PROFESSIONAL NOTES
Prepared by Lieut. Commander H. W. Underwood, U. S. Navy
FRANCE
The French Naval Programme.—Circumstances have placed France in a difficult position as regards the determination of her future naval policy. If, on the one hand, the collapse of Germany and the dismemberment of the Austrian Empire have materially reduced the risk of attack by sea, on the other, she has emerged from the war still a great Colonial Power, burdened with all the maritime responsibilities inseparable from that status. Since neither national dignity nor considerations of a more practical nature permit her to rely permanently on foreign aid for the safety of her coasts and oversea communications, she finds herself compelled to take such measures of naval defence as are feasible within the narrow limits imposed by a depleted exchequer. It is now going on for 20 years since France abandoned the hopeless attempt to compete on equal terms with this country, Germany and the United States in building great battle fleets. Unable to stand the severe financial strain which this policy involved, she adopted a new formula of relative strength, based principally on the maintenance of supremacy in the Mediterranean. Thanks to the entente with England, she was able to withdraw most of her forces from the Channel and concentrate them in the Middle Sea; for although she had no explicit assurance that the British Navy would protect her northern coasts from German aggression, she nevertheless proceeded on that assumption, and subsequent events vindicated her judgment. The French building programmes from 1905 onward were therefore framed with a view to securing a margin of superiority over Austria and Italy, who in virtue of the Triple Alliance had to be reckoned as potential confederates. The last pre-war building project, authorized in 1913, included five battleships, constituting the Normandie class, which were chiefly remarkable for the disposition of their 12 heavy guns in quadruple turrets. All five vessels were under construction when war broke out, but it soon became necessary to suspend work upon them, and from that day to this the ultimate fate of these 25,000-ton vessels has been the subject of endless debate. A numerous party in France favoured their completion more or less to the initial design, but with minor modifications indicated by war experience. Others proposed a recast of the plans to embody 18-inch guns and a higher speed, whilst some suggested converting them into merchant ships. The French Government has now decided to scrap four of the unfinished hulls but to complete the fifth ship, the Beam—which was launched in April, 1920—as an air craft carrier, Although it means sacrificing a considerable sum of money which has been spent on the four condemned ships, this decision is unquestionably the wisest that could have been reached. No amount of tinkering with the plans could have made these vessels equal in fighting power to the capital ships now being built in other lands, and by completing the group France would merely have added five inferior ships to her navy at an estimated expenditure of £28,000,000 sterling.
In submitting this decision to the Chamber of Deputies last week, M. Denise, Rapporteur of the Naval Committee, defended is on the ground that heavy ships were too vulnerable to submarine attack, thereby implying that battleships would in any case be useless to France, even though she could afford to build them. Without reopening a controversy which has been closed for the nonce by the unanimous resolve of the three leading naval powers to perpetuate great ships as the primary units of their respective fleets, we may assume that France is dispensing with this type, not because her naval advisors have embraced the alluring doctrines of the Jeune Ecole—"le nombre, la vitesse, l'invubierabilite, la specialisation"— but because she is unable at the moment to spare the money for a squadron of modern capital ships. Unless this fact be duly emphasized, there is a danger that false conclusions of a technical nature may be drawn from the new French programme. It authorizes the construction of 6 cruisers, 12 flotilla leaders, 12 destroyers, and 36 submarines, and, including the cost of transforming the Beam into an aircraft carrier, represents a total outlay of 1,416,000,000 francs, to be spread over five or six years. Such meager particulars of the cruisers as have transpired show them to be more akin to the British Raleigh and the American Omaha classes than the conventional light cruiser. On a displacement of 7500 or Boco tons they are to steam at 34 knots and carry a powerful armament, either of 6.4-inch or 7.6-inch guns. They are expected to cost 70 million francs apiece. It is a noteworthy fact that no light cruiser has been laid down in France since 1897. The new ships are already evoking criticism on the score that they signify a return to the discredited armoured cruiser type, are needlessly large, and will cost too much money. These strictures are countered by references to the generous dimensions which have been adopted in latest British and American cruisers designed for ocean work. The 12 flotilla leaders are to displace about 2000 tons, and will cost 22 million francs each. Their design may have been influenced by that of the similar vessels which Italy is now building, and also, perhaps, by the ex-German boat S 113, now incorporated in the French navy as the Amiral Senes. This latter vessel, with her relatively tremendous armament and high speed, would doubtless prove very formidable in smooth water, but the great weight of top-hammer causes her to roll dangerously in a seaway. Having had the opportunity of studying the German prototype at first hand, the French constructors may be relied upon to avoid its defects in the big flotilla leaders they are about to lay down. The size of the 12 new destroyers has not been stated, but as a sum of 168 million francs has been set aside for them and they are estimated to cost 11,000 francs per ton, the displacement is presumably about 1270 tons, which would make them rather smaller than our Admiralty IV class. Finally, there are the 36 new submarines, costing 504 million francs in the aggregate. Their displacement, it is said, will average 1000 tons, but two or three distinct types will be represented, including large submersible cruisers, minelayers, and medium ocean-going boats of 800 to 1000 tons. In this case, too, French constructors have a large selection of models to choose from. They do not seem enamored of the German types which have come into their possession—and which, though the fact is studiously ignored in Germany, are modifications of the d'Equivilly type, and therefore French in conception—regarding them as unworthy of imitation except in certain minor features, though the excellence of their M. A. N. Diesel engines is admitted. French submarine development has suffered in the past from the very fertility of the national genius. A restless desire to attain perfection led to the too hasty adoption of experimental types, theories of construction were promptly put into practice before they had been thoroughly studied, and so it befell that France never gained a fair return for the vast amount of thought, energy, and treasure which she expended on the submarine arm. But her faith in its efficacy is unshaken. French naval experts, with few exceptions, consider the geographical position of their country to be exceptionally favourable for the employment of submarines and naval aircraft, both for defence and attack. Speaking in the Chamber in March, 1920, M. de Kerguezec declared that "the day on which France is supported by a fleet of 250 to 300 submarines she will be able to contemplate the future without any misgiving whatever." And many years before, when the submarine was still primitive and unreliable, a French admiral had exclaimed, "Jamais nous n'aurions trop de sous-marins!"
The restoration of French sea power to a level commensurate with the extensive maritime commitments of the republic will be watched with interest and sympathy in this country. Throughout the war the navy of France performed splendid service, and the valour of her seamen often triumphed over material deficiencies. The large majority by which the new programme passed the Chamber without modification or amendment is proof that the French people appreciate the value of naval power and are not to be deterred from cultivating it by the heavy cost involved.—The Engineer, June 24, 1921.
The Rhone.—The bill authorizing the carrying out of works for utilizing the Rhone as a waterway between the Swiss frontier and the Mediterranean, as a producer of electrical energy and as a means of irrigating large areas of land that are at present unproductive, has now been passed, and every effort is to be made to carry out a scheme that has been discussed for nearly three decades. If the enterprise is regarded as of national importance it is because the hostilities showed the danger of leaving the country dependent upon foreign coal supplies, and it is hoped by utilizing the hydraulic power of the Rhone to limit the home demand for coal to what can be supplied by the home collieries. The hydro-electric installations will furnish 800,000 horsepower and will represent an economy of42,000,000 tons of coal a year, which is nearly equal to the quantity imported before the war. Again, by releasing such a large quantity of fuel more will be available for the smelting of the Lorraine ores which are in need of cheap coal from the Saar or from the Nord if the industry is to develop to the extent justified by the importance of the deposits. The Rhone electrical distribution will permit of the country south of the Loire largely reducing its demands upon the northern coal fields. The canalization of the Rhone is intended to permit of the passage of boats of 1200 tons between Strasburg and Marseilles, for which purpose the canal between the Rhine and the Rhone will have to be enlarged. The scheme also provides for the irrigation of 675,000 acres of territory which, by this means, will be able to produce twice as much as they are now doing. The cost of the undertaking is estimated at 3,400,000,000 francs, and it is to be carried out by a company comprising all the interests concerned. This vast enterprise will contribute greatly to the industrial activity of the country, which, with the reconstruction and other work, should find an abundance of employment in nearly all branches of industry in the near future.—The Engineer, June 3, 1921.
GERMANY
The German Maritime Revival.—"Ten years hence Germany will once more possess a flourishing mercantile marine and a formidable war navy. Thousands of people here are working for the great maritime renaissance which will, they believe, precede and make possible the complete restoration of imperial Germany," so writes a well-informed correspondent who has spent the last six months in Berlin and the chief industrial centres of the Fatherland. He reports the existence of a vigorous propaganda on behalf of sea power. Every effort is being made to slur over the inglorious collapse of the old "Reichsflotte," and with so much success that the Kiel mutiny is now universally ascribed to the machinations of agents financed by the Entente. The fact that the personnel of the High Seas Fleet remained docile enough until ordered to go out and face the British guns is conveniently ignored. A legend of victory has been woven round Jutland, as witness the enthusiastic celebrations of the anniversary reported from Berlin last week. Because the High Seas Fleet escaped annihilation by a rare combination of good leadership and amazing luck it is held to have been victorious, just as the German army boasts itself "unconquered" because—for reasons best known to the Allied statesmen, but inexplicable to everyone else—it was permitted to return home with bands playing, colors flying, and all the outward signs of "withdrawal according to plan." In this way the fable of German "invincibility by land and sea" has been carefully preserved. It is already forgotten that Hindenburg and Ludendorff were metaphorically on their knees before Foch, pleading for an armistice at any price; that Ludendorff himself declared the army to be incapable of further resistance and warned Berlin that any delay in arranging a truce would lead to a debacle without precedent in military history; and that the German Navy purchased its exemption from ordeal of battle by the most humiliating surrender on record.
Those who knew the Germany of pre-war times never believed for a moment that she would allow matters to proceed to the last extremity in the event of an unsuccessful war. They foresaw that she would, on the contrary, seize the psychological moment to draw back from the abyss of irretrievable disaster and endeavor by political chicanery to make good the consequences of military defeat. But it may be doubted whether the keenest student of German methods anticipated the sublime effrontery with which our late enemies are now perverting the facts of recent history. The average Briton smiles indulgently over his newspaper when he reads of these Jutland "victory celebrations" in Berlin or scans the pompous rodomontade of some Prussian general who less than three years since was quaking in his shoes at the name of Foch. But it is wrong to dismiss as unimportant these manifestations of reviving "Kriegslust." According to the correspondent who is quoted at the head of this article, "hatred of England is the cement that keeps the German Empire together and saves it from total disruption. Anglophobia was general enough before the war, but it is tenfold more rampant to-day. The Germans affect to despise France, and such grudging tribute as they pay to the military genius of Foch is due to the popular myth that he is of German extraction. They are equally contemptuous of America, while privately regarding her as a potential ally (the German conception of America is that of a country where all the brain power and most of the political influence are vested in the 'German-American' element). For England is reserved the honor of unequivocal hatred, and although public allusions to 'revanche' are officially frowned upon, nine Germans in ten live for the day of reckoning with Great Britain which they believe to be foreordained."
From further information supplied by my correspondent it seems that the "Abrechnung mit England" may be postponed as the result of disagreement concerning the means. The naval enthusiasts are all for the restoration of German sea power, mercantile and military, which they consider to be the only weapon capable of reaching the heart of England. These favor the rapid development of German shipping side by side with the gradual building up of a naval force, the main components of which will be fast cruisers, submarines, and aircraft. They are working more or less hand in hand with the Air Leaguers, who see in a supreme air fleet the one sure method of achieving the common aim. Both schools are at loggerheads with the Ludendorff party, which claims priority for the reorganization of German military power and dreams of revenge in terms of cadres and divisions. Col. Repington's articles in The Daily Telegraph on German army reorganization show this party to be in the ascendant for the time being. The old army formations are being kept together under the camouflage of police ("Orgesch," an abbreviation of "Organization Escherisch"; Einwohnerwehr, etc.), and most elaborate measures have been taken to facilitate the rapid expansion of these nucleus bodies, mainly composed of veteran officers and N. C. O.'s, into full-fledged army corps when the time is ripe for throwing off the mask. How far the corresponding preparations for aerial warfare have progressed is a point on which the information is somewhat conflicting, but presumably the Allied Governments are kept au courant by their respective missions.
Secret naval preparations at the German ports are reported from time to time, mainly by the French Press, and M. Lefevre claims to have reliable news of the building of submarines in defiance of the Peace Treaty. So far, however, none of these rumors has been confirmed. They are, in fact, inherently improbable. Germany knows full well that precipitate action of this kind would be fraught with the gravest consequences to herself. Moreover, the Allied missions still maintain a vigilant watch and appear to have established an efficient intelligence service. Some weeks ago British and French officers paid a surprise visit to the Jaeger Ironworks in the Varresbeck, which were found to be manufacturing equipment for submarines—ostensibly to Dutch order. The mission insisted on the immediate stoppage of this work and the destruction of all material, models, and drawings relating thereto. Not until the Allied control officers have been withdrawn from Germany shall we have real cause for apprehension in regard to the secret manufacture of submarines, aircraft, and other war material.
The German shipping revival is making remarkable progress, considering the adverse circumstances. Most of the yards are well supplied with orders, every month witnesses the launch of several big ocean-going ships, and the well-known lines are taking advantage of the abnormal rate of exchange to recover some of their former business which had temporarily passed into foreign hands. That the German public believes in a bright maritime future is shown by the eagerness with which it is investing money in shipping enterprises. In the first three months of this year new capital to the amount of 210,720,000 marks was contributed to overseas shipping, shipbuilding, and deep-sea fishery undertakings, either in the form of subscriptions to new companies or increases in the capital of existing concerns. In the corresponding quarter of last year only 10,150,000 marks were similarly invested, the total for the whole year amounting to 223,684,000 marks, which was barely 13,000,000 marks more than the sum invested during the first three months of 1921. These figures speak for themselves. Taken in conjunction with the far-reaching schemes of harbor works and port improvements reported from Kiel, Hamburg, Cuxhaven, and Wilhelmshaven, and with the announcement that 90 per cent of the total amount of money which the German Government has agreed to pay its nationals by way of compensation for war losses in shipping is to be spent on new construction in German yards, they show how fallacious is the popular belief that Germany has abandoned her maritime ambitions. When she is once more in possession of a great merchant fleet she will undoubtedly begin the reconstruction of her war navy, a task for which the ground is already being prepared by intensive propaganda. We have not done with Germany yet.—The Naval and Military Record, June 8, 1921.
German Justice.—Seven judge’s in violet robes upheld the German policy of frightfulness when they acquitted Naval Lieutenant Karl Neumann of the sinking of the English hospital ship Dover Castle. Such is the view of the Providence Bulletin and a score of editors the country over. The lieutenant's defense was that he merely obeyed orders, and the judges of the High Court at Leipsig, where the trials of German war prisoners are being held, acquitted him accordingly. "If this ruling is to be considered a general precedent, no submarine commander, no field commander, no military governor of occupied territory is likely to be brought to punishment, whatever may have been his crimes," concludes the Detroit Free Press. Nevertheless, thinks the Utica Press, "the subordinate who would sink a hospital ship or a Lusitania, with its hundreds of non-combatant men, women, and children, is not one whit less a murderer than his superiors who would order it; Neumann is freed by a German court, but by his own confession he and the government he served are branded as murderers."
The long-delayed trials of German war criminals, originally intended to bring some one in authority to book for some of the major crimes committed in the war, began with the trial and conviction of a sergeant charged with brutal treatment of British war prisoners. Ten months' imprisonment was his portion, but, as the Tacoma Ledger puts it, "he was only one of the goats; the big criminals are the important items on the list." Next came the case of the commandant of a German prison camp, who, according to the diary of a British prisoner, was "responsible for the deaths of hundreds of Tommies." Another British witness against the Herr Commandant said the German officer "liked to amuse himself by riding horseback into groups of sick prisoners too weak and helpless to get out of the way." Six months, said the seven judges in violet robes. A second non-commissioned officer, for striking prisoners with a rifle-butt, knocking them down, and continuing to strike them, was found guilty and sentenced to six months' imprisonment; then came the trial of Lieutenant Neumann. This was the crucial case of the four selected by the Germans to prove that they could render justice. But "it was not Lieutenant Neumann who was on trial; it was the whole German people, whose government had ordered ruthless submarine warfare," declares Arno Dosch-Fleurot in a dispatch from Leipzig to the New York World. In this correspondent's opinion—
"It made no difference whether Neumann was convicted or acquitted, he was not the real criminal before the bar. The German Admiralty was on trial, yet the decision of the court had nothing to do with the guilt of the Admiralty. The question really before the court was whether the Admiralty had the moral right to sink British hospital ships, although the court could decide only whether Neumann was guilty.
"The trial consisted in Neumann explaining that he only carried out explicit orders to sink British hospital ships, of which the Dover Castle happened to be one. He gave a cold recital of how he waited for six hours near the Dover Castle while it zigzagged in flight until the opportune moment to strike. His orders were read in court and the case came to an end. There were no witnesses because they were at the bottom of the sea."
Editors and correspondents remind us that Germany promised at Versailles to hand over to the Allies for trial an imposing list of indicted German war criminals. "There are 573 of them listed in a French 'Who's Who of Atrocity,’" according to the Chicago Tribune, including the names of Von Hindenburg, Prince Rupprecht, Von Mackensen, Von Biilow, Von Tirpitz, and Prince Eitel Fricdrich. Even the former Kaiser was to be no exception; in fact, we are told, Premier Lloyd George's election pledge in 1919 was to "hang the ex-Kaiser." Germany, however, did not keep her promise, and the Allies thereupon permitted Germany to try the prisoners herself. Leading London papers call the trial a farce, as do the Milwaukee Journal, the Providence Journal, and a dozen more of our own papers. Yet, notes the Baltimore American, "an impartial effort by the Germans to fix the guilt of their countrymen is contrary to the laws of nature; the pot can not sincerely call the kettle black."
"The real criminals are the men higher up, the field-marshals and statesmen," asserts the New York Times, and its neighbor, The Tribune, tells us why:
"It follows that real responsibility for ruthless submarine warfare, the sinking of hospital ships and merchant ships, neutral or Allied, carrying non-combatant passengers; for the bombing of unfortified towns and land hospitals, the slaughter of enemy civilians and the wanton destruction of property outside the zone of battle rest with the German higher-ups, who determined that war should be waged on a new basis. The German policy was deliberate and cold-blooded. It was predicated on the assumption that the fighting was to occur mainly on foreign soil and that Germany would be fairly safe from reprisals. She had no merchant marine on the high seas…
"Will the court go after the high command which framed the German policy of ruthlessness on land and sea and place the guilt where it belongs, even if the trial leads to Tirpitz, Falkenhayn, and Ludendorf, and to the once Aller-Hochste, now a crestfallen, cringing exile in Doom? Or will it be solemnly adjudged, should they be brought into court, that they were not guilty because they took no personal part in the atrocities?
"It does not appear that the Leipzig court has any intention of trying the higher-ups," says the Albany Journal, as if in reply. In fact, avers the Columbus Ohio State Journal, "the spirit of Germany is the same as it was under the rule of the Kaiser; it is as full of deception, evasion, trickery, and assumption as ever."—The Literary Digest, June 25, 1921.
The Leipzig Trials.—Up to the time of going to press four only of the subordinate German war criminals have been tried for the hideous barbarities they perpetrated during the war, either against defenceless prisoners or against the sick and wounded passengers on hospital ships; and while one of them has escaped any punishment whatever on the wholly insufficient grounds that he acted under orders, the three remaining ruffians have been given sentences ridiculous and even offensive in their leniency. We notice that the Attorney-General deprecates the tendency he observes in Parliament and in the press to sit in judgment on the Leipzig sentences upon what he terms "very imperfect information," while he smugly remarks that he considers the righteous indignation which has universally been aroused as "a little premature." We do not envy Sir G. Hewart his point of view, nor do we know what further evidence he requires that the whole Leipzig procedure is becoming a disgusting and sorry farce. The four criminals were found guilty of the foul acts of which they were accused; three have been awarded wholly inadequate sentences—which, moreover, neither will serve out in full—while the fourth gets off under something like a quibble. The policy our legal representatives foolishly followed of prosecuting subordinates only stands condemned, as all sensible people prophesied that it would; the present series of trials, selected and accepted as a test of good faith, has demonstrated that German courts are not the proper places for deciding upon the guilt and for the punishment of Germans accused of horrible crimes against their opponents in the late war; and there is only one thing to be done in the matter, and that is at once to consider the propriety of having the rest of the trials removed to London, and to demand the immediate extradition of the superiors who formulated and issued the orders which caused their subordinates to act in a manner contrary to the laws of civilized nations. The view expressed in these columns last week about the trial of the first German military officer charged at Leipzic with inhuman and barbarous offences against British prisoners of war applies with even greater force to the result of the so-called trial of the first of the submarine commanders. Indeed, the circumstances of the latter case afford a convincing endorsement of the argument which was put forward, that it is somewhat of a farce to proceed further with these trials without bringing to account those in higher positions whose code of discipline and warfare made possible the crimes which were committed. If ten months' imprisonment is, as most people will admit without question, a hopelessly inadequate punishment, and if six months and two months in the next cases are even more so, what is to be said about the acquittal of Lieutenant-Commander Neumann, of UC-67, on the charge of torpedoing the hospital ship Dover Castle on May 26, 1917? Neumann admitted the act, but pleaded his conviction that ammunition was on board the ship, although he was unable to adduce proofs, of course. Even the judge, in relation to an alleged photograph brought by a German prisoner from France of the loading of ammunition in hospital ships, said he had never seen such a picture, and could not regard the allegation as proved.
Neumann's defence rested solely and wholly on the fact that he was carrying out the orders of his superiors issued on March 29, 1917. This is the first time we have heard of any order of this date, although the particular edict referred to is probably well known to the British Government. It is quite certain, however, who were the persons who first started the submarine war on merchant ships, hospital ships and the like, and the immediate need is to bring them to trial, for if the plea of obedience to orders is to be allowed as in the case of Neumann it is futile to proceed with the cases of the subordinates. The surprising thing is that our government should have acquiesced in the plan of trying the juniors first, or rather in the arrangement whereby an officer like Neumann is put up to get off scot free. If it was known that the line of defence would be that no charge could stand where an officer adhered strictly to orders, it should have been easy to find plenty of cases where officers did not do so, but committed personal cruelties over and above their orders. Even these arch-criminals, however, might try and shelter behind the war lords in authority. We are glad to learn that some of the latter are to stand their trial later before a more important Leipzic tribunal. So far, the trials have been utterly devoid of justice.—The Army and Navy Gazette, June 11, 1921.
Herr Hugo Stinnes, who was a great man in Germany before the war, has loomed even larger since the Peace. Known originally as an iron and steel magnate, he has since acquired immense influence as an owner of a great number of newspapers, and, indeed, of many other organizations, and at one time it really appeared as though he could dictate his policy to the government of the day. Yet the Hamburg-American Company, in which undertaking Herr Stinnes is a large shareholder, has shown that they felt strong enough to be independent of him. The annual general meeting of the company was held at the end of April, under the chairmanship of Herr Max von Schinckel, who, in recommending the official candidates for election to the board, told the shareholders that the directors could not recommend the inclusion of the name of Herr Stinnes. The board has arrived at this decision because the gentleman in question has started a new line to South America, and has done so without any regard to the interests of the Hamburg-American Company. This action would have been annoying enough under any circumstances. The policy of German shipping has for many years been towards agreements and inter-working. But since the war it seems to have been agreed that no co-ordination is essential to the re-starting of the German shipping machine. And the inauguration of a rival company by their own familiar friend was therefore about the bitterest blow that could have been struck at the directorate. Indeed—considering that Herr Stinnes has so large an interest, not only in the Hamburg Company itself, but also in the German East African and the Woermann Lines, in which the company, too, has large interest holdings,—it seems strange enough that he should have encouraged a new competition in the field. However, whatever his reasons may be, the company has made its protest against what the chairman terms "exaggerated ambitions," and has evinced its determination to maintain its freedom of action and its independence. The policy of the company, indeed, is not to be changed. For, losing the services of Herr Stinnes, they filled his place by the election of another great industrial magnate, Herr Heniel, who is the leading spirit of the Gutehoffnungshutte, whereby they evidently hope to secure themselves against any ill consequences from their bold action. Meanwhile, Herr Stinnes proceeds on his way unruffled, his latest reported transaction being the purchase of a group of newspapers, of which the Deutsche Zeitung is chief, at a price of no less than seventeen millions of marks. This is a huge sum enough. For, though the mark may not be worth more than a penny in the international markets of the world, depreciated currency has hitherto always maintained its face value in domestic transactions. —The Marine Engineer and Naval Architect, June, 1921.
GREAT BRITAIN
Combined Staff Training.—In the early part of this month a discussion was evoked in the House of Lords by Viscount Haldane who, as has ever been the case, succeeded in putting his finger on a weak spot in the defensive plans of the nation. In common with every close student of the successive events of the late war, he recognized that in spite often of most brilliant work separately, there had been an unfortunate lack of cohesion, or rather of combination, between the forces which were fighting on land and those which were fighting on the sea. Lord Haldane, therefore, in laying stress on the necessity of unity of knowledge and understanding, further emphasized what has justly been described as a cardinal feature of our traditional strategy, in other words as an "amphibious strategy." This, of course, is familiar to all as embracing command of the sea and an expeditionary force that can be supported by the fleet.
It is undeniable that in order that warfare carried on with such means should prove successful, there must be not only unity of knowledge in the navy and the army, to which now, of course, must be added the air force, but also in the relations between the services in the air, on the water, and on the land. As a naval correspondent of the Morning Post points out, owing to their training being on entirely different lines, it is quite the exception for a soldier and sailor to regard a particular problem with the same mental outlook. This, as we have just observed, is further complicated by the comparatively recent introduction of a third arm—the air service. Yet our insular and imperial position is such that practically every question of major strategy affects all three arms. "If three people come together and talk in different tongues, the result is not much better than a tower of Babel in miniature. To obtain the maximum effort there must be co-ordination and co-operation; which, in its turn, is possible only if those concerned are able to regard the particular problem from a common point of view. Or, in other words, they must think the same strategical thoughts; talk an identical strategical language; and be animated by a common doctrine of war. It seems that this desirable end can be achieved only by means of a close liaison between the services, most particularly in regard to staff work." The Naval Staff College is, in the near future, to be moved from Greenwich to the vicinity of the Military Staff College at Camberley.
It is only reasonable to assume that sooner or later a similar institution for the air force will be established, and if so it also will be placed somewhere in the same neighborhood. Thus, as our contemporary's correspondent observes, with common lectures, free intercourse, discussions, and debate between the staffs and students of the various colleges, there will come in time that common mentality, which again, in course of time, will permeate throughout the three services. From three separate staff colleges the institution will become an imperial staff university, and with dominion representatives there and on the various staffs, there will be built up an-organization which, to use Lord Haldane's words, will ensure "cohesion in naval matters and unity in other matters also, and we should become such a power as the world had never seen."
Too much importance can hardly be placed upon the desirability, nay, the urgent necessity of collaboration among the various forces. The want of such collaboration has often been unfortunate, and only luck has prevented it from being disastrous. The plan now being adopted should reduce risks of this nature to a minimum in the future. In the discussion in the House of Lords, Lord Lee stated that the scheme included officers from the dominions "in order to produce, so far as practicable, that community of ideas" upon which the future of the empire may depend. Lord Lee added that the subject would doubtless be discussed at the Imperial Conference. The regular attendance of successive parties of officers from overseas portions of the empire should prove valuable in two ways. It is clear it can be but advantageous that when colonial forces share in a campaign with those of the mother country, the training of both should as far as possible have been similar, and the military education of the staff officers identical. The constant presence of the most intellectual officers from overseas dominions should also tend to the tightening of the bond of sentiment which as long as it remains united must render the British Empire invincible. The scheme for the coordination in the work of the two, and presumably three later on, staff colleges, is in every way commendable and in theory really excellent. It is to be hoped it may prove equally good in practice.—The United Service Gazette, May 28, 1921.
Empire Naval Policy.—Now that the Imperial Conference is on the point of assembling it is well not to cherish exaggerated hopes of what may result from these intimate discussions between the leading statesmen of the empire. Here at home an idea has undoubtedly gained ground that the dominions are about to lift from our shoulders a large share of the financial burden involved by the up-keep of our post-war naval and military forces. This would, indeed, be good news for the British taxpayer, but we are bound to confess our inability to discern any solid basis for such an assumption. It appears to have arisen from the report that the laying down of two or four new battleships would be delayed until the conference had met, and many people at once concluded that half the cost of the building programme would therefore be debited to the dominions. This, to put it mildly, is very improbable.
The Navy League has done well to discourage hopes which are almost certainly doomed to disappointment. A leading article "in the June number of its organ, The Navy, pours cold water on the expectation that the Imperial Conference will devise means of sharing imperially the expense of the new building programme. The inference it believes to have been unjustified, and "it is well that it should be dismissed from our minds." There is not a tangible shred of evidence that the peoples of Australasia or Canada are ready to contribute between them the 12 to 14 million pounds represented by the cost of two improved Hoods; on the contrary, such action as they have taken since the war has been indicative of a firm resolve to cut down expenditure on armaments to a very low figure indeed, and the present naval establishments of Australia and Canada are considerably smaller than those maintained before the war.—The Navy and Military Record, June 15, 1921.
Australian and Canadian Views.—It is not a question of loyalty to the empire. All through the war the dominions gave lavishly of their best, and shrank from no sacrifice of blood or treasure which they knew to be essential to victory. Nor are they likely in future to shrink from assuming a fair proportion of the common burden of defence. But at the present moment there is nothing to suggest that they are ready to contribute largely to the cost of warships which are to be built in Great Britain, manned by the Royal Navy, and administered by the British Admiralty. In the opinion of those competent to judge, the Australians would far rather spend 10 millions on their local fleet than contribute one million to the cost of the Royal Navy. Australia, in other words, believes more firmly than ever before in the principle of local control, and is determined to make this principle the foundation of her future naval policy.
As regards Canada, that dominion is not at the moment displaying any marked enthusiasm for naval projects, but there is no reason to suppose that she has changed her mind since 1913, in which year the Borden programme was rejected by the Canadian Senate because it was regarded as a contribution to the Royal Navy, instead of providing, in Sir Wilfrid Laurier's word's for "a Canadian service, built, manned, and equipped in Canada—the goal to which we look forward." In our frequent allusions to the questions of defense which loom so large on the agenda of the Imperial Conference we have invariably expressed the hope that no scheme will be submitted by the Admiralty which does not begin by recognizing, fully and unreservedly, the right of each dominion to create and maintain such naval forces as it considers necessary for its own protection. As the Navy League puts it, "the individual fleet unit remains the political ideal of the dominions, and it is the business of the conference so as to adapt its measures that politics and strategy run, if not in double harness, at least as a manageable tandem."—The Naval and Military Record, June 15, 1921.
Local Fleets.—Why there should ever have been so much boggling at Whitehall over this question of local control we fail to understand. No one gifted with a spark of imagination can have believed for an instant that the dominions would stand aside if the mother country got into difficulties. The veriest stay-at-home must have had some inkling of the deep-rooted patriotism and loyalty which bind the member-states of the empire together with ties stronger and more durable than links of tempered steel.
Two, and only two, serious objections could be urged against the building up of an Imperial Navy comprising individual fleet units, and both could have been removed by the exercise of tact and statesmanship. The first objection was under the control of a central authority both material and methods of training might cease to be uniform and the Imperial Fleet degenerate into an ill-assorted collection of ships, heterogeneous in design, personnel, and training. As a matter of fact, this particular difficulty never arose, because the dominions very wisely took the Royal Navy for their master pattern, building their ships and training their men on the model of the parent service.
The second objection was somewhat more serious, but in this case, too, experience showed its gravity to have been exaggerated. Apprehensions seem to have been entertained at Whitehall lest the dominions, assuming that they were prepared in case of Imperial emergency to place their respective fleets at the disposal of the Admiralty, should nevertheless insist on having a voice in strategic dispositions, with special reference to the defence of their own seaboards. This contingency, which did in fact show some tendency to develop in the early months of the war, could have been forestalled by the creation of an Imperial Naval Staff. It is of good omen that this ideal should be categorically endorsed in the First Lord's recent memorandum. Gradual progress is to be made by appointing dominion officers both to the Naval Staff at the Admiralty and as students at the Staff College, while it is hoped that the dominions will eventually set up similar institutions of their own, working on the same lines as the college at home. This matter is to be laid before the dominion representatives, and when their views have been ascertained the Admiralty hope to indicate the machinery required to ensure the building up of navies imbued with a common doctrine and working to a uniform plan.—The Naval and Military Record, June 15, 1921.
Future of British Airships.—The fate of our airship fleet is still in the balance. While the government declines to provide any more funds for the up-keep of the big dirigibles built under the war programme, it is ready to hand them over to private enterprise on very favorable terms. If the airship really possesses a tithe of the commercial value which enthusiasts claim for it, this offer should not go begging for long. The latest proposal concerns the employment of the vessels as mail and passenger liners between England and the nearer parts of the empire. It is suggested that trial flights be made to Gibraltar, Malta, and Egypt, preliminary to the establishment of a regular air service to India.
Many naval officers who regard the airship as a unit of great value for reconnaissance at sea would welcome any arrangement which had the effect of keeping these vessels available in case of emergency. So far, however, it has been a case of much cry and little wool. The possibilities of the airship, strategic as well as commercial, remain more or less theoretical in the absence of practical performance. With the exception of R 34's voyage to America two years since, no airship has been sent on a transoceanic cruise, though we now have several which are said to be capable of such journeys.—The Naval and Military Record, June 15, 1921.
Getting Together.—The statement of American foreign policy transmitted from Washington last week constitutes the most cheering development in international affairs which has occurred since the armistice. If the Times correspondent has rightly interpreted the aims of the Harding administration, we may witness in the near future the negotiation of an agreement between this country and the United States, allocating to each a definite standard of naval strength which neither will attempt to exceed. Such an instrument would not only banish the spectre of Anglo-American naval rivalry, but make impossible a new attack upon the freedom of the seas, either from Germany or any other power. This journal has consistently upheld the view that a warship-building competition with the United States would be madness. It is not merely that the country cannot afford to lavish hundreds of millions on armaments; the economic argument is, of course, highly important, but it is not decisive. If the British people believed absolute supremacy at sea to be as indispensable to their security in the future as it was in the past, we think they would not hesitate to maintain it, be the cost what it might. But that belief is no longer held by the majority. Instinct and reason alike tell us that we have nothing to fear from a powerful American navy. We know that in the United States there exists a body of opinion which, on racial grounds, is implacably hostile to Britain, and would like nothing better than to see the two nations engaged in a fratricidal conflict. But this faction, though it doubtless comprises several million "typhenates" and is vociferous out of all proportion to its numerical strength, has entirely failed to influence American policy. Its motives are too transparent, to obviously at variance with the principles of genuine Americanism to make them acceptable to the American people as a whole.
There will be an immediate and most cordial response from this side to American overtures for limiting armaments and stabilizing world peace. Our government, without being unnecessarily loquacious, has twice affirmed in the formal way our acceptance for the future of a one-power naval standard. Lord Lee of Fareham referred to that fact in his excellent speech of March 17, and made it perfectly clear that British statesmen are ready to put aside all other business, however pressing, when the moment come to discuss the naval issue with their American confreres. He spoke for the whole country when he insisted so strongly that "in this matter we are not engaged in a game of poker or of bluff, but in a sort of game where we ought to lay our cards on the table and discuss frankly with our friends what the future should be." It was not enough, he added, to talk of hands across the sea; we must have our heads across the sea as well. There is undoubtedly a certain amount of sentiment in this matter, as there must always be in matters affecting kindred peoples, and it will be a bad day for the world when, if ever, sentiment is wholly divorced from Anglo-American affairs. But at the present juncture we want that "plain horse sense" which Lord Lee rightly declared to be characteristic of both countries. Hitherto it has been argued that two are needed to make an agreement and that American opinion had not shown any marked enthusiasm for a naval agreement with England That argument loses its validity in face of the positive statement by the Times correspondent that the ultimate desire, even the deliberate plan, of the Harding administration is to bring the United States and the British Empire together.
No moment more opportune could have been chosen for this announcement. It has come on the eve of a conference which meets primarily to determine the basic principles of empire defence by sea, land, and air. Were the future attitude of the United States at all doubtful, the problem before the conference would be difficult to the point of hopelessness. But with that attitude more or less clearly defined, the problem is at once reduced to comparatively simple proportions. Let us consider briefly what it would mean if the United States proposed to take over the naval guardianship of the Pacific, leaving us responsible for the Atlantic and European waters. Such an arrangement would, we take it, absolve us from the necessity of creating huge fleet bases in the Far East—a financial nightmare which has oppressed thoughtful minds for the past year or two. It would render possible the most effective and economical application of their naval power by the British Empire and the United States respectively, by enabling each to concentrate its entire strength in one particular area, instead of dissipating it by trying to maintain adequate forces in several prospective "danger zones." It would allay the apprehensions felt in Australasia and Canada as to the future of the white race, and, by forging a real bond of community between these dominions and the United States, make Britons and Americans working partners, if not formal allies, the world over. Nor would the bargain be by any means one-sided. The United States, on her part, freed from all anxiety as to the protection of her Atlantic coastline, could turn with an easy mind to the Pacific and take such measures as she deemed expedient for the security of her Western seaboard and her insular possessions. Such an arrangement, we are told, would "naturally involve the renunciation of the idea of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance." That, apparently, is the sole obstacle in the way of a compact which in our judgment would be infinitely more effective as a preservative of peace than the League of Nations. If a naval agreement on the Hues indicated could in any sense be construed as a menace to or a betrayal of Japan, honor would forbid our accepting it. But the Japanese know as well as we do that their legitimate interests would be promoted not prejudiced, by an Anglo-American understanding of this nature. As a fact, judging by the comments of the press, the alliance has long since ceased to enjoy popularity in Japan, and it is doubtful whether its denunciation would cause a single tear to be shed in that country.—The Naval and Military Record, June 22, 1921.
Oil Fuel in the Navy.—As engineers in general, and marine engineers in particular, are quite familiar with the advantages of oil fuel for the propulsion of warships, and the remainder of the community has lately been most forcibly reminded of some of the drawbacks of coal, little serious opposition to the Admiralty's decision to build only oil-burning ships in future was to be expected. The matter was discussed on Tuesday last when the House went into Committee of Supply on Navy Estimates, in connection with the vote of £5,836,600 for works, buildings and repairs at home and abroad. A considerable proportion of the proposed expenditure under this heading is to be incurred in the construction of tanks at various naval centers in this country to provide storage for a reserve of oil fuel for our warships. Such a provision is obviously essential for the future efficiency of the navy, and though it involves considerable expenditure at a time of serious financial stringency, we are of the opinion that the expenditure is fully justified. The sum allocated in the present estimates for oil storage at home amounts to £057,600, of which £388,000 will be spent on the new depot at Plymouth. The total estimate for the construction of this depot is £1,400,000, and £265,000 has already been spent on it, leaving £747,000 to be voted in future estimates.
Additional oil storage accommodation is being provided on the Clyde in the Glasgow district, and a sum of £291,000 will be spent on this work during the year, while £2,430 is required for the oil fuel installation and pipe line now approaching completion in the same district. In the Rosyth district it is proposed to provide oil storage at Grangemouth on which £80,000 will be spent in the current financial year, while a further sum of £10,670 is allocated to the work in hand at Port Edgar. For similar work in progress at Portland, a sum of £145,500 is required, and at Pembroke it is proposed to commence work which will involve a total expenditure of £480,000; of the latter sum only £40,000 is voted for the current year. With regard to the proposed expenditure on oil storage facilities abroad, the Civil Lord, Mr. Eyres-Monsell, was careful to explain that the provision made was intended to meet the peace requirements of our ships on the ordinary ocean routes; strategic requirements, he stated, would probably be discussed at the forthcoming Imperial Conference.
The oil-fuel now under construction at Malta will have cost £308,000 before completion, while the cost of similar work at Gibraltar, including the construction of a pipe line, will be £311,800. Work at both these depots is in hand, but is not very advanced in either case; the expenditure during the current financial year is estimated at £77,600 and £76,200, respectively. Storage accommodation at Hong Kong and Port Said will be finished during the year by the expenditure of £65,000 and £43,650, respectively, while that at Jamaica will be nearly completed by a further expenditure of £21,340.
Of the new work decided on, the most important is that at Singapore, tile total cost of which will be £250,000 but only £50,000 of this is to be spent during the current year. A similar sum is required this year for work to be commenced at Rangoon, the total cost of which is estimated at £150,000. Storage facilities are also to be provided at the Cape of Good Hope, tile Falkland Islands, and Sierra Leone. The total cost of the first-mentioned proposal will be £90,000, and £42,000 of this will be spent during the year. The total costs of the other two depots mentioned will be £75,000 and £65,000, respectively, and £10,000 will be spent on each of them this year. Overseas oil-storage accommodation thus accounts for a total sum of £445,890 in the current estimates.
The only important points raised in the debate on the estimates was the question of adequate defence of the depots against hostile action, and this, we think, may safely be left in the hands of the naval authorities. The vote, which was agreed to, also includes the expenditure of about £100,000 on what may be regarded as welfare work, its object being to improve the arrangements for the comfort and well-being of naval ratings in dockyards.—Engineering. May 27, 1921.
JAPAN
To Clear Pacific War-Mists.—In time of peace prepare against war, is the new reading of an old saw introduced by Japan and the United States in their decision to sit down and reason out points at issue between the two countries, which fire-eating militarists and publicists in both lands envelop in dangerous war-mists, subject to explosion. Such is the comment in some quarters on the conversations of Secretary of State Hughes and Baron Shidehara, Ambassador from Japan, having for their ultimate object, say Washington dispatches, the negotiation of a treaty or agreement between the two governments which will cover perhaps a dozen matters now in dispute. Among these occupation of various territory in the Far East and the Japanese land and immigration questions in the United States. In addition, we are told, there is the question of the island of Yap and cable rights in the Pacific, but it is pointed out that settlement of this question will be distinct from settlement of the others, "inasmuch as it involves the rights and privileges of France, Great Britain, and Italy as well as of Japan and the United States." Thus the negotiations between the two governments fall into two classes—those concerning only Japan and the United States and those concerning other nations as well. What is more, Washington dispatches report that the American Government will not participate in the deliberations of the latest Council of the League of Nations now at Geneva, because this country and Japan are having a cleaning-up time of their own. Among the Japanese press there is occasional complaint that America's attitude is "open to question in the light of international law and diplomatic precedent," and the Tokyo Kokumin suggests that the Harding Administration had "better abandon its present stand and recognize all the facts relating to the Paris Conference, endeavoring to take part in the Peace Treaty and the League of Nations Covenant," for even—
"If it is difficult for America formally to join the Treaty, she may make a declaration of a tenor similar to its provisions and thus publicly pledge herself not to deviate from them. This is a means of maintaining international confidence in her and, indeed, is a condition precedent to her diplomatic activity."
The Kokumin turns to the partial evacuation of Siberia, which was decided upon by Premier Hara and General Tanaka, the War Minister, "by themselves alone," and add.
"The militarists have been kicked over. They may be resentful, but that is a sign of the times.
"Evacuation is at least one year overdue. For this reason the people have been compelled to waste over 100,000,000 yen. Japanese evacuation from Siberia was urged by America, demanded by public opinion in this country, and informally approved by the government itself…
"In any case, the decision of the present government to carry out evacuation without much further delay, if not immediately, almost without any conditions, may be considered an expiation on its part for its past sins."
Of Shantung the Tokyo Yamato tells us of a reported proposal that Japan "withdraw all the garrison from Tsing-tao and abandon the project for the establishment of an exclusive Japanese settlement, only succeeding to the rights formerly possessed by Germany." Though this newspaper professes inability to vouch for this report, it believes it would be advisable to open negotiations with China if the Shantung question can be settled that way, because—
"There has never been greater need of Chino-Japanese cooperation than at present. It is inimical to the interests of both Japan and China that they should be at loggerheads at such a moment. Moreover. America is inclined to interfere in the negotiations of Japan and China, and in a certain contingency the question may become further complicated. It is very desirable, therefore, that direct negotiations should be opened between Japan and China. We should be grateful to America for her anxiety, but in the present state of affairs there is a Monroe Doctrine in Asia as there is in America. If America is to be bothered for Asiatic affairs, especially matters relating to Japan and China, the consequences may be mutually unpalatable. It may be for the purpose of bringing American pressure to bear on Japan that China is trying to enlist the support of America, but will it not damage the interests not only of China but of Asia as a whole if the seed of evil is now sown impulsively?
"Japan has no ambition whatever. The conditions which she proposed for the return of Shantung were due to doubt whether peace and order could be secured in Shantung, and also to apprehension lest the rights to be abandoned by Japan should pass into the hands of a third country. If China is fully prepared on the two points, we believe that Japan will not insist on the original conditions."
Even for the purpose of domestic politics, the Tokyo Jiji believes Japan should adopt a new policy, though it admits that so important a matter as Chinese and Siberian policy "should not be exploited for the purpose of serving temporary political ends," and this daily proceeds:
"The fact is, however, that this is the best opportunity for deciding a new policy. Let us advise the government fundamentally to renovate its policy with great determination. Above all, it is necessary that double diplomacy should be done away with. Its evils are clear to everybody. Indeed, military diplomacy should be held responsible for the fact that troops have not yet been withdrawn from Siberia, the Chinese Eastern Railway zone, and Shantung.
"There may be various circumstances and designs accountable for the refusal of the Chinese Government to entertain Japan's proposal to open direct negotiations, but it is perhaps necessary that Japan should immediately withdraw her troops from Shantung in order to demonstrate her sincerity to the world. It is evident that Chinese suspicions regarding Japan, which form an obstacle to Chino-Japanese diplomacy, are due principally to the diplomacy of the militarists."
As to the Californian issue, the Japan Chronicle calls attention to an article by Count Soyeshima, in the Japanese Diplomatic Review, in which he declares that it is purely "a Californian issue" and "can not be a cause of war between the two nations." The Californian problem can be settled "as a local issue," he believes, and urges his fellow citizens not to "risk national fortunes over a question which does not menace our country." In other states the Japanese are comparatively favorably treated, according to this personage, who adds:
"In California, too, there is no reason why the Japanese immigrants should be subjected to so much opposition and persecution. Even according to the report of the committee for the investigation into the conditions of Japanese immigrants, composed exclusively of American citizens, 'they are well educated, they are eager to learn English, they have a high standard of personal cleanliness, they are generous in their relations with others, and they are generally temperate.' In fact, the Californians arc benighted, deficient in the sense of justice, and impervious to reason, but while Japan has the absolute right to protest against their benightedness, their injustice, and their unreasonableness, and it is further necessary that she should resolutely assert and enforce this her right, it would be absurd for Japan to stake her national fortunes on a local issue like this. Though it is held by some people that the Californian complication is nothing but an expression of American Imperialism and a conflict of the national policies of the two powers, yet in my opinion the trouble is a domestic one. Nor is it racial or religious, as some people think. So long as Japan and America do not come into a great conflict on the Asiatic continent, the Californian problem can be amicably settled as a local issue. It is not wise to risk national fortunes in a war over a question which does not menace our country. At every new phase of the Californian problem, there are some irresponsible politicians who refer to Bushido and otherwise have recourse to boastful language. But this is very thoughtless of them. On the occasion of national danger, incitement and instigation may be in place, but it is unwise to employ violent language to the prejudice of sound diplomacy when the question can be quietly and peacefully settled."—The Literary Digest, July 2, 1921.
Japan Employs British Air Experts.—Tientsin, June 27.—Japan's naval program includes not only the capital ships, of which mention has been made so frequently, but an abundance of minor craft and particular submarines, destroyers and seaplanes. Japan to-day has three air squadrons of six hydro-aeroplanes each. The program being rushed to conclusion calls for fifteen squadrons of six machines each. These will be based at the three great naval stations and in Formosa, where a great base has been established near the lower end of the island, only a few hours from the Philippines.
There have arrived in Japan 86 aviation experts who have seen service in the British Army of Navy. In all, 100 such Britishers have been employed as instructors by the Japanese Naval Department. They include both pilots and mechanical experts. These men are brought here from England at Japan's expense and are paid 1500 yen ($750) a month, in addition to light, heat and quarters allowances, according to a naval authority. A great shop for the manufacture of motors and airplanes is being erected in Nagoya. Major Wynder, representing Vickers, Ltd., has been in Japan for some time and is selling Japan a large amount of aircraft material. The aviators who have come from England are headed by Lieut. Col. Cecil H. Mears.
They include among other well-known officers of the late British air force Lieut. Commander Todd, Majors F. B. Fowner, H. C. Bradley, B. M. Dodds, Captains A. H. Ellis and A. Hillis and a large number of men who held the rank of lieutenant.
Coincident with the arrival of the British airmen there have arrived in Japan from Germany five experts from the House of Zeiss and six from the Goerz factory. These also are paid 1500 yen and allowances monthly. They are to manufacture periscopes and range finders for the Japanese navy and to train and supervise Japanese workmen in the branch.
A force of experts from the Short Brothers Airplane Manufacturing Works is teaching the Japanese how to assemble the eight airplanes of the F-5 class recently purchased by Japan from that plant. This type of machine is of the seaplane style, with a wing spread of no feet and body of 50 feet. It has two motors of 350 horsepower each and can remain in the air with six passengers for 10 hours.
Major Dodds said that these machines were equipped with the Eagle VIII type of engines from the Rolls-Royce plant. The Average speed is 80 miles an hour and the oil tanks hold sufficient for 10 hours' flight at maximum speed, thus giving a range of 800 miles. The machines are being assembled at the Yokohuka station.—The N. Y. Times, June 28, 1921.
UNITED STATES
Navy Department—Bureau of Construction and Repair
Vessels Under Construction, United States Navy—Degree of Completion, As Reported June 30, 1921
Type, number and name | Contractor | Per cent of completion | |||
July 1, 1921 | June 1, 1921 | ||||
Total | On ship | Total | On ship | ||
Battleships (BB) | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? |
44 California | Mare Island Navy Yard | 98.0 | 98.0 | 97.0 | 97.0 |
45 Colorado | New York S.B. Cpn. | 75.4 | 73.5 | 73.1 | 71.3 |
46 Maryland | Newport News S.B. & D.D. Co. | 99.5 | 99.3 | 99.2 | 98.9 |
47 Washington | New York S.B. Cpn. | 67.3 | 60.8 | 65.0 | 58.5 |
48 West Virginia | Newport News S.B. & D.D. Co. | 57.0 | 48.2 | 54.1 | 44.4 |
49 South Dakota | New York Navy Yard | 32.2 | 25.7 | 30.5 | 22.3 |
50 Indiana | New York Navy Yard | 29.8 | 22.7 | 28.0 | 20.7 |
51 Montana | Mare Island Navy Yard | 26.1 | 17.3 | 24.4 | 15.2 |
52 North Carolina | Norfolk Navy Yard | 35.8 | 26.6 | 32.3 | 23.1 |
53 Iowa | Newport News S.B. & D.D. Co. | 26.3 | 22.6 | 23.0 | 19.0 |
54 Massachusetts | Beth. S.B. Cpn. (Fore River) | 8.6 | 3.0 | 6.4 | 0.9 |
Battle Cruisers (CC) | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? |
1 Lexington | Beth. S.B. Cpn. (Fore River) | 21.1 | 12.3 | 18.7 | 9.2 |
2 Constellation | Newport News S.B. & D.D. Co. | 11.5 | 9.0 | 10.5 | 7.7 |
3 Saratoga | New York S.B. Cpn. | 24.2 | 15.4 | 22.4 | 13.4 |
4 Ranger | Newport News S.B. & D.D. Co. | 2.0 | 0.8 | 1.8 | 0.7 |
5 Constitution | Philadelphia Navy Yard | 9.2 | 5.7 | 7.7 | 4.0 |
6 United States | Philadelphia Navy Yard | 9.2 | 5.2 | 7.7 | 4.0 |
Scout Cruisers (Light Cruisers CL) | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? |
4 Omaha | Todd D.D. & Const. Cpn. | 93.0 | 84.7 | 92.1 | 83.4 |
5 Milwaukee | Todd D.D. & Const. Cpn. | 90.5 | 82.1 | 89.2 | 80.9 |
6 Cincinnati | Todd D.D. & Const. Cpn. | 84.4 | 77.0 | 81.7 | 74.1 |
7 Raleigh | Beth. S.B. Cpn. (Fore River) | 59.7 | 41.5 | 56.7 | 38.8 |
8 Detroit | Beth. S.B. Cpn. (Fore River) | 59.8 | 41.6 | 56.6 | 38.7 |
9 Richmond | Wm. Cramp & Sons Co. | 67 | 45 | 66 | 40 |
10 Concord | Wm. Cramp & Sons Co. | 64 | 42 | 63 | 37 |
11 Trenton | Wm. Cramp & Sons Co. | 47 | 30 | 45 | 25 |
12 Marblehead | Wm. Cramp & Sons Co. | 45 | 27 | 43 | 22 |
13 Memphis | Wm. Cramp & Sons Co. | 39 | 24 | 37 | 19 |
Auxiliaries | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? |
Fuel Ship No. 18, Pecos | Boston Navy Yard (Oiler AO6) | 97.2 | 97 | 88 | 87.5 |
Repair Ship No. 1, Medusa (AR1) | Puget Sound Navy Yard | 63.6 | 48.1 | 62.4 | 47.7 |
Dest. Tender No. 3, Dobbin (AD3) | Philadelphia Navy Yard | 64.8 | 64.5 | 62.3 | 62 |
Dest. Tender No. 4, Whitney (AD4) | Boston Navy Yard | 28.9 | 21.9 | 25 | 16.5 |
Sub. Tender No. 3, Holland (AS3) | Puget Sound Navy Yard | 20.2 | 4.2 | 17.8 | 2.5 |
Aircraft Tender, Wright (AZ1) | Tietjen & Lang | 80 | … | 76 | … |
Patrol Vessels | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? |
Gunboat No. 22, Tulsa (PG 22) | Charleston Navy Yard | 69.2 | 50.5 | 67.7 | 48 |
In addition to the above there are under construction 4 destroyers, 5 fleet submarines, and 37 submarines.
Authorized but not under construction or contract 12 destroyers, 7 submarines, and one transport.
Merchant Marine
To Rescue Our Merchant Fleet.—Albert D. Lasker may not know the difference between the starboard bow and a marlinspike, as the Baltimore Evening Sun suggests, but dozens of editors laud his courage in giving up extensive business interests to accept the chairmanship of the Shipping Board, after the honor of handling its tangled affairs had been declined by several others. "The work of salvaging the government fleet from ruin and decay, in view of American shipping laws, American construction and operating costs, and American export conditions, will not be child's play," notes the New York Herald, "but the country has every reason to feel confidence in the ability of Chairman Lasker to do the thing if it is in anybody's power to do it." "The questions before the Board are the knottiest that confront any government agency," asserts the New York Times, and if Mr. Lasker fails to solve them, "it will be his first failure in which supposed sea and trade Solomons also have failed," remarks the Baltimore Sun.
"The fleet can be put on a paying basis, and I can operate it at a profit," was the astounding dispatch that was sent from Mr. Lasker's home city, Chicago, to a New York paper as the new chairman left for Washington, but, upon telegraphic inquiry, Mr. Lasker assured The Digest that he was misquoted. "What I said was that the President wanted a basis established for a permanent and profitable American merchant marine to be developed through private initiative and enterprise," the new chairman telegraphed. Thus Mr. Lasker is seen to be in full accord with President Harding's policy, as outlined in a dispatch from the Baltimore Sun's Washington correspondent:
"1. That the business of ship operation be turned over to private interests with as little delay as possible.
"2. That the deficits must be stopped.
"3. That the Shipping Board shall make an appraisal of the assets of the government under its jurisdiction and charge to the war every liability that cannot be made useful and profitable."
"The first step of the new Board will be to formulate a policy, and the second will be to take the government out of the shipping industry," is the positive statement of George Rothwell Brown, writing in the Washington Post. "President Harding is taking a direct and personal part in the impending liquidation of the largest single business in the world today, and a highly important policy which can not fail to have far-reaching and beneficial results has been outlined," adds Mr. Brown. The withdrawal of the government from merchant shipping will require at least three years, he thinks. As we read on in The Post:
"It is to be the helpful intention of the administration which the new Shipping Board is destined to become such an important part, to correlate the merchant marine with American commercial expansion with port development, and all the other factors which are essential to a country's economic stability and development. Its plans are marked by breadth and vision.
"It is not to be expected that these things are to be brought about at once by the waving of a magician's wand; that cannot be. The processes necessarily must be slow. It is the purpose of the government that this part of the national structure shall be built up on a solid foundation.
"An asset which cost $3,000,000,000 could hardly bring to-day more than $750,000,000. This, also, is authoritative. The taxpayers will have to make up their minds that the enormous sum represented by the difference will have to be charged off on the ledger of patriotism as a part of the cost of the successful war against Germany, precisely as have been thus charged off the cannon, the guns, the ammunition, and the airplanes with which the war was won."
This is rather hard on American taxpayers, many editors agree, "but it is only what the merchants of the country have been compelled to do during the past few months in readjusting their war-time operations to a peace-time basis," notes the New York Commercial. "We have had the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve Board telling the people of the country that their business enterprises must be deflated, yet the government itself, engaging in what is essentially a private business, has hitherto refused to face the issue," maintains this business organ.
"After being in a position near the bottom of the list of the great seafaring nations we are once more near the top, and our Shipping Board crews are 80 per cent American, whereas four years ago they were only 10 per cent American," we are told by the Marion Star. What to do with the fleet of steel and wooden ships, however, "is a question that has perplexed even the experts in the shipping business," says the Chicago News. Here is part of Mr. Lasker's statement, made after he had accepted the chairmanship:
"American industry and finance can not exist on the scale to which it has been created unless foreign markets are opened and remain open. American commerce must compete successfully on the seas with the commerce of the world.
"The constructive end of the Shipping Board's work is to inaugurate and put in being a policy that will accomplish this. To this end it must call into cooperation other departments of the government, all those interested in merchant marine and the manufacturers and financiers of the country. The President has said that the inspiration of private initiative and enterprise must be the guiding principles of the Board's work.
"It will be the first duty of the Board to do those things which are necessary to end incompetence and make of the Shipping Board a business institution guided by business principles and measuring up to business standards. The charge on the public treasury must be cut down, and that with all possible expedition, so that this burden on the taxpayers will be alleviated."
"At the end of May 684 steel ships (about one-third of this country's steam and oil tonnage) were laid up," declares the New York Times. "So many are idle that expenses run to $20,000,000 a month," is the startling announcement of the Baltimore News, and the Boston Herald notes that "there are 275 wooden vessels on the hands of the Shipping Board, and the care of them costs the government $440,000 a year." What to do with them is one of the new chairman's problems. "Far better to give them away if they can not be sold, or to burn them if they cannot be given away," thinks the Philadelphia Inquirer.
"The taxpayers of the United States must pay a stiffs price for the procrastination of their government," writes Ernest Cordeal in the Transportation World (New York); "two years ago the government might have come well out of its investments in ships and shipyards, but to-day it must take a heavy loss. And the longer it delays in disposing of its interests, the greater will be the loss." "If the Shipping Board had not been prevented by the Hearst injunctions from putting ships on the auction-block a year or more ago, and had it not held them at too high a valuation, the government might have cut its losses materially,'' declares the New York Tribune. Now, it adds, "the only way to avoid throwing good money after bad is to sell all the ships than can be sold and to stop operating the others." "The American public is tired of government coddling and nursing; it will not tolerate the ship-subsidy talk that has been going the rounds," agrees the New York Journal of Commerce.
"The merchant marine should not be entirely in private hands," thinks the Washington Post, "although the ships may be privately operated." As the Providence Journal sums up the four-year regime of the Shipping Board:
"When all is said and done, the foundation has been laid for an American merchant marine. It has cost extravagantly, but the excess over what it is now worth may be absorbed in time. It has been an expensive experience, but has afforded a convincing demonstration of the shocking waste possible, even inevitable, to government ventures into the field of business. There is compensation in that. The educational value of the experience should serve us well, into the far future. At any rate, we have made a big beginning and there can be no thought of turning back."—The Literary Digest, June 25, 1921.
American Maritime Policies.—In his address before the Eighth National Foreign Trade Convention, Mr. James A. Farrell made the following points: One, no sale at present of government vessels to private owners; two, our steamships are well constructed and compare with the best abroad; three, the average cost approximates that of foreign ships; four, even with temporary improvements in freights it will take three years to absorb the world's idle tonnage; five, international agreement to stabilize rates and lay up tonnage might be useful; six, American traders and travelers should use American ships; seven, we should abandon the attempt to build up trade routes from every United States port and serve only ports where cargo is available; eight, Time-charter Shipping Board vessels with option of purchase; nine, operating costs must be reduced to equality with foreign costs; ten, shipping laws which impose a disadvantage estimated at five per cent on investment should be repealed.—The Scientific American, July 2, 1921.
Shipping Troubles.—We have before us an analysis by the editor of the Shipping World of the discouraging conditions which existed in the British Merchant Marine in the spring of the present year. It is the statement of one of the world's best authorities on shipping matters, and all that he says of conditions three months ago may be repeated with greater emphasis to-day. One cannot read this material without being struck by the fact that like causes have produced like effects on our side of the Atlantic. In commenting on the report of the Liverpool Shipping Association, attention is drawn to the fact that though the ship-carrying power now available in the world is sufficient to deal with a larger volume of overseas traffic than was handled in 1913, and the needs of Great Britain as a consumer are greater than ever before, yet in 1920 the overseas commerce of the United Kingdom was in weight 19 per cent below, and the exports 56 per cent below those dealt with in 1914. To-day, of course, the situation is considerably worse than that. In 1920, although the British tonnage available was at least equal to, and the foreign tonnage available was far in excess of, that afloat in 1913, there was used in the overseas trade of the United Kingdom in 1920 ship-carrying power only in the proportion of 80 against the 100 employed in 1913. Furthermore, although more ships were employed, under the present conditions it is taking five ships to do the work that was performed by four ships in 1914.
Bearing in mind conditions in the deep sea trade m this country, there is something familiar in the British analysis of their own troubles. We are told that the advance in wages has raised the cost of production and transport, making it impossible for the British to sell their exports in foreign markets. We are assured that, in the main, it is the advance in food prices which has brought about such an advance in wages. Take note also of the fact that they have reached the maximum traffic which can be dealt with through the ports working under prevailing conditions, and unless those conditions can be altered, it will be impossible to import only five-sixths of the overseas supplies of food obtained under pre-war conditions. Hence follow scarcity and high prices; continued demands for high wages to meet those prices; a cost of production which makes selling of manufactures and coal in foreign markets an impossibility; constant curtailment of production; a decrease in exports; and last, a further and inevitable reduction in imports. Thus the whole thing runs in an endless circle, and it can truly be said that, with modifications due to local conditions, we are passing through a similar experience. The principal modification as between us and Great Britain is the question of exchange; but of our merchant marine, as of theirs, it is true that the greatly increased costs of operation constitute a severe handicap. Indeed, in this respect we are in a more parlous state than they; this for the reason that our impossible laws—the burden laid upon our shipping by the, suicidal LaFollette Act—renders successful competition on a common rate basis out of the question.—The Scientific American, June 25, 1921.
Internal-Combustion Engines for Ships.—The American Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers have recently been discussing the relative merits of oil engines as against steam engines for the propulsion of cargo vessels. The subject was brought before them by a paper entitled "The Internal-Combustion Engine as Applied to Marine Propulsion," read by Messrs. John F. Metten and J. C. Shaw at their meeting on May 26 last, in New York. The authors appeared to be far from satisfied with the development of the motor ship in America as compared with the progress made in Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries, and pointed out that the country found itself in the possession of a large government-owned fleet, almost wholly steam-driven, which private owners were reluctant to purchase or operate. The advantages of the internal-combustion engine were taken for granted, and the question was presented as to whether it would be preferable to convert some of the existing steam vessels or to build new motor ships. No direct answer was given to this question, the authors devoting themselves principally to the question of the relative costs of operating comparative vessels of 13,000 tons deadweight capacity and 3500 shaft horsepower, one driven by geared turbines and the other by Diesel engines. The steamer was supposed to burn oil in the furnaces. Very complete estimates were presented, which may be summarized by saying that the motor ship was calculated to earn 16.65 per cent on the capital invested as against 10 per cent in the case of the turbine vessel. The William Penn, a vessel of 12,375 tons deadweight, the first large oil-driven vessel to be owned by the United States Shipping Board, has a pair of six-cylinder Diesel engines, of 35CO shaft horse-power, the bore of the cylinders and stroke being 740 mm. and 11 50 mm. respectively. The vessel will have a service speed of 10.5 knots to II knots and will be operated over the same route and by the same company as the electrically-driven ship Eclipse, recently put into service. This should enable very useful comparative figures to be obtained, and we may fairly presume that in due course they will be published, m accordance with the open-minded policy which is characteristic of American engineers.—Engineering, June 17, 1921.
Progress in Motor Shipbuilding.—This article gives extracts from the returns of "Lloyd's Register of Shipbuilding" for the past month. Throughout the world there are at present actually under construction 180 motor ships of 750,000 tons d. w. c, or 454-50- gross tonnage. Of these 57 are being built in the United Kingdom, of gross tonnage 227.010, represent half the total tonnage being built. The proportion of motor ships to steam ships being built in this country is considerably less than abroad, though it is rapidly increasing. These figures do not include a large number of motor ships which have been recently ordered in this country and abroad, but the construction of which has not yet commenced. They also do not include vessels building in Germany, the number of which is considerable. Details are given in tabular form of the tonnage of motor ships being built in various shipbuilding centers in this country and abroad. (Motor Ship. London, Feb., 1921.)—The Technical Review, June, 1921.
AERONAUTICS
Airships and Steamships.—In pursuance of the policy announced in the House of Commons on the introduction of the Air Estimates, it was officially intimated at the beginning of last week that unless a firm offer to take over and operate the existing airships in this country for commercial purposes were received by August 1, the Air Ministry would discontinue all airship activities, and would hand the vessels, stations and material to the Disposal Board. It may be recalled that the government has offered to present, free of any charge, to a suitably constituted British commercial airship company the three airships R-33, R-36 and R-80, the ex-German airships L-64 and L-71, and the airship R-37, on which, when nearly completed, work was suspended. With the exceptions of the ex-German airships, these vessels are fitted with bow-mooring arrangements, while one of them—the R-36—is fully equipped for the carriage of passengers. The government is also prepared to make a free gift to the proposed company of all of its spare engines and other airship material and stores, to assist the company with all available information, to lend it for a period any airship specialists required, and to lease or sell to it the Cardington and Pulham air bases as they now stand. This offer, involving, we believe, the gift of over one million pounds' worth of material, has been before the country for some months, and has, we know, been the subject of much discussion among people likely to be interested in the commercial operation of airships. That no one so far has shown any inclination to do anything more than discuss it is a clear indication that, in the opinion of those concerned, the commercial operation of airships is unlikely to yield a sufficient return in the present state of the art and in the prevailing conditions affecting transport services in general. Is that view justifiable, and, if so, on what particular point or points connected with the operation of an airship service can be established?
Assuming—and it is a large assumption—that there is a public awaiting the advent of the commercial airship service, we may endeavor to obtain some guidance as to the commercial prospects of such a service by comparing the qualifications and performance of the existing passenger airship R-36 with those of an ocean-going passenger steamship. It is not easy to select the particular marine vessel that may justly be compared with the airship. A steamship of the size and speed of the Mauretania is well known, under present conditions, to be uneconomical, and as a basis of comparison may be expected to show the airship in a too favorable light. On the whole, we are of the opinion that a steamship of the size and speed of the Carmania is probably the least exceptionable standard that can be adopted. That vessel is certified for 1995 passengers, and carries a crew numbering 513. Allowing her four weeks for the round voyage to American and back, and assuming that she runs all the year round and on each trip carries 100 per cent of her capacity, she is capable of transporting 51,870 passengers per year. The airship R-36 is fitted with accommodation for 50 passengers and carries a crew of 28. With her speed of 65 miles an hour she ought to perform the round trip in seven days. Running with full capacity all the year round, she should thus be capable of carrying 5200 passengers per year. It therefore appears that so far as passenger-carrying capacity is concerned, ten airships of the R-36 class are equivalent to one Carmania. Total horsepower of the engines of these ten airships would be 15,700; that of the main engines of the Carmania is 21,000. The aggregate crews of the ten airships would be 280; the crew of the Carmania numbers 513. In both these important respects, therefore, economy is distinctly on the side of the airship. This result is, we feel, surprising, for economy in any respect is not generally associated with aerial transport. Stated generally, it means that for the same total passenger-carrying capacity over a given period of time, the airship, on the same average factor of passenger loading, is 25 per cent more economical in power expenditure than the steamship, and 45 per cent more economical in the matter of crew. This very favorable result must not, however, be accepted at its face value; it has to be tempered by several considerations. In the first place, it has to be observed that the higher the speed of a vessel the greater is the strain thrown upon it and its crew. It is not impracticable to run the Carmania voyage after voyage at four-week intervals with the same crew. But in the case of the airship the time in port is reduced in proportion to the increased speed on the trip, and would be far too short to effect running repairs and to rest the crew. On the London-Paris air route, we believe, it is not found practicable or desirable to fly back the aeroplane leaving on a Monday before the following Friday, or even the Monday of the next week. The trans-Atlantic steamship service could be maintained at least for a time by means of one Carmania. The corresponding airship service could not, it is certain, be maintained for any time whatever by means of the ten airships indicated by our calculation Four additional airships would absorb all the economy in the matter of power expenditure, but it may be doubted whether anything short of 100 per cent reserve of craft and crew would be sufficient to meet the conditions. In the second place, the question of upkeep has to be considered. There are elements in this matter which it must be admitted are distinctly in favor of the airship. There is, for instance, the fact that the total airship carrying capacity need not be reduced, at any instant, for the purposes of dry-docking by more than 10 per cent, whereas with the steamship service nothing less than the whole can be withdrawn. On the other hand, in the matter of engine upkeep, there can be no doubt on which side an overwhelming advantage lies. At present not more than 30 to 40 horsepower per cylinder can be developed in an aero-engine. The ten airships required to provide the equivalent of the passenger-carrying capacity of the Carmania would thus have between them 400 cylinders, at 800 valves, 100 magnetos, and a corresponding multiplicity of fuel and water pumps, radiators, sparking plugs, etc. It must be admitted that by comparison the engines of the Carmania are simplicity itself. Even to-day, in spite of the improvements that have been effected in the construction of aero-engines, the limit of running time between complete overhauls does not by much exceed 200 hours. Thus in the present state of development the engines of the airship service would require to be completely overhauled at the end of every second round trip. Actually, for the ten airships, the separate engine overhauls required would work out at the rate of 1300 per year. Another important item in the upkeep bill would be the replacement of the hydrogen lost on the voyage, an item against which we have nothing to put in the case of the steamship service. Taking the loss at as low a rate as 5 per cent of the capacity per round trip, the annual replacement quantity required comes out at no less than 55 million cubic feet per year for the ten airships. There is thus indicated the provision of hydrogen generating plant capable of producing on the average 150,000 cubic feet per day.
Even from an outline analysis such as we have presented above features emerge which clearly suggest the need for the utmost caution before a definite opinion is formed as to the commercial prospects of the airship. Our analysis, we know, is very short of being complete, but so far as it goes it fails either to prove or disprove the case for such craft. Some will, no doubt, hold that the apparent economy of engine power and crew shown by the airship is of much importance than the apparent lack of economy in upkeep. Others, probably, will heartily disagree with that view. For ourselves, we would urge that the question should be looked at as a whole and apart from the free gift from the government of the existing airships and material. Capital cost will have to be considered sooner or later if the service established is to remain in force successfully. Then, too, we should consider the airship not solely as a passenger-carrier, but also or alternatively as a means of transporting goods. The question of terminal charges should also be brought within the scope of the comparison. In these and other matters the advantage seems at times to be on the side of the airship and at times against it. At other it is next to impossible to form a sound judgment where it lies. Thus, in the matter of terminal charges, the economy of ground personnel rendered possible by the use of mooring masts seems to place the advantage with the airship. In the matter of the carriage of goods the reverse appears to be the case. Thus, even the Mauretania— a less commercially efficient vessel than the Carmania—can carry 1000 tons of goods apart from her passengers' luggage. In the same proportion the R-36 airship should carry nearly 30 tons of freight in addition to her passengers. Actually, when fully loaded with her 50 passengers, she cannot take anything beyond 2 ¼ tons of personal luggage. On the matter of capital cost we have no data to guide us, for all the airships so far constructed in this country have been built more or less on an experimental basis. On a production basis we can only rely on estimates, and therefore introduce an additional element of uncertainty into our calculations. It may be added, however, that from inquiries we have made it would appear that in the matter of capital cost the balance of advantage would probably fall on the side of the airship service. Altogether, then, the commercial prospects of the airship are at present hard to determine, so hard, in fact, that we shall not be surprised if the allotted period goes past without the receipt by the government of the offer it desires for its surplus airships and material.—The Engineer, June 10, 1921.
The Limitations of Aerial Bombing.—Naval officers point out that there have been appearing in the press with increasing frequency erroneous statements respecting the cost of battleships as compared with aircraft. It is also claimed that aerial bombs are more destructive than gun projectiles, because such bombes contain a larger percentage of explosive than armor-piercing shells of the same size. The statements most frequently made with respect to costs are that 1000 airplanes can be constructed for the cost of one present-day battleship; that each plane can carry a bomb of sufficient power to sink a battleship; and that the airplane requires a personnel of only two or three men, whereas the battleship requires 800 or more.
In the first place present-day cost of battleships, due to lower prices, is less than $45,000,000; but granting the cost to be that sum, and that such a battleship could be used for the first line for a period of 15 years, and the second line for 10 years, at an annual up-keep cost of $1,000,000, the cost of the battleship for 25 years would be $70,000,000, or $2,800,000 yearly. Granted that 1000 planes can be built for $45,000,000—which, on account of the diversified types required by complete naval air force, seems hardly possible, inasmuch as planes of the larger type cost considerably more than $45,000 each, including their equipment—it should be borne in mind that the life of a plane in service is approximately two years. Hence, the entire cost of the planes must be again spent each succeeding two years, or 12 ½ times during the life of a battleship; and inasmuch as not less than 50 per cent on the average, of the first cost of a plane is required to keep it in commission for two years, the total cost of 1000 planes for 25 years would be $843,750,000, or $33,748,000 per year, a sum sufficient to keep in commission 12 battleships of the present-day type.
Furthermore, in the matter of personnel, naval officers do not agree with the printed statements. A battleship such as contemplated would have a crew of 1500 officers and men instead of 800, while in the case of airplanes, for every man in the air there is required approximately 20 on the ground. On this basis, 12 battleships would require 18,000 officers and men, and 1000 airplanes, on the basis of one man in the plane and 20 on the ground, would require 21,000 personnel. To be perfectly fair in the matter, it may be considered that the personnel of the two would about cancel each other in cost, inasmuch as highly skilled mechanics are required on battleships and aircraft alike. In the case of landing fields and hangars for 1000 aircraft, we may also consider that the expense is canceled by docks and navy yards required for the repair of battleships. That brings the case down to a comparison of material cost, and, as above stated, 1000 aircraft stretched over a period of 25 years, which is the extreme life of a battleship, would equal the cost of 12 such battleships.
Regarding the statement that aircraft could each carry a bomb sufficiently large to destroy a battleship, it is not believed that at the present day this can be done. Bombs have not been developed to such an extent that they are armor-piercing, and after landing on the deck of a ship their destructiveness would be local. The experiments on the U. S. S. Indiana with a large bomb filled with T. N. T. which was exploded on her deck, causing considerable damage to her old-style upper works, has been used as an illustration of what bombs can do, and statements have been made that if the bomb were destructive when laid on the deck, it would be much more so if dropped from an airplane. This is erroneous. The destructiveness of T. N. T., unconfined, has a certain potentiality which is not increased by the mere dropping of the T. N. T. from a height. If is necessary for the projectile to pierce the armor of the ship and explode inside of her hull. This cannot be done by thin-walled aerial bombs subject only to the impulse of gravity. There must be acceleration beyond the force of gravity to cause the shell to pierce armor and the shell must be of the armor-piercing variety; consequently, the weight of the shell wall reduces the amount of T. N. T. which it may contain, reducing the destructiveness of the bomb.
It is believed that the actual facts should be given the public. Erroneous comparisons which only bring out one side of the argument do not help the cause of aeronautics but do more harm than good.—The Scientific American, July 2, 1921.
ENGINEERING
The Teachings of Experience.—It has been noted as curious and characteristic that a committee appointed before the war by the German Government to report on specifications for steel bridges did not include amongst its members a single engineer having experience in the behavior of structures under traffic. The committee was constituted entirely of professors and designers of structural steelwork, all no doubt being well versed in the art of computation. Such an equipment is, however, far from adequate to successful design, as has been repeatedly demonstrated in practice, a notable instance being the failure of the giant cranes supplied to Panama. Computation must, in short, be constantly checked by an unceasing study of the behavior in service conditions of structures and engineering products generally. Such studies are even more important in the case of moving machinery than in that of structures. In the latter case the loads and stresses are generally reasonably well defined and are static rather than dynamic. When stresses are dynamic we meet with singular anomalies. Turbine designers, for example, tell us that they have found it advisable to limit the working stress on rotor shafts to some 5000 pounds per square inch, although the component in question is very simple in form and the torque transmitted is almost ideally steady. It is not, therefore, surprising that builders of high-speed engines were at times almost driven to declare that no rational rule could be found for proportioning their crankshafts. In the case of slow-speed machinery failures have been less mystifying, but it has been generally recognized that in all cases an empirical element entered into their design. It was this consideration that gave such value to those reports in which Mr. Michael Longridge was accustomed to describe the investigations into machinery failures made by him in his capacity as chief engineer to the British Engine, Boiler and Electrical Insurance Company. This annual commentary on power plant pathology was extremely valuable to the designer, who thus obtained an authoritative statement as to what had actually happened in accidents, of which he might possibly have heard rumors, or even been supplied with some particulars by the workmen engaged on the repairs. Particulars thus obtained are, however, commonly very apt to be misleading as the purveyor of them is seldom content to report his actual observations, but having formed his own theory as the cause of a breakdown, colors his communications accordingly.
The discontinuance of Mr. Longridge's reports was a distinct loss to engineering literature, and the hiatus has not yet been filled. Though there are other societies engaged in the insurance of machinery not one of their engineers has ventured to play the part of "Elisha" to Mr. Longridge and take up the mantle dropped from his shoulders.
Mr. Stromeyer's annual memoranda to the Manchester Steam User's Association, highly interesting as they are, cover a much narrower field, being concerned almost wholly with the construction and behavior of boilers and steam pipes. In the latest of these memoranda, Mr. Stromeyer discusses at considerable length the value of hydraulic tests. Such tests appear very convincing to those lacking practical experience, and it appears that in some countries, such as Russia, yearly tests of this kind had to be applied' under official supervision to every boiler in service. From the standpoint of the official the practice had no doubt much to commend it, as a properly-conducted boiler inspection is at best an unpleasant job; whilst a government inspector superintending an hydraulic test need neither remove nor protect his uniform. Moreover, from the owner's standpoint the preparations for such a test involve much less expenditure of time and trouble than does the preparation of a boiler for a proper inspection. Where, however, such an inspection is possible an hydraulic test is at the best superfluous, often misleading, and at times actually harmful. Mr. Stromeyer quotes many instances in which disastrous explosions have occurred very shortly after the application of what was thought to be a satisfactory hydraulic test. In these cases he holds that quite probably the test was a contributory cause to the final failure, having extended pre-existing cracks so that they have afterwards become through fractures, under the "breathing" of the material concomitant to actual service.
With new material there is less danger of such sequelae, and most boiler builders like to apply the test to new boilers, though it is quite possible that the satisfaction with which they regard a favorable issue has little logical foundation. As Mr. Stromeyer points out, no practical man thinks of submitting ship's structure to any acceptance test, though we may note that at the Titanic inquiry one of the counsel engaged seemed to think the omission a reflection on the builders, not realizing its absolute impractibility. In ship construction reliance is of necessity placed on careful design and workmanship, yet the stresses to which ship structures are subjected are much higher than are admitted in boiler practice. Mr. Stromeyer claims accordingly that the hydraulic test should be abandoned in the case of boilers, and in this he is certainly logical, although we are not inclined to give an unqualified assent to all his contentions If we understand him correctly he takes the view that an occasional application of an excessive load will permanently diminish the working life of a structure subject to fluctuating stresses, so that the application of one hydraulic test may do as much harm as thousands of repetitions of normal working pressures. We are inclined to think that experience hardly bears this out. Locomotive boiler shell plates, for instance, are bent cold and not subsequently annealed. The material has thereby been undoubtedly subjected to very excessive stresses, yet experience seems to afford no reason for believing that the working life of such boilers would have been increased had cold bending been dispensed with. Again, many bridges are apparently subjected to occasional excessive stresses due to the change of temperature between summer and winter, yet there is no evidence on record of a collapse attributable to this.
An interesting point raised in the report is the action of superheated steam on cast-iron pipes and fittings. Failures due to this are becoming increasingly common and are no doubt attributable to lack of experience with superheated steam. It was, we believe, Outerbridge who first called attention to the "growth" of cast-iron at high temperatures. The matter has been experimentally, investigated by Professor Carpenter, who has confirmed the fact previously discovered by steam turbine builders that the phenomenon depends largely on the composition of the iron, being due to the oxidation of the silicon. Mr. Stromeyer reports that many failures have occurred with cast-iron bends and valves at temperatures considerably below the limit noted in Professor Carpenter's experiments, and he makes the very probable suggestion that the metal of a pipe being stressed, chemical action occurs more readily than it otherwise would do. It is, in fact, well recognized that the corrosion of non-ferrous metals may be greatly hastened by stressing the material, and it is a fair presumption that cast-iron follows a similar rule. As already mentioned, much depends on the composition of the iron and some engineers claim to have produced a growth-free cast-iron, whilst others have turned to steel.
We note that the Manchester Steam Users' Association is revising its code of instructions to boiler attendants, and a draft of their new issue is included in Mr. Stromeyer's memorandum. Many of the points dealt with are elementary, but cannot be neglected on that account since it frequently happens that both stokers and owners are lamentably ignorant of the first principles of boiler management. One piece of advice in this code is likely to arouse the ire of smoke abatement enthusiasts, who are accustomed to declaim that smoke means waste. The actual fact is that unless smokeless fuel be used the greatest efficiency is obtained when there is some light smoke. With ordinary coal a complete absence of smoke means that an excessive amount of air is passing through the flues and carrying away with it an abnormal amount of heat. Dense smoke is, of course, equally uneconomical.
We note one curious slip of the pen in the memorandum where, on page 11, the remark is made that "the higher the pressure the greater the difference of temperature for equal differences of steam pressure." Of course, the exact reverse is the case, but at times an author's pen, with the inmate malignity of many inanimate objects, takes control, and leads him to say the exact opposite of what he had in his mind. Such slips often escape correction in proof because the author reads what is in his mind and not what is on the paper.—Engineering, June 10, 1921.
Petrol Engine Efficiency.—The whole subject of the efficiency of petrol engines was brought during the war into great prominence on account of the application to fighting aeroplanes, in great numbers and high powers, of this type of prime mover. This led investigators thoroughly to review the thermodynamic conditions which govern performance in the hope of finding some modifications of the cycle which would provide higher powers and greater economy. There are only two obvious ways of increasing the power output of a reciprocating engine, namely, either by increasing the mean effective pressure on the piston, or by an augmentation of the piston speed. So far as piston speeds are concerned, the limit is reached when the inertia forces of the reciprocating masses stress, to within a reasonable percentage of their elastic limits, the best high-tensile steel available for such parts as the connecting rods and the bottom end bolts. Reduction in the weight of reciprocating masses, the use of aluminum pistons, &c., have increased this limit, and possibly higher speeds can still be successfully sustained, although the margin for improvement in this particular direction cannot but be extremely small.
As regards increasing the m. e. p., the safe limit is reached when the heat flow attains to a figure above which troubles are encountered. Recently we dealt very fully with this question in connection with large marine Diesel engines in our article on "Tendencies in Marine Oil Engine Practice," and it is interesting to find this point again so fully emphasized, where the smaller petrol type of engine is concerned, in the paper on "Some Experiments on Supercharging in a High-Speed Engine," read by Mr. Harry Ricardo. B. A., at the Institution of Automobile Engineers on the I2th inst. It is well known that if, with a petrol engine, the mixture strength be reduced, the thermal efficiency more nearly approaches that of the standard air cycle. As the mixture strength is decreased the maximum temperature is reduced. In ordinary practice, the weakening of the mixture of petrol and air below a figure of from 85 to 90 British thermal units per cubic foot, is not possible. Mr. Ricardo again enunciates his theory of stratification of the combustible charge, and discusses means whereby the mixture in the way of the sparking plug is made of sufficient strength to ensure ignition and support combustion, which will heat up and cause expansion on cooling of the remaining air entrapped in the cylinder. In a series of tests which were carried out during 1913-14 there was used a highly efficient single-cylinder vertical engine. The power output of the engine was controlled entirely by the quantity of fuel separately admitted through the suction valve, so that, at all times and under all conditions, the full air charge was taken into the cylinder, and it was found possible to reduce the mean mixture strength from the normal mixture strength of 85 British thermal units per cubic foot, down to 10 British thermal units with perfectly regular running. It was found further that the engine could be started at all times, even on the coldest day, on the first pull over, and that when running light with an indicated m. e. p. of only about 14 pound per square inch, the exhaust was almost inaudible, the speed of the engine remaining absolutely uniform, and the indicator diagrams extraordinarily consistent. On opening the needle valve and increasing the fuel, the engine would immediately accelerate even from the lowest speed of 120 r. p. m. The results of efficiency obtained approximate very nearly to the theoretical limiting efficiency, and at a mixture strength of 10 British thermal units per cubic foot were almost 80 per cent of the theoretical. The gain in efficiency by working with such rare stratified charges, enables a consumption of fuel per indicated horse-power per hour of approximately 0.37 pound to be maintained, from 20 i.h.p. up to 60 i.h.p., rising to 0.45 at 120 i.h.p., thus proving conclusively the correctness of the basis of the theory.
The second part of the research work described fully in this paper concerns the retention of the idea of stratification to reduce the temperatures of the cycle, together with supercharging to bring up the horse-power output, and a special engine was constructed for this purpose, containing the well-known Ricardo supercharging piston. The cycle of operations was as follows: During the suction stroke the piston drew from the carburetor a charge of petrol vapor and air of a normal proportion. Towards the end of the stroke the ports round the lower end of the cylinder were uncovered and a charge of air, compressed in the crosshead chamber to a pressure of about 12 pound per square inch, entered the cylinder. Simultaneously with the opening of these supercharging ports, the main inlet valve in the cylinder head was closed. This supplementary air for supercharging from the crosshead chamber raised the pressure of the cylinder contents to about 5 pound per square inch above atmospheric pressure, and assisted at the same time towards stratification by forming a layer above the piston. The actual indicator diagram of this part of the cycle closely approximates to the theoretical aimed at. In this way at the end of the suction stroke the contents of the cylinder consisted of about 70 per cent of combustible mixture of normal strength (viz., about 95 British thermal units per cubic foot) and about 30 per cent of air, the normal mixture being concentrated in the neighborhood of the sparking plug. The mean mixture density of the whole of the cylinder content was therefore about 66 British thermal units per cubic foot. On the exhaust stroke supercharging similarly took place, since the underside of the piston operated as a two-cycle air pump, and the second supply of cool air entering through these ports assisted in lowering all the temperatures of the cycle. Careful analysis of the various losses was made by motoring round the petrol engine. The total frictional losses, including windage, were equivalent to a mean pressure of 11.5 pound per square inch on the main piston when running supercharging. The fluid pumping losses in the cylinder were 3.5 pound per square inch., and those in the crosshead chamber 4.5 pound. The object of these tests was to obtain high outputs with low temperatures and with maximum economy, which at that time was the problem confronting designers of motors for aeroplanes. Quite early in these trials it was found that the liability to detonate was the limiting factor. Very little was then known on this subject.
Reference at this stage may be made to the paper by Mr. H. T. Tizard read before the North-East Coast Institution of Engineers and Shipbuilders, on the nth inst., on "The Causes of Detonation in Internal-Combustion Engines.'' It is now generally known that the cause of this phenomenon, sometimes called "knocking," "pinking" or "detonation," in an internal combustion engine is not in any way mechanical in nature. The influences of the shape of the combustion head and of the nature of the fuel are alone sufficient to dispose of this idea. It can perhaps be said with safety that detonation occurs when the rate of rise of pressure in the cylinder exceeds a certain unknown limiting amount. Mr. Tizard gives a considerable amount of information in regard to the importance of the nature of the fuel on the tendency to detonate, it being well-known that liquid hydrocarbons of the paraffin series such as heptane, for instance, show the greatest tendency in this direction. Maximum flame temperature also has an important bearing on the subject perhaps only secondary to the nature and quality of the fuel employed. However, the figures given in this interesting technical research, indicate that in the high compression engine, the compression temperature approaches very nearly to the ignition temperature before the spark passes, and it is worth recalling in confirmation, that when high compression aero engines are switched off, it often occurs that they continue to run a considerable time by pre-igniting the charge.
Mr. Ricardo, with his engine, carried out a number of alterations to overcome detonation:—the fitting of intercoolers between the supercharging chamber under the main piston and the ports in the main cylinder walls, altering the timing of the cylinder head exhaust valve, and using the Ricardo masked valve for the inlet of the mixture. The result of these modifications, as debated, is interesting. The final solution by which the best results were achieved, shows that the stratification of the charge of mixture and air, instead of being carried out by means of air from the supercharging chamber, is very much more efficient when cooled exhaust gases are used for this purpose, detonation also being eliminated by this means up to the highest power achieved. It was therefore arranged that exhaust gases should be used for the supercharge. The top of the piston was made concave further to encourage the supercharging air or gas to form a layer above the main piston. Detonation was checked even at compressions of 5.1 to 1 and up to 6 to 1. at which latter figure, however, so much gas had to be added to the supercharge, that the maximum power output was decreased. During normal running at 2000 r. p. m., the maximum brake horse-power was 20.6, with 99 pound per square inch brake mean effective pressure. The fuel consumed per brake horse power hour was 0.535 pound and the indicator thermal efficiency was 30.9 per cent. By supercharging the brake horse-power was raised to 29.6 and the maximum brake mean effective pressure to 141 pounds per square inch, while the fuel consumption was reduced to 0.47 pound and the indicator thermal efficiency was increased to 33.7 per cent. Whilst these figures are in no way remarkable, as admitted by the author, in the light of present day knowledge of the subject, it must be remembered that the engine upon which this work was carried out, is by no means a new one, having been designed seven years ago, and that the combustion head with valves in a side pocket is not the form to give either the best power or the highest economy. There is no doubt, however, that the improvement made and the figures given indicate that this line of research, if further pursued, should result in extraordinarily high efficiencies. It is hoped that further researches, which are understood to be under way, will in due course bear the fruit which they promise. The subject is one of particular interest where aeroplane engines are concerned, since this method of stratification and supercharging tends very successfully to correct the reductions in power to which normal petrol engines are subject at very high altitudes.—Engineering, May 27, 1921.
Graphic Calculation of the Critical Speed of Shafts.—The author refers to the lengthy and tedious calculations required for determining the safe speed of shafts having cranks and other revolving weights attached, and describes a method adopted during the war in connection with shafts in German submarines where whirling speeds approaching 7000 per minute were used.
The deflection caused by each revolving mass is plotted and the amplitudes determined by means of a polar diagram and a funicular polygon. Small adjoining masses can by this means be treated as one mass. A curve is then drawn through the points thus determined when the whirling stress in the shaft at various speeds can be read off.
The weight of the balancing mass which varies inversely with the number of revolutions must be determined next. By plotting the number of revolutions as abscissa and the deflective strains found from the first diagram as ordinates a descending curve is obtained which gives the balance weight required for any given number of revolutions.
Special diagrams are shown for finding the amplitude of the internal vibrations of the shaft itself, whilst three tables give the formulae used for determining the moments of inertia of the crank, crank arms, crank pins, and other vibrating masses on the revolving shaft.
The result of the graphic calculations are very exact and in close agreement with the results from actual tests. (Fr. Sass, Zeitschrift des Vereines deutscher Ingenieure, Jan. 15, 1921.)—The Technical Review, June 14, 1921.
Single-Collar Thrust Bearings.—The principle of the single-collar bearing lies in the fact that a rocking pad, which is pressed against a lubricated surface in motion, takes a position as to form a wedge between itself and the surface. This wedge is filled by the lubricant and no contact between the pad and the surface takes place, even if high pressures are exerted. With multiple collar bearings of the general fashion there is always a certain amount of contact between the gliding surfaces, as these lie parallel one to the other. In annular bearings, the shaft is always a little smaller than the boring. Therefore there is only contact in one line, when the parts are at rest. When moving, the lubricant is drawn through this line of contact, and the contact disappears, so that there is only oil friction. This difference between thrust bearings and annular bearings made the thrust bearing much inferior to the annular bearing, and the drawback has been overcome by the single-collar bearing, where all direct contact between gliding parts has been eliminated. The figures for friction and permissible pressure of different kind of bearings are given as follows:
? | Annular bearings | Multiple collar thrust bearings | Single collar thrust bearings |
Coefficient of friction | 0.004-0.010 | 0.020-0.030 | 0.001-0.0015 |
Permissible pressure lb. per sq. in. | … | … | … |
Normal conditions | 200-300 | 40-60 | 200-500 |
Special conditions if well lubricated | 700 | 120 | 800 |
The experience made with marine single-collar bearings led to the adoption of pivoted and adjustable supports of the pads instead of rocking edges. Instead of adjusting each pad, devices have been introduced to distribute the pressure uniformly on all pads. The center of pressure on each pad has been found to be about 0.58 of the total length of the pad from the entering edge. In order to have a good slope of the lubricating wedge the support should be placed at about 0.66 of the total length of the pad. But it has been also shown that a good rounding of the entering edge of the pad draws the center of pressure nearer to this edge; therefore, if a bearing is used for an engine running ahead and astern, the point of support can be placed at the middle of the pad, if both edges are well rounded. A good many different constructions of single-collar bearings are shown, such as are used for general merchant marine use, for ships of high power, for turbines, reciprocating steam-engines and motors, also for men-of-war and a special construction which has been used for German U-boats. Details of cooling arrangements, stuffing boxes, and methods of lubrication, are given. (Dr. Ing. Commentz, Werft und Reederei, Jan. 22, 1921.)—The Technical Review, June 14, 1921.