WHAT IS THE MATTER WITH OPERATING ENGINEERING?
THE QUESTION
By Lieut. Commander H.F.D. Davis, U. S. Navy
1. What is the matter with operating engineering?
2. This question is raised constantly by officers who have watched the development of engineering in the navy. It is held in the minds of all by comparison of the interest shown in operating engineering with the interest in gunnery, such comparison never being to the credit of engineering. It is brought forcibly to the front at the present time by the fact that the personnel situation is such that the navy must begin at the bottom and build up a structure almost entirely new.
From: Commanding officer
To: Commander battleship division…
Subject: Operation engineering, lack of interest in.
1. It is believed it may safely be said that there has never been more competent commissioned engineering talent in the battleship force than is the case to-day. Considering the service of the battleship force, past and present, material engineering conditions are excellent. On the other hand, operating conditions are only fair, and the reason for it is due, it is believed, to the lack of organization for co-ordination in engineering similar to that which obtains on the squadron staffs, and particularly on the force staff, in connection with gunnery. The gunnery officers of the battleship force have the closest sort of liaison organization to the immense benefit of the gunnery work. Due to this intimate association of the gunnery officers, led and guided by the force gunnery officer, not only has each ship reached a position as far as records and data are concerned that at the end of each week the individual ship knows how she stands as far as efficiency is concerned, but the division and force commanders also know, and the other ships of the force, and if any unusual or unforeseen difficulties have been encountered in the other vessels of the force; and efficient standardization of methods and records is thereby determined. On the other hand, the efficiency of naval engineering has not improved in anything like the same degree, if at all, and there is vast room for improvement in operating engineering. This letter does not refer to designing engineering at all. Designing engineering will take care of itself if the policy recommended in this letter is carried out.
2. Gunnery officers and signal officers have frequent gatherings for the exchange of ideas and for mutual indoctrination. The supply officers sometimes have such meetings, and even the navigators meet occasionally, but so far this cruise there has been nothing of the kind for the engineers. It is one of the hopeful signs for progress, that whereas not so many years ago the engineers might have desired not to have a feeling of neglect, and somewhat of derogation, because of the apparent lack of interest on the part of the flag officers in the personnel of the heads of the engineering department of the ships of the battleship force.
3. But further than this, the gunnery officers are sought diligently, a list of officers possibly good material for the development of the gunnery officers is kept, and diligently scanned and revised. When once found they are watched closely, and the most excellent records of their performances, their characteristics and capabilities are kept and studied. This solicitude is due in great measure to the fact that our sole source of supply for gunnery officers lies in the naval service, whereas it is commonly accepted that an abundant supply of steam engineers can be obtained from civil life. It is true that engine drivers, and engineers of the grade of our warrant engineers, can be obtained in the case of necessity, practically without limit, but the experience of this war has shown that the high-grade engineer, such as those we have among the commissioned engineers of the naval service, is difficult to obtain from civil life, and when found, it takes not less than six months for him to orient himself sufficiently to begin to show ability in a practical form. It is believed to be a fact that nowhere is there a list kept of the available commissioned steam engineers of the service, with records of their performances, qualities, and characteristics, similar to that which obtains in the case of the gunnery engineers; nor will there be until the fleet begins to approximate the interest in the personnel of the engineer officers that now obtains in the case of the personnel of the gunnery officers. It is not too much to say that they are of equal importance.
4. It is desired to emphasize the fact that the staff engineer officer is primarily a personnel officer. Heretofore he has appeared to have been a material officer only. It is not desired to minimize the importance of the material duties of such an officer but it is desired that it be clearly understood that this officer is above all else a leader of men.
5. The lack of interest is not confined to the battleship force. The Bureau of Steam Engineering, the Bureau of Navigation, the Office of Operations, and the Office of Engineering Competitions are equally apparently lacking in interest in this regard, and if the principle of the policy above suggested meets with the approval of the division and force commanders, and of the commander-in-chief, it is suggested that this letter be forwarded to the Navy Department with appropriate comment.
6. It is recommended that an officer of appropriate rank be assigned to all force staffs, and that it shall be his duty to coordinate and direct the efforts of the engineer officers of the force with the mission to determine the highest possible standard of engineering efficiency in the force; particularly operating efficiency.
(Signed)…
The Condition of Engineering Personnel
3. The conditions of enlisted personnel on January 1, 1920, are shown in the following table:
Branch | In service, Jan. 1, 1920 | Required for 143,000 | Present shortage |
Seaman branch | 52,996 | 67,664 | 14,668 |
Artificer branch | 7,013 | 11,765 | 4,752 |
Engine room force | 23,789 | 41,311 | 17,522 |
Engineer force—all ratings | 27,436 | 49,904 | 22,468 |
Special branch | 7,054 | 10,600 | 3,546 |
Commissary | 3,689 | 6,982 | 3,293 |
Messmen | 7,139 | 4,835 | 2,304 excess |
? | 101,680 | 143,157 | 41,477 |
From this table it is seen that the engineering personnel, including those artificer ratings, usually under the engineer officer of a ship, should be (49,904/143,157) = 35 per cent of the total; 33,282 of the 49,904 should be petty officer ratings. The actual shortage on January 1, 1920, in all the engineer ratings was 22,468. There were only 12,903 engineer petty officers instead of the 33,282 required and many of these 12,903 will probably soon leave the service unless conditions are radically changed for the better. These petty officers are the experienced men, the backbone of engineering personnel of the service, the men upon whom the service relies to train, by personal example and daily intimate association, the new and untrained recruits.
The Need for an Immediate Answer
4. The answer to the question raised in this paper should be found and a proper remedy discovered for the trouble affecting operating engineering in order that the problem of building up the operating personnel may proceed more rapidly from a sure foundation and with a vital stimulus forcing officers and men on to better things. The guns of our ships are of no use unless they are put in the proper place and kept there by the operating engineers. The best brains in and out of the service are therefore to be enlisted to work on this problem in an effort to get the right answer.
5. It will also be seen from the above table that for a total strength of 143,000, 67,864 men are called for in the seaman branch; and the enlisted engineering personnel should be 73 per cent of this number viz.: 49, 904 as stated.
6. Accordingly, in order that the men of the engineer force may be given the same amount of supervision during education and training as is given to men of the seaman branch in their gunnery training, there should be 73 per cent as many officers of equal ability, below heads of departments, assigned to engineering duty as are assigned to gunnery duty. Further, the Secretary of the Navy, the chief of naval operations, the bureaus of the department, the commanders-in-chief, the commanders of squadrons, the captain of each ship and the staff officers of each ship should properly show the same interest in the officers and men of the operating engineer force that they manifest in the officers and men that fight the guns.
7. It is not believed that anyone will dispute the fact that such interest is not now shown. What captain of a ship shows the same interest in the selection of his engineer officers that he shows iH the selection of his gunnery officers? What commander-in-chief shows the same interest in the work of his fleet engineer officer as in the work of his fleet ordnance officer? How does the care with which an engineer officer is selected for a ship in the Bureau of Navigation compare with the consideration given the selection of the ordnance officer of a ship?
8. In this connection a study of proposed legislation now being considered by Congress reveals the important fact that extra compensation is to be provided for men to stimulate interest in gunnery, in clerical work, and in commissary work. No mention is made of similar rewards to stimulate interest in engineering!
9. An attempt will be made to show that there are definite reasons for this state of affairs; and the kind of remedy needed will be pointed out.
The Interest in Gunnery
10. The care of guns, turrets and ordnance material in general is a relatively simple operation directly comparable to "cleaning stations" in the engineer department and elsewhere in the ship. The preparation for action of guns is a relatively simple and short operation. The active life of a gun, assuming it to be 1000 rounds, is less than as many seconds. During this short time it gets or fails to get all the results that are expected of it.
11. Standardization in ordnance has progressed to a relatively great extent and the quality and characteristics of guns of similar size and design are remarkably uniform.
12. The productive life of a naval gun is divided into periods during which five to ten shots are fired. By the target practice methods developed to date, the results of each period can be definitely computed in hits per gun per minute. This measure of efficiency is direct and easily arrived at. It becomes a part of the records of the men in the gun's crew, of the battery or turret officers concerned, of the gunnery officer, of the Executive and of the Captain. Each of them is, therefore, intensely interested in making as high as possible the "hits per gun per minute" of each of the guns which affects his record.
13. In the active training of guns crews and the units that make up the gunnery organization of a ship the conditions of target practice and actual service of the gun can be and are very closely simulated. Records of the hits per gun per minute can be and are made a part of the daily drills and thus give continuously a direct means of comparison between guns crews, divisions, ships, and larger units of the fleet.
14. A better plan for stimulating interest of all concerned can hardly be conceived. The "hits per gun per minute" make the lever by which gunnery has been raised to its present level of excellence, and the lever which in the hands of interested officers will serve to force progress hereafter.
The Lack of Interest in Engineering
15. The productive life of a machine is quite unlike that of a gun. The nearer to 100 per cent of its actual life that can be made productive the better the machine. The cleaning of a machine is a minor, although necessary, part of its life. The repairs to the machine are more or less frequent depending on the conditions of operation. During operation it requires constant attention such as lubrication, adjustment of speed and load, increase of, or decrease of, input, of temperature, etc.
16. Although the engineering material of our ships is uniformly good, standardization in engineering has proceeded to a less degree and the excellence of similar machines on different ships varies in very marked degree.
17. There has not been developed, nor is there in immediate prospect a definite measure of the productiveness of a machine in terms similar to hits per gun per minute. We have not yet developed a convenient, easily understood, easily arrived at measure of efficient performance for each machine. There is no measure of results of productiveness which becomes an immediate part of the record of the men responsible for the operation of the machine, the supervisory officers concerned, the engineer officer, the executive and the captain. The methods of operation usually shift, partially or completely, the immediate responsibility for proper operation of a given machine each time a watch changes, i.e., every four hours. In consequence, there is no stimulating vital interest in the men or the supervisory officers, extending through the engineer officer and the executive to the captain. In this fundamental point lies the trouble with operating engineering. The engineering competition fails, and has failed, because it does nothing to give a vital interest extending from the man with the shovel or the oil can through the supervisory officers and the captain to the commander-in-chief and to the Navy Department itself. There is now no lever of like value to "hits per gun per minute" which can be put in the hands of interested officers to raise the standards in operating engineering and upon which to base rewards; assuming that proper rewards are forthcoming.
Conclusion
18. In propounding the question "What is the matter with operating engineering" and in explaining the lack of vital interest in engineering, a parallel has been drawn with gunnery and gunnery methods.
19. It is not intended to indicate thereby that the vital interest giving element that it sought for engineering can be furnished by the methods developed for gunnery. In view of the great differences indicated above, it is believed that it may be found in a very different way. The finding of this method of stimulating interest in engineering appears to be largely a psychological problem which must have a practical solution found by the navy for itself. The trained psychologist, however, should be able to give valuable assistance.
20. It is confidently believed that a solution of this problem can be found and that, when found, operating engineering will rapidly advance, as it should, and remain thereafter the coequal partner in a growing success of our navy. Such solution cannot come without the careful thought, efforts, and cooperation of all officers who are interested in seeing our navy the leader of naval progress without a peer in all branches of naval endeavor.