OUR DIVIDED PERSONNEL
By Rear Admiral A.C. Dillingham, U. S. Navy
It is a mistake made by officers, who believe, that, with their retirement, their life's work is finished, because with many such officers, their experience, mature years and rank, their opinions on professional matters, are, more or less, respected, and if their influence is properly used, it might be of great value to the service.
My attention has been called to an article appearing in the New York Times of August 2, 1920 entitled "Our Divided Navy—Questions of American Policy Brought to the Front by the Proposed Panama Maneuvers" and signed "Americus."
I believe that I recognize the writer of this article, as an officer of mature years, long experience, retired statutory on account of age, a student of naval history and strategy, who might possibly be called a pupil of Mahan's, one whose influence might be of great use to the navy, if properly applied.
The derisive style of the author and his indulgence in personalities, displays an effort to influence the public to accept his views of the condition of the navy to-day, as failing to meet the basic principle of organization, and a failure in administration to appreciate the mission of the navy.
I declare that the author violates the basic principle of administration, which is co-operation, that his method is obstructive and dangerous, and that he ignores and violates the best traditions of the navy. The result of the late investigation concerning matters in the navy, has apparently brought a division of sentiment amongst the officers, which is entirely wrong and damaging, and which, as a matter of fact, has no reason to exist, because, though the testimony of officers presented at the investigation may have differed as to opinion, the fact and principle remained the same with all who testified. Without going into this investigation, I believe it can be said that every officer testifying as to his command, intended to declare the efficiency of that command, "as far as the circumstances would permit," and I believe that every officer knows, and believes, that our unpreparedness for war was, and is, absolutely up to the creative body, Congress. We must not forget that in our country there is no co-ordination of the makers or framers of policy, and the force that is to back that policy, and it is a fact that most of our troubles come from serving in a military profession in a non-military country and many from irresponsible legislation. But we cannot help this; our business in the premises (and this is the acme of efficiency) is to get results with what we have.
There is nothing new in what "Americus " says in his article; it is well known by all officers and, in the division of operations, that the basic principle of all organizations is simplicity and that it must be based upon logical principles and that, if the organization of the fleet is not ideal, or consistent with the requirements of battle, we will not get the best results from operations, though the administration be ideal. I believe it can be truthfully said that the administration of the fleet was never more nearly ideal, from a military viewpoint, than it is to-day, not that it meets entirely the requirements of ideal military administration, but it is more nearly that, than it ever was before.
Our navy is essentially a two-ocean navy, so that our extreme mission requires an organization capable of carrying on successfully war in the Atlantic, and in the Pacific, at the same time.
Under such circumstances the initial organization, which would represent our extreme mission, would divide the fleet into two parts, known as the Atlantic and Pacific fleets. The organization of these fleets is identical and permanent, so that it would make no difference in adding or subtracting units from one or the other.
We deviate from or leave the initial organization to meet the demands of the political aspects of the world, so that we can say that the composition of the fleet will depend upon the political aspect of the world, and this is in the hands of the Chief of Operations.
We are obliged, with our institutions, and with what the creative body, Congress, gives to us, to deal with expediences, and that is exactly what the Chief of Operations is doing to-day. He is endeavoring to meet these expediences, and to, as far as possible meet the demands for a single fleet. I believe that officers will agree with me, and that Operations is of the opinion, that the same reason for a single command ashore exists for a single command afloat. If our extreme mission is to be so organized as to successfully carry on war in the Atlantic and Pacific at the same time "Americus" might possibly find in "proposed Panama Maneuvers" an effort on the part of Operations to test such an organization, or it might be that our lack of operating bases in the Pacific prevents mobilization of the entire force on that coast, or that economic conditions may require a division,, nor must we forget that the mobility of our force is greatly increased with the Panama Canal in operation.
The present Chief of Operations is an officer of experience with a very level professional head, but, in his efforts he has not the co-operation of certain officers of the service, as is exhibited by "Americus"; he is obstructed and may be seriously obstructed by a public sentiment that "Americus" is endeavoring to create. I claim that this is not becoming a good officer and that it is violating the best traditions of the navy, which has always been loyalty to each other, with an esprit de corps which was admirable. The Chief of Operations is approachable; he is always accessible; he is ready to consider seriously professional advice or convictions, and the only proper way for an officer in the navy to better the service is to co-operate with the Chief of Operations, who is the military head of the navy. It was only a few days ago that I took the liberty of writing to the Chief of Operations a personal letter upon what I thought to be an important professional matter. I received, by return mail, a very full and considerate reply with assurance of his interest and his thanks for my suggestions. The same course is open to every officer in the navy and will receive the same attention.
I believe that the Chief of Operations is supported by a large majority of the officers in his efforts to put the navy on a solid foundation after its apparent slump since the World's War, but there are certain officers, " Americus " for instance, who do not co-operate with him, certain officers who by these anonymous letters and growling, display a destructive intention, that is lamentable.
We must have co-operation, for without it no administration will ever succeed, and though this Naval Institute gives to us an opportunity of presenting our professional views, I believe that it would be to the advantage of the service, if we could have once a year a convention of naval officers, where, as officers, and as man to man, open and above board, we could present our views and discuss them for the best interest of the service. This in no way could interfere or intrude on the prerogative of the War College, or any other institution that we might have.
Let us get back to our single aim—the good of the service; let us forget personalities, with our intense interest for the good of the service; let us demand that officers cease their efforts, especially in print, to pull down the military head of the navy by such articles as "Americus" sees fit to publish, and so follow the splendid traditions of our navy.