commerce with the United States, and much of its foreign trade, should pass through the market centers and ports of the South.

 

"We have much to gain by offering aid and encouragement to any movement that is aimed at Mexican welfare and the development and closer friendship between the Mexican and our own people. Aside from humanitarian motives, it means business to us.

 

"A thousand Mexican students studying in the universities of this country would work wonders in wiping out the animosities of the past.

 

"By all means let's have the Mexican students come over."

 

The Star, of Indianapolis, observes:

 

"The theory of the interchange is not new, although application of it to Mexico is an innovation. There is a great opportunity for development of the relations between this country and Mexico and the present is believed by those familiar with conditions south of the Rio Grande to be the psychological moment for launching a vigorous effort. The great difficulty in the way of trade expansion in Mexico has been a lack of understanding between us and the Mexicans that has aroused suspicion and prejudice on both sides."—The Literary Digest, Mar. 12, 1921.

 

Merchant Marine

 

Training and Manning of Our Merchant Marine.—Returning to New York from a trip round the world as commander of S.S. Westwind. I have during my visits at different ports met with many incidents of such nature, that I feel it my duty to relay the suggestions incited by these experiences.

 

The suggestions I have hereunder recorded deal with the officers and crew of our merchant ships and how to man our ships in such a way, this with special reference to our fast passenger and mail service, that there will be the least inconvenience, troubles and delays as: strikes, union interference, lack of discipline and many other things too numerous to mention, but which are all objectionable to proper management of our ships, especially in our close competition with foreign nations.

 

First.—All American merchant ships should be manned by officers and men enlisted in the U. S. Navy.

 

(a) A special branch to be established in the navy called the merchant marine branch of U. S. Navy.

 

(b) By enlisting officers and men in the U. S. Navy, merchant marine branch, they are thereby under the Navy Rules and Regulations, which seems the only way to maintain a disciplinary standard, necessary and most suitable to our modern and growing shipping.

 

(c) The officers and men enlisting in the U. S. Navy, merchant marine branch, should wear the regular navy uniform. A clear distinction between Naval Reserve officers of the merchant marine branch uniform and that of the regular naval officer should be manifested, and my suggestion is: That a one-eighth (1/8 inch) inch wide light blue silk thread or cord be stitched close to the upper (upper end) gold stripe on each sleeve. This suggestion is taken from the naval reserve officers' uniform in the Royal Swedish Navy. I believe such an arrangement would also please the regular naval officer, because he would otherwise feel an infringement has been made on the uniform he is most proud of, and for which he has gone through years of special training and schooling, and it seems by right that no one but a graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy should wear the regular naval uniform.

 

(d) All officers and men enlisting in the U. S. Navy, merchant marine branch, will be paid standard merchant marine wages, and kept on the steamship company's payroll he is engaged by, in the same manner as at present. He will therefore not receive any pay from the navy whatsoever, except if he has retainer or confirmation pay from the Naval Reserve to which he may belong.

 

Conclusion.—Every merchant marine officer and sea-faring man must belong to the U. S. Navy merchant marine branch, to be able to sail in any American ship, at least in ships of and above 2500 gross tons, but he will not receive any pay from the navy, but be paid regular merchant marine wages from the company he is engaged by and for the time only that he is actually engaged on board a ship.

 

(e) When not actually engaged on board a ship he resumes automatically his status as an ordinary citizen.

 

(f) Special provision and rules to be made for officers and men engaged in the U. S. Navy merchant marine branch, in regard to wearing of uniform: (1) Uniform to be worn on board ship at all times. (2) Civilian clothing allowed to be worn when going ashore and off duty ashore. Uniform also to be allowed on shore at the option of the wearer.

 

(g) The letters to be used for marking the branch to which a man belongs should in this instance be f. i. : U. S. Navy (M. M.), (D.) or (E.) or (P.), each of the latter letters indicating. Deck—Engineer's Department—Pay department (including pursers, clerks, stewards, messmen.)

 

(h) It will be clearly seen, that if such an arrangement is made as above suggestions, it will not only mean: Better discipline, uniform regulations for all ships, uniform standard and status of all officers and men, easy means of keeping track and record every officer and man, no delays caused by strikes, union troubles, as all hands are under strict naval rules and regulations, subject to court martial. It would also mean cleaner, better ships, cleaner and better and more attractive-looking officers and men, as everybody must wear prescribed uniform on all American ships.

 

Officers and men enlisted in the U. S. Navy (M. M.) should be called for any other service but in merchant ships, except on his own request.

 

(i) All officers and men enlisted in the U. S. Navy (M. M.) should be given three months' preliminary training on board regular navy ships, before being assigned to any ships. Every officer and man should also be compelled to serve three months every fourth year on board a regular navy ship; it should, however, be preferable that six months' actual service on board a regular navy ship should be required every sixth year for two first six-year periods, and after such service has been fulfilled no other regular service on board a navy ship should be required, except in case of national emergency.

 

(j) If the above suggestions should become law, the navy should always have a large reserve of officers and men to draw upon and depend upon. Men that are trained and used to Navy Rules and Regulations and naval routine. Every one of such men will always be ready on a moment's notice to pack his bag and report to the ship, ready for duty. Sufficient clothing always in possession of each man.

 

(k) Officers and men at present enrolled in the U. S. N. R. F. and having retainer or confirmation pay, should be transferred to U. S. Navy (M. M.) and continue to draw retainer and confirmation pay as before.

 

(l) Navy Rules and Regulations to be changed to some extent so as to be practically applied to the running of merchant ships. Details of such changes to be worked by a board whose members have had experience both in the navy as well as merchant ships.

 

(m) Pension system to be adopted, similar to the system prevailing in the Swedish Navy ; f.i. A naval reserve officer receives 300 a year after 25 or 30 years' service, during which time he also has fulfilled all obligations and service in the regular navy and has a clear record. Amount of pension varying according to last rank held before retiring. This pension to be paid to members of U. S. Navy (M. M.) by the navy, a special appropriation to be made for that purpose. Such a pension would serve to stimulate and encourage a man's desire to join the merchant marine branch, to make him stick and become a valuable asset both to the navy and the merchant marine.

 

The above suggestions have been made, because of the experiences met with during this trip round the world, when at various ports and in American ships; the captain of one ship was compelled to pay off the whole crew, part of crews being discharged in many other instances, and troubles of all kinds existing, a situation which is alarmingly increasing, not only menacing our shipping in general, but making a bad name for us in foreign countries. Such a condition is probably due to lax shipping and marine laws, due to which the authority of a master is almost nil, when most extraordinary demands are continuously made by officers and men, in all kinds of matters, which as a whole serve as a hindrance to our growing marine.

 

When this ship was at Honolulu last August, several of the men in the engineering department demanded being paid off. The ship was only in for fuel oil and I had a very short time in which to get new men so as not to delay the ship. A suggestion was made to me by the U. S. Shipping Commissioner at Honolulu, that if a recruiting station and a suitable training ship be stationed at Honolulu it would be no difficulty m getting Hawaiian boys to go to sea; they are most suitable to become seamen, easily trained and very adaptable, disciplinary, clean and willing. As Honolulu is a port where many of our ships call, and where ships are many times delayed due to discharging of men, I should think the question of Honolulu as a recruiting station for U. S. S. B. as well as US. Navy (M.M.) should be taken up without delay. A ready supply of trained men should then be always ready at that place to replace men being discharged there for some or other reason, or to sent to some other port where needed by Lieut. Commander C. H. Hermance, U.S.N.R.F.

 

American Shipping.—By Senator Wesley L. Jones.—Good times in this country depend largely upon our foreign trade. So long as we produce a surplus this will be so. If we must depend upon the shipping of other nations and especially of our competitors for the transportation of this surplus we are at their mercy. The success of the farmer, the manufacturer and in fact all producers rest in their hands. If we cease to produce a surplus, if we reach the time when we must bring from other countries the things required for our own wants, we are then even more at the mercy of other people if we do not have the facilities to transport these things.

 

Surely we have not so soon forgotten the plight we were in when the world war broke out. We were then dependent upon foreign shipping to get the things we needed from abroad and to market our surplus. We found ourselves without these facilities. Freight charges soared. Our surplus products piled up at our terminals and could not get to market, even though enormous freights are offered. Railroad facilities were choked with freight seeking ships and embargoes were placed upon them, and the sidings throughout the country were filled with loaded cars. Industry was paralyzed and thousands of our people faced ruin—all because in time of peace we had not built up our shipping but had relied upon others for our ocean carrying. In the hour of stress we were at their mercy. Boasting of our freedom, of our independence and of our power, we were wholly dependent upon and our prosperity was wholly dependent upon the nations whose ships sailed the sea. We were at peace with them. They aided us all they could because they need our products. How much more disastrous it would have been if we had been at war with them.

 

A nation like ours without a merchant marine is an industrial vassal in peace and a helpless combatant in war. An adequate merchant marine is more important to us than a navy, even in war. Battleships may destroy battleships. They cannot carry trade. If we have no merchant marine our enemy need only keep their battleships at home and their merchant fleet away from our ports to work upon us untold suffering and ruin, and if that enemy is a country upon whom we would ordinarily depend for much of our ocean carriage.

 

Surely there is no American who does not know and admit the need of an adequate merchant marine. We all want one, but are we ready to do what must be done to get it? I wish I could do something that would lead our people to a fixed determination to have a merchant marine. It is no small thing for us to do. It is the biggest thing and the hardest problem to solve that faces us now. We must get the right kind of ships. We must get our people to go to sea and must train them. We must get American agents abroad. We must establish and build up business agencies and banking facilities. American marine insurance facilities must be created. All this must be done in competition with those firmly established and well-fitted by experience in all these activities, backed by their respective governments to the limit. Can we do it? We can, and we must. There is no human thing we cannot do if we will. We have the ability, the capacity, the energy, the initiative, the wealth and the power to do whatever human effort can do, if we will. What we need is the will to do. While recognizing the difficulties, we must counsel with our courage and not with our fears. If our people will determine to do this great thing regardless of cost or opposition we will succeed. It will cost money and take effort. We will suffer losses. We will meet with setbacks. We must endure discouragements. Our competitors will do all they can to keep us off the sea. They will scare us if they can. They will bluff us if they can. They will seek to discourage us. They will beat us if they can. I find no fault with them. I do not criticize them for this. Rather I honor them for it. They are looking after their own interests. I want to take a leaf from their book. I want our people and our government to look after our interests as Britain and other countries and their peoples look after their interests.

 

We are not doing this now. There are many people and agencies in this country who are now doing more to prevent an American merchant marine than all direct foreign agencies. Some are acting unwittingly. Others I fear are acting purposely. Some are honest in their fears. Others are doing the will of alien agencies under the cloak of Americanism. The results of one are just as deadly as the other.

 

On the Pacific and in the Far East is a fertile field for the development of our commerce and our shipping. A short time ago several of our army officers were going across the Pacific to their various stations. They discussed shipping. Every one took the position that we could not establish a merchant marine. All agreed that the British had the experience, the training and the facilities and that they could do the ocean carrying cheaper than we can and therefore we should not contest with them to do it. On inquiry it is learned that before they started a United States army officer had given a lecture to their class in our War College and had taken this position. These men are probably at their various stations innocently but none the less effectively aiding the British marine. Just think of a United States army officer taking such a position in the face of the strong desire of this people to build up a merchant marine and of the experience we had only six years ago when any saving of the years by reason of cheap foreign carriage was wiped out in a few months and civilization hung in the balance while we built up in feverish haste and with prodigal wastefulness what we should have developed and maintained through the years. Our papers almost daily ran great headlines charging wastefulness, inefficiency and graft in the operation of the Shipping Board. The laying up of ships is made a feature and the loss in the operation of our shipping is pointed to as an evidence of our inefficiency. This tends only to discourage and dishearten our people. These things were inevitable with the conditions under which our ships were built and are more of a reflection upon our people and their patriotism than on the efficiency of the Shipping Board. The government is laying up ships, but why are we not told that private owners and operators are laying up ships, too. Nor are we the only people whose ships are being laid up. Besides our wooden ships we have laid up three or four hundred steel ships, but I am reliably informed that twelve or fifteen hundred British ships are also laid up. Shipping is not the only industry that is in a bad way. All of our industries will recover if we will just look to their future, bear with fortitude the ills of the present and determine to succeed. We must not let our indignation at what we think is the incompetency and graft of our public officials blind us to the need of the future.

 

A great legislator, moved with indignation at the apparent incompetency of the men of the Shipping Board, declared a short time ago, in substance, that not another dollar would be taken out of the treasury with his consent to run our fleet and that the board must depend on receipts from operations and sales of ships. That will be cheering news to our competitors. No more deadly blow could be struck at our merchant marine than to follow such a course. If that is to be our policy all that alien shipping interests need do is to sit tight and wait for the inevitable. We should get rid of inefficient, incompetent or dishonest agents if there arc any, but we must keep our shipping going until world conditions improve, as they will. We must carry on this great enterprise just as private parties carry on their enterprises through bad times as well as good. It we are not ready and willing to do this we might as well quit right now trying to build up a merchant marine. No halting, hesitating, halfway policy will succeed.

 

Let me call to your attention one cheering fact. Before the war only eight or nine per cent of our foreign commerce was carried in American ships. To-day we are carrying about forty per cent, or nearly half in American ships.

 

Alien shipping interests have close connections with our great business enterprises. This was one thing that grew up of the fact that we were depending for so many years upon them for our shipping. Through these relationships they seek to mold public opinion and direct the action of our leaders of thought and enterprise. It is a tremendous, insidious and far-reaching influence, and I have about reached the point that if I find any man or agency opposing our laws or belittling our efforts and magnifying our difficulties in building up a merchant marine I look for some of these influences. I do not urge you to do this, but I think just now it is a pretty safe guide for those to follow who earnestly want an American merchant marine. I proceed on the assumption which I think is a safe one) that foreign interests, private or governmental, will do all they can to keep up off the sea.

 

The people of this country are proud of the great city of New York and of the commanding position it holds in world affairs. No one desires to do anything to retard its growth or lessen its influence so long as that influence is directed toward promoting American interests. Above state interests, should be the interests of the nation. These should be made supreme in the heart, desire and effort of every American and of every American community. A feeling is taking root throughout the country that alien interests are seeking through New York to control the enterprises of this nation. They know that foreign shipping interests center here and that much of whatever adds to the foreign business of New York benefits alien shipping. They are beginning to feel that certain influences are directing the action of certain governmental agencies in such a way as to concentrate here the export and import trade of the country to the detriment of other ports as well as to the injury of the producers. They are beginning to suspect that foreign shipping concerns, acting through interlocking directorates, etc., are very largely responsible for such a state of affairs. They are beginning to wonder if they could not afford to pay a considerable sum for an American merchant marine that will sail from different ports to carry to foreign markets the products for export that are naturally tributary to such ports. The people cannot understand Why it would not be better and cheaper to export or import from other ports where car and ship meet than to send cargo from ship to the car or from the car to the ship as it does from New York to interior points hundreds of miles away. I was told in Newark the other night that it costs $50, a car freight from Pittsburgh to Newark and $50 from there to the ship in New York harbor. That is a burden on commerce that ought to be removed. The people of Newark urge the improvement of their part of New York harbor to save that expense. They urge it as a national benefit. It will be a national benefit, but it will be a greater national benefit if our export trade can be relieved of that burden and at the same time be largely carried in American ships, and if, to do that, much of our commerce must be sent to other ports, this should be done and American ships made available there to carry it. The American people would like to see in New York that intense American spirit that we must have to build up an American marine. We want to see the great papers of New York urging unity among our people. We want to see them urging their support and the enforcement of law, whether relating to shipping or otherwise. We want to see them urging us to stand by our rights and the using of the measures that are necessary to prevent discriminations against us. We want to see them urging the people to be willing to sacrifice and not be discouraged at losses until our merchant marine is established. We want to see them urging the people to look to the future and not fill their columns with mistakes of the past with relations to our ships. In a word, we would like to see all the great papers of New York and the heads and leaders of great enterprises in New York express their faith in the ability of our people to build up a merchant marine and to urge their support of every measure that may be deemed necessary to secure it. Let every American do his duty and insure for our flag a merchant marine commensurate with power, wealth and needs of this great nation.—The National Marine, February, 1921.

 

Conditions of Success in the Merchant Marine.—Since the Spanish War, that is to say, for nearly a quarter of a century, there has been a more or less persistent effort to awaken the United States to the need for a merchant marine. The steady, and in late years phenomenal, growth of our foreign trade necessarily gave increasing emphasis to this movement. Before the war, it was estimated that we paid out about 300 million dollars per year in freight charges to foreign-owned shipping companies, and it was urged that if we had our own ships, this large sum of money would be diverted to the United States.

 

To-day we own such a fleet, but, unfortunately, its profitable operation is handicapped by shipping laws which impose such a heavy handicap upon American ships that they cannot possibly compete with those which fly a foreign flag. This is true, in spite of the fact that the general increase in wages throughout the world has brought this element in the cost of ship operations well up to the American level. Thus, thanks to the laws governing the operation of American ships, our splendid new merchant marine finds itself handicapped by having to carry much larger crews than its competitors. The accommodations for our seamen are more spacious and comfortable, and as to the way they are fed, the menu in the fo'castle of some of our ships would make many a city clerk or mechanic green with envy. This generous provision for the American seaman, so far as health and bodily comfort are concerned, is all to the good and will meet with approval; but anyone who is familiar with the problems of shipping operations will realize that this advancement of the conditions of housing, food and work imposes such a handicap upon our ships that, if we are to compete successfully with foreign-owned ships and to carry all of our own trade and a reasonable share of the trade of the world, it will be absolutely necessary for Congress to make good the difference in the shape of a very substantial annual subsidy from the national treasury.

 

Either that, or our shipping laws must undergo a drastic revision.

 

Hitherto, those of us who have striven to awaken the United States to the commercial and naval advantages that would follow from its possession of a powerful merchant marine have found that the mere mention of the word "subsidy" has acted like a spark in a powder magazine, except among the peoples who live along the seaboard and have an intelligent and sympathetic understanding of the shipping question. There is this difference, however, between the situation to-day and then. Formerly, we possessed no merchant marine. To-day we possess a great fleet composed largely of recently-built and thoroughly up-to-date freighters representing, so far as the one-half of it owned by the Shipping Board is concerned, an outlay of about four billion dollars of Uncle Sam's money.

 

It is certain that matters cannot go on as they are. To-day the operation of these ships is a losing proposition. We cannot go out of business, tor one reason because nobody in these times of terrific depression and abnormally low freights would care to buy our ships at any reasonable figure That being the case, what does the nation wish to do with this splendid property? Are we willing to sell the ships for a mere fraction of heir cost? Shall we let them rest at moorings? Or shall we bring a little national pride into the matter and send these vessels well equipped and manned by American crews, to display the American flag on all the seven seas, with the assurance that the taxpayers of the country are, to a man behind the great venture and will cheerfully make good a deficit which is largely due to world conditions over which we have no control.—The Scientific American, Feb. 19, 1921.

 

AERONAUTICS

 

Aeronautics in 1920 in Great Britain.—A general review of events of the past year, of which the part referring to commercial aeronautics is of particular interest.

 

From an examination of results obtained on the mail service from London to Paris, it would appear that out of 391 flights 298 (76 per cent) were completed without a delay of more than three hours. In 16 cases the flights were completed during the day on which they were started, but without a delay of more than three hours. In 77 cases the flights were either completed on the following day, not completed at all, or not started.

 

Railway passengers would probably have just cause to complain if one train in every four on a certain line between two cities failed to make the trip with a delay less than three hours.

 

It has also been found that aerial transportation both of passengers and freight is still very costly as compared with other methods. The main reason, however, why the public distrusts aerial transportation is on account of the impression of danger.

 

Turning to the records of the past year in England it is found that during the 17 months from May, 1919, to September, 1920, according to Air Ministry statistics, 100,285 passengers were carried in England in machines licensed for civilian flying. In this period seven pilots and eight passengers were killed in air accidents, and 13 pilots and 15 passengers were injured. The casualty rates per thousand passengers carried were thus 0.07 pilot and 0.08 passenger killed, and 0.13 pilot and 0.15 passenger injured. If the same rate of accidents prevailed on British railroads 140,000 passengers would be killed each year and over 26000 injured, while in something like three months all the engine drivers in England would have lost their lives. Admitting that such a comparison may involve gross errors, the margin against the safety of flying is still quite great.

 

As regards the status of production, the Sopwith Company went into liquidation, the Aircraft Manufacturing Company was absorbed by another concern, while the British Nieuport, the General Aircraft Company, the Grahame-White and the British Aerial Transport Company have practically closed the doors. The Vickers, Ltd., has been doing some work on training machines and on an order from the Chinese Government. Several companies, however, are fairly active in developing new types.—Mechanical Engineering, March, 1921.

 

New 1000 Horsepower Aero Engine.—London.—According to The Evening News, a powerful new Napier aero engine, called "The Cub," which, it is claimed, will revolutionize air travel, has undergone successful tests. It is an 18-cylinder engine of 1000 horsepower, and is intended for use by the Royal Air Force.

 

On its test the engine gave 1057 horsepower and was run for 20 hours. It weighs just under a ton and cost about £5000. It is understood that two "Cubs" are to be fitted to the Titania, a large flying boat which is being built by the Fairey Aviation Company. The Titania, says The Evening News, will have a range of about 1500 miles, and in wartime would carry crews of about ten. If adopted to civil use it probably could accommodate 50 people.

 

The paper declares that the advent of "The Cub" engine opens up possibilities of regular daily transatlantic service with giant flying boats of 5000 horsepower, carrying 250 passengers.—The Aerial Age Weekly, Feb. 14, 1921.

 

Preparedness in the Air.—A business man who has insured his factory for many years does not complain that he has paid premiums for nothing because there has been no destructive fire in his building; nor, if he is a practical man, does he consider insuring his property for $10,000 when it is worth ten times as much. Congress does not look at insurance of the country against the waste of war as sensibly. Constantly are heard complaints that too much money has been spent upon the army and navy for national defense, and when appropriations are wanted to equip a branch of the military service adequately a half or a third is allowed, no matter how good a case is made out for more. Thus the country carries less insurance than it should have, which is bad business.

 

The House Committee on Appropriations has recommended that $19,200,000 be allowed by army aviation, although Brig. General William Mitchell, Assistant Chief of the Army Air Service, had asked for $60,000,000, of which $17,000,000 was to be spent to equip units with modern aeroplanes. "Those we have now," he told the House Military Affairs Committee on January 4th, "are obsolete, old and becoming unsafe." There was such wastage during the war in building American aeroplanes on a colossal plan which proved to be a shocking failure that Congress is suspicious when the development of the air service of the army or navy on a modest scale is urged now. And members of Congress, of whom drastic economy in most things is expected, are prone to cut down every estimate asked for with small regard for the need of the appropriation. Even when there is crying need for money for the upkeep of an established and meritorious institution the knife goes through the estimate just the same, often leaving it a remnant. H the appropriation wanted is for national defense, the danger of another war is declared to be remote. Little attention is given to the wisdom of full insurance.

 

House committees may not accept General Mitchell as the most eminent authority on military aviation, and they may be disposed to turn to others for information about naval aeronautics, but in his appearances before the Military Affairs Committee early in January and the Appropriations Committee last week he surely qualified as an expert both at the front in France and since the war as Assistant Chief of the Army Air Service. What General Mitchell told the committees about the offensive and defensive power of the aeroplane on sea or land was not new, although more than one Representative seemed to hear it for the first time. Unfortunately there are few members of Congress who make a study of war inventions and preparedness. At the hearing early in January General Mitchell stated that the French were maintaining a force of 3000 land planes, and that the British, besides keeping up a formidable army flying corps, were acquiring ocean aircraft carriers and developing machines to fight above the water, while the United States lagged behind in aviation. The committees he addressed listened to illustrations of war in the air with wonder or incredulity. How great cities might be gassed from the sky by planes brought to the coast on aircraft carriers, unless there should be a defensive force to drive the enemy off, should have made a profound impression in the telling.

 

All the horrors described by General Mitchell, America may experience if other wars are to be waged and preparedness has been neglected. He pleaded with his hearers for a demonstration of what bombing planes could accomplish in attack upon an obsolete war vessel selected for experiment. That may be the business of the navy, but certainly one of the old battleships of the Spanish War could be spared tor a thorough test. And other demonstrations of the destructiveness of bombs dropped from the air would be educational. H Congress can be made to understand the offensive power of aircraft on land and sea, adequate appropriations may not come so hard. (Editorial in N. Y. Times.)—Aerial Age Weekly, Feb. 14, 1921.

 

General Mitchell on the Air Service Appropriations.—Brig. General William A. Mitchell, Assistant Chief of the Army Air Service made a pleas before the House Committee on Appropriations January 28 for adequate funds to develop aviation as a means of military defense, especially of the coast cities. The committee in the Army Bill which was reported recently, however, recommends the appropriation of only $19,200,000 instead of the $60,000,000 which had been asked.

 

General Mitchell insisted that the aeroplane had become so much superior to the battleship that a well-balanced military program must include a large aerial force to be effective in the next war. He said that a sufficiently large force could be formed and equipped in three years at a cost of $45,000,000, which represented no more than the cost of a battle-cruiser.

 

General Mitchell wanted the committee to recommend the use of the former German liners Leviathan Von Steuben and Agamemnon as aeroplane carriers. With these fast ships carrying an air force, he said, they could be quickly carried to any zone of operations. With these ships equipped the entire Atlantic Coast could be well protected, he said.

 

"The vulnerable part of our country is from the Chesapeake Bay up to Boston, and from New York to Chicago," said the general. "By having an air force ready for action somewhere in New Jersey you can reach any part of that area within two or three hours, whereas you could not do it in less than a day or two with railway guns, and then they could have little effect. You must remember that it takes an hour at least to put railway guns into firing position and we can go no miles an hour with our bombardment aeroplanes, much more with our pursuit. We can shift our air forces within 25 to 30 flying hours from the east to the west coast, and from the North to the South in the same proportion of time.

 

"You must remember, also, that battleships cost $45,000,000 each, and we can build a thousand aeroplanes for the cost of each battleship.

 

"The whole training of the navy is that the armored ship, is mistress of the sea, whereas actually it is just as helpless as the armored knight was when firearms were brought against him."

 

General Mitchell said that 600 aeroplanes—60 per cent pursuit, 20 per cent attack, and 20 per cent bombing—would be sufficient to protect the Atlantic Coast, while the Pacific should have the same number. As a protection for the land, 1200 other planes were needed, he said.

 

The officer asserted that, with the improvements in aviation and bombing, "any ship in existence can be destroyed to-day." He told how in a test attack with bombs on the old battleship Indiana aircraft 5000 feet up made 11 per cent of hits.

 

Explaining the use of gas against cities. General Mitchell said:

 

"We believe that in the next war gas might be used by a barbarous foe on the centers of communication. We know just how much gas has to be put down on these centers to interrupt communication. Take New York and an area in the vicinity ten miles by ten miles. If two tons of crying gas are dropped by aeroplanes or airships there once in eight days, it will make everybody wear gas masks and goggles.

 

"If we want to keep that place covered with mustard gas, we can put down 70 tons once in eight days and everybody will have to protect themselves against mustard gas in that area. If we want to kill everybody in that area and use phosgene, we have to put down 200 tons of phosgene once in eight days and it will keep that area covered. All you have to do is to go over that area once every eight days and keep it inundated with gas. The only protection against such a procedure is protection in the air."—Aerial Age Weekly, Feb. 7, 1921.

 

Appropriations for Naval Aviation.—Following is a statement made by Capt. T. T. Craven, Director of Naval Aviation, before the Naval Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives:

 

The committee has before it an analysis of the estimates for naval aviation for the fiscal year 1922.

 

The estimates are divided up and analyzed as has been the case for the past two years and under the same subheads as before.

 

The Department submits a request for a total of $35,000,000. Considerable progress in fleet aviation has been made during the past year despite the difficulties connected with all naval operations due to shortage and changing of personnel which have interfered with training everywhere. In the Pacific the aviation activities have been based largely in the San Diego region, where a fine climate and a shore base near to the drill ground for ships has materially assisted operations. The Atlantic Fleet has operated in the West Indies and also on our own coast, and has had conditions not as favorable as those experienced by the Pacific division of the fleet There has been constant effort to make aviation a fleet activity. Difficulty has been experienced because of the absence of vessels capable of adequately caring for aviation interests. The Shawmut and the Aroostook, two mine layers, have been continued as aviation tenders and have given excellent service in that capacity, despite the fact that they are not fitted for this work and have simply been loaned by the mine force to aviation. If these two craft had not been with the Atlantic and Pacific fleets, naval aviation would have had to continue to base its efforts entirely upon the shore. In addition to the Shawmut and Aroostook acting as mother ships for the large aeroplanes which now accompany the fleets, the destroyers Harding and Mugford have been loaned to the two fleets as tenders for groups of large flying boats of the NC type. In the Atlantic fleet a mine sweeper, the Sandpiper, has also assisted as a tender for the purpose of aviation.

 

Four battleships in each fleet have been fitted to convey planes and each of these ships has been equipped with two heavier-than-air machines, which they have flown from the turrets. A number of vessels of various classes are equipped with kite balloon winches and are prepared to operate knife balloons. A kite balloon division has been organized in the Atlantic and in the Pacific to continue development to the kite balloon operations.

 

While material progress has been made with fleet aviation, it must be clearly understood that without the conveniences and the machines permitting the development of aviation afloat with a minimum of effort and inconvenience to ships, the progress of molding aviation into the naval establishment afloat necessarily will be slow.

 

I believe I am correct in stating that the difficulties for the sailor who flies are as much greater than those of the flyer over land as is the case with all of the other highly technical operations which a seaman undertakes by comparison with the work of the soldier. The development of military and naval aviation came about during the World's War and during that struggle the land operations of aviation were carried on intensely and constantly. The major effort of naval aviation was the suppression of the submarine and only towards the close of the struggle did it find a place in the fleet. The supremacy of land aviation put its stamp upon naval thought and until now the effort has been to improvise for naval purposes machines and tactics developed primarily for use over the land. Even the type of machine to be employed from ships cannot be the same as that best employed from shore. Those who are unfamiliar with naval subjects and the naval problem cannot understand this idea, which is in direct opposition to the view that a united Air Service is either practicable or desirable.

 

The aviation service which the navy desires to-day, and which it must have, is an arm which will assist it to defeat the enemy at sea. This is its paramount present-day essential. In so far as this detail is concerned, and regardless of future developments, the matter now is purely a naval one which the navy alone is competent to handle.

 

Because of the stress given to land aviation, the development of the land plane and of aviation tactics over the land in conjunction with troops has progressed far beyond the uncertain stage of experimentation. In the combined service which has been developed in England, the preponderance of experience and of skill and technical talent rests with the branch, by far most numerous, composed of flyers who have won their laurels over the land. Consequently, the attempt has been to compromise and to adapt the land type of machine to naval purposes. Development has been slow for two reasons: first, because Great Britain has two services in the same ship occupied with a common problem. It is not difficult to understand why progress has been impeded as a result of this arrangement. A second obstacle has been that incidental to the attempt to compromise the land type and to improvise the machines for ships' use rather than to attack the problem of the design of a machine for overseas work directly, which is distinct and separate from that involved in the design of land machines. There are certain principles which must be embodied in machines to be used from ships. The first is (a) flotation, which provides reasonable safety for the pilot and for the machine. Unless flotation is supplied which insures reasonable safety, the development of the tactics of aviation for naval purposes will not proceed, as the commander-in-chief and the commanding officers of vessels employing aircraft will not wish to hazard the aviation personnel in developing the tactical usefulness of aviation in time of peace and in studying the tactical employment of this arm. Consequently, interest in aviation and the application of aviation, in so far as the navy is concerned, cannot be obtained unless this characteristic is given to naval planes. An effort to compromise the land type of plane by fitting it with air bags for work over water has not been satisfactory as a means for fulfilling naval requirements.

 

A second quality essential for naval planes is (b) ruggedness and dependability, capable of being easily and quickly taken down and assembled, and when taken down, capable of compact stowage.

 

The conveyance of planes on the decks or turrets of ships adds one more mental burden to the great load carried by the captain of a naval unit. Planes carried on decks or turrets are very much in the way and one cannot expect to find planes in general use from various types of ships until machines have appeared which can be taken down easily and stowed inboard out of the weather and in a way in which they do not interfere with ship activities. It would seem that we must look to metal as material for assisting us to obtain this characteristic. Features which permit the quick taking down and assembly of planes are of far greater importance to the navy than to the army.

 

The third attribute to be incorporated in a naval plane is (c) ability to fly from a vessel, either directly or assisted, and to land on the deck of a vessel or in the water. The necessity for this characteristic is self-evident and in order that planes may be carried in different types of vessels it is essential that they may get away from the ship with a very short run or that a machine such as a catapult be supplied by which they may be projected into the air. A plane must be fitted to land on a deck or on the water. The land flyer is not concerned with these details.

 

A fourth attribute is (d) low landing speed. It can be readily seen that the closer the speed of a plane approaches the speed of a plane carrier—the ship upon which she desires to land—the easier a landing becomes upon the deck of such a vessel. A plane with an excessively high landing speed cannot land upon the deck of a carrier. The importance of low landing speed is supreme for planes to be conveyed in ships of the carrier type.

 

Having accepted the four above-mentioned characteristics as essentials, we then have a fifth which must be included in order that a machine carried by ships may serve a useful end. Such a plane must be (e) capable of conveying and of usefully applying military power. This involves performance, ability to communicate, and the employment of weapons.

 

It is evident that these characteristics cannot be secured without sacrifice to some degree of the high performances now given to the plane of purely a land type, but the navy must accept this penalty in the aviation arm as it does in all the arms conveyed in surface and subsurface vessels.

 

If one considers the five characteristics enumerated above and has knowledge of the conditions of the art as it exists to-day, it becomes evident that the naval problem is far from solution and it is seen that the time for standardization in so far as naval types are concerned is far in the future.

 

In other words, development of naval planes can only be carried on experimentally and it is of vital importance that the operator and the designer work closely hand in hand. Standardization is as yet impossible. The proposition to combine the production of machines for the army and navy therefore is illogical and can only result in delaying the naval branch in its effort to acquire the apparatus which will permit it to definitely give to aviation the place belonging to it in naval affairs.

 

Steps to Be Taken for the Procurement of New Types of Machines.—The following steps must be taken in order to attack directly the problem in hand by the navy for the procurement of machines adapted to its use:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. • Encourage designers to develop planes suitable for naval purposes, through competition or otherwise.
   • Encourage manufacturers to produce planes of different sizes incorporating the above requirements, through contracts.
   • Improve and augment the experimental facilities of the aircraft factory and enlarge the technical designing force.
   • Investigate and purchase abroad any types of aircraft which seemingly are well adapted for our purposes.

 

The development has proceeded along the lines indicated above. The lack of technical designers is felt keenly, particularly as many reserve officers who were employed in work of this nature have left the service, and with the departure of each one an unfilled vacancy in an important field remains. It is earnestly hoped that the limitations in regard to the amount which may be spent for classified and technical employees may be increased in order to permit the navy to proceed with the important work in hand. The solution of our problem has been retarded for lack of a carrier with which to carry on our experimental work. The conversion of the Langley (ex-Jupiter) will be completed during the coming spring and when that vessel become available we will be able to make a start toward the solution we desire. A bigger and a faster ship than the Jupiter must be provided, however, before we can hope to attain final results.

 

The conversion of the Upright has been delayed and that vessel will not be ready for many months. When commissioned the ship will serve a most useful purpose as a base or tender for large seaplanes and for a kite balloon unit.

 

Funds for experimental work should not be curtailed, and pending the development of machines best adapted for use from shipboard planes not so excellent for naval purposes must be supplied in sufficient numbers to permit the development of organization and skill of personnel.

 

The personnel of aviation during the fiscal year 1922 is expected to be about 800 officers and 7000 men in the navy and 124 officers and 1100 men in the Marine Corps. At present a total of 631 officers are employed on aviation duty, of whom 362 are aviators and 53 student aviators. We have a total of 60 heavier-than-air and lighter-than-air enlisted pilots and a total of about 7200 enlisted men employed in aviation duty, of whom 3000 are at the Training School at Great Lakes.

 

A detachment of 15 officers and 45 enlisted men is on duty in England in connection with the construction of the rigid being manufactured tor our naval service. This contingent is being instructed in the operation of rigids by the British. The completion of the ship has been retarded somewhat, as has also been the hangar intended for her reception in this country. It now looks as though the vessel would be completed in March and the hangar at Lakehurst would be ready for occupancy on July 1. It is probable that the ship will make the passage across the Atlantic early

 

During the year shortage of personnel made it necessary to place the air stations at Chatham and at Cape May on an inoperative basis. These stations have been closed and placed under caretakers

 

The station at Rockaway has operated throughout the year. The amount of money spent at this place has been kept low and nothing has been spent on public works beyond what was absolutely necessary for upkeep. The matter of the acquirement by the government of the land on which the station stands has been taken up with the authorities in New York, but no arrangements have been consummated to this end.

 

It is evident that it is of great importance to the government to preserve aviation facilities in the neighborhood of large centers of population. Only through the maintenance of such establishments interest in flying on the part of many individuals who would be immediately useful as flyers in the event of war can be sustained and a reserve of aviators perpetuated.

 

There has been considerable progress in the completion of the station at Hampton Roads, which during the next year will become our important aviation operating base on the Atlantic Coast.

 

There is no aviation station south of Hampton Roads within the continental limits of the United States, with the exception of the school at Pensacola. The activities at this place have been augmented considerably during the past few months because of the larger classes which are now being sent there made up of officers of the regular navy. This is probably one of the most active flying schools in the world.

 

A small station at Coco Solo in the Canal Zone, established during the war, has continued to struggle on with the limited conveniences supplied during hostilities. The importance of supplying adequate facilities insuring the protection of the Panama Canal would make it evident that a considerable sum should be devoted to the improvement of the aviation facilities in the Canal Zone in the near future. Better provision should be made for the housing of personnel station at this post.

 

On the west coast, San Diego has been a very active center during the past 12 months, and the importance of this point will increase during the coming year. Up to the present no decision has been reached in regard to the site for the rigid hangar for the construction of which money was appropriated by Congress last year.

 

It is expected that contracts for the establishment of the station at Pearl-Harbor, authorized by the last Congress, will be let in the near future.

 

The Great Lakes mechanics' school has continued to fill a most useful role and is engaged in the training of aviation mechanics. Every one who has visited this institution has been impressed with the excellence of the course given to young men sent to this station. I believe it to be one of the leading, if not the leading, manual training school in the world. The only flying facilities at Great Lakes are those supplied during the war by private contribution, and it would seem most desirable that a hangar should be erected at this place which will permit flying in this locality. The Department has been seriously embarrassed during the past year because of the lack of facilities in this neighborhood where there is little that can be supplied reserve officers for the purpose of continuing their flight exercises and flight training.

 

The development of the torpedo-plane is being undertaken seriously by the Navy Department. In order to carry on this work it is necessary to have flying facilities at places where it is convenient to run torpedoes. During the past year we have endeavored to carry on torpedo work at Yorktown, but in order to insure the progress which we desire, the Bureau of Ordnance is very anxious that facilities permitting the use of aviation should be created near the torpedo station at Newport.

 

It will be noted that no money has been requested for seaplanes, as it has been assumed that the planes left over from the stock accumulated during the war will be available for another 18 months. It costs a considerable amount to recondition these machines, but the large boats on hand are well worth this expenditure.

 

In the estimates presented to the committee, it will be noted that a total of 67 heavier-than-air planes are requested for the navy and 61 planes for the marines. This is a very conservative number; certainly it would seem impossible for us to do with less, and were it not for the large number of seaplanes on hand which will also be utilized, a far greater number of heavier-than-air craft than the 128 requested should be authorized.

 

Lighter-than-air activities everywhere have been very much curtailed. With the commissioning of a tender which will permit the better employment of the kite balloon, greater interest in the use of these units is to be expected. At the present time operations with kite balloons in the fleet are attended with serious difficulties.

 

The war definitely determined the airship to be primarily a naval unit. The Allied navies found the non-rigid airship to be of value in the antisubmarine campaign in convoy and patrol operations. The Germans demonstrated the usefulness of the rigid as a naval scout, after abandoning this type for offensive overland operations.

 

The rigid airship in its present state of development has a wide cruising radius and an ability to stay in the air for long periods of time. Owing to the excellent visibility and weather conditions prevailing in the Pacific and West Indian areas rigids would be of tremendous value in event of war to a fleet operating in these theatres.

 

The small non-rigids requested will always be useful for coastal work in time of war and are valuable as training units for lighter-than-air personnel. After his course in non-rigids, the pilot should then be competent to begin his instruction in rigid airships. During the coming year we will have one rigid in operation and one under erection in this country. We cannot be expected exhaustively to study the usefulness of rigids for naval work with but two ships of this character, and it is to be hoped that the Congress will see fit to continue our development in this line.

 

The Department has a giant seaplane under construction. A small amount of money has already been expended on this project from that appropriated for experimental work. The construction of a great ship along the line proposed by the Department is directly in the road of progress and should be continued. A considerable sum is requested for construction of stations, and a considerable part of this sum is to be devoted to construction in the Philippines, at Dutch Flats, and on the Pacific Coast rigid station.

 

The disinclination to appropriate unduly for naval shore activities is thoroughly appreciated and unquestionably ideas on this line are entirely correct, but it is submitted in passing that aviation is a new branch which does not fit itself readily into any of the naval shore establishments and bases already in existence, and facilities permitting flying must be created before flying can be conducted. All naval operations of every kind must always be based upon the land. This is true for work with ships as well as aircraft, and consequently any money wisely spent in shore development is a permanent asset and cannot be wasted in so far as aviation is concerned.

 

In the estimates for maintenance of stations, effort has been made to cut, and figures have been based upon actual performances during the past year. The fund for experimental work is believed to be the minimum that should be supplied. The matter of anti-aircraft research and methods for withstanding aircraft attack has recently been investigated by a board m the Navy Department, and it is evident that a considerable sum must be devoted to this important work. The recommendations of this board were not received until after the estimates herein contained had been submitted, but it is believed that the amount requested by the board ($1,000,000) can be covered in the total of $35,000,000 recommended for aviation purposes during this year.

 

It will be noted that an increase of $125,000 is proposed for drafting, clerical, and technical service. All progressive experimental and design work in aviation has been very much retarded through the lack of trained and skilled technicists. This is particularly the case now that many of the reserve officers, formerly employed m technical capacities, have left the service. Something must be done to enable the navy to retain adequate technical assistance in order to insure the development of aviation.—Aerial Age Weekly, Feb. 7, 1921.

 

ENGINEERING

 

Electric Ship Propulsion Discussed.—The question of whether reduction gearing or electricity is better for ship propulsion was the principal subject of discussion at a joint meeting of the New York sections of the American Institute of Electrical Engineers and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, held on January 28. The chief features of interest in a lengthy program were an address by Admiral Benson, chairman of the United States Shipping Board, and two papers on ship propulsion by Eskil Berg, of the General Electric Co., and W. E. Thau, of the Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co.

 

Admiral Benson pointed out the need of perfecting every possible device for making our merchant ships more efficient, in order that we may hold our present position in world trade and eventually make it stronger. He gave it as his opinion that the system of ship propulsion that will ultimately prove superior to all others for mercantile vessels as well as warships is the "Diesel-electric" type. He said he had the utmost confidence in the new merchant ship Eclipse, the electric propulsion machinery of which was described in Power for Nov. 2, 1920; that he had, in spite of criticism, sent this vessel on its first voyage all the way to the East Indies; and that the latest report, from Singapore, stated there had not been a bit of trouble since leaving port.

 

Mr. Berg, in his paper, "Turbine Reduction Gears vs. Electric Propulsion for Ships," said that the question depends entirely upon the type and operating conditions of the vessel concerned. He pointed out that the Navy Department has decided upon electric drive for all the larger vessels, but he described the geared turbine as being more advantageous in fast destroyers and light cruisers where the propeller speed is always high. In the case of mercantile ships he felt that each individual installation deserves study and that no general rule can be drawn except, possibly, that electricity is better for fast passenger liners.

 

In summing up, the speaker gave the following points in favor of electric drive.

 

It affords easy reversal at full power by electrical connections without reversing the turbine.

 

It makes it possible quickly to detect trouble and to check up on fuel consumption, by means of voltmeters, ammeters, and other accurate electrical instruments.

 

It is practically noiseless.

 

Electrification of mills and factories has greatly reduced maintenance cost and is expected to have the same result on ships.

 

It makes possible economical cruising at reduced speeds.

 

In case several generating units are used, one may be shut down without impairing the efficiency of the complete installation.

 

As the turbine is never reversed and there are no reverse blades dragging, a higher degree of superheat and higher steam pressure may safely be used.

 

The omission of reversing blades shortens and lightens the turbine shaft and thus permits higher speeds and longer bearing life.

 

The generating units may be put in any convenient place, near the boilers, for instance, and the motor at the extreme stern if desired, thus eliminating the space requirements and bearing troubles of a long propeller shaft.

 

Arrangements may be made to drive the main auxiliaries by electricity, so that if the main generating unit breaks down, steerageway may be maintained by the auxiliary unit.

 

Comparing the efficiency of electric drive with that of gear drive Mr. Berg declared that there is little difference in fairly large installations such as 3000 horsepower and over. He gave about 92 to 94 per cent as representative efficiencies of the transmission apparatus, consisting of gear in one case and a generator and motor in the other. He put the cost of electric drive slightly higher than for gear drive.

 

W. E. Thau, in his paper, "Electric Propulsion of Ships," agreed with Mr. Berg that the type of drive depends upon a number of different factors, so that no system of propulsion can well be recommended for general use. He regarded electric drive as a logical and successful development, but declared that the geared turbine drive has come to stay and has a legitimate field. He described the internal-combustion or Diesel drive as offering possibilities superior to those of any other type. Mr. Thau said, however, that the development of high-speed Diesel units for electric drive has not been perfected in sizes that will permit a drive in excess of approximately 6000 horsepower. He advocated the use of a number of small, high-speed Diesel engines so as to obtain greater flexibility and reserve power.

 

In the discussion that followed the papers, G. A. Pierce, of the William Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine Building Co., defended strongly the use of turbine reduction gears and criticized electric drive, particularly for its complexity and the difficulty of training men to handle it at sea. He even questioned the superiority of electric drive at cruising speeds over a well-designed turbine installation containing geared cruising turbines. He asserted that the full-power reversing made possible by electric drive is unimportant, because no more than about one-third of full power can properly be utilized in stopping a ship and no more than that is needed in backing. He then read a statement from J. F. Metten, chief engineer of the Cramp Company, which said that proponents of electric drive generally compare the newest and best examples of that system with selected failures of gear drives, and that in his opinion the latter type will eventually prove its superiority.

 

Commander C. A. Jones, of the U. S. Navy, on the other hand, said that as far as capital ships in the navy are concerned, electric drive has come to stay, and also that no great difficulty has been encountered in training the engineer force to handle the electrical machinery involved.—Power, Feb. 8, 1921.

 

Problems Awaiting Solution in Diesel-Engine Design.—Problems and Probable Field of the Oil Engine, Paul Rieppel. The author starts with the discussion of the economical and political problems connected with the control of the world's supplies of oil and of the application of the oil engine—by which he means the various types of internal-combustion engines, the Diesel and its modifications being first considered. In the course of the article the author makes many interesting observations and raises several questions well worth attention.

 

Combustion Processes.—As regards the nature of combustion processes in the Diesel engine, our knowledge has reached the point where we can clearly distinguish the processes of injection, vaporization, gas formation and combustion. The author believes, however, that a very wide field in this domain remains as yet unexplored and that more work should be done in the laboratory by the physicist, such work being preferable in many cases to extensive experimentation on actual engines.

 

The most rapid and complete combustion is a function of the fineness of atomization, intermixture with air, and, to an extent which has not yet been fully appreciated, of turbulence. No thorough tests have been made to determine what is the best method to obtain the most complete atomization and what fineness of atomization is needed under each set of conditions.

 

As to the influence of catalysis in the cylinder, whether that due to presence of water or of some other catalytically acting material, the tests of Stein contain valuable material, but the influence of very small, in fact extremely small, amounts of water on fuel combustion remains as yet to be investigated. As a matter of fact we know that under certain conditions very poor oils burn better in the presence of water, and the use of other catalytic agents, such as silicon and various metals, may bring startling developments in engine design and offer a means of increasing our ability to control combustion.

 

How to obtain the best possible conditions of turbulence and how to evaluate the influence of turbulence are questions which may be answered by tests on self-ignition of oils and the velocity of flame propagation therein. In a bomb, oil vapor at rest does not ignite at all at temperatures corresponding to the temperature of compression in a Diesel engine, but when a slight turbulence is produced, as for example, by injecting a small amount of air, self-ignition takes place. This and other questions must be considered by everyone interested in the subject of combustion processes, and they are not mere academic problems but important stones in the foundation upon which the structure of economic design of an engine has to be raised. Had we had this information a highly economic Diesel engine could have been designed long ago and have done away with the compressor. From this the author proceeds to the discussion of various attempts to build a Diesel engine without a compressor, such as have been proposed by Vickers, Price and Steinbecker.

 

Economy of Operation.—In the determination of the economy of operation, questions as to the use of a 4-stroke or 2-stroke cycle, high or medium pressures, are ones which lie at the foundation of the problem. After discussing briefly the relative position of the 4- and 2-stroke cycles and the question of scavenging, the author proceeds to the question of compression and asks whether we shall continue to operate Diesel engines with a combustion of 35 atoms, and the heavy weight of the engine and mechanical difficulties which it involves.

 

The higher thermal efficiency secured with this compression does not have decisive value in the author's eyes, as motors employing lower compression pressures would have a lower first cost, be more reliable and show a better mechanical efficiency. As regards the advantage secured through self-ignition of the mixture, it is pointed out that the point of self-ignition is lowered very materially when the cooling produced by the expanding stream of the injection air is eliminated. With solid injection every condition of engine operation can be met without external means of ignition at a pressure of 25 atoms. But even assuming that self-ignition would have to be dispensed with, why not? The high value placed on the ability of the engine to operate on a basis of self-ignition is a survival of a time when electrical ignition was still complicated and unreliable. To-day it is quite easy to provide reliable means of producing a good electric spark having a good control of timing, or, where necessary, to produce a wire spirally wound and maintained constantly at a glowing heat by a flow of electric current. There is no reason why one should not employ outside methods of ignition in engines in which the most economical operation may be secured at compressions at which self-ignition can no longer be relied upon.

 

In connection with the problem of securing the most economical operation of oil engines, the author takes up the question of utilization of waste heat. It is true that as high as 40 per cent of the heat in the fuel may be usefully employed in the oil engine, but this is no reason why one should waste the other 60 per cent without any effort at recovery. The comparison with the 12 per cent heat efficiency of the steam engine is often misleading because in a steam engine a good deal of the heat in the exhaust steam may be still utilized for purposes of heating and drying. In properly conducted factory processes employing steam, the power generated by the steam engine should be considered as a mere by-product, while in the case of oil-engine drive it is the main if not the only product of fuel combustion.

 

The problem of utilizing the waste heat of oil engines is one of the most important from an economical point of view. The usual way is to pass the exhaust gases on to steam boilers, a method well known in large gas engine operation. This cannot be done as conveniently with oil engines, because the temperature of the exhaust gases is considerably lower. Furthermore, any attempt at a thorough utilization of exhaust heat from oil engines would involve a considerable increase in the first cost of the installation and also possibly corrosion troubles due to the presence of sulphurous acid in the exhaust gases. In particular, in the case of auxiliary boilers on shipboard, it has been found advisable to equip them with direct oil heating in addition to heating by exhaust gases An important physical problem is the determination of the coefficient of heat transfer from exhaust gases to the boiler wall. This is a question proposed by Nusselt, but, in general, the coefficients now employed are more or less of a rough nature and do not take into consideration many important factors.

 

In this connection may be mentioned attempts to mix the exhaust gases with steam and to add to them compressed air and utilize the mixture either in turbines or in reciprocating engines. It does not appear that any such efforts may lead to useful conclusions.—Mechanical Engineering, March, 1921.

 

Krupp's Single Collar Thrust Bearings.—This new type of bearing is a modification of the well-known Michell thrust block. It is made in two types: oil bath and pressure feed.

 

In the case of the oil bath type the single thrust collar dips into the sump and, rotating, carries the oil along its circumference. This oil is collected by a scraper at the top end of the bearing, and flows along troughs in this scraper to the ducts feeding the journal bearings of the thrust shaft. The troughs in the scraper are so arranged as to work for both directions of rotation. The oil level in the bath is kept below the bottom part of the shaft, an oil indicator being provided for the purpose. At the outer ends of the two journal bearings oil thrower rings are provided on the shaft, which throw the oil creeping past the bearing back into the sump lo prevent any oil leakage past the bearing cover, ordinary ring glands are provided. The oil caught by the sides of the thrust collar lubricates the thrust blocks or pads, which in the main follow the Michell design i.e., provide a wedge clearance, allowing a much higher initial pressure to he maintained without breaking the oil film. These blocks are white-metal lined, and their entering edge is rounded off to allow a better access of oil In the Krupp design of these pads the special cage to hold them, as in he Michel type, is done away with, the blocks being kept in position in a ring groove of the bearing body by means of hook-shaped lugs. The length of these lugs is about two-thirds of the length of the pad; this allows a certain amount of rolling of the latter to give the necessary wedge-shaped clearance. The propeller thrust is transferred through hose pads to the bearing body and to the ship's hull. A number of these thrust bearings were supplied to the German submarines. The pressure type consists of one journal bearing and two thrust collars, the oil being fed to the center groove in the bearing and then leaks past it to the thrust collars, which carry it away to lubricate the pads contained at both ends of the journal bearing. In this case only one side of the thrust collar rests against pads, and one collar working at a time.—The Technical Review, Feb. 15, 1921.

 

ORDNANCE

 

Military Initiants and the Industries of Peace.—The conclusion of an article on the utilization of military initiants for peaceful purposes. The disposal of certain surplus detonators, caps, and safety fuze is dealt with, and conclusions drawn as to the developments necessary in the industry as a result of war experience.

 

It is emphasized that every endeavor should be made to restrict the varieties of detonators and caps manufactured, such varieties as are kept being made useful for as many purposes as possible, both for industrial and military use. Production should in all cases be possible with existing machinery, and the design should be as simple as possible, thus facilitating increase of production when necessary. Detonator shells should never require more than five pressings, and all with threads, flanges, etc., should be eliminated. Aluminum should be universally adopted for their manufacture. This is undoubtedly the future material for the purpose, and Germany's war experience in its use should enable her to get in front of foreign competitors and re-establish her overseas trade in the commodity. Fulminate of mercury in detonators must be replaced as rapidly as possible, tetryl and trinitrotoluene with a small quantity of lead azide being introduced for all varieties. The latter must be further investigated. As a covering, silk must be replaced by home produced material. For safety fuze coverings it is also essential that foreign materials such as guttapercha be eliminated, and acetyl-cellulose is suggested as an alternative. The practice of regarding discoveries as the trade secret of a small group of manufacturers must also be replaced by the exchange of ideas, in order to insure the best practice throughout the industry, and the elimination of unsatisfactory or unnecessary varieties. The synthetic manufacture of alcohol is also a matter urgently requiring investigation, so that in any future emergency it would be unnecessary to utilize such an important food as potatoes in its production. (Paul Galewsky, Zeitschrift fur das gesamte Schiess- und Sprengstoifwesen. Nov. 1, 1920.)—The Technical Review, Feb. 15, 1921.

 

Mercuric Azide.—An account of the preparation and some of the properties of a fulminating agent of great violence, and, under certain conditions, extreme sensitivity. The preparation was undertaken as part of a research to discover a highly sensitive initiant, but this feature is so highly developed in mercuric azide that the substance is incapable of being put to practical use. Its preparation is described as one of the most dangerous and treacherous operations known to chemistry.

 

The mercuric azide was prepared by placing 6.5 gm. of sodium azide in a small flask and adding concentrated sulphuric acid drop by drop, the evolved hydrazoic acid being led to the bottom of a container in which had previously been placed 10 gm. of mercuric oxide and 200 gm. of boiling water. The oxide quickly disappears, and a nearly concentrated solution of mercuric azide is formed. The excess mercuric oxide is quickly separated by filtering through a hot water jacketed funnel, the solution being caught in a number of beakers and stirred continuously with a wooden rod to prevent the formation of large crystals. Rapid radiation from the beaker walls must be prevented, as otherwise clots of crystals form thereon, when an explosion is certain. If the solution is not agitated, long acicular crystals form, and these explode as soon as movement occurs, the whole mass detonating even when under water. The crystals are white and transparent at first, but turn bright yellow on exposure to light. If crystallized under agitation, the product is a crystalline powder, and has a similar sensitivity to impact to fulminate of mercury. Crystals over I mm. in size are, however, extremely dangerous. It is recorded that a small clot of crystals which formed in the funnel stem and were removed by washing with water, sank through a considerable depth of water in the beaker, and on touching the bottom detonated violently, completely destroying the apparatus, making a hole of about 2 cm., diameter through the wooden bench, and projecting glass particles no larger than dust clean through thick-walled glass apparatus in the vicinity. An alternative method of preparation is to mix cold concentrated solutions of sodium azide and mercuric nitrate, when the mercuric azide is formed as a cheese-like precipitate. In this extremely fine state of division the substance appears to be somewhat less sensitive than lead azide. Mercuric azide is of the same molecular weight, and on explosion releases the same amount of gas as fulminate of mercury, but the former is more brisant than any other of the known azides, and is capable of causing the complete detonation of high explosives when quantities are used of only one-twentieth to one-thirtieth of the weight of the fulminate of mercury which is necessary. While the detonation of the fulminate is accompanied by a dull, reddish, indefinite flame, that of the azide is a remarkable bright blue flash of almost magical tint. (Alfred Stettbacher, Zeitschrift fur das gesamte Schiess- und Sprengstoffwesen.)—The Technical Review, Feb. 15, 1921.

 

Shore Batteries Attack U.S.S. "Massachusetts."—Highly successful firing tests were made in January by our Coast Artillery against the old battleship Massachusetts off Pensacola Harbor, Florida. They proved that more destructive results can be obtained by firing projectiles from guns, mortars and howitzers at high angles than by horizontal attack against the belt armor. Twenty-five hits were obtained out of 85 rounds, the high angle firing being at distances of from 5000 to 6000 yards, carried out by 12-inch mortars. The results showed that railway artillery is as accurate as the fixed gun, and this in spite of the greater length of range. A number of hits were obtained by 12-inch railway guns at the great range of 20,000 yards.—The Scientific American, Feb. 26, 1921.

 

MISCELLANEOUS

 

Reasons for American Unpopularity Abroad.—Men who go abroad in the interests of foreign trade are oftentimes surprised to find that this country is unpopular among foreigners to whom we desire to sell our goods. On their return these travelers are occasionally interviewed by reporters, whose stories appear in the newspapers under such headings as "Say Argentinos Dislike Us," "Brazilians Offended, Threaten Reprisals," or "Europeans Affronted by Treatment Here." If we endeavor to trace the cause of this ill-will we usually find that it has its origin in the actions of our lawmakers and officials. While, in fact, our commercial representatives are striving to extend our foreign trade our legislators and department heads are doing everything possible to destroy their work. Good will is the essence of successful trading, a fact that is apparently forgotten by those who seek to abrogate our commercial treaties with foreign counties, to establish discriminatory duties against foreign shipping and raise a tariff wall that would shut out numerous imports from nations with which we expect to trade. In addition to all this, foreigners are constantly irritated by the enforcement of annoying and frequently unnecessary rules and regulations, which in some cases are likely to provoke retaliation.

 

A good example of this sort of officialism is the recently announced ruling that foreign ships are not to be allowed to enter United States ports with alcoholic liquor on board, regardless of whether it is sealed or in transit from one country to another. This attempt to force our dry laws on foreigners, even if the ruling remains a dead letter, is none the less intolerable. It has already been severely condemned in all parts of the world. Quite apart from any moral factor entering into the drink question, this interference with the liberties of other people is bad business, and it is not likely to increase our popularity abroad. In any event there can be no doubt that any effort to enforce the ruling would precipitate strong opposition in which the principal maritime nations overseas would be firmly united.—The Nautical Gazette, Feb. 2, 1921.

 

World's Trade Revival Hinges on Revision of Peace Treaties.—Shipping men are realizing more and more that no permanent improvement in ocean transportation rates can take place until the countries of the world begin to interchange goods on something like the pre-war scale. Experts are agreed that the principal cause of the present widespread economic crisis is the inability of the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, which formerly absorbed one-third of the world's output of raw materials, to purchase their usual quota of products. For this state of affairs the unwise economic clauses inserted in the Paris peace treaties are largely responsible. These treaties have been drawn on the theory that the way for the victors in the war to obtain economic supremacy was by putting fetters on the trade and diminishing the resources of the enemy states. The fact was overlooked that no nation can be plunged into adversity without its neighbors being similarly affected.

 

How true this assertion concerning the commercial interdependency of nations is appears from the figures of Hamburg's ocean traffic during recent years appearing on another page. One reason for the existing depression in British shipping is that British vessels of only 952,000 net tons had occasion to call at Hamburg last year, while the British merchant fleet putting in at the same port in 1913 aggregated 4,096,000 tons. The two-thirds shrinkage recorded in Hamburg's overseas trade between 1913 and 1920 has therefore diminished considerably the opportunities for the profitable employment of British shipping, which could not fail to gain were Germany's trade to revive. Instead of recognizing this truth, however, the Allies insisted upon the surrender of all of Germany's ocean-going fleet, thereby correspondingly retarding the ex-enemy country's economic rehabilitation. The tonnage thus parted' with the Germans could have used to good advantage, while the Allies are experiencing difficulty in keeping it employed. Of the 301 German vessels allocated to Great Britain, only about half had been sold according to last accounts. Many of those undisposed of are tied up in British harbors doing no good to anybody, while those recently marketed have been sold at such low prices that the British exchequer has been but slightly benefited.

 

If the Allied statesmen could only be made to realize that in helping Central Europe to its feet they would be removing one cause of unemployment in their own countries, the return of normal trade conditions could be greatly hastened by undoing the mistakes of the peace treaties. But unless they are willing to pursue such an enlightened policy it is certain that the economic restoration of Europe will be long delayed to the detriment and mutual loss of all the great trading nations and with the resultant continued prostration of the world's shipping.—The Nautical Gazette, Feb. 26, 1921.

 

Concrete Shipbuilding Is Still in Early Experimental Stages.—In a communication to the Nautical Magazine, attention is called to the fact that, whereas shipbuilding in wood and steel has practically reached its finality, the use of concrete for this purpose is still in its infancy. Improvements are constantly being made in the direction of lighter and stronger mixtures together with the more effective disposal of the steel reinforcement and concrete.

 

By using a coke aggregate for instance, where the material is mixed with Portland cement to form concrete, the weight per cubic foot has been reduced from 160 to no pounds and even further improvements in this direction may be expected. Already ships can be built of concrete which weigh less than wooden vessels of equal cargo-carrying capacity, and in time the weight of concrete hulls may even approach that of those built of steel.

 

In addition to being lighter, concrete has other advantages over wood for shipbuilding, being cheaper and more durable, while costing much less for repairs and upkeep. The position is fully appreciated in Norway where a very successful concrete shipyard has been in operation for several years in spite of the plentiful supplies of timber procurable in that country at comparatively low prices. At this establishment a concrete motor ship of 1000 tons was lately completed. In Denmark also concrete shipbuilding is being carried on, two vessels of 1300 tons having been recently built there.

 

In England one of the most enterprising of British concrete shipbuilding concerns is Concrete Seacraft, Ltd., on the Mersey, which employs the Ritchie unit system of construction. According to this method 75 per cent of the hull is made up from small units which are cast separately, to be assembled and set up at the building berth. Each unit consists of a section of the shell between the frames, in fact, flanges at the ends form the latter.

 

With transverse frames joints are arranged at the bilges and keelson, so that such frame is in four parts. Longitudinal members are continuous, holes or notches being provided for them in the transverse units. Naturally they are cast after the latter have been placed in position. Cross diagonal bracing bars which pass through notches in the frames are arranged over the entire hull. Finally the spaces between the frame flanges are grouted with cement.

 

Either the transverse or longitudinal method of building may be employed with the Ritchie system. It has the further advantage of facilitating the inspection of every part. Owing to this feature, Lloyd's and other classification societies are willing to allow a great reduction of thickness as against the casting of the complete ship on the building site. By the Ritchie method a thickness between frames of 1 ¾ inches is considered enough for vessels of 250 tons, while only 2 ½ inches are demanded for those with deadweight capacities of 1000 tons. In the former case a thickness of 3 ½ inches is insisted upon with the older form of construction

 

One notable benefit accruing to the use of concrete for shipbuilding is its anti-fouling properties. It is not suggested that no fouling takes place, but the growths are very much lower and more easily removed than is the case with steel and wooden hulls. It is also quite possible that by rendering the underwater bodies with neat cement to a smooth surface even better results may be achieved.

 

The outstanding advantages of concrete, however is the low cost of upkeep. So far as is known at present ships built of concrete are almost everlasting. Naturally, rails, bulwarks, and other exposed par s will be occasionally chipped and damaged, but these can be made good as when new by a builder at an almost trifling cost. Not long since the 5000-ton American concrete steamer Faith had a hole knocked in her side owing to a collision with another vessel, but the damage is said to have been made good by a bricklayer and his mate for £5.

 

Officers and engineers who have sailed the seas in concrete ships state that the behavior of these crafts is excellent when seas are running. All agree that there is a notable absence of vibration, while it is generally admitted that concrete ships are more easily driven than those of wood and steel having a like displacement. In other words, the speed is higher for a given horsepower and tonnage.—The Nautical Gazette, March 5, 1921.