SQUANTUM, THE VICTORY PLANT
By Captain Reginald R. Belknap, U. S. Navy
PART I
To the service at large, Squantum was first introduced by Captain Henry Williams (C. C.) writing in the April, 1920, number of the U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, "A Record in Destroyer Construction," dealing mainly with the building history of the destroyer Reid, 59 calendar days from keel laying to delivery, tried and complete. To appreciate that achievement, the whole account should be read, for it shows a remarkable example of planning and management, but although, as a single destroyer building record, it is believed never to have been equaled, it does not stand as the only mark to Squantum's credit, nor the only ground for naval interest, historical and future.
The Squantum site in October, 1917, was a 730-acre tract, comprising 120-odd acres of solid, dry upland, the rest marshland and tidal flats, the whole lying along the Neponset River and Dorchester Bay, about 3 miles southwest from President Roads, Boston Harbor. Bleak, remote, and isolated, it yet had a not inconsiderable history. The name came from Squanto or Squante, an unusually intelligent and capable friendly Indian well known to the early settlers. Old resident neighbors tell of the fine crops grown in past years where now are the shipbuilding ways and the baseball field. On the edge of one attractive spot, looking across the Neponset River to Lawley's Yacht Building Yard, are the ruins of an old powder mill. Long a favorite resort for outing parties, a real estate boom brought to "New Squantum" a score or more summer cottagers, as well as a few substantial houses of well-to-do people, but the place lost these with its growth in popularity with an element inclined to be rough. There was a Squantum sporting club, and the ruined foundation is pointed out of the house where John L. Sullivan lived with his trainer Muldoon, while preparing- for the fight with Kilrain. Aviation began here in Grahame-White's time and was our navy's first war activity on this ground.
Between breaking ground for the new destroyer-building plant, October 6, 19 17—cows still grazing on the site—and the cessation of work, February 14, 1920, a period of 28 months, 35 destroyers were built, of which 33 were delivered complete and the other two were transferred to Fore River within a month's work of completion—and this in spite of two winters of extreme severity. The first destroyer, U. S. S. Delphy, was launched on July 18, 1918, and on November 30 was delivered to the government. The incentive of a state of war thereafter was lacking, yet the work kept on in the same enterprising spirit as it had begun. Experience with the plant and its organization made progress more and more rapid, so that by the second anniversary, October, 1919, all 35 keels had been laid, 29 destroyers launched, and 22 delivered. The record feat in building the Reid was made at the peak of production, when 17 launchings, 36 builder's trials, 28 official trials, and 22 deliveries took place within six months. The average building time of the destroyers here was about 7 ½ months, which was less than done anywhere else and in marked contrast to the pre-war average of about 18 months.
The opportunity to plan a modern installation free from the embarrassments of already existing equipment or restricted area was evidently appreciated and utilized. The Squantum plant is compact without being crowded, so arranged as to avoid crossing of lines, carrying back, or other interference or lost motion in the movement of material. Traveling cranes and tracks communicate everywhere, and every operation of hull assembly, after launching as well as before, is done under cover. What could be more complete, more secure from delays of bad weather?
Since the boilers and machinery of the Squantum destroyers were built elsewhere, the engineering side of the new plant was at first comparatively limited. More engineering equipment was installed as the work progressed, and it became clear that finishing, fitting, adjustments, and replacements could be done to best advantage on the ground. The plant to-day is nearly as complete in machinery division equipment as it is for hull construction, the principal lack being tools and equipment for turbine work.
Many plant extensions and other war time constructions, aggregating in cost many millions, became of no further use to the government after the Armistice and had to be dismantled or sold. At Squantum, however, the prospect of future naval usefulness was favored by two important considerations. The plant was not adaptable for mercantile ship construction, which decided the Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation not to absorb it, and its location had happily been so chosen as to be suitable for a torpedo vessel base.
A board of naval officers, convened early in 1919 to consider the development of the shore establishment to meet future naval requirements, recommended Squantum for a building, repair, and reserve base of large capacity for destroyers, submarines, and possibly other craft of similar dimensions, and this mission was confirmed in general terms by the Secretary of the Navy on April 2, 1920, in G. O. No. 525, which designated this plant as the "U. S. Destroyer and Submarine Base, Squantum, Massachusetts," effective upon its taking over by the navy. After the closing of work, in February, 1920, the business of assessing costs, appraising, stock taking, cleaning up and general restoration, was well enough along by June 1, 1920, for the plant to pass into naval custody on that date. For the present it is administered as an annex to the Boston Navy Yard under its own commanding officer.
Against odds Squantum made a record long to stand, of which all connected with the establishment may well be proud. The plant's locally popular name and its connections—Victory Plant, Victory Road, Victory Bridge—denote the spirit which, let us hope, may always be the characteristic tradition. Like a thoroughbred, Squantum having run one race is fit for the track again, and so ends the first chapter. The next opens with a great opportunity.
PART II
Ships, like weapons, if they are to be serviceable, must be well kept, whether in use or idle, and this applies most forcibly to the finer mechanisms. Few will question the wisdom of giving priority to capital ships in all things—maintenance, upkeep, repairs, personnel, and training—for unless the main stem be sound and vigorous its branches cannot long endure. But though they come first they are not the only essentials, and could any demonstration be plainer than the late war, of the value of the branches towards preserving the stem? The very terms battleship, capital forces, and fighting fleet becloud the teaching of every great war, that it is the so-called secondary forces which carry on and bear the brunt of the long argument, and that, when at length there comes a test of heavy strength, the result will be much influenced by the past and present performances of the minor craft. The tendency of naval warfare seems towards increasing the proportion of the small vessels to the large, and unless their material needs be met, bitter experience is sure to follow in capital operations, through the breakdown or poor performance of flying, torpedo, escorting, patrolling, or sweeping vessels slackly cared for.
It takes some time after mobilization before the crews—inevitably inexperienced—can get the many additional small vessels now required well enough in hand for reliable upkeep. Vessels taken in from outside may or may not be ready for naval activity without repairs. That is a matter beyond naval control in peace. But it would seem to be only prudent and economical to make commensurate provision for the continuous reliable upkeep of all naval craft, small as well as large, whether active or reserve. Modern mobilization is swift, especially with naval forces, and to accept or wink at any sure cause of delay is to court initial heavy loss if not defeat.
Whatever may have been the sufficiency of our dockyard facilities for our whole fleet in the first decade since the war with Spain, the dreadnaught era threw much out of balance, which is long in being restored. For ships of to-day the formerly sufficient berths, water frontage, depths, and docks have relatively shrunk. Ours was not the only navy so to suffer, as we have Lord Jellicoe's statement that British facilities too were out of adjustment. Leviathans demand large space and facilities, to meet which small needs have been crowded out, to find satisfaction elsewhere. Whether our repair and docking facilities for destroyers and submarines have kept pace with their numbers, recently much increased, is a question to which all such vessels give the same answer.
That the facilities for small vessels should be equal to their needs will not be contested. If not sufficient, a number of destroyers, submarines, and others will soon become unfit for service unless extensively repaired and their cost will have been wasted or vastly increased. On the other hand, if the cost of one or two destroyers or submarines would provide facilities for keeping a large number ready for immediate and prolonged service, such outlay would indeed be well spent, yielding a large return in the serviceability of many vessels.
In the year 1907, in a round of visits preparatory to going to duty as a naval attaché, I saw at the Norfolk Navy Yard an early stage of what our destroyer force at that time hoped would become before too long a reasonably well equipped base for torpedo vessels. Seagoing fashion, they were doing their best to make something out of nothing and, starting with an old pipe-bench salvaged from the scrap heap, they had made a fair show of a beginning. Commander I.V. Gillis was the presiding genius, then a lieutenant in command of the old cruiser Atlanta, used as a torpedo-boat tender, moored on the St. Helena side of the Elizabeth River. A very cheerful, confident, self-reliant atmosphere prevailed there. The torpedo boat people were happy to have a place they could feel was their own, where they could stretch their legs, use a few shop tools, and carry out their ship's force work without interruptions, such as the shifting of berths so frequently necessary when their lot cast them in among the big ships in the navy yard proper. Yet the outside observer could not fail to see that, except for their hopes, the establishment was meager indeed.
From various sources it would appear that in more than one foreign navy more symmetrical provision had been made than by us for the care of small as well as large vessels, especially in regard to the kind of arrangements which our destroyer people were striving for with such persistence, namely: a place set apart where their needs had first consideration and undivided attention, where all facilities were for their use only, including separate berthing, ample and convenient storage, shops for ships' force work, barracks for crews not quartered on board, and recreation facilities for all.
No navy has kept or will keep its entire strength always in full commission, and the considerable number of torpedo vessels, as well as others, not in full commission need special provision for their upkeep. While their navy yard repairs are going on, it is comparatively unimportant whether the vessels' complements be full or much reduced, provided the repairs be done expeditiously so as not to prolong unduly the interruption of routine upkeep. Whether such repairs can be done satisfactorily along with work on other ships at navy yards, or to better advantage in a separate division of a navy yard or in a separate yard devoted to the specialties of destroyers and submarines, is not the subject of discussion here. The main consideration in this respect is that the repairs should be timely, adequate, and quickly accomplished.
During the considerable periods between navy yard overhauls, torpedo vessels which are too slimly manned to operate or which are able to operate singly in a limited way by being grouped and each in turn taking the partial crews of all in the groups, need better than improvised arrangements for their upkeep, if they are to be counted on for immediate readiness for active service. Water, steam, and light should be furnished them from an outside source, for the more the reduced crews can be relieved of auxiliary watch duty, freed from disarrangement of their routine, and allowed the use of such upkeep equipment as they do not themselves carry, the more certain of attainment will be the desired result.
The atmosphere of a large general repair yard is unfavorable for vessels in such a reserve condition. A special place apart is wanted, for which Squantum offers an exceptional opportunity. Without impairing its present facilities for building and repair or hindering the further development of the latter or the full utilization of both, if so decided, all the requirements for a reserve base for destroyers and submarines already exist in part or may be completed with small outlay—berths, shops, ships' storehouses, torpedo storage, quarters for submarine personnel, recreation spaces, good outside connections.
A great advantage of the Squantum property is that, in addition to its excellent equipment for building destroyers—easily adaptable for building fleet or smaller submarines and destroyer leaders as well, up to a length of 450 feet—other naval activities also may be placed here without interfering with full utilization of the first mentioned or with one another. Thus, of aviation Squantum has seen more than a little, and was used for that purpose by the navy in our first few months in the war. The adjacent waters are sheltered but wide, and about 1000 feet of water front is still adaptable, so that local naval aviation could well have headquarters here. Then, Squantum has been designated as the depositary for all Atlantic Coast mine-sweeping gear, and a glance at the chart shows how favorable this situation is for a base for all minesweeping craft operating from Boston. The large acreage also offers ample space in a proper location for fuel storage. As a whole, there is so much area disposable that, while one or more of these three uses may come in the future, all of them together would not interfere with having the base affairs of destroyers and submarines in large number as the principal business at Squantum, for which it is best suited.
Estimates have been submitted embodying the main features common to the plans of all boards that have passed upon Squantum, which would provide first, among other things:
(a) Berthing 60-odd torpedo vessels.
(b) Dredging to a depth sufficient for the largest torpedo vessels to lie clear at lowest tide.
(c) Quarters for the complements of submarines.
The proposed beginning would utilize the existing facilities of the plant; make no expenditure on temporary structures except for necessary use pending their permanent replacement; proceed in such order as to interfere least with early beginning and future progress; avoid the probability of future changes by adhering to the broad outlines of a comprehensive plan; and as far as consistent with the foregoing, take advantage of natural features of the ground and site. Assuming the present estimates to be accepted, future improvements would simply add storehouses and enlarge the berthing and quarters capacity, since the proposed beginning, at outlay little more than the cost of one destroyer, would make the base equipment practically complete, and still of capacity to rare for more vessels than could be berthed at one time.
Squantum is distant from President Roads 2 ½ miles by a nearly straight channel, and it lies so detached from its surroundings that undesirable haunts seem hardly likely to cluster around. The property as it now stands divides itself naturally into five main parts:
The industrial area, A, is sufficient for a large expansion, such as would permit the work of building, repairing, and keeping vessels in reserve to go on simultaneously without mutual interference. The natural direction of any further expansion beyond the present Dorchester Bay water front would seem to be along Neponset River, over the area marked B, lying south of Victory Road. Still more land and more water front on Dorchester Bay could be made, if needed, however, by dredging and filling in to the eastward of the building slips. Thus the shop and storage growth and increase of berthing space would naturally first cover area A (possibly with its extension eastward), then area B.
On the foregoing it follows that area C lies clear of the natural direction of the industrial growth, yet near enough to the water front and to outside connections to be a suitable location for quarters for the personnel of submarines, and of some destroyers also when necessary.
For recreation, the area D lies outside the ground natural for industrial plant extension, yet central for men's quarters in area C, for vessels' crews on the water front, and for connections to outside. Part of this area is already prepared for baseball. It has a swimming beach, there are a few trees, the outlook is pleasing, and the spot is generally attractive, long used for outings in the past. It invites use and improvement for such a purpose.
The southernmost section, E, sufficiently out of the way for privacy yet near enough for easy access and being a natural building site, would be advantageous for quarters for the commanding officer and other principal officers of the base. It has near access to the main highway, Quincy Boulevard, and over a direct roadway to the plant, along the existing railway line, it would be only 1300 yards from the office building.
Thus ample space and orderly, logical arrangement seem natural here, offering unusual opportunity for material development of high efficiency and along with it due provision for the human element, now gaining in recognition of its importance for military success.
A recent visitor at Squantum, an experienced British shipbuilder, remarked, "This is a wonderful plant, the best arranged and most complete anywhere, but I find it equally remarkable that they propose to close it." Other visitors, from shipyards on both coasts, have spoken in similar vein. Likewise naval officers are most favorably impressed. They find the plant to be of far greater magnitude and completeness than expected—"exceeding my wildest dreams," as one expressed it—and the property as a whole very desirable for naval purposes.
Thanks to completeness for its war activity, Squantum's further naval usefulness does not lie only in the distant future. Besides the building equipment, lying ready but idle, berthing and ship's force repair facilities are available for 13 to 20 destroyers and submarines.
On Tuesday, July 27, 1920, arrived the U. S. S. Meredith, Lieutenant F. K. O'Brien, U. S. N., commanding, the first destroyer at Squantum since it became a naval base. Next day came the Kimberly and after three weeks the Maddox. All were awaiting their turn for repairs at Boston; meantime their coming to Squantum not only relieved the water front congestion at Boston but gave the destroyers the space and freedom from interruption desired. They were not long in making themselves at home, getting their chains, floor plates, and other gear out on the dock for cleaning and airing, and arranging other ship's force work in company without fear of disturbance. Swimming and sailing were daily indulged in, the baseball field was soon in use, and although extra trolley cars were added to the schedule for the convenience of liberty men, home attractions at Squantum even at this stage proved stronger for many. From the first they liked it, thankful to be in a place where their needs had first consideration and hopeful of development of the base's possibilities—recalling that scene in Norfolk in 1907, already described, but with the important difference that the physical possibilities and the facilities already existing are here much greater.
This beginning, however welcome and timely, serves to show only more plainly that we should go on and grow. The unproductive but unavoidable expenditure for the upkeep of an almost idle plant worth $13,000,000 would become, with the small increase incident to a considerable activity, wholly productive. There is here the possibility of an invaluable military asset, in peace and war, and in the era of retrenchment now upon the country, the navy ought to shine in developing this property economically, as well as technically, organically, and administratively.